18-M Thompson- Philosophical Approaches to Categories

8/3/2019 18-M Thompson- Philosophical Approaches to Categories

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PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORIES 337

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~ pr.2 ce ~ H is a rg umen ts fo r th is p rin cip le h av e b e en a matte r o f d isp ute.. among Aris to tel ian commenta tors as the arguments concernthe very founda-tio ns of h is ph iloso phy . It is a t le ast cle ar, tho ug h, fro m Me ta ph ys ic s I V thathe rega rded the d is ti nc ti on be twCZ! ll ,! !> s .t ance.a lJ (a~l9.el lt a s s~1!1ethi~. .g~ .tb e in vo ke d in d ef en se 0 1w lia tI ie ca lle d " th e mos t c er ta in p rin cip le ," m e p rin -apreoTContradlCiio:n:-- . --' . ~ -"- At l007b 16-18 Aristotle concludes that "there m ust be som ethingwhich signifies substance," and that "if this is so it has been show n that con-tr ad ic to rie s c an no t b e p re dic ate d a t th e s ame tim e. "2 T his c on clu sio n c omes inth e c ou rse of a "de mo nstratio n b y ref utatio n" o f th e prin cip le of co ntrad ic -tion . T he demo ns tration c on sists in sho win g th at sin ce a ny s ign ifican t ut-. te ra nc e p re su pp os es t he p ri nc ip le , a ny on e who p ro fe ss es t o d en yl he p ri nc ip ler er ute s h im se lf a s s oo n a s h e s ay s a ny th in g s ig nif ic an t. T he p rin cip le is s hownt o b e p re su pp os ed i f i t i s s hown ( a) th ~t "s igQ .U lc .a .t io n re qu ir es .~ som .e th in gwh ic b s ig ni fi es s ub sta nc e a nd (b) t ha t n ot hi ng !I JPuJgn i{ i~ 9. .. il


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338 MANLEY THOMPSON PH IL OSO PH IC AL A PP RO AC HES TO C AT EG OR IE S. 33 9th ey a re in a ny p os sib le w or ld , in a ny c ou nte rf ac tu al s itu atio n, in w hic h th eym ight exist." To use an exam ple from Putnam , an objective reference tow ater is to an ob ject dete rm ine d a s H 20 rathe r tha n as so meth in g c olorle ss"odor le s s, t as te le s s, and thi rs t-quench ing . Wi thout t hi s


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34 0 MANLEY THOMPSON~ ri st ot el il l: ll _~ e go ri es a re ~bp! .Qn .t clQgi ca l. They P .I .9 -v id~the .. b. ig h es t, .g~ne ta ..~ n8 -a ng ~ " th ~o n!Y..$ en er a" p. !.2 ~ ~ nc e th ey a re t,h e~ olJ lyg en g~ \.w ~i.~ lla re n ot s pe cie s. i1'J . . .". ...

IIA c ommon o bje ction to the A risto telian ap pro ac h to c ateg orie s ru ns as

fol lows. Wh i le acciden ts cannot ex is t apar t f rom..~ . ! .l b. st }nces .Jhe l! l. tl .. e. r, ,! !Jleast in thecase of matepal ! iu6~!l. l1ces"C. i.J1D9Wist, .. ithout .. .the.CoI;met. .~ te na l SUbs ta nc e a lways e xi st s a t a p la ce a nd t ime . s it ua teQ. in .. .x !l. !! .2 !! !. ~y .s _ . .q~li ta tively a .[1d_q~~~! i.~ t~y~~!1 .~Ldif~ren tlYA~i!o y~!ou~.?~su~- 's ta nc es e xi~ ~i l1 g~ t t. h~ t im~ How a re we t o d is ti ng ui sh i ts e ss en ce f rom i ts a c:.C lo en t! ;, ie ., w h at i s t ru e o f i t i n a ny pOSS 'i nt es ilu i: lt io n- hrwhkh i t m ig ht e x- is tfro m w hat hap pen s, to be tru e o f it b ec aus e o f its acc ide nts in ev ery situatio nin w hic h w e h av e o bs er ve d it? I be re s ee IJ l1 iJ o b ~ n o..b aID.s -U :> Lh e ,! aim t h atth is d ist inction can ..be. .dr .a.wn-ohjectiY.e l. .;. ---.-- T he rep ly s ug ge sted in Meta ph ys ic s I V, as I have already indicated, is '\{t ha t u nl es s 'w e !. e3 !1 iz ~. .t he . d is ti nc ti on a !2 !? ~g i~ we d es tr oy t he p ps si bi li ty 4of s i nific~ n. JLwe say _th at a su l?st~ !lce is F o,!lJ Y~ ecau se w eha ye alw ayo se rv~ . Jt t o b .e .F , we canno t rul eou t. .t he poss ib il itY9r ..~i !!1 at jo .l !si n wh ich i tis ' not-F .. If w e h av e to say th is no m atte r w ha t pre dic ate 'F ' m ay rep res ent,-we c an no t e ve n e xc lu de th e p os sib ility o f s itu atio ns in w hic h th e th in g is F a ndnot-F at ~he same time and in the same respect. For we cannot e~~an yth ing ~ ~U e_a ~~m_ th.at J h~ thin g~ .ha s .\il! -e s~ !1S ~,_ th@ t th ~re JL .s ometh in g it is n ec es sa rily n o matte r w ha t w e h av e a lw ay s o bs er ve d it to b e. I tw llr ilOCC lo t o s aY t ha i h ow ev er tf iln gs ~may 'b ; in th ;~ se Tv e;w e c ~n ot p os ~sibly observe a thing to be F and not-F at the sam e time and in the sam er es pe ct. U nle ss w e r ule o ut th e p os sib ility o f th in gs in th em se lv es b ein g in th isc on trad ictory s ffiiiilion w e ca n m ake no cla im t.o o bj~ ctiv e re feren ce . W e-w ould h-a ve to ad mit th at on e w ho den ies the prin cip le of co ntrad Ictio n ju stm ig ht b e r ef er rin g to th in gs in th em se lv es a lth ou gh w e c an a tta ch n o mea nin gt o h is r ef er en ce .' .,.Aristotle's p~is r~~ in m odified form with a proposalurged 'recently b~ and\.P~!n~ml W eare to accept a statement pur-p or te dly s pe ci fy in g a th in g's e ss en ce , e .g ., t ha t w at er i s H20, a s e pi st em i ca ll ycOI}~i!l.gs:J!t~e.~


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34 2 MAN LE Y T HOMP SO N P HIL OS OPH IC AL A PP RO AC HES T O C AT EG OR IE S 34 3s ig nif ie s a n e ntity f allin g u nd eL a c ate g.l> ry , so th at th e n umbe r o f c ate go rie sco rresp ond sto tl1 e diff~ enn orm s o! u.nc2Il1pin~_a~R!s.iQIlS~(Caiegories~) .Wi tl rKant , on the o the r hand , t he d if fe ren l! .~ .Q l t.2l c? !! !EW~a!~on (syn thesi s)d is cl os ed j)Y~ Ji.Mb: ~s .. .2 f c omb in ed ( sY .! J! .~ ~d ) t x~~~or re sp on dst~ th e n umbe r o Lc ate g2 tie s (A 7 0- 80 = B 95-106). !b.~.t~R!PPL~hsm.~thus be cont!asted.roug .1!.!y ~J 2ne whic~ b~gin~ ~!th . ..a_cl.assi f! :at ion of termsi ! i a f S l g n i r y th jng s (c ate gQ r~~ ti~ r.m s) !n d prp ce ed s to a cla ~i[ i~ !rd _n'~ 'forms o f PJgp .Q~ it io1 l.LPf ()~h,c~ by_c .Q . !D . .P ipi nglbese t~m s (as A ristotlep ro ce ea 8f rom C ate go rie s to De Interpretatione),!,!'ld o1)e~hiqh~moyes. in th~~e.posi~cz.J!Y:.~Sti>.1la s K ~t J'.r o.~ eed s.from _a tab le o f . wrm s o f j ud gm en ts toca tegor ie s a s conc< ;.pt s2 f j \n ob J~ ,t .. )n_~ne! .~p . .-T O ti& e "the difference betw een the approaches as that of opposing at-titudes tow ard w or9-m ~a~il1g and selJ!en..~~g places an em phasis onlanguage that is foreign to both A ristotle and K ant. F .Q f Aris!o_tle, w hatm akes an expression one and in no way com bined is northat it consists ofw ha t c ou nts g ramm atic ally as a s in gle w ord b ut th at it sig nit'j~ s S ' P s . . . t . h ! . n g . : ,'Two -f oo te d la nd a nim al', th ou gh c ompo se d o f s ev er al w or ds , s ig nif ie s ~thiD&t~ ~ at\1ra lls}!!9 .; a nd 'in th e L yce um ' s ign ifies a sing le ac cide nt, aplace that happens at some time to belong to a particular substance.8'M u sic al m an ', th ou gh , is n ot o ne e xp re ss io n, f or it d oe s n ot s ig nif y o ne th in gb~_cQ 'mp .Qs it e o f subs tance aq si ~c!dC(nt .Bu !. !! .b~ s,omes one,comb ined ex -~s .s iQ~when ~nca t~~oremaEc wo_ rd sar .. (Ladd~d~ .p. .P . J.S>P.Ji !! ie ly~s in 'S om em an is m usica l', w hich is a sin gle a ffirm atio n sig nify ing on e th ing ab out o nething. 'M an is a tw o-footed land anim al', one the other hand, as a (real)definition has the unity of an uncom bined expression, for it signifies onething.9 A la P utnam and K ripke, it expresses a genuine identity and is like'W ater is H20' in contrast to the single affirmation 'W ater is thirst-

. quenching'. .Th e fun dj ~~ .JHl .U ,Y .J :o r K ant i s i n t he t ho u~h. !. ~p .r es ~ 2 r .. at h~ !. .~ !f ni n t he16i l)&.~ Jg ll if i~d . I t i s a un it y YW~ghJ~ r2~gh. . c l?mb ina ti ol ! o r. syq tbe~l~o f r ~2 !e Se nta tio ns ... an d. iiO r to e u nity o f a n o bj~ ct in jts el( in deRe ~d ~n t" ,Q f.repiesent~tiol). The form s of com bination found in ..Ar.llio~ DeInterpretatione provide cOQ


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34 4 MANLEY THOMPSON P HILO SO PHIC AL APP RO AC HES TO C ATEGO RIES 345i t ial ly giv~~Y,' !2e! for~s of_re_


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34 6 MANLEY THOMPSON PHILOSOPH ICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORIES 34 7T hat ~ theory of categories should be accom panied by a claim to com -p le te ne ss a nd th at it s ho uld p ro vid e a p rin cip le o f in div id ua tio n a re r eq uir e-

m en ts o f K an t's e pis temo lo gic al a pp ro ac h th at h av e h ad c on sid er ab le a cc ep -ta nc e in s ub se qu en t th eo rie s o f c ate go rie s. T he a cc ep ta nc e, h ow ev er , h as b ee nm ainly of the requirem ents them selves rather than of K ant's proposals forme et in g t hem .IV

With h is di~vo~~,Il~le!!ge Qu~also develops a radically~ nK an tia n w ay 0 s atls ~ in g th e . se co qg r eq uir em en t impo se d ~y".aKa!ltia.!LoJ;\e p'l sT emQ Io gi fl !. !. :t [" e. ,o ry -oL s! !l ~g~, t h3 ! Q f P .I "9 vi di .Qg_ p ri nc ip ~ o f j n~d iv id ua ti on . K an t's R ri nc iQ le , a s w e n ot ed , i nd iv td ua~ f2y.Rroc la ,i !. ri ip gd if ;. :~Ference in spati~11JltoraI19~tion..M.J.uffi


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34 8 MANLEY THOMPSON PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORIES 349a do pt Quin e's a ttitu de a nd p ro sc rib e p hilo so ph ic al u se o f i nte ntio na l id ioms .S tr awson , howeve r, a dopt s a d if fe rent a tt it ud e and a rgue s t ha t quant if ic at io npres up po ses " the id en tific ato ry fu nc tio n c hara cteristic ally p erfo rm ed b ydefin ite s ingular terms refer ring to part iculars. "'6 , .T h~ ntific at~ IY .. [\!Q ctio n, as S tra ws on v iew s it, c an no t b e a naly ze dw it hout u se o f i nt en ti on al i di oms . T .b eJu,! .1 ct io ni s p er fo rmed when a ~eake rsucceeds in identifying for ot~ 2l.!~l'i!i!E..(fed ref~,~ence.Success~ s-p Oss ib l~ ly if s pea k~ r a nd a ~~ !.i~ ~ .!ha r~ !!. H ~~ ary sp ~tio temp ora lf rame~ort ..wl thin. .which they. b ~ U l have a p!~. Spatiotem poral objects aretoe n "th e b as ic p artic ul;rs " p ;'es upp os ed in a ll s ig nifica tio n. "T his po in t,"Straw s on comments, "is the sam e as that m ade by K ant in saying that spacea nd tim e a re o ur. o nly fo rin s. o f lJ ;1 t! !!Iio n." '7 L ik e-K an t a n< fu nlik e Quin e,~ n t hu ;b as .. .! Se JQa tj ~~d .c a~~gQW:s and t he re fo re h as no p la ce i n h isca teg ore al sc heme fo r a v ersio n o f L eib niz 's id en tity o f in dis ce rn ib le s a s ap ri nc ip le app li cabl e t o p rima ry exi st en ts .Yet unlike K ant, Straw son does flot hqJ9 tgat ~t~lishing ~pace and,t ime a sa p ri on f orms o fi '! .t !E tf ~r sJ t! fr lc kn t. ., tQ .~ sf v. t he r e9 J! .i L& .ooen,UQil ta th e~ y .. !. te go ~~ s p ~ic :!C ?U '!W.c ili> ~ ~ diY .~ ~l.!2 n. .E ve n i f w e \< n~wap rio ri th at b od ie s (ba sic p articu la rs ) are a w ay s o bse rv ed 1 0 sp ace an d tim e,this know ledge, as K ant recognized, assures us only of the npm ~J~cal dif-ference o f b od ie s o bs er ve d in d iffe re nt p la ce s a t th e s am e tim e.lt< !2 giJ 1o t ~ s:su re us"o f1 li e numer ica l identity of a body observed at different tim es. Y etu nles s w e a re a t'le as ts< im etim es a ss ure d 'O f the T atter w e" 11 "a ve -o b as is,S traws on a rg ue s, f or m ain ta in in g th at b od ie s o bs erv ed a t d iffe re nt tim es a reobserved in the sam e space. For w e can attach no m eaning to 'in the sam espace' except with reference to a point of origin for a set of spatial. co-o rd in ate s. If w e c ou ld n ev er re id en tif y a p oin t o f o rig in d ur in g s tre tc he s o f d is -c on tin uo us o bse rv ation , w e c ou ld n ev er k now w he th er the o bjec ts ob serv edduring different stretches w ere in the sam e' space or w ere m erely spatial.R eid en tific atio n o f b as ic p artic ula rs is th us a n ec e~ sa ry _c on di tio n fo r a u n-'., ..}. itary !pa..~l


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350 MANLEY THOMPSON PH ILOSOPH ICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORIE S 35 1je ctiv ely b y wha t a n o bje ct is i n its elf ra th er th an s ub je ct iv ely b y a pp ea ra nc es .The distinction between substance and accident is basic not only for~111010gyl5uratsofor 1ogIC,-as e v e n - th e prInc ip le o f cont raa lCt ion isdefended u l'ifmately by aQpeal to-the-distinction. - '-- 'this A ristotelian appro~ch' m ay b;10110w ed as long as one does notq ue stio n th e o bje ctiv it y o f a n id en tif ic ati on o f s ub sta nc e a pa rt f rom a c oll ec -tio n o f ac cid en ts . B ut if th e o bje ctiv ity o f w h at is ad va nc ed a s th e co nd itio n o fobjectivity is questioned, a radically different approach is in order. Thec ru cia l iss ue is whe th er o n !. .~ ~e stio n th e f!. .b j,e ctfv !J JLf !.~i~_conditio"-..w~thout a~ the sam..! .ti!!!e q~~s!!!!,' !!..niJli/:;i .inciP.leoi.ntaMii.(jon.-rr;con-trary to A risto tle, o ne c an , th en fo rm al lo gic b y itse lf p ro vid es c on ditio ns o fc oh ere nt d is co ur se w ith in whic h o ne may d eb ate c on dit io ns o f o bje ct iv ity a ndfind the clue to a com plete list of categories as a priori concepts of an objectin g en er al . In iti all y, t he n, o ne a ss um es n o e pis temic fa cu lty o th er th an th at o fth ou gh t o r d is cu rs iv e a ctiv ity , a nd c on ditio ns o f o bje ctiv it y a re d ete rm in ed a sc ate go rie s a re re la te d to th e in pu t o f s en sib ility , a se co nd e pistem ic fa cu lty .ObiectivityjUbuLaco~qt~


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352 MANLEY THOMPSONH e say s h is "proc ed ure ha s a c lo se relation to w hat K ant ca lle d a 'tran sc en de ntal' in -v es tig atio n," a lth ou gh it is n ot "w ho lly in de pe nd en t. o f emp ir ic al a ss um ptio ns.'.' Im ak e n o a ttemp t to c ha ra cte riz e P utn am 's la ttir p os itio n.7 . F or a r ec en t d is cu ss io n o f th e is su es , se e Jo na th an B arn es , Ar is to t le 's Pos ter io rA na ly tic s T ra nsla te d w ith N ote s ( Ox fo rd : C la re nd on P re ss , 1 97 5) , p p. 2 56 -6 0.8. C f. J. L . A c krill, A ris to tle 's C a te go ri es a nd D e I nte rp re ta ti on e T ra ns la te d w ithN ote s a nd G lo ss ar y (O xf or d: C la re nd on P re ss, 1 96 2) , p p. 7 3-7 4.9 . I bi d., p . 1 26 . . .1 0. T his is n ot to say that K ant d re w n o distinc tio n b etw een a re al de finitio n andthe mere ascription of a property. See Lewis W hite Beck, "Kant's Theory ofDefinition," Phi losoph ica l Review, 6 5 (1 95 6): 1 79 -9 1. R ep rin te d in K an t: A C olle c-ti on o f C ri tic al E ss ay s, e d. R obe rt P au l W olff (G arde n C ity, N Y: D oub leda y & C o.,1967),pp. 23-36. .II. T he ~Iaim h as be en de fe nd ed in d etail by K lau s R eic h, Di e Vo ll st an d ig kei t d e rKant is ch en Ur te il st af el (B erlin: R ich ard S ch oetz , 19 32 ; 2n d ed ., 19 48 ). .R eic h'sdefense is expounded sym pathetically by Jam es E llington, Im ma nu el K an t'sM eta ph ysic al F ou nd atio ns o f N atu ra l S cie nc e T ra nsla te d w ith I ntr od uc tio n a nd E s-sa y ( In dia na po lis a nd N ew Yor k: B ob bs -M err ill C o., 1 97 0), p p. i5 0-7 3.12. W . V . Q uine, W ord and O bje ct (C am brid ge , M A: M IT P re ss, 1 960 ), p. 1 61.P ag e re fe re nc es to this w ork a re give n in the te xt in p aren th eses.1 3. "On Empi ric al ly E qu iv ale nt S ys tem s o f th e Wo rl d," Erkenntnis, ~ (1975):327-28.1 4. O nto lo gic al R ela tiv ity a nd O th er E ss ay s (N ew Y or~ : C olumb ia U niv er sity. Press, 1969), p. 25.. ..1 5. P . F . S tr aw so n, The Bounds o /Sense (L on do n: M e th ue n & Co ., 1 96 6), p p .80-81.16 . "S ingul ar T e rms and P redi ca ti on ," Journal o f Philosophy, 58 ( 1961 ): 4 11 .RepriQtedin Wordsand Object ions ,eds. D. Dav idson& J. Hin tikka (Dordr ech t, Ho i -l and : D . Re id el publ is hi ng Co ., 1 .9 69)p . 115.17. Indiv iduals ( Lo nd on : M e th ue n & Co ., 1 95 9), p . 1 19 .1 8. I bid ., p . 3 5.1 9. T he n ee d fo r a v erifi~ atio n p rin cip le h as b ee n a rg ue d b y B arry S tro ud ,"Transcendental Arguments," J ou rna l o f Ph il os ophy 65 ( 1968) : 2 41 -56 . S tr oud 'spaper has sparked a number o f r epl ies .For a cri ti ca l d i scuss ionof the i ssue, see Pe te rHacker , "Are Transcenden ta l Arguments a Ver sion of Ver if ica tioni sm?" AmericanPhilosophical Quarter ly 9 (1 97 2): 7 8-8 5. F or fu rth er: re fe re nc es , c on su lt th eb ib lio gra ph y in J on ath an B en ne tt, " An aly tic T ra ns ce nd en ta l A rg um en ts ,"TranscendentalArguments and Science, e ds . P . B ie ri, R . J lo rtsma n, & L . K rU ge r(Dordr ech t, Ho l land: D. Reide l Pub li shingCo . , 1979) , pp .~~ '- 64. For the r eader in-t er es te d i n l oc at in g t he i ssue o f v e ri fi ca ti on ism i n Kant , I s ugges t t u rn ing , not t o t het ranscenden ta l a rgument s in the Analy t ic , bu t to the Append ix to the Dia lec ti c, esp .A64 8 - B 6 76 and A 6 51-54 = B 679- 82 .2 0. F or a rg um en ts c lo se to th is so rt., s ee th e r ef er en ce s to P utn am a bo ve , n n5 a nd 6 .2 1. A r ea din g o f A risto tle 's a rg um en ts in M eta ph ysic s IV fo r th e n ec es sity o f d is -. tin gu is hin g s ub sta nc e f rom a cc id en t a nd a cc ep tin g th e p rin cip le o f c on tr ad ic tio n a s

'1- tra ns ce nd en ta l a rg um en ts is g iv en .in T . H . Irw in , " Aris to tle 's D is .c ov ery o fMetaphysics," Review of Me taphys ic s 3 1 ( 19 77 ): 2 10 -2 9. S ee e sp . p p. 2 25 -2 6.

TH IN KING, THO UG HT, A ND CATEGO RIES

.. T hink ing is often tho ugh t of as a kin d of co nnectin g-in the sense ofs ea rc hin g f or p re -e xis te nt c on ne cti on s a nd e xh ib itin g wh at h as b ee n fo un d; inthe sense of m aking connections and exhibiting w hat has been m .ade; or insom e th ird sense w hich com bin es the form er w ith the latter in som e w ay: Ine xp lic itly o r im plic itly emp lo yin g c erta in m eth od s in o ne 's th in kin g o ne ipsofacto uses so-called "categories," Le., concepts of high generality,c ha r;1 cte riz in g a sp ec ts o f w ha te ve r e xis ts o r c an b e th ou gh t. A ris to tle , w hoc on ce iv ed o f th in kin g m ain ly a s fin din g, K an t, w ho c on ce iv ed o f it m ain ly a sm a kin g a nd s ome o f th ei r s uc ce ss ors s et th em s elv es th e ta sk o f l is ti ng , c la ri fy -ing and justifying a set of categories, w hich in each case w as judged by thep hilo so ph er w ho p ro po un de d it to b e u niq ue ly n ec es sa ry a nd th us a bso lu te lyp erferab le to a ny co mp etin g set. .The aim of this essay is rather different. It is to locate the origin ofcategories in certain gene ral m ethod s of thin kin g; to draw attention to th epo~sibility of different and m utually exclusive sets of categories beingle gitim ate ly emp lo ye d; a nd to th ro w lig ht o n th e re la tio n o f a s et o f c ate go rie sto the system o f beliefs of w hich it form s part. T he essay b egin s by co nsid er-in g. th e m e th od s o f d ed uc ti ve o rg an iz ati on a nd e pis tem ic s tr atif ic at io n ( I) . Itth en d is cu ss es c la ss ifi ca tio n a nd i ns ta ntia tio n a s w ell a s c ompos itio n a nd p ar-tit io n ( 2 ); in te rp re ta tio n, o bj ec tiv iz ati on a nd i de al iz ati on ( 3) ; a nd t he d is -tin ctio n b etw ee n in de pe nd en t a nd d ep en de nt p artic ula rs a nd a ttrib ute s ( 4).A fter these preparations som e c atego ry qu estio ns a re raised and an sw ered(5). Th e essay co nclu des by b riefly exp lain ing th e n otion of a categ orialframewo rk a nd b y in dic atin g h ow u sin g it a vo id s th e m is ta ke s o f b oth a p rio ria bs ol uti sm a nd p sy ch olo gism ( 6 ).'1 . D ed uc ti ve o rg an iz at io n a nd e pi ste mi c s tr at ifi ca ti on

D eductive o rgan ization an d epistem ic stratification co nstitute con -straints on all thought and thinking, including thinking in and aboutc ate go rie s. T o o rg an iz e o ne 's th in kin g d ed uc tiv ely o r lo gic ally is to c on fo rmto p rin cip le s o f c on sis te nc y a nd p rin cip le s o f d ed uc tiv e in fe re nc e, d efin ed inte rm s o flo gic al im p li ca ti on b etw ee n c ompou nd p ro po si tio ns , th e c ompon en ts0 '( w h ic h a re c omb in ed b y me an s o f c on ne ctiv es , q ua ntif ie rs a nd , s om e tim e s,modal or other operators. There are more ways than one of deductive

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18-M Thompson- Philosophical Approaches to Categories