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Limiting Market Power:Regulation and Antitrust. . . The one law you can’t repeal is supply and
demand.WILLIAM SAFIRE, NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 13, 1998
● The Public Interest Issue: Monopoly Power Versus Mere Size
● Part 1: Regulation♦ What is Regulation and Who Regulates What?
♦ Some Objectives of Regulation
♦ Two Key Issues That Face Regulators
♦ The Pros and Cons of “Bigness”
♦ Deregulation
● The Public Interest Issue: Monopoly Power Versus Mere Size
● Part 1: Regulation♦ What is Regulation and Who Regulates What?
♦ Some Objectives of Regulation
♦ Two Key Issues That Face Regulators
♦ The Pros and Cons of “Bigness”
♦ Deregulation
ContentsContents
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
● Part 2: Anti-Trust Laws and Policies♦ The Public Image of Business When Anti-
Trust Laws Were Born
♦ Measuring Market Power: Concentration
♦ A Crucial Problem for Anti-Trust
♦ Mergers and Competition
♦ Use of Antitrust Laws to Prevent Competition
● Part 2: Anti-Trust Laws and Policies♦ The Public Image of Business When Anti-
Trust Laws Were Born
♦ Measuring Market Power: Concentration
♦ A Crucial Problem for Anti-Trust
♦ Mergers and Competition
♦ Use of Antitrust Laws to Prevent Competition
Contents (continued)Contents (continued)
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Public Interest Issue: Monopoly Vs Mere SizeThe Public Interest Issue: Monopoly Vs Mere Size
● Firms that possess monopoly power may threaten the public interest.
● The abuse of monopoly power is undesirable because:♦ High prices reduce the wealth of consumers.
♦ High prices lead to resource misallocation.
♦ Efficiency and innovation may be stifled.
● Firms that possess monopoly power may threaten the public interest.
● The abuse of monopoly power is undesirable because:♦ High prices reduce the wealth of consumers.
♦ High prices lead to resource misallocation.
♦ Efficiency and innovation may be stifled.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
How and Why Did Regulation Arise?
The Public Interest Issue: Monopoly Vs Mere SizeThe Public Interest Issue: Monopoly Vs Mere Size
● But firms that are big do not necessarily have market power♦ oligopoly market
♦ easy entry
● But firms that are big do not necessarily have market power♦ oligopoly market
♦ easy entry
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
What Is Regulation and Who Regulates What?What Is Regulation and Who Regulates What?
● Regulation: government agencies that enforce rules about business conduct enacted by Congress
● Types of government regulation of industry ♦ Limiting market power
♦ Promoting consumer and worker protection and safety
● Regulation: government agencies that enforce rules about business conduct enacted by Congress
● Types of government regulation of industry ♦ Limiting market power
♦ Promoting consumer and worker protection and safety
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
What Is Regulation and Who Regulates What?What Is Regulation and Who Regulates What?
● Federal Communications Commission: broadcasting and telecommunications
● Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: interstate transmission of electric power and sale of natural gas
● Securities and Trade Commission: sales of securities
● Federal Reserve System: banking
● Federal Communications Commission: broadcasting and telecommunications
● Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: interstate transmission of electric power and sale of natural gas
● Securities and Trade Commission: sales of securities
● Federal Reserve System: banking
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Some Objectives of RegulationSome Objectives of Regulation
● Control of market power resulting from economies of scale and scope
● The pricing of “bottleneck” facilities and the parity-pricing principle
● Universal service and rate averaging
● Control of market power resulting from economies of scale and scope
● The pricing of “bottleneck” facilities and the parity-pricing principle
● Universal service and rate averaging
FIGURE 18-1 Economies of ScaleFIGURE 18-1 Economies of Scale
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
AC
MC
Pri
ce a
nd
Co
st p
er U
nit
Quantity Produced per Year
A
B
100 50 0
P
5
$7
3
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Two Key Issues That Face RegulatorsTwo Key Issues That Face Regulators
● Prices intended to promote the public interest may cause financial problems for firms.
● How to prevent firms with monopoly power from earning excessive profits without eliminating all incentives for efficiency and innovation
● Prices intended to promote the public interest may cause financial problems for firms.
● How to prevent firms with monopoly power from earning excessive profits without eliminating all incentives for efficiency and innovation
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Two Key Issues That Face RegulatorsTwo Key Issues That Face Regulators
● Marginal versus Average Cost Pricing
● In many regulated industries, firms would go bankrupt if P = MC because:♦ Many exhibit significant economies of scale.
♦ In industry with economies of scale, long-run average cost curve is downward sloping.
♦ If average cost is declining, marginal cost must be below average cost.
● Marginal versus Average Cost Pricing
● In many regulated industries, firms would go bankrupt if P = MC because:♦ Many exhibit significant economies of scale.
♦ In industry with economies of scale, long-run average cost curve is downward sloping.
♦ If average cost is declining, marginal cost must be below average cost.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Two Key Issues That Face RegulatorsTwo Key Issues That Face Regulators
● Marginal versus Average Cost Pricing♦ Setting price equal to average cost is also
problematic, especially for a multi-product firm.
♦ The Ramsay pricing rule is a regulatory solution.
● Marginal versus Average Cost Pricing♦ Setting price equal to average cost is also
problematic, especially for a multi-product firm.
♦ The Ramsay pricing rule is a regulatory solution.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Two Key Issues That Face RegulatorsTwo Key Issues That Face Regulators
● Preventing Monopoly Profit but Keeping Incentives for Efficiency and Innovation♦ When regulators control profits, they face the
danger of removing the useful incentive effects of profits.
♦ The existence of regulatory lag may offer some incentive for efficiency.
● Preventing Monopoly Profit but Keeping Incentives for Efficiency and Innovation♦ When regulators control profits, they face the
danger of removing the useful incentive effects of profits.
♦ The existence of regulatory lag may offer some incentive for efficiency.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Two Key Issues That Face RegulatorsTwo Key Issues That Face Regulators
● Price Caps as Incentives for Efficiency♦ An adjusting price cap is a way of controlling
profits yet retaining some of the incentive effects of profits.
● Price Caps as Incentives for Efficiency♦ An adjusting price cap is a way of controlling
profits yet retaining some of the incentive effects of profits.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Pros and Cons of “Bigness”The Pros and Cons of “Bigness”
● Bigness in industry may benefit the general public:♦ Economies of large size: where small-scale
operation is inefficient
♦ Required scale for innovation
● Bigness in industry may benefit the general public:♦ Economies of large size: where small-scale
operation is inefficient
♦ Required scale for innovation
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
DeregulationDeregulation
● Effects of Deregulation♦ Effects on prices: generally lower prices
♦ Effects on local services: some communities have been hurt, some have gained
♦ Effects on entry: many new competitors
● Effects of Deregulation♦ Effects on prices: generally lower prices
♦ Effects on local services: some communities have been hurt, some have gained
♦ Effects on entry: many new competitors
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
DeregulationDeregulation
● Effects of Deregulation♦ Effects on unions: unions have been hurt
♦ Effects on concentration and mergers: many mergers following deregulation
♦ Effects on product quality: “no frills” services have become common
● Effects of Deregulation♦ Effects on unions: unions have been hurt
♦ Effects on concentration and mergers: many mergers following deregulation
♦ Effects on product quality: “no frills” services have become common
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
DeregulationDeregulation
● Effects of Deregulation♦ Effects on safety: no change
♦ Effects on profits and wages: profits and wages have been depressed
♦ Conclusion: Deregulation has helped some and hurt others, but, in general, it has promoted the welfare of consumers.
● Effects of Deregulation♦ Effects on safety: no change
♦ Effects on profits and wages: profits and wages have been depressed
♦ Conclusion: Deregulation has helped some and hurt others, but, in general, it has promoted the welfare of consumers.
FIGURE 18-2 A “Hub and Spoke” Airline Routing Pattern
FIGURE 18-2 A “Hub and Spoke” Airline Routing Pattern
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
B
A
F
C
E
D
H
FIGURE 18-3 U.S. Airline Accident Rates, 1960-2000
FIGURE 18-3 U.S. Airline Accident Rates, 1960-2000
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Deregulation (1978)
Fatal Accidents
All Accidents
Rat
e p
er 1
00,0
00 D
epar
tu
res
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
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The Antitrust LawsThe Antitrust Laws
● The Sherman Act (1890)
● The Clayton Act (1914)
● The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)
● The Robinson-Patman Act (1936)
● Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act (1950)
● The Sherman Act (1890)
● The Clayton Act (1914)
● The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)
● The Robinson-Patman Act (1936)
● Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act (1950)
TABLE 18-1 Basic Antitrust LawsTABLE 18-1 Basic Antitrust Laws
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Antitrust LawsThe Antitrust Laws
● The Sherman Act♦ “Per Se” Issues: courts have consistently held
that price fixing among competitors is illegal
● The Sherman Act♦ “Per Se” Issues: courts have consistently held
that price fixing among competitors is illegal
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Antitrust LawsThe Antitrust Laws
● The Sherman Act♦ Rule of Reason: Courts have developed
different and varying standards for deciding when large companies have illegally:■ Monopolized trade■Engaged in tacit collusion■Used predatory pricing
♦ According to the “rule of reason,” size alone is not an offense.
● The Sherman Act♦ Rule of Reason: Courts have developed
different and varying standards for deciding when large companies have illegally:■ Monopolized trade■Engaged in tacit collusion■Used predatory pricing
♦ According to the “rule of reason,” size alone is not an offense.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Antitrust LawsThe Antitrust Laws
● The Clayton Act♦ Prohibited price discrimination in restraint of
trade
♦ Prohibited tying contracts
♦ Prohibited stock purchases that reduced independence
♦ Prohibited interlocking directorates
● The Clayton Act♦ Prohibited price discrimination in restraint of
trade
♦ Prohibited tying contracts
♦ Prohibited stock purchases that reduced independence
♦ Prohibited interlocking directorates
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Antitrust LawsThe Antitrust Laws
● The Federal Trade Commission Act♦ The FTC was created to investigate “unfair”
and “predatory” competitive practices.
♦ In 1938, the FTC was also charged with preventing false and deceptive advertising.
● The Federal Trade Commission Act♦ The FTC was created to investigate “unfair”
and “predatory” competitive practices.
♦ In 1938, the FTC was also charged with preventing false and deceptive advertising.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
The Antitrust LawsThe Antitrust Laws
● The Robinson-Patman Act♦ Sought to protect small wholesale and retail
firms from the “unfair competition” of chain stores and mass distributors
● The Robinson-Patman Act♦ Sought to protect small wholesale and retail
firms from the “unfair competition” of chain stores and mass distributors
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Measuring Market Power: ConcentrationMeasuring Market Power: Concentration
● Concentration: Definition and Measurement—The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index♦ Four-firm concentration ratio
■% of industry’s output produced by four largest firms
■ a common, but flawed, measure of concentration.
● Concentration: Definition and Measurement—The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index♦ Four-firm concentration ratio
■% of industry’s output produced by four largest firms
■ a common, but flawed, measure of concentration.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Measuring Market Power: ConcentrationMeasuring Market Power: Concentration
● Concentration: Definition and Measurement—The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index♦ The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a more
accurate measure of industry concentration and is used by the Department of Justice in analyzing potential mergers.
● Concentration: Definition and Measurement—The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index♦ The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a more
accurate measure of industry concentration and is used by the Department of Justice in analyzing potential mergers.
TABLE 18-2 Concentration Ratios and H-H Indexes
TABLE 18-2 Concentration Ratios and H-H Indexes
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Measuring Market Power: ConcentrationMeasuring Market Power: Concentration
● Concentration: Definition and Measurement♦ Three conclusions are widely accepted:
■If an industry has a very low concentration ratio, then its firms are very unlikely to have any market power either before or after the rise in concentration.
■If circumstances in the industry are favorable for successful price collusion, a rise in concentration will facilitate market power.
● Concentration: Definition and Measurement♦ Three conclusions are widely accepted:
■If an industry has a very low concentration ratio, then its firms are very unlikely to have any market power either before or after the rise in concentration.
■If circumstances in the industry are favorable for successful price collusion, a rise in concentration will facilitate market power.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Measuring Market Power: ConcentrationMeasuring Market Power: Concentration
● Concentration: Definition and Measure♦ Three conclusions are widely accepted
(cont’d):■Where the market is highly contestable, market
power will not be enhanced because an excessive price will attract new entrants who will soon force the price down.
● Concentration: Definition and Measure♦ Three conclusions are widely accepted
(cont’d):■Where the market is highly contestable, market
power will not be enhanced because an excessive price will attract new entrants who will soon force the price down.
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Measuring Market Power: ConcentrationMeasuring Market Power: Concentration
● Evidence on Concentration in Reality♦ The concentration of industry has not increased
in the United States in the twentieth century.
● Evidence on Concentration in Reality♦ The concentration of industry has not increased
in the United States in the twentieth century.
TABLE 18-3 The Trend in Concentration in Manufacturing
TABLE 18-3 The Trend in Concentration in Manufacturing
Copyright © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
A Crucial Problem for AntitrustA Crucial Problem for Antitrust
● It is often a challenge for the antitrust authorities to distinguish between vigorous competition and acts that undermine competition and support monopoly power.
● It is often a challenge for the antitrust authorities to distinguish between vigorous competition and acts that undermine competition and support monopoly power.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Anti-Competitive Practices and AntitrustAnti-Competitive Practices and Antitrust
● Predatory pricing = pricing that threatens to keep a competitor out of the market♦ One principle widely followed by the courts
holds that prices are predatory only if they are below either marginal or average variable costs.
● Predatory pricing = pricing that threatens to keep a competitor out of the market♦ One principle widely followed by the courts
holds that prices are predatory only if they are below either marginal or average variable costs.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Anti-Competitive Practices and AntitrustAnti-Competitive Practices and Antitrust
● Even in cases where prices are below MC or AVC, predatory only under two conditions:♦ If evidence that the low price would have been
profitable only if it succeeded in destroying a rival or in keeping it out of the market.
♦ If a real probability that the allegedly predatory firm could raise prices to monopoly levels after the rival was driven out.
● Even in cases where prices are below MC or AVC, predatory only under two conditions:♦ If evidence that the low price would have been
profitable only if it succeeded in destroying a rival or in keeping it out of the market.
♦ If a real probability that the allegedly predatory firm could raise prices to monopoly levels after the rival was driven out.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Anti-Competitive Practices and AntitrustAnti-Competitive Practices and Antitrust
● There have been many predatory pricing cases, but few convictions.
● There have been many predatory pricing cases, but few convictions.
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Microsoft: Bottlenecks, Bundling, & Network Extern.Microsoft: Bottlenecks, Bundling, & Network Extern.
● Bottlenecks♦ MS Windows, an operating system that runs
about 90 percent of all personal computers, is a prime example of a bottleneck. ■Microsoft itself supplies not only Windows, but
also many applications.
♦ The worry is that Microsoft will use Windows in a way that favors its own programs and handicaps competing programs.
● Bottlenecks♦ MS Windows, an operating system that runs
about 90 percent of all personal computers, is a prime example of a bottleneck. ■Microsoft itself supplies not only Windows, but
also many applications.
♦ The worry is that Microsoft will use Windows in a way that favors its own programs and handicaps competing programs.
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Microsoft: Bottlenecks, Bundling, & Network Extern.Microsoft: Bottlenecks, Bundling, & Network Extern.
● Bundling♦ Computer manufacturers receive a discount if
they buy a bundle of Microsoft programs, not just Windows alone. ■This means that rival producers of applications
have a price disadvantage in selling their products to PC owners.
♦ The question: is Microsoft’s low bundle price legitimate or constitutes a case of predatory pricing to destroy competitors.
● Bundling♦ Computer manufacturers receive a discount if
they buy a bundle of Microsoft programs, not just Windows alone. ■This means that rival producers of applications
have a price disadvantage in selling their products to PC owners.
♦ The question: is Microsoft’s low bundle price legitimate or constitutes a case of predatory pricing to destroy competitors.
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Mergers and CompetitionMergers and Competition
● Horizontal Mergers ♦ The merging firms compete directly by
supplying products that are identical or very similar
♦ Reviewed by both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to prevent mergers that would reduce competition
● Horizontal Mergers ♦ The merging firms compete directly by
supplying products that are identical or very similar
♦ Reviewed by both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to prevent mergers that would reduce competition
Copyright© 2003 Southwestern/Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.
Mergers and CompetitionMergers and Competition
● Recent Surges in Merger Activity♦ Since the early 1980s, more permissive merger
guidelines have lead to a significant increase in merger activity that continues today.
● Recent Surges in Merger Activity♦ Since the early 1980s, more permissive merger
guidelines have lead to a significant increase in merger activity that continues today.
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Mergers and CompetitionMergers and Competition
● Are Mergers Anti-Competitive? ♦ Mergers sometimes reduce competition,
particularly in markets that are not contestable.
♦ However, where there is reason to believe that mergers will not reduce competition, mergers may lead to greater efficiency.
● Are Mergers Anti-Competitive? ♦ Mergers sometimes reduce competition,
particularly in markets that are not contestable.
♦ However, where there is reason to believe that mergers will not reduce competition, mergers may lead to greater efficiency.
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Mergers and CompetitionMergers and Competition
● Do Mergers Improve Performance? ♦ The evidence here is mixed.
♦ Several mergers have been disappointing and brought limited cost savings.
♦ Still, a number of recent studies of merger activity during the 1980s has reported significant productivity.
● Do Mergers Improve Performance? ♦ The evidence here is mixed.
♦ Several mergers have been disappointing and brought limited cost savings.
♦ Still, a number of recent studies of merger activity during the 1980s has reported significant productivity.
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Use of Antitrust Laws to Prevent CompetitionUse of Antitrust Laws to Prevent Competition
● A serious concern is the potential misuse of the antitrust laws to prevent competition.
● Firms that try to protect themselves in this way always claim that their rivals have not achieved success through superior ability but, rather, by means that they call “monopolization.”
● A serious concern is the potential misuse of the antitrust laws to prevent competition.
● Firms that try to protect themselves in this way always claim that their rivals have not achieved success through superior ability but, rather, by means that they call “monopolization.”
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Use of Antitrust Laws to Prevent CompetitionUse of Antitrust Laws to Prevent Competition
● Various steps have been suggested to deal with the misuse of U.S. antitrust laws: ♦ Implementation of a “loser pays the legal
costs” rule
♦ Prescreening of suits by a government agency
● Various steps have been suggested to deal with the misuse of U.S. antitrust laws: ♦ Implementation of a “loser pays the legal
costs” rule
♦ Prescreening of suits by a government agency
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Use of Antitrust Laws to Prevent CompetitionUse of Antitrust Laws to Prevent Competition
● Anything that restricts anti-competitive, private antitrust suits will almost certainly also inhibit legitimate attempts by individual firms to defend themselves from genuine acts of monopolization by rival enterprises.
● Anything that restricts anti-competitive, private antitrust suits will almost certainly also inhibit legitimate attempts by individual firms to defend themselves from genuine acts of monopolization by rival enterprises.
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Concluding ObservationsConcluding Observations
● Most economists believe that by the 1970s government intervention had clearly gone too far in some respects and that deregulation was, thus, in the public interest.
● However, the general issue is still open to considerable debate.
● Most economists believe that by the 1970s government intervention had clearly gone too far in some respects and that deregulation was, thus, in the public interest.
● However, the general issue is still open to considerable debate.