178018802 Kalevi Holsti the State War and the State of War Select Pages

8/11/2019 178018802 Kalevi Holsti the State War and the State of War Select Pages

1/24

The state war and th

state

ofwar

invite external int . Wl m tat . Int mal war may calate or

(

states, but wars about and .th.

resides in the

f u n ~ r v e n t i o n

but their primary if not elusive etiology

amental quarrel b h

and the processes and

l

s a out t e natur of communi

ties

he question

is

whettero thems of state-building t fundamentally,

transported to nonE r e European concep

of

the tate can

be

I

d

- uropean enviro

repro ucible, no matt h nment . Is th tate infinitely

qu

ti

er w

at

the cont

t?

R

es

ons about an a ex ec

nt war

c rtainly

raise

Wars within ppropriate answer.

b and between co . .

~ t w n states. The latt thr mmunlties are not the same as wars

highl er oughout d E

Y

mstitutionalized and fo . mo ern uropean history were

war, we also think of unif rmahzed. That is why, when we think of

we orms ch

apons systems camp . ' ams of command sophistica ted

r li ' algns h ,

ega

a,

the laws of war and ' onors and decorations regimental

wars about , peace treaties F f ,

liz

d

communities and t ew o the e are relevant to

e . And th sates. These . . .

B .ti h ere seems to be I ttl wars are

not

mstituhona-

c ~ ~ :

'tiAmericans, Russians IPoe can do about them. The French,

. onal means of wagm' r guese, and others found out that

sanes JUSt d , g war again t

Cr on t work. "The s non-state-sponsored adver-

eveld (1991

2

7

,.

cold brutal f

t

irreleva t . ' IS that much p ' ac , write s

Martin

Van

n as an in tr resent-da li

ests over s ument for extend. Y rru tary power is simply

amounts t :?st .of the globe; by thimg ~ e f e n d i n g political inter-

military , s cntenon d d

cannot prevail or h power at all." And . ' .m ee , 1t scarce y

can the Unit d N settle quarrels b if maJor milita ry powers

f

e ations? p a out comm ty d d

ailed, but a fund erhaps it uru an statehoo ,

An organizati d a ~ e n t a l flaw in the can s ~ c c e e d where others have

on eslgn d organiZ ti h

faces fundamentall

.e

to prevent or he a on as to be corrected.

within states. Th ~ l f f e r e n t types f P settle wars between states

th

e difficulti

0

problem

e former Yugo

1

. es faced in S . s m wars

about

and

B t this s avla refl t h omaha and

u is anticipatin

ec

t e conceptu

1 most poignantly

in

to support the asse the analysis. First a flaws of the organization.

ha b r on that ' we must 1

ve een and will

Wars

of th

supp

Y the evidence

of the European a n ~ O ~ t i n u e to be fund e recent past and the future

wars of a "third kind old War experi:mentally different from those

. nces w

e are concerned with

2

ars of the third kin

In 1740, using a trumped-up claim to territorial title, Frederick the

Great invaded Austrian Empress Maria Theresa's domains in Silesia.

The war lasted

two

years, which

was

typical of the times. The Seven

Years

War (1751'H>3)

earned

that

title because combat lasted substan

tially longer than the norm of the eighteenth century. In the first half of

the twentieth century, most wars were fought

by

the organized armed

forces of two or more states, and decisive victories were usually

achieved within two years of the inauguration of hostilities. The Russo

Japanese War (1904-5), the Italian campaign in Libya in 1911, the

Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Soviet-Polish War of 1920-2, and the

Soviet war against Finland, 1939--40, among others, lasted less than

two years, some only several months. Wars during the eighteenth

century

on

average lasted only one year (Levy 1983; Tilly 1990: 72).

1

Wars were not only relatively brief. Reflecting the Clausewitzian

concept of war, they

had

a regular sequence from beginning to end.

There was

an

initial crisis where diplomatic negotiations could not

reconcile the incompatible foreign policy or defense requirements

of

the states concerned.

n

ultimatum or an

incident - often

staged by

the

aggressor-

then led to a formal declaration of war. We

know

the

exact dates that eighteenth-, nineteenth-,

and

early twentieth-century

wars

commenced. Following the declarations of

war, armed

combat

led either to stalemate or, more often, to a decisive military defeat in a

single battle or a short series of battles. The defeated party then agreed

to a formal armistice and sued for peace. Both parties negotiated a

preliminary peace, which usually included the terms of military with-

Levy's figure is based on great-power wars only. The average war listed

in

my

previous study (Holsti 1991: 85-7) lasted four years.

19


2/24

~ ~

The state war and the state ofwar

~ r a w a l and g e n e ~ a l principles that would guide th n gotiation of a

final peace. The ~ a l p e a c e would then be conclud d within a y ar or

n o

after the a r ~ s t i ~ e or preliminary peace. In the i ht

nth

and

runeteenth centunes, final peace treaties would often b di patched for

rev.iew by other interested governments that might make their own

clauns and re.commend amendments. The Congre of B din (1 78),

for example, mcorporated a number of change to th Tr

aty

of San

S ~ e f a n o that had been negotiated bilaterally b tw en the Ru sian

VIctors

over the Ottomans

in

1876

Th fin

1 d

f

. e a peace treaty s tabhshe a

new set o nghts, responsibilities and t .t .

1

d

b

' ern ona a )Ustrnent that were

to ecome part of established international

1

. .

new arrangements le

11

. tifi aw. ViOlations of those

punishment Wars

a

y

J t ~ s

anned reprisals or oth er forms of

. ere e rruddle stage f 1 1 d t d

sequences of intematio

1

fli o c ear y emarca e

na con cts and

th

.

We know that something h h etr permanent settlement.

as c anged wh th d

stages become blurred or

fail

to develop en ese sequences an

A typical war since

1945

has a very differ . . . .

precipitates them, and they typically

do

n ent profile.

No

smgle cnsts

There are no declarations of war th ot start at a

particular

date.

, ere are no se f . .

and few end with peace treaties D . . asons or campatgnmg,

terror, psychology, and actions eClSIV e ~ a t t l e s are few. Attrition,

R h

th

.

amst

ctvihans hi hl h b

at er an highly organized anned f g tg t com at.

hi ch

orces based . d

erar y, wars are fought by loosel kni on a strtct comman

lars, cells, and not infrequently by l ~ c a l l ~ t o u p s of regulars, irregu

or

no

central authority. Y ased Warlords under little

Wars of the late twentieth century typ

Vietrninh took

up

arms after Japanese

tcally

last for decades The

. evacuati

f

achteved

v i c ~ o r y

t h i r ~ y.ears later. Eri:n

Indochina

in

1945.

wtthin the Ethioptan empue m 1961. Th

eans

began a rebellion

sometimes against each other -

for

thir ey

more

or less fought -

regime in

Ababa

c o l l a p ~ e d

in 1

99

{

f r ~ : r s

until. the Mengistu

people. Kashmiris have been fighting

0

a rebellion of its own

d

f

. . n and

off

.

en ce or annexation to.Paktstan, since

1948

.

e t t ~ ~ r

for indepen-

have sustamed armed resistance against

th

Minonties in Myanmar

the early 19

60

s. The East Timorese have e

e n t r a l

government ce

into Indonesia since 1975. Ulster was m

resisted

their incorp smti

a state

f

ora on

a n ~ 1995. Even w hen c t o r ~ o u s as was the case

0

War

between 1961

Entreans, no peace treaty IS negotiated. (Th

0

f the Vietnam d

peace accords in Paris in 1973, but imm

de

VIetnamese ne

e s t ~

atnd

. . . . e lately b go 1a e

proviSIOns and completed the military rout

f roke

the .

o South

v

u

mam

letnamese and

20

Wars of

he

third kind

American forces.) Most frequently, one set of governors replaces

another, so no new rights, responsibilities, or allocations between

states are made. The prize is not territory, resources, a crown,

or

avigation rights.

t

is the establishment

and

control of a_particular

J


3/24

l t )

t l

t l

0

N

0

o

0

\ )

0

0


4/24

The s

tate

war and

the state

of

war

Table 2.2 Tile decline of

nterstate

wars 1715 1995

Period

Avg. no. states in

central systema

1715-1814 19

t\o. centrJ system

mterstate warsb

Interstate wars/

s tate

per

yeJr

1815-1914

21

36

1918-1941 30

29

1945-1995 140 25

0.019

0.014

0.036

=

38

Note

a 0.005

b . average number of central st

excludes imperial wars ate system members fo

th

od

state syst

f

th ' wars among or a r c

pen

teenth cee:

o

e time (e.g., Boxer

r e b e l r g a ~

non -members of

the

central

include ~ e d r y .' antd w ~ r s of "national

lib;onti'

. u t ~ AmericJn

wars

in nine-

m erventions inv 1 ra

on

' smce 1945 [ t t

Source:

Holsti (

1991

) d o vmg signifi

1

. n

ers ate

wars

19 . , ata from 85-7 cant oss

of

hfe.

45

penod are from the appendix. '

1

40-

2

, and 214-16. Data for the post-

Table 2.3 Armed conflicts

per

state

y

.

~ 4 5 1 9 9 5

Region Number of

: ; = : ~ s ~ t a t t e s

Interstate Internal

Africa

43

: __nterventions wars

Middle East : ~ = ~ : : . : :

South Asia 18 0.16

Southeast Asia

7

0.61

East Asia 11 0.57

South America 6 0.45

c 12 o so

entral America/Caribbean 20 0.08

Balkans

/Eas

t Europe

8

0

.

20

Former USSR

15

0 3B

We:;t Europ e

18

Average

and domestic wars, although South

A .

0.86

1.22

2.00

1.82

0.50

0.67

0.50

0.25

0.47

0.16

0.85

armed combat of domestic

orig;,... -n..

has

the hi

h

. "' ne

fi

g est

fi

argument of thlS chapter are the avera gures that bes gure for

all the regions of the world not .

1

at

the

botto t support the

,

me

u m

N

tn of

T b

been

an

average of 0.85 internal wa g

Orfh A .

a le 2

.3:

in

I

. rs per state . '"enca th

on y 0.30 mterstate wars

per

state or . Since 1

945

' ere has

. , a ratio

of

2 '

corn

every mterstate

war and

armed

;,...terv

.

2

.9 do.... pared to

...

entton

1

'"Csti.

n

199()

c

Wars

for

2

The figures may be distorted by the number of l i l t ~ '

a reasonably

whereas many of the wars were fought wh h

Pl r re.,;

en t ere w oOrt. It .

ere fewer IS as of

1995

24 Sl.ltes. This

Wars

of

he

third kind

typical year for the post-war period, there were thirty-one armed

conflicts in progress, only one of which

was

an interstate war. In 1993,

there were forty-seven

armed

conflicts, none of which

was

between

states (Wallensteen

and

Axell 1994). The trend of declining interstate

and

increasing internal

wars

is gaining

momentum;..

, f Three major conclusions emerge from these figures. First, classical

I

nterstate

wars have

declined dramatically compared to previous

historical periods, and constitute only

about

18 percent of all

wars

t since 1945. The main problem of war since 1945 has been within

and

lsbout

states,

not

between statesJ Second, the realist

and

neo-realist

prediction that

in any

system of anarchy, including its component

regions, wars

must

occur with some regularity is not borne out

by

the

data. Three regions have been free of interstate

war

for more

than

a

half-century

and two

regions - Europe

and

North America - have been

relatively free of

all

kinds of

war

during the same period.

Finally, perhaps the most remarkable

datum about

war

since 1945 is

that there has been no great

power

war. The problem of

war in

the

theoretical

and

practical literatures on international relations has been

characterized as essentially a great-power phenomenon; great powers

are

both

the sources of

war and

the authors of means of alleviating or

/ resolving the problem (cf. Waltz 1979; Bull1977: ch. 9) Although there

have been numerous American, Soviet, British, and French armed

interventions since 1945, almost all of them were occasioned

by

wars

and

rebellions within states in the Third World, in the communist bloc,

or among the post-communist states. The cast of war-launching

/ characters has fundamentally changed in the last one-half

of the

I

wentieth century.

t

is no longer the great powers, but the lsraels,

Egypts, Indias, Croatias,

and

Iraqs of the world. Interstate

war,

to the

l

xtent tha

.t

still exists, has become primarily a small-

or

medium-

we r

activtty. \

These trends

and

patterns cannot be explained

by

the

standard

theoretical devices of international politics, particularly

by

neo-realist

analysis. Rousseau

would

have been surprised that

in

some areas of

the

world

his hunters seem to collaborate regularly

and

none suffers

from a security dilemma in his backyard.

He

could not have predicted

the end of great-power war, nor the rise of wars within states.

f

such a large proportion

of

wars have domestic origins, then the

particularly the case

in

Africa. It is unlikely, however, that a calculation based on an

annual ratio of wars per state would produce

an

overall pattern significantly different

from the one in table 2.3.

25

/


5/24

The state war and the state

of

war

place to pursue explanations .

between states

but

in the

ch

IS

not in the character

of

relations

. , aracter of the t t h

parhcularly interested in h

th

s a cs

t

emsclve >.

We are

ow

ey

were bo d h

m creating coherent civil

soci ti man

0\ \ . th

ey

have

fared

ments and those societies We es tolerable links between govem-

st t h e

move

mto th

f

a e morp ology (and sometirn e area o

state

creation

and

national politics. This is not t

es,

state pathology) rather

than

inter-

. o exclude

.secunty problems within

t a t ~ Th

mtemational influences on

But to pursue the argument

~ w i l l

be addressed in

chapter

7.

to the problem than mere wtie ave to establish that there is more

arms? Wh t

'd

a

on

of war Wh

a

1

eas, conditions and . Y

did

people take up

o rebellion and w a r ~ o 'h asptrattons drove them t th . t

f f i . \ l ug the Wa r 0 e p0tn

r- - ~ ~ ~ ISsues

being contested, the m .

ISted

in the

appendt

x had

f ~ ~ c a l community.fSince 1945 a)onty dealt with the

que

stion of

e ~ ~ o g n a l h l i b t :rabtion." These a r ~

a h i ~ c h h a v e

taken

the

form

of

w a ts roadly consd have th f

or less well-defined c t ered to be i l l e ~ t i e purpose o

ommuruty In

th o

mate rule

over

a more

predominantly rebellions of

ethn..

e nineteenth centu h

mun 'ti

tcaUy

and/ ry, t

ey

were

es agatnst Russian, Austrian or religiously d fin d

1945, .they have been wars

of

, and Ottoman im e . e e

c ~ m -

exdustvely fought . de-colonizati P

nal

rule. Smce

agamst Dutch F on pri b

Portuguese rule In h

1

rench,

Brir h

1

man y

ut

not

eac case, the pu

IS

, Spanish 5o d

satellite into a prototype o f a E

pose

was to tr ' vtet, an

+

In

addition to wars

f ,

ur?pean state." ansform a colony or

" . . . o national P-- J .

national untfication , The tueration" th

.

tr

purpos . , e

real

or

imagined that h b e IS

to re-unify

re are wars of

' as een torn som

_powers in the aftermath of wold apart or div'd e community,

gical struggles)

and

the Ind' r. wars.

Vietnam

ed by the great

thi , tan mcorpo . , "oreaV I .

s category. Internal faction and id

r ~ o n

of Goa . ; . I ~ so tdeolo-

for universal principles such d

e o l o g ~ c l

wars are

tnduded in

thn . as emocra , Osten '

b)

e .

tc

and other social cleavages within thcy or

SOcialism

St

Y fought

Fmally, there are the numerous s .e war zone 3 , often mask

nities in post-1945 states: communitieceshston wars f ~ u h

t ed es t at

ha

g t b

m egrat mto that larger communty th Ve

not

b y commu-

colonial rule. The Biafra armed se

1

.

at sought

indeen

successfully

cesston E

ePend

Lanka, the Sikhs in the Pun

1

ab th ' ntrea

th

ence from

I e several

le

' e Ta ls

movements

by

the Karen, Chin, Mon, and othngthy armed

m,

. in Sri

er

groups

. resistance

3 ~ ~

For example, the Sendero Lumino:.o arme d . . -uuar,

based largely

among

dis.lffectcd

groups

of n ~ f a n s n s m g p d u n n g the l9 U\

m

eru. Vl>

ai\Q 1

99:

was

26

Wars

of he

third kind

the Christian and animist population's struggle to tear away from

Muslim Sudan, Bougainville's secession fight against the central

authorities of Papua New Guinea, and an independence movement

within Senegal are just some of the

many

examples. Alt hough of later

f'origin, ( many of these conflicts are similar to wars of "national

liberation" because they

are

driven

by

a

community that

seeks to

create its own state. They involve resistance by various peoples

against domination, exclusion, persecution, or dispossession of lands

and resources, by the post-colonial state. We can term these state

nation wars. }

These kinds of war concern, ultimately, the question of statehood

and

the

nature of community within states. They are very different

from the kinds of issues that drove most wars

in

eighteenth- and

nineteenth-century Europe. While many of them

have

become inter

nationalized through foreign intervention, questions about statehood

and

state-nation relations, and

not

Cold

War

strategic competition,

centrally define them. Since these are

wars about

states rather than

about international politics,

and

since

most

have

been

fought in

what

used to be called the Third World, we might also expect that the

European-based norms

and

styles of warfare

would

not be duplicated.

This is indeed

the

case.

If

eighteenth-

and

nineteenth-century European

wars

were characterized by etiquette, rules, and formal sequences

(crisis, war declaration, military defeat, followed by a negotiated

peace), wars about states have

had

very different characteristics.

War

since 1945 has become de-institutionalized. We are debating, then,

not

only a very different geography and typology of

armed

conflict, but

also

very

different forms of war.

Before exploring the etiology

of

wars

about

states,

w

need to show

how wars

have changed

in

strategy, tactics,

and

rules.

War

s

of

the

"third

kind" (Rice 1988)

bear

little relationship to the Europe an wars

of

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

or

to

the

total wars

of

the first

half

of

the twentieth century. The main criteria for distinguishing

forms of war are: (1) the purposes

of

war; (2) the role

of

civilians

during

wartime; and (3) the institutions

of

war. The

dur

a tion

and

phases of war,

as

the opening paragraphs

of

this chapter demonstrated,

are also fundamentally different. When two or more of these criteria

change fundamentally,

we

can say that there

has

been a transformation

of war. Typical wars of the late twentieth

and

early twenty-first

centuries

bear about

as

much

relationship to their eighteenth-century

predecessors

as

Louis XIV's wars related to the

marauding

mercenary

27


6/24

~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

'-

The

state

war and the state of war

J

-form the war from a local t . .

taking. Clearl the d en erpnse mto a vast transnational under-

war. y, uel

or

ballet analogy has

no

role in this kind

of

What else is so diffe t

fr .

urposes

ohrrmed rill.iren

om prev1ous eras? Mostly it is the

ith limit d -

~ t :

War as

an instrument of

a

f o r e i ~

po_ g

.- -.. . e goals lS not necess

I

h . -

ought o - f ~ ~ ~ r v ~ orestabl1Sh a an y t

s a ~ e p h e n o m e n a ~

as

w ~ r

entury, the colllillmuty h

commumty\Smce the early

mneteenth

Wars of

n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i : ~ ~ u a ~ l ~

b ~ n


7/24

The state war

and

the state ofwar

~ t e r e s t s , identities, psycholo

; ~ a _ l are involved. War in t i c ; : . ~ ~ r e ~ n d state C rt.>ation and sur-

as ~ e e n not mere ly a means f ' _wntes John Kttgan (1993: 56)

a vehtcle th h .

0

resolvmg int. . '

th roug which the embitter .l'rstate disputes but

also

e earth, and the hungry ed, the dispossesstd th ked

f

th . masses . , e na o

thetr anger, Jealousies

and

pent-u yeammg to breathe free, express

us tend to be nasty bruti h P urge to violence " p

1

,

s , and lo eop es wars

b

mce

~ e ~ e

wars

of a third

kin

ng

(Roberts 1993: 214

).

volve

CIVIlia

b d are

fundam II

fter killing

nsd

as . oth combatants and . e ~ t a y about people, and

, an matmin . VIchms thei r . I

figures are staggering: 1 0 ~ ~ O t h e . waves of r e f u g ~ s th mam egacy

Kashmir

about th

' Hindu s esca . .

ey

create. The

half million seekine same number of Oss t ~ m g the on-and-off war in

g safe h e tans flee G .

Azerbaijan; about th aven from the w b mg eorgia; one-

r

.. e same n b ar etween A d

aJma - an

area

th h

urn

er in

L b

.

rmema

an

ey ad

inh

b

1

ena 200 00

mvasion of 199S

600

000

a Ited for centu . ' ' 0 Ser bs left

Yugoslavia,

with'

another have l ~ f t the

B a l k a ~ e s

.-after

the

Croatian

hanging on in

the re

. three million displ d smce the

collapse

of

gton two

milli

ace fr h .

slaughter

in

Rwanda

' on refuge fr om t

etr

homes

but

Z

' mostly cam es

om th

19

atre

and

mill" ped

out

. e 94 genocidal

. , IOns

more from

th

m netghb

tion (Gelb 1994

6

) . e Various " ormg Tanzania and

L k continuin g Wars of

an

a,

Sudan and

Ta ki m

My ' - national

debilita-

'

JI stan

(B

-uuar

C b

I n ~ e ~ a t i o n a l Red Cross

fi

res roWn 1993: 17), am odia, Iraq, Sri

mtlhon displaced

p e r s o ~

f , there Were 23 1994,

according

to

uprooted from their hom , or a total of aim on refugees and 26

Qu

'b, . es as a result ost 49 . .

. e ecms

des

Relations Intem ati of Wars of th .

mtlhon

people

rwar s

of

the third

kind h onales

1995:

1 A e third

kind (Centre

syst em since 1945 Th . ave predomm ' yoob 1995 174)

B .

ey

persist and . ated

in

th

e c a ~ s e m many regions of the Will continue . t e international

relation of the state to t ts World the issue mf o the future Why?

I constitu o st . .

peop es has

not been settled w"th d ent nations atehood

and

the

states

-not

in the military I e-colonizaij communities d

. sense, but on. In

. ,

an

~ r e and will be the locales of w a ~ terms of legi . Particular,

weak

m ~ g h t be settled once and for all -

Jo e x t e n ~ c y and

efficacy

w ~ l l often be by

armed combat

To a

Ubtous

pro . those

issues

will

be

the case it is n . underst and hpoSltion

at

b .

' ecessary to exa .

w

y this

est

- 1t

~ o d e m

states. The sources of

present

Il'tine the b has been and

different European

and

Th d W and futur Irth and

natu

format ion Ir orld experi e

War

lie .

re

of

. ences of

statem

~ h e very

btrth and

4

----1

3 The formation

o

states before 945

Wars

of the

third kind

have

numerous unique qualities. Their histories

vary, as do their outcomes- defeat of

insurgents

in Malaya, victory in

Algeria,

stalemate in Kashmir

and

the

Sudan -

but they have

a

common source: the definition of a legitimate political

community

and

the search

for statehoodf'D:.e

mystiques of statehood

and

nationality

drive today's wars,

just as balances

of power,

successions, searches for

hegemony, and

rivalry

over

colonies

drove most

eighteenth-century

wars.(fhe end

of the Cold War has not

brought

a new world

order

because that rivalry

was largely

irrelevant

to a much

more funda

mental historical process, the definition

and

determination of legiti

mate community

from imperial to

other forms, and the

transformation

'

of

a

heterogeneity

of political

organizations into

a single format, the

, lOdem

s t a ~ o understand

why we will

continue to have

wars

of the

third kind in future years,

we

need to have a better understanding,

first, of the origins, the drive for, and forms of political community and

statehood and, second, of the difficulties facing many new states.

The

process

of state-formation in Europe has become an area of

increased

research by historical sociologists

and

political scientists

during the past several decades. We now have a reasonably rich

literature

that generalizes across many eras and locales and

develops

a

variety

of perspectives

(cf.

Tilly 1990; Hal11986; Rasler and

Thompson

1989; Ruggie 1993). While

narratives

and

explanations

by no

means

agree on details

and

emphases, there is a

general

consensus that the

development of the state format of political organization

was

a lengthy

process, that it took many forms and trajectories, and that political

elites between the fifteenth and twentieth

centuries

did not have an

overall

plan or

model they were trying

to create (cf.

Smith

1986: 239;

Tilly 1990: 194).

4


8/24

The

state,

war, and

the state o

war

~ . t h e year 1200,

Europe

was carved .

pohtical forms, a heterogeneous II . up mto a hotch-potch of

"ti

1 co echon f t b

ct es, e c ~ estastical proto-states, duk o

n

utary empires,

free

Arab

tribal organizations m edoms, hereditary kinidoms

and

(

19904 part s of S fA

0

'

5), a mmtmum of 80 distin t . . pam. c c o r d i n ~ to

Tilly

500 d d" c pohtical t

'

epen mg

upon how one defi um s and a maximum

of

th

nes a p

rr

e continental

landscape

On

av

0

1

leal

organization

dottedb 1 erage

1 ,

a

out

6,000

square

kilomete rs th . , a ru er controlled an area of

9 ~ 0 Europe

had been

e d u ~ e d ~ o s : of c o n t e ~ p o r a r y El Salvador.

?rms. the modem territ orial natio eteen umts

that

took only two

tional e T n-state a d h

mpue.. wo decades later, th n . t e dynastic multina-

~ ~ : : ; ; s e d , l e a ~ m g only the single form:t multinational empires had

S .

and

Stalm resurrected a new form f of the territorial state until

f ovtet Union. Europe

moved

from extr o multinational

empire

in the

h ~ : ~ ~ ~ n : ~ ; o ~ : ~ ~

about

five c e n : ~ ~ ~ e ~ o g e n e i t y

of

political

Andorra, Liechtenstein

u::he

form of n o n ~ e r e ~ w r e ~ ~ n t s

of

that

cies

and

destinati f ' d ~ o n a c o , but they entities

such as

Authors

do

otns

or tounsts

rather than madre

pnmarily

dependen-

no

agree

on

all

th

0

ern so

development of them d e conditions th vereign state s.

o em state

fo at

ti

1

the relative continental . I t' rmat, hut am s mu

ated

the

1so a ton fro . ong th .

world (although the Ottoman E . m Imperial

0

em we can hst

large parts of east

and

central ~ I r e ~ o s t

s u ~ e e : e r

c ~ n t e r s of the

common Christian culture, and ~ p e

m

the sevent ed m embracing

replacement of elite Latin b e development eenth century) , a

44-7) Y mass vern of p

The devel opment of citi acuiars cf nnt and the

(Tilly 1990),

and

the c o n c e n t r a t i ~ s ~ a t fostered c a ~ : O d e r s o n 1983a:

as the lie de France, Castile, and ; ol an ethnic elite 1 al ~ c c u m u l a t i o n

were also critical sources of the t e ;7 (Smith 9 8 ~ o ; e

m

areas such

. The previous chapter emphasized t ~ : t state. . 41; Smith 1989)

m the formation of states As

Anth

G war

also

Pla

ony

iddens

Yed

a m .

The European state syste (1987: 112) aJor role

ment in which the

absolu:t:: ' t

not

simply the

suggests,

~ h e condition, and in s u b s t a n t i a ~

a;;

n a t i o n s t a t e ~ O l i t i c a l environ-

evelopment. It

was war, and pre ara p'ee the v eveloped.

It

was

~ o s t potent energizing stimulus for ;:ons for

wa SOUrce

of

that

hbve lres?urces

and fiscal reorganizatione

h c o n c e n t r t i ~ t Provided

the

a so uhsm.

at chara

of

ad

. .

tninistra-

Indeed, one could make the case

that

. . . (cf.fiowar:e rise of

were

born through

war and tin'

a Significant llla

1976: 55)

con ued to centr '''- )Otity of

""Ze aft states

4 anned

The formation of states before

1945

~ - c o m b a t { I n

France, England, Spain, Russia, Germany, and elsewhere,

civil wars

between

centralizing monarchs

and

local and regional

power

centers characterized historical development for

c e n t u r i ~

French kings subjugated local authorities through a variety of means,

both persuasive (bribery of various forms)

and

coercive. Occasionally,

resistance took the form of civil war (the Fronde of the mid-seventeenth

century). Peter

the

Great

subdued the

boyars

through

military cam

paigns and mass executions. British kings confronted

armed

nobles

through coercion, bribery, and various forms of

armed

pacification.

Under

the influence of Richelieu and Colbert, French kings system

atically destroyed the fortifications of cities

and

nobles. They were

replaced by fortifications

on

the periphery of France. By the early

1700s, the French population had been effectively disarmed (Tilly 1990:

69) and thus incapable of serious resistance against expanding central

authority.

Fixed and delimited territorial boundaries are a relatively recent

invention.

Throughout most

of human history,

the

territorial

base

of

political jurisdictions

was at

best fluid. There were vast grey areas of

overlapping

jurisdictions

(and thus

frequent quarrels) of uncertain

domains. Patrimonial realms were not the same as the carefully

delimited

and defended

frontiers of today. Until

the

late seventeenth

century, Europe included vast open spaces where goods, people, and

ideas could migrate

without

reference to citizenship

or

origins. State

core areas were separated from the peripheries by wastelands, forests,

or

farm areas

that

were difficult to traverse. Even as late as

the

1790s it

took eleven

days to

travel by coach from Paris to Marseilles (Braudel

1990); a trip from Moscow to St. Petersburg

was

a major undertaking.

But the peripheries

were

also the routes for foreign invasions. To

define a realm

more precisely- and

thj;refore to be able to

defend

it

..----

better - lineal frontiers were drawn.( The move from frontiers to

borders, from amorphous zones to mutually agreed upon demarcated

lines, did

not

occur until well into t he eighteenth centux:rj The first

surveyed lineal boundary in Europe was recorded in a treaty in 1718

(Giddens 1987: 90). As the central authorities

began

to organize their

realms vertically by undermining or destroying local power centers,

they also began to organize their horizontal space. By the early nine

teenth century,

most

of the states of Western Europe

were

well defined

in terms of sovereign jurisdiction. The actual delimitation of frontiers

was

as

often

as not

the result of

wars

and their resulting peace treaties.

A province, duchy, or region was dismembered from one state and

43


9/24

The state war

and

the

state ofwar

annexed to its neighbor Th

th rough th

t

e ~ ,

uncertainly defined "realm , e

I

tt>tnth to nuwtt>tnth centuries,

onal states. s becamt spt'(ilic,JIIv loc.1ted terri-

State-making was .

some h essentially an int 1

ll

monarc s were to learn) B

ema

undert.Jking

(or

ordeal,

as

a

owed

central th . . ut to the e t h .

t

.

au

onties to t x

ent

t .1t 1t succeeded it

axahon of va . ex ract ever . - . '

. .

nous

forms. Th

-mutasmg

nvenuts through

centraliZation

pr

ese

revenues

tions thr ou ocess by expandin a . . Wl're used to further the

sove . , ghout the realm. Th g dmtnlstratiw .md judicial

institu-

reign s armed mi h ey Were al

domestic

g

t. State-makin

so

used to increase the

concern Rous g thus w

captures the t. _seau's con_cept f th , as not a matter solely

of

exernal

c .. o e sec .t d"l , .

~ o v e r e i g n s disami.e(f ~ I \ S e q _ u ~ C : e s of the

un

Y

. ~ e m m a

mcely

mcreased

th

thetr populati

state-makmg

process: as

etr capacity f ons

and 1

This

was

perceived b tnaintainin au

s s e ~

power centers, they

copied the centraliz Y neighbors as a g t t ~ o n t y within the

realm.

critically impor t t mg practices of t h p ~ enhal threat.

They

therefore

an to th eir com .

John Hall (1986:

1

64-S e state-makin peht ors . Emulatio

was

barbarians on the peri ~ ~ p u t

it:

e;/rocess

cf.

Waltz

1979). As

to surv ive. Peter t h pGenes; states Inustires

don't

need

to copy

the

e reat's . copy h

one of the more d .

SOJOUrn .

eac

other

if they want

h" b . . ramatic t l

zncognuo

. A

s

1

P

uddmg crafts in

0

d a es of e"'ul . m msterdam is Just

b R . , r er to bUi} ... ation H

ay . ussta s enemies in the no d a naval fl e studied Dutch

Emptre. His model for th

Rrth

and south Seet capable

of

holding at

count erpart, Frederick als e ussian state ' Weden and

the

Ottoman

model the disparate a ~ d n o ~ - ~ : w .France a s w ~ s France.

His

Prussian

~ h a n

a century later, Japan senttiguous rea1mse ~ t a t e upon

which

to

.urope to copy state instituti numerous " o Brandenburg. More

tions of p ons and research

. russia Germany. Fo

mPartiCU}

commissions"

to

ef(ective centralization th . r reasons ar the milita . . -

. ' e

s t a t e m a ~ ~- ~ . . .

nl"estige ry mstitu

CIOn. d

c

d

Wh

- . . elense

an

at 1s

'

ti I ~ u s s _ m g from this narrativ ? l..- -llta sense a chain

I

ca

soenhsts who

ha e. vlost

his

~ : ~ ~ : : : / n a t e r i a _ l i s ~ s ~ = y

s : : ~ ~ ~ s ~ e s t a t ~ ~ s ~ o l o g i s t s

and

IOns, pnnting, vernacular Ian e caPital an:tion process in

1

gtlages

coerci

In some respects, howev . and the on, war,

T er, empues did

slow d

ttary tactics

and

equipment. Caval

c o p ~ S 1Tte

Of

evelop-

arlter groups

who

at th . ry

and

stirrups

their

b

b b e time were c . w r . al'ba .

ar arian. I

am

grateful to the an onstdered b

liitrOd.uc

nan adversaries'

pomt. ony mou s externaly the Jn,.; ed by

M:o

I

e x a _ ~ r civi iz

. ngo s and

Of

this ations to be

44

study for the

The formation

of

states before 1945

ment

of administrative capacities. They miss the ideas

and myths that

sustain

the legitimacy of political orders

and

the communities on

which those orders are

a s e ~ i s t o r i c a l l y

leaders of political commu

nities have based their right to rule on combinations of religion (as for

example in the doctrine of divine right of monarchy), virtue, inheri

tance, special achievement (particularly heroism in war), race, lineage,

and

as in

the

myths

to justify European

and

American imperialism, the

paternalistic ideas

inherent in

"civilizing missions." Until

the

late

eighteenth century,

European

princes

based

their rule

on

a combina

tion of these, collectively

known

as the dynastic principle under which

hereditary rulers passed on their possessions to offspring with the

blessing of the Holy See and other monarchs. The communities over

which they ruled were defined as groups of subjects often sub

identified

by

creed. But

under

the influence of the Enlightenment,

questions began to be raised about both the sources of political

authority within the state and the nature of the community over which

state rule is exercised. For the next century, two new ideas among a

number of

older

ones became

paramount

in defining

the

political

community

and

the right

to

rule over it: citizenship

and

nationality.

2

The community of citizens

We do not need to elaborate on the change of legitimizing

myths

or

principles underlying democratic claims of a right to rule. t is well

known: the American and French revolutions substituted the concept

of

popular

sovereignty for divine right

and

its attending beliefs and

doctrines of succession and royal mystique based

on warrior

and other

achievements. What is less understood in terms of its importance for

international politics

and war,

is the change in definitions of political

community, that is, the specification of who, precisely, is to be counted

as a member of the political order and on what basis.

2

Anthony Smith makes a similar distinction: Western civic

and

Eastern (German)

cultural-national bases of authority. The civic concept contains four elements:

(1)

a

territorial referent

( homeland )

as repository of historic memories and associations;

(2)

the idea of

patria

a

community

of laws

and

institutions;

(3)

a sense of legal equality;

and (4) a measure of common values and traditions. The Eastern concept is based on

birth regardless of political context. To define oneself, there is a

need

for a pre

historical reality" - a reference to a people that existed before the state, as well as

culture and ethnicity (Smith 1991: 9ff). I question whether items 1 and 4 are critical in

immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia. Legal equality,

in

my view, is the

crucial

component

of the civic basis of political community.

45


10/24

The state war and the state of

war

{After the

Thirty

Years W .

tions, the specificati

f

ar until the American and French

revolu

d

. . . on o communt d. :i

efinition of community h

1

Y tc

. not pns ent a problem. he

on the basis of th li . ad been settled

m

the Trl'aties of Westphalia

e

re

gton of the

w1th the prince's sub pnnce. The

community

was identical

co )eets, whose prim i

mmuruty was formed h . ary tc entity was faith.

he

- - m ~ r r i a g e s .

This

was

a s s u ~ s t ~ n c a l l y

through wars,

successions,

and

vam among the writin e rather than debated. lOne searches n

ti

f gs of Hobbe d L

on o community

C .

s an ocke for

some

other

specifica-

tu . unously alth h .

na re was universal im

1

. oug thetr

metaphor

of the state of

c?ntest the actual l m ts fp Y ~ g world government, they did not

eighteenth

0

terntorial d.

. . . -century Europ Wh JUns tchon

of

seventeenth- and

md

diV

1

duals in order to se; ether the social contract was between

uals and th up a sovere

L .

d

e state-Leviathan (H tgn ocke), or between indtvt

rea ers would obbe ) th

C

easily identify th . s ' e

authors

assumed thetr

ommonwealth e affiliati f

England of th to use Hobbes's te ons

0

these individuals.

The

In e mid-seventeenth

rrn

was

understood

to mean the

contract theo th century.

plied b th

ry

e state

is

th .

There s n :

= h e r s

making up h ~ e c a t i o n of

n d i v i d u a l

will, multi-

based on inte enl

ce

to groups a

~ m m u m t y

or commonwealth.

rest, angu , ssociatio . .

executive co . age, culture ns, or other collechvities

rnmittee f , or othe b

matter of will d

0

the people

' t .

r ~ t t n utes. The state

is

the

rna e a '

1

Is

their

responsible for th SOCial contract . crea tion . If all have as a

contract, while

; : u l ~ s . There

c ~ o ~ f o l l ~ w ~ ~ h a t all are

equally

special privileges fail to

do so

a be md1v1duals who make a

reexe .

The mdiVidualisrn f mpt from It, or

who have

citizen.

The c o m m u n i ~ contract theory tr

territorially bounded ' then,

is

defined . anslates to the concept of the

h realm

On 10

term . .

ng ts and responsibil'ti . ce attain d s of c1t1zenship within a

Th

d

1

es for

Ind' . e '

Citiz

h'

1

e I ea of the citiz

IVIdual

ens Ip

provides

equa

I

. en wasd s.

revo uhon.

It

is often f eveloped .

Declaration of the R i g h ~ : g o t t e n that the

~ : r

to and during the French

subsequent years the r e v ~ { u ~ n

and

the C ~ ~ a l Assembly drafted the

b a s ~ on wealth ( active a n ~ ~ ~ e s e s t a b l ~ ~ ~ e n (1789). Although in

dehberate ly excluded servant Passive . . d Various qualifications

to be equal. But who were th s

:nd

o m e : ~ e n s

and

education and

assume? rather than argued i ; , ~ ~ Was

n ~ : :

theory all citizens 'were

of the kmg.

Citizens

matter of d b

R

. Were

t e ate.

It

was

estdence in the French n

ti

0

be the

fo

b ts

a

on

(c

rmer su ec

omxn.UOi

6 ly), after th

e age of twenty

The

formation

of states before 945

one, automatically warranted citizenship. Birth

and

residence in the

nation, rather than privilege mediated through the monarch, became

the basis of equal rights (Fitzsimmons 1993: 31). The Revolution

destroyed or abolished all subnational jurisdictional boundaries and

corporate distinctions. This left the citizen face to face

with

the state;

there were no more buffers (Brubaker 1992: 45). But since, theoretically,

it

was

citizens

who now made

the laws, buffers

were no

longer

necessary. Most significant, whatever the debates and changes in the

formal qualifications of citizenship, they were

not

based

on

some

concept of nationality, religion, language (very few Frenchmen

could

read

the Declaration of

the

Rights of Man

and the

Citizen in French),

or ethnicity. Indeed, in the first version of the citizenship concept,

foreigners residing in France were included. The community, then, is

defined

in

terms of citizenship achieved by all people residing within

the traditional territorial unit called France, the United States,

or

whatever.

Humans

form all sorts of associations for different purposes,

be

they economic, religious, familial, political, athletic, or others. In the

concept of the citizen, rights

and

responsibilities transcend such

associations. Individuals cannot be put into permanent categories; to

do

so implies either special privileges

or

special exclusions. Rights,

then, are enjoyed equally regardless of a citizen's location, ethnic

origins, language, beliefs, sentiments, or affiliations. A naturalized

Canadian of Chinese birth has exactly the same rights and duties as a

native-born Canadian. The Canadian-Chinese may be marginalized

economically, or discriminated against (illegally) in various associa

tions, but he

or

she stands in exactly the same relationship to the state

as any other Canadian. It is this legal equality that is supposed to

provide the glue for society. Questions of identity, personal associa

tion, language, religious practices,

and other

issues are left

to

the

individual to organize or experience privately. They are beyond the

purview of the state.

But

not

all individuals find citizenship

an

adequate basis for commu-

nity. It is individualistic, abstract, and ultimately taken for granted. A

second definition of the political community seeks to provide the

emotional and sentimental glue that citizenship and popular sover-

eignty lack.

47


11/24

The state war

and

the state of war

he

onunu

y

The literatur

m

o

nationals

eon nati I

going.3 Defini . ona

Ism

is vast th, . .

1

tions abound ' l dlb.1tes .nt tunous and

on

face t?

wade into the thi:k

ats Oudo

moral

judgments.

This

is not

the

ormation proc . e r cone

P

. ess

m

Europe d . lm

1s

to

compare

the

state-

rocess m oth

unng

the .

1

h .

th

. er parts of th

pas alt-mdlennium

with

the

ese differ e World

1 .

Mo t ences relate to the in

"d

' most y smcc I Y-t5, and to see how

s contemporary Cl ence of war.

members of the analysts agree th . . .

expressed

fi

t b state, nationalism . at as a

scnllment

bmdmg

did not beer s y political elites m this a recent phenomenon.

t

was

orne a

gr

e era of th F

century ass-roots se ti e rcnch revolution but

n ment u n .

Prior to this time n

1

well mto the nineteenth

England, Spain ~ : e a s a n t s of eighteent

themselves P ~ a r i l other European d h - c e ~ t u r y France, Germany,

between the

pe

Y

as

Christians

If

ynashc territories identified

. . asant and there

pnmanly

in the fo the king

was

any political nexus

a subject of

this

m of tax paYment'

Thqueen,

Prince, or

duke,

it was

or that . ere w

e ~ p e r o r but

peasants and Pnnce or local as a vague

sense

of being

bemg a member of a , . many toWns magnate,

or of

a distant

there were any secular

~ t i o n : _in

the mc :ople

were not

conscious of

local. Consider the F chdentities that h ern sense (Pfaff 1993 61)

If

F ren c ad r

_ranee in 1664 was d i v ~ s e . po ltical impact, they were

ms1de the area kno lded by

in

welded wn as the ternal cu t

mto a customs . mq

gr

08

s oms barriers except

P?rtion of northern

F r a n ~ o ~

by Colbe;es fennes which

had

been

Plcardy. French a u t h o r i t i ~

ut

: x c l u d e d B ~ a t

area covered a good

gund

y and cons1d nttany

"f . VIrtually the

wh

1

erect

t h ~ and

large parts of

ore1gn Th o e f ~ . . . are

(

ey were legally France as, along with Bur-

except Burgundy) b Part

of

th south fBraude) 19

88

.

68

'

ut

in fact

fore

e heredita

0

t ~ e

Loire,

as

France: .

).

Braude) (1988: 7 ~ r collntriesy terntorial realm

Wfit.,., (see

the map

in

of

~ o r

~ h a l l we

find

unity

whe

eighteenth-century

f i n ~ _It- at the level of politic:e

We

Il\i.ght

pohhcal center ever succeed _

PDwer.

N

ha"e

expec

.

ed Ill

Unf>os

0

Btructu

. ted m theory to

A

useful

summary and analysis is

in 01 W lll.g Unity

; ~ g force

from

the

natJonahsm 1s h

1

e aev q'

act

. , never e

ess,

based h . er et al lVersity h" h

expenences. English-language stud

eavdy

on the E

1993:

ch

w C

where

are

rare cf. Norbu 1992) Jes of the t i o i ~ Ur >Jlean . 2). lhe literatu

. ~ ~ f ~ reoo

0

l"llls of Orth American

48

llation 1

a Ism else-

The formation

of states before

1945

seemed

to

have ineradicable vitality. No sooner was it disciplined

than it broke out again: neither political, social nor cultural order ever

contrived

to foist

more than surface unity on the whole.

He continues when describing the centuries-long efforts of French

royalty to bring unity to the realm:

But what difficulties, obstacles, forces of inertia and counterpowers it

had

to

face

From its long past, it inherited a farrago

of

disorgani

zation, confusion, downright impotence. French society was by no

means under the

firm

hand of the state, far from it There could be

no such thing as an even halfway unified society in France until the

French nation had been forged - something that

is

still so recent that

we almost think of it as accomplished within living memory.

Until the late nineteenth century, France

was

a geographical expression

and

a territorial state, but

not

a nation. That key indicator of a nation

a

common language

-

was

a creation of

the

French state

between

1536

when

Francis I declared it

the

official language, and today. In between,

France was a congeries of local dialects

and

patois. In a

published

account in 1707, an English traveler claimed that "it is no less difficult

for a peasant from these parts [southern France] to make a speech in

French

than

it would be for a newly-landed Frenchman

to speak

English

in England"

(quoted in Braudel 1988: 86). At the time of the

French Revolution - often claimed to

be

the first great manifestation of

French

nationalism-

one-half of France's citizens

spoke no

French, and

only

about

12

percent spoke

it

properly (Hobsbawm

1990: 60).

According to Braudel, in

the

eighteenth

century

the dialects

spoken by

the French

peasantry

generally extended no

more than

7 kilometers.

Even as late as

the

mid-ninetee nth century, few

peasants

in

Languedoc

could speak

French. Eugene Weber's (1976)

study, Peasants

into

Frenchmen: The

Modernization of Rural

France

1870-1940,

based

on

empirical materials, argues

that most rural

and

small-town dwellers

in

France

did not

conceive of themselves as

members

of

the

French nation

until the late nineteenth century.

What Weber has chronicled for France is supported for other

European groups

by Walker Connor (1990: 92-103). In his

study based

on

American

immigrants'

self-identification

between

1840 and 1950,

some startling results appear. Luxemburgers, for example, identified

themselves as Germans throughout the nineteenth century. Ukrainians

had

no

idea what Ukraine meant; they identified themselves as Rusyns

and Ruthenians, and

not

infrequently

as

Russians and Poles. Mace

donia

was

non-existent as a social

and

sentimental community. Im-

49


12/24

The

state war and the

state

of

war

migrants from the Austr

terms of o-Hungari,ln

f

regtons, valleys and

1

t:mp.lrl' ldtnlllll'd themselves in

o Alba c '

owns

rua, onnor 1990 9

6

)

1

.

' not

sonw

"n,ttinn.tlitv."

Writing

g

overnme t 1 c

a1ms it

.

n c atms to

th

. Is not t'\"tn \ t t. d te

e contrary: . t a n.t wn, esp1

[l)t is not at all cert .

welded

the high am that a single Alb .

cultu . and Gegs a d .1111.111 l n n - . . . t o u ~ r w s s has truly

re,

mduding

. n

more

south

1 .

1

.

consequenti

1

SOcial organizati

1

r \ o-.b. Mfert'nces m

two peopl a are readily percept"blon,

1rt

pronounnd Far more

es, a

fonnd

1

e phvs1

1 J f

commo I able b c.t u1 ltnrKt>s behn>en the

n ancestry th arner to th, . .

at the govern t

me

uk.1t1on of the

myth

of

Th

" ment so

ls s

1

J

1

e nation as a uous y cult1vates.

vintage

in

most

parts

:ass-roots

phenomen .

only if

we

look at li Europe. Its

ped

o ~ , then, 1s of very recent

. e tes . tgree 1s

r ~ : _ eator of F

zec JOurnalists. Politi

1

kings

Se

rench nationalism as

symbols, invented doctrine

c(a

leaders

and

rbian

prime

ministers,

drew

in s

self-d.,..-

movem

grass-roots support ~ ~ t m i n a t i ents manipulated

ranged

from develop ing con ers to sustain on, national

honor)

and

(d.

~ a m i l l e r i

and

Falk 1992: ~ ~ t s the

\Vel

their objectives,

~ h i c h

~ m p i _ r e . For the inclusiveness of. th

Smarck setare

state to

making

war

mptre, he substi tuted the exclus e

lOOse, dec

out to create a German

t h ~ : i ' ~

a German race P f a ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ of t h e ~ : a l i z e d

Holy

Roman

h

e.

east of the sources of m .

46).

rman state

based

on

was

c romcled

by

many durin ass Oatio .

Ieonie wars

Th

g the Frennl..

llalism

w

. ese wars were ins -..

1

rev l . as War itself t

dynastic regime's

deliberates ~ m e n t a l

. o Utionary d N .

The

nation in

arms

eparation of the n breakin an apo-

without popular

sen un

onctelpt

could not l . . ~ t a t e

al'll\y

g down the

.

en

a

and

.

'l


13/24


14/24

The

state

war and th

est te of rmr

the

result

of

wh t I ha many millums of

I

I

a ve said [T] J't t'P

1

''

tlwtr hllflt.'S raised by

accord . me llllr 1

1

..

ance

w

1

th th . tmt r.u.-... .1 'lllt >ltlln [m Pans] m

that G esc pnnoplt l 1

.

reat

Britain F

s

Hll .un m d

wtth

the

statement

oblig

ti or rann h .

h

a .on. I tell them b . .1\

1

'

1'11lt'rtd 1111


15/24

The

state

,

War

and

r '\ . .

r ~ on. Colonial and So t d . . t .

had been

reasonabl h .... ~ conunum .

Vie

a mmls

ra

from South As y omogeneous ~ e s _ w h e r e formerly there

1a were trans uu\lnities

H'

d

ibbean

15

lands Chin ported to Gu m

us

and Muslims

ese Ja Yana

p--

laborers migrated . ' panese, Korean S '

1

)

1

, and several Car-

m waves t th , amo .

Hawaii. Russians

were tr

0

e Amen . an, and Okinawan

lies, and restless (anti-c

a n s p ~ r t e d

to the Cencantr liDperial domain in

ommUTIISt} " al A

were liquid ated forceful . natives" th Stan Sov1et repub-

, y asslffiilated ere and .

(d.

Lemaitre

et

al. 199

2

:

123

) . , or earned m the Caucasus

areas where they had not x i s t ~ ~ ~ t i e s

Were ff

o distant locales

The

main

point is

clear th pl

rev1ously.

us often

created

in

1

. . ecooni 1

re ationship to any pre-coloru 1 a_ territorial .

1

. . a efuni

l lnit

b

1

.

re 1g10us communities or polt'ti

1

c, reJip-;

0

ore 1ttle or no

ca syst

o

us pol' .

There were, of course, excepti ems. , 1tical, social, or

mated historical, precolonial p o ~ : Some coloni

Rwanda, Morocco Egypt T u n ; ~ cal entities z es actually approxi-

lnd ' m.:o1a, a few f tmbab

ochma, Burma, plus most small . l o the form We, Swaziland,

over and their historic territorial W: and Colonies er Soviet republics ,

known, which was not always the ca:) the e x t : ~ r e simply taken

ere

acceptedthat they were

6 as the colonial

The creation of states

since 1945

boundaries. Somethi ng akin to states, defined by Harik (1990: 5) as an

established authority which enjoys jurisdiction over a core territory

and people

for

an extended period

of time," existed

in most of the

Arab

world

prior

to the

nineteenth century. Oman,

he

argues (p. 17},

goes

back

as a

separate

political

unit

to

the eighth

century. The

Asante

in Africa, if

not

yet a state

when

colonized, constituted a national-type

society

on

its way

toward

becoming a nation-state. I t possessed

known boundaries,

a central

government with

police

and

army,

consequent law and order,

an

accepted national language; and beyond

these

it even

possessed,

by

the 1880s, an

emergent middle

class capable

of envisaging the role of capitalist entrepreneur (Davi dson 1992: 75).

Whatever the ultimate hopes of Asante development, they quickly

came

to

an

end

with colonial rule.

What of precolonial political organizations? The same generalization

applies:

in

a majority of the colonies there was no political organization

that approximated the territorial jurisdictions established in London,

Paris, St. Petersburg,

and

elsewhere

in

Europe. The colonial authorities

defeated, bribed, coerced, and sometimes exterminated an incredible

variety of political leaderships, ranging from clan elders, tribal chiefs,

hereditary

kingdoms,

and

local sultanates

to

maharajas

and

imam-

chiefs.

Colonial authorities

used

these local political forms and forces

as

the

primary medium for indirect rule. They supported

and worked

through chiefs, caudillos,

and

various types of strongmen who

made

rules and allocated values

among

a variety of ethnic, clan, class, and

functional or

communal

social units (d. Migdal1988: 31-9). The British

in India created political, legal, and social institutions for different

religious, ethnic,

and caste communities when these demonstrated

loyalty to colonial rule. They also recruited their

armed

forces from

martial

races,"

thus

separating

them

from the rest of society (Nafziger

and

Richter 1976: 93). All of this helped sustain colonial rule,

but

it also

hindered the development of a sense of identity

that

corresponded

with colonial territorial divisions. While in some colonies (e.g., India) a

strong sense of nationalism had already developed in the early

twentieth century, in many of the others colonial rule respected some

degree of local autonomy and sustained traditional political structures

specifically so

that

they

would

form poles of attraction and identity in

competition

with the

early "nationalists" who

were beginning

to

think

in European terms (cf. Mazrui 1983: 42)

Much has been written

on

the economic and social depredations and

65

I,


19/24


20/24

The state w

'

r, and

the state o

~ w r

. *

r UY

ational iberati

-1 (

I

~ P o l i t i c a l

legitim

on

l, rule " over 'dacy. refers to the p . . I

the p t 1 an

1

entified politic

I nnup

e(s)

on whteh

the "right to

1 os - 945 stat th a communtt . ,

: alism In es,

e Princi

1 ) ts l'st,Jbhslwd. In many

of

/ , most colo

1

P e was neg

l t i .

. 1 L . .

-"" republics .

rua

territori

\l.

lllt'r,l tontromcoloru

' national lib es, as well a . .

and/or

d'fc eration was

s

m

sonw

former

Soviet

1

1erent rei' . more a

mo

,

exploitation, and ~ g t o n s against W \ enwnt_

of

colored peoples

Nationall iberati raosm, than a p estem or S..wil' domination,

different from ~ n . s t r u g g i e s in the rogram to

build

something nE J

and North

Am .

etr nineteenth-c post -

194

5 world were significantly

of national lib

n c ~

counterparts ~ r y European,

South American,

political rule eration. It

Was

e American

revolution

was a war

B 1 . ' namely a a

war t . .

a tic and East E republican d

0

tnshtute

a

new

kind of

just "national" ~ o p e a n countries sh emocracy . In 1919, many

of

the

the ch erenden ared that . .

/ 1 )

ance to create ce

from.

th .

VISion. They

sought not

) British, or American parliamentary d etr respective

empires

but

also

( \ Europe was for s o m e t h i n m . ? < I e l s ( N a t i o n a ~ ~ o c b racies

based

on the French,

well as aga

g -

p o ~ e r t i o n

h d, mst someth1n

~ u l a r

so

: In

t e Americas

an

Most n ti ...1.gJ

- - . _

Veretgnty - -

a onal I iberati - - .

and

democracy -

as

emphasized the on

m.ovem.

than the . . oppressions

an

ents

in

the .

F pnnctples on

whf..;t:.

d depfed . colomes,

in

contrast,

or

them lib .

u 1

the-- ations f

,toward ' eration was fre J ? O S . t ~ o t o t \ i . o colonialism

rat ler

. . a greater g()a[

Iftn-

. < l _ _ : _ ~ t l y a n -at state should

be

based.

soCiahsm (or . ere

was---

.. _

in

economic tr pnvate markets

i l \ 4 . ~ l 0 a d e ~

. . ttself. not a

means

ansform ti me nn L messa

multitude

f a on, not dem. : S o . . \ i e t . r ge, tt

was

usually

leaders e ~ ~ h s p ~ e c h e s and p o l i t i ( : ~ < 1 ' or

P o p ~ p u b l i c s )

and instant

meaning

an adstzed freedom andrnobiliiiitio ar sovereignty.

The

en

to forei d new n effort b 1b

paper by Uri T gn Offiinati ~ o n . s y 1 eratiOn

a . tmango f on

l

onu.c

. .

emphasized

th t " o the p : o take . opportunities,

1

a

our

strug 1 restden .

JUst

on

1

c ass one it is g e today is

tiai

C e examp

e,

a

d o m i n a t i ~ n

P o ~ struggle of the maS:

l i r n . a ~ u n c i } of

FRELIMO

these m a s s ~ s

( q u ~ ~ = ~ e

~ o ~ ~ i a l i s m , for

fr

of Peopre

a:

~ e o l o g i c a l or

statement

could

have

bee aganc;a and

~ O m

and .

gamst

foreign

national liberation m n made by an allerstei:n ~ d e p e n d e n c e of

more profound rheton?vements. In India Ylof do:1.,.._982: 125). This

c emerged ' a n ~ - -:-'

18

of 1

of

democracy

and

the

1

emphasizi:n

~ a eaders

of

tively

uncommon

c o m p s e c ~ ar state, but

s u ~

the

cti; d

elsewhere,

are to the emphasis o eltJ>ositicat importance

1\''l;\.._ ons

72 ""' l'aij Were rela-

on:

The creation of states since 1945

The leaders of the liberation movements were themselves rarely

elected,

and

once independence

was

achieved they seldom subjected

themselves to popular validation. Frelimo and

dozens of

its

counter

parts became the

post-colonial

governments,

the

sole

legitimate

representatives" of the Mozambique and other national

selves,

by

virtue of waging an efficient mili tary

and

political campaign on behalf

of the colonial

people.

As

in so many

historical societies, rule

came

to be based

primarily

on the

legends

created through war. But there

were

no

organized methods

to

validate the sole

legitimate

representa

tives."

Some

colonies

transformed

themselves into states

with demo

cratic institutions through referenda or plebiscites (Bechuanaland,

Cyprus, Zambia,

French Guinea, Nigeria,

Ghana,

Western Samoa), but

most

achieved

the change

through peaceful transfers to essentially self

proclaimed

and often

unrepresentative

political parties or movements

or through

armed

combat

in wars

of national

liberation."

. International legitimation of post-colonial states

2

l

:(Post-1945 states

were not

created solely

by

armed

national liberation

movements or by the co-opted indigenous elites of the colonial state.

The

United Nations, representing the international community and its

Inorms, was also involved in the state-making r o c e ~ _ s } I t participated in

~ r e e

ways: (1) by defining the territorial extent ana political forms

of

new states; (2) by establishing the philosophical and political ground

rules for de-colonization; and (3)

by

granting membership to the

organization and

providing the

new

states

with a

variety of

life-

support assistance.

The

role of

the United Nations

in

the proposed

1947

partition

of

Palestine

was

the first major effort by the

new

international

organiza

tion to define and

help

create states.

t

failed in this instance;

even if

the

Palestine Liberation Organization succeeds

in

transforming its jurisdic

tion in the Jericho and

Gaza

areas ultimately into a state encompassing

the West Bank as well, it will not have gained as much as the 1947

partition plan envisaged. On hindsight, the rejection of the United

Nations plan was

a major blunder by

the Arabs

and Palestinians.

More

instructive

in comparing

the pre-1919 and post-1945 state-

2

A more elaborate discussion of the role of the international community in creating

and

sustaining post-colonial states, states

imbued

with "negative sovereignty," is pre

sented in Jackson (1990). Some of the points below derive from his seminal discussion

of the problem.

73


21/24

The

state war and th

'

estate of war

making processes .

Eritrea in arti IS the case of the

Ho . . . .

United N pti ~ J a r (Dubois 1994) E . m ot Atnca m general and

colony

a n ~ ~ r i S

m 1 ~ 4 9 because

. a r ~ t n a .

came

to

the attention of the

coloniall e . e wartime Allies wph

of had

Ol't'n a former Italian

gac1es w ' o

were

tl

They

th

f ' ere unable t 1

Y to cilspose of Axis

ere ore h d o agree am

The . an ed over th

ong themselves

on

its

future

orgaruzatio e Issue to th U . .

the problems n set up a comm . e

mted

Nations.

d

o

and

ISSIOn

to t

I

0

1spose of th recomrnend t h rave to f ~ n t r e a examine

e territ o t e G '

agree among th ory. The rnemb eneral Assemb ly how to

emselv ers of the

recommended full

.

es. The Guat comm1ss wn could not

d' mde

emalan

and fl

k

.

Irect trusteeshi B pendence aft a 1stam delegates

. p. urm , er

a

p d

~ I a n confederatio b

as

representar eno of United Nations

five-year perio d Thn ut With the

ri

h IVe proposed

an

Eritrean-Ethio-

E

'tr

. e No . g t

of

the f

n ea mto the Ethi . r w e g ~ a n del ormer to secede

after a

part of the t e r r i t o r y o ~ : a n empire, u t e ~ ~ proposed the integration

of

annexed to Sudan if detached and ft the

proviso

that the western

co_nsensus, the G e n e r a ~ ~ e p t e d by a'

~ e ~ ~

a_

period

of British rule, be

: ~ ~ . t h e

Ethiopian cro ss


22/24

The

state war

' and

the

state ofwar

This interpreta .

ciated

thr

tion of self d

oughout th . - etermination I . I

\was thus to b e hlStory of th '

l.Js

1t>tn consistently enun

/authorization f e solely a vehicl f org.lnl/,ltion. Sdf-detennination

cia

--.

or subseq e

or

de 1

un_nR_timmood uent seces . co oni/,ltion, and notan

an

internation

1 . As

the late

c__

son divtrst groups that mi ht

' and d a organ Jt."Cretary c .

oes not IZation th

U .

.cneral U rn.mt stated

As

Princi 1 accept ' e mted

Nl

. ,

, P e

of

se

.

and I

do

. ' liOns

has

never

accepted

'Buckeit 19 esston of not behev' .t .

the . _ 8:

87).

Th a part of its

c

1

w l ever

accept the

. pomt m fightin e organization Member States" (quoted in

,no support g against

spent ov,

d

to

se . the Kat cr

:)(}()

m1lhon

to

make

anD elsewhere. esstonist movem a n g ~ secession in

1960

and

gave

e-colo ents

In

Tib , '

no int

~ a t i o n was

th et,

B1afra,

Bangladesh,

ernational s . e act of

characteristi ctutiny self-determ .

words, ex

. c ~ of

the

Post

or questionin matJon. There was to be

nity of citk: ly endorsed

c ~ ~ n i a l

state. ~ ~ f U t h ~ territorial or other

source. rather t-\..__ concept of th nted Nations, in other

.. ktl l on c e stat b

The proble

0

11Sanguini e

ased

on a commu

freedom fr m Was that th ty or some other "natural"

. . om

colo

. e

tlni

c_Itizenship

for th

r u a ~ rule

sh ted Nations .

tion was gr e

t e l l ' i t o . . ; ~ ~

ould also b . failed to stipulate that

th anted aim . lQ.l Pop la

.

nng . h .

ey had to d ost aut tion. "

Wtt

1t equal rights of

t th 0

Was Ontati

n

LVtembe

h. .

0

e Principles f PrOclaim th

ca

Y to the rs

1

P m the organiza

e

simple

devic:

United ~ : e l v e s p e a ~ ~ ~ l ~ freed colonies.

All

He new state accept : declaration ons Charter

~ - m g

and

committed

th the new gove e the o b l i g a t i ~ Inade in a fo

18

t ~ e y did through

e mternational

~ e n t s

ruled

ns of

the rmai

mstrument

that

{In 1919, the n : ~ e u u z a t i o n . their

reop?'arter

(Kelsen 19SZ: 67).

external . states f es Was f

rna. scrut iny before tho Eastern

b

o

no

concern to

)Or

powers d ey g

:.Uro

Nations _an thereb s amed di Pe

Were

.

for I .To gam recognitiy ubsequentPlomatic r subJect to intense

e echons . on, th

m-.. ecognr

com . ' evtdence of efc had

to

\..-:tbershi .

1

IOn from the

mitments to

1

ective l t lV P m th L f

possess t protect the

ri

rule

Of

e consti . e

eague

o

state Th he characteristics a

gdhts

of ntin and tutions, schedules

e underly . n hall-.

0

titi as not d

new stat mg prmciple

f ...

tarks es.

In

b . e ' vanous

made

c o ~ s d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p u l a r s o v e r e i ~ t h e

" r i g h ~ ~

t h e

l i b ~ ; ~

they

had to

was denied . upon domestic .

RecOSni.

rule'' . democratic

N

. or VIolated. lillprov-..

ion_

wa ~ t h e post-1919

o such q

rt

-.. en

s

etth

ua I Cations appl d ts Wh er denied or

Ie

to th ere th

p p .

1

76

OSt,194s nnctp

e

countn

es.

o one

The

creation

ofstates since

945

\inquired into the domestic politics of the new states? The United

Nations

did not

carry over the regime for protection of minorities

/ado?ted in the 1920s in Europ., Some members argued specifically

agamst such a regime on the grounds that official recognition of

'

r ~ i n ~ r i t y

status might weaken multi-ethnic st ates (Ryan 1990: 157)(Nor

d1d 1t require any evidence of the validation and legitimation of post

, colonial rule.

If

a

state had been born through

a

war

of national

liberation, it seemingly

had

more legitimacy than one that came into

, being

through

a plebiscite.

Armed

struggle

was

a validation

in

itselV'

FRELIMO, for example, was recognized as the legitimate representa

tive of the Mozambique national "self," not because it

was

elected, but

because it had

proved

itself

by

waging a successful military campaign

against Portugal. The same formula was adopted for Indonesia,

Algeria, Cyprus,

and

all the other states that were born through armed

fcombat. These struggles, then, were not regarded as a traditional war

\under Chapter VII

of the United Nations' Charter.

On

the contrary, the

: "Declaration

on

the Strengthening of International Security" (General

Assembly Resolution 2734, 1977) specifically urged rpember states to

; "increase their

support and

solidarity"

with

violent

n ~ t i o n a l

liberation

: ,movements, which were defined

by

the United N a t i o t ~ as a legitimate

, means of achieving independence from colonialism. ',,

While some jurisdictions legitimated themselves through elections or

plebiscites, most did not. Having been a colony was sufficient qualifi

cation for attaining immediate membership in the United Nations.

' ' There

was

to

be no

international scrutiny of post-colonial political

arrangements

and

practices.

It

was assumed tha t a constitution (some

times drafted with the help of United Nations officials)

and

adherence

to the United Nations Declaration on

Human

Rights (1948) were

_3 fficient to guarantee the full rights of citizenship.)

The United Nations thus validated new s t a ~ s without inquiring

whether

they

met

all four traditional qualifications of statehood:

(1)

a

defined territory; (2) a permanent population;

(3) an

effective govern

ment;

and

(4) the capacity to enter into treaty relations with other

3

Western governments' treatment of the former Soviet republics and socialist states

has

been substantially different, however. Since 1989, they have insisted that all post

socialist states commit themselves to market economies

and

democratic institutions if

they wish to obtain diplomatic recognition and various forms of aid. In the case of

many

of

the

former Soviet republics, the condition

has

been more rhetorical

than

real.

Despite professions of commitment to both principles, the politics of Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan, Georgia, and elsewhere in the former republics

have hardly

become

democratic (Kangas 1994;

and

for further discussion, Holsti 1994).

. j


23/24

The

state

war and the state of war

states.

t

is the

Documents

178018802 Kalevi Holsti the State War and the State of War Select Pages