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N61 - September 13 2007 Published every two weeks /
International Edition
P. 1-4 Politics & GovernmentKREMLINc Viktor Zubkov :
thePetersburg hard core takes overFOCUSc Yuri Chayka, a
publicprosecutor on a tight-rope
DIPLOMACYc The new Russian priorities in Asia
ALERTc Mikhail Margelov to headthe Council of
Europeparliamentary assembly?
INTERVIEWc Alain Blum (EHESS)
P. 4-6 Business & NetworksENERGYc Europe : a new
challengevisible for Gazprom
ALERTc Lukoil and Gazprom soon in Somalia ?
FOCUSc Nuclear : the first stepstoward reform
BEHIND THE SCENEc Shtokman : Gazprom waits hand and foot on Yuri
Kovalchuks friends
P. 7-8 Regions & CIS
FOCUSc Why Kamchatka is againbecoming strategicCAUCASUSc
Ingushetia, the weak link
The serious business in anticipation of the succession of
Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin has justbegun in Moscow. September
12, the head of government, Mikhail Fradkov, submitted his
resig-nation to the Russian president, who accepted it after having
given a strong (and apparently sin-cere) homage. A few minutes
later, the president of the state Duma, Boris Gryzlov, declared
thatthe Kremlin had retained the candidature of the head of the
Federal financial monitoring agency(Rosfinmonitoring), Viktor
Zubkov, 65, to succeed Mikhail Fradkov. An announcement whichwas
all the more surprising since the entire corps of Moscow observers
took it for granted that incase of such a reshuffle, Sergey Ivanov
would be the next Prime minister.
Viktor Zubkov is not an unknown quantity for the readers of
Russia Intelligence. In our editionof last March 2, we revealed his
rise in Russian power circles. As a matter of fact, the future
Primeminister (his candidature will be confirmed by the parliament
September 14) is a part of the Pu-tinist first circle. Born in 1941
in the Urals, he is a 1965 graduate of the Institute of agriculture
inLeningrad. His rise began truly beginning in 1985 : he then found
himself assigned responsibilitywithin the Communist party. Viktor
Zubkov in 1991 is the first secretary of the executive commit-tee
for the district of Priozersky of the Leningrad region. This is the
time when became acquaintedwith Vladimir Putin and Boris Gryzlov.
According to information gathered by Russia Intelligence,Viktor
Zubkov would have facilitated the transfer of plots of land for
construction by the well-knowndacha cooperative Ozero. Located in
Solovyovka on the banks of lake Komsolmoskoe, the latterincluded,
it should be recalled, among its founding members Vladimir Putin (a
the time in chargeof external relations for the Saint Petersburg
municipality), Vladimir Yakunin (head of the RZhD,the Russian
railways), Vladimir Smirnov, (TENEX read also articles page 2 and
6), NikolayShamalov and Viktor Myachin, joint shareholders of the
Rossia bank of Yuri Kovalchuk. FromJanuary 1992 to November 1993,
Viktor Zubkov presented himself for the post of governor of
theLeningrad region, but he collected only 8.5% of the votes (Boris
Gryzlov was then his campaign man-ager). Vice minister of finance
from 2001 to 2004, he assumed the leadership in 2004 of
Rosfinmon-itoring, the financial investigation squad, which he
headed until his surprise nomination. ViktorZubkov is therefore, as
can be seen, a trusted associate of Vladimir Putin. He is in
addition the fa-ther-in-law of the Defence minister, Anatoly
Serdyukov, whose surprise nomination last Februaryalso follows the
same pattern. Viktor Zubkov is also very close to Viktor Ivanov,
the presidentialassistant who has a controlling hand on nominations
and who we had previously indicated hadstrengthened his position in
the Kremlin (Russia Intelligence n49 of February 16 2007).
The main question is certainly to know if the promotion of
Viktor Zubkov makes of latter thelong awaited successor to Vladimir
Putin. His profile and also his age lead most Moscow sourcesfor
Russia Intelligence to doubt this scenario. Viktor Zubkov could
remain Prime minister afterMarch 2008, reproducing the trajectory
of Mikhail Fradkov, who also came out of nowhere andwas installed
before the presidential vote of 2004. The other question concerns
the reason thatled Vladimir Putin to delay, or even to abandon, the
Sergey Ivanov option. The first vice Prime min-ister, very much in
view in the media at the side of the president since the beginning
of summer,seemed well on the way. A veteran, like Vladimir Putin,
of the KGB external intelligence services,he shares with him the
same weltanschauung. But we also know that Sergey Ivanov arouses
con-siderable fears within the numerous Kremlin clans, whom he is
not obligated to and to whom hehad given no guarantees for after
2008 (Igor Sechin who Sergey Ivanov, rightly or wrongly, sus-pects
of having set a trap for him in the media during the Sychev affair,
which involved this ter-ribly mutilated draftee in a Ural barrack
in late 2005 felt particularly targeted according to in-formation
we have gathered.
The elevation of Viktor Zubkov also leaves open the scenario,
long considered as emerging fromscience fiction but which could be
unwise to exclude in view of the essentially Byzantine nature ofthe
Russian political game : a faked departure for Vladimir Putin. The
latter could leave the Krem-lin in March 2008, as the constitution
obligesto better return on the scene in place of a ViktorZubkov who
would have then fulfilled his ultimate mission in the service of
his friend. d
Viktor Zubkov : the Petersburg hard core takes over
cKREMLIN
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2Russia Intelligence N61 j September 13 2007
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RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Poli t ics & Government
FOCUS
Yuri Chayka, a public prosecutor on a tight-ropecAugust 27 may
seem in retrospect as the finest hour for Rus-
sias General prosecutor. In announcing to Vladimir Putin inthe
Kremlin that the investigation of the murder of journalistAnna
Politkovskaya was concluded and that the godfather ofthe Tambov
group - Saint Petersburgs principal mafia organi-sation had been
locked up, Yuri Chayka thought he had esta-blished himself as the
hero against all the dangers of this post-vacation season, (Russia
Intelligence n60 of August 30 2007).But the cards changed
completely in the space of a few days.
The Politkovskaya case : an accusation that evaporates.It was
with obvious satisfaction that Yuri Chaika had told of
theinterrogation of ten suspects in the Politkovskaya case.
Amongthose was found an FSB lieutenant-colonel, Pavel Ryaguzov,
twoagents of the Interior ministry research service, Dmitry
Lebe-dev and Oleg Alimov, as well as an anti-gang squad member,
Ser-gey Khadzhikurbanov, which seemed to indicate that the
inves-tigation had been thorough. Yuri Chayka had also established
alink between the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya and theone of
Paul Khlebnikoff, the editor in chief of the Russian edi-tion of
Forbes shot to death in 2004, and the former vice presi-dent of the
Russian central bank, Andrey Kozlov (Russia Intel-ligence n41 of
October 13 2006). The latter point was all themore surprising since
the Kozlov case had been said to have beensolved in the spring and
the presumed killers jailed.
Yuri Chayka in any case thought he had two winners. The sol-ving
of the Politkovskaya case, a few days from the first anni-versary
of the death of the Novaya gazeta journalist, was madeto order to
bolster the image of the Russian president in theWest. It was also
meant, for the public prosecutor, to underlinethe efficiency of his
services on the eve of the creation of a Com-mittee for
investigation, a quasi-autonomous structure of theProsecutors
office whose presidency Vladimir Putin had assi-gned to Alexandre
Bastyrkin, one of his former university class-mates (Russia
Intelligence n58 of June 28 2007).
But by August 28, it seemed that Yuri Chayka had proclai-med
victory prematurely. It was learned first of all that a
firstdetainee had been cleared by the investigators and
released.Lawyers for Sergey Khadzhiburbanov had themselves let it
beknown that their client had a solid alibi since he had been
indetention on October 7 2006. The actions Pavel Ryaguzov
wascharged with dated back to 2004 and had no connection withthe
murder of Anna Politkovskaya. In the end, this case smacksso much
of amateurism that one is left to wonder whether YuriChayka wasnt
manipulated and sent into oblivion.
The strange Barsukov affair. Virtually unnoticed in theWest, the
arrest of Vladimir Barkusov (alias Kumarin) is howe-ver even as
politically sensitive as the Politkovskaya case. Theone presented
as the godfather of the Tambov group was arres-ted on August 22 by
units of the Interior ministry and Prosecu-tors office who had come
from Moscow without the outposts inSaint Petersburg getting any
advance warning of the operation.An apparently useful precaution
since, according to Yuri Chayka,many well-placed persons had tried
to derail the investigators.Vladimir Barsukov was wanted; among
other reasons, for mo-ney laundering, extortion of funds, attempted
murder and mur-der. He is notably accused of the attack in the
spring of 2005
against Sergey Vasilev, a businessman who unofficially
control-led the oil terminal for the northern capital, an assets
soughtby Barsukov.
This case must be followed with the utmost attention be-cause it
is likely to spill over against the core of the Putin net-works in
Saint Petersburg. Several close associates of the pre-
sident had at one time or another businessdealings with
Barsukov. First of all, Vladi-mir Smirnov, the boss of TENEX, the
statefirm specialised in uranium enrichment(read page 6). In the
mid-1990s Barsukovcontolled, with Smirnov, the private secu-rity
agency Rif Security, which was nota-bly charged with the
surveillances of theOzero cooperative dachas. As a reminder,this
very exclusive village hosted Smirnovhimself, Andrey Fursenko, the
Science
minister, Vladimir Yakunin, the boss of the railways, and a
cer-tain Vladimir Putin. Smirnov and Barsukov, would find
them-selves a few years later at the Saint Petersburg
Hydrocarboncompany (PTK) : Smirnov was the president of the
administra-tive council, while Barsukov occupied from 1998 to 2000
thepost of assistant director general.
Vladimir Barsukov also controlled a number of affiliates
ofSurgutneftegaz, including Kirishinefteorgsintez, specialisedin
refined products. And, readers of Russia Intelligence knowsince
operation Baikal and the purchase of Yuganskneftegaz,of the
importance and influence of the networks linked to Sur-gutneftegaz
(n6 of February 11 2005 and n43 of November 102006). We need
mention only Yuri Kovalchuk, the head of theRossia bank, and Alexey
Mordashov of Severstal.
Finally, Vladimir Barsukov testified in 2004 before
Germaninvestigators in the case of SPAG, a firm based in Hessen
thatinvested in property in Saint Petersburg and which the
Germanauthorities suspected of money laundering for the Tambov
group.Barsukov was the co-manager of one of the SPAG affiliates,
Zna-menskaya whose director was none other than Vladimir Smir-nov.
Markus Rese, at the time boss of SPAG, declared in 2001to the
weekly Newsweek that Vladimir Putin had been a consul-tant to his
group, a function that according to him was unpaidand essentially
honorary.
The main question that arises is to know if those who reques-ted
the arrest of Barsukov want him to talk or remain silent. Inthe
first instance, he should not leave the VIP cell of the
famousKresty prison in Saint Petersburg where he was taken after
hisarrest. Perhaps Barsukov will never be heard from again, buthis
presence behind bars by itself constitutes a sword of Damo-clese
over the head of persons numerous and influential aswe have seen
who had been in contact with him. The secondpossibility leads to
the recollection of the fate of another note-worthy figure of the
Petersburg mob, Roman Tsepov (RussiaIntelligence n33 of May 18
2006. Close to certain Putin circles(in particular that of General
Viktor Zolotov, the boss of theFederal protection service) and
knowledgable (too) about theunderside of the Yukos affair, he was
mysteriously poisoned inthe autumn of 2004. d
Vladimir Barsukov
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RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Poli t ics & Government
DIPLOMACY
The new Russian priorities in Asiac
In the decade of the collapse of the Soviet union, Russianpolicy
toward Asia rested essentially on strategic partner-ships with
India and the Peoples Republic of China. Vla-dimir Putins recent
tour of the region on the occasion of the15th APEC summit in Sidney
illustrated the new geographicpriorities of the Kremlin and
confirmed the dominance of eco-nomic factors in Russian
diplomacy.
The first stopover of the Russian president, Indonesia isone of
the new strong points of the Kremlin policy in southeastAsia. It
was well known that for several months Moscow andJakarta were
discussing the details of new arms contracts.During the recent
Moscow air show, Rosoboronexport andthe Indian Defence minister had
signed an accord on delivery,between 2008 and 2010, of 6 new Sukhoi
fighter-bombers (3Su-30SKM and 3 Su-30 MK2, for an amount evaluated
at 335million dollars). Another, more ambitious, accord was
comple-ted in Jakarta September 6. Russia and will in fact deliver
toIndonesia ten Mi-17 and Mi-35 transport and attack helicop-ters,
twenty BMP-3F armoured troop carriers, as well as twoKilo class
conventional submarines. This transaction will befinanced by a
credit of a billion dollars from the Russian go-vernment, an
arrangement that illustrates Moscows new fi-nancial flexibility,
which had already been inaugurated du-ring the summer of 2005 in
the framework of a contract withJordan. According to certain
information, Indonesia wouldalso be interested by the Kornet
anti-tank systems from KBPTula, unspecified anti-air arms, and also
in civilian aircraft(the Sukhoi SuperJet-100 and the Be-200 and
Be-103 amphi-bious aircraft.
The successes of Russian industrialists in Indonesia werenot
limited to the armaments and aerospace sectors. Lukoiland the
national company Petramina signed a cooperation ac-cord concerning
several off-shore deposits. Rusal and Antamalso signed an accord on
the construction by 2001, of a com-plex of a capacity of 5 Mt/yr
that will be supplied by bauxitedeposits from Munggu Pasir and
Pantas. Oleg Deripaskasgroup represented in Jakarta by the former
Finance minis-ter Alexandr Livshits will hold 51% of a joint
venture thatwill soon be created. Lastly, Altimo telecoms
subsidiary ofAlfa-Group is said to be prepared to buy, for 2
billion dol-lars, the share of ST Telemedia (Singapore) in the
Indone-sian mobile telephone operator Indosat. We should also
pointout that the president of Alpha-Bank, Pyotr Aven, accompa-nied
Vladimir Putin on his Asian travels, as well as Sergey Ki-rienko
(Rosatom), Vagit Alekperov (Lukoil), Vladimir Ev-tushenkov (AFK
Systema), Vladimir Dmitriev(VneshEkonomBank), Leonid Reyman, the
Communicationsminister, Sergey Stepashin, the president of the
Court of ac-counts, and also the chief representative of Vladimir
Putin inthe Far-east federal district, the Tatar Kamil
Iskhakov.
The Australian phase for Vladimir Putin was also as fruit-ful.
True, the discussions with George Bush led only to an in-vitation
to a fishing date in Siberia, with no progress seen onthe thorny
problem of the WTO or the anti-missile defence.But Vladimir Putin
obtained from his APEC partners that theorganisations summit
planned for 2012 take place in Russia.On the economic front, the
major event was incontestably the
signing of an intergovernmental nuclear accord. Australia,which
holds 40% of world uranium reserves, will export a partto Russia.
The amounts will be the subject of new discussionsbetween
Rosatom/AtomEnergoProm and the Australian autho-rities. The
intergovernmental accord of September 7 in anycase will facilitate
the negotiations underway between TE-NEX and BHP Billiton
concerning a participation in the de-velopment of the giant Olympic
Dum reserves. It especiallyconstitutes a major assurance of the
long-term supplies of theRussian nuclear industry in uranium, while
the cooperationwith Kazakh and Ukrainian source is full of
uncertainties. (UIn39 of August 30 2007 and CACI n15 of August 30
2007).
Virtually unnoticed in the West, the visit of Vladimir Putinin
the United Arab Emirates was nevertheless more than asimple
courtesy visit. In inauguring in Abu-Dhabi an exposi-tion on Arab,
Persian and Turkish military trophies in theKremlin museum, the
Russian president hoped to symboli-cally recall the role and the
historic influence of Russia in theMiddle East. If we can believe
certain elements filtering inMoscow, the main theme of the
discussion between VladimirPutin and Cheikh Khalifa ben Zayed
al-Nahyane was Iran.The Emirates sought notably to obtain the
mediation of Mos-cow on the coastal limit dispute involving the
Abu-Musa andTunb islands annexed by Tehran in 1971. Moscow again
madeAbu-Dhabi aware of the possible risks of an American mili-tary
intervention in Iran and would like to see it play a roleas
moderator with Washington. It should be noted in passingthat the
issue of the Bushehr nuclear power station remainssubject of
differing evaluations in Tehran and Moscow. Thesecretary of the
Iranian security council, Ali Larijani, decla-red September 6 that
a good accord has been found withRussia and that the calendar of
deliveries of fuel has beenadopted. An announcement quickly denied
by Sergey Novo-kov, the Rosatom spokesman. d
3 A Russian to head the Council of Europeparliamentary assembly
?
Mikhail Margelov, the president of the Federation councilForeign
relations commission, confirmed on October 10, that hewould present
his candidacy for the presidency of the Council ofEurope
Parliamentary assembly in the name of the Europeandemocrats group
(EDG).
Born in 1964 in Pskov, Mikhail Margelov is an Arab
expertgraduated from the Institute of African and Asian countries
of theUniversity of Moscow. He taught Arabic at the KGB school
ofadvanced studies at the end of the 1980s before assuming
theleadership of the Arab editorial team at the ITAR-TASS
newsagency. Charged with relations with the foreign press on
thecampaign staff of Vladimir Putin in 2000, he was appointed to
theSenate a few months later.
His grandfather a general decorated with the title of hero ofthe
USSR was one of the founders of the Soviet airborne troops.His
father, Vitaly Vasilevich made his career in the
externalintelligence service and was the aide to Yevgeny Primakov
at theSVR in the early 1990s. d
A L E R T
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RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Poli t ics & Government
DEMOGRAPHYAlain Blum : Demographic policies are at theheart of
Vladimir Putins public communication
c
An interview with Alain Blum, director of the Studies centre of
the Russian world, the Caucasus and Central Europe (School
ofadvanced social science studies and the CNRS national scientific
research centre)and director of research at the National institute
of demographic studies (INED) Author specifically of Birth, living
and dying
in Russia, Paris, Payot, 2004, and Bureaucratic anarchy
statis-tics and power under Stalin, La Dcouverte, 2003, (with
Mar-tine Mespoulet).
The demographic situation was recently described byVladimir
Putin as one of the principal threats to natio-nal security for
Russia. What are the profound causes?
The demographic situation and the demographic policiesfollowed
in Russia today, are the object of very extensive me-dia attention,
fostered by the entourage of Vladimir Putin. Thisis part of the
general rhetoric concerning the promotion of thegreatness and power
of Russia, which translates here in termsof population, as well as
the argument that an increase in birthswould be the direct
expression of a hope and rediscoveredconfidence.
The reform of the 1990s have been put forward as the cau-ses of
this demographic situation, inasmuch as the decline inpopulation as
well as the decline in fertility date back about tothe collapse of
the USSR. The growth rate turned negative inthe early 1990s.
Certain political or media figures had even ac-cused Boris Yeltsin
of being responsible for genocide of the Rus-sian population and
nationalist and conservative speechesadopted this accusing tone.
But, when we examine closely thedemographic trends, we can see that
the reality is completelydifferent. The most preoccupying, the
extremely high level ofmortality, (the male life expectancy at
birth, the most preoccu-pying, reached 58.9 years in 2005, compared
to 76.8 in Francethe same year. Russian men live on average close
to 20 yearsless than French men!) is linked to a gradual,
quasi-linear, de-gradation, that began in at the start of the 1970s
decade. No-thing to do with the Yeltsin reforms. The cyclical, and
very tem-porary, effect of the war on alcoholism in 1986 gave the
impressionof a counter-action of these reforms. If the latter
existed at all,it was very limited compared to the long-term
trends.
The causes are complex, and closely linked to the lack
ofadaptation of the health-care system to the new health
condi-tions, alcoholism which remains very preoccupying,
importantviolent mortality, affecting in particular young men
closely lin-ked to alcoholism. In terms of fertility, there was
certainly theeffect of uncertainty about the future, leading many
couplesto delay the arrival of children. But that situation was
only par-tially linked to the reforms. The current fertility rate
corres-ponds to European levels, and, whats more, it has
sufferedfrom the delay of the age of the first birth, which had
been ex-tremely precocious in Russia. Young women delayed their
first
child, while the oldest had already brought a child into
theworld. In general in Russia, we are passing, slowly, from
themodel of very precocious first coupling first marriage first
birth, to a more European model where a succession ofco-habitations
precedes a couple giving birth to a child, andwhere, a couple waits
to be integrated into the working worldbefore giving birth to
children. In effect, for several years, thiseffect led to an
apparent decline in the birth rate higher thanit was in
reality.
What are the most realistic projections concerningthe evolution
of the Russian population for the mediumand long-term?
Its impossible to furnish numbers since evolution is diffi-cult
to forecast, especially migratory terms. A realistic projec-tion
supposes, however, that mortality will begin to declineand that
fertility will rise slightly (strongly for a while, andthen return
to an average level) and that immigration flowswill develop,
whatever policy is put in place. On this basis, wecan probably
foresee a population of 135 million inhabitantsby a timeframe of
2015, a relatively high variant, rather thanthe 145 million
imagined by Medvedev. Reaching such levelswould presuppose very
important migratory flows, which arenot to be excluded but which
remain unrealistic (while Med-vedev counts only on a strong
increase in births).
Demography is one of the national projects to thesame extent as
housing or education under the res-ponsibility of vice Prime
minister Dmitry Medvedev. Whatpublic policies have been put in
effect by the govern-ment? Can they have a real impact, in your
view?
Policies in demographic matters are at the heart of Vladi-mir
Putins public communication. Two national projects, oneon
demography, the other on health, are developing. The firstmade
considerable noise and consists primarily of a premiumof 8500 euros
(250 000 rubles)for the second birth, a conside-rable sum when
compared with the average salary. This pay-ment is placed in a
pension fund, then available after a fewyears to finance housing or
studies for the child. It representsa short-sighted policy, very
much in line with certain Sovietpolicies : the impact will be
rapid, without a doubt, since cou-ples will anticipate the birth of
their 2d child. But the effectwill probably be temporary and will
mark more the momentwhen couples have their 2d child. As a result,
we risk havingviolent upheavals in the age pyramid, a difficult
managementfor child care, education, follow-up health care. The age
ofmaternity will again decline, which is hardly desirable.
Fer-tility will probably rise slightly in the end but much less
thanit will seem in the years to come. At a high price, in terms
ofpublic child management. On the other hand, the health sys-tem is
significantly below what it should be, even if we canhope that
mortality will decline considerably in the years tocome, given the
incredibly high level of today. The govern-ment, apparently, is not
developing a demographic policy,but a political fact, essentially
to put forward successeswhich are in large part illusory. d
Alain Blum
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RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Business & Networks
ENERGY
Europe : a new challenge visible for GazpromcIf the discussions
with Total, BP or E.On are proceeding and
indicate some new and very promising cooperation (Russia
In-telligence n60 of August 2007), Gazprom also nevertheless
risksbeing confronted by new political obstacles from certain
Euro-pean governments and the European commission in Brussels.
Like in previous autumns, Gazprom is readying to launch
dis-cussions with its clients on the price of gas for the coming
year.Since world hydrocarbon prices remain particularly high
(morethan 70$ a barrel on average in August), a new re-evaluation
re-mains the order of the day. The first to get excited were
theLithuanians. On August 29, the daily Lietvos rytas publishedan
article reporting on a notification addressed by Gazprom tothe two
Lithuanian gas importers, Lietvos dujos and Dujotekana,warning of
an increase of 40% beginning on January 1 2008 (or280$/1000 m3
against 195 currently). The Lithuanian Prime min-ister, Gediminas
Kirkilas, had for his part spoken of an evenlarger spread
(312-320$/1000 m3) during an interview withReuters news agency a
few days earlier. Comparable increasesare also awaited in Estonia
and Latvia. After having demon-strated a policy of relative
restraint for three consecutive yearson prices upon entry of the
Baltic states into the European union a moderation which had found
a counterpart in its entry intothe capital of the national gas
distributing companies EestiGaas (37.02%), Latvijas gaze (34%) and
Lietuvos dujos (37.1%) Gazprom will now charge the normal European
prices to re-peat the expression of one of its managers. The
Russian com-pany is even less inclined to make concessions in the
case ofLithuania since the parliament of that country this spring
adopteda law forbidding Lietvos dujos to apply a margin higher than
8%of the price of Russian gas bought at the border. The
discussionscould continue until October 31, the date set by the
Russian andLithuanian parties. In order to avoid a head-to-head
confronta-tion with Gazprom that promises to be dangerous, Vilnius
an-nounced that it hoped to associate other European union
coun-tries in the discussions. This is an initiative that has few
chancesof succeeding in the absence of a common European policy
butwhich confirms the extreme politisation of energy questions
inthe new member states in the Baltic region.
Gazprom is equally confronted with significant political
re-sistance in the case of Nord Stream, the underwater gas
pipelinelinking the region of Vyborg to Germany. Poland has let it
beknown that it would ask Stockholm to conduct new environmen-tal
studies since the new path of the future pipeline was modi-fied to
the limits of Swedish and Danish territorial waters. Thischange had
the object of distancing Nord Stream from zoneswhere shells from
the second world war lie, but all pretexts arevalid as seen from
Warsaw to try to delay the Gazprom project.The Russian group could
also find some other difficulties comingfrom Estonia. If certain
information drifting out of Tallinn areconfirmed, the Reform party
plans to submit to the parliament adraft law on maritime frontiers
that foresees extension of ter-ritorial waters of 3 nautical miles.
We recall that Finland and Es-tonia left a neutral corridor of 6
nautical miles between theirrespective waters, to permit Russia to
have a free access to restof the Baltic sea to the north of which a
segment of the NordStream should pass. There again, the prospects
of such an ap-proach would seem, to say the least doubtful, so long
as it is hardto see Helsinki headed toward a clash with Moscow in
this mat-ter. But the strategy of harassment by the opponents of
Nord
Stream reveals a climate that is increasingly hostile toward
allenergy projects originating in Russia .
In this context, the attention of the Kremlin (and of its
in-telligence services) is more than always focused on Brussels.
TheRussians are anticipating notably new proposals from the
Euro-pean commission, expected September 19, on the demonopoli-
sation of the en-ergy sector.Gunter Ver-heugen let it beknown
during avisit to Moscowin mid-July thatcertain provi-
sions could affect Gazprom. It involves possible restrictions
onthe ownership of gas and electricity distribution networks,
sec-tors we know to be precisely the new targets of the
Russiangroup in Europe (Russia Intelligence n 54 of April 24
2007).
Another reason for Gazprom and the Russian government toworry
concern the preparation of a series of directives underthe
direction of Alejo Vidal-Quadras. In the aftermath of a votein the
Euopean parliament in early August, its vice presidentwas charged
with formulating a certain number of proposalsaimed at encouraging
respect for the principle of reciprocityconcerning investments of
third countries in the European en-ergy sector. The aim is to limit
access of public companies fromcountries where the local energy
markets are subjected to re-strictions. This measure is not
specifically directed against Rus-sia (Algeria, Saudi Arabia or
Iran are potentially concerned),but we can imagine that they would
seriously contradict theGazprom ambitions if they were to be
applied. d
3 Lukoil and Gazprom soon in Somalia ?The ambassador of Somalia
to Moscow, Mohamed Handule,
has become quite active in recent weeks to persuade
Russiangroups to invest his country. August 22, he declared during
a pressconference that his government is ready to cooperate with
Russiain the uranium extraction sector (Somalia holds a bit more
than6000 tonnes of the mineral). If we believe certain
informationcirculating in the Russian capital, he is ready to meet
onSeptember 19, Igor Gavrilov, the director general
ofZarubezhgeoligia. This public organisation had conductedimportant
exploration campaigns in Somalia before the splitbetween the
government in Mogadischio and the USSR in 1977.Somalian authorities
would like to have access to the results of theresearch and invite
Zarubezhgeoligia to undertake some newdrilling. The Russian side
remains discreet on this question, but itwould seem that some very
promising finds were made by theSoviet engineers in 1976. Certain
generally well-informedconsultants in Moscow even believe that the
Somalian reservescould be in the same range as those in
neighbouring Sudan.Mohamed Handule has in any case approached
Lukoil andGazprom in the past weeks. It remains to be seen if the
evolutionof the political and security situation of this country
ravaged by 15years of civil war will permit the fulfilment of these
projects. d
A L E R T
c Like in previous autumns,
Gazprom is readying to launch
discussions with its clients on the
price of gas for the coming year.
RIA61 13/09/07 1:26 Page 5
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RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Business & Networks
6Russia Intelligence N61 j September 13 2007
www.russia-intelligence.fr
For several months, Russia Intelligence has regularly informed
its readers ofthe reforms underway in the Russian civil nuclear
sector. Carried out by formerPrime minister Sergey Kirienko, named
to head the Federal Rosatom agencyat the end of 2005 by Vladimir
Putin, they have as their objective the establish-ment of a
national champion uniting the complex of the protagonists in the
sec-tor along the lines of the model recently put in place for the
aeronautic (OAK)and naval construction (OSK) industries. In the
end, it means competing withAreva and Westinghouse on the world
market thanks to an integrated organi-sation present from the
extraction of uranium up to the construction of turnkeynuclear
reactors.
The signal for the launch of this reform was given, we recall,
at the end of Aprilwith the publication of a presidential decree
for the creation of AtomEnergoProm.Since, several important
announcements have been made by the government. July7, the Prime
minister Mikhail Fradkov, adopted its bylaws, as well as its
admin-istrative council, to be headed by Sergey Kirienko. Vladimir
Travin will occupythe post of director of AtomEnergoProm. It is not
strictly speaking a surprise tothe extent that the latter is a
confident of Sergey Kirienko. Born in 1960, educatedas an engineer,
Vladimiur Travin began his career at the prestigious Sarov
nuclearresearch centre (formerly Arzamas-16). He converted to
finance during the 1990sbefore becoming vice president of
Norsi-Oil, Sergey Kirienkos company based inNizhny-Novgorod, then
vice president (in charge of finance) of the public opera-tor
Transneft. As soon as he was nominated to the head of Rosatom,
Sergey Kirienkohad summoned him to his side as counsellor. He then
named him associate direc-tor, again charged with finance, January
26 2007.
The pattern of integration and, especially, the allocation of
spheres of influ-ence within AtomEnergoProm between the four
pillars of the Russia civil nuclearsector (TENEX uranium enrichment
services , RosEnergoAtom oper-ator of some of the 31 reactors in
service in Russia and AtomStroyExport construction of power
stations abroad), are far from being settled. At this stage,it is
only known that Sergey Kirienko wants to create UGRK, an entity
that willunite the mining assets of TVEL and TENEX. Its direction
will be confided to theteam of Alexandr Shkarovsky/Vadim Zhikov,
respectively n2 of PriangarskoeMining and Chemical Production
Association (a complex located in the Chitaregion which extracts
some 3300 tonnes of uranium mineral per year) and n2of TENEX.
The other major uncertainty concerns the role of the large
private industrialgroups in the civilian nuclear sector. Currently,
several oligarchs have positionedthemselves. Oleg Deripaska, the
boss of United Rusal, concluded last April anaccord on the
construction in the Far east of an aluminium foundry and a
nuclearpower station of 2000 megawatts. Since Russian law prohibits
private parties frombeing operators of nuclear power stations, the
most likely outcome is that UnitedRusal would participate in the
financing of the project in exchange for a long-term accord
guaranteeing electricity supplies under privileged conditions.
Inter-ros, Vladimir Potanins holding company, signed on June 18 a
cooperation frame-work agreement with Rosatom in the uranium
extraction sector. Joint projectsare under study, especially in
Uzhbekistan. But the most active is undoubtedlyViktor Vekselberg.
After having concluded a framework agreement with TENEXto cooperate
in southern Africa (Russia Intelligence n50 of March 2 2007),
theboss of Renova took over at the end of may a 25%+1 share in
EMAlliance-Atom,a joint venture created between TVEL and
EMAlliance, the partner of Alstomand parent company of JSC
Machine-building Plant ZIO Podolsk, ZIOMAR (en-gineering),and
Krasny-Kotelshchik (turbines).
Lastly, Gazprombank. In June 2006, the group sold 4% of the
53.8% it held inAtomStroyExport to TVEL, thus allowing Rosatom to
reclaim majority. But sincethen relations have become tense between
Andrey Akimov and Sergey Kirienko.The latter has sought since the
summer of 2006 to convince the boss of Gazprom-bank to sell him the
activities of OMZ linked to the nuclear, especially
Izhorskiezavody, the only Russian producer of nuclear reactor vats.
Matters are apparentlyreaching a scale where Rosatom announced in
early August that it was suspend-ing orders from Izhorskie zavody.
d
cc F O C U S
Nuclear : the first steps toward reform
In one of its previous editions, (n50 ofMarch 2 2007), Russia
Intelligence hadanalysed the reforms underway in theRussian naval
construction and maritimetransport sectors by underlining
theinteraction with large groups in the energysector, called on to
be a more importantsilent partner and even more affluent than the
Defence ministry. Gazprom has justprovided proof, twice within a
few weeks, bytaking important decisions on the Shtokmanand
Sakhalin-II projects.
In mid-August, Valery Golubev, one ofAlexey Millers assistants,
revealed that thecall for tender for the construction of
twodrilling platforms concerning the Shtokmanproject had been won
by the Vyborg (VSZ)shipyards, preferred over Sevmash and
anunspecified Korean firm. The choice wassurprising at first glance
since VSZ wasmoribund and had not won a contract since1997, the
date when it built the launchplatform for a US-Russo-Ukrainian
Sealaunch space programme. Looking at itmore closely, the VSZ
victory owes nothing tochance. In September 2006, Ako Barss hadin
fact sold his (75.6%) stake in VSZ toseveral private investors
linked to YuriKovalchuk, the major Saint Petersburg bankerwho is
well-known to readers of RussiaIntelligence. Included were, among
others,Vasily Gorelov (son of Dmitry Gorelov,shareholder of up to
12.6% in the Rossiabank), or Sergey Kolesnikov, member of theboard
of Sogaz, an insurance companyformerly affiliated to Gazprom which
wasbought by Yuri Kovalchuks bank in thesummer of 2006. The entry
of the Kovalchuknetwork into Gazprom (also illustrated by
thepresence of Boris Kovalchuk, Yuris son, nearDimiti Medvedev) has
begun to bear its fruit.The call for tender won by VSZ is worth
thehandsome sum of 59 million rubles (2.3billion dollars).
We should also mention that SakhalinEnergy, the operator of the
Sakhalin-II projectin which Gazprom is now the majority holder,has
announced that the Prigorodnoe terminalwould be operated in
partnership withSovkomflot, the new Russian nationalchampion in
maritime transport matter led byIgor Shuvalov, the sherpa for
Vladimir Putin,(Russia Intelligence n 39 of September 2006and n52
of March 30 2997). d
The updated biographic profile of Yuri
Kovalchuk is now available on our Internet
site. Reserved for our Premium subscribers.
BEHIND THE SCENE
Shtokman : Gazpromwaits hand and foot onYuri Kovalchuks
friends
RIA61 13/09/07 1:26 Page 6
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7Russia Intelligence N61 j September 13 2007
www.russia-intelligence.fr
RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Regions & C IS
FOCUS
Why Kamchatka is again becoming strategiccThe brief visit
undertaken by Vladimir Putin on the way to
Indonesia and then Australia (read article page 3) was onceagain
the occasion for the president to demonstrate his prox-imity even a
certain complicity with Sergey Ivanov, whosebowling prowess the
Russian television viewer could admire(and learn at the same time
that the new leisure centre builtat Vilyuchinsk for the families of
the crews from the Russianpacific fleets submarine force was
financed by Surgutneftegaz).The third to date since 2000, it
primarily served to confirm thepriority afforded by the Russian
state to the peninsula, whichhas been called on to play a new
economic and military role inthe coming years.
Forbidden to foreigners during the Soviet era, Kamchatka,during
the 1990s, experienced an economic collapse aggravatedby its twin
distinctions isolation and the strong military pres-ence the major
victims during the Yeltsin presidency. In or-der to boost the
region, the Kremlinfor a while imagined duplicating themodel tested
with a certain successin neighbouring Chukotka with Ro-man
Abramovich (Russia Intelli-gence n53 of April 13 2007). In
otherterms, assign the province to an oli-garch ready to invest his
personalresources as a means of redeeminghimself. Long considered,
ViktorVekselberg managed to escape thehonour. As a result, the
administra-tion privileged another scenario.
The re-establishment of manage-ment over the peninsula came in
threephases. The Kremlin first of all dis-missed in March 2005
Vladimir Logi-mov, the governor of the autonomousdistrict of the
Koryaks. It then initi-ated the merger between this areasubject to
Federation control withthe Kamchatka region, actually ap-proved by
a referendum October 232005 and officially completed on July1 2007.
This administrative remodel-ling also had as a byproduct the
re-moval of the governor of Kamchatka,Mikhail Mashkovtsev, elected
in 2000under the communist label. He was replaced last May by one
ofhis assistants, Alexey Kuzmitsky, the governor of the
autonomousdistrict of the Koryaks. The latter studied and passed
most of hiscareer in Saint Petersburg. A graduate of the
Electro-technicalinstitute (1992) and the administration academy
(2003), he was,among other posts, counsellor of the director of the
institute ofradio-navigation and then financial director of a firm
linked tothe national fisheries committee. It was his connections
with thissector of activities highly important to Kamchatka that
ex-plains the rise of Alexey Kuzmitksy in the peninsula in May
2005.
The other illustration of the renewed interest by the Krem-lin
for Kamchatka was the announcement in early July 2007of a new
submarine base in Vilyuchinsk. According the com-mander in chief of
the Russian combat navy, Admiral Vladimir
Masorin, no less than 9 billion rubles (about 300 million
dol-lars) will be invested by 2010. The new base will host the
firstunits of the Borey class nuclear missile launcher
submarine(MLSM) the Yuri Dolgoruky (launched last April),
theAlexandr Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh (under construc-tion in
the Sevmash shipyards in Severodvinsk). We also re-mind readers
that up to now, most of the Russian MLSMs havebeen deployed with
the Northern fleet and stationed on theKola peninsula. According to
naval experts consulted by Rus-sia Intelligence, the choice by
military authorities can be ex-plained by configuration of the bay
of Vilyuchinsk, that allowssubmarines to rapidly reach depths to
enable them to avoiddetection by American satellites.
Last, Kamchatka has a vocation to become and import hy-drocarbon
production centre in the coming decade. The headof Rosneft, Sergey
Bogdanchikov, created a stir by announc-
ing, September 5, that no less than24 billion dollars would be
investedin exploration/production projectsin the Okhotsk
continental shelf. Itshould be recalled that Rosneft hadsigned in
September 2004 a cooper-ation memorandum with the KoreanNational
Oil Company (KNOC)then in February 2005 an interme-diate financial
accord. The two par-ties then created a joint-venture(West
Kamchatka Holding BV), inwhich Rosneft holds a 60% interest.A first
series of tests should be com-pleted in 2008, but if the
informa-tion revealed by Sergey Bogdanovichis borne out, the
Kamchatka off-shoredeposits would be larger than thoseof Sakhalin
(3.8 billion TOE, with-out at this stage being able to detailthe
proportion of oil and gas). Thecooperation accord negotiated
withthe Koreans is especially interest-ing since it foresees that
KNOC fi-nances the totality of the prospect-ing phase (300 million
dollars for theyear 2008 alone), but that Rosneftwould begin to
receive profits fromthe development of these deposits
without waiting for its partner to reimburse its costs.
We also underline that, like with the Sakhalin-III
project,Rosneft risks finding Gazprom in the way. Valery Golubev,
oneof Alexey Millers most visible associates in recent weeks,
de-clared during the meeting on the socio-economic developmentof
Kamchatka that Vladimir Putin presided on September 5that his group
was prepared to substitute for the RAO EES ofAnatoly Chubais in the
construction of the 300-kilometre gaspipeline between Sobolevo and
the regional capital,Petropavlovsk-Kamchatksy. Under certain
conditions. One ofthem being that the Ministry of natural resources
grant it anexploration permit for certain zones of the continental
shelfnear the Rosneft-KNOC deposits. d
RIA61 13/09/07 1:26 Page 7
-
Russia Intelligence N61 j September 13 2007
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Intelligence
RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE
CAUCASUS
Ingushetia, the weak linkcAs in the autumn of 1999, the north
Caucasus has invited itself
into the heart of the Russian news on the eve of Russian
legisla-tive and presidential elections. This time, however, its
Ingushetiaand not Chechnya in the spotlight, and the federal power
struc-ture could have done without such attention. Attacks, special
op-erations, and clashes are in fact virtually daily events,
arousingfears of increasingly wider destabilisation.
Murat Zyazikov looses his footing. Elected in 2002 and ex-tended
in his post by the Kremlin in 2006, Murat Zyazykov an ex-FSB
general is far from controlling with assurance the situationin the
Republic, as recently affirmed with confidence Karim-Sul-tan
Kokurkhaev, a senior Ingush official in charge of human
rights.Since the beginning of summer, no less than 40 armed
incidentshave in fact taken place. June 26 the facilities of the
presidentialadministration and the general direction of the FSB in
Magas, thenew capital, were the targets. June 16, a Russian
teacher, LudmillaTerekhina, was assassinated with her two children.
Two days later,an explosion took place during her burial at the
Ordzhonikidjevkayavillage cemetery, making 11 victims. We should
note in passing thatthe small Slavic minority seems to be
systematically the targetof terrorists: August 30; another teacher,
Vera Draganchuk, wasassassinated in Karabulak; September 7, Natalya
Mudarova doctor in charge of the blood transfusion service in
Nazran, whowas married to a Chechen, met the same tragic end.
This multiplication of attacks led the federal authorities to
re-inforce the deployment of the Interior ministry in Ingushetia.
Noless than 2500 additional men were dispatched on August 10 to
con-duct a special prophylactic operation. With, up to now, mixed
re-sults. The battalion of Interior troops stationed in Malgobek,
forexample, was attacked on the night of September 9, leaving
onedead and three wounded among the federal forces. The
Russianpress has in addition begun to give voice to the increasing
disquietof the Ingush population in the face of the often blind
repressionof the FSB.
In Moscow, several top specialists of north Caucasus affairs
con-tacted by Russia Intelligence fear a repetition of events on a
scalesimilar to the raid on Nazran in the summer of 2004, or on
Nalchikin October 2005. It should be recalled that combat in the
region inthe capital of Kabardino-Balkaria which had opposed
membersof the Yarmuk Jamaat and state security forces lasted more
thanthree days and claimed more than one hundred lives. As a sign
ofincreasing anxiety but also of a certain defiance vis--vis
MuratZyazikov the Duma commission on security affairs just
announcedthat it would take up the matter. But the Kremlin does not
seeminclined to drop soldier Zyazikov. Dmitry Kozak, the special
rep-resentative of Vladimir Putin in the federal south district;
has ex-cluded any change at the head of the republic. It must be
said thatthose in the Centre have no alternative solution. The two
other
truly influential clans in Ingushetia are led by two of Moscows
hatefigures : Ruslan Aushev, the ex-president (1993-2001) of the
northCaucasus republic, and the Gutseriev brothers (Russia
Intelli-gence n 56 of May 31 2007 and n60 of August 30 2007).
Ramzan Kadyrov as a white knight? While the Kremlin is insearch
of a strategy to avoid Ingushetia plunging into chaos, theChechen
president, Ramzan Kadyrov, has declared his readinessto lend
assistance. We will re-establish order, as two and two makefour.
The republic (of Ingushetia) isnt large, he declared on Sep-tember
10, adding that he would act only on the request of thesupreme
commander in chief, Vladimir Putin. These statementswhich are not
made lightly and illustrate the state of grace thatthe Chechen
president has enjoyed since his victorious showdownwith his
predecessor Alu Alkhanov (Russia Intelligence Specialedition of
February 16 2007). Ramzan Kadyrov has especially un-derlined the
decline in armed incidents in Chechenya and theprogress undeniable
after all in the reconstruction of Grozny.He also undertook in
August a new tour of the Middle east (Jor-dan and Saudi Arabia)
supposedly aimed at reinforcing his reli-gious and international
legitimacy.
The objective of the Chechen president is to reconstitute
theChechnya-Ingush republic in its pre-1992 borders. At this
stage,the federal authorities do not seem to be too enthusiastic at
theidea of confiding the reins over Ingushetia to Ramzan
Kadyrov,whom many especially in the military and within the FSB
al-ready find too powerful (the headquarters in fact currently
sup-port the military leader of the only pro-Russian unit the
Za-pad battalion still outside Kadyrovs control, Said Kakiev.
Weshould note in passing that the test of strength between the
lat-ter and the Chechen president also includes a religious
dimen-sion since Kakiev is a representative of a Suffist
brotherhoodNaqshbandiya,while Kadyrov himself is a member of the
Qadiriyabrotherhood). It goes without saying that Murat Zyazykov
andmore generally, the Ingush elites have no desire to place
theirfate in the hand of the Chechen big brother.
The events in Ingushetia pose the question of Vladimir
PutinsCaucasian political balance sheet. Certainly, the Kremlin has
suc-ceeded in finely tuning the thorny question of the successions
(allthe president of the north Caucasus republics have been
replacedin recent years: in addition to Kadyrov and Zyazikov,
Moscow hasalso installed Taymuraz Mamsurov in North Ossetia,
ArseneKanokov in Kabardino-Balkaria, Mukha Aliev in Dagestan,
AslanTkhakushinov in the Adygea republic). Dmitry Kozak also
mo-bilised the Russian oligarchs to invest in the region (Russia
Intel-ligence n41 of October 13 2006), and not only in Sochi. But
if thespectre of Chechen separatism is receding, the principal
socio-eco-nomic challenges which the north Caucasus is confronting
remainon the agenda. d
Regions & C IS
RIA61 13/09/07 1:26 Page 8
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