173d Airborne Lessons Learned 7 Mar 1968

8/2/2019 173d Airborne Lessons Learned 7 Mar 1968

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UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD388578

NEW LIMITATION CHANGETOApproved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROMDistribution: Further dissemination onlyas directed by Office of the AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development,Department of the Army, Washington, DC20310, 15 NOV 1967, or higher DoDauthority.

AUTHORITYAGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


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UNCLASSIFIEDAD NUMBERAD388578

CLASSIFICATION CHANGESTO: unclassified

FROM: confidentialLIMITATION CHANGES

TO:Distribution: Further dissemination onlyas directed by Office of the AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development,Department of the Army, Washington, DC20310, 15 NOV 1967, or higher DoDauthority.

FROM:Controlling DoD Organization: Office ofthe Assistant Chief of Staff for ForceDevelopment, Department of the Army,Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY30 Nov 1979, DoDD 5200.10; DoDD 5230.24,18 Mar 1987

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TOAGAM-P (M) (4 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-T674257 7 March 1968

SUBJECI: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173dAirborne Brigade (Sep), Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordancewith paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should bereported to ACSFOR OT RD , Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of re-

Sceipt of covering letter.2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-

pri.6te benef'ts in the future from lessons learned during current operationsand may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

I Incl ( KENNETH G. WICKHAMas Major General, USADSTR~IBTO:~ t' . 0 - The Adjutant General , R ._9DISTRIBUTION: 6." ."k . '


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V1

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Medical Field Service SchoolUS Army Military Police SchoolUS Army Missile and Munitions'SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Southeastern Signal SchoolUS Army Special Warfare SchoolUS Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of EngineersChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffThe Surgeon GeneralThe Provost Marshal GeneralResearch Analysis Corporation (Library)Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD (SA)Defense Documentation CenterPlanning Research CorporationDirector, Weapons Systems Evaluation GroupCommanding GeneralsUS Army Weapons Command

US Army Flight Training Center5th Infantry Division (Mech)173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)

Commanding OfficersUS Army Aviation Test Activity4th Brigade, 6th Infantry DivisionIst Battalion, 82d Artillery

USAF Air Ground Operations SchoolSenior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command

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l7'AIRnoRNE BRIGADE(S)OPERATIONAL iEPORTLESSONS LEARNED1 UGUST -31 OCTOBER1967

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CoNFUINTIALMPAMMt OF MHam

HEADQUATUES 173D AIRBOME BRI (SPAR)APO Sani Franciso925AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned(1August - 31 October 1967)

THRU: IFFORCEVATTN: S-3APO San Francisco 96350

THRU: USARVATTN: AVHGC-DSTAPO San Francisco 96375

THRU: CINCUSARPACATTN: GPOP-OTAPO 96558TO : Department of th e Army

ATTN: ACSFORWashington, D.C.20310

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliancewith USARV Regulation 1-19 and AR 1-19.FOR THE COI'4ANDER-

W. L. KVASNICKAILT, AG CAsst AG

CONFIDENTI NLDOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12YEARSDOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

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eMODNTIALAVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJEM Operational Report Lessons Learned

I. Significant Organizationa. and Unit Activities1. Introduction

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers th e period 1 August 1967through 31 October 1967. Th e 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) has continued toconduct operations aimed at locating an d destroying Viet Cong and North VietnamesArmed Forces an d installations. During this quarter, the Brigade relocated itsbase camp from BIEN HOA to AN KHE, thereby providing more immediate administrativean d logistical support to units in he forward area. Th e Brigade Civic ActionProgram continued to play a key role in he Brigade's counterinsurgeney effort.To best accomplish it s mission, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separamte)conducted tw o (2) ajor operations during the reporting pej iod. Operation GREhh'i,(which commenced in id-June 1967), continued throughout the month of August andinto September 1967. Brigade participation in the Operation terminated on 12 Oot-ober. Prior to the termination of Operation GREELEY, th e Brigade (-) cployedto the vicinity of PH U HIEP (south of TUY HOA on the South China Sea Coast) fo rOperation BOLLING. Operation BOLLING was still in rogress at the end of tiisreporting period.

2. OrganizationThe 173d Airborn( Brigade (Separate) underwent several significant

changes in rganization during this reporting period. In ugust, the Brigad&'ssignal capabilities were enhonced with the arrival an d assignment of the 723d For-ward Signal Platoon from Fort Riley, Kansas. The platoon's authorized strength is1 officer and 38 enlisted men.In ate October, the Brigade rcceived an additional Infantry Battalion,the 3/503d Infantry from Fbrt Bragg, North Carolina. Through TO&E, th e battalionis uthorized 36 officers, 2 warrant officers and 771 enlisted men. The 3/503dInfantry underwent jungle training at An Khe base camp prior to deployment onOperation BOLLING.On 7 October, OPLAN 7-67 wa s published directing rear elements at BIRIHOA to commence relocation to AN KHE, the home of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.Th e Brigade no w Employs an entirely new rear detachment policy. Each battalionand separate company has personnel assigned to Company "E" Provisional). Theduty of these personnel is o insure that the personnal effects of all soldiersin he forward area is ept secure. Transient personnel from the forward area,replacements, leave and R & R returnees are now required to process through the173d Replacement Detachment, This ne w policy maintains a minimal rear detachmentthereby augmenting the combat effectiveness of the forward elements. Company "E"(Provisional) is ssigned to the 173d Support Battalion with its own morning reportan d TO&E drawn from Brigade resources.The 1.73d Engine r Company, the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment andth , 51st Chemical Detachment were all augmented in personnel strength during this

reporting rcriod, Th e Engineer augmentation wa s due to the assignment of an Equip-ment Maintcnsnce Section.The 39th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), the 46th PI Detachment an d the628th MI Detachment all received a change of status from attached to assigned.

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ONFIoENT 1LAVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUEIICT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

a. The enemy situation beft and during each operation conducted by theBrigade during this reporting riod is as follows:(1) Operation GREELIEY

(a) Operation GRELEY comenced on 17 June 1967. Prior to thecommencement of the operation the followig enemy units were believed to be in thearea of operations: 24th NVA Regt, 304th VM C Bn , 200th VC Arty Bn , and H-15 LF Bn .However, on 10 July 1967, evidence of a new unit appeared after the 4/503 engageda unit and captured documents and a POW. This unit was the Doe Lop Regt (NtA).On 19 July 1967 another unit newly infiltrated into SVN appeared when two (2) NVAsoldiers rallied at DAK PEK SF Camp. These Chieu Hois stated they were from the174th Regt, 316th NVA Div; these reports proved correct on 8 August when the 8thARVN Task Force made heavy contact with elements of the reigment eight (8) kilo-meters west of DAK SEANG SF Camp.

(b) The Doe Lop Regt was believed to have withdrawn across theTri-Border area after contact on 21 July with 2/503 Inf. The 174th NVA Regt wasbelieved to have withdrawn across th e Laotion border after contact with th e ARVNon 8 August 1967.(c) During August and September there were few contacts with th e

enemy. The significant contacts involved Brigade LRRP teams as listed below:DT E LOCATION FRIENDLY UNIT ENEMY FORCE12/8 .B 933300 LRRP TM # Est 30 VC18/8 ZB 105347 LRRP TM #1 Eat 30-50 VC29/8 ZB 116325 LRRP OP Unknown05/9 ZB 105327 LRRP TM #7 11 VC

(d) Terrain and Weather Analysis:i Terrains The area of operation fell within KONTUMProvince. The western boundary was marked by the Cambodian/Laotian borders, thesouthern border by the YB 00 B- M grid line, the northern sector included the DAKPE K Special Forces Camp and the eastern protion was generally bounded by the AS9259 to ZB 1200 grid line. The DAK PO and DAK PSI Rivers form the major drainagesystem in the area. The contour of the terrain is characterized by high mountainranges interlaced with river valleys and streams. Major routes into the area areNational Highway 14 and Communal Route 512.2 Weather: The weather during Operatioy. GREELEY wa scharacterized by the marked influence of the Southwest Monsoon with frequent andheavy precipitation. Cloud ceilings during early morning houra below 1,000 feet

were common with ceilings rising to 2,000 - 4,000 feet in the afternoon.(e) Following is a list representing the enenq's order ofbattle:UNIT &STRENGTH LOCATION SUBORDINATE UNITS WEAPONS & F';UIP24th NVA Regt ZB 140340 4 Inf Bn 4 x 120mm Mtrs1000 5 In f Bn 21 x 82mm Mtrs6 Inf Bn 13 x 12.7 AA MG's

27 x RR's (57's & 75's)12 x Goryunov MG's9 x RP-46LMG'sAssorted SA

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M!O IDENTIh LAVBE-SC 15 November 1967USBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

4 Bn/24 ZBo9210 Unknown UnknownRegt5 Bn/24 Unlocated Unknown UnknownRegt6 Rft/24 ZBO00171 Unknown UnknownRegt304 VCMF ZB215385 D-11 Inf Co 21 x SMG's350 (C-1)D-12 Inf Co 36 AR's(C-2)D-13 Inf Co 9 x 6Crm Mtrs(c-3)D-14 Arty Co Assorted SA(c-4)200 VC YA993830 1 Co 18 x 12o7mm AA MG'sArty Bn 2 Co 38 x AK-47's300 3 Co 57 x SKS'sPossible 75mm and 105mmArtillery piecesAssorted CAH-15 LF Bn Unlocated C-1 Inf Co Unknown400 C-2 Inf CoC-3 Inf CoC- 4 Inf CoC-5 Inf Co

(2) Operation BOLLING(a) Prior to commfncement of the operation the following enemy

units were believed to be operating in he area of operations: 5th NV A Divisions,consisting of three Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Battalion and the 3Cth MY Bn(NVA); 85th LF Bn, K-65 Sapper Co , K-76 Sapper Co; and two elements were believedto possibly be operating in he area, the 91st NVA Regt and the 313th NVA Bn.(b) The enemy's logistical problems indicate the enemy is x-

tremely vulnerable due to lengthy overland supply lines. The enemy is ulnerableto air and artillery airstrik s when concentrated; therefore, large troop move-ments must be made during periods of low visibility. Logistics problems indicatethe enemy cannot support sustained attacks against friendly forces. Attacks appearlimited to infiltration raids.(c) Most all contacts during Operation BOLLING have becn with

squad size or smaller elements. The following is a list of significant contactsfor Operation BOLLING during the reporting period:DATE LOCATION FRIENDLY UNIT ENEMY FORCE

Sep 191150 CQ078405 E/17 Ca v Unknown271600 BQ984374 A/4/503 6 VC271945 BQ914590 A/l/503 Unknown

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SOFIINTIAL

AVUB-SC 15 Nove er 1967Oct 041100 DQ 843381 O/1/503d Infantry 16 - 20 NVA061805 CQ 014471 /2/8th Cay 4 NVA

09115 DQ 942589 A/1/503d Infantry Eat NVA Sqd092005 BQ 949588 A/1!503d Infantry Eat NVA Sqd111045 BQ 998695 ARA, 2/8th Cay 8 VC200555 BQ 974367 LRRP Tm A 5 VC310945 BQ 989298 E/l7th Cay Est VC Sqd(d) Te ain and Waatbe, Ana1lj:

j. Terrain: The area of interest is located within south-ern PHU YEN Province and a northern portion of KANH HOA Province. The contour of theterrain is characterized by two principle land formations - the coastal plain andmountainous areas. The coastal plain is generally flat with little variation.The inland momtain ridges are divided by beth wide and narrow valleys runing Agenerally north to south. The most prominent terrain feature is the east to westSONG DA RANG. The river empties into the South China Sea. Vegetation in the plainsarea is predominently rice fields. Further inland, dense broadleaf evergreen forestcovers the mountain ridges with canopy rising in excess of 80 feet. Interprovincialroute 7B and Route 1 are the main lines of communication in the area.

2. Weather: The weather during Operation BOLLING has beenclear and warm with only a few days of thunder showers. Th e autumn transition fz ,mthe dry season to the northeast monsoon has not as yet come into full swing. Humidityranged from 65 - 85 per cent. Temperature ranged from 76 to 83 degrees.(e) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of

battle:U11IT SUB UNITS LOCATION AKA WEAPONS95th NVP Regt I Bn BQ 8853 801 Infil Gp 60 and 82mm mtrsStr - I00 2 Bn Ngo Quyen 12.7 AA3 Bn Unit 335 75 RR's

Song Lo 3-40 RL'sWork Site 10 K-51 riflesHanoi - 93 AK-47 riflesSong Thad K-56 riflesSong Da SKS riflesCong Truong 10 .50 cal HM'sThon 18 Assorted LMG's

4th En, 95th 1 Co CQ 0258 l1th Bn 1-82mm MortarStr - 300 2 Co Unit 337 2-75mm RR's3 Co 11 Village4 Co Hung Dao BnI8t BnCO-ChauXA-11Khue-1

5th Bn, 95th CQ 0244 12th Bn 2-82mm mtrsStr - 300 Unit 339 1-75m PH-3 Bn AA M's2d Bn AK-47'sCO-Bich SKS 56'sKhue-212 Village

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o jO ro rSC 15 November 1.967SUBCTz Operatonal Roport. Lesson$ ILaredMM SIMMOCATIOH AKA M US6th Bn, 95th BQ 9082 13th Pn 2-82.a MrsStr - 300 Unit 341 2-75mm RR'sH-53d BnCO DongKhue-385th LF Bn CQ 0464 not available not availableStr - 285 DK-I 1 9328DK-3 CQ 095485DK-5 BQ 9256DK-7 CQ 035680DK-9 CQ 008330th MF Bn B-I CQ 1328 Infil Gp D-3 3-60mm mtrsStr - 350 B-3 U-3 3-81mm mtrsB-5 K-71 4-12.7 MG'sB-17 X-14 3-57mm RR's

B-19 Quan 30 2-XH 40'sT-29 2-XM 79's331 Bn,Duong 250Thon Viet 180

K-65 Sapper Co not available CQ 0528 not available not availableK-76 Sapper Co " BQ 8273 "5th Div Fwd BQ 8852 "5th Div Main BQ 8652 " "2d Bn, 91st CQ 0737 "NVA Regt313th NVA Bn 1, 2, 3 Co's BQ 165605 "

b. Viet Cong/NVA losses for the period 1 August - 31 October 1967:Enmy Personnel:KIA (BC) ................................ .......... 137KIA (POSS) .......................................... 39PO W ...................................... .......... 37Civil Defendents ................................... 149Returnees ...................................... 2Eouipment/SuppliesWeapons:AK-47 Rifles ........................................ 22

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. @~~NFUIN.FTIAtLSAVE-4C 15 November 1967SUBJECT= Operational Report Lessons Learned

f SKS Rifles ................... ................ 6Mauaer ............................ 7BAR ee ....... .of .......... . ......... 1Carbine .... .. .. .'M-1 Rifle ........................................... 7Springfield 03 ...................................... 2MAS 36 ......................................... .... 3Remington 03 .... .................. ............ 1RPD Machine Gun . ............................... 1.4 5 Cal Pistol ........................ ............. 1Chicom 54 Pistol .................................... 2Ammunition, Mines and Explosives:Assorted Small Arms Rounds ................... 6456Heavy Ammo (50 & Up) .............................. 56B-40 Rocket Launcher Rounds ......................... 2Shotgun Rounds ................................. 7M-79 Rounds ..................................... 23460mm Mortar Rounds .............................. 12357rm Recoiless Rifle Rounds...... .......... 150CBU Bomblets ................................... 102750 # Bomb ............... 2250 # Bomb .................................. ... 11CO # Napalm Bomb ................... 11C5mm Artillery Rounds ........ . . ...... 10Hand Grenades ................................. 71Rifle Grenades ............................ .. 13Smoke Grenades . . 0-00.0....................Blasting Caps ...........................0-0..19AT Mines ...................................Chicom Claymore ........... ........... ...... 1US Claymore ........................... 1

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AVBI,-8C 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons LearnedLand Mine Fuszes so........................ .o 3

Surface Charges **.o.o ....*o..* ..... ...... &......o. 382mm Fuzes v/shipping Plugs so....o-o.....o50Hand Flare o....................... 2Trip Flare ............................. 2White Star Cluster ............. 1..........82mm Morta~r Round .............................. 18Installations:Huts ......................................... 230Bunkers.......... .... ...... ................. 213Foxholes ... o.......................7Trench Systems ........................ .l.140.MetersFood:Rice .. ................................... 9 TonsSalt ... ..... .......................... 2320 lbsCorn.................... o........ 265 lbsPotatoes .. o................ o...... 205 lbsBarley ................................... 100 lbsBananas .................... ............... 80 lbsFish....... o................ ........ .... . 10 lbsMeat ......................... 10 lbsGrapefruit ..................... 12 lbsBreadfruit..... ... ... .................... 10 lbsSugar ... o.............o..........,*........5 lbsPepper ..... oo........ o..... o................j 1WTobacco ...... ............................ 220 lbsMiscellaneousl:AK-47 Magazines.......... ....... .............. 32RPJ) MG Mage.zines........ .... ................... 2Carbine Mgazines ........ ....................... 8

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AVBE-SC 15 November 1967ISUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons LearnedM-1 Clip. .......... . . 84M-16 Magazines ................ ............... o. 2Bayonets .......... . 2Grenade Launcher ........................ .. 1Compass, U ................ 1Flashlights .................................. , 5Flashlight Batteries ........................ 21PRC-1O Batteries ................................... 2Transistor Radios .................................. 4Boats .............................................. 4Flags .............................................. 2Shovels ............................................ 2Rucksacks ......................................... 61Pith Helmets ....................................... 6Packboards ......................................... 3Hammocks ........................................... 7Ponchos ........................................... 16Stoves ..... . ....................................Rice Machine ....................................... 1Canteens .......................................... 16Briefcase .......................................... 1Suitcases .......................................... 3Plows .............................................. 5Bubble Level for Mortar Sight ...................... 1Printing Press ..................................... 1Tooth Brushes ...................................... 4Tooth Paste .................................. 3 TubesChopsticks ................................... 17 SetsMachette ........................................... 1

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URNDENT# LAVE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJEC: Operational Report Lessons Learned

57m RR Cannister ................................ 1BAR Magazines . ................................. 2SM Magagines ........................... 1Gas Maaks ................. 12Gas Mask Nosepiece ................................. 1Brush Hat .......................................... 1Sxwgical Shears .................................... 1US Helmet .......................................... 1AN/PRC-25 Battery .............................Sandals ........................................ 32 PrShaving Brush ................................. 1Soap Bar ................... ....................... 2Assorted Clothing ........................... 550 lbsMosquito Net ............... ........................ 1Straw Hat .................. ....................... 1Straw Mat ..................................... 9Oil Bottles .................................... 2Water Cans ................................... 2Pistol Belts ........ ................ ........... 8Medical Kits .................................. 5Medical Supplies .............................. 50 lbsBarbed Wire Rolls .................................. 2Dog Muzzle .............. . ......... 1Headlamps ...................................... 2Blanket, Wool ...................................... 1Sewing Bag ......................................... 1Cigarette Lighter ................................. IWriting Tables ................................. 18Baskets ............................ .............. 19

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INA(T-SC 15 November 1967

J SUBJECT: Operational Report Lesson LearnedVII Piasters ... . ...... ... ... $3510.00NPC ... $1.20Rifle Meaning Equipment .................... AssertedFarm Implements . ..... AssortedCooking Utensils ............................ AssortedDishes ................. Assorted

4. Combat Operations:General: Th e Brigade continued to conduct combat and Revolutionary Devel-

opment (Civil Affairs and Civic Action) operations designed to locate and destroyViet Cong/NVA Forces, logistical installations and to further reduce his hold onthe Vietnamese people.

During the month of August 1967, the 173d Airborne Brigade continuedOperation GREELEY. Security in the Brigade Rear Area wa s provided by rear detach-ment personnel of the Brigade. Operations continue into the month of September1967.

During the reporting period, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continuedit s security/search and destroy operations (Operation GREELEY), in the tri-borderarea, vicinity of DAK TO . On 6 August, the ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion contactedan estimated NV A Company which was later reinforced to Battalion size. Contactbegan at 1412 hours at vicinity of DAK SEANG (YB 847405). Friendly elements wereengaged with recoilless rifle fire, 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. Enemy forces werereported as having taken heavy losses. Enemy contacts with elements of the 173dAirborne Brigade continued to be sporadic and consisted primarily of harassing andsniper fire. The largest enemy contacts were made by two LRRP teams and on! LRRPOP on 12, 18 and 29 August. The contact of 18 August resulted in 1 US WIA and 1US KIA. When the team engaged the NVA, the team leader sent his patrol to the pointof extraction while he remained to divert the enemy soldiers in pursuit. His bodywas iecovered the ne>t day. A rifle company was deployed to the area of contactshortly after the team's extraction. Throughout the reporting period, tnf-antry elements of the Brigade discovered numerous installations, huts, bunkers,mortar and small arms rounds. On 23 August, Brigadier General Leo H. Schweitertook command of the 173d Airborne Brigade from Brigadier John R. Deane Jr . Opera-tions during the month of August were supported by132 TAC sorties, 29 FAC sortiesand 146 visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 177.5 tons of ordnance wasdropped. Supporting artillery (3/319th Arty) fired a total of 3359 missions expend-ing a total of 19,417 rounds. The Brigade's Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon)supported all operations. A statistical report of their activities follows:

UH'ID MissionsType Mission Sorties Missions TonsResupply 1018 60 20Command and Control 864 274 0Medevac 50 20 0

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AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons LearnedMaintenance 35 10 0Other 60 50 0Total HoursTotal Passengers 634

OH-13 MissionsCommand and Control 750 193 0Reconnaissance 45 30 0Maintenance 20 15 0Training 10 10 0Other 16 35 0Total Hours 245Total Passengers 228Grand Total (Sorties) UH-lD 2037

OH-13 841Grand Total (Missions) UH-ID 41

OH-13 228Operations during the month of August resulted in the following VC/NVA and friendlycasualties:

VC/NVA Losses US LossesKIA (BC) 4 KIAKIA (POSS) _4 WIA 12VCC 0 MI A _0Detainees 0 Non-Battle Injured 9Ralliers 0 Non-Battle Dead 1

Septenbr

During the month of September, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) con-tinued Operation GREELEY in the II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE under the operational controlof the 4th Infantry Division. From 1 - 18 September 1967 the Brigade conductedoperations in the DAK TO/DAK SEANG area of KONTUM Province in the CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.On 18 September, the Brigade Headquarters (-), 1/503d Infantry, 4/503d Infantry,2/8th Cavalry (OPCON), C/3/319th Artillery, elements of the 173d Support Battalion,173d Signal Company and the 335th Air Mobile Company Light moved to TUY HOA in TINHPHU YEN Province in preparation for a new operation, code named BOLLING. Operation

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UONIMENTIr LAVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons LearnedBOLLING commenced on 19 September and continued Uh iL%. '-he end of th e month. From7 September through 28 Septebe 1967, the Brigade supported a CIDG operation north-west of DAK SEANG and west of DAK PEK code named Operation DARBY. The BIEN UOATactical Area of Responsibility was secured by elements of th e 1st and 9th InfantryDivisions on a rotational basis as directed by II FFORC7V. Brigade personnel providedsecurity for the BIEN HOA Base Camp perimeter.

From 1 - 14 September 1967, th e Brigade continued participation in OperationGREELEY with operation moving northwest of DAK SEANG and west of DAK PEK in ONTUMProvince. Th e Brigade deployed the 1/503d Infantry and th e 2/503d Infantry with th e4/503d Infantry as Brigade Reaction Force at DAK SEANG. From 7 - 28 September, th eBrigade supported Operation DARBY, a CIDG operation northwest of DAK SEANGo TheBrigade had no significant contact during this period. On 13 September, te 2/503dInfantry became th e Brigade Reaction Force and th e 1/503d and 4/503d Infantry beganpreparation for movement to DAK TO. On 14 September, th e Advance Party departedDA K TO fo r T11Y HOA on the SOUTH CHINA SEA in preparation fo r a new operation codenamed BOLLING. By the 19th of September, the movement was completed with the 1/5C3dInfantry, 4/503d Infantry, elements of the 173d Signal Support Battalion, C/3/319thArtillery, 335th .AsUlUJ~eJicqpttr 9, ,5 73d Signal Company and Headquarters andHeadquarters Company (-) eing located in UY HOA commencing Operation BOLLING on19 September. A/3/319th Artillery an d th e 2/503d Infantry remained at DAK TO as apart of TASK FORCE 77 (2/503d Infantry, A/3/319th Artillery, 27th MIKE Force Company,3d ARVN Airborne Battalion an d th e 1/12d ARVN Regiment). Operation GREELEY continucdinto the month of October with no significant contacts. Operation BOLLING continuedat TUY HOA with operations spreading east and frequent contact with, he enemy reported.Operation BOLLING also continued into October. Operations. uring the month of Sept-ember were supported by 444 TA C Air sorties expending a total of 506.66 tons ofordnance. Supporting artillery (3/319th) fired a total of 1,844 missions expendinga total of 11,185 rounds. The Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon) supportedall operations. A statistical breakdown of their activities follows:

MISSION UH-lD OH-13Resupply 1,476 0Command and Control 823 472Maintenance 123TOTAL SORTIES 2,558 699Total Passengers Transported .... ............. .. 895Total Cargo Transported ............... 6,000 poundsTotal Hours Flown .... ............. .... . 984

Operations during the month of September resulted in the following VC/NVA and friendlycasualtics:

VC/NVA Losses US LossesKIA (BC) 33 KIA 2KI A (POSS) 6 WI AVCC 14 MIA 0Detainees 1180 Non-Battle Injured 14Ralliers 0 Non-Battle Dead

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SONRWEltIPI LATBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

OctoberDuring the month of October 1967, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)continued Operation BOLLING in the vicinity of TUY HOA on the coast of the SOUTHCHINA SEA. In addition, the Brigade relocated its rear base area from BIEN HOAto AN KHE by road convoy, sea and Air Force transport.During the reporting period (1 - 31 October), the 173d Airborne Brigade* (Separate) continued search and destroy operations in the TUY HOA/PHU HIEP vicinity.These operations were designed to provide security for the local rice harvest.Brigade elements maintained daily contact with VC/VA forces operating in this coas.ta l region, however, the enemy was almost always found in small groups, seldomlarger than squad size. The largest enemy force contact during the month wasestimated to be between 16 and 20 NVA. The contact took place at 1100 hours on 4October at BQ 843381 while C/I/503d Infantry was searching a base camp. Contactwas broken at 1200 hours. One (1) VA was KIA (BC) and four weapons were capturedOn 9 October, A/i/503d Infantry made contact with an estimated squad of NVA at BQ942589 (1145 hours). Final results of this brief contact were 6 NVA KIA (BC) and3 eapons cqtured. There were 4 US WIA. Throughout th e month, Brigade elementsaccounted for numerous VC/NVA kills resulting from such small skirmishes. Duringth e month of October 1967, th e Brigade relocated it s rear base camp facility fromBIEN HOA to AN KHE. The move required a massive effort on the part of SupportBattalion and rear detachment personnel. All TO&E an d personal items belonging totroops in he forward area were loaded into conex containers which were then con-voyed to SAIGON (NEWPORT). From NEWPORT, men, vehicles and equipment were movedby sea to QUIN NHON. From QUIN NHON, convoys moved overland to AN KHE, the homeof the is t Air Cavalry Division. The Brigade rear detachment became operationalimmediately upon arrival in AN KHE. Shortly after the arrival in AN KHE, the 3dBattalion, 503d Infantry arrived in-country. The 3/503d Infantry was formedat Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Battalion underwent Jungle Training in AN KHEprior to deployment to the Operation BOLLING AO. Operations during the month ofOctober 1967 were supported by.269 TAC sorties, 145 FAC sorties and no p*r sevisual reconnaissance missions. A total of 329.55 tons of ordnance was droppedby Air Force fighters. Supporting artillery (3/319th Arty), fired a total of1,222 missions expending 16,163 rounds. The Brigade Aviation Platoon (CasperPlatoon), supported al l operations. A statistical report of their activitiesfollows:

UH-ID MissionsType Mission Sorties MissionsResupply 671 225Command and Control 1060 275Maintenance 178 77Total Hours - 58 0Total Passengers - 666

OH-13 MissionsCommand and Control 957 27 0Maintenance 158 64

13CONFIDENTIAL


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V

AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Total Hours - 394Total Passengers - 130Total 7.62mm Ammunition Expended - 9,7000roundsOperations during the month of October 1967 resulted in he following vc/NVA andfriendly casualties:

VC/NVA KIA (BC) 1 US KIA _9VC/NVA KUL (Poss) 9US WIA_Civil Defendents 9_ US MI A _

Returnees 2 Non-Battle Dead 3VC/NVA PW's 23 Non-2attle Injured 9

5. Trininga. During th e reporting period th e Brigade continued to conduct extensivejungle warfare training of newly arrived replacements. During th e latter part ofOctober, th e 173d Airborne Brigade Jungle School, with th e remainder of the Brigude'sRear Detachment at BIEN HOA, deployed to AN KHE. Along with th e tremendous task ofrebuilding the school under Adverse conditions, the cadre also had to train thenewly arrived 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry. Training of the 3/503d Infantry commenzedon 27 October an d continued until 2 November, resulting in omplete training andorientation of 820 officer and enlisted men in n unprecedented time period. Abreakdown of th e number of personnel trained by month follows:

(1) August: 356 personnel.(2) September: 57 8 personnel, 40 US Air Force Air Policemen.(3) October: 82 0 enlisted men and officersoof~the: 5adjInfkntry an d

121 normal Brigade replacements.b. Even though th e Brigade Jungle School was operating at a handicap,first rate training continued throughout the period without interruption.

6. Psychological Operations and Civic Actiona. Ast: During the month of August, th e Brigade continued its construe-tion program in he BIEN HOA area. This month a market place was refurbished, 1

flagpole erected an d 6 see-saws constructed. JUSPAO Newsletters were distributedin conjunction with th e NEDCAP/DENTCAP program.(1) Civic Action: MEDCAP teams treated 9,383 patients while DENTCAPteams treated 514 patients. Distribution for the month of August was as follows:

Tooth Brushes ........ . . . . . 51Tooth Paste (tubes).. ........ .41Cooking Oil (cases) .. . .. . ...... 17Canned Goods.. .. .. .. .. . 5,314 lbs'.W Ic'N T)

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*~F V.IL*NTIfj LAVBESC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

d. Solatium Payments:(1) Villagers of DAK PEK fo r damage done to rice fields:

Rice ...... . . . . . o . .400ibsDlgar Wheat .............. 20 lbs(2) Victfts of accidental shelling of a village south of DA K TO:

33,000 $VN7. Logisticss. During the reporting period, the logistical posture continuedto remain excellent. Tactical operations were supported by land, air and ship

lines of supply. In the latter part of October, the Brigade relocated it s RearBase Camp from BIEN HOA to AN KHE. Th e move required a massive effort on the partof the 173d Support Battalion and resulted in approximately 308 tons of cargoand passengers and IO60 conexes being moved by ship,nair.i ndvehiye' on4y fromSAICON. NEWPORT) to AN KHE. A logistical summary by classes is furnished bymonth in Inclosure 3.

8. Personnel and Administrationa. Personnel

(1) Brigade Casualties:Battle Casualties Non-Battle Ca~uajtiesKIA WIA M IA DIED INJURED

August 3 18 0 1 9September 2 23 0 0 14October _ _ .6 0 _3TOTAL 14 77 0 4 32

(2) Brigade Strenth:AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH

AUTHORIZED ASG I Aji 67 AS G 31 Oct 67OFF WO EM AGG OFF WO FM AG G OFF WO EM AGG

I/Assigned Units 282 40 4828 5150 267 36 4218 4521 300 44 4816 51502/Attached Units 12 2 34 48 14 1 86 10 1 15 1 35 51Aggregate 294 42 4862 5198 281 37 4304 4622 315 45 4851 5211

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III

AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2UNS AND LSSE BY,NTHAugust 1967 September 1967 October 1967OFF WO EM AGG OFF WO EM AGG OFF WO EM AG O

2/Gains 20 2 586 608 26 4 192 222 60 8 911 979h/Losses 14 2 364 38 0 21 1 277 29 9 17 1 419 43 7NET +6 0 +222 +228 +5 +3 -85 -77 +43 +7 +492 +542/ During the reporting period the assigned units authorized strength increased.The increase was due to the status of the 39th Infantry, Platoon (Scout Dog), N.Ithan authorized strength of 1 officer and 20 enlisted men being changed from attachedto assigned in late October; the 723d Forward Signal Platoon, with an authorized

strength of 1 officer and 38 enlisted men being assigned in August and the 173dEngineer Company authorized strength being increased from 147 enlisted men to 188enlisted men, in at e October, Also, th e assigned strength of th e Brigade wasreduced in early October when "?I Company (LRRP), 51st Infantry was activated withfan assigned strength of 1 officer and 228 enlisted men and transferred from theBrigade.2/ During the reporting period th e attached units authorized strength decreased.The decrease was a result of the 67th Infantry, with an authorized strength of '9~enlisted men, being relieved from attached and reassigned in late October and the39th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), with an authorized strength of 1 officer and 20enlisted me n being changed from attached to assigned./ Represents all assigned gains to include both in-country and out-country.Included also is the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry._4/Represents al l assigned losses to include DEROS, ETS, in-country reassignments,deceased members, out-country medical evacuation and the reassignment of "F" Compary(LRRP), 51st Infantry.

b. Discipline, Law an d Order:(1) The discipline within the Brigade remained excellent during thereporting period. No stragglers were reported.(2) During this quarter there were 9 General Court Martials, 34 Special

Court Martials, 5 Summary Court Martials and 320 Article 151s.(3) Assistance from the Brigade IG was readily available throughoutthe reporting period.

c. Developement and Maintenance of Morale:() 'Morale within the Brigade remained excellent due to increaed andimproved services and facilities.(2) Finance: The Brigade Finance Section (Company "A", A&dinistration)continued to provide financial support throughout the reporting period. Newlyarrived replacements were made aware of th e Soldiers Savings Program an d the variousallotments available to them through orientation an d various newsletters.

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Tv

91: AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(3) Chaplain: During the reporting period there were 556 religiousservices conducted (all faiths with a total attendance of 14,267).

(4) Rest and Recuperation: Brigade R&R allocations during the report-ing period were as follows:

OctoberHawaii 58 60 79Bangkok 85 89 63Hong Kong 44 43 40Tokyo 60 51 30Taipei 65 43 29Singapore 19 14 15Kuala Lvmpur 10 9 5Manila 9 12 1Penang 21 18 13Australia NIATOTAL 371 339 310

(5) There were a total of 1,389 awards for valor and meritorioussorvice during the reporting period. A breakdown follows:

APPROVED AWARDS AND DECORATIONSAnt Sentember OctoberDistinguished Service Cross 0 4 1

Silver Star 1 5 1Legion of Merit 1 4 4Distinguished Flying Cros.s 1 1 2Bronze Star Medel (Valo) 60 37 6Bronze Star Medal (Merit/Achievement) 139 68 43Air Medal (Valor) 3 0 0Air Medal (SerVice) 437 31 34Soldiers Medal 0 1 0Army Commendation Medal (Valor) 78 20 16Arqy Commendation Medal (Merit/Achievement) 137 75 99

18COPP I NTIA L


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AVB-SO 15 Novembar 1967SUBJECT: Operational 'eport Lessons LearnedAa Sentember Octobe

Joint Services Conmendation Medal 0 0 0Purple HeartTOTAL 875 294 220

9. The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) pro-vided chemical support on a standby basis whenever requested by elements of theBrigade. The following units were supported by smoke:Unit LZ Coordinates

3 Aug 67 4/503d Infantry JO ZB 61416414 Aug 67 4/503d Infantry Vicinity DAK PEK YB 90370020 Aug 67 C/2/503d Infantry PETE YB 865250

The following Riot Control Agent CS-I missions were folwn:Date Coordinates10 Sep 67 YB 820472 - YB 8054631 Sep 67 YB 803466 - YB 81044028 Oct 67 BQ 875205

In addition, the 51st Chemical Detachment dordinated eight (8) efoliationand crop destruction missions with the US Air Force which were flown in supportof Brigade operations. The detachment also assisted units in preparation of Four,gasse mines and flew Airborne Personnel Detector missions utilizing the modifiedManpack personnel detectors in conjunction with other intelligence gathering sour-ces under the direction of the Brigade S-2.

II. Com der's Observations and Recommendations:1. Item: Artillery Observation

Discussion: During Operation GREELEY, the total effectiveness of theartillery available to support the Brigade was heavily dependent upon th eavailability of observation aircraft. Visual adjustment by ground observers wa sextremely difficult, often impossible, because of the dense jungle foliage.

Observation: Aerial observers should be utilized continuously or beprepared to become airborne on notice. For operations in thick jungle additionalair observers should be made available. The Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Oklahomashould include pratical training in aerial observation for new Forward Observer's.

2. Item: Check Fires for Use of TAC Ai rDiscussion: On contact missions the artillery did great damage to the

enemy, bu t maximut efficiency an d effect wa s not obtained due to the periods oftime in which the artillery was silenced in order to introduce airstrikes.

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ABE-SC 15 November 1967SMBJFOT: Operationrl Report Lessons Learned

O rat : In case of close contact with the enemy on several sides,artillery will permit closer support, a higher volume of fire an d multiple firingunits within --ange. Nore portions of a units perimeter can be supported simultane-ously by artillery than by TAO Air. TAC Air would be more effective against aconcentrat enemy position on a "point" target. In close contact, TAC Air shouldbe used pmarily on enemy withdrawal routes.3. Item: Artillery Fire Safety Clearance Procedures

Discussion: Current safety requirements, even though time consuming,ar, necessary to preclude errors which might result in unnecessary casualtiesbeing sustained by friendly forces or by cfilian non-combatants.Observation: Inaccurate artillery fire greatly lowers troop morale

and confidence in close artillery fires.4. Item: Locations of Infantry and Supporting Elements

Discussion: Artillery elements must be kept aware at al l times of thelocations of the infantry elements they support and of al l elements adjacent to thesupported infantry elements position.Observation: Artillery liaison officers must be kept informed of alltroop locations to provide timely effective fire3 and prevent unnecessarycasualties which might result from misplaced fires.

5. Item: Keeping the Main Supply Route OpenDiscussion: The main problem facing the 173d Engineer Company duringthis period was that of keeping the MR open during the monsoon rains. This prob-lem could have been avoided only if a major road construction effort, utilizing

equipment an d personnel resources external to the company, had been undertaken.Observation: An al l weather MSR would greatly relieve the strain onaerial resupply an d also provide more timely resupply by land an d reduce vehiclemaintenance problems.

6. Item: LZ Clearing TeamsDiscussion: In he DA K TO operational area, it wa s found advantageousto have a quick reaction LZ clearing team available for deployment with 30 minutesof notification. All personal equipment and operational items for this team wereprepacked. This greatly facilitated their timely deployment.Observation: Eigineer LZ clearing teams greatly facilitated the prep-aration of LZ's in dense jungle. They proved invaluable. Prepacked LZ clearingkits can also be dropped to units to help them prepare LZ's in thick jungle.

7. I%m:oBangal-ord TorpedoesDiscussion: For LZ clearing in dense bamboo growths, it was found thatbangalore torpedoes can be efficiently used. Ten bangalore torpedoes in 100 footlengths five meters apart will clear an area approximately 40 by 40 meters.Ob'servtion: Bangalore torpedoes are the most rapid means of clearingdense bamboo growths.

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/

AVB0LS 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons LearnedS. JW: Formation of Engineer Demolition Liaison Teams

Discussion: A requirement exists for a one or two man team for eachinfantry battalion to provide technical assistance and advice on demolition andother engineer problems as well as training assistance.Observation: Engineer Demolition Liaison Teams provide good on the jobtraining to the infantryman in the use of demolitions. These liaison teams arealso helpful in giving guidance on blowing up enemy fortifications and clearingLZts.

MIS

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I PRECEbINM PAEBLAN-NOT FILMCONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT (15 Nov 67) Ist IndSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending31 October 1967 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WARJFF 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 2 6 DE C 1967TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,

APO 96375Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the

Army, Washington, D. C. 20310(C) This headquarters has reviewed the 173d Airborne Brigade

Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31October 1967 and concurs with the observations and makes the followingcorrections and comments:

a. Refernece paragraph 3a(1)(a) (page 2) , Intelligence.CHANGE FROM TOLine 3 304th V14C Bn 304th LF BnLine 3 H-15 LF Bn deleteLine 6 19 July 1967 25 July 1967Line 7 Chieu Hois Hoi Chanhs

b, Reference paragraph 3a(1)(b) (page 2), Intelligence.CHANGE FROM TOLine I Doc Lop Regt Doc Lap Regt

c. Reference paragraph 3a(1)(d)._ (page 2), Terrain.CHANGE FROM TOLine 5 DAK PO DAK POKO

d. Reference paragraph 3a(2) (page 3), Operation BOLLINGCHANGE FROM TOLine 2 5th NVA Divisions 5th1 Divisiont s

95th NVA Regt

CONFIDENTIAL DOWNGRADED AT 3Y,,RDECLASIIl'-j-D AFTErR 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5.)


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*1

CONFIDETILAVFA-GC-OT (15 Nov 67) 1st IndSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending31 October 1967 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WARJFF 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (U)

e. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph I (page 19),Commanderts Observations and Recommendations: Forward observers andother personnel within the artillery unit should be trained as aerialobservers by the unit to meet these contingencies.

FOR THE CMIADER:

jAmEs P, GASTONCaptnm , AGOA -, , .\.JUtant GeneS~h

C0 3

COIIDENT[A-1


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CONFIDENTIALAVHGC-DST (15 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C)SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned (1 August - 31 October 1967)HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 6 JAfITO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LessonsLearned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters,173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (ARJA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent coments follow:a. Reference item concerning artillery observation training, page

19, paragraph 1: Concur. The limited availability of aircraft often pre-cludes this type training from being conducted for all students; however,those destined for forward observer duty in RVH should be given practicalexperience training on a priority basis prior to deploying for assignmentin RVN.

b. Reference item concerning keeping the 145R open, page 20, para-graph 5: Nonconcur. A LOC construction program ha s been established forVietnam to upgrade th e existing road net. This program is in it s early stageswith initial effort concentrated on MSR'so Assistance by non-organic unitsmay be requested through the tactical chain of command, based on the priorityestablished for engineer support by the senior tactical headquarters.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reportingunit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. . ARATSUKASACapta),. AGCAssistani Adjutant General

cy furn:HQ, 173d Abn Bde (SEP)HQ, I FFORCEV

R4 CONFIDENTIALD -".'-r-jt 3 year intervalsDecul " ^, eftor 12 YearsDOD DIR b 0.a0 Applies


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GPOP-DT(15 No v 67) (U) d IndSUBJECT" Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October1967 from HQ, 173d Abn Bde (SEP) (UIC WARAA)(RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwardingindorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR TH E COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CPT, AGCAsst AG

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KNj I\/L

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F(N T(fL vAVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

1.. s:a. Supply:

(1) Class I: Class I operations remained the same. LRRP raionscontinued to be utilized by tke Brigade at an increased rate. Class I supply inthe forward areas has settled down to a routine.(2) Class II &IV : The percentage fill on expendable items in-creased significantly during August. The log jam in the logistical channels hasbeen broken and the time frame on filling requisitions is decreasing significant-ly. The useage rate of clothing and equipment continues to be abnormally high

du e to the conditions of weather an d terrain.(3) Class IlI & liA: Class III activities have remained constant.

Class III an d liA continued to be supplied by the FS B in he forward area withthe exception of certain packaged products that are supplied from Base Camp.

(4) Class V: Class V articles remain constant with no items ofparticular concern. The unit's 15 day stockage level of ammunition was reloca-ted from the Air Force ASR to the old 173d storage facility.

(5) The rate of attrition and useage of equipment is very high inthe Brigade. Command emphasis is equired on care and maintenance of individualclothing and equipment as well as on major items.

b. Maintenance:(1) Considerable difficulty was experienced during th e rainy seasonwith brake failures, especially on j-ton trucks. This failure was due to lack ofperformance of organizational maintenance. Wheels were not removed and properlycleaned. Brakes were not properly serviced and equipment was not lubricated.

Forty-one (41) sets of brake shoes were direct exchange during the month of August.Approximately 25% of these shoes were cleaned and returned to stock. Fifty (50%)percent of these shoes were worn unevenly, indicating that proper adjustment hadnot been made. Twenty-five (25%) percent of the shoe linings were worn beyondthe wear limits, the drum indicating that these vehicles had not been properlyserviced. These brake shoes should have been replaced prior to failure.(2) Approximately twenty-five (25) of the Brigade'o vehicles werechecked on dispatch during August. Only tw o had a lo g book. Four vehicles ha d a

deficiency and should not have been on dispatch. These vehicles had missing (wbroken air lines, no brakes, leaking oil lines on engines, leaking fuel lines andone vehicle had more than 50% of th e lug nuts missing from one wheel.(3) One (1) enerator and five (5) ehicle engines were replaced inthe Brigade's equipment recently as a result of derelict operators. Four (4) 3/4ton trucks and one (1) -ton truck were driven under water without a deep-water

fording kit. Water was taken in hrough the air cleaner into the carburetor and in-to th e engine. All of these engines could have been saved had they been reportedto orhanizational and direct support maintenance immediately.c. Medical: New malaria cases - 13.

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AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Services Activities2. September:

a. Supply:(1) Class I: Th e Brigade was criticized by USARV for not followingthe new 28 cycle menu. We were following th e menu, but were two days behind sche-dule. We were two days behind to retain flexibility. Perishable rations were issued

from LONG BINH Ration Breakdown to the Class I officer of the Brigade each day forthe next day's consumption. By staying two days behind on out issue we were ableto maintain a minimum of two days A-rations on hand to cover any emergency requestswe received. We also were able to issue three times per week. We are presently onschedule with the 28 day cyclic menu. Rations are issued daily and we no longerhave an y reserves.

(2) Class II & IV : The major problem areas exisiting in Classes II &IV is he tendency of the units to disregard established supply procedures. For thesupply system to work effectively, unit supply officers must anticipate needs andsubmit requisitions for expendable supplies before they deplete their stocks. Alsoin many instances units are complaining of critical shortages of items that havebeen on request for an excessive period of time. In ost cases these units haveeither failed to submit follow-up requisitions, or they had received status cardsindicating the requests had been cancelled. It is mperative that units know whatthey have on requisition and the status of .he requisitions. The fill on requisi-tions to depot was good this month. Wire, WD-1, on all types of reels continued tobe a shortage item.

(3) Class III & liA: The supply fill in lass III has remained good.(4) Class V: The supply of all adopted items of Class V was adequate.

b.. Maintenance*(1) j-ton brakes: Considerable difficulty was experienced during the

monsoon season at DAK TO with brake failures on J-ton vehicles. This failure wa sdue to mu d entering the brake drum and wearing the brake shoe lining. Units hadto remove, clean and service brake shoes and brake systems approximately everythree days. 432 brake shoes, FS N 2520-678-3111, were utilized during the month.(2) Spot checks on Brigade vehicles: Approximately 45 of the Brigade'svehicles were checked on dispatch during the month of September. Only two had an

equipment log book. Four vehicles had a deficiency existing in hem and should nothave been dispatched.

(3) Critical repair parts: Difficulty is still being experienced inthe repair of Engineer equipment. The average down time of Enginee7 equipment Acontinues to run in xcess of 35 days. Currently, this unit has a road grader thathas been deadlined for a clutch assembly for 57 days. One each D-7 dozer was dead-lined for 42 days.3. October:

a. Supply:(1) Class I: There was little significant Class I activity. Long

Range Patrol packets were used frequently during this period. Special authorization

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AVBE-SC 15 November 1967SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

had to be obtained in order to draw additional rations fo r the adequate supportof Brigade operations. 54,000 LRRP ration packets were issued to the Brigadeover and above the normal 8,000 for the month of October.

(2) Class I & IV: Several items were in short supply during thefirst few day of this period. Items such as BA-30 and BA-386 dry cell batteries,fatigue trousers, size lOR and 1O W jungle boots, poncho liners, wire WD-I andinsect repellant were nften difficult to obtain. The supply of sandbags was cri-tical during the latter half of the month.

(3) Class III & ILIA: The supply of Class III items was adequate.(4) lass V: The supply of all adopted items of Class V supply was

adequate.b. Maintenance: Projects accomplished during the mont of October wereas follows:

(1) Modification of the M16. Modification of all M-16's in theBrigade with a new buffer assembly wa s completed on 15 October 1967.(2) Reconciliation and Up-dating of PLLts: This project has beencompleted for three units within the Brigade. Th e remaining units will be com-

pleted prior to 15 November 1967.(3) Establishiig the fill of all PLL's at 97%: This had been

accomplished for three units within the Brigade. This project has slipped con-siderably due to the movement of the Brigade base camp. A completion date hasbeen established for this project at 30 November 1967 (the original deadline was30 October).(4 ) Designing and developement of a container for PLL's: A samplecontainer has been designAted for electronics and armament repair parts for organi-

zational maintenance units. This container consists of a modified unserviceableguneconomically repairable foot locker. A container fo r automotive and materielhandling equipment is being developed and is expected to be completed on or before15 November 1967.

e XFflDLn{


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J AVBL.SC 15 November 1967SJBJECT: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon

1. Orgoanzation an d Trainii: The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoonis under the oporaticnal control of th e Brigade S-2 and is assigned to Troop "7'1,17th C alary fo r adtMnisvratiara and logistics. The platoon is organized as follows:

Commanding Officer - CaptainExecutive Officer - First LieutenantPlatoon Headquarters Intelligence SergeantSenior Communications Sergeant

Medical CorpsmanTwo (2) adio/Telephone OperatorsEight (8) ix (6) an teams Team LeaderAssistant Team Leader

Radio/Telephone OperatorThree (3) couts

Training: All members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol are graduatesof the Recondo School and are airborne qualified. Platoon treining on first aid,map reading, patrollipg, ntelligence reporting, individual weapons, hand-to=hand com-bat, artillery and air adjustment procedures an d all additional Ranger-type subjects.2. Techniques of Tactical Employment: Upon orders by the Brigade S-2, LRRPteams are inserted into AO's usually outside of an operating battalion's control fora three to seven day operation. Teams are inserted by helicopters, water, walk-in'sor stay-behinds. Teams are used for surveillance, reconnaissance g prisoner snatches,limited ambush and occasional screening operations.3. ProbleA- _rgs.Recommended Solutions. Shortage of aircraft for radio

relay when tern a, working fa r out is a constant problem. General communicationsare a problem, TIo LRUP's ar6 not authorized an y equipment and must borrow fromthe Brigade. Tt roor .:nded that a fixed-wing aircraft be attached to th- LRRP'sfor radio rela: r, poses ,ind that an WOE be authorized fo r the platoon.The lack of training with helicopter crews for infiltration and exfiltra-tion due to the rapid turnover of helicopter crews is also a problem. This oftenleads to a LRRP team amd a helicopter crew working together for the first time un -der actual combat conditions. It is ecommended that there be.rore raining betweenLRRP teams an d helicopter crews on rope rapelling, insertion and exfiltration tac-tics.Concealment in nemy areas is ften disclosed when the point man is forcedto fire his American made weapon, thereby alerting all the enemy troops in he area.It is suggested that the point ma n be armed with an AK-47 rifle so as not to alert

surrounding enemy forces on initial contact.


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PRCEI, AG BLAUKmuiNOT PIIMED

UNCLASSIFIEDSecritl sn l i cs ionDOCUMENT CONTROL DATA. R&,D

(Security dlaexltecation of ItleI,ody of Abotraet and Indexingaennotation ogunt e onlered whon Ilc eorolteport 11telled)OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 2010 Confidential

ORIGINATING ATIVITYCorpoal. author) 2b. ROTCUP IYCASFCTO4

3. REPORT TITLEOperational Report -Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)

4 DESCRIPTIVZ NOTIEZ (Type of report and Incluolve date*)Exoeriences of tiit en gat d n counterinsurizency operations. 1 Au g -31 Oct 19675. AU THOR(S) (Ftet nameo,Middle Initt ,t~ ao

CC, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)6- REPORT DATE IS. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 7. NO. OF REFS15 November 1967 31Sa. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. 9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBERISI

b. PROJECT NO. T674257C. N/A 2b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other nun~bere that may be ansigned

Itaieport)d. *11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES [12. SPONSORING MILITARY AC !IVITY

N/A -OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 2031013 ABSTRACT

FORMDDI NOV .. 1473 UNCLASSIFIE~D 1

Documents

173d Airborne Lessons Learned 7 Mar 1968