171861_Security Assessment - Cali, Colombia

3/24/2006

2006 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

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CALI, COLOMBIA: ecurity Assessment

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3/24/2006

CALI, COLOMBIA: Security Assessment

Country The Republic of Colombia is a South American nation on the northwestern edge of the continent, bordered by Panama, the Caribbean Sea, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and the Pacific Ocean. It has a population of almost 43 million people. The only country in South America with coastlines on both the Pacific and the Caribbean, Colombia occupies strategic and fertile terrain and is perhaps best known to foreigners for drug-trafficking and an ongoing insurgency. Although violence has decreased over the past two years, Colombia remains a very dangerous country for visitors and residents alike. City Santiago de Cali, better known simply as Cali, is the capital of Valle del Cauca province in southwestern Colombia. With approximately 2.3 million people, Cali is Colombias third-largest city after Bogota and Medellin. Cali is the main city in Colombias less densely populated southern half and is located close to the city of Buenaventura, Colombias main Pacific port. Cali has suffered for several years from moderate-to-high violence due to the presence of one of Colombias main drug-trafficking cartels and guerrillas of the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). While the Cali Cartel has been practically defeated, FARC is still active in Valle del Cauca and neighboring regions, if not specifically inside Cali itself. U.S. citizens who experience problems in Cali should call the U.S. Embassy in Bogota at (571) 315-0811 during business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.) and (571) 315-2109 or (571) 315-2110 for emergencies during nonbusiness hours. U.S. citizens in Colombia are strongly encouraged to register with the U.S. Embassy by calling its Consular Section at (571) 315-1566 and asking for the American Citizen Services unit. There is no U.S. Consulate in Cali. Terrorism The U.S. Secretary of State has designated three Colombian groups as foreign terrorist organizations: FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These groups have carried out bombings and other attacks in and around major urban areas and have hit civilian targets (recreational areas, public transportation) as well as critical infrastructure (water, oil, gas, electricity). While the Cali Cartel was responsible for most of the violence in the Cali area during the 1980s and 1990s, such as bombings and assassinations, FARC and other rebel groups are responsible for most of it today. In April 2002, for example, a group of FARC rebels carried out an audacious multiperson kidnapping involving rebels dressed in Colombian military uniforms. The kidnappers arrived at the San Luis County Assembly Building in downtown

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Cali where the Valle del Cauca Department Assembly conducts its day-to-day political affairs. There, rebels abducted 13 local congressmen, whom FARC still holds. In February, FARC attacked three electric power towers in the sectors of La Estrella, La Curva del Diablo and Monaco on the outskirts of Cali. The attack damaged nearby houses and a school, although there were no injuries. Also in February, two people died and three were injured when FARC detonated explosives outside a Colombian security-forces headquarters in Cali. The two persons killed in the attack were day laborers whom FARC had hired to transport material in explosives-laden wheelbarrows, without informing them they would be used as unwitting suicide bombers. FARC has associated itself with other transnational terrorist organizations in its quest to expand and control the drug trade. Specifically, it has formed alliances with militant groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatist group ETA. In particular, British and Irish counterterrorism officials say FARC and the IRA appear to have enjoyed a close working relationship since at least 1998. These officials estimate the IRA earned nearly $20 million from 1998 to 2001 teaching FARC how to manufacture highly accurate homemade mortars and sophisticated bombs. These improved bombs have increased the number of FARC-inflicted casualties in Colombia over the past five years. FARC reportedly used one of these IRA-designed mortars when it attacked the Iscuande naval base in southwestern Colombia on Feb. 1, 2005, killing 16 sailors and injuring 25 others. FARC also is not averse to exploring possible strategic relations with Islamist militants. A Secret Intelligence Service (aka MI6) warning issued to British embassies in Latin America


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in December 2004 asserted that FARC is believed to have links with militants associated with al Qaeda, Syria and Iran. The threat of terrorism in Cali is high.1 Crime Crime, particularly the threat of offenses perpetrated by Colombias three insurgent groups, continues to be a constant concern in Colombia. The United States provides Colombia a great deal of assistance in its fight against drug production and distribution, which is mainly dominated by insurgent organizations. The well-known program Plan Colombia constitutes part of this assistance. Foreigners in Colombia continue to be victims of threats, kidnappings and other criminal acts. During the past two years, the incidence of kidnapping and other violent crime has decreased markedly in most urban centers, including Bogota, Medellin, Barranquilla and Cartagena, but remains high in Cali and the surrounding areas, largely due to drug traffickers. Colombia has a high rate of kidnappings for ransom, with 185 kidnappings reported in the first four months of 2005. Most kidnappings occur on rural roads and stretches of highways, not in big cities. While Cali might be the least safe of Colombias big cities, the likelihood of being kidnapped there is not as high as it is in rural towns and villages surrounding the city. Accordingly, it is highly recommended that visitors travel between cities by air. If overland travel cannot be avoided, the Colombian government has established programs to protect travelers by organizing caravans. If traveling on the highway, one should try to do so during the weekends, when traffic is higher, and always during the daytime. Secondary roads should definitely not be used. The administration of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez has increased the safety of main roads in recent months. While traveling in the cities themselves, as in most of Latin America, it is highly recommended to use taxis instead of public transportation. Travelers should arrange taxis in advance instead of hailing cabs from the street. While withdrawing money from ATMs, machines open to the street are best avoided, as are cash machines located in quiet, out-of-the-way places. In Cali and other cities, several cases have occurred of individuals being robbed by the person in line behind them at ATMs. Travelers should also limit the amount of cash they carry at any given time. While tourists do not represent high-value targets for Colombias guerrillas and paramilitaries, employees of large transnational firms in Colombia do, since such firms previously have paid kidnappers ransom demands. At least five Americans were kidnapped in 2004, and at least one in 2005. No one can be considered immune from kidnapping on the basis of occupation, nationality or other factors. FARC and the ELN and other criminal organizations continue to kidnap civilians for ransom or as political bargaining chips. FARC have held three U.S. government-employed contractors since February 2003. Although the U.S. government places the highest priority on the safe recovery of kidnapped Americans, it


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is U.S. policy not to make concessions to or strike deals with kidnappers. Consequently, the U.S. government's ability to assist kidnapping victims is limited. Murders in Cali decreased in January by 27 percent against the previous year, and declined by 33 percent in Valle del Cauca as a whole. Nevertheless, murder rates continue to be considerably higher in Cali and Valle del Cauca than in the rest of the country. In 2005, Colombias murder rate was 39 per 100,000 inhabitants (down from 66 per 100,000 in 2002). In Cali, the figure was 64 per 100,000 and in Valle del Cauca it was 90 per 100,000. While the murder rate decreased in Cali, robberies and thefts increased during 2005; residential robberies jumped by 136 percent and robberies of commercial establishments increased 252 percent. The exception was car thefts, which declined 50 percent. Crime in Buenaventura is high, as is insurgent activity along the road from Buenaventura to Cali. Buenaventura saw its murder rate increase 12 percent during 2005, the highest growth among the 20 largest cities in Colombia. Travel to Buenaventura is not recommended. Much criminal activity occurs in Serrania de la Macarena National Park, west of Cali. Visitors should not travel to this park due to these insurgent and counterinsurgent activities. Colombias beaches on the Pacific should also be avoided. The threat of crime in Cali is critical.2 War and Insurgency Colombias two main insurgent groups, FARC and ELN, began their armed operations in the 1960s; both aimed to instigate a Marxist revolution in the country. While the ELN has maintained most of its original ideology, FARC soon morphed into a criminal-militant organization. For decades, FARC operated in parallel to the main drug cartels, based in Cali and Medellin. To combat FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups were organized in several communities. Soon, these groups took a life of their own, transforming into a criminal-militant organization fighting not only the left-wing insurgents but the Colombian army, too. FARC and the paramilitary groups, currently operating under the aegis of the AUC, a paramilitary umbrella organization, became greatly involved in drug-trafficking once the Cali and Medellin cartels leaders were arrested or killed. The Uribe administration has adopted a hard-line policy toward the insurgent groups, a stance that has yielded some benefits. For example, the ELN decided to sit down at the negotiating table with the government in the first months of 2006; the subsequent talks could lead to the ELNs eventual demobilization. The government has also engaged in dialogue with the AUC since 2005; an agreement has been reached for the paramilitaries partial demobilization and disarmament. The demobilization has proceeded on schedule for the most part, although around 4,000 out of an estimated 20,000 paramilitaries remain active. The Uribe administrations negotiations with the ELN and AUC have reduced the level of insurgent violence substantially, though it is unknown whether the agreements will become permanent. In any case, violence remains high. Meanwhile, FARC has continued its attacks, refusing to negotiate or dispose of its arms despite the Colombian governments 2004 capture of one of FARCs main leaders. FARC not


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only still attacks government facilities, it also targets civilians in order to intimidate and terrorize the populace. Cali and Valle del Cauca have frequently seen FARC attacks. In 2002, FARC members assassinated the Most Rev. Isaias Duarte, archbishop of Cali. FARC leaders behind the killing were arrested, and received sentences of 36 to 37 years in prison in January 2005. The bodies of at least 12 youths were found in Buenaventura on April 19, 2005, shot in the head and burned with acid. Among the victims were Afro-Colombians whom paramilitaries had repeatedly threatened. That same month, police arrested six guerillas connected with an April 22 grenade attack on a day care in Buenaventura that killed one child. Police suspected the attack was directed against the families of recently demobilized paramilitaries. In February 2005, unidentified gunmen shot and killed photojournalist Hernando Marne Sanchez in Tulua, Valle del Cauca. Local police had not determined a motive by the end of 2005. Beyond the risk of being directly targeted by insurgents, getting caught in the crossfire is another potential danger to travelers. The Popular Education and Research Center said Colombian air force units bombarded and indiscriminately sprayed machine-gun fire May 4, 2005, in the communities of El Aguila, San Jose, San Jeronimo and El Queso, all of which are near Buenaventura. Colombia has experienced tensions with Ecuador in recent months due to Colombian air force incursions into Ecuador during the pursuit of FARC guerrillas. The Colombian government offensive against FARC has forced the guerrilla group into a partial retreat toward Colombias border with Ecuador, and even into Ecuadorian territory. It is not recommended to travel to the southern border region. The threat of war and insurgency in Cali is critical.3 Political Instability Colombia is in the middle of a political campaign season. On March 12, Colombian congressional elections took place, while presidential elections will occur May 28. The leading presidential candidates are Uribe, who is seeking re-election, Horacio Serpa from the Liberal Party, and Carlos Gaviria from the Democratic Pole. Uribes re-election seems highly likely, barring some unexpected scandal, given that his coalition won a convincing majority in the congressional elections. The campaign season raises two main issues for travelers. As in many political campaigns, rallies and demonstrations can suddenly become violent. While the potential for violence has dictated that campaign rallies in Colombia are less frequent and smaller than in other countries, it is still advisable to keep a distance from them. A more important consideration is the potential for increased violence by guerrillas, specifically FARC, in the run-up to the election. During the three weeks preceding the March 12 elections, FARC increased the frequency of its attacks, which prompted a massive mobilization by the Colombian armed forces. While some attacks occurred in the outskirts of urban areas like Cali, the majority of FARC


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activities took place in rural areas. FARC used diverse modes of attack: bombs against houses, roadside bombs and simply gunning people down. In one of the more serious pre-election attacks, FARC guerrillas assaulted a passenger bus in Caqueta province, shooting and burning nine civilians in the bus. On election day March 12, however, no violence was reported in Cali, and only two minor incidents were reported in Valle del Cauca as a whole. FARC is expected to stage a repeat performance in the weeks before the May 28 presidential election, upping its pace and intensity of attacks with the aim of discouraging the population, especially in rural areas, from voting. Since the attacks before the congressional election did not appear to have a deterrent effect on the people, it can be expected that FARC will attempt more powerful attacks. Therefore, avoiding small towns, rural areas and secondary roads during the presidential election season is highly recommended. Colombia has a mature party system, and election results are not expected to be challenged. There is very low probability of postelection protests and activity by the organized political parties. The threat of political instability in Cali is high.4

Miscellaneous Threats Colombia faces periodic road closures, related to flooding and mudslides, which could cause delays in travel. This should not be a major issue, however, if travelers heed the recommendation to use air transport when shuttling between Colombian cities. Travelers should also pay attention to traffic conditions and driving habits, since streets tend not to be pedestrian-friendly. No vaccinations are required for entry into Colombia. If traveling into the jungle regions of southern Colombia, however, yellow fever, dengue and malaria vaccines are recommended. The miscellaneous threat level in Cali is medium.5 _________________________________________________________________________

1. Terrorism threat levels. Low: No known credible threat. Medium: Potential but unsubstantiated threats by capable indigenous or transnational actors. High: Demonstrable history and continued potential for militant attacks against generalized targets. Foreigners and/or foreign facilities are not specifically targeted. Critical: Demonstrable history and continued likelihood of militant attacks. Foreigners and/or foreign facilities are specifically targeted.

2. Crime threat levels. Low: Relatively low crime rate, mainly property or petty crime. Medium:

Generally high crime rate with incidents of property crime that specifically targets foreigners, low potential for violence. High: Generally high crime rate with incidents of property crime that specifically targets foreigners, probability of violence and moderate risk of physical crime. Critical: Extensive criminal activity targeting foreigners with a high possibility of physical crime, including violence and kidnapping; heavily armed criminal elements abundant.

3. War and Insurgency threat levels. Low: No or relatively low threat of violent insurgency.

Medium: Nearby insurgency with the potential of affecting city, region, country or transportation network. High: Insurgency within the city, region or country but with little


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direct effect on foreigners. Critical: Insurgency within the city, region or country directly threatening foreigners.

4. Political Instability threat levels. Low: No or minimal visible activity directed against the

government. Medium: Sporadic street demonstrations, largely peaceful. High: Routine large-scale demonstrations, often affecting traffic and having the potential for violence. Critical: Endemic strikes, protests and street demonstrations almost always affecting traffic with a high probability of associated violence.

5. Miscellaneous threat levels. Low: Little or no known threats posed by disease, weather,

natural disasters, transportation hazards or other dangers. Medium: Moderate level of risk posed by some or all of these threats. High: Considerable danger posed by some or all of these threats. Critical: Extremely high level of danger posed by some or all of these threats.


Documents

171861_Security Assessment - Cali, Colombia