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Nationalities Papers, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999

ISLAM AND NATION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Galina M. Yemelianova*

Historical Introduction

This article is based on the preliminary results of a project on Islam, Ethnicity andNationalism in Post-Soviet Tatarstan and Dagestan, which began in March 1997

and ended in S eptember 1999.1 These two out of Russias 21 autonomous republics

were chosen for comparative research because, although they are both Muslim, there

are obvious geographical, ethnic, cultural, and political differences between them.

Each republic also represents a distinctive model of the evolution of Muslim society

and its relations w ith Russian culture in general and with the Russian political center

in particular.

Tatarstan is situated at the conuence of the two greatest riversthe Volga andthe Kamaof central Russia and is the homeland of the Tatars, one of Russias

largest ethnic and religious minorities. The republic has a special place in Russias

past and present. Its population is almost equally divided between Tatars and

Russians.2

Ancestors of the present-day Volga Tatars (Bulgars) and Russians (vari-

ous eastern Slavic tribes) have lived and closely interacted there. Their long history

of conict and coexistence has had a crucial impact on their respective evolution.

From the eighth-century, proto-Tatars and proto-Russians have often coexisted

within a single political form ation. In the eighth and ninth centuries they came under

Khazar suzerainty. From the thirteenth to the fteenth centuries the Bulgars and the

Russians were integrated, although on different terms, within the Chingisside empire.

The B ulgar elite m erged with the C hingissides and secured a privileged status for the

Bulgars compared to the Russians and other peoples conquered by the Chingissides.

In the late fteenth century Russian resistance to ChingissideBulgar domination

facilitated the amalgamation of numerous Russian princedoms and the formation of

the unitary Russian state, centered in Moscow. In 1552, the Russian Tsar Ivan the

Terrible reversed the power balance by the conquest of the Kazan Khanate, the

successor to the Chingisside Golden Horde which was the rst Tatar state. From the

mid-sixteenth century until the present, the Tatars have lived in the Russian state.

Although in the ninth and tenth centuries their ancestors, Bulgars and Kievans,

opted for different religionsIslam and Christianity, respectivelyclose interaction

between the Tatars and the Russians persisted. It is, perhaps, signicant that the

Bulgars opted for the most tolerant and exible Hana madhhab (Islamic legal

school ) of Sunn i I slam , w hic h fur the red t hei r extensive link s w it h their

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G. M. YEMELIANOVA

non-Muslim neighbours. During the Chingisside period the Volga region turned into

one of the major world centers of Islamic learning and scholarship. Tatar Islamic

theology drew on the traditions of ijtihad (critical theological judgement) and tajdid

(renovation), generated by such great medieval Islamic thinkers as al-Ghazzali,

al-Maarri, Omar an-Nasa, Ibn Taimiya, and Saad ad-Din at-Tahtazani.

3

Adherence to the ijtihad and tajdid allowed Tatar Islamic scholars (ulema) to play down the

dogmatic differences between Muslim s and to emphasize the m oral and social values

of Islam. It also succeeded in reducing religious and cultural conict in the

multiethnic and polyreligious environment.4

The Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552

was accompanied by the severe suppression of the Islamic religion and its intellec-

tual representatives. As a result, the traditions of Tatar high Islam, characterized by

dynamism and creativity, were undermined. The Tatar Islamic elite was either

destroyed or forced to move to Siberia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, or Hejaz.5

More than two centuries of persecution of Tatar Islam resulted in its ruralization and

primitivization.

Under the rule of the enlightened Tsarina Catherine the Great (17291796),

however, Islam was legalized in Russia and the Tatar elite was coopted into the

Russian political and economic establishment. In 1789 the rst Russian Muslim

administration, the Muftiyat, was formed in Ufa. It was administered by the Mufti,

the ofcial head of Russias Muslims. The Muftiyat consisted of the Volga Tatars,

who since then have dominated Russian Islamic ofcialdom. R eligious liberalization

under Catherine the Great enhanced the economic and political activity of the Volga

Tatars and contributed to the restoration of traditions of Tatar high Islam. Since the

late eighteenth century the Volga Tatars have played the leading economic and

spiritual role among the Muslims of Eurasia and acted as intermediaries in relations

between Russians and the various Islamic peoples. Another important consequence

of the lengthy TatarRussian interaction was the Tatars dispersal all over the

Russian empire, as well as the continuous increase in the Russian population within

the Tatar heartland in the Volga-Urals.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the extent of the Volga Tatars integration

Russia and their subsequent cultural assimilation ensured their leadership in the

national awakening of the Muslims and other non-Russian peoples of the Russian

empire. The Tatar Islamic and intellectual elite generated the Tatar Islamic mod-

ernism, known as jadidism (innovation), which sought to merge Islam and Islamic

culture with modernity, associated with Europe.6

Jadidism became a distinctive form

of Tatar Islamic nationalism. Its leading proponents viewed the future nationaldevelopment of Tatars within the Russian political context. T he political goals of the

Tatar Islamic and national leaders were to a large extent congruent with those of the

Russian liberal opposition. In particular, the great majority of Tatar jadids favored

the evolution of the despotic Russian empire into a democratic, parliamentary,

multiethnic modern nation where Tatars, as well as other Muslims, would enjoy

equal political and juridical rights with other citizens. 7 In the early twentieth century

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

this was reected in the common political program of the Muslim (predominantly

Tatar) faction and the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party of the Russian

Duma.8

Following the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, the majority of

Tatar leaders maintained allegiance to constitutional democracy and advocated theestablishment of the nationalcultural autonomy of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia

and Siberia within Russia. Alongside the liberal majority, there was a nationalist

minority which pressed for full political independence and the creation of a Tatar

state. After the Bolshevik revolution, Tatar nationalists attempted to revive Tatar

statehood by proclaiming an Islamo-Turkic state of Idel-Ural, covering the territory

of modern-day Tatarstan and Bashkorstan, much of Orenburg region, and the

territories extending south to the Caspian Sea. The Idel-Ural was shortlived, how-

ever.9

In May 1920 the Bolsheviks forced the Volga Tatars into a new administrativeunit, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, whose borders coincide with

present-day Tatarstan. As a result of this territorial delimitation many Tatars found

themselves outside their ethnic republic, i.e. within the borders of neighboring

Bashkir Republic (todays Bashkorstan) and elsewhere in the Volga-Urals. During

the Soviet period Tatarstan, like the rest of the USSR, experienced the dramatic

consequences of the enforced political delimitation, industrialization, collectiviza-

tion, atheization, cadre purges, and cultural revolution (including a dual script

change: rst from Arabic to Latin in 19271937 and then from Latin to Cyrillic in

1937). Tatarstans urbanization resulted in substantial secularization of the Tatars.

In the conditions of the Gorbachevian thaw of 19861991, T atarstans government

attempted to upgrade Tatarstans status to that of a union republic.10 In 19901992

during the period of intensive sovereignization of Russia and within Russia,

Tatarstans leadership, alongside the Chechen leaders, refused to sign the Federal

Treaty of 1992. Instead, Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiev11

and Chechen

President Djokhar Dudayev championed the dismantling of the Russian/Soviet

empire and promoted a new mode of relationship between Moscow and its regions.

While Dudayev opted for the immediate secession of Chechnya from Russia,

Shaimiev suggested a fundamental reform of the centerperiphery relations within

Russia. In particular, he proposed to replace the unitarist de facto structure of the

Russian Federation with a looser asymmetrical federation as a viable remedy for

its survival as a politically integral and yet both ethnically and culturally diverse

state.12

Shaimievs initiative has been termed the Tatarstan model.

In order to increase his stakes in the bargaining with Moscow, Shaimiev orches- trated the Tatar national movement under the leadership of the VTOTS (All-Tatar

Public Center), the Party of Ittifaq (Union), Milli Mejlis (National Assembly), and

Azatlyk (Freedom). In February 1994 Presidents Yeltsin and Shaimiev signed a

power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Kazan which ensured Tatarstans special

status within the Russian Federation.13 Under the terms of the bilateral treaty, Yeltsin

undertook not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tatarstan, while Shaimiev

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G. M. YEMELIANOVA

formally recognized Moscows supremacy and supported Yeltsin during the all-

Russia elections of 1996.

Dagestan (country of mountains in Avar) is located in the North Caucasus on

Russias southern frontier. It has paramount geopolitical signicance for Moscow. 14

It shares a 300-kilometre eastern border with semi-independent and rapidly Islamiz-ing Chechnya; to the west is the oil-rich Caspian Sea; to the south, newly indepen-

dent Christian Georgia and Shia Azerbaijan; and to the north, the autonomous

republic of Kalmykiya, under the eccentric leadership of President Illumdjinov, and

the Cossack-populated areas of the Stavropol region of the Russian Federation.

Dagestan is multiethnic and its society is based on a rigidly closed clan structure.

Traditionally each clan, or tukhum, unites a group of families related to each other

by a common mythological male ancestor. Each clan has its historical area of

habitation. The internal life of the clan is regulated by strict patriarchic norms,customary law (adat), and shariat.

15

It is populated by more than 100 different ethnic groups, each of which has its own

culture and speaks a distinctive language incomprehensible to the rest.16

The

Dagestani Constitution of 1994 nominated the 14 largest ethnic groups as titular.

T he y a re: Av ars (577 ,1 3 4), Dargin s (33 2,2 8 1), Kumy ks (267,4 8 9), L ez gin s

(250,666), Russians (150,054), Laks (102,636), Tabasarans (93,600), Chechens

(92,217), Azeris (88,327), Nogays (33,408), Mountain Jews and Tats (18,520),

Rutuls (17,086), Aguls (16,006 ), and Tsakhurs (6,295).17 They are represented in the

State Council (the Parliament) and have the right of legislative initiative.

Dagestan is one of the ancient centers of world civilization. However, it was

subjected to a succession of foreign invasions. At the end of the rst millennium BC

it was part of Caucasian Albania; in the third century AD Sassanid Iran conquered

Dagestan; in the seventh and eighth centuries Arabs invaded it and subjected it to

gradual Islamization; in the thirteenth century, together with the Russians and Tatars,

Dagestanis were integrated into the Islamicized Chingissides; between the fteenth

and nineteenth centuries it comprised a conglomerate of local feudal states, depen-

dent on either Turkey or Iran. The rst Russian (Cossack) strongholds had already

emerged in northern Dagestan in the sixteenth century, and Russia has increasingly

dominated Dagestan since the late eighteenth century. It was formally annexed by the

Russian Empire in the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) Treaties between

Russia and Iran.18

Russian penetration in the region was met with a erce resistance

which acquired the form of an Islamic holy war.

Historically Islam has played the central role in Dagestan and in its relations with the outside world. The rst Dagestani Muslims were Laks who adopted Islam in the

eighth century. By the tenth century Islam prevailed in Derbend and southern

Dagestan; by the fteenth and sixteenth centuries the vast m ajority of Dagestanis had

converted to Islam. The Dagestanis as w ell as the Chechens and Ingushes opted for

the Shai madhhab of Sunni Islam, while the rest of the Muslims of the North

Caucasus chose the Hana madhhab . By the fteenth century the Dagestani cities of

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

Derbend, Tarki, Kazikumukh, and Kunzah had become centers of spiritual enlighten-

ment for the Muslims of the North Caucasus, and Dagestani Islamic scholars were

highly respected in the Islamic world.

From early times, the development of Dagestani intellectual Islam was ac-

companied by the advance of popular Islam, or the Islam of mazar (burial place ofa Muslim saint), associated with Susm. The rst Sus of the tariqa (Su brother-

hood) of Abu Bakr Muhammad Derbendi appeared in Dagestan in the eleventh and

twelfth centuries. Between the fteenth and seventeenth centuries the Susm of the

tariqas of Naqshbandi, Kadiri, and Shazali won spiritual domination in Dagestan.

Since then Susm has become one of the key components of Dagestani identity.19

In

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Naqshbandi tariqa became the largest and

most politically inuential Su brotherhood in Dagestan, providing a mobilizing

framework for resistance to Russian expansionism in the region. Naqshbandi shaykhs headed an Islamic holy war against Russian Christian rule in D agestan and other

parts of the North Caucasus. The most active participants of the Islamic holy war

were the Chechens, Avars, Dargins, and other mountain peoples of Dagestan. In the

conditions of extreme polyethnicity, Su Islam served as a viable basis for political

unication in Dagestan. From 1785 to 1790 shaykh Mansur Ushurma united various

peoples of Dagestan and Chechnya in an anti-Russian politicalmilitary union.

Between 1824 and 1859 Imam Shamil formed on the territory of present-day

Dagestan and Chechnya an Islamic state, Imamat, based on Sharia .20 In 18771878

an Islamic holy war was defeated by the Russian troops and Dagestan was nally

incorporated within the Russian empire.

After the Russian revolutions of 1917, the German, Turkish, and White Russian

armies occupied Dagestan. A group of rebellious Dagestanis and Chechens attempted

to revive the Islamic state and proclaimed a theocratic North Caucasian Emirate. It

was defeated in 1921 by the Bolsheviks, and Dagestan became the Dagestan Soviet

Socialist R epublic of the R ussian Federation of the Soviet Union.21

During the Soviet

period Dagestan underwent a radical socioeconomic and cultural transformation w ith

some distinctive features that were not evident in Tatarstan. Among them were the

1944 deportations of Dagestans Chechen-Akkins from the Aukhovskii (Novolak-

skii) district (raion). Although most of the Chechen-Akkins returned to Dagestan in

the 1950s, their lands were taken by neighboring peoples, primarily Laks. This has

resulted in territorial and personal disputes and turned the Akkin Chechens into a sort

of fth column in Dagestan.

Moscow persistent resettlement between the 1920s and 1950s of mountainethnic groups on the Caspian lowlands created another potential timebomb in

Dagestan. The resettlement aggravated territorial and ethnic tensions between moun-

tain peoples and lowlanders, especially between Avars and Dargins on the one hand

and Kumyks, Cossacks, and Russian peasants on the other.22 Yet another serious

ethnic problem was generated by the Soviet national policy from 1920 until the

1960s aimed at consolidating over 30 ethnic groups into several larger nationalities. 23

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G. M. YEMELIANOVA

The Avars thus formally became the largest ethnic group: 27.5% of the total

population.24 They have thus dominated the political, economic, and military

establishment of Dagestan.

The scale of Soviet industrialization and urbanization in Dagestan was much

smaller than in Tatarstan. In fact it remained an agrarian republic, strongly dependenton Federal subsidies, which helped to preserve the clan and Su social network.

Paradoxically, this network merged with the Soviet/party system and produced a

distinctive synthesis of primordial and modern structures. In spite of decades of

Soviet atheism Dagestan remained overwhelmingly a Muslim republic: over 90% of

its population remains M uslim.25

During the period of relative religious liberalization

in the 1940s the Dagestan city of Buynaks witnessed the formation of a Spiritual

Board of the Muslims of the North Caucasus (Muftiyat), whose leading positions

were occupied by the Dagestani Islamic elite. There was a very different response to perestroika in Dagestan than in Tatarstan.

The general ofcial and public reaction was one of desolation and frustration. The

break-up of the USSR in December 1991 and subsequent de-Sovietization were

widely perceived as the worst nightmare in Dagestani history. The authorities hung

on to the Soviet political system until 1995, much longer than anywhere else in

Russias autonomies and regions. Unlike in other parts of Russia communists

maintained their popularity. Moreover, Dagestan was adversely affected by the

RussianChechen war of 19951996 in particular and by the incompetence of

Moscows policy in the region in general.

Given the differences between Tatarstan and Dagestan my research has aimed to

analyze the role of Islam in the ongoing process of national, political, and cultural

self-determination among the peoples of both republics. Within each republic the

research has focused on the biggest cities and six districts that have populations w ith

complicated ethnic and religious compositions.26

This article addresses a number of key issues, including:

1. The extent to which Islam and Islamo-nationalism have inuenced the shaping of

the post-Soviet political and social systems in the two republics.

2. The role of Islam in the ideology and political practice of various opposition

national and religious political parties, popular organizations, and movements in

Tatarstan and Dagestan.

3. How the post-Soviet Islamic ofcial clergy, the so-called young Imams, has

viewed the role of Islam in Tatarstan and Dagestan.4. How the leaders of non-ofcial Islam, which has historically had wider popular

appeal than of cial Islam, reacted to the conditions of religious liberalization and

profound ideological and social crisis, the scale and forms of the foreign Islamic

in vo lv e men t in T ata rsta n a nd Dag estan , a nd to wha t e xten t th e T a tar a nd

Dagestani Muslim comm unities look to unofcial Islamic authorities for guidance

and leadership.

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

5. The position of the leading Tatarstan and D agestan intellectuals on the role of

Islam in public and private life and how politically inuential their views are.

6. The implications of the post-Soviet Islamic revival for interethnic relations in the

ethnically and culturally pluralistic societies of Tatarstan and Dagestan.

Islam and Republican Leadership

The Islamic factor in largely secularized and binational Tatarstan has not had a direct

impact on the republican leadership and its policy. The Tatarstan political establish-

me nt ha d b ee n rep re se nted b y th e former Obkom (regional Communist Party

Committee) functionaries who made their careers under the atheistic Soviet regime

and who have very little true interest and expertise in Islam and Islam-related

matters. Their major political goal has been a prolongation of the special relationsbetween Kazan and Moscow on the basis of the Bilateral Treaty of 1994. This treaty

secured the semi-independent status of Tatarstan and allowed President Shaimiev to

form an authoritarian regime that is strongly reminiscent of the K azan K hanate in the

fteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Shaimievs regime has pursued a policy of strengthening political and economic

autonomy from the Federal center, with the consequent Tatarization of the adminis-

trative, economic, and cultural spheres. In this context Islam, which constitutes an

integral part of Tatar national identity, has been bound to play an indirect role in

Tatar politics. On the forma l level an Islamic theme has been consistently introduced

into Tatar national symbols, architecture, monuments, and design. Tatarstans author-

ities have allowed a faster pace of building of mosques, Islamic schools (medresses),

and other Islamic institutions in comparison with Russian Orthodox construction.27

Despite the ofcial equality of Islam and Orthodoxy in Tatarstan a special relation-

ship has been formed between the Tatarstan political establishment and Islamic

ofcialdom. Since 1992 President Shaimiev has encouraged the secession of

Tatarstans Islamic authorities from the Federal Islamic structures represented by the

Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and European states of the CIS

(TSDUMR, formerly DUM ES), based in Ufa, Bashkorstan. Tatarstans leadership

has regarded the independent Tatarstan Muftiyat as an important attribute of sover-

eignty. Furthermore, it has supported the claims of the Tatarstan Islamic ofcialdom

to represent Tatars outside Tatarstan, i.e. within the mythological borders of the

Idel-Ural. In February 1998 the Shaimiev administration staged a Unifying Islamic

Congress in Kazan and organized the election of Gusman-hazret as the new Mufti ofTatarstan.

28(The new Mufti was linked to Shaimievs family through his mother

Rashida Abystay, who has inuence over S akine Shaimieva, Shaimievs wife.) Since

then the role of the Tatarstan Muftiyat has increasingly resembled that of the Russian

Patriarch at the Moscow court.

The strengthening of the symbolic function of Islam in Tatarstans politics has

been accompanied by attempts to revive the ideological function of Islam. For

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G. M. YEMELIANOVA

example, the leading Tatar ofcial theoretician on Islamic issues, R. Khakimov, has

advocated the restoration of Tatar reformist Islam, or jadidism, as a viable basis for

the Tatar national idea. He is the author of the concept of EuroIslam, w hich is

described as a synthesis of Tatar jadidism and postmodernism. He argues that

EuroIslam would permit the resolution of the apparently inevitable conict betweenformally Muslim Tatarstan and allegedly Islamophobic Europe.

29 The ideological

dimension of Islam has been present in historical studies. In some newly publshed

history textbooks, Islam has been given a preferential portrayal in comparison with

Orthodoxy.30

(There is, however, no evidence that the concept of EuroIslam has

gotten beyond purely academic discussion.)

Outside the ofcial mainstream approach to Islam there have been a few advocates

of neo-qadimism (Islamic traditionalism).31

The latter have called for the restoration

of the Islamic way of life among the Tatar population. The leading campaigner for the thorough re-Islamization of Tatars has been the parliamentary deputy F. Shay-

mardanov. H e has initiated parliamentary discussion of such issues as the creation of

Islamic schools, hospitals, m aternity wards, food stores, and cafes, as w ell as special

places for prayer in various places of work and recreation; the formation of Muslim

units in the Russian army; the introduction of a ban on alcohol sales during the

Islamic holidays, and a ban on the use of Islamic symbols in the labelling of alcohol

and travel tickets, etc.32 These initiatives have had a marginal effect on government

policies.

In Dagestan the impact of Islam on the policy-making process has been much

more prominent than in Tatarstan. One reason has been the much deeper economic

crisis, aggravated by the lengthy economic blockade. Another is the substantially

higher level of religiosity of the population33 as well as the spontaneous popular

Islamic activities within Dagestan and an uneasy relationship with its neighbor, the

rapidly Islamized Chechnya.34

The inability of Dagestans leadership to curb the increase in crime35

as well as

corruption and the low standards of morality and professionalism of the ofcial

Islamic clergymany of whom were former party and Komsomol chiefshas

reinforced popular Islamic protest, which has been channelled largely into the

fundam entalist m ovement, known as Wahhabism, Salasm, or Muhlicism.36

Thus far,

only about 57% of Dagestani Muslims practice Wahhabism, but its popularity has

been increasing very quickly.37

For example, the rst Wahhabis turne d up in

Dagestan in 1988. Ten years later, in July 1998, three villages in Buynakskii district

(Karamakhi, Chaban-Makhi, and Kadar) had already proclaimed themselves Islamic territory, based on Sharia law. Almost all of the representatives of the opposition,

including extremists, have appropriated Islamic slogans and symbols. In May 1998

the green banner of Islam was installed by a crowd of extremists over the Dagestani

Parliament in Mahachkala. 38

In the circumstances, the Dagestan leadership has opted for ruthless political and

administrative suppression of Wahhabism. The common hostility towards it has

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

united the Dagestan secular political elite and Islamic ofcialdom, represented by the

Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD).39 In December 1997 the

Peoples Assembly (Parliament) issued a ban on the activities of the Wahhabis on the

territory of Dagestan. The government also adopted a decree On the immediate

measures against the religious extremism.

40

This signaled the beginning of the waragainst the Wahhabis. Ma n y Wahhabi leaders were arrested, their ofces were

demolished, and their periodicals were banned.41

There has been a tightening of the

border control with Azerbaijan to block the supply of Wahhabi literature and

missionaries. The Dagestani mass media intensied the anti-Wahhabi propaganda,

presenting Wahhabis as Saudi and British mercenaries, bringing back the old theme

of the Great Game and the British conspiracy in the Caucasus.42

Behind this brutal suppression of Wahhabism have been the corporate interests of

the ruling elite. T he D agestani authorities have badly needed the phantom of internaland external enemies in order to justify their political indispensability and to have an

effective lever in their relations with Moscow given its allergy towards Islamic

fundamentalism and the Chechen bandits. This propaganda has disguised the

formation of a corrupt and semi-criminal ethnocratic regime in Dagestan. Although

according to the Dagestani constitution 14 titular ethnic groups/nationalities have the

right of legislative initiative and are equally represented in Parliament, the actual

political and economic power has been monopolized by ve or six ethnic maa

nomenklatura groupings. Avars and Dargins have occupied the top and most

lucrative jobs in the republic. Until May 1998 the Laks maa, headed by the

Khachilaev clan, had been politically active.43 Most top politicians have been closely

connected with their respective ethnic/national business groupings and their armed

formations.

In contrast to the leadership in Tatarstan, which has pressed for asymmetrical

relations with Moscow, the Dagestani leaders, largely dependent on Federal subsi-

dies, have consistently demonstrated their loyalty to Moscow. There have been no

attempts, as in Tatarstan, to introduce nationalist modications in the school pro-

grams or to switch to the Latin alphabet.44

The Dagestani political establishment,

which has been largely illiterate in Islamic matters, has opposed any suggestions

from the SBMD and some Islamic politicians to introduce elements of Islam into

public life.45

Among those suggestions have been the integration of Sharia law into

the Dagestani legal system, as it was in the 1920s; the replacement of Sunday by

Friday as a weekly holiday; the formation of an Islamic educational system and the

creation of an Islamic University; and an increase in Islamic broadcasting ontelevision and radio.

46Surokat Asiyatilov, the parliamentary deputy and the leader of

the Islamic Party of Dagestan, has been an enthusiastic proponent of these ideas.

The alliance between the Dagestani leadership and Islamic ofcialdom has pro-

vided the former with the legitimacy that is vital in the religious culture of Dagestan.

Some high-ranking representatives of the Islamic clergy have been coopted into the

political establishment. For example, in 1998 Ilyas-hadzhi Ilyasov, the former deputy

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G. M. YEMELIANOVA

Imam of the Central Mosque in Mahachkala, was appointed as a religious advisor to

Khizri Shikhsaidov, the Prime Minister. Others have been granted the even higher

status of unofcial policy makers. One of them is Avar shaykh Said-afandi Chir-

keevskii, who has masterminded the anti-Wahhabi campaign and strongly inuenced

the Avar public in favor of particular politicians and parliamentary candidates.

Islam and Opposition

The study of the Tatar opposition and its relations with Islam has revealed the

increasing Islamization of its political agenda. This has been a reaction against

Shaimievs betrayal of the nationalists in 1994.47

In the aftermath of the Bilateral

Treaty in February 1994 the Shaimiev government turned to neutralization of theTatar nationalists. The most intelligent and therefore dangerous representatives of the

Tatar national movem ent have been silenced through their cooption into the political

establishment.48

The irreconcilable Tatar nationalists, on the other hand, have been

removed from their premises and their periodicals have been closed.49

In order to

undermine the ideological credibility of Tatar nationalists, the authorities have

created parallel pro-government national institutions, like an All-Tatar World Con-

gress, and have incorporated some nationalist ideas into their own political agenda.50

As a result, the Tatar nationalists have been politically undermined and demoralized.

Their organizations have disintegrated and have lost the bulk of their former

followers. Some prominent gures in the Ittifaq and Milli Mejlis have distanced

themselves from the extremist leader of the Ittifaq, Fauzia Bayramova, known as the

Tatar Iron Lady. At the Ittifaq congress in December 199 7 the party was split, with

almost half of its members deserting Bayramova.51

The centrists, headed by F.

Saullin, have turned to sanctioned opposition to the regime, which has given them

a l ic en ce to c ri tic iz e th e g ov ern ment for in su f cie nt n atio na lism a nd a nti-

democratism, while enjoying the privileged position of court opposition. The

hardliners, though they continue to pursue their radical agenda, have been effectively

marginalized.

Thus, having lost their political and ideological raiso n detre , the Tatar nationalists

have attempted alliances with the other enemies of the main enemy, the Shaimiev

government. Fauzia Bayramova has joined forces, on the one hand, with the very

Communists who advocated the restoration of the evil empire, the USSR, and with

the M uslim clergy, on the other.

52

In November 1998 a new political movement,Omet (hope), was founded by the ex-Mufti of Tatarstan, Gabdulla Galiulla,

53which

united the representatives of the Ittifaq party, the Communist party of Tatarstan, and

some Islamists. The language and slogans of the Tatar nationalists have been

increasingly Islamized, but their inuence has persistently declined.54 At present their

popularity among the Tatar population is minimal, and they have little hope of

political success in the foreseeable future.

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

There has been no evidence of viable Islamic opposition in Tatarstan although the

clergy have made several attempts to create some sort of Islamic political organiza-

tion. Most notable was a popular-political movement, Muslims of Tatarstan

(Musulmane Tatarstana), which was formed in June 1996. Its avowed goal was the

formation of an Islamic faction in Tatarstans Parliament.

55

But the activity of thismovement was soon reduced to lobbying for the personal political ambitions of its

leader and his entourage. Representatives of non-ofcial Tatar Islam formed a

number of Islamic groups, among which have been Sa Islam (Pure Islam), which

later transformed into the group of Faiz Rahman and Tabligh (Message) . Altogether

they have united only a small number of followers and do not have any signicant

impact on the political process.56

In Dagestan the nationalist and Islamic opposition has been much more articulate

and active. Still, the general trends of its development have been similar to those in Tatarstan. Thus, the post-Soviet conditions of the parade of sovereignties and

religious liberalization have facilitated the formation of numerous national/ethnic

movements and Islamic parties and organizations in Dagestan. Among the most

assertive national movements have been the Avar popular movement, the Lak

popular movement Kazi-Kumukh, the Kumyk national movement, represented by

Tenglik, the Nogay society Birlik, and the Lezgin popular movement Sadval.57 The

declared agendas of these organizations have included the federalization or autono-

mization of Dagestan and the promotion of the political, economic, and cultural

rights of the various ethnic groups. However, in reality they have served the

economic and political ambitions of the ethnic groupings, for which purpose most of

them have created their own armed formations. The major rivals have been the Avar

and Lak clans, headed respectively by Gadzhi Makhachev, who was in charge of the

oil business, and Magomed Khachilaev, who controlled the caviar and shing

business.

By 1995 most of these national organizations had evolved into largely criminal

maas. They had lost their previous popular support and were torn apart by internal

rivalries for leadership and lucrative business. Some of them broke apart, while the

others ceased to exist. For example, the Avar popular movement split into the Front

of Shamyl, headed by Gadzhi Makhachev, and the Union of Avar Jamaats (com-

munities). The Kumyk national movement was divided into the Tenglik, inltrated

by the FSB (Federal Security Service, former KGB) agents, the Vatan (motherland),

and the Kumyk National Council. Birlik disappeared altogether. Only the Lezgin

Sadval has rem ained loyal to the idea of federalization but its inuence has seriouslydiminished.

58In 19961997 there were attempts to revive the national movement in

its original form. A Coordination Council of Popular Movements was formed in

January 1996 for this purpose, but it lasted only one m onth. In December of that year

an Organizing Committee of the Assembly of the Peoples Movements and Political

Parties of Dagestan was created. In March 1997, it convened a Conference of the

Assembly, but since then there has been no evidence of any nationalist activities.

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In the last two years the Dagestan authorities have pressed for the self-dissolution

of the national movements, which they claim have turned into a destabilizing

politica l factor.59 However, the ofcial renunciation of the national movements has

concealed some collaboration or even mergers between corrupted politicians and the

leaders of these movements/maas. Furthermore, the Dagestan government has beenincreasingly manipulated by the leaders of the national/ethnic maas which have

been the true masters of Dagestans resources and nances, and has allowed them to

establish direct cooperation with foreign business partners.

The relations of these national organizations with Islam have been purely instru-

mental. The majority of their leaders and members have an atheistic Soviet back-

ground and no real interest in Islam. However, all of them exploit Islamic rhetoric

and symbols in their programs and propaganda. This is particularly characteristic of

the Lak national movement due to its leaders relation to the All Russian Union ofMuslims (RUM).

Dagestan has witnessed the widespread activity of purely Islamic organizations

and parties. Among them have been the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the

Islamic organization Al-Islamiyya, the Supreme Religious Council of the Peoples of

Caucasus, and the regional association of Muslim women, Maslima. There have also

been the Dagestani branches of the All Russian Union of Muslims and the popular-

political movement Nur (Light), which in 1998 became the Party of Russias

Muslims (PRM).

Most rad ic al of th ese g rou p s were th e IRP a nd Al-Isla miy ya , whic h were

ideologically close to the Islamic fundamentalist organization the Muslim Brother-

hood. The Dagestani IRP was formed in 1990 as a branch of the All-Union (i.e.

Soviet Union) IRP. Both organizations advocated the gradual Islamization of society

and the transformation of Dagestan into an Islamic state. They advocated the

territorial and cultural unity of Dagestan on the basis of Islam, and its political

independence from the Russian Federation.60

They criticized the ruling nomenklatura

for its complacency towards growing ethnic nationalism in Dagestan. But the ideas

of the IRP and Al-Islamiyya, which were widely associated with Wahhabism, found

only a limited response among the young Avars who had recently moved from the

mountains to the plains. The peak of their political activity was between 1990 and

1993. Since 1994 they have been consistently isolated by the authorities.

Ofcial pressure has caused radical changes in the program and policy of the

Islamic Democratic Party, which was formed in 1990 by democratically oriented

Dagestani intellectuals under the leadership of Abdurashid Saidov. The originalprogram of the party presented a paradoxical combination of Islamic and democratic

ideals, opposing the rule of the corrupt party nomenklatura and calling for its

replacement by an Islamic-democratic government. In doctrinal terms it favoured

tariqatist (belonging to a tariqa ) Islam although it was tolerant towards Wahhabism.

In 1994 the IDP split between those who stuck to the original goals of the party

and those who agreed to cooperate with the ruling regime. S. Asiyatilov got

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

ofcial support and was elected as the new leader of the party, which dropped its

democratic goals and changed its name to the Islamic Party of Dagestan (IPD). It

soon evolved into a tame Avar-dominated political organization which was closely

linked to Avar politicians, nationalists, and Islamic ofcialdom.

Until 1998 the leader of the RUM, Nadirshah Khachilaev, played an importantrole in Dagestans politics and was regarded as a serious candidate for the top job.

Khachilaev, who had a Soviet atheistic background and has little knowledge of

Islam, has chosen Islam to promote his personal political ambitions. In fact, the

leadership of the RUM enabled Khachilaev, who was Lak, to raise his popularity in

Avar and Dargin dominated Dagestan politics as well as internationally. In 1996 he

was elected Dagestans deputy to the Russian State Duma. It is widely believed that

Khachilaev, one of the richest men in Dagestan, has made his money on caviar

smuggling and the nancial backing of various Islamic institutions of Saudi Arabia.

Islamic Ofcialdom

The behavior of Islamic ofcialdom and its interaction with the secular authorities

and the wider Muslim community have been similar in both republics, in which the

Soviet-era Islamic establishment has been challenged by the young Imams. The

latter, who have been courted by the nationalists, have pressed for the destruction of

the old Soviet Islamic Spiritual Boards, based in Ufa and Makhachkala, and their

replacement by autonomous Muftiyats. In both republics Islamic ofcialdom has

been largely represented by corrupt and theologically incompetent gures who were

d epe nd en t o n lo ca l semi-c rimin al struc tu re s a nd o n ma te rial a nd d oc trin al

assistance from foreign Islamic institutions.61 Their policies and behaviour have

often been motivated by internal rivalry, personal ambitions, and greed. The main

internal tension has been over the pilgrimage (hajj) business, which has become the

major source of enrichment. However, there have been substantial differences in the

forms and intensity of the Muftiyats activities and their interaction with the

authorities.

In August 1992 the congress of the Imams of Tatarstan elected Gabdulla-hazret

Galiulla as Mufti of a Kazan-based Muftiyat of Tatarstan, independent from the

TSDUMR, headed by Mufti Talgat Tadjuddinov.62

In terms of Islamic knowledge

and public respect Mufti Galiulla was much inferior to Talgat Tadjuddin. To justify

his secession from the TSD UMR, Galiulla and his entourage unleashed a propaganda

assault against Talgat Tadjuddin, whom they pronounced schizophrenic.

63

Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin, on the other hand, did not recognize a self-proclaimed Mufti of

Tatarstan and continued to consider the Tatarstan M uslim comm unity as his spiritual

domain and to nominate his representatives there. In November 1994 the TSDU MR

supported the formation of the alternative Spiritual Board (Muftiyat) of Tatarstan in

Zelenodolsk, rst headed by Gabdulhamit Zinatulla and later by Farid Salman, who

was based in Kazan.

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At the beginning the Muftiyat of Zinatulla/Salman, which acted on behalf of the

TSDUMR, had higher status and maintained control over the vast majority of the

local Muslim communities. However, the Muftiyat of Galiulla soon acquired an

advantageous position compared to the TSDUMR due to backing from the other

young Imams and the indirect support of the Tatarstan government. In 1993Galiulla was elected by other young Imam s as the head of the H igher Coordination

Center (HCC) of the Spiritual Board of Russias Muslims, which was designed to

replace the TSDUMR. However, the activity of the HCC was soon paralyzed as a

result of internal rivalries and animosities among its members. In 1996 Galiulla

supported Ravil Gainutdinov, the self-proclaimed Mufti of Central European Russia

(Moscow), in the creation of another anti-TSDUMR institutionthe Council of

Muftis of Russia.64

The Shaimiev government supported the anti-TSDUMR drive of the TatarstanMuftiyat because it regarded the latter as an important attribute of Tatarstans

sovereignty. The Unifying Islamic Congress, which was organized by the Tatarstan

authorities in February 1998, legitimized the break-up with Ufa and elected the one

Mufti of Tatarstan. The new Mufti, Gusmanhazret, who received his Islamic

training in Libya, was one of Galiullas deputies. With the blessing of President

Shaimiev the new Mufti has begun to replace the local Islamic ofcials, who were

appointed by the Ufa Mufti, with his own nominees. In order to speed up such

replacement he introduced new registration rules for Islamic communities. The

ambitions of Gusman-hazret have even gone beyond the borders of the republic.

Claiming the backing of President Shaimiev, he has tried to replace the Islamic

authority in Perm, which remained under the jurisdiction of the TSDUMR. By the

end of 1998 Gusman-hazret claimed to control nearly all of Tatarstans Islamic

communities (about 1,200) that were administratively attached to the Tatarstan

Muftiyat. However, Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin insisted that he maintained control over

470 Muslim communities in Tatarstan.65

The confrontation between the TSDUMR and the Tatarstan Muftiyat has also

had a doctrinal dimension. The inadequate Islamic education of the present

Tatarstan Islamic establishment and its heavy nancial and ideological dependence

on foreign Islamic institutions has dened its laissez-faire attitude toward the

proliferation of non-traditional and more rigid forms of Islam in T atarstan, including

Wahhabism. In contrast to Gusman-hazret, who has succumbed to the Wahhabi

inuence, Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin has continued to promote the Tatar Islamic

traditions based on the most tolerant and exible Hana madhhab of Sunni Islam.Although the Wahhabi advance in Tatarstan has been restricted by the relatively

small group of believers, its continuing dissemination could split Tatar Muslims

along doctrinal lines and aggravate interethnic (interconfessional) relations in the

republic. However, the level of awareness of the Tatarstan secular and Islamic

authorities of the dissemination of Wahhabism and its implications has remained

min ima l. Only a few Muslim c le rg y h av e trie d to a le rt th e a tte ntio n o f th e

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government and the public about the advance of Wahhabism and its consequences

for Tatarstan.

In Dagestan the post-Soviet sovereignization of the Islamic administration ac-

quired an ethnic dimension. In 1992 the Spiritual Board of Muslims of North

Caucasus (the Muftiyat of the Muslims of six Muslim autonomous republics of theNorth Caucasus) disintegrated along ethnic lines. In the conditions of extreme

multiethnicity this process resulted in the emergence of four ethnic Islamic Spiritual

Boards. They represented Dagestans largest ethnic communities: Avar, Kumyk,

Lak, and Dargin. From 1992 to 1994 the Lezgins also pressed for the formation of

their own Spiritual Board. In this early period of post-Soviet political and ideological

confusion, there was a short-term alliance between these national/ethnic boards and

the respective national/ethnic movements.

Since 1994 there has been only one ofcially recognized Muftiyat in Dagestan the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD), represented by the Avar

Islamic elite and supported by the government. In reality the SBMD has been

accepted as a Dagestan Muftiyat only by Avars. The SBMD has been the only

recipient of government and foreign Islamic funding and has been put in charge of

the ra pidly growing Islamic infrastructure: mosques, medresses (Islamic schools),

and Islamic colleges and universities.66 It is signicant that in spite of its generally

pro-government position the Muftiyat has had a distinctive approach to the role of

Islam in Dagestan. In particular, it has advocated making Friday an ofcial holiday,

the gradual Islamization of education, and the introduction of some elements of the

Sharia into the legal system, as there were in 1920.67

Compared to Tatarstans representatives of Islamic ofcialdom, who have lost

their historical connections with Susm (Ishanism ), their Dagestani counterparts

have preserved strong links with particular Su tariqas. The SBMD has been staffed

with murids of the Avar Naqshbandi shaykh Said-afandi Chirkeevskii, who repre-

sented Dagestans unofcial tariqatist (belonging to tariqa , or Su order) Islam. For

example, the last Mufti Abubakarov, who was assassinated in August 1998, was the

murid of this shaykh. The inuence of Said-afandi has transcended the religious

sphere, his approval being crucial for many politicians: he has been courted by the

inuential Russian politician Russian Ramazan Abdulatipov, who is one of the key

candidates for the Dagestan leadership.

The common hatred ofWahhabism has united the D agestan political and religious

establishment and Avar nationalists. Together they have created an extremely

negative image of Wahhabis , accusing the latter of the instigation of civil war andof a pro-Chechen and pro-British conspiracy. Still, the ofcial rejection of Wah-

habism has not been shared by some distinguished representatives of the non-Avar

Islamic clergy or by ordinary Muslims. They have argued that it does not matter how

believers express their faith as long as they believe in Allah.68 These non-Avar

Islamic clergy have also pointed to the duplicity of the leaders of the SBMD, who

accuse the Wahhabis of foreign Islamic connections but prot from similar connec-

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tions themselves. In particular, they deplore the permissiveness of the SBMD

towards foreign Islamic teachers in Dagestan. Many Dagestani Muslims strongly

believe in the superiority of Dagestans traditional Islamic scholarship, based on the

heritage of Aligadzhi Akushinskii and other great Dagestani Islamic scholars.69

Unofcial Islam

This part of my research has been of special interest because it deals with the most

volatile and politically active Islamic phenomena such as Wahhabism and tariqatism.

It is particularly relevant to the situation in Dagestan.

In Tatarstan, Su traditions have been strongly undermined as a result of the

Stalinist purges of the 1930s. Nevertheless, my research has revealed a number of

contemporary Sus who have been inuential among a small group of initiatedMuslims.

70 The larger and socially more inuential group of unofcial Islamic

authorities has been represented by Muslim elders who have not had an Islamic

education but have been highly respected in their local, mainly rural communities.

They have acquired their special status through their virtuous life and non-

involvem ent in corruption and criminal business. T heir opinion and advice have been

sought by the locals and often preferred to that of the mullah .

In Dagestan unofcial Islam has been at the forefront of political and social

life. It has been represented, on the one hand, by tariqatist Islam, Naqshbandi,

Shazali, and Kadiri of the Shai madhhab of Sunni Islam, and by Wahhabism, or

Sa Islam, on the other. In numerical terms tariqatists have had enormous superiority

over Wahhabis. (Tariqatist Islam has been professed by 60% of Dagestan Muslims

an d Wahhabism by only 57%.) In contrast with Tatarstan, the Su network in

Dagestan has survived in spite of decades of Soviet atheism. In contemporary

Dagestan there are about 4050 Su tariqas , 23 of them headed by living shaykhs.

The Su orders have preserved their clandestine structure and their afliation to

specic kinship and subkinship local formations; Su shaykhs have retained their

high spiritual status among ordinary Muslims. Alongside them there have been a

number of inuential Islamic scholars and Imams who do not identify themselves

with a particular tariqa . All of them, especially Said-afandi, have exercised indirect

inuence on the political process by supporting particular candidates during

elections.

Unlike Susm, which has a centuries-long tradition in Dagestan, Dagestani

Wahhabism has been a relatively recent development.

71

Its spread has occurred in theconditions of post-Soviet religious liberalization. The annual participation of thou-

sands of Dagestanis in the pilgramages to Mecca and Medina, as well as in the umra

(small pilgramage), has been the m ain m eans of its proliferation.72 In addition, a

growing number of Dagestanis have studied abroad, at Islamic centers in Turkey,

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. There has also been a ow of foreign

teachers of Islam into Dagestani Islamic schools and universities as well as a ow

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ISLAM AND NA TION BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN

of pro-Wahhabism propaganda by foreign Islamic missionaries and Islamic literature

published by foreign Islamic centers. The peak of Wahhabi activity was in the rst

half of the 1990s.

In spite of its still relatively small number of followers, Wahhabism has rapidly

proliferated, especially in the Kizilyurtovskii, Buynakskii, Khasavyurtovskii,Karabudakhenskii, and Tsumadinskii districts. In terms of Islamic doctrine Wah-

habism allegedly represents the pure and true Islam of Prophet Muhamm ad and the

four righteous Caliphs. The spiritual leader of Dagestan Wahhabis (who, in fact

object to this term and call themselves simply Muslims) is Bagautdin Muhammad,

who is very knowledgeable in Islamic matters. In terms of politics there has been a

split between the moderate Wahhabis grouped around Bagautdin and the late

Ahmed-kadi Ahtaev, and the radicals headed by Jordan-born Hattab. In particular,

the moderates and radicals have differed on the issue of Jihad. Bagautdin hasinterpreted Jihad as the internal spiritual process of an individual Muslim. Hattab,

who is closely linked to the Chechen Islamists, has attached a military dimension to

Jihad.

Wahhabis advocate strict monotheism (tawhid) and oppose tariqatism as a devi-

ation from Islam. In particular, they insist on the necessity to observe all ve pillars

(arkans) of Islam and oppose the authority of local shaykhs as mediators between

Allah and the individual. In particular they reject sermons and the tariqatist burial

tradition which involves reading the Koran at the cemetery. They recognize the

special role of Jihad. The material and nancial resources of the Wahhabis are a

controversial issue. The authorities, the Muftiyat, and the mass media have accused

the Wahhabis of being imm oral mercenaries, nanced by Saudi funds. The Wahhabis

have persistently rejected such accusations and have claimed their non-involvement

in criminal business which they argue is characteristic of Islamic ofcialdom in

Dagestan.

Relations between Wahhabis an d tariqatists have been controversial. Some vil-

lages have been divided into Wahhabis an d tariqatists , each having their separate

mosque as well as Imam, or amir (head of the Islamic community). There have even

been cases of armed conict between the proponents of Wahhabism and tariqatism,

which have been recycled by the Dagestan and Russian mass media. But, there have

also been cases of grassroots cooperation between the two sides which have not

appeared in the press.73

Moreover, some Dagestan Su shaykhs have expressed their

tolerance towards Wahhabis .74

Paradoxically, the negative public attitude towards Wahhabis has not been borneout by my rst-hand contacts with them. The Wahhabis interviewed have demon-

strated an impressive knowledge of Islam and have rejected the accusations against

them as a slander. They have stressed their peaceful character and openness to

theological and political dialogue with the authorities and tariqatists. They have

counter-accused the Islamic ofcialdom of corruption, involvement in dirty politics

and nancial fraud, and fear of open discussion with them. 75

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Islam and the Intellectual Elite

The position of the intelligentsia towards Islam and its role in society as well as the

impact of these perceptions on the political process show a remarkable similarity in

the two republics. In both, the majority of that social group has been frustrated by the non-intellectual composition of the present political leadership, by its inability to

formulate a sound religious policy, and by its neglect of the intelligentsia itself,

which accounts for the weakening of the intelligentsias impact on policy making

even in comparison with Soviet times.

Nevertheless, in both republics the interviewed representatives of the intelligentsia

have perceived religion, Islam, and Orthodoxy in particular as a viable moral and

spiritual foundation in the post-Soviet crisis of values. However, the national/ethnic

origins of the representatives of the intelligentsia have affected their views on theoptimal degree of Islamization of the society and its specic forms.

In Tatarstan, the majority of Tatar-speaking Tatar intellectuals have stressed the

importance of Islam in the national self-identication of Tatars. They consider the

Islamic faith part of Tatarness, as Orthodoxy is a part of Russianness. They would

therefore welcome the gradual strengthening of Islamic ethics and m orality in family

life and the incorporation of Islamic social norms (related to intergender and

intergenerational relations, communalism, charity for the poor and care for the

disadvantaged, dress code, attitudes to alcohol, drugs, theft, etc.) in public life.76

The dissemination of the views and ideas of the Tatar intelligentsia has been

obstructed as a result of strict government control over the mass media. In March

1995 som e Tatar intellectuals attempted to raise the public prole of Islam by joining

the Council of Islamic Scholars (Golyamlar Shurasi), which w as headed by the Mufti

of Tatarstan. However, it was a still-born creation: Mufti Galiulla did not want any

intrusion into the domestic life of ofcialdom.

The intelligentsia of various Islam ic peoples of Dagestan has had even greater

expectations of Islam, w hich has often been perceived as a crucial factor in the moral

salvation of a society that has been socially degraded and criminalized.77

Many

Dagestani intellectuals have expressed their bitter dissatisfaction with the present

Dagestan leadership and have linked the possibility of a solution to the current crisis

to the emergence of a strong, charismatic Islamic leader. They have admitted that

they would have welcomed the development of an Islamic educational system and

the introduction of elements of the Sharia into public life as the only viable deterrent

to the process of criminalization. The attitudes of the various representatives of theDagestan intelligentsia towards Wahhabism have varied considerably. Some have

totally rejected it, while others have expressed their toleration of it or even preferred

it to tariqatism. There has been a view that Wahhabism, which is based on the most

severe Hanbali madhhab of Sunni Islam, appeals to the particular mentality and

temper of Dagestanis. On the whole, the non-Russian Dagestan intellectuals have had

a greater opportunity than their Tatar counterparts to publicize their views.

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Tatarstan authorities. In both republics there have been no special Russian

periodicals, television, or radio programs.

Russian passivity could be explained by the inertia associated with a big brother

complex. Because of it, they have failed to react quickly to the sudden decline in

their privileged position which they used to take for granted. Many still desperately hope that the situation will return to normal. But another explanation of their

passivity could be their fear of active political protest in the light of Moscows policy

of non-interference and their dependence on the ruling elites. They do not want to

be persecuted. There is no faith among most Russians that the situation could be

improved and some sort of democratic accountability established.82

In both republics the Russians and other non-Muslims have responded to national

discomfort through emigration. In Tatarstan this has affected predom inantly Russian

academics, especially in the humanities. The composition of emigrants from Dages- tan has been more diverse and has included qualied industrial, transport, and

railway workers, m ilitary engineers, and machine builders.83

The main destination of

the Russian migrants has been the neighbouring Stavropol and Krasnodar regions.

The peak of Russian emigration occurred in 19941995. Since then some have

returned after having failed to adjust to life in the Russian republic. However, from

1998 the rapid deterioration of the political and security situation in Dagestan in the

aftermath of the ofcial crackdown on Wahhabism has given new impetus to Russian

emigration.

Conclusion

Islam has had a growing inuence on public and private life in both republics.

However, its character, intensity, and specic form has differed substantially in each

republic. In Tatarstan the role of Islam has been considerably weaker than in

Dagestan. Tatarstan society has remained overwhelmingly secular. The Islamic

renaissance there has been more symbolic than genuine. In its symbolic capacity it

has constituted an integral part of the policy of T atarization. Islam has been regarded

as a vital component of Tatarness. But the genuine Islamic revival has been m arginal.

This has been due to the weaker religiosity of T atars in general and to the inadequacy

of Tatar Islamic ofcialdom in particular. The moral and professional inferiority of

the latter and its strong dependence on foreign Islamic institutions have determined

the low esteem in which it is held by ordinary Tatar Muslims. Furthermore, it has

succumbed to the inuences of non-traditional Islam, which have been opposed in the wider Tatar Islamic community. So far no viable Islamic alternative to the

corrupt and incompetent political and religious establishment has been generated.

In the more religious and multiethnic Dagestan, the ofcial approach to Islam has

been consistently negative. There has been spontaneous re-Islamization from below,

which has occurred within the framework of unof cial Islam . It has been represented

by Su, tariqatist Islam, on the one hand, and by Wahhabism, on the other. In order

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to ensure their political survival the present Dagestan authorities have opted for an

open confrontation with Wahhabism. The common anti-Wahhabi position of the

atheistic Dagestan political establishment and of Avar-dominated Islamic ofcialdom

has dened their alliance. Since the end of 1997 they have unleashed a compre-

hensive political, military, and propaganda cam paign against Wahhabis. However,

the continuing economic and political crisis has done nothing to decrease the

attractiveness of the Islamic solution in Dagestan.

NOTES

* This article is based on the preliminary results of a project funded by the Economic and

Social Research Council of the UK.

1. The research method has involved a combination of textual analysis of local periodicals and

specialist literature, statistics, and interviews with members of the political and religious eliteon the issues of Islam, national identity, nationhood, and relations with Moscow.

2. The territory of Tatarstan is 68,000 square kilometers. One fth of its territory is covered by

forest. The population is 3,760,000 (1996). The urban population accounts for 74% of the

total. Tatars, who are Turkic people of Islamic cultural background, make up 48% of the

Tatarstan population, i.e. only 26% of the total Tatar population of the Russian Federation

and the CIS (7,000,000). Russians, who are Slavic people of Russian Orthodox cultural

background, make up 44% of the Tatarstan population. Tatarstan is divided into 39 districts

and 18 cities. Tatarstan is one of the most economically advanced autonomous republics of

the Russian Federation. The major industries are oil and gas rening, chemicals, petro-

chemicals, aircraft building, m achine building, car manufacturing, light industry, and food

processing.

3. Galina Yemelianova, The National Identity of the Volga Tatars at the Turn of the Nineteenth

Century: Tatarism, Turkism and Islam, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1997, p. 554.

4. Mirfatikh Z. Zakiev, Tatari: Problemi Istorii i Yazika (Kazan: Academy of Sciences of

Tatarstan, 1996), p. 102.

5. Stephane A. Dudoignon, Djadidism, Mirasism, Islamism, Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol.

37, Nos 12, 1996, p. 17; M. Kempler, Entre Boukhara et le Moyen-Volga: Abd an-Nasiri

al-Qursawi (17761812) en conic avec les oulemas traditionalistes, Cahiers du Monde

Russe, Vol. 37, No.12, 1996, p. 42.

6. Jadidism derives from a new a phonetic method (instead of the old syllabic method) of

teaching Arabic and later Tatar in the Tatar confessional primary and secondary schools. This

method was rst introduced by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinskii in 1884. Later on,

Jadidism evolved into Tatar national ideology. See also: D. Iskhakov, Jadidism kak

natsiestroitelstvo, Iman Nuri, Vol. 4, 1996, pp. 4, 22; Edward J. Lazzerini, Ismail Bey

Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 18781914, PhD dissertation, University of

Washington, Seattle, 1973; Azade-Ayse Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Prole in National

Resilience (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 49.

7. Yemelianova, National Identity of the Volga Tatars, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4,1997, pp. 543572.

8. The Muslim Duma faction consisted mainly of the members of the Party of Ittifaq (Union).

It was formed in 1905 and represented the Muslim intellectual and nancial elite, who like

Russian kadets, favored the enlightened and liberal transformation of the Russian empire into

a modern democratic civic nation. See Inorodcheskoe obozrenie, Vo l. 2 , N o. 1, 19 15;

Musulmanskaya Pechat v Rossii v 1910 Godu (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies,

1987).

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9. Zaki Validi Togan, Vospominaniya (Ufa: Kitap, 1994); Harriman Review , Vol. 9, No. 4,

1996, p. 6.

10. Pravda, 22 September 1989.

11. President Mintimir Shaimiev, a Tatar, was born in 1937 in the village Anyakovo of the

Aktanyshskii district of Tatarstan. In 1959 he graduated from Kazan Agrarian Institute. Since

1962 he has been within the Soviet/party nomenklatura, rising from the position of a district party functionary to the First Secretary of Tatar Obkom.

12. Farit Mukhametshin, Tatarstan in the Outside World, International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4,

1997, pp. 197202; Edward W. Walker, Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism in

post-Communist Russia, in Gale L apidus, ed., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation

(Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 79113.

13. The power-sharing arrangements under this treaty were detailed in 12 cooperation agree-

ments. See: Dogovor o razgranichenii polnomochii, preamble, 18 February 1994, Belaya

Kniga Tatarstana. Put k Suverenitetu, 19901995 (Kazan: Panorama Forum, 1996, No. 5,

pp. 8692; F. Mukhametshin and R. Izmailov, eds, Sovereign Tatarstan (Moscow: Insan,1997), p. 241.

14. Dagestans territory is 50,300 square kilometers and its population is 1, 954, 2 53 (1995). The

urban population makes up 43.6% of the total while the rural population is 56.4%. Dagestan

is multiethnic; it is populated by over 100 different groups, each of which has its own culture

and history and speaks a distinctive language incomprehensible to the rest. Dagestanis belong

to three major linguistic families: the Nakh-Dagestani branch of the Caucasian language

family, the Turkic group of the Altay language family, and the Indo-European family. Over

90% of Dagestanis are Sunni Muslims of the Shai madhhab. Over 60% of Dagestani Sunni

Muslims belong to the Su orders of Naqshbandi, Shazali, and Kadiri. About 5% of

Dagestani Muslims are Shiites. Dagestan is divided into 42 districts. One of the least

economically developed autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, it is strongly

dependent on Federal subsidies (8095%) and other suppliers. It is a largely agrarian

republic, specialising in sheep breeding, shing, fruit growing, and the related production of

wine and brandy.

15. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, ed., The North Caucasian Barrier (London: Hurst, 1992), pp. 34.

16. Until the late 1920s Dagestans linguae francae were Arabic and Turkic (Kumyk and Azeri)

languages, based on Arabic script; afterwards it was Russian, based on Cyrillic script.

17. Statisticheskii sbornik (Makhachkala: Statizdat, 1996).

18. Istoriya Dagestana, Vol. 1, (Makhachkala: AN, 1967).

19. Amri R. Shikhsaidov, Knizhnie Kollektsii Dagestana. Rukopisnaya i Pechatnaya Kniga v

Dagestane (Makhachkala: AN, 1991), pp. 89.

20. Bennigsen-Broxup, North Caucasian Barrier, p. 34.

21. Gadzhiali D.Daniyalov, Stroitelstvo Sotsializma v Dagestane, 19171937 gg., (Moscow:

Politizdat, 1988), pp. 4964.

22. Migratsiya Naseleniya Respubliki Dagestan, 1996; Statisticheskii Sbornik (Makhachkala:

Statizdat, 1997), p. 4.

23. For example, as a result of such consolidation, 13 ethnic groups of the Ando-Tsez linguistic

group (Andis, Didys, Godoberins, Bagulals, Chamalins, Tindins, Akhvakhs, Karatins, Bot-

likhs, and some others) were registered as Avars. Similarly, Kaytaks and Kubachins were

registered as Dargins, while a large number of small ethnic groups of the central plateau

became Laks; Southern Terkmens turned into Azeris and Northern Terkmens into Kumyks.

See Traditsionnoe i Novoe v Sovremennoi Kulture i Bite Dagestanskikh Pereselentsev

(Moscow:Yupiter, 1988), pp. 2223, 32.

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24. Osnovnie Natsionalnosti Respubliki Dagestan. Statisticheskii Sbornik (Makhachkala: Statiz-

dat, 1995), pp. 12.

25. Narodi Rossii: Entsiklopediya (Moscow: Entsiklopediya, 1994), p. 434.

26. I investigated the cities of Kazan and Naberezhnie Chelny and the districts of Arskii/

Pestrechinskii, Drozhanovskii, Elabuzhskii, Laishevskii, Menzelinskii, and Sarmanovskii in

Tartarstan. In Dagestan I investigated the cities of Makhachkala and Derbend and the districtsof Buy nakskii, Kaytagskii, Karabudakhkentskii, Kizilyurtovskii, Kizlyarskii, and Rutulskii.

27. By 1996, 106 mosques and only seven churches had been built, while 148 mosques and 34

churches were under construction. Religia v Sovremennom Obshestve: Istoria, Problemiu,

Tendentsii, 56 (Kazan: Magarif, 1994), p. 265.

28. Some participants at the Congress who were interviewed admitted that over half of the people

there were undercover policemen.

29. Interview with R. Khakimov. Kazan, 2 September 1997.

30. Interview with B. T erentiev, teacher of history and Russian at comprehensive school No. 87,

Kazan, 13 September, 1998; G. M. Davletshin, F. Sh. Khuzin, and I. L. Izmailov, Rasskazi po Istorii Tatarstana, 56 (Kazan: Magarif, 1994), p. 265.

31. Yemelianova, National Identity of the Volga Tatars, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4,

1997, pp. 557559.

32. Deputy Fanavil Shaimardanov provided the copies of parliamentary hearings. Kazan,

September 1998.

33. The religiosity of the population varies considerably in different parts of Dagestan and among

various ethnic groups. The general perception is that the Avars and Dargins are the most

religious, the Kumyks and Laks are less religious, and the Lezgins are the least religious. In

many rural areas Islamic norms prevail over secular regulations. Village Imams still play a

central role in the everyday life of many rural communities. They have the nal say in land,

property, and family disputes. The function of the village administration is often limited to

the rubber-stamping of the decisions reached by the local Imams. However, even within the

same ethnic community the scale of religiosity differs greatly among local communities.

34. In 1997 the Chechen Republic ofcially proclaimed itself an Islamic state observing Sharia

law.

35. Like Chechnya, Dagestan has been overwhelmed by a wave of kidnapping and political

assassination. Among the recent victims have been the vice-premier of Dagestan, Gamid

Gamidov; the leader of the Kumyk national council, Bashir Alzhanbekov; and the Dagestan

Mufti Abubakarov. The mayor of Makhachkala, Said Am irov, has survived ten assassination

attempts.

36. Wahhabism is a religious and political movement within the Hanbali madhhab of Sunni

Islam. It originated in the mid eighteenth century in Arabia. Its founder was Muhammad ben

Abd al-Wahhabi who advocated strict monotheism (tawhid ). He renounced the worshipping

of saints and sacred places and called for the purging from Islam of its later accretions.

Wahhabism is the state ideology of Saudi Arabia.

37. From an interview with Magomed Kurbanov, the Deputy Minister of Nationalities of

Dagestan, Makhachkala, 20 June 1998.

38. On 2021 May 1998, a group of armed people, under the command of the leaders of the Lak

popular movement, the All-Russian Union of Muslims, the Avar popular movement, and the

chair of the Makhachkala city council, occupied the Parliament building for 12 hours. Novoe

Delo, No. 22, 29 May 1998.

39. SBMD, based in Makhachkala, emerged in 1992 as a result of the disintegration of the

Spiritual Board of Muslims in the North Caucasus.

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Mufti of Tatarstan, and a number of Tatar intellectuals, who asked not to be named, Kazan,

17 September 1998.

57. Yemelianova, Ethnic Nationalism, Islam and Russian Politics in the North Caucasus, in Ch.

Williams and Th. Skas, eds, Ethnic Nationalism in R ussia, the CIS and the Baltic States

(Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999), pp. 120148.

58. Put Islama, No. 2, 1994, p. 1; Znama Islama, No 2, 1996, p. 1. The leaders of the DagestaniLezegin nationalists have continued to press for the formation of the Lezgin state. However,

this idea has not found an enthusiastic response among the Azerbaijan Lezgins, whose living

standards have been considerably higher than among the Dagestani Lezgins. Interview with

Abdul Gamid Aliev, the deputy head of the Dagestan Scientic Center of the RAS (Russian

Academy of Sciences), Makhachkala, 17 June 1998.

59. Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, Makhachkala, 20 June 1998.

60. Put Islama, No. 2, 1994, p. 1; Znamya Islama, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1996, p. 1.

61. Among the most active in both republics have been the University of Imam Muhammad ben

Saud, the Islamic charities of Taiba and Ibraghim al-Ibraghim in Saudi Arabia, the UAEIslamic charity organization Al-Khairia, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the

World Islamic League, the World Association of Islamic Youth, and the fund of Ibraghim

Hayri. About 400 Young Tatars and Dagestanis annually receive scholarships to study at

various Islamic institutions in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, the

UAE, Egypt, and Malaysia.

62. Catherine the Great created this Muftiyat in Ufa in 1789.

63. Interview with Galiulla-hazret, Kazan, 10 April 1997.

64. Among other members of the Council of the Muftis of Russia are the new Muftis of

Dagestan, Chuvashiya, Siberia and the Far East, Penza, the Volga region, Bashkorstan,Kabardino-Balkaria, Orenbourg, and Ulyanovsk.

65. Interview with Muftis Gusman-hazret, Kazan, September 1998; and with T algat Tadjuddin,

London, 12 March 1999.

66. In 1996 there were 1,670 mosques, 25 Islamic schools, and 9 Islamic Institutes functioning

in Dagestan. Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, Makhachkala, 17 July 1997.

67. Interview with the members of the Muftiyat establishment, Makhachkala, 18 July 1997.

68. Interview with Imam Ali Abdullaev of K arlabko village, Levashinskii district, 16 June 1998.

69. Interview with Ali Magomedov, the head of the Religious Department of the Dagestani

government. Makhachkala, 16 June 1998.70. It is believed that Susm of the Naqshbandi tariqa played an important role among Tatar and

Bashkir Muslims before the October revolution. Many Tatar Muftis were members of the

Naqshbandi tariqa. (Interview with Tatar Ishan Abul-hakk, Kazan, 16 September 1998).

71. According to the Muftiyat, the rst Dagestani Wahhabi was Ali Kayaev, who turned to

Wahhabism during his studies in Egypt. He returned to Dagestan in 1913 and began the

dissemination of Wahhabism. The Wahhabis themselves reject this version.

72. For example, in May 1998, 12,700 Dagestanis conducted the pilgrimmage. In addition about

6,000 Dagestanis went on the small pilgrimmage.

73. For example, in May 1998, in the village of Kirovaul in the Kizilyurtovskii region, tariqatistsand Wahhabis formed joint Sharia courts to combat crime, alcohol and drug abuse, theft, and

moral laxity. Interview with a Wahhabi called Gadzhi, Kizilyrt, 29 June 1998.

74. Ispoved Wahhabita, Dialogue, No. 7, April 1998.

75. During the only joint press conference that was organized by the authorities in 1997,

Wahhabis outplayed tariqatists.

76. Interviews with Rashid Gulyamov, Indus Tagirov, Rafail Khaplekhamitov, Rashad S aphin,

Tolgat Boreev, Tufan Minullin, and Aydar Halim; Kazan, Naberezhnie Chelny, 19971998.

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77. Interviews with Fazu Alieva, Abdurashid Saidov, Vladlen Gadzhiev, Amri Shikhsaidov, and

Ali Aliev; Makhachkala, Moscow, 19971998.

78. Interviews with Alexander Salagaev, Vladimir Belyev, Andrei Maltsev, Gennadii Mukhanov,

Boris Terentiev, Alexei Litvin, Liya Sagitova, and Georgii Milovanov; Kazan, Makhachkala,

19971998.

79. Guzel Sabirova and Elena Omelchenko, The Renaissance of Islam in Tatarstan andDagestan: Popular Perceptions, BASEES Conference, Cambridge, U.K., 2729 March 1999.

80. In 1990, there was only one Tatar school in Kazan; in 1997, there were already 124 Tatar

gymnasiums and 1,112 schools out of a total of 2,439 had the Tatar language as the language

of instruction. They have probably produced their rst graduates in 1999. The elite schools

are TurkishTatar lycees that are based on the Turkish curriculum and use Turkish and

English as languages of instruction. In 1 997, there we re two such lycees in K azan out of eight

in the whole republic. Interview with Radik Zaripov, head of the Department of National

Education of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan, 10 April, 1997.

81. Interview with Georgii M ilovanov, M akhachkala, 17 July 1997.

82. Many Russian voters in Tatarstan have expressed their pessimism about any control of

Izbirkoms (electoral committees) in the future. This fear has been fuelled by the negative

experience of the parliamentary elections in 1995, when seven out of 21 candidates from

Soglasie were badly beaten. One was killed and some others were sacked from their jobs.

83. Interview with Georgii M ilovanov, M akhachkala, 17 July 1997.