1509550

Harvard Divinity School

Creata ad Imaginem Dei, Licet Secundo Gradu: Woman as the Image of God According to JohnCalvinAuthor(s): John L. ThompsonSource: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 125-143Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509550Accessed: 10/09/2010 15:09

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HTR 81:2 (1988) 125-43

CREATA AD IMAGINEM DEI, LICET SECUNDO GRADU: WOMAN AS THE IMAGE OF GOD ACCORDING TO JOHN CALVIN *

John L. Thompson Pasadena, California

Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over ... all the earth ..." So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.

To say that Adam and Eve were created in the image of God ought to answer a host of questions, but the historian of exegesis finds that it raises more questions than it answers, since any given interpretation of the image of God reveals as much about the interpreter as it does about the image itself. It would be a bit melodramatic to describe Gen 1:26 as an exegetical Rorschach test, a literary "ink blot" which means only what the interpreter thinks it means. But Gen 1:26 does, in fact, serve usefully as a "weathervane." An interpreter's explanation of the imago dei often points to his or her larger theological agenda.

However, to demonstrate how Calvin's exposition of the imago dei serves as a microcosm of his broader theological concerns is not the main point of the present essay. My chief concern here is to show how Calvin defines the image of God, then redefines it when he comes to describe the way in which women may be said to possess that same image. The specific statement of Calvin which first attracted my attention is the assertion in his commentary on Genesis that "the woman was created in the image of God, albeit in a secondary degree."

*This essay is a revision of a paper presented at a meeting of the American Society of Church

History in New York on 29 December 1985. 1 Comm. Gen. 2:18 (CO 23.46). This is a phrase which has been regularly noted, but

insufficiently analyzed, by most of the recent commentators on Calvin and women. See John H. Bratt, "The Role and-Status of Women in the Writings of John Calvin," in Peter De Klerk, ed., Renaissance, Reformation, Resurgence (Grand Rapids: Calvin Theological Seminary, 1976) 3; Willis P. DeBoer, "Calvin on the Role of Women," in David E. Holwerda, ed., Exploring the Heri-

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

The purpose of the present paper is to examine Calvin's discussion of the image of God in order to make sense of this statement about women. In this examina- tion I will be drawing primarily on Calvin's commentaries on Genesis and 1 Corinthians as well as on the Institutes. After a discussion of Calvin's general use of the term imago dei, I will examine his qualification of the term as he applies it to women. I will then attempt to place my findings in the broader context of Calvin's teachings concerning women.

I

Anyone who has read more than one commentary on Genesis knows that there are many different ways to explain the meaning of the phrase "image of God." Interpreters agree that there is some aspect of human nature that does (or did) "image" or "resemble" its Creator, but what exactly is this theomorphic feature?

Calvin singles out a number of earlier commentators, such as John Chryso- stom, who identified the imago dei with the dominion Adam exercised over creation. Some have seen in the human body a literal, physical likeness of God, Calvin observes, while others have refined this crude anthropomorphism some- what by calling attention to the "admirable workmanship" seen in the body as a reflection of a divine (though incorporeal) craftsman. Still others-presumably Osiander and Servetus-attempt through various arguments to tie the image of God to Christ, who is that very image in which Adam was created. Perhaps the best known interpretation is that of Augustine, who found in the triplex structure of the soul (as memory, intellect, and will) an image of the triune God.2

Although Calvin is familiar with all these opinions, he himself believes that such exegetical diversity rests more on speculation than on the data of the text at hand. Like Luther before him, Calvin shows a certain reluctance to isolate the imago and dogmatize upon it. Therefore, in his commentary on Gen 1:26, Cal- vin rejects the view of the "anthropomorphites" that the imago is borne by the

tage of John Calvin (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976) 252-54, 270; B. J. Van der Walt, "Woman and

Marriage: in the Middle Ages, in Calvin, and in our own time," in idem, ed., John Calvin's Insti- tutes: His Opus Magnum (Potchefstroom, South Africa: Potchefstroom University for Christian

Higher Education, 1986) 214- 15; Jane Dempsey Douglass, Women, Freedom, and Calvin (Philadel- phia: Westminster, 1985) 60, 80; and Mary Potter, "Gender Equality and Gender Hierarchy in Calvin's Theology," Signs 2 (1986) 727.

2 In Comm. Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.26). Calvin refers the reader to books 10 and 14 of Augustine's De trinitate and to book 11 of De civitate Dei; see also Institutes 1.15.4. The reference to Servetus is noted by John T. McNeill in his footnote to Institutes 1.15.3 in LCC 20 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960) 187 n. 101. That Calvin refers to Osiander in Comm. Gen. 1:26 is made clear in the parallel discussion in Institutes 1.15.3 (see following note).

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human body.3 Furthermore, though he is not wholly unappreciative of the ingenuity of Augustine's famous analysis, Calvin accuses Augustine of "specu- lating" (philosophatur) and states that "a definition of the image of God ought to rest on a firmer basis than such subtleties (argutiis)."4 Other interpretations of the imago dei are mentioned only en route to dismissal. For example, in his Genesis commentary, Calvin initially rejects Chrysostom's exposition, arguing that the imago dei is not the exercise of "dominion" (imperium) over the world as God's vicegerent. But he then goes on to correct himself by allowing that dominion is a part, albeit "a very small" part, of the image of God.5 In a parallel discussion in the Institutes there is no longer any acknowledgment that dominion is even a small part of the imago. But Calvin does state for the first time why he disagrees with this interpretation: God's image is not to be sought in external concerns, for the imago is "an inner good of the soul."6 Finally,

3 Calvin comments on the anthropomorphites also in the Institutes; see 1.13.1 and 4.17.23, 25. Calvin's execration of the anthropomorphites in Comm. Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.26) is immediately fol- lowed by his denigration of those "who, though they do not imagine that God is corporeal, yet maintain that the image of God is in the body of man." Calvin is probably referring here (in 1554) to the teaching of Osiander, whom he refutes by name in the 1559 Institutes (1.15.3): "Osiander ... [by] indiscriminately extending God's image both to the body and to the soul, mingles heaven and earth."

4 Comm Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.26). 5 Ibid.: "Nihilo verior Chrysostomi expositio, qui ad imperium refert quod homini datum erat, ut

Dei vices in mundi gubernatione quodammodo gereret. Est quidam haec imaginis Dei aliqua portio, sed perquam exigua."

6 Institutes 1.15.4, where Calvin does not name Chrysostom. Although the term translated here as "dominion" by Battles is not imperium (as in Comm. Gen. 1:26) but dominatus, the present argument does not depend on Chrysostom's particular term, but rather on Calvin's understanding of Chrysostom's concept. Chrysostom's original term, of course, would have been in Greek, though Calvin most likely read Chrysostom only in translation. One may surmise that the text of Chryso- stom that Calvin had in mind was his homily on Gen 1:26, to which Calvin had access in a 1536 Latin edition. Here, in Hom. Gen. 8.3-4 (PG 53.72-73), Chrysostom repeatedly uses &apXi and its cognates (also found in Gen 1:26-28 of the LXX); I have not seen the translation of this passage which Calvin used, but Migne's facing-page translation usually, though not always, renders &apxI (etc.) in this passage as dominium or a cognate (PG 53.72-73). In any case, what Calvin apparently rejects is Chrysostom's interpretation of the image of God as consisting in the exercise of (say governmental) power, authority, rule, or dominion-an image wherein the human exercise of power images the omnipotence and providence of the Creator. The flaw in this interpretation, says Calvin, is its apparent neglect of the interior and spiritual character of the imago dei, next to which "external concerns" are virtually without significance. Nonetheless, Calvin's explicit rejection of Chrysostom's interpretation is problematic, as we shall see. On Calvin's limited knowledge of Patristic Greek, see William Newton Todd, "The Function of the Patristic Writings in the Thought of John Calvin" (Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary [New York], 1964) 75 - 77, 252 - 57. On the editions of Chrysostom possibly used by Calvin, see Alexandre Ganoczy, La Bibliotheque de l'Academie de Calvin (Geneva: Droz, 1969), listings # 26, # 37, and # 70. Calvin's own handwritten annotations of Chrysostom's homilies are reproduced in Alexandre Ganoczy and Klaus Muller, Cal-

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Calvin also breaks with patristic and medieval tradition by refusing to find any real distinction between "image" and "likeness."7

What, then, is the imago dei according to Calvin? For Calvin, this is a difficult question to answer because, since the fall, we

have not had access to that image. It has been lost, destroyed, shattered. We cannot know the imago by looking at ourselves; now we know what it was only on the basis of its restoration through the Gospel.8 Calvin here refers his reader to Col 3:10, which identifies the "new nature" bestowed in regeneration as the "image" of its creator, and to Eph 4:23, where the new nature is described as "righteousness and true holiness."9 Thus, imago dei designates "the perfection (integritas) of our whole nature, as it appeared when Adam was endued with a right judgment, had affections in harmony with reason, had all his senses sound and well regulated, and truly excelled in everything good." 0 The same series of four phrases is used in the 1559 Institutes, except that the final phrase in the sequence quoted above is qualified by Adam's acknowledgment of the source of his excellence: "and he truly referred his excellence to exceptional gifts bestowed upon him by his Maker." I

One key element of Calvin's definition of the image of God, then, would seem to be that of "right order," which is itself established through the knowledge of God and which is essentially the "reordering" of oneself towards God through the renewal wrought by the Gospel.12 A further prominent ingredient of the image of God-as important as "order"-is derived by Calvin from certain connotations of the word imago. In Calvin's view, "image" is not seen exclusively in terms of the static connotations of an artistic "likeness" (as in a statue or portrait). Instead "image" is associated more frequently with the more dynamic and relational concept of "reflection" (as in a mirror).13

vins handschriftliche Annotationen zu Chrysostomus (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981). Unfortunately, Calvin did not annotate the text in question.

7 Comm. Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.26); Institutes 1.15.3. 8 Comm. Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.26). 9 Similar phrases are found also in Calvin's commentaries on these verses.

10 Ibid. 11 Institutes 1.15.3. 12 Institutes 1.15.4. Lucien Joseph Richard notes (The Spirituality of John Calvin [Atlanta: John

Knox, 1974] 112) that "Calvin's concept of the image of God and of order were interchangeable." It may be additionally noted that Calvin also finds order to be a chief characteristic of the kingdom of God; see Comm. Matt. 6:10.

13 This dynamic (or, "relational") aspect of the image of God is especially noted (and documented) by T. F. Torrance in Calvin's Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949) 36, 57-61, 68. Charles Partee, however, corrects those who would conclude that such is the only aspect of Calvin's doctrine: "[Torrance's] exposition ... tends to underemphasize the natural, i.e. created, character of the image of God which Calvin also affirms"; see Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1977) 52 n. 8. Torrance's one-sided account is also challenged by Richard Stauffer, Dieu, la

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Accordingly, Calvin describes the image of God in Adam as his "mirroring" of God's glory or righteousness:

Adam was at first created in the image of God, so that he might reflect, as in a mirror, the righteousness of God. But that image, having been wiped out by sin, must now be restored in Christ. The regeneration of the godly is indeed ... nothing else than the reformation of the image of God in them.'4

This use of the image of the mirror seems to conflate with the light-imagery Calvin employs when speaking of the glory of God. To bear the image of God, then, is to "reflect" God's glory.15 But this definition of the imago dei in terms of "that which reflects God's glory" raises another question for Calvin, namely: Is not God's glory reflected also by the angels, indeed, by all of creation? Cal- vin addresses this question in the following passage from the Institutes:

Although the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, yet there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which some sparks did not glow. It is sure that even in the several parts of the world some traces of God's glory shine. From this we may gather that when his image is placed in man a tacit antithesis is introduced which raises man above all other creatures and, as it were, separates him from the common mass. And indeed, we ought not to deny that angels were created according to God's likeness, inasmuch as our highest perfection, as Christ testifies, will be to become like them. But by this particular title Moses rightly commends God's grace towards us, especially when he com- pares only the visible creatures with man.'6

Although Calvin addresses the problem of the distinctiveness of God's image in human beings in this passage, he does not fully solve it. Although he clearly wishes to retain "reflecting God's glory" as a criterion for the presence of the image of God, he does not define "glory" in a way which would allow one to distinguish God's glory in human beings from God's glory in the rest of creation. In fact, Calvin's "tacit antithesis" between human beings and "all other creatures" seems to contradict his preceding statement that traces of God's glory appear also throughout the world.17 Leaving this apparent contradiction to

creation et la Providence dans la predication de Calvin (Bere: Peter Lang, 1978) 201-4, who nicely supplements Torrance's documentation.

14 Comm. Eph. 4:24 (CO 51.208 - 9); see also, of course, Comm. 2 Cor. 3:18. 15 An especially illustrative text from Comm. 1 Cor. 11:7 will be cited below. 16 Institutes 1.15.3, emphasis added. See also a similar passage in Comm. Ps. 8:1 (CO 31.88),

cited by Richard, Spirituality, 112. 17 "Certum est in singulis etiam mundi partibus fulgere lineamenta quaedam gloriae Dei: unde

colligere licet..." (Institutes 1.15.3 [OS 3.178]).

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one side for the present, it remains clear that there is for Calvin a difference between human beings and beasts which, by restricting the title imago dei to human beings, the author of Genesis intends to underscore. Only a little later, in Institutes 1.15.4, Calvin identifies what further differentiates Adam from other living creatures: only humans have received a life "joined with the light of understanding."18

Calvin discusses other aspects of the imago dei in the Institutes and in his commentary on Genesis, but his definition of the imago dei is never made appre- ciably more precise. Calvin seems content to describe the imago in terms of the general excellence and integrity which the first human pair possessed, an integrity which was reflective of (and responsive to) the divine glory and righteousness. It is precisely this dynamic of "reflection" or "imaging" that fur- nishes Calvin's exegesis of the image of God with its compelling logical structure, wherein the divine image consists simply in "imaging" God, that is, in "reflecting God's glory." But this same dynamic of "reflection" and this same logic also engender Calvin's exegesis with its fundamental ambiguity, whereby any created entity said to reflect God's glory may also legitimately lay some claim to the divine image.

But at least in one sense this is a claim no one can make at present. Hope- lessly deformed in the fall and no longer visible in ourselves, this image, Calvin argues, can now be known fully only in Christ, who is himself that image. Insofar as the elect have been reborn in the spirit, the image of God is mani- fested "in some part.... But it will attain its full splendor in heaven."19

II

This, then, is Calvin's general outline of the image of God. But the problems of interpreting Calvin's doctrine do not stop here, at least insofar as the image of God in woman is concerned. Immediately following his general discussion of

18 Torrance argues (Calvin's Doctrine, 69) that one must read this phrase as a whole ("the light of the understanding") so that the accent on the illuminating grace of God is maintained; otherwise, one might falsely conclude that Calvin intends to define the image of God as merely the faculty of understanding, i.e., as human reason. As the context of Institutes 1.15.4 makes clear, the "light of the understanding" is "God's Eternal Word" (citing John 1:4). Torrance's instinct here (at 1.15.4) is surely correct, then, that the faculty of reason constitutes the image of God only as that faculty par- takes of the knowledge of God-a knowledge (and hence an image) which distinguishes us from the beasts. At the same time, however, one must add that Calvin elsewhere speaks of reason without the careful, relational distinction that Torrance admires. In fact, Calvin often defines the image of God in terms of just such a faculty of reason which is possessed by all, believers and nonbelievers; see Stauffer, Dieu, 201-4. Both David Cairns (The Image of God in Man [London: SCM, 1953]) 128-45) and Richard Prins ("The Image of God in Adam and the Restoration of Man in Jesus Christ," SJT 25 [1972] 32-44) explore some of Calvin's inconsistencies concerning the imago dei, but this hilly terrain is still not fully charted.

19 Institutes 1.15.4.

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the image of God, Calvin turns to the thorny implications of 1 Cor 11:7.20 In this passage Paul seems to exclude woman from the imago dei: "For a man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but woman is the glory of man." It is painfully obvious to the modern reader that to assert that the Apostle intends to deny the woman's status as co-possessor of the divine image is to argue from silence; yet, by the same token, the Apostle's silence from which this venerable and vexed argument is drawn is itself both painful and obvious. In the contexts in which this argument is raised, Calvin appears to be arguing against those who would exclude woman from the imago dei alto- gether. In Calvin's opinion, 1 Cor 11:7 does not exclude woman from the imago dei in general-after all, Gen 1:26 must also be given a hearing. Rather, 1 Cor 11:7 excludes woman from the image of God only with respect to "the political order" (ad ordinem politicum) or "the domestic state" (oeconomicum statum) or "the conjugal order" (ad ordinem coniugalem ).21 The first of these phrases seems to exclude woman from public leadership outside the home, while the second and third apparently refer to woman's subjection within the home.22

In furnishing his explanation of Paul's apparent denial that woman is in the image of God, Calvin seems to believe that he has found "an easy solution" to this problematic text-so easy, in fact, that his treatment of 1 Cor 11:7 in his

20 This is the pattern of Calvin's discussions of 1 Cor 11:7 both in Comm. Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.27) and in Institutes 1.15.4. The latter discussion, most of which was added in 1559, incorporates Calvin's earlier remarks in the Genesis commentary (sometimes verbatim) and adds to them. Still fuller treatments of Paul's dictum, of course, are found in Comm. 1 Cor. 11:1-16 [1546] (CO 49.472-79) and in Serm. 1 Cor. 11:1-16 [1556] (CO 49.706-50).

21 These three phrases are found respectively in Institutes 1.15.4, Comm. Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.27), and Comm. 1 Cor. 11:7 (CO 49.476).

22 Douglass argues that, for Calvin, politia (Fr. police) signifies more than what is implied by "the political order" (above). What is rather in view is all "humanly made order or governance," an order and a governance "that is seen both in the political order and in the church" (Douglass, Women, 24). Douglass wishes to underscore Calvin's assessment of all such order and governance as contingent order, indeed, as indifferent matters which are binding upon the church (and society) only insofar as they prove useful in preserving order and decorum in a particular culture and time. See Douglass, Women, 24-25, 29-41, 50-65, 82; see also Calvin Institutes 4.10.30-31 and Comm. 1 Cor. 14:34-40 (CO 49.532-36). That Calvin does so "relativize" (for lack of a better term here) considerations of ecclesiastical and social polity is undeniable-at least in the two texts just cited-and it is especially to be noted that he addresses such statements specifically to issues of women's behavior in church (wearing veils, keeping silence, etc.). It is less clear, however, that Cal- vin may be said to be "genuinely open to exceptions to the normal rule of women's subordination" or to "major change in the future" (Douglass, Women, 104, 121; see also 63), for alongside such statements as those in Comm. 1 Cor. 14:34-40 are other pronouncements (e.g., in Serm. 1 Tim. 2:13- 15 [CO 53.224]) which characterize the subordination of woman as "an inviolable rule which will remain until the end of the world." But the question of "exceptional cases" and future change will be taken up in detail below.

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Genesis commentary (as well as in the Institutes) really amounts to no more than a hasty aside.23 But his commentary on 1 Corinthians provides a few more provocative details concerning Paul's statement in 1 Cor 11:7:

The same question can now be raised about the image, as was raised before [i.e., at 1 Cor 11:3] about the head. For both sexes were created according to the image of God, and Paul urges women, no less than men, to be reformed according to that image. But when he is speaking about image here, he is referring to the conjugal order. Accordingly, it has to do with the present life; it does not pertain to the conscience. The straightforward solution is this, that Paul is not dealing here with innocence and holiness, which women can have just as well as men, but about the preeminence (praestantia) which God has given to the man, so that he might be superior to the woman. The glory of God is seen in this higher standing (in hoc superiore dignitatis gradu), as it is reflected in every superior authority (in omni prin- cipatu ).24

This passage calls for three rather closely related comments.

1) The realm in which Calvin would restrict the applicability of imago dei to woman is opposed to a wider and theologically more significant realm. On the one hand, there is a realm in which the divine image simply is not possessed by woman; this is the realm of the "conjugal order," the realm of the "present life." On the other hand, there is another realm in which men and women share

equally in the image of God; this is the realm of the "conscience," which in this context seems to stand as a rubric for all the spiritual concerns of the Christian. "Conscience" in this passage is probably to be taken as synonymous with the attainment of "innocence and holiness," even as Calvin adds in the parallel discussion in Institutes 1.15.4 that "whatever has to do with spiritual and eternal life is included under imago."

Calvin is thus drawing a distinction between two realms of applicability, two contexts in which the term imago dei carries diverse connotations. On the one hand, there are spiritual or eternal concerns and, on the other hand, there are the concerns of the "present life" or of "political and domestic order." Without distorting Calvin's thought at this point, one may characterize this distinction as one between an internal image of God (the image as an "inner good of the soul") and an external image of God (the image as visibly reflected in human relations).25 These two concepts of image are suggested not only in Calvin's

23 Comm Gen. 1:26 (CO 23.27); Institutes 1.15.4. 24 Comm. 1 Cor. 11:7 (CO 49.476), emphasis added. 25 In a recent article, Mary Potter ("Gender Equality," 731-32) has attempted to account for

Calvin's apparently inconsistent evaluation of woman's status in general, and her possession of the

image of God in particular, by attributing to Calvin "a shifting theological perspective." Accord-

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comments on 1 Cor 11:7 (quoted above), but also in his comments on the so- called "headship" of the man over the woman in Comm. 1 Cor. 11:4-6 (alluded to by Calvin at the outset of the previous quotation, above): "In his own home, the father of a family is like a king. Therefore he reflects (relucet) the glory of God, because of the control (dominium) which is in his hands."26 The father's "headship" thus reflects God's glory in a way that his family does not, implying that a father also bears the divine image in a way that his family does not. And, as cited above, Calvin's principle has an even wider application: "The glory of God is seen in this higher standing [which the man has], as it is reflected in every superior authority."27

2) The second of these three comments is basically a restatement or an intensification of the first. Given the fact that Calvin defines the divine image (at least in part) in terms of "reflecting the glory of God," the conclusion seems inescapable that Calvin is not simply distinguishing between two realms in which imago dei is to be applied differently. Calvin, in fact, has two distinct definitions of imago dei. The first pertains equally to men and women and has to do with the invisible, "inner good of the soul." That is to say, it primarily concerns salvation and sanctification insofar as these constitute the restoration of God's image in the elect who glorify God spiritually. Calvin's second definition of imago dei pertains exclusively to men. This definition has to do with the way

ingly, when woman is considered from the perspective of the cognitio dei (i.e., from the perspective or knowledge which God has), woman is seen to be the equal of man, sharing equally in the divine image. But when woman is viewed from the perspective of the cognitio hominis (i.e., from the limited, relative, and hierarchically oriented perspective or knowledge which human beings have), she appears to be inferior to the male. Potter's "perspectival" hypothesis would be a plausible resolu- tion of Calvin's two accounts of woman as the image of God were it not so at odds with Calvin's own language and with his very approach to doing theology. Specifically, although the Institutes begins in 1.1.1 with Calvin's well-known inquiry into cognitio dei et nostri, then turns in 1.2.1 to consider the duplex cognitio dei (knowing God as creator and redeemer), neither of these phrases can be taken as subjective genitives, as Potter seems to have done. When Calvin speaks of the cognitio dei, he has in mind not the absolute knowledge which God himself possesses, but the knowledge which we may obtain of God-a knowledge which is quite relative, at least insofar as it is a knowledge of God as he has accommodated his revelation to us. And for Calvin, as for Luther, this is the only kind of knowledge of God we can obtain; any more "absolute" perspective would be dangerous, blasphemous, impertinent speculation. Calvin's doctrine of woman may well admit to no "easy solution" or systematization at this point, but even something like Luther's coram Deo / coram hominibus distinction would serve as a better working hypothesis, whereby women are free and equal before God, but bound to submission with respect to their vocation in the present life. Cal- vin occasionally suggests something like this (it arises in Serm. Eph. 6:5-9 [CO 51.804] in a related context), but the subtleties of Luther's two kingdoms doctrine are not well preserved by Calvin.

26 Comm. 1 Cor. 11:4 (CO 49.475). 27 Ronald S. Wallace calls attention to Institutes 4.20.24, where Calvin clearly implies that a ruler

worthy of the name ought to reflect the image of God; see Wallace's discussion in Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life (Edinburgh/London: Oliver & Boyd, 1959) 160-61.

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the "headship" of a man who is the head of a family or the head of a state visi-

bly reflects or "images" the glory of God.28 Insofar as the reflection of God's

glory which constitutes this external and visible imago is itself constituted by the

possession and exercise of authority,29 one must also conclude that though Calvin's primary and preferred definition of imago dei focuses on "whatever has to do with spiritual and eternal life," there is also a secondary, almost tacit affirmation of Chrysostom's definition of the image as dominion-Calvin's

explicit rejection of Chrysostom's interpretation notwithstanding. It is this "alternate" definition of the imago dei, then, which must be

employed to explain Calvin's troubling statement later in the Genesis commen-

tary: "Certainly, it cannot be denied that the woman was created in the image of God, albeit in a secondary degree (secundo gradu )."30 Insofar as Eve was fashioned at creation for eternal life, together with all the internal, spiritual goods entailed therein, she was created unqualifiedly "in the image of God." But insofar as Eve was also fashioned "to be a help meet for Adam," a model of obedience and not of authority in all her visible, outward actions, she was created "in the image of God" only in a secondary degree.

However, it is precisely in this phrase, "in a secondary degree," that one senses a collision between Calvin's two definitions of imago dei, between Calvin's appreciation of God's glory as an outward, visible phenomenon, on the one hand, and as an inward, spiritual phenomenon, on the other. Calvin's "ambidextrous" approach to the glory of God surely reflects scripture itself at this point, in that both accounts of the divine glory may be documented from the Bible itself. Yet one could scarcely conclude, on the basis of those texts in which Calvin specifically addresses the relationship between God's image in human beings and God's glory in human beings, that Calvin sees any problems in his appeal to this twofold account of God's glory. Indeed, it is precisely in these texts that Calvin's two definitions of the image of God proceed alongside one another and do not seem to touch. In this way the illusion is preserved that Calvin's "easy solution" successfully maintains a univocal concept of the

imago dei. What to moder readers is an extremely troubling assertion with

respect to the image of God-namely, that there is some sense in which the

28 It is not immediately clear from the passages at hand whether such "imaging" applies equally to Christian as well as non-Christian families, but Calvin's affirmation (in Comm. 1 Cor. 11:7, cited

above) that the "glory of God is ... reflected in every superior authority" would seem to imply that the imaging of the divine glory which occurs in domestic "headship" extends to all households. This conclusion may also be inferred on the grounds that such headship is part of the (universal) "order of nature." Thus all husbands and rulers "image" God in their headship (though not all

equally well!), just as all human beings "image" God to some extent in their use of reason (see n. 18

above) even in a fallen and unredeemed state. 29 Dominium, above; also praestantia, principatus. 30 Comm. Gen. 2:18 (CO 23.46).

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woman does not share that image, Gen 1:26 notwithstanding-Calvin is able to make more palatable by appealing to the diverse "degrees" in which God's glory is seen in creation and in creatures. But what Calvin certainly implies, and what his language about Eve's "secondary" possession of the image of God serves only to obscure, is that insofar as the imago is considered as a visible and external representation of the divine glory, Eve was not created in the image of God at all.

3) A third comment on the passage cited earlier from Calvin's commentary on 1 Cor 11:7 concerns his almost parenthetic reference to the "present life." The "external" imago dei which cannot be borne by woman, says Calvin, pertains ad praesentam vitam, not, one must infer, to the life to come. The question, then, concerns the significance of Calvin's phrase in this context. Is his reference to the "present life" just a casual synonym for the "conjugal order" or might this phrase betray an admission on Calvin's part that the subordinate status of woman is, however much tied to the orders of creation, still only a penultimate ordinance?

The latter conclusion would, in fact, seem to be in order: the hierarchy that exists between men and women, however much it is an ordinance of creation, is still but an ordinance of this world.31 The familiar hierarchical authorities of church, state, and home truly reflect the image of God, for now. Indeed, the present order is not only penultimate, it is (by comparison) merely a stepping stone to the future life. Moreover, given the fact that the logic of Calvin's exegesis of the image of God virtually demands that he find the image more visible (though not more theologically significant) in non-Christian husbands than in Christian wives, it is perhaps not surprising that he is willing so thoroughly to subordinate the present, visible order to the future life.

At the same time, though the subordination of women to men is not an eternal law,32 such subordination will surely endure until the end of this world. The order of creation may be suspended in "exceptional cases," but the order of creation is generally binding as long as creation itself endures. The church is an adumbration of the kingdom of Christ, but this kingdom is not inaugurated in the present in such a way as to alter the external relationships between woman and man. Perhaps this is why Calvin often seems so sympathetic to the plight of

31 Heinrich Quistorp (Calvin's Doctrine of the Last Things [trans. Harold Knight; Richmond: John Knox, 1955] 175) calls attention to Calvin's statements that "marriage [and, hence, the conjugal order] is merely a temporal, not an eternal, fellowship." Douglass similarly observes (Women, 34) that, for Calvin, all earthly rule and authority is strictly penultimate, destined to pass away at the end of this world. See esp. Comm. 1 Cor. 15:24 (CO 49.546-47), also noted by Douglass, and the pages cited from Douglass, Women, in n. 22 above.

32 Although Calvin does use this and similar phrases to describe the divine institution of women's subordination (as in Comm. 1 Tim. 2:13 [CO 52.277]: "aetema Dei institutio"), his usage must be qualified by our observations in the preceding note and paragraph.

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woman, for, quite simply, Calvin has little to offer her beyond eschatological hope:

God has established an inviolable rule which should last till the end of the world: since man is created as the head of the woman, and since woman is a part of and like an accessory to man, it is necessary that we follow this direction and that great and small order themselves to it.33

Exceptions there have been, and exceptions there may be, but Calvin's word to his congregation is still that "in the present life" the rule remains inviolable.

III

But just how stable is the relationship between "exception" and "inviolabil- ity"? The juxtaposition of these two ingredients set out above is representative of Calvin's enigmatic tendency to allow for the possibility of future change "in principle" while simultaneously denying that possibility in practice. Thus one may affirm34 that insofar as Calvin regards such issues as matters of polity (that is, as adiaphora, matters in which the only binding rule is order, decorum, fitness, edification, and love) he "intentionally" establishes the possibility of greater freedom for women to exercise leadership in both church and society in principle.

At the same time, however, Douglass seems to go too far when she argues that Calvin is "genuinely open to exceptions to the normal rule of women's subordination," especially if such exceptions are taken as the harbinger of "major change in the future."35 It is true that Calvin leaves God free to violate his own rule that women are not to exercise public leadership by raising up exceptions through "the secret impulse of the Spirit."36 It is even true that Cal- vin expects such exceptions. But Calvin always projects such exceptions only as part of a hypothetical, dismal turn of events wherein God raises up a woman only in order to put men to shame.37 Such women may indeed be genuinely called by God to exercise leadership-witness Deborah, the judge of Israel-but

33 Serm. 1 Tim. 2:13- 15 (CO 53.224), as translated by Douglass, Women, 55-56. 34 With DeBoer, "Role of Women," 262-64, 271-72, and Douglass, Women, 63, 82, 106. See

also Andr6 Bieler, L'homme et la femme dans la morale calviniste (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1963) 80.

35 Douglass, Women, 104, 121. 36 Thus Calvin rationalizes Sarah's demand that Abraham banish Hagar, in Comm. Gen. 21:10

(CO 23.301); see also Comm. Gen. 24:12 (CO 23.334). 37 See, e.g., Comm. Matt. 28:1 -7 and parallels (CO 45.792).

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God's purpose in raising up women is to chastise the unfaithfulness or inactivity of men.38

Problems associated with looking for such "exceptional" women in the future are multiplied by Calvin's refusal to supply criteria for distinguishing divinely sent exceptions from those who are merely self-appointed.39 Involved here is Calvin's reluctance to allow private persons spontaneously to assume roles of public leadership. Calvin's rejection of civil disobedience is a clear analogy in this context.40 Just as Calvin was loath to allow private citizens any right to resist a tyrant but would urge them to "wait for God to raise up a Moses," so also was he unable to provide predictive criteria by which a woman-who, virtually by definition, is a private person-might know if she were called to be a "Deborah."41 Calvin seems to believe that such a call (whether it involves a Moses or a Deborah), if it comes, can only be self-

38 Even Calvin's conciliatory letter to William Cecil (wherein he attempted to regain the favor of Queen Elizabeth by distancing himself from John Knox's offensive treatise, The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women) gives no real indication that Calvin shifts his

position in the least. He does acknowledge, on the grounds of "custom, common consent, and long established usage," that women may legitimately inherit the rulership of a nation, and he cites Isa 49:23 as proof that queens, as "nursing mothers of the church," are to be distinguished from private women. Furthermore, he seems to flatter Elizabeth by stating that "certain women"-Calvin later names Huldah and Deborah, and presumably wishes to include Elizabeth in this company-"have at times been so gifted that the singular blessing which appeared in them made it clear that they were

guided from above." But Calvin's valuation of such women rulers is woven throughout, even in this letter: "Because [female government] deviates from the first and original order of nature, it ought to be counted among those punishments which are inflicted upon mankind for neglecting [that order], just like slavery." Calvin's allowance for women leaders in exceptional cases still supposes that the

purpose of such exceptions is either "to condemn the slothfulness of men, or to show more distinctly [God's] own glory." There is no reason to suppose that Calvin has shifted from his position expressed in an earlier letter to Bullinger: "A gynecocracy ... is like tyranny, which is to be endured until it is overthrown by God." See Calvin to Cecil (May 1559; CO 17. 490-92, # 3036), and Cal- vin to Bullinger (3 May 1554; CO 15.125, # 1947).

39 Douglass also raises this issue, Women, 65. 40 Ironically, Calvin himself draws a comparison between gynecocracy and tyranny (in Calvin to

Cecil, n. 38 above), though his advice there concerns one's obligation to endure such apparent disorder, knowing that such circumstances are yet part of God's providence. Not surprisingly, Cal- vin does not address there how one might discern God's extraordinary call to initiate such "disorder'-though he would not deny, if pressed, that God could so call one.

41 See Institutes 3.20.29-30. Roland H. Bainton has noted that Calvin's restriction of the right of tyrannicide to those who had a "special revelation" was a "grave embarrassment" to the Huguenot pamphleteers, "who badly needed a justification for armed revolution" ("The Immoralities of the Patriarchs according to the Exegesis of the Late Middle Ages and of the Reformation," HTR 23 [1930] 48).

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evident, and that the divine source of the call will be known from its positive results.42

To be sure, Calvin never loses sight of the fact that God always remains free to violate his own rules. At the same time, Calvin consistently warns the readers of his commentaries that neither the patriarchs nor the matriarchs are to be taken as models for today in instances in which they exhibited exceptional but ques- tionable behavior. Just as Calvin would not allow a private citizen to cast off the tyrant's yoke but counseled him to "wait for a Moses," so also did Calvin warn his female listeners not to attempt to imitate Sarah or Rebekah or Deborah:

The things related in the scriptures are not always proper to be imitated. Whatever the Lord commands in general terms is to be held as an inflexible rule of conduct; but to rely on particular examples is not only dangerous, but even foolish and absurd.43

We have come to a bit of an impasse. Calvin finds exceptions in the past and he expects them (albeit cheerlessly) in the future. Yet he cites no cases of any such exceptional women who have exerted leadership in the church since the days of the New Testament.44 Similarly, Calvin categorizes Paul's instructions concerning women's silence in church as polity (as opposed to doctrine) and as

42 These two "criteria" may be discerned in the letters just cited (n. 38). Thus Calvin recounts to

Bullinger his earlier advice to John Knox concerning the recent accession of Mary Tudor that "if any tumult shall arise on account of religion ... nothing seems better and safer to me than to remain quiet until an extraordinary call should appear." The second criterion, that the exceptional call be validated by results, may be inferred from his letter to William Cecil, as quoted in the same note: "Certain women have at times been so gifted that the singular blessing which appeared in them made it clear that they were guided from above." Calvin's idea of validation by results also appears in Comm. Gen. 24:12 (CO 23.334).

43 Comm. Gen. 24:22 (CO 23.335). This is a recurring theme in Calvin's commentary; it is

applied to patriarchs and matriarchs alike. 44 Douglass, Women, 65. On the basis of Calvin's letter to William Cecil, one may infer that Cal-

vin allowed Elizabeth such "exceptional" status in the political realm (see n. 38 above). A case could further be made that Calvin's general treatment of women is far less severe than his rather traditional exegesis might suggest; evidence for this may be found both in his letters and in his ser- mons. Nonetheless, though Calvin's letters to noblewomen in particular do show him as able to treat woman "in spiritual matters ... as if she were equal to man," Calvin's egalitarianism in this context does not seem to have influenced either his exegesis or his formal theological position. Charmarie Jenkins Blaisedell concludes (in reference to Calvin's correspondence with Marguerite de Navarre, Jeanne d'Albret, and Renee de France) that "in spite of the fine educations of his female correspon- dents, Calvin never ventured far into theological discussions with them. His respect for these well- placed women was limited to their political roles as agents and supporters for the Reform in France" ("Calvin's Letters to Women: The Courting of Ladies in High Places," The Sixteenth Century Jour- nal 13:3 [1982] 74, 84). Calvin's letter to Cecil evidences a similar ambivalence. There Calvin compromises his theology not at all while yet allowing Elizabeth's political legitimacy as an "exception" grounded in "custom, common consent, and long established usage."

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adiaphora; yet he also grounds the prohibition against women as teachers in God's eternal decree.45 Douglass resolves this impasse by portraying Calvin as one whose awareness of the contingency of politia has led him to a "genuine openness to change" concerning women in leadership. But is this portrait of Calvin able to reconcile Calvin's alternating assessment of the submission of women first as adiaphora and then as a creation ordinance?

An alternative explanation might begin with an inquiry into Calvin's motives. Is his affirmation of the polity of women's subordination as adiaphora intended to allow for social change, however distant in the future? Or does Calvin's classification of Paul's advice as adiaphora serve instead to draw a bold line between those teachings of the New Testament which bear on salvation, and those which do not? It may be possible to answer "yes" to both questions, since an inevitable corollary of Calvin's interpretation of the command for women to keep silence as adiaphora would be that Paul's advice might be set aside at some other time or place, if only decorum be preserved. Calvin virtually says as much.46 But surely it is a greater priority for Calvin to safeguard both the purity of the Gospel and the freedom of the Christian by distinguishing doctrine from polity, while at the same time providing a common basis for unity among the evangelical churches in all of Europe. Calvin's distinction of doctrine from polity as that which is necessary for salvation is regularly part of his discussion:

Because he has taught nothing specifically, and because these things are not necessary to salvation and for the upbuilding of the church ought to be vari- ously accommodated to the customs of each nation and age, it will be as fitting (as the advantage of the church will require) to change and abrogate traditional practices as to establish new ones.47

Given this interpretation that Calvin's primary motive was to preserve the doctrines of salvation from encroachment, it is easy to see how he might relegate all other teachings to a relative status. Calvin even includes the

45 See, e.g., Comm. 1 Tim. 2:11 - 13 (CO 52.276-77). 46 See, e.g., Institutes 4.10.30-31. 47 Institutes 4.10.30. Douglass comments on this text (Women, 31) that "Calvin's principal line

of argument is clear: he wants to cut through what he perceives to be a mountain of religious obligations imposed on the Christian by the papal church, obligations that have created anxiety and even terror for the conscience, by sharply distinguishing Christ's commands from church laws. Only Christ's commands are binding on believers' consciences, and only Christ's clear teaching is to be seen as necessary to salvation." Douglass's discussion here (ibid., 30-41) supplies a firm ground- ing for both emphases of Calvin's teaching about the contingency of polity: (1) Calvin wishes above all to protect the doctrines concerning salvation (and, hence, the freedom of the believer's conscience) from encroachment by merely human ordinances; and (2) Calvin is seeking the broadest possible foundation for ecumenism without compromising the Gospel itself.

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doctrines of women's subordination within the purview of those things relativ- ized by the Gospel-or does he? Calvin clearly "relativizes" the various expressions of subordination (e.g., wearing veils, keeping silent in church), but does he relativize the principle of subordination itself? The answer is both yes and no. As noted above, this principle does not appear to be an eternal decree in the sense that it will endure even in heaven, for Calvin sees no worldly hierarchy in heaven. The order which demands the subjection of woman is "part of the form of this world which is passing away."48 But at the same time, Calvin does not seem to budge on the principle of women's subordination. Even if veils are (rightly) seen to be adiaphora, even if women are allowed to speak in church, even if God raises up exceptional women and by them teaches men, there is no indication that Calvin would allow that God will ever suspend the "order of nature," the "eternal law," or the "law of creation" which informs us of the inferior standing of woman. "All women are born to submit to the preeminence of the male sex," Calvin says, "woman is by nature ... born to obey."49

This is why it is difficult to reconcile the whole of Calvin's teaching about the subjection of women with his inclusion of the Pauline advice concerning silence under the rubric of adiaphora. Calvin is willing to include the various concrete expressions of submission among the adiaphora, and he is also willing to allow God to suspend the general rule in exceptional cases. But the exceptions do not destroy the rule, nor do they allow us to frame a new rule-Calvin is adamant here. Furthermore, one may legitimately see Calvin's tendency to "tame" the accounts of these exceptions in the scriptures as one consequence of his concern to protect the rule against the exceptions.50

Calvin seems to be tor between the two evaluations of the penultimate status of women's subordination which he acknowledges. On the one hand, he happily affirms that though the inferior status of woman is decreed as an order of creation, as an eternal law, such inferiority will endure only as long as this world itself. Furthermore, such inferiority pertains only to the "external" aspects of

48 Serm. 1 Cor. 11:4 - 10 (CO 49.728). 49 Comm. I Cor. 11:10 (CO 49.477); and Comm. 1 Tim. 2:12 (CO 52.276). 50 In dealing with Philip's daughters, Calvin emphasizes that their teaching function is to be inter-

preted in such a way that their status as private women is not compromised; that is, they exercised no

public office and probably (Calvin speculates) prophesied "at home." Likewise, Priscilla's teaching of Apollos was done "in private." See Comm. Acts 21:9 and 18:26 (CO 48.478, 438). A further

example is found in Calvin's account of Sarah's imperious behavior in ordering the banishment of

Hagar. Calvin allows that Sarah was the "minister (ministra) of a great and terrible judgment. ... But even though she sustains a higher character (persona) than that of a private woman, she does not

usurp power from her husband, but makes him the lawful director of the ejection" (Comm. Gen. 21:10 [CO 23.3011). It is unusual for Calvin to grant any woman more than private status, especially in the realm of spiritual or ecclesiastical leadership, but his interpretation of Sarah's behavior miti-

gates her quasi-public office by emphasizing the traces of her enduring submission to her husband.

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the present life. Insofar as eternity has broken in upon the present life through the transforming power of the Gospel, women are the spiritual equals of men. But, on the other hand, though the subjection of women is merely penultimate, it is no less than penultimate. It is a law of our nature, "eternal" in that it is a decree of the eternal God. Indeed, Calvin can describe the divinely decreed subordination of women in the same terms usually reserved for discussing predestination and reprobation.51 The subordination of womankind is thus a sort of "this-worldly" reprobation, an ordinance whereby God orders the world.

When considered in the same context as the Gospel teachings concerning salvation, the doctrine of woman's subordination may clearly be seen as relative. In comparison with the truth of the spiritual and eternal equality of men and women, the hierarchical relationship between the sexes in the present life is clearly a matter of small importance, destined to pass away. Likewise, com- pared with the doctrines of salvation, the concrete expressions of women's subordination are themselves virtually trivial matters. Such expressions would include the wearing of veils and, under circumstances which Calvin refuses to specify, the acceptability of women speaking in church.52 These things are in fact matters of "mere" polity, and as such may change and be changed. Nonetheless, within the sphere of the penultimate, there is no indication that the rule of women's subordination may be suspended qua rule. Calvin's position may thus be characterized as a dialectic. Depending on the context of his remarks and on whether he is considering the issue of women's subordination in its ultimate or in its penultimate significance, his emphasis shifts dramatically. But this dialectic is also rather static: Calvin will not allow the hierarchy between the sexes to be dissolved prematurely. To be sure, this happens in the church on a spiritual level, and this is without hesitation the theologically more significant level. At the same time, God's occasional suspension of the rule notwithstanding, the hierarchy of the sexes is not dissolved on the external, visible level of church office.

Returning at last to the primary focus of my inquiry, it may be said that this same "static dialectic" also characterizes the imago dei in the two senses in which Calvin uses the term. On the one hand, there is a sense in which the

51 The actual image used by Calvin is the "potter and clay" metaphor found in Romans 9. "Shall the pot complain against the potter? ... If the woman asks, 'Why should men have such preeminence?' [the answer is that] God so willed it. And we can allege no desert [to explain] why God has preferred us to women" (Serm. 1 Tim. 2:12-14 [CO 53.212]).

52 See Institutes 4.10.31 and Comm. 1 Cor. 14:34-40 (CO 49.533). It is difficult to determine whether Calvin here envisions merely occasional exceptions to Paul's advice regarding women's silence, or whether he has in mind a more general allowance for women's speech. It does not seem at all self-evident that Calvin equates allowing women to speak with allowing them to teach, given his vociferous defense of this particular Pauline prohibition. See Comm. I Tim. 2:11-13 (CO 52.276-77); cf. Douglass, Women, 106.

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imago dei is simply not possessed or possessable by women. From the perspective of eternity (i.e., in light of spiritual concerns), this is a relatively unimpor- tant dimension of the imago, as the following passage from one of Calvin's ser- mons indicates:

And if he [Paul] says that women are not at all marked with the image of God like men, in regard to this temporal state which passes and vanishes with the figure of this world ... they see that God has created us all in his image, both males and females, and however much this image has been abolished by the sin of Adam, it is renewed by our Lord Jesus Christ.53

But, on the other hand, when the concerns of the present life and of preserving the divinely instituted order within that life are at issue, Calvin can prove himself a willing defender of the subordination of women:

Paul is not speaking here of individual persons, nor of an individual household. Rather he divides the human race into two parts .... Thus there is the male and the female. I say this for the benefit of any unmarried man, lest he at any time abandon his privilege by nature, namely, that he is the head. Of whom? Of women, for we must not pay attention to this only within a household, but within the whole order that God has established in this world.54

Notably, although the two aspects of this dialectic emerge within the confines of a single sermon, there is no indication that the more significant aspect (the imago as the spiritual possession of both male and female) will effect any change or compromise in the exclusivity of the less important aspect (i.e., the imago as the external possession of the male alone). The external image of God, like the creation ordinance upon which it is founded, is for Calvin a penul-

53 Serm. 1 Col. 11:4 - 10 (CO 49.728), as translated by Douglass, Women, 35. 54 Serm. I Cor. 11:4- 10 (CO 49.724), as translated by DeBoer, "Role of Women," 245.

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timate institution, but it is never less than that.55 In the end, Calvin defends the "exclusive privilege" of the male, however tied it is to this world which is passing away.

55 Douglass states (Women, 80) that she finds "no evidence in Calvin of such an attempt [i.e., as that of Augustine and Aquinas] to base male superiority on the fuller possession of the image of God." It is true that Calvin wishes to reject any notion of the male's fuller possession of the image of God insofar as that notion is based on the supposed superiority of the male's body, intellect, or biology. Calvin wishes to affirm the equal possession of the image by men and women as a reflection of their spiritual equality, even as both Augustine and Thomas maintain similar positions. But the unique way in which the male bears the image is nonetheless a quasi-material reality for Cal- vin, at least in the sense that the image is visible and external. It is possible to say that male superiority for Calvin is not based on a fuller possession of the image only if one acknowledges that the two are at least correlated. That is to say, both the male's superiority and his fuller possession of the image of God involve his "imaging" of God in a way that women do not. This imaging and this superiority are effected by what I have described as a this-worldly election, grounded in God's secret counsel. Hence, both are attributed by Calvin to God's free choice; there is no room in Calvin's theology for an eternal or ontological superiority of the male, since the male's superiority is merely an arrangement of this world. The "external" aspect of the image of God has nothing to do with salvation, only with the preservation of order and decorum-both of which are useful (if not required) for the Gospel's propagation.

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