14.Peace Missions in Africa

7/25/2019 14.Peace Missions in Africa

1/21

United Nations Peace Missions in Africa: Transformations and DeterminantsAuthor(s): Assefaw BariagaberReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 38, No. 6 (Jul., 2008), pp. 830-849Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40035026.

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2/21

UnitedNations

Peace

Missions

n

Africa

Transformationsnd Determinants

Assefaw

ariagaber

SetonHall University

Journal

f Black

Studies

Volume 8

Number

My

2008

830-849

2008

Sage

Publications

10.1177/0021934708314990

http://jbs.sagepub.com

hosted t

http://online.sagepub.com

The author

xamineshe

rajectory

hat nited ations

UN)

peaceoperations

in

Africa ave taken ver he

past

10

years

nd

provides

n answer

o the

following

nterrelated

uestions:Why

have UN

peace

missions

n Africa

dramaticallyrown

n

frequency

nd

cope

n

the

ast

10

years,

whenAfrica

has

become

ncreasinglyeaceful,

nd which ariables avebeen

critical o

this ramatic

rowth?

heauthor

a)

empirically

emonstrateshe

uantitative

and

qualitative rowth

f UN

peace

missions

n Africa nd

(b)

identifies

systemic-,ontinental-,nd individual-levelariables hat ontributedo

this

growth.

he author

rgues

hat he

convergence

f thesevariables

t

differentevels

has

provided

he

conditions

ecessary

nd sufficient

or

changes

n

the

frequency,

ature,

nd

scope

of UN

peace

missions

n Africa

over he

past

10

years.

Keywords:

United

Nations;

Africa;

political conflict; eace

missions;

transitional

eriods; ipenessor onflict

ntervention;

ofi

nnan

hasbecome he enter f ttention

n

the nternational

ommunity.

This ttentioname bout artlyecause f he xistingnstabilityn he

oil-producing

reas

f

heMiddle ast nd he

rowingecognition

f

Africa

as an alternative

ource f this

ommodity

nd

partly

ecause

of Africa's

strategicmportance

n

thewar n terror.s a

result,

oreign

nvestments

n

the oil

sector,

oreign

id,

and bilateral

militarygreements

ith ther

nations,

specially

he

United

tates,

have shown

ignificant

ncreases.

More

mportant,

here ave been

significant

ncreases

n

United

Nations

(UN)

peace operations

n

Africa ver he

past

10

years.

These

ncreases

coincidedwith he

organizational

hallenges

he

UN

faced,

ncluding

he

ongoing

ut o far

utile

ttempts

o

expand

he

Security

ouncil nd

the

role or ackthereof)heUNplayed efore nd fter .S. and llied roops

invaded

raq.

These increases lso coincided

with,

r

immediately

ol-

lowed,

many

fthe

perational

hallenges

nd etbacks heUN suffered

n

830

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3/21

BariagaberUN Peace Missions nAfrica 831

its

peace

missions

orldwide,

ncluding

hose n

Somalia,Rwanda,

he or-

mer

ugoslavia,

heDemocratic

epublic

fthe

Congo

DRC),

and o on.

The UN thereforeaces

hallenges

t

two evels.At the

organizational

and

higher

evels,

he

hallenges

nvolve

N

reinvention

o make he

body

relevant

n

the

years

head.

Cognizant

f

his,

heUN has

produced

arious

documents

hat nderscorehe

entrality

fthis ssue.

One

such

nfluential

document

s the

UN-commissioned

nd

widely

ead

monograph

More

SecureWorld: ur

Shared

ResponsibilityUnitedNations, 004a).

At the

operational

nd ower

evels,

he

hallenges

nvolve hemore

ffective an-

agement

fUN

peace

operations

orldwide,

ncluding

frica. he

secretary-

general's

eport

o he

ecurity

ouncil,

auses

f

Conflict

ndthe romotion

of

DurablePeace

and

Sustainable

evelopment

n

Africa

United

Nations,

1998),

nd hemore xtensive

eport

f

he anelon

United

ations eace

Operations

United

ations,

000a)

both nderscorehe

ngoing

ebate n

thenature nd

challenges

f UN

peace operations.

This

studyoins

the

ongoing

ebatenot so much o

prescribe olicy

options

or heUN but

athero

explain

he

rajectory

nd determinantsf

UNpeace operationsn Africa ver hepast10years.Atthemore eneral

level,

his

tudy

nterrogates

ransformationshat

nternational

rganiza-

tions uch as theUN

undergo uring

ransitional

eriods.

ndeed,

given

(a)

the

rganizational

hallenges

he

UN

faces,

b)

its etreatnder

ressure

from omalia

and Rwanda n the

mid-1990s,

nd

c)

the

persistentrob-

lems t has encountered

n

many

f ts

past

nd current

eace

missionsn

Africa,

ncluding

hose

n

Sierra

eone,

he

DRC,

and

Eritrea-Ethiopia,

ne

wouldhave

xpected

heUN to

pause

or cutback

ts nvolvement

n

exist-

ing

missions ntil hedebate

s settled.

n the

ontrary,

he

UN

has added

new missions

ecently,

n

Sudan

n

March

2005

and

Cote d'lvoireand

BurundinMay2004.Moreover,thasexpandedts nvolvementnexist-

ing

missions,

uch s

in

the

DRC,

andhad

to

press

udan o

accept joint

African nion

AU)-UN

peace

mission n Darfur. hese

developments

raise wo

ritical

uestions:Why

haveUN

peace

missions

n

Africa

rown

both

uantitatively

nd

qualitatively

hen he bove

ndicators

uggest

th-

erwise,

specially

hen he

magnitude

f

warfare

intrastate

nd

nterstate)

inAfrica

as been

declining?

What ariables ave ontributedo the

UN's

newly

ound

esolve n ts

peace operations

n

Africa,

specially

fterts ll-

fated

ttempts

n Rwanda nd Somalia

n

the

mid-1990s?

In this

tudy,

examine he

aradox

hese

uestions

aise.

argue

hat he

convergencef ystemic,ontinental,nd ndividual-levelariablesince he

latter alf

fthe

1990s

has

provided

he onditions

ecessary

nd sufficient

for he

UN

tobe more

igorous

n ts

peace

missions. hesevariablesre he



4/21

832 JournalfBlackStudies

nature f

transitional

eriods,ripeness

or onflict

ntervention,

ncreased

resolvewithin

frica o deal with

ecurity

ssues

n the

ontinent,

nd the

effectivenessfKofiAnnan

s

secretary-general

ftheUN.

First, owever,

demonstratehe

quantitative

nd

qualitative rowth

f

UN

peacekeeping

missions

mpirically

nd

how hat heres no

empirical

upport

or

he lter-

native

xplanation

hat

ncreases

n

UN

deployment

f

peace support

orces

in

Africa

since

he ndofthe

oldwar

were]

necessary

ecause

f

signif-

icant

ncrease

n

thenumberfconflicts

Bonyongwe,000,p. 84).

Political

Conflict

nd

UN Peace

Operations

in

AfricaAfter

he Cold War

I

define

peace

mission s the

deployment

f a UnitedNations

res-

ence n

the

ield,

itherto ith

he onsent fall the

arties

oncerned,

or-

mally

nvolving

nited Nations

military

nd/or

olice

personnel

nd

frequently

ivilians s well

Boutros-Ghali,

992,

.

1

1).

propose

hat he

quantitative

ransformationf

suchmissions

n

Africa fter he old

war,

particularlyfter he ll-fatedomaliaandRwandapeacemissions fthe

mid-1990s,

s

better nderstoodn

none other han he

frequency

f

UN

intervention.

ndeed,

rom

945

to

1991,

theUN

approved

total

f 22

peace

missions

worldwide,

f which

6,

or

approximately

.13

peace

missions

eryear,

were

n

Africa. he

remaining

4,

or

approximately

.30

peace

missions

eryear,

wereundertakenn the

est fthe

world.

f the

in

Africa,

were

pproved

nly

oward heend of thecold war

United

Nations

epartment

f

Peacekeeping perations,

.d.).

Therefore,

xcept

for

herobust

N

peace

mission n the

Congo approved

n

1960,

heUN

did not

undertake

peace

operation

n

Africa or lmost

0

years,

xtend-

ingfrom 960to the ndofthe1980s.

From

1992 to

2007,

however,

heUN

approved

8

peace

missions

n

Africa,

r

approximately

.2

missions

eryear.

his

represents

ninefold

increase

n

the

numberf missions

er

year

ompared

ith heUN's

peace

missions

n

Africa

uring

he old war.On theother

and,

t

approved

0

peace

missions,

r

pproximately

.33

peryear,

n

the est f heworld. his

represents

lightlyreater

han

fourfoldncreasenthenumberfmissions

peryear

uring

he ame ime

eriod.

herefore,

he

requency

fUN

peace

missionsn

Africa

rew

t

more han wice he ate or he est f heworld.

It s also

mportant

o note

hat f ll themissions he

UN

approved

fterhe

coldwar, lmost in 2 was nAfrica18 of38),

compared

ith bout1 in

4

(6

out of

22)

during

he old war.More

mportant,

heUN

approved

total f 11

missions

n

Africa fter

tsfailedmissions

n

Somalia

n

March



5/21

BariagaberUN PeaceMissionsnAfrica 833

1995

and Rwanda

n March

1996,

qual

to the

number

t

approved

or he

rest ftheworld.

herefore,

he

uantitative

ncreasesn

UN

peace

missions

in

Africa,

venwhen

ompared

ith he ncreases

n

missions

lsewhere,

cannot e contested.

The

qualitative hanges

n

UN

peace

missions ince the

debacles

n

Somalia

ndRwanda

n

the

mid-1990s

rebetter

nderstood

nterms

f he

nature

nd

scope

of UN intervention.

irst,

lthough

arlier

nterventions

had occurred ith heconsent

f

all

parties

o the

onflicts,

omerecent

interventionsaveoccurred ithouthis eeded onsent. hese nclude he

UN

mission

n

Burundi,

here he

Palipehutu-FNL

ovementefused o

join

the

eace

process

ntil

ecently

United

Nations

peration

n

Burundi,

2005),

and

in the

DRC,

wherevarious

militias

ave

long

resistedUN

involvement.

lso,

the UN had threatenedo intervene

nilaterally

n

Darfur,udan,

nless he

overnment

einsn he

Janjaweed

ilitias.udan's

recent eluctant

cceptance

f a

compromiserrangement,

n

the orm f a

hybrid

U-UN

mission,

s

anotherase

in

point.

his,

n

conjunction

ith

the

ublication

n December 001 of

Responsibility

o

Protect

International

Developmentesearch entre,001), ndicateshat n nternationalndivid-

ual

rights

egime,

hich

hallenges

he

overeignty

fthe

post-Westphalian

state,

s

graduallymerging.

ndeed,

s Lawson ndRothchild

2005,

p.

229)

stated,

orms

nderwhich he nternational

ommunity

ill havea

right,

even

duty,

o

ntervene re

gradually

aking hape,

nd his s

manifest

n

someofthe ecent N

interventionsnAfrica.

Second,

UN

mandates ave

usually

ncluded

monitoring

easefires

agreed

o

by conflictingarties. ecently,

owever,

heUN has

expanded

its

scope

of activities

o nclude tate

econstruction,

ombatant

eintegra-

tion,

order

atrols,

mining

learance,

nd other

ctivities eemedneces-

sary or ustainableeace. Examples f these bound: heUN mandaten

Sierra

eone ncluded

stablishing agistrates'

ourts,

raining

he

police

force,

nd

other uch ctivitieso

help

he tate xert ontrol ver

ts erri-

tories

United

Nations,

002).

The same

may

be said ofthe

missions

n the

DRC

and Liberia.

As Lawson nd Rothchild

2005)

succinctlyut

t,

the

mission

oday

hasbecome]

tate

re)formation

p.

235).

Third,

heUN

has done tsbest o

be,

or

appear

o

be,

mpartial

hen

intervening

n the

past.

Recently,

owever,

t has

gradually

bandoned

ny

semblance

f

mpartiality.

ts role

n

Sierra eone has been to assist

he

government,

hich s

a

party

o the

onflict,

n

controlling

ts

erritory.

he

conduct f oint perationsetween N troopsndCongolese rmy nits

to control

turi

in

northeastern

ongo)

s also a

case

in

point

ecause he

Congolesegovernment

as a

party

o the conflict. uch behavior

was



6/21


unthinkablefew ecades arlier.

or

xample,

n

1960,

Dag Hammarskjold

opposed

ending

N

troops

o

Katanga

o

suppress

secessionist

move-

ment ecause

of theUN's

presumed eutrality

n

thedomestic

olitics

f

the

Congo

Gibbs,

000).

Fourth,

he

rules f

engagement

ave

undergone

undamental

hanges.

Previously,

N

troops

ouldfire okill

only

n

self-defense.

ecently,

ow-

ever,

hey

avebeen

permitted

o fire ot

only

n

self-defenseut lso

to

protect

nnocentivilians.

he

ongoing

N

missionnthe

DRC

and he

ust

completed

issionn

Sierra eone

are uch ases

United

Nations,

004b).

In

addition,

heUN has

authorizedther

owers

o use massive orce o

establish

eace

and

security

n

its behalf. his has

been

thecase in the

peace

missionsn

Sierra eone and the

DRC,

where he

United

Kingdom

and

France,

espectively,

sed ethal

orce nd saved the

peace

missions

from

robable

ollapse.

France s also

actively ngaged

n the

peace

mission n

Cote

d'lvoire,

with

strong

upport

rom he UN

Security

Council.

That

s,

the

UN has relaxed ts

restrictive

equirement

n

theuse

of

force

y

ts

roops

ndhas

calledon

major owers

o use

overwhelming

force n tsbehalf,ndthis s a recent evelopment.

Fifth,

he

UN has

successively

ncreasedts

roop

trength

o

meet dded

challenges.

or

example,

n

Sierra

eone,

t ncreasedts

troop

trength

record

our imes n

a little ver

a

year

from

pproximately

,000

in

February

000 to

approximately

7,500

by

March 001.

Similarly,

n

the

DRC,

it

ncreasedts

roop trength

t eastfour imes rom

bout

,300

n

April

003 to more

han

6,000

n about

years.

Nowhere,

ndat

no

time,

had the

UN increased

ts

roop trength

uccessively

o such evels n such

a short

eriod

f time.At

present,

frica osts

4,775

uniformedN

per-

sonnel

excluding

ivilian

upport

taff

members)

ut

ofan

estimated

otal

of82,871of all uniformedN personnelUnitedNations epartmentf

Peacekeeping perations,

007).

This

constitutesbout66% of all

uni-

formed

N

personnel

eployed

round he

globe.

Finally,

nd much

elated o the

hanges

escribed

bove,

he

original

mandatef

pre-1992 eace

missions,

n the

whole,

adremained

nchanged

for

hedurationfthose

missions.

ately,

owever,

ariousmandates ave

been

progressively

evised nd

expanded

o meet heneeds n the

ground.

In

other

words,

s

in

Somalia,

ach has

become haracterized

y

mission

creep

Freeman,

ambert, Mims,

1993).

However,

nlike

n

Somalia,

where t retreatednder

ire,

heUN has

stayed

hecourse nd

progres-

sively xpandedtsmissionmandatesespite ecurringroblems.nother

words,

ompared

with ts

nvolvement

n

therest f the

world,

heUN's

currentnd recent

nvolvement

n

Africa s not

onlyhigher

n

terms f



7/21


frequency

ut lso more xtensive

n

terms

f

scope

and more ntensive

n

terms esolve.

It s

important

o underscorehat oth

uring

ndafter he old

war,

he

frequency

fUN

peace

operations

ndthe

cope

nd

frequency

f

political

conflict

n Africawerenot

ystematically

orrelated.

xcept

or heUN's

operation

nthe

Congo

n

July

960,

he

UN

didnot aunch

eace

operations

for

early

hree ecades

despite

fairly

onstantncreasen the

magnitude

ofwarfare

nAfrica

uring

heColdWar/decolonization

eriod,

946-1989

(Marshall,

005,

p.

2,

especially

ee

Figure

).

That

s,

UN

peaceoperations

in Africa id

not ncrease ecause

of ncreases

n

warfare

otals,

ntrastate

and

nterstate,

uring

he

old war.

erhaps

t was the

xponential

ncrease

in

conflict

n the ontinent

n the

1970s

nd

he

1980s

nd he eluctancef

theUN to

respond

o the onflict

n

Somalia

n the

arly

990s

hat

ushed

Secretary-General

outros outros-Ghali

o refer o the onflict

n Bosnia-

Herzegovina,

o which he nternational

ommunityesponded

ith

rgency,

as a rich

man'swar

Global

Policy

orum,

996).

After

hecold

war,

however,

heUN became

more nvolvedn

peace

missionsn Africaandtherest f theworld), nd this oo did notreflect

increases

n the

cope

and

frequency

f

political

onflictn

the ontinent.

For

xample,

Wallensteennd

Sollenberg

2001,

p.

632,

specially

ee Table

3)

reported

hat etween 993

and

2000,

the

number f armed onflicts

n

Africa

luctuatedetween

4

and

15,

except

or

1995,

when

t

was 13.

Therefore,

s theUN

was

busy

ncreasing

ts

peace

missions

n

Africa,

he

number

f conflicts

n the

continentemainedlmost onstant.

arshall

(2005)

also established

hat since

1993

the rend

in

conflictncreases

n

Africa]

a[d]

reversed

ndthe

general

magnitude

fwardecreased o

about

half ts

peak

value

of

1992]

by

2004

(p.

6,

especially

ee

Figure

).

He

attributedhis observed ecline n armed onflictn recent ears o the

multilateral

ngagement

n

peace

negotiations

nd

peacekeeping

pera-

tions

by

African

egional

rganizations

. . and a more ctivist frican

Union

p.

3).

Marshall urther

oted hat he

recent

teep

decline

n the

war

magnitude

rends

ince the

arly

1990s

[italics dded]

ndicates hat

some

ofAfrica'smost

erious nd

protracted

arshavebeen

ended,

uch

as the

wars

n

Mozambique,

thiopia

Eritrean

eparatism),

iberia

p.

8).

Therefore,

ncreases

n

UN

peace

missions

n Africa fter he cold

war,

especially

fter he

failedmissions

n

Somalia

nd

Sudan,

oincided

with

decreases

or,

t

best,

with

onincreases)

n the

magnitude

f nterstate

nd

intrastatearfaren thecontinent.n otherwords, heres no empirical

support

or

he

lternative

xplanation

hatncreases

n UN

peaceoperations

inAfrica fter

he old

warwere

irectly

orrelatedith he

magnitude

f he



8/21


conflictsn the

ontinent.

xplanations

or uch ncreasesmust

e

sought

n

the

onvergence

fdifferent

ariables,

s

shown

elow.

Systemic-

nd

Continental-Levelariables

One of themost

emarkable

evelopments

n

recent

ears

s the onver-

gence

ffactorshat

ncouraged

N resolven

dealing

with frican

ecurity

issues.Notwithstandinghedifficultiest faces nmany f tscurrenteace

missionsn

Africa,

he

UN has n fact efused o

seriously

onsider

iring

private

eacekeepers,

ho re

een s more fficientndfree rom n

over-

archingoyalty

o

anyentity

Deen, 2004).

And much ike themultilevel

challenges

he

UN

faces

t

present,

here re variables t different

evels,

includingystemic-,

ontinental-,

nd

ndividual-level

ariables,

hat

xplain

the

UN's

newly

ound esolve. s stated

arlier,

hese ariables

re

a)

the

nature

f transitional

eriods,

b)

ripeness

or conflict

ntervention,

c)

increasedesolve

within frica o deal

with

ecurity

ssues n the

ontinent,

and

d)

the

ffectivenessfKofiAnnan

s

secretary-general

f

the

UN.

The

Nature f

Transitional

ystems

System

ransitional

eriods

re

periods

etweenwo ifferenttructuresf

an

nternational

ystem.

ften,

olitical

cientistsifferentiateetweenhree

important

ystem

tructures:

nipolar,

n

which ne statedominatesnd

imposes

tsvalues n

others,

s Great ritain id n the

1800s;

multipolar,

n

which hree r

more tates re

lmost

qually owerful

utnonehasthe

mil-

itary

nd conomic

apabilities

o

mpose

tsvalues n the

est,

s

in he

years

betweenWorld

War andWorldWar

I;

and

bipolar,

n

which wo tates

om-

inate nd mpose heir alues nsomebutnot llstates,s theUnited tates

and

he oviet nion id

fter orldWar I.

Gilpin

1981)

noted hat

hanges

in

ystem

tructure

sually

ccurwhen here

evelops disjuncture

etween

the

xistingovernance

f he

ystem

nd he istribution

f

power

n he

ys-

tem

p.

186).

That

s,

the

xisting egemon,

hich as

providedeadership

and

stability,

ecomes

rogressively

eaker ecause f the normousosts

leadership

ntails nd s

challenged

y

a

rising ower

ent n

instituting

system

hat eflectsts

ncreased ational

apability.

n

general,

hecon-

frontation

s

resolved

hrough

hegemonic

ar

p.

197).

However,

he

period mmediately

fter

egemonic

wars s

unstable,

becauseno clear eaderwillingndcapableofestablishingegemonyas

yet

merged.

n

other

words,

lthough

heres clear

ejection

fthe arlier

system

tructure,

here s also

uncertainty

f the

future,

nd the

merging



9/21

BariagaberUN PeaceMissionsnAfrica 837

hegemon sually

hesitates efore

sserting

ts nfluence.

ndeed,

ooking

back tevents

nworld

olitics

nd he oles nternational

rganizations

ave

played,

ne notices hat

n

the ftermathf

arge-scale

ars,

well-structured

international

rganizations

nd/or onstructurednternational

egimes

re

created,

r

remade,

o

help

fill

hevoid.

Such

organizations

nd/or

egimes

play

mportant

oles

n

shaping

hefuturef the

nternational

ystem,

ll in

an effort

o avoid uture

ars,

s illustratedn the

ollowing.

At he

Congress

fVienna

n

1815, urope

was

reorganizedccording

o

stricter

alance-of-powerpproach

o

prevent

he

mergence

fa

hegemon

capable

f

unleashing

ars ike

Napoleon

id.The

prevailingtmosphere

n

Europe

equired

hemeans o

prevent

he recurrencef those

vils from

which he

then]

xisting eneration

ad so

grievously

uffered

Webster,

1965,

.

74).

The

Congress

fVienna nd he

eriod

ollowing

t,

heConcert

of

Europe, ave permanence

o a territorialettlementhich

was defensible

solely y

the

principle

f balance f

power p.

102),

ndthis

ignificantly

contributed

o

European ecurity.

n

fact,

here

ere

no

large-scale

ars or

almost 00

years,

ntil he

eginning

fWorldWar

,

a

periodong nough

or

proponentsf he alance fpower,ncludingansMorgenthau,oclaim hat

the alance f

power

wasfar

more onducive

o

peace

han ther

ystem

truc-

tures.

his s because

power

balance,

nderstood

n

terms f the

qual

or

almost

qual

distributionf

power, iscourages

state

rom

nitiating

ar

given

hat

ts

hances

f

winning

re

only

bout

0%.

Similarly,

he ndofWorldWar

brought

bout he stablishmentfthe

League

of

Nations,

ased on the

principle

f collective

ecurity

n which

national

nterest as seen s subordinateo world

eace.

The new

oncept

was

a total

epudiation

f

the

balance-of-powerpproach

nd the

primacy

of national

nterest, hich,

ccording

o PresidentWilson f the

United

States nd fellowdealists,madeWorldWar possible.And when ollec-

tive

ecurity

id notwork he

way

t

was

hoped, ailing

o

prevent

nother

war,

ttoo was

summarily

iscardedn favor f a

new

ecurityegime

nd

a new

rganization

o

helpmanage

nternational

eace

and

ecurity.

ndeed,

after

he nd of WorldWar

I,

theUN

was

created

n

the

recognition

hat

national

nterestnd the

overeignty

f nationswere

paramount,

nd the

victors eremade

guardians

f nternational

eace

and

security.

It s no

surprise,

herefore,

hat

lthough

he ndof the old war

did not

give

rise o a new nternational

rganization,

t did

n

fact reate

onditions

for heUN to

be more

igorous

n

the

management

f nternational

eace

nd

security.aving eenparalyzedy uperpowerivalryor ver 0years,he

UN set

out to

fill hevacuum reated s a result f the

dissolution

f

the

Soviet

nion

nd he etrenchment

f heUnited tates.

nder

he

eadership



10/21


of

Secretary-General

outros-Ghali,

he

UN

setout o fulfillhe

mandatets

founding

athers

nvisioned. nlike

n

the

past,

however,

he

UN

was not

replaced y

nother

rganization

or womain easons:

a)

no

arge-scale

ar

occurredoend he

ipolar ystem,

nd

b)

the

United

tates,

s the

pparent

victor,

as nfact

he

rimary

ctorn

establishing

he

UN,

and he harterf

theUN

reflectedhe alues n which he

United tateswas

founded.hat

s,

despite

ontinuous

ttemptsy

someAmerican

N

skeptics

o discredithe

organization

nd

ts

ecretary-generalsee,e.g.,Gardiner,004),

a

strongerUN was seen s

complementary

o

U.S. effortsnd nterests.

It s

mportant

onote

hat

n

dditiono he ise fnew rreinventednsti-

tutions,

ransitions

rom ne structure

othenext avebeen

ccompanied

y

new

deas, ssues,

nd

norms. he lasttransition

ave prominence

o such

issues s

peacekeeping,

nternational

errorism,

eapons

fmass

destruction,

global

pidemics,rganized

rime,

conomic

evelopment,rograms

o cut

poverty

evels,

nd

so on. As varied s the ssues

became,

he means f

addressing

hem lso

went

eyond

he

raditionallyll-capable

ation-tate.

It s now

widely

ccepted

hat

ffectiveolutionso these ssues

equire

he

combinedffortsfstates, ongovernmentalrganizations,ntergovernmen-

tal

organizations,

nd others. ach of

these ntities

ay

be more uited o

dealwith ne

ssue

ompared

ith

thers.or

xample,

tates remore uited

to

use massive orce oeffect

egimehange,

s

in

raq.

However,

hey

o not

have he

ostconflict

tate

management

xpertise

heUN is wellknown or.

In

short,

he

existingmultiple

ssues

require

multiple

hannels

o address

them

ffectively,

nd his

as contributedo UN

reinvigoration.

It

is also critical o

observe he ontentionhat s an

organization,

he

UN's

becoming

moredeterminedo deal with

nternational

eacekeeping

does notdiminishhe

fact hat

major owers, specially

heUnited

tates,

have ontrol fwhat heUN Securityouncil oes.However,heprolifer-

ation f

ethnically

ased

conflicts

n

the ate 1980s and

early

1990s

and

other

ransnational

roblems,

uch s

international

rime,

rug

rafficking,

the hreat f the

pread

f

weapons

f mass

destruction,

errorism,

nd so

on,

eft

major

owers

with

ittle

ption

ut o et heUN do the

ob.

Indeed,

as

U.S. PresidentialeviewDirective

3

ndicates,

hanges

n

U.S.

partic-

ipation

n

UN

peacekeeping

rom

just

when he

United

tates ouldmake

a

uniquemilitary

ontributiono a

U.S.

commitmento

usingmilitary

force

n

concert ith ther ations atherhan

nilaterally

ame bout

nly

after

lengthy

ebate

n the

highest

chelons f U.S.

policymaking

ver

the bestresponseitalics dded]to a world ull fpost-ColdWar thnic

and subnationalonflicts

Smith

&

Preston,

993).

That

s,

U.S.

policy

adjustments

ith

espect

o UN

peace operations,ncluding

he

possible



11/21


placement

f

U.S.

troops

nder

UN

command,

were

a function f the

emergingeopolitical

ealities ndthe eadiness fthe

UN

to fill

hevoid.

Presidential eview Directive 3 was laterrevised nto

Presidential

Decision Directive 5

because of

opposition

rom

ome members f

Congress,

specially

fterAmerican oldierswere killed n

Somalia

n

October 993.

The new directive

epresented

retreat rom

policy

of

aggressive

multilateralismf thePresidential eview

Directive 3 to a

policy

based

on caution nd

prudence Cohen,2001, pp. 240-241).

Because of

this nd also because f the

ncreasing

merican

pprehension

at the

eadership

f

Secretary-General

outros-Ghali,

herewas a lull

in

new

peace

missions or a few

years.

For

example,

he

UnitedStates

refused

o

provide

unding

o

a

proposed

N

interventionorce

hat ould

have

stopped

he civil

war in

Congo-Brazzaville

n

1966

(p.

241).

However,

.S.

opposition

o freshmissions

id

not ast

ong,

nd theUN

resumedts

peace

missions

n

earnest

n

part

ecause he nternationalnvi-

ronment

emandedt and

n

part

ecauseKofiAnnanhad become ecre-

tary-general

n

1997.

Therefore,

he

xplanation

hat

ost-cold

war

urge

n

UN peaceoperations as duetoU.S. foreign olicy hanges,whichwere

more eactivehan

roactive,

s

only artial.

In

summary,y

ts

very

ature,

ystem

ransition

s

a state f

system

disequilibrium

Gilpin,

981,

p.

10-15)

nd s risk

rone.

owever,

hen

viewed

s rational

ctors,

tates re

risk

verse

nd

chooseto retreat

ntil

thedust

ettles.

his

environment

pensopportunities

o create ew nter-

national

rganizations

r,

n the ase of

existing

nes,

o

emerge

rom heir

hibernation.

nd heUN

did

emerge

romtshibernationo

play

n

mpor-

tant ole

n

peace operations

n a fast

hanging

orld.

Ripeness orConflictnterventionnAfrica

The notion f

ripeness

or onflict esolution as revolved round he

realization

y

each of

the

onflictingarties

hat t cannot

win;therefore,

continuation

f the

onflict ill not

pay

off.

his

stage

s

usually

eached

when

ach

party

egins

tofeeluncomfortable

n

the

ostly

ead-end nd

a

hurting

talemate

hat

may

ollow

Zartman,

989,

.

268).

Hence,

ach

party

ecomes

more

eceptive

o

third-party

ediation.

mplicit ssump-

tions

n

thisnotion

re that

a)

the

onflict as lasted

long

ime;

b)

the

parties

n conflictlone

decidewhether ediation

hould ake

place;

and

(c) thirdartiesreneutral,endingheir ervices nlywith he onsentf

the

parties

n conflict.

he literaturelso

suggests

hat hechances f a

successful

utcome

n mediationncrease

f hemediators a stakeholder

n

the onflict

Crocker,

ampson,

Aall,

1999).



12/21


Looking

t recent onflictsn

Africa,

nd how and

why

heUN

inter-

vened, owever,

eveals he

following:

a)

The

UN

intervened

n

many

f

the

conflicts,

uch as those

n

Sierra

eone, Liberia,

he

DRC,

and Cote

d'lvoire,

arly

n,

ndthese onflicts ere

elatively

resh

compared

ith

the

ntractableonflicts

uring

he old war

ra)

at the ime f

ntervention;

(b)

theUN intervened

ithouthe onsent f all the

parties

o the onflicts

after

takeholding

egional rganizations,

uch s the conomic

ommunity

of West

African tates

ECOWAS),

failed o furtherdvance he

peace

process;

c)

theUN was not

neutral,

ecause t ssisted

overnments,

hich

were

parties

o the

onflicts,

n

building

he

apacities

f the

tates,

s in

Burundi,

ierra

eone,

nd the

DRC;

and

d)

the

UN

did nothave well-

definedtake n the

onflictss much s

neighboring

tates id.

Therefore,

as

discussed

elow,

he

more

ertinentuestion

s notwhetherhe onflicts

were

ipe

or esolution

ut ather

hy

heUN

saw

the nvironments

ripe

for

ntervention.

The economic

roblems

frica aced n

the1970s ndthe

1980s

nd

the

further

arginalization

t sufferedecause f

ncreased

lobalization

xac-

erbatedhe olitical,conomic,nd ocialproblemstfaced,o much o that

many

tates

imply

topped roviding

inimal ervices o their

itizenry.

Therefore,

hemain

onstituenciesithinhese

tates the

overnment,

he

opposition,

nd

the

general ublic

have

come

to

accept,

nd even wel-

come,

oreign

ntervention,

ecause

hey

ee t s the

nlyway

o

resolve he

conflicts.

irst,

overnments

n

such

tates,

whichwerereluctanto nvite

UN interventionn

prior

ecades,

now

welcomeUN interventionecause

they

o

longer

ave he

unqualified

upport ajor owers rovided uring

the oldwar.

Atthe ame

ime,

hey

reunable o solve heir

roblems

rom

within

ecause f

economic

roblems

ndother

dditionaltresses

rought

about yglobalization.hey reunable odefeat,r ven ontain,he mall-

est

armed

pposition.

he decisions f the

governments

f

Sierra

eone,

Liberia, urundi,

nd he

DRC

to

gratefullyaccept]

broad

UN

interven-

tion n their

nternalffairs re

cases

n

point

Lawson

&

Rothchild,

005,

p.

229).

Governmentehavior

uch as thiswouldhave been difficulto

contemplate

fewdecades

go.

Of

course,

his oes not efero

bilaterally

agreed

nterventions

y friendly

overnments

uch as Cuba

in

Angola;

France n

Francophone

frica;

nd

Cuba,

the

Soviet

Union,

ndYemen

n

the

Ogaden

War

etween

thiopia

nd

Somalia.

Second,

opposition

roups,

s

always,readily

welcome ntervention

because heyretoo weakto achieve heirimsofgovernmentontroly

force n a

relatively

hort

eriod

ftime.At the ame

ime,

he nternation-

alization f the

conflicts

rovides

hemwith

he

egitimacyhey

have



13/21


alwaysdesperately

eeded o

participate

n the

peace process,

ncluding

elections.

hird,

he

general ublic,

which

uffershemost

n

civil

wars

because

of the

ncreasingmpunity

ithwhich rmed

ombatantsiolate

the

rights

f unarmed

ivilians,

s themost

ager

for

ome kind f

mes-

sianic ntervention.

he

oy

with

which

Monrovians

reeted

mericans

when

hey

ntervenedn Liberia

n

August

003

contrasts

ighly

ith he

period

etween

960

and

1990,

when

ny

orm

f ntervention

as

suspect

(Itano, 003).Hence,

here xisted rare

onvergence

f theneedsof

the

maindomestic onstituenciesnthe

arget ountry,

nd this

gave

theUN

addedreasons o intervene.

n other

words,

he

nternational

ommunity

was

willing

o

supply

he esources eeded or

eace operations,

nd

Africa

was a

willing

nd

gratefulecipient.

IncreasedResolve

WithinAfrica o Deal

WithAfrican

ecurity

ssues

The ink etween

ystem

ransitionnd the reation f new

nstitutional

structuresomanagenterstatenteractionseen t the ystemicevel arlier

may

lso be

applicable

t the ontinentalevel.Once

ndependent

tates n

Africa

ppeared

n the ate

1950s

and

early

1960s,

African tatesmen

established

he

Organization

f African

nity

OAU)

and

approved

he

organization's

hartern

May

25, 1963,

o

help

consolidatehehard- on

independence

s well s the

overeignty

of

African

ations]

. . and o

fight

against

eo-colonialism

African

nion,

969).

Although

heOAU on the

whole

ucceeded

n

helping ring

bout he nd of

Portuguese

olonialism

and ettler

egimes,

s in the ormer hodesia nd

partheid

outh

Africa,

t

was

not s successful

n

its

peacekeeping

nd

peacemaking

ffortsn con-

flicts ithinndbetween fricantates. espitemanyonflictsn the1960s

andthe

1970s,

s

in

Somalia-Ethiopia,

udan,

Nigeria,

ndWestern

ahara,

it ook

ome17

years

fterts stablishmentefore heOAU could aunchts

first

ver

peacekeeping

peration

n

1980

n

Chad.

This effort

as

fraught

with

perational,

ogistical,

inancial,

nd other

roblems,

nd themission

ended fter

isseneHabre

forcibly

ook ontrol f the

ountry

Berman

Sams,

003).

t took lmost

decade fterhat efore he

OAU ventured

n

a second

eacekeeping

issionn Rwanda

n

1990.

With

he

new

geopolitical

ealitiesfter

he ndofthe old

war,

owever,

the OAU

became

more ctive nd

participated

n four

peace

endeavors

(Berman Sams, 003,pp.40-42).At he ame ime,egionalrganizations,

such s

ECOWAS,

have aken

major teps

n

peacekeeping

nd

peacemaking

in the onflicts

n

Liberia,

ierra

eone,

nd o on.And ince ts reation

n



14/21

842 JournalfBlack Studies

2001,

he

AU

has aken

major

oles

n

resolving

frican

ecurity

ssues.

hus,

since

1992,

African-led

orces ave ntervened

n

no fewer han

dozen on-

flicts,

f

which

he

ollowing

remost otable:

a)

the onflict

n

theCentral

African

epublic,

o which

urkina

aso,Chad,Gabon,Mali,

Senegal,

nd

Togo,

hrough

he nter-

frican orce

n

theCentral frican

epublic,

ent

troops

n

1997;

b)

the

onflictsn

Sierra

eone,Liberia,

nd

Cote

d'lvoire,

to which

COWAS sent he

Military

bserver

orce n the

1990s

nd

early

2000; c)

the onflictn

Burundi,

orwhich heAU establishedheAfrican

UnionMission

n

Burundin

2002;

d)

the onflict

n

Darfur,

or

which he

AU establishedheAfrican

nionMission

n

Sudan

n

2004;

nd

e)

themore

recent

onflictn

Somalia,

or

which heAU establishedhe

African

nion

Mission n

Somalia

n

2007.

n

other

ords,

heres now ncreased esolve

within

frica

o

find African olutions o African

roblems

ecause a

growing

umber

f

Africanountrieso

onger

iewed

tate

overeignty

s

sacrosanct

Berman

Sams, 003,

pp.

36-37).

In

mostof these

nterventions,

he UN has

subsequently

aken ver

responsibility

or he

peace

operations.

owever,

he

role

played

by

the

African-ledissionsswidely ecognizedshaving een riticalnmaking

UN interventionsore

conducive.

Major powers, ncluding

he

United

States,

anada,

the

European

Union,

nd eventheNorth tlantic

reaty

Organization,

ave

noticed he

cooperation

etween he

UN

and African

partners

nd have

promised

unds nd

logistical upport

o

help

Africa

shoulderts

ecurityesponsibility.

n

fact,

he

AU has

now stablishedhe

Security

ouncil fAfrica o

deal with

mergingecurity

hreats

nthe

on-

tinent.

herefore,

ecent

evelopments

n

Africa

ncouraged

he UN to

work

n

tandem

ith

he

AU

andother

egional rganizations,

ecause he

likelihood f

successful utcomes f

peace

endeavorsn

Africa

ncreases

when uthenticallyfricanartnersre nvolvednpeace processes.

Individual-Level ariables

The

systemic-

ndcontinental-levelariables

escribed

bove

provided

a

fertile

nvironment

or

he

UN

to actthe

way

tdid.

However,

heremust

be

eager,

eceptive,

nd

purposeful

rganizations

n the ther nd o trans-

late attitudesnto

oncrete

rograms

f action. n other

words,

he

sys-

temic

nd

continental-level

ariables

n

and of themselves

ay

not

fully

explainwhy heUN intervenedheway tdid,becausethey nlyprovide

conditions

ecessary

or

UN behavior.

hey

must nteract ith ndividual-

level

variables o

complete

he

quation

eeded o

produce

he

uantitative



15/21

BariagaberUN Peace Missions n Africa 843

and

qualitative

ransformationsf UN

peace

operations

n

Africa.

ndeed,

UN readiness

oundertake

ew

missions ook

quantumeap

with he lec-

tion f Kofi

Annan,

he irst

ecretary-general

fthe

UN from ub-Saharan

Africa.

is election

s

a leader fthe

UN

put

African

ecurity

eeds t the

top

not

nly

because

he

came from he ontinentut lso

because,

s

the

under-

ecretary-general

or

eaceoperationsuring

he

enocide

n

Rwanda,

he carried

long

with

im

sense

f

organizational

nd

personal uilt

t

not

helping

wanda

uring

ts ime f need.

KofiAnnan s

Secretary-General

f theUN

It has beenwell established

n the

iterature

hat

ationaleaders ave

great

egree

f nfluence n

political

nd other vents. he

great-man

theory

and

some

empirical

vidence)

uggests

hat ationaleaders hart

their

oreign olicies

n thebasis

of their

nterpretations

fthe

national s

well

as internationalnvironmentsonsistent ith eliefs

hey

old dear

(Ray

&

Kaarbo,

005).

Accordingly,

wo

eaders,

ven f

hey

re

ubjected

to the amenational nd nternationalnvironments,reexpectedohave

differentierarchiesf

priorities

ecause

f

diosyncratic

r

personally

el-

evant

haracteristics,

ncluding

heir

pbringing,eligions,

ocioeconomic

status,

nd so on.

Because human

eings

re

generally

isk

verse,

eaders

set heir

riorities

n the asis

of

familiarssues

n

an efforto minimize

he

risk ssociatedwith

he

unknown.

ndeed,

linging

o thefamiliar

dds

to

one's sense f

security.

The

great

man

heory ay

e relevantn

assessing

he

egree

f nflu-

ence

a

secretary-general

f theUN has on

peace operations. y

virtue

f

the

position

e or

she

holds,

he

ecretary-general

erves

n

two

apacities:

as secretary,r chief dministrativefficer, nd as general, r chief

political perative

Gourevitch,

003,

p.

53).

In

the atter

ole,

he

ecre-

tary-general

an

prudently

se a

given

windowof

opportunity

n the

Security

ouncil

to make a differencen

policy

ssues,

ncluding eace

operations.

or

example, ecretary-Generalammarskjold

s

said to have

often

ed theUN

in his

capacity

s

general

nd

s considered he

prin-

cipal

nspiration

o

present-day

UN]

peacekeeping

fforts

Gibbs,

000,

p.

361).

His convictionhat he

UN

was

uniquely

ositioned

o

contribute

to nternational

eace

was so

deep

that

n

1960,

he

personally

lew o the

Congo

and escorted everalunits

of

Swedish

nfantry

nto

[Katanga]

(Gibbs, 000,p. 366).

Similarly,

avier

erezde

Cuellar,

hefirst

ecretary-general

f

theUN

from

atin

America,

ave

the

negotiations

in

El

Salvador]

he

priority,



16/21


backing,

nd

degree

f

political

ommitment

hey equired

ndwas nstru-

mentaln the

first-everN

peace operation

n

a conflict

n

Latin

America

(Crocker

t

al., 1999,

.

683).

Under

peace

accord

igned

n

January

992,

the

government

f El

Salvador and FrenteFarabundoMarti Para la

LiberationNacional

agreed

o hold

elections,

which he

UN

Observer

Mission n El

Salvadorwas

mandated

o

monitor. he resolutionf the

Salvadoran onflict ith

he active nvolvementf the

UN

came about

partly

ecauseof

U.S.

policy hanges rought

bout

by changed

nterna-

tional nvironmenttheUnited

tates

idnot

ush

ts

ong-heldpposition

to

any

ntervention

y

the

UN

in

LatinAmerica and

partly

ecause,

s the

first

ecretary-general

rom atin

America,

e

Cuellar

gave

the

necessary

attentiono

security

ssueson the ontinent.t

is

especially

nstructiveo

note hat he

mpendingeparture

f

de Cuellar

n

December

1, 1992,

nd

a

private

ignal

rom

his]

uccessor hat he

Salvadoran

ssuewouldno

longer

e

given

riorityave

added

urgency

o reach

negotiated

ettle-

ment

de

Soto, 1999,

p.

379).

As

Crocker

t al.

(1999)

aptly

oted,

with

differentastof

personalities

he

United ations

may

nothavebeen ble

to

play uch n effectiveole p.683). ndeed,when group fAfricaniplo-

mats t the

UN demanded hathe

do

something

henthe civil war

n

Liberiabroke n

1990,

de

Cuellar

eplied

hat

herewas

nothing

e

could

do

because he was not

authorized o intervenen domesticmatters

(Goulding,

999,

p.

160).

After

he

departure

f

de Cuellar

n

December

992,however,

here as

certain

ressure

rom henew

Secretary-General

Boutros outros-Ghali]

.

.

for

more

eacekeeping

n

Africa. e was the irst

frican

ecretary-General,

with

eep experience

fAfrica . .

[and

unlike e

Cuellar]

hismade

him

sensitiveo

complaints

hat

fricawas notgettingtsfair hare

of

UN attention

Goulding,

999,

p.

163).

Therefore,

ecretaries-general

f

the

UN do have nfluencen

what he

organization

oes,

ncluding eace-

keeping perations.

id

Annan,

ike his

predecessors

bove,

nfluence

peace operations?

Annan

as beendescribed

s

persuasive

nd skilled uilder fcon-

sensus n the

Security

ouncil

Shawcross,

000,

p.

409).

Unlike

ther

secretaries-general,

ho

have become dentified ith he

U.N.

bureau-

cracy

perhaps

ith he

xception

f

Hammarskjold],

nnan as madehis

reputations an honest rokermongworld eaders ndhasactedmore s

general uring

is

tenure

Maniatis,

001,

p.

44).

For

example,

hen

he

Security

ouncil ebated he

U.S.

sponsored

esolutionhat emandedhat



17/21

BariagaberUN Peace MissionsnAfrica 845

Iraq provide

nrestrictedccess

to

weapons nspectors

r face

military

attack,

e

personally

nsured

he unanimous ote

[italics dded]

he

wanted

raq

to see

a

world

nited

by

obbying yria's

President ashir

al-Assad,

he ast holdout

Meisler,

003,

p.

35).

It is

also true hat he

Security

ouncil

ave

Annanwhat e wantedwhen e

requested

hat om-

batant emobilization

nd

reintegrationrograms

f UN

peace operations

be

financed rom ssessed

budgets

United

Nations,

000b).

This

s

espe-

ciallynoteworthy,

ecause

previousunding

or

uch ndeavors as

sought

from

oluntary

ontributions

nly.

Unlikewhat

many riginallyhought

hen

e

assumed

eadership

fthe

UN

in

January

997,

Annan was

willing

o take hances ndmove

eyond

normal ounds

n

the

nterestf

peace,

nd he

usually

scaped

unscathed

even

f his stand n issueswerenot

popular

Meisler,

007,

p.

168).

For

example,

whenhe

seriouslyontemplatedaking trip

o

raq

to

convince

the

raqigovernment

o

allow

rms

nspectors

n,

heUnited tates dvised

him o the

ontrary.otwithstanding

his,

nnanmade hedecision o

take

the

rip,

nd theUnited tates

urnedround nd

supported

is

trip. pon

Annan's eturno NewYork, heUnited tates joined hefourteenther

members

fthe

ecurity

ouncil

n

approving

he

greement

nd

congratu-

lating

Annan

forhis mission

Meisler,

007,

p.

166).

Similarly,

hen

Annan

made

speech

t theUN

questioning

he

overeign

oninterference

in a state hat iolated he

ights

f ts

citizens,

many elegates

rose

up

to

denouncehe

heresy.

owever,

he]

ucceededn

putting

he

roposal irmly

on

the

global genda,

nd what's

more,

e survived nscathed

Williams,

2000,

p.

20).

As

former erman

hancellor elmutKohl

put

t,

When

[Annan]

pproaches

ou

.. it

is not

possible

o

keep up any

barriers

(quoted

n

Ramo,

2000).

In

other

words,

Annan

has a

disarminguality

whenmeetingthersndoften ad he ourageoact sgeneralnthe nter-

estof

peace,

ven

f

hiswent

ontrary

o

the

wishes

f

the

major owers.

Similarly,

ne wouldhave

xpected

eneral

allaire,

orce ommander

of the UN

AssistanceMission to Rwanda n

1993

and

1994,

to blame

Annan orUN inaction

n

Rwanda,

iven

hat he atter as

head

of he

UN

Department

f

Peacekeeping perations

UNDPKO).

On

the

contrary,

General

allaire

2003)

put

heblameon the

Security

ouncil

nd

wrote

that Annan

rojected

humanismnd dedication o

the

plight

f

others

that

have

rarely xperienced p.

92).

Others,

uch s Richard

olbrooke,

who

became U.S. ambassador

o the

UN

in

1998,

thought

f Annan

s

someonewho has a nearlymagical bility o movepeople throughis

personal

harm

quoted

n

Maniatis, 001,

p.

44).

Given

hese

ualities,

and

the evidence

provided

n the

previous

wo

paragraphs,

ne

may



18/21


inescapably

onclude hat nnan adwhat ttook o

getmajor owers

up-

portpeace

missions,

erhaps

is

top

priorityuring

is

tenure.

ndeed,

major

power

onfidence

n

the UN had increased fter

Annanbecame

secretary-general

n

1997.

All in

all,

the

Security

ouncil

approved

0

peace operations

n Africa

uring

nnan's

0-year

enure,

nd all of

them

occurredt a time

whenAfricawas

becomingncreasingly

ore

eaceful.

It

s also instructiveo note

hat he

Security

ouncilhad

approved

new

peacemission,

he

UN ObserverMission

n

Angola,

n

June

997,onlyfewmonthsfter nnan

egan

his

tenure,

nd this ccurredfter

3-year

hiatus

uring

he

enure

f

Boutros-Ghali.

As

mentioned

arlier,

nnan

erved s

head of

UNDPKO

whenthe

Srebrenica

assacre

nd

theRwandan

enocide

ccurred. fter e

became

secretary-general,

nnan

epeatedlypologized

n behalf f he

UN

and

on

hisbehalf

or

ailing

o act.This

personal

s well s

organizational

ense

f

guilt

ontinuedohave ome

mpact

n hisbehaviort thehelm ftheUN.

It is

important

o

note,

s

Annanhas

stated,

hat

he

Rwandan

enocide

had influenced

any

f his

laterdecisions s

secretary

eneral

UN

Chief'sRwandaGenocideRegret, 004).Therefore,ispersonalityraits,

including

is characternd

eadership

tyle,

he

ontinentromwhich

he

came,

ndhis

negativexperience

n

Rwanda s headof

UNDPKO

provide

additional

xplanations

or

he

rajectory

fUN

peace operations

nAfrica

during

he

past

10

years.

Conclusion

The

systemic-,

ontinental-,

nd individual-level

ariables,

n

and

of

themselves,

o

not

provide

complete xplanation

s to

why

UN

peace

missions n Africahave undergone uantitativend qualitativerans-

formationsver he

past

10

years.

ndeed,

n the

whole,

he

ystemic-

nd

continental-levelariableswere

present uring

he tenure f

Secretary-

General

outros-Ghali,

s there as ncreasedeadinessnthe

art

f

major

powers,

ncluding

he

United

tates,

o et he

UN

undertakencreased

eace

missions nd on the

part

f Africanso welcome hosemissions.

n other

words,

he

emand-supply

exus f

peaceoperations

as

present.

owever,

Boutros-Ghali

idnot

have he

ersonality

raitshat nnan ad.There

s no

doubt

outros-Ghali as

more f

a

general

nd was committed

o make

difference

n

Africa. ut the

United tates

ncreasinglyrew

isenchanted

withhis

eadership

nd did notendorse imfor second erm. his was

unusual n

the

history

f

secretaries-general

f theUN.

In

other

ords,

he

individual-levelariable onducive o

more

igorous

N

involvementas



19/21

BariagaberUN Peace MissionsnAfrica 847

lacking

efore

nnan ssumed

eadership.

ndeed,

ither

ensing

he

nega-

tive nternational

olitical

nvironment

f

the

old

waror because

hey

id

nothavethe harisma

hat

Annan

had,

UN

secretaries-general

t the ime

found

t more

rudent

o servemore s chief dministrative

fficers

uring

their enure. n the ther

and,

he nternational

olitical

nvironmentur-

ing

Hammarskj

ld's tenure as more imilar o that fAnnan:

hey

both

served

uring

ransitional

eriods.

lso,

both

ossessed

he harisma

eeded

for chief

olitical perative

o

nfluence

he

ecurity

ouncil. he

par-

allels between

he

tenures

f thetwo

secretaries-general

hat

many

have

drawn,

ncluding

hawcross

2000)

and Meisler

2003),

may

be

explained

by

the

onvergence

fthe

ystemic-,

ontinental-,

nd ndividual-levelari-

ables

during

heir

espective

enures.

Quite

usefully,

ne

may

borrow

hemathematicalerm

necessary

nd

sufficientonditions o establish he

relationship

etween he

dependent

variable

transformations

n

UN

peace

missions)

nd the

ndependent

ari-

ables

the

nature f transitional

ystems,

ncreased esolvewithin

frica,

etc.).

The

systemic-

nd continental-level

ariables

may

be viewed s hav-

ingprovidedonditionsecessaryor heUN to be morenclined o nter-

vene,

ut

hey

o not

omplete

he

quation

or ctual

UN intervention.

hey

must

e

complementedy

the ndividual-level

ariable,

hich

rovided

condition

ufficiento effectntervention.

ogether,

he hree

ypes

f vari-

ables dentified

nthis

tudy

rovided

he

necessary

nd

ufficientonditions

formore

igorous

N intervention

n

Africa

ver

he

ast

10

years.

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14.Peace Missions in Africa