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Figuring out Cult Receptivity Author(s): Roy Wallis Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 494-503Published by: on behalf of Wiley Society for the Scientific Study of ReligionStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1385913Accessed: 16-03-2015 14:33 UTC

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Figuring Out Cult Receptivity

ROY WALLIS*

Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge have advanced a theory of religion which draws upon a wide range of supporting data. One body of data advances the claim that new religions will appear disproportionately often in settings where traditional religion is weak, and that - contrary to prevailing opinion - Europe is markedly more receptive to new religions than the United States. This paper subjects that claim to critical scrutiny and finds it entirely wanting. Through a reanalysis of the Stark and Bainbridge data, and with the addition of new data of a more persuasive kind, this paper demonstrates that the pattern which emerges is more complex than Stark and Bainbridge allow. While cult activity may increase with declining church attendance - a finding compatible with their theory - cult activity is seen to remain particularly high in Anglo-Saxon, Protestant dominated, immigrant based societies, despite continuing high rates of church attendance. An alternative theory is drawn from extant work to account for this finding and the overall pattern.

INTRODUCTION

Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge have advanced a theory of religion and then sought to test this theory on a diverse range of data. In this paper, I take issue with one variety of such data, arguing that it does not show what Stark and Bainbridge claim for it, namely that schismatic forms of religion are most prevalent where traditional religion remains strong, while culturally innovatory forms of religion are most prevalent where traditional religion is weak. In particular, Stark and Bainbridge's claim that Europe is peculiarly receptive to culturally innovatory forms of religion is shown not to be true. Indeed, when their data are extended and considered in the round, they are shown to support a quite different theory of secularization and of the contemporary distribution of religion.

THE DATA

Stark and Bainbridge (1985) argue that secularization is a self-limiting process. After showing that schismatic forms of the prevailing religious tradition ("sects") are most prevalent in those regions of North America where church membership is high and that culturally innovatory forms of religion ("cults") are most prevalent where it is low, they claim that "cults reflect efforts by the unchurched to become churched, and sects reflect efforts by the churched to remain churched" (1985:491). They then seek to apply their theory to Europe, arguing that the rampant secularization reported in Europe can also be shown to have a reaction in the form of a high level of receptivity to cults. Unfortunately, the data at their disposal are rather crude, but it nonetheless results in some interesting rates and correlations. For example, by counting cults from various listings, they calculate

*Roy Wallis is Professor of Sociology at The Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland,

© Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1986, 25 (4): 494-503 494



FIGURING OUT CULT RECEPTIVITY

that England and Wales have a rate of 3.2 such groups per million population, compared to only 2.3 in the United States.

From other sources, Stark and Bainbridge calculate national rates for "Indian and Eastern cult centers and communities" per million population, and show that a large proportion of European countries exhibit higher rates than the USA (see Table 1). "Impressionistically," they say, "the data pattern is in accord with what are believed to be greater and lesser degrees of secularization" (1985:483). But although they note the very high rates for Australia and New Zealand, and the higher rate for Canada compared to the USA, they do not tell us how these nations fit into their intuitive pattern of secularization.

Further evidence is offered from data on Scientology churches and staff members which show high rates for Denmark and Sweden in churches per million compared to the USA, and for Denmark only in respect to full-time staff. Sweden, Switzerland and the UK are higher than the rest of Europe on this latter measure, but not as high as the USA. Curiously again, Canada, Australia and New Zealand exceed the US rate for churches, and Canada exceeds it for staff, while Austrialia and New Zealand are both high.

Hare Krishna temples per million again show higher rates for Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland than the US. However, Canada has a rate almost twice that of the USA, Australia nearly three times, and New Zealand more than four times the US rate.

Mormons, however, despite their longer period in the field than the groups discussed so far, fall very far short of the US rate. There may be something to the Stark and Bainbridge argument that up to World War I converts were encouraged, and assisted, to migrate to the US, but they do not clearly explain why, if Europe is so much more receptive, it has not made up the gap between it and the US since World War I in Mormon membership. Nor is the situation of Canada, Australia and New Zealand accounted for, when doubtless early converts from these countries were also encouraged to go to Utah. Canada and Australia have rates considerably higher than European countries, and New Zealand has a rate exceeding even that of the USA itself, although perhaps 50% of New Zealand Mormons are Maori, according to Michael Hill (1982: 187).

Some rather indecisive evidence is offered for Seventh Day Adventist congregations; indecisive, that is, except for very high rates in Australia and New Zealand! Stark and Bainbridge discount these findings on the grounds that perhaps Seventh Day Adventism is more sect-like than cult-like, which shows rather less clarity in their formulation of these notions than they are inclined to claim, and also serves as a convenient ad hoc hypothesis to undermine inconvenient evidence.

Jehovah's Witnesses have a higher rate for their congregations throughout Scandinavia, in Switzerland, and anomalously in Portugal, when compared to the USA. Yet again, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have rates in excess of the United States.

As predicted by the theory, rates for sects in the form of North American evangelical Protestant mission congregations per million, were low in Scandinavia and the UK, but high in France, Italy and Portugal, although highest of all in Switzerland.

Stark and Bainbridge argue that, "Each of the cult measures is very strongly negatively correlated with rates of church attendance" (1985: 495). One assumes that only European nations are involved here, because this can hardly be the case for Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

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TABLE 1

VARIOUS DATA ON CULT ACTIVITY AND CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY COUNTRY

a b c d e f g h i Approx. average

Indianl Jehovah's church attandance Eastern Scientology Scientology ISKCON Witness COG (Mol) (Sigelman)

centers, etc. churches staff temples Mormons congregations members % %

Denmark 3.1* .59* 50.0* .20* 786 44.9* 21.43* <5 - Sweden 2.5* .36* 16.4 .36* 700 37.11* 17.30* <5 9 Finland 2.8* - - - 775 53.40* 5.62 <5 5 Norway - - - - 845 45.50* 23.81* <5 14 England & Wales 3.0* .09 10.5 .05 1,353 20.84 9.55 15 Scotland 3.2* 1,678 f 26 West Germany 1.4* .02 4.5 .05 423 23.43 5.10 27 27 Netherlands 2.0* .07 2.5 .07 531 20.21 11.21 P:?;C:65 42 Austria 2.1* - 2.7 .13 361 28.80 6.11 35 38 Switzerland 3.8* - 14.3 .16* 770 36.19* 18.13* - 30 France 2.5* .02 2.7 - 204 22.28 8.16 20 25 Belgium 1.0 - 2.0 .10 356 28.67 5.75 40 - Italy .7 - -.04 105 23.02 5.64 30-40 - Spain .6 - - - 67 20.03 7.41 - Portugal - - - - 108 40.10* 10.43 --

United States of America 1.3 .10 17.9 .15 11,001 34.16 12.91 - 43

Canada 1.5* .17* 18.3* .29* 3,036 43.74* 22.46* 40 - Australia 5.3* .27* 13.9 .41* 2,327 36.83* 26.32* 40 New Zealand 5.2* .32* 17.7 .65* 11,725* 38.39* *21.58* P:20;C:70 -

Notes 1. Columns a-f are taken directly from various tables in Stark and Bainbridge (1985: ch. 21). 2. Columns a-g are calculated as rates per million of population; columns h-i are percentages of population. 3. Column h is derived from Mol (1972), except for Canada which is taken from Mol (1976), but some of the figures are at best "guesstimates" derived from a variety

of figures provided for a particular country. Data on church attendance are often very poor and very unsystematic. 4. Column i is taken from Sigelman (1977). 5. Stars indicate rates higher than USA.

:z 0

C1% 0 z:

0

M

5C M4




THE INTERPRETATION

These findings are of some interest, and part of the interpretation put upon them is unexceptionable. It is no doubt true that new religious movements of a culturally innovatory kind are positively related to secularization. The more deteriorated the traditional denominations in terms of active involvement of the population, the larger the available constituency for new faiths, given that a high proportion of those who are unchurched have not entirely abandoned supernatural belief (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985: 49; Sigelman, 1977).

However, it follows from the Stark and Bainbridge theory, and they would have us infer that empirically it is the case, that western European nations with higher levels of secularization than the USA, as indicated by lower rates of church attendance, are more receptive to cults than is the US. This seems contentious at best.

It was certainly true that the rates for non-Catholic European countries were higher than for the US with regard to "Indian and Eastern cult centers and communities;" for Denmark and Sweden, with regard to Scientology churches; and for these two plus Switzerland with regard to Hare Krishna temples. But then, both Denmark and Sweden only had one temple each, and Denmark and Sweden had only three Scientology churches each. While I would not wish to challenge the higher rates for these countries, the small numbers of objects involved do give grounds for some anxiety.1 Moreover, the overall European rate for "Indian and Eastern cult centers and communities" seems a very problematic statistic. It is an aggregate of a variety of different groups and movements which are quite likely to wish to be represented in every major country. This would automatically produce higher rates per million for small population countries, and thus for Europe as a whole compared to the USA. As Stark and Bainbridge admit, "a count of cult movements is not a count of cult members" (1985:479), and therefore the relationship between centers, churches and temples on the one hand, and active followers on the other, remains indeterminate. That someone opens an office does not mean that he has any customers.

When we get nearer to the customer, as in the rate of Scientology staff, only Denmark has a higher rate than the USA. Stark and Bainbridge do not offer any data on Scientology membership, although they do seek to set aside in anticipation possible implications of such data, with the argument that American born groups have had longer to build a following at home. They do not explain why this argument is not equally as compelling for Scientology churches and staff as it is for members. Since I can see no such reason, I offer the following evidence on Scientology membership made available by the Church of Scientology (1978: 224). That Europe is so much more receptive to cults than North America is hardly borne out

by these figures, which show the "North American" rate to be two and a half times that for the UK, and nearly five times that for the rest of Europe (although this would

1. As one very perceptive referee of this paper observed, the data on Scientology are probably even more suspect than I have here given reason to believe. Stark and Bainbridge do not appear to be counting "missions/franchises." The distinction between "church" and "mission" is often a matter of policy and politics rather than a matter of numbers of recruits. Moreover, the availability of Scientology probably often has more to do with literacy in English than with secularization. This does not, of course, affect my argument one iota, although it does provide an additional reason to doubt the statistics supplied by Stark and Bainbridge.

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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

TABLE 2

SCIENTOLOGY MEMBERSHIP BY LOCATION

Scientology membership Rate per million at June 1977 N population

North America 4,000,000 16,427

United Kingdom 336,000 6,011

Australia 100,000 7,047

New Zealand 42,000 13,548

Europel 624,000 3,684

Note 1. Europe comprises Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

undoubtedly vary enormously between one country and another if the figures could be disaggregated). However, what Stark and Bainbridge have to explain is why, if it is the case that American origins are a factor inhibiting growth in Europe, it does not equally inhibit growth in New Zealand, where the rate almost rivals that of the USA, and is twice the rate of its "motherland."

Stark and Bainbridge do offer us figures based on actual membership in the case of the Mormons, but these do not seem altogether promising for their argument. Rates run at less than a tenth of that of the US in every European nation except the UK, which runs at about one eighth of the US rate. Jehovah's Witness congregations do show more the pattern Stark and Bainbridge would wish, although only Scandinavia and Switzerland exceed the US rate (along with Portugal, less clearly in line with the theory). All of this would seem to me to fall some way short of meeting Stark and Bainbridge's stipulation that their theory requires that Britain and Northern Europe "ought to have produced or attracted even more cult movements than have the United States and Canada" (1985:475), or that, more generally, they display a higher rate of cult activity and participation.

THE COG DATA

I am able to offer still more membership data to supplement Stark and Bainbridge's data with regard to Mormons (which did not appear to advance their theoretical claims significantly), and my own Scientology data (which appeared, if anything, directly to contradict their thesis). These further data relate to the Children of God/Family of Love, between 1980 and 1983, divided by nationality.

COG have counted different kinds of people as members at different times, but the crucial category of membership is that of "TRFers" (or Tithing Report Form members, who report regularly each month and tithe a tenth of their income in return for the full range of COG publications and other movement facilities). Data on these members (and some other categories) were published regularly in Good News (a COG publication intended

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only for TRFers) between 1980 and 1983 (at which date I ceased to receive these publications). Internal evidence and long acquaintance with this movement suggest to me that the figures published have not been "massaged" to boost morale or for public relations purposes, since they clearly reflect a progressive decline in adult TRFers throughout the period. I know of no reason to challenge the accuracy with which COG record the information received from TRFers. At times of widespread shifting of location in the movement, reporting may not have been as complete as at more stable periods. My view is that no major inaccuracies are introduced by this problem, and by averaging the rates for the year end of 1980, 1981, 1982, such fluctuations are likely to be smoothed out. It should be noted that the figures used here refer to citizenship (i.e. country issuing the member's passport) rather than merely location. Rates per million have been calculated from data in the UN Demographic Yearbook for 1982, using appropriate mid-year population estimates. A by now quite familiar pattern appears. The US rate of nearly 13 per million is considerably exceeded by most of Scandinavia (Finland shows greater resistance). Switzerland too shows its characteristically high rate, exceeding the US rate by almost 50%. The UK rate is only some 70% of the US rate. The rest of Europe remains generally well below the US rate. However, as we have now come to expect, the rates for Canada, Australia and New Zealand greatly exceed that for the USA, running at least as high as most of Scandinavia.

Although these data do not show that Europe has as high a receptivity to cults as the USA, they do show a broadly consistent pattern for the nations included:

1. Receptivity to cults is generally lowest for Catholic countries and West Germany, rising for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

2. Rates rise again for the USA. 3. Scandinavia has the highest levels of receptivity to new religious movements in

Europe, along with the somewhat anomalous case of Switzerland. 4. However, US rates of receptivity to cults are generally exceeded by those of Canada,

Australia and New Zealand, whose rates rival those of Scandinavia. This pattern creates difficulties for the Stark and Bainbridge theory. I ignore for the

moment the case of Switzerland, which they account for in terms of the peculiar responsiveness of Geneva. However, Stark and Bainbridge claim that cult activity will be greatest where church attendance is lowest. This works well enough for much of Europe. However, compared to Europe, the USA has high levels of church attendance, but also high levels of cult activity. The rate of church attendance in Britain is less than half that of the USA on most estimates, but cult rates for the UK exceed those for the USA only with regard to Indian and Eastern centers and communities. On the other hand, while Canada, Australia and New Zealand have cult rates often exceeding those of the USA, their church attendance rates are not appreciably lower than for the US. (Hill [1982: 180] reports recent overall attendance rates, from various New Zealand studies, of between 35-42%.)

This suggests that we have two patterns of cult activity: 1) Cult activity increases with declining church attendance; and 2) Cult activity is also particularly high in Anglo- Saxon, Protestant dominated, immigrant based societies, despite continuing high rates of church attendance. What then is the explanation of these patterns? Stark and Bainbridge believe that there is a constant demand for supernatural compensators. Thus, when the

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churches fail to meet this demand, there first occurs revival and sect formation, but later as the tradition further loses credibility and appeal, there appear new religious faiths (imported or native inventions). But, as we have seen, the evidence does not support this theory.

I suggest that the patterns which emerge support an alternative view, namely, that people will be more inclined to participate in innovative religious forms when they are unconstrained by a demanding and community supported traditional religious faith. They may be unconstrained because of the extent of secularization, particularly characteristic of societies with an overwhelming Protestant majority and a state-supported church. They may also be unconstrained because, in a society where virtually every aspect of culture is imported or a recent innovation, less stigma generally attaches to adopting any particular innovation or import, than in a traditional, or a culturally homogeneous society. Cultural pluralism encourages the acceptance of further additions to the range of available beliefs and life-styles as at least potentially legitimate. Stark and Bainbridge even suggest such a perspective when they say that, "the more faiths that are seen as legitimate, the more easily a new faith can escape serious stigmatization" (1985: 504).

In passing, it might be suggested that it is this too which explains the extraordinarily high level of cult activity in Geneva and thus in Switzerland. As an international meeting place for organizations and people from all over the world, Geneva is subjected to a plurality of cultural influences, beliefs and practices unparallelled in Europe. This must greatly heighten the potential legitimacy and acceptability of new religious faiths, even beyond the level to be expected from Geneva's high level of secularity, or the low level of Protestant Swiss church participation.

A case could also be made for viewing predominantly Protestant and Anglo-Saxon immigrant-based societies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand as highly secularized in the same way as pertains in the United States, and along the same lines as have been advanced for the USA by Wilson (1969), following Herberg (1960). Immigration, as the basis of a society's growth, creates a peculiarly enhanced role for the church, even in an increasingly secularized society. It provides continuity with the past, and thus a basis for identity in a context where, through high levels of mobility, mass produced clothing and lack of a highly crystallized class structure, other bases of identity are less clear. It also provides an agency for assimilation into the community and thus a focus of community activity invaluable to newcomers without other roots. One New Zealand community study reports, for example, that, "Many of the communal leisure events in the district focussed on the school and the church, and these buildings served as multi-functional centers for social intermixing" (Pearson, 1980: 23, cited in Hill, 1982).

Finally, it provides a means of affirming a commitment to respectable national values. Where churchgoing is the norm, not to attend church - no matter which - is to reject a value of the society into which one is seeking to be assimilated. Thus, church membership and participation remain high in such societies, because religious institutions have other work to do beyond relating the individual to his God. But because they perform a largely secular task in these respects, they will tend to conform more closely to secular values, abandoning and eliding what is distinctive and a source of conflict, to become more alike while retaining (except for those which become so alike as to merge, producing, for example,

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the United Church of Canada) sufficient difference to ensure "brand loyalty." This is not to say that the religiosity of the leading denominations in predominantly Protestant immigrant-based societies is any the less serious or sincere than that of their counterparts in Protestant western Europe, only that the former attract to church services people who in the latter would maintain their modest level of religious sentiment and belief without attending church, or doing so only rarely. In short, the faith that pervades such denominations (one is not talking here of the more sectarian groups) is, for many participants, not of any very demanding kind, and thus leaves individuals free to transfer their loyalty to another denomination or to a new faith without excessive anxiety. Hill reports that census data for New Zealand "point to a substantial amount of nominal adherence from an early date" (1982: 171), and that "while a majority of New Zealanders have always been prepared to adopt a nominal religious identity, religious practice - at least in its traditional definition of church attendance - has been characteristic of only a minority" (171).

Thus, not only secularization, but also cultural pluralism and the attenuated demands of denominations in Anglo-Saxon, immigrant societies account for the freedom to explore new faiths revealed by these figures, a freedom which they also show to be grasped by very few of those who might do so if they chose.

HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE

However, Stark and Bainbridge have still another argument in their armamentarium to confound the critic (1985:503):

Left-wing politics often serve as a functional alternative to sect and cult movement.... To the extent that nations have serious left-wing political movements, some of the energy that might otherwise have been channeled into religion will be diverted. To the extent, then, that the Left is far stronger in many European nations than in Canada and the United States, comparisons of sect and cult rates will be influenced - without as much radicalism, the more secularized European nations ought to be even higher than they are on cults and southern Europe ought to be even more receptive to sects.

Now this is a useful argument. If secularized Protestant countries have high cult rates, this confirms the Stark and Bainbridge theory. If they have lower cult rates than suggested by the theory, this is because they also have "seriously left-wing political movements," and this also confirms the theory.

But will this really do? Can the modest level of political radicalism in the United Kingdom really account for the fact that its levels of cult activity rarely get close to those for the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand? It is by no means obvious that this is so. Radicalism in the UK is scarcely markedly more "serious" than in Australia. Nor is it obvious that the US has more serious radicalism than Canada, Australia and New Zealand to account for its generally lower rate of receptivity to cults. If Stark and

Bainbridge mean this argument about left-wing radicalism to be regarded as anything more than an ad hoc attempt to salvage a flawed theory, they must offer more compelling evidence relevant to the crucial cases at issue than they have provided so far. Since any simple functional equivalence between radical politics and culturally innovative religious beliefs seems likely only for a rather restricted range of people and of new religions, persuasive and relevant evidence will probably be hard to find.

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There are doubtless important historical cases of religious movements arising or growing where political responses might seem appropriate, for example, in situations of colonial expansion; or, as in the Halevy thesis, in connection with the rise of Methodism in England in the late 18th and early 19th centuries; or in moder Latin America. The historical detail of these cases cannot be considered here. What is crucial, however, is that because a religious response arises after the failure of political efforts, or where political protest and organization might seem more appropriate, this entails nothing about the "functional equivalence" of radical politics and new religious movements in the sense Stark and Bainbridge intend. Rather it shows that both politics and religion provide an ideological framework and guidelines for action of a very general kind. When traditional religion fails to provide an adequate means of grappling with changing social circumstances, political means or new religious means may become attractive, and likewise, when politics fails, new forms of religion may seem the only means of achieving the desired state of affairs.

The evidence upon which Stark and Bainbridge appear most to rely is that advanced in Glock and Stark (1965). In two chapters of this work, Glock and Stark consider survey data showing that "radicalism" in the sense of attachment to left-wing political causes is negatively related to church attendance and related measures of religiosity. The correlation is clear enough, but does it demonstrate a "functional equivalence"? One must ask: What function is it that they equivalently perform? Stark and Bainbridge's answer is: both function to provide compensators for rewards that are presently scarce or unavailable. But this is to assume what they have yet to prove, namely, that people seek compensators when rewards are unavailable; that religion and politics provide compensators; and that those who seek compensators can be persuaded to take them in either religious or political form. Since none of this has been demonstrated (see, for a preliminary critique, Wallis and Bruce, 1984), we have no satisfactory grounds of accepting that radicalism and new religions are functionally equivalent.

All that the evidence presented by Glock and Stark shows is that the more radical people are politically, the less likely they are to be religious. This may well mean no more than that the more one accepts a radical critique of prevailing social institutions and social norms and values, the more one is likely to reject one of those particular institutions and its associated norms and values. It gives us no clear reason to believe that radicalism and new religious movements are incompatible, but even if they were, this still would not demonstrate that radicalism and new religious movements were functional alternatives, and that a lower than expected rate of religious cult activity can be explained by the prevalence of political radicalism.

That a few communists become christians and vice versa, and a few New Leftists join the Divine Light Mission or become Human Potential trainers, is also not enough to persuade us of the general case Stark and Bainbridge seek to advance. A correlation of left-wing enthusiasm and secularity, and a few cases of people making the switch between religion and politics, is still some way short of a demonstration that radicalism and new religious movements are functionally equivalent, and that too little cult activity in the United Kingdom, compared to what is required by the Stark and Bainbridge theory, can be explained away by what passes for political radicalism in that presently troubled land.

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REFERENCES

Church of Scientology 1978 What is Scientology? Los Angeles: Church

of Scientology of California. Glock, Charles and Rodney Stark

1965 Religion and Society in Tension. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Herberg, Will 1960 Protestant, Catholic, Jew. New York:

Doubleday. Hill, Michael

1982 "Religion." Pps. 169-95 in Paul Spoonley, David Pearson and Ian Shirley (Eds.), New Zealand: Sociological Perspectives. North Palmerston, New Zealand: Dunmore Press.

Mol, Hans 1972 Western Religion: A Country by Country

Sociological Inquiry.The Hague: Mouton. Mol, Hans

1976 "Major correlates of church going in

Canada." Pps. 241-54 in Stewart Crysdale and Les Wheatcroft (Eds.), Religion in Canadian Society. Toronto: Macmillan.

Pearson, D. G. 1980 Johnsonville. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Sigelman, Lee 1977 "Review of the polls: multi-nation surveys

of religious belief." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 16: 289-94.

Stark, Rodney and William S. Bainbridge 1985 The Future of Religion. Berkeley: Univer-

sity of California Press. Wallis, Roy and Steve Bruce

1984 "The Stark-Bainbridge theory of religion: A critical analysis and counter proposals." Sociological Analysis 45: 11-27.

Wilson, Bryan R. 1969 Religion in Secular Society. Harmond-

sworth: Penguin.

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