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UNIT 6: PARTIES ANDVOTESWare CH 11 and Mueller and Strom
112-140
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Guiding Questions
When are parties likely to adopt a vote-
maximizing strategy?
What factors shape how parties position
themselves to win votes?
How can we model party competition?
What are the strengths/weaknesses of these
models?
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When Should Parties Seek Votes?
Voting certainly matters in democracies. We can conceive of the
voting process as delegating
authority from the citizenry to the political elite.
But votes, in and of themselves, are rarely useful. We typically
see votes as instrumental to achieving other
goals. When would vote seeking strategies be likely? 1) When
parties want to increase their bargaining
weight. 2) When elections are competitive (i.e. outcome is
unclear). 3) To reach certain thresholds
Example: majority/minority government, minimumthreshold for
representation, etc.
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Downss Assumptions about Voters
Downs 1957
Models party competition spatially.
1) Voters hold preferences over the types of policy theywant
government to enact.
These preferences are linked to their interests, and
areexogenous to parties.
2) These preferences can be represented along a singleleft-right
dimension.
3) Voters are rational, but not well informed about
connections between their preferences and the policiespolitical
parties advocate. Takes preferences as exogenous (or given)
Thus, voters vote for the party positioned closest tothem.
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Downss Assumption about Parties
Downs 1957
1) Parties seek to maximize their vote share.
2) Parties position themselves along the left/rightspectrum
adapting their policy positions based on their
perceptions of voter interests.Parties are loosely bound by past
history.
Prevents parties from leap-frogging other parties.
3) Parties use ideology as a tool to mobilize mass
electorates. That is, policy is viewed instrumentally (i.e. it
wins
votes).
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Downs and Number of Parties
4) Number of politicalparties is dependent uponthe shape of
distributionof voters.
Single peaked: twoparty system is likely.
Multi-peaked:multiparty system islikely.
Two party systems createincentives for parties toconverge at the
positionof the median voter.
Multiparty systems donot.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Median_voter_model.png
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Evaluating Spatial Models of Voting
Downs 1957 Important contributions
regarding: 1) Spatial modeling of
party competition 2) Identification of issue
dimensions which framepolitics.
3) Linkages betweencampaign promises andgovernmental
performanceexplained as a function ofre-election prospects.
Dunleavy 1991 Questions assumption
that voter preferencesare exogenous toparties.
Government parties canshape preferences via: 1) social
engineering 2) social relativities 3) context management.
Opposition parties canshape preferences via: 1) exploiting
social
tensions 2) strategic agenda setting
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
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Conclusions: Parties as Unitary Actors
Modeling parties as unitary actors can be usefultheoretically,
but problematic when describing reality.
Tsebelis (1990)
Party competition is a nested game party leaders
play on two levels: electorate and activists. Party activists
can constrain the ability of parties to shift
positions in response to changes in the electorate.
The ideal political position or platform may not beacceptable to
activists.
But maintaining policy positions preferable to activistsmay come
at a cost: possibility of entering office orwinning votes may be
affected.
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Case Study: the Netherlands
Examine:
Dutch Labor Party (PvdA)
Why were policy goals so dominant for so
long within the party?What did an emphasis on policy goals do
for
the PvdAs vote winning abilities?
What did it take for office seeking goals to
be privileged over policy goals?How did the push for votes shape
the partys
behavior?
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Schedule
Game: Elections
Unit Theme: Parties and Ideology
Readings:
Ware CH 1Mueller and Strom pgs. 89-111
Unit Theme: Coalition Formation
Readings:
Reserves: Laver and Schofield, Lijphart Dalton and Wattenberg CH
9
Game: Coalections.
