DPRK NAVY 2011 ASSESSMENT 110216Total Manpower Strength46,000

SUBMARINES78

FRIGATES3

CORVETTES4

FAST ATTACK CRAFT348

PATROL CRAFT58

MINESWEEPERS24

AIR0

LANDING CRAFT (including approx. 100 NAMPO crafts that carry up to 30)200

+/- KONGBANG HOVERCRAFT (Carry 35-55)30

Source Janes World Navies Issue 3 2009 / Military Periscope 2009

Summary Primarily a coastal defense force; ill-equipped (mostly outdated Russian equipment) and ill-supplied Limited capability in terms of total coastal defense outside of 12 miles off the coast and for special operations insertions into S. Korean territory cannot defend coast/territorial waters out to 200 m out to see Past decade it has a constant combat ship strength of cca. 840 vessels with economic problems degrade training/operations capabilities as well as maintenance due to lack of purchasing power for parts, with 20-30 percent of surface fleet in engine/hull repair or in dry docks or graving docks, with an additional 10-15 percent of the surface fleet is stored on land; in the open and tunnels, meaning that major repairs would need to be completed to make them operational

Submarine forces in better condition/state of readiness, however numbers are declining due to aforementioned problems

Navy responsible for sinking S.Korean ship last March submarine torpedo action

Hindering factors for the Korean Peoples Navy (KPN)

Limited training Obsolescing equipment Poor material materiel condition of combat ships Unsophisticated Electronic Warfare equipment Shortage of modern equipment Inefficient/inadequate logistics system Too much bureaucracy Poor command and control Moderate morale

Were the KPN to engage in a conflict, it would be able to conduct limited short-term and defensive operations, namely Deploy attack surface and submarine attack forces to the Yellow and East Seas to disrupt commercial shipping to ROK and Japan/serve as an obstacle to an attacker Interdict into Japans eastern ports with midget and coastal submarines Conduct special operations landings Conduct two-batallion-brigade and multiple company-battalion sized amphibious lift ops to ROK Patrol sized crafts cant operate outside of 50 miles off the coast

In a conflict with ROK and US, the vast majority of KPN surface ships however submarines would be able to continue to fight longerEQUIPMENT DEC05 DEC06 JAN08 JUL09 SHIPS

Attack Submarines 22 20 20 22 ROMEO-class attack (China/North Korea) 21 21 6 21 37-meter special ops midget SANG-O-class) (most in reserve) # 36 36 36 YUGO type 20-meter special ops midget # # N/A N/A 8.6-meter special ops (North Korea)

Frigates 1 1 1 1 SOHO class (w/4 SS-N-2A Styx SSM) 2 1 1 2 NAJIN class (w/2 SS-N-2A Styx SSM)

Patrol Boats 15 7 7 10 SOJU-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Osa-I type) 6 5 5 6 SOHUNG-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Komar class) 4 4 N/A 4 HUANFENG-class guided-missile 8 8 N/A 8 OSA-II-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (ex-USSR) 40 63 63 40 SIN-HUNG class torpedo (some w/ hydrofoils fitted) (North Korea) 60 60 N/A 60 KU SONG-class torpedo 13 13 6 13 TAECHONG-class patrol (Chinese HAINAN class design) 6 6 N/A 6 HAINAN-class patrol (China) 18 18 18 33 SINPO-class patrol (North Korea) 4 4 2 5 SARIWON-class patrol (Russian TRAL class) 12 12 N/A 12 SHANGHAI II-class patrol (ex-Chinese) 15 N/A 4 18 S.O. 1-class patrol (Russian/North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A CHODO-class patrol (North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A FSU SHERSHEN w/ 533-mm TT 14 14 54 CHONG JIN class 2 6 CHONGJU-class patrol 18 59 CHAHO-class patrol (North Korea) 10 10 TB-11PA-class harbor patrol (North Korea)

Mine Warfare 23 18 19 24 Yukto-I/II-class MCM (North Korean 24-m design)

Amphibious 10 4 4 10 HANTAE-class medium landing ship (North Korean 50-m design)

100 60 60 96 NAMPO-personnel landing craft (North Korean 27.7-m design)

15 4 4 4 HANCHON-utility landing craft (North Korean 35.7-m design) 40 40 40 Kong Bang-series personnel landing craft

Infiltration # 7 7 7 Hand Grenade-class infiltration launches (U.S.) # # # # infiltration submersibles (Korea) # # infiltration craft (Korea) # 8+ 8+ 8+ Cluster OSPREY semi-submersible craft (Korea)

Auxiliary # 1 1 1 KOWAN-class submarine rescue ship

MISSILES Surface-to-Surface # # # # SS-N-2A Styx (Russian 4K40 Termit)

ARTILLERY Coastal Defense Guns # # # # 152-mm M-1937 # # # # 130-mm SM-4-1 towed # # 130-mm M-1992 # # # # 122-mm M-1931/M-1937

Anti-Submarine # # RBU 1200

MISSILES Coastal Defense Surface-to-Surface # # # # SSC-2B Samlet # # # # HY-2 (6 sites) (China) # # # # SS-N-2 Styx

Order of BattleCommand and ControlKPN (HQ Pyongyang) is under the Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF), along with Korean Peoples Air Force (KPAF) and the Korean Peoples Army (KPA). Commander of the Navy: Admiral Kim Yun-Sim subordinate to Chief of the General Staff Department Commander of the Navy serves three functions: Helps to formulate policy at MPAF-level Commands the KPN through Naval Command Head Quarters Naval Staff Coordinates naval ops with other armed forces branches Coordination and Support Units one coastal defense unit Maritime Department Merchant Marine Coastal Defense Artillery Coastal Security Units

Subordinates to the Commander of the Navy are: East/West Sea Fleet Commanders Chief of Naval Staff Deputy Political Commander Deputy Technical Commander Deputy Rear Services Commander Deputy Navigation Commander Military Prosecution Office Military Justice Office Naval Medical Center (Navy Medical Hostpital) Kim Chong-suk Nval Technical Training Center Naval Officers School Navy Petty Officers School Naval Technical Training Center Numerous ship building and repair facilities Fleets do not exchange vessels/mutual support non-existent due to geographic/infrastructure/financial shortcomings.

Commander West Sea Fleet (also Yellow Sea Fleet Nampo): Rear Admiral Jyung Myung-Do subordinate to Commander of the Navy Six Squadrons (three names known according to Janes Defense 09, 6 squadrons, according to Military Periscope, 5) 8th Naval Squadron [Sagon-ni (37 49 23 N; 125 20 57E), Hwanghae-Namdo ()] 11th Naval Squadron (Nampo) 12th Naval Squadron (Yomju-gun, Pyongan-butko) 3 Unknown Squadrons 1 Navy Sniper Brigade\ Pipa-got is the primary location for Submarines Nampo is primary repair and logistics base 11th Naval Squadron HQ is Nampo, but subs are located usually at Pip-a-got Coastal Security Bureau provides an additional 50-60 vessels

Commander East Sea Fleet (Toejo-dong, Nagwon-up): Rear Admiral Park Won-Shik subordinate to Commander of the Navy 10 Squadrons (Unknown) includes the 4th Squadron tasked to insert Navy Sniper Brigade in war to Japan Coastal Security Bureau 70 to 80 additional vessels in East Sea 1 Navy Sniper Brigade Chaho, Mayang-do and Yuktae-tong (across from Mayang-do) are the primary submarine bases for Sang-o Class and Yugo class SSM; reported at Hwangtdo, Kosong-up and Toejo-dong

Role of bases: organizational/logistics center Most KPN patrol craft are in small ports, with 6-12 patrol craft, apparently Organization of Squadrons HQ Batallions Companies Squadron Structure (Eg. 12th Naval Squadron - West Fleet) HQ Battalion 11 Batallions 7 Batallions with nine small inshore patrol craft (suspected to be pontoon) 2 Battalions for transport (of Snipers) 1 Torpedo boat battalion All vessels commanded by a 1st lieutenant or sub-Lieutenant All missile-armed fast attack craft are commanded by lieutenant commanders

Operations/Tactical Doctrine Influenced by ex-USSR/China Focus on support of military/spec ops via infiltration operations and amphibious landings, supported by Submarines Missile craft Naval rocket bombardment Minelaying Limitations: Aging equipment Parts shortages (or non-access) Lack of Electronic Warfare equipment Wear and tear of ships Communications of KPN relies on ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications, in addition to using other military branch communications or civilian networks KPN bases rely on fortified underground facilities for protection and concealment Ship deployment to smaller FOBs and civilian ports Known base location coordinates

Chaho 40 12 26 N; 128 3858 E Munchon 39 18 00 N; 127 23 54 E Mayang-do 39 59 54 N; 128 12 50 E Najin 42 09 24 N; 130 12 04 E Nampo (Chinnampo) 38 42 59 N; 125 23 12 E Pipa-got 38 35 29 N; 124 59 29 E Sagon-Ni (Sa-got) 37 49 23 N; 125 20 57E Cho-do 38 32 09 N; 124 52 39 E Chongjin 41 46 34 N; 129 49 54 E Chakto-dong (Chakto-ri) 39 48 58 N; 127 39 33 E Haeju 37 59 47 N; 125 41 59 E Hodo-ri 39 21 00 N; 127 32 00 E Hwangto-do 39 10 00 N; 127 32 01 E Kosong up (Changjon-ni) 38 44 25 N; 128 11 25 E Kwangyang-ni 38 44 25 N; 125 13 30 E Ohang-ni 39 18 52 N; 127 25 59 E Puam-dong 41 19 34 N; 129 45 49 E Sinchang-nodongjagu 40 08 11 N; 128 28 10 E Songjin (Kimchaek) 40 39 32 N; 129 12 27 E Songjon-pando 39 21 56 N; 127 27 08 E Sunwi-do 37 46 10 N; 125 20 18 E Toejo-dong (Nagwon-up) 39 54 13 N; 127 46 29 E Wonsan 39 09 10 N; 127 26 37 E Yoho-ri 39 52 20 N; 127 47 05 E Yongdok 39 36 47 N; 124 37 52 E Yongam-ni (Yongamnichung-chon) 40 24 35 N; 128 54 28 E Yongampo 39 56 05 N; 124 22 23 E Yuktaedong-ni 40 01 29 N; 128 09 35 E

Training

Officer Training Conducted at Kim Chong-suk Naval University, the Naval Officers School and Navy Petty Officers School

Enlisted training Conscript basic training conducted at KPN recruit centers at Wonsan and Nampo, to be assigned to a training unit at a duty assignment upon completion of basic training recruits that excel in their training unit/duty unit can be sent to the Navy Technical Training Center at Najin for advanced technical training Navigation Gunnery Missiles Radio Communication Engine maintenance Etc.

Doctrine

All training based on the USSR/Chinese navy doctrine Ideological/political indoctrination Focus on physical fitness and basic military skills

The famine/economic crisis in the 1990s turned training more towards ideological/political indoctrination, resulting in a loss of capabilities June 1999 losses in skirmishes around Yonpyong-do Island caused the KPN to re-focus on afloat exercises, which, tapered down over time to a consistent pace since 2007

Use of defensive minefields in case of war

Research and Development KONGBANG Class Hovercraft Capacity 35-50 50km speed Light armor 50mm and 30mm machine guns at stern Allegedly newer craft have been developed, with speeds up to 90 km an hour Same specsSOURCESourceshttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htmPROFILE

Geography Area: 122,762 sq. km. (47,918 sq. mi.), about the size of Mississippi.Cities: Capital--Pyongyang. Other cities--Hamhung, Chongjin, Wonsan, Nampo, Sinjuiju, and Kaesong.Terrain: About 80% of land area is moderately high mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys and small, cultivated plains. The remainder is lowland plains covering small, scattered areas.Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid, summers.

Government Type: Highly centralized communist state.Independence: August 15, 1945--Korean liberation from Japan; September 9, 1948--establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K., or North Korea), marking its separation from the Republic of Korea (R.O.K., or South Korea).Constitution: 1948; revised in 1972, 1992, 1998, and 2009.Branches: Executive--President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (chief of state); Chairman of the National Defense Commission (head of government). Legislative--Supreme People's Assembly. Judicial--Central Court; provincial, city, county, and military courts.Subdivisions: Nine provinces; two province-level municipalities (Pyongyang, Nasun, also known as Najin-Sonbong free trade zone); one special city (Nampo), 24 cities.Political party: Korean Workers' Party (Communist).Suffrage: Universal at 17.

Economy*GDP (2008 estimate): $24.8 billion; 46.2% in industry, 32.2% in services, 21.6% in agriculture and fisheries.Per capita GDP (2008): $1,800.Agriculture: Products--rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, cattle, pigs, pork, and eggs.Mining and manufacturing: Types--military products; machine building; chemicals; mining (gold, coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, etc.); metallurgy; textiles; food processing.Trade (2008): Exports--$ 2.06 billion (South Korean Trade and Investment Promotion Agency): minerals, non-ferrous metals, garments, chemicals/plastics, machinery/electric and electronic products, animal products, wood products, vegetable products, and precious metals. The D.P.R.K. is also thought to earn hundreds of millions of dollars from the unreported sale of missiles, narcotics, and counterfeit cigarettes and currency, and other illicit activities. Imports--$3.58 billion: minerals, petroleum, machinery/electronics, vegetable products, textiles, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, plastics, vehicles, and animal products.Major trading partners (2008): (1) China, (2) R.O.K., (3) Singapore, (4) India, and (5) Russia.

*In most cases, the figures used above are estimates based upon incomplete data and projections.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONSNorth Korea has a centralized government under the rigid control of the communist Korean Workers' Party (KWP), to which all government officials belong. A few minor political parties are allowed to exist in name only. Kim Il-sung ruled North Korea from 1948 until his death in July 1994. Kim Il-sung served both as Secretary General of the KWP and as President of North Korea. The latter post was abolished following Kim Il-sungs death and the title of the Eternal President of the Republic was established and given to Kim Il-sung.

Little is known about the actual lines of power and authority in the North Korean Government despite the formal structure set forth in its constitution. Following the death of Kim Il-sung, his son, Kim Jong-il, inherited supreme power. Kim Jong-il was named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997, and in September 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) reconfirmed Kim Jong-il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position as the "highest office of state." However, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Yong-nam, serves as the nominal head of state. North Korea's 1972 constitution was amended in late 1992, September 1998, and April 2009.

Three key entities control the government of the D.P.R.K. The cabinet, formerly known as the State Administration Council (SAC), administers the ministries and has a significant role in implementing policy. The cabinet is headed by the premier and is the dominant administrative and executive agency. The National Defence Commission (NDC) is responsible for external and internal security, and under the leadership of Kim Jong-il the NDC has assumed a significant role in influencing policy. The Politburo of the Central Peoples Committee is the top policymaking body of the KWP, which also plays a role as the dominant social institution in North Korea.

Officially, the D.P.R.K.s legislature, the Supreme Peoples Assembly (SPA), is the highest organ of state power. Its members are elected every 4 years. Usually only two meetings are held annually, each lasting a few days. A standing committee elected by the SPA performs legislative functions when the Assembly is not in session. In reality, the SPA serves only to ratify decisions made by the ruling KWP.

North Korea's judiciary is "accountable" to the SPA and the president. The SPA's standing committee also appoints judges to the highest court for 4-year terms that are concurrent with those of the Assembly.

Administratively, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and two provincial-level municipalities--Pyongyang and Nasun (also known as Najin-Sonbong). It also appears to be divided into nine military districts.

Principal Party and Government Officials Kim Jong-il--General Secretary of the KWP; Supreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces; Chairman of the NDC; son of North Korea's founder Kim Il-sungKim Yong-nam--President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly; titular head of stateHan Song-ryol--Ambassador to the D.P.R.K. Permanent Mission to the UNPak Ui-chun--Minister of Foreign AffairsKim Jong-un--General of the Peoples Armed Forces, Vice-Chairman Central Military Commission; son of Kim Jong-Il

DEFENSE AND MILITARY ISSUESNorth Korea has one of the largest armies in the world. It has an estimated active duty military force of up to 1.2 million personnel, compared to about 680,000 in the South. Military spending is estimated at as much as a quarter of GNP, with up to 20% of men ages 17-54 in the regular armed forces. North Korean forces have a substantial numerical advantage over the South (around 2 to 1) in several key categories of offensive weapons--tanks, long-range artillery, and armored personnel carriers. The North has one of the world's largest special operations forces, designed for insertion behind the lines in wartime.

North Koreas navy is primarily a coastal navy, with antiquated surface and submarine fleets. Its air force has twice the number of aircraft as the South, but, except for a few advanced fighters, the North's air force is obsolete.

The North deploys the bulk of its forces well forward, along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Several North Korean military tunnels under the DMZ were discovered in the period from the 1970s to the present day. Over the course of several years, North Korea realigned its forces and moved some rear-echelon troops to hardened bunkers closer to the DMZ. Given the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ (some 25 miles), South Korean and U.S. forces are likely to have little warning of attack. The United States and South Korea continue to believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea remains an effective deterrent. North Korea's attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program has also been a source of international tension (see below, Reunification Efforts Since 1971; Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula).

In 1953, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was created to oversee and enforce the terms of the armistice. North Korea has sought to dismantle the MAC in a push for a new "peace mechanism" on the peninsula. In April 1994, it declared the MAC void and withdrew its representatives.

www.militaryperiscope.comNations/Alliances/Geographic RegionsAsia -- North KoreaNavyArmed Forces StructureEquipmentDeploymentIssues and NotesPlans and Programs

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEWThe North Korean navy is divided into the Yellow Sea Fleet (West Coast Fleet) and the East Sea Fleet (East Coast Fleet). The Yellow Sea fleet, headquartered at Nampo Dong, contains five operational commands; the East Sea Fleet, headquartered at Toejo, contains seven operational commands. The fleets do not exchange vessels because geographical limitations make mutual support almost impossible. The navy, in conjunction with the army and air force, operates one coastal defense artillery and missile regiment on either coast. Amphibious operations are conducted by the special forces command in conjunction with naval personnel. There is no naval air arm. Most navy vessels are small patrol-size craft unable to operate over 50 nautical miles from the coast, but are capable of policing the DPRK's territorial waters. The navy's most-capable weapons systems are their guided-missile patrol boats equipped with the SS-N-2A Styx anti-ship missile. Though their small size limits operations to coastal waters and calm seas, they have the capability to quickly respond to ships approaching the coast. The largest part of the navy consists of small combatants, including torpedo boats, patrol boats, patrol craft, fast attack craft and small amphibious landing craft. Nearly half of the torpedo boats were built in North Korea. The DPRK also has indigenously produced over 200 personnel landing craft. This includes approximately 100 NAMPO personnel landing craft that would spearhead any clandestine landings directed against South Korea. Each NAMPO can carry approximately 30 personnel.

PERSONNEL STRENGTHThe North Korean navy has an active force of 46,000 personnel.

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search our Weapons Database. Equipment is of Russian origin unless otherwise noted. # denotes an unknown quantity)

DEC05 DEC06 JAN08 JUL09 SHIPS

Attack Submarines 22 20 20 22 ROMEO-class attack (China/North Korea) 21 21 6 21 37-meter special ops midget SANG-O class) (most in reserve) # 36 36 36 YUGO type 20-meter special ops midget # # N/A N/A 8.6-meter special ops (North Korea)

Frigates 1 1 1 1 SOHO class (w/4 SS-N-2A Styx SSM) 2 1 1 2 NAJIN class (w/2 SS-N-2A Styx SSM)

Patrol Boats 15 7 7 10 SOJU-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Osa-I type) 6 5 5 6 SOHUNG-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (Russian Komar class) 4 4 N/A 4 HUANGFENG-class guided-missile 8 8 N/A 8 OSA II-class guided-missile (w/SS-N-2A Styx) (ex-USSR) 40 63 63 40 SIN HUNG-class torpedo (some w/ hydrofoils fitted) (North Korea) 60 60 N/A 60 KU SONG-class torpedo 13 13 6 13 TAECHONG-class patrol (Chinese HAINAN class design) 6 6 N/A 6 HAINAN-class patrol (China) 18 18 18 33 SINPO-class patrol (North Korea) 4 4 2 5 SARIWON-class patrol (Russian TRAL class) 12 12 N/A 12 SHANGHAI II-class patrol (ex-Chinese) 15 N/A 4 18 S.O. 1-class patrol (Russian/North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A CHODO-class patrol (North Korea) 3 2 N/A N/A FSU SHERSHEN w/ 533-mm TT 14 14 54 CHONG JIN class 2 6 CHONGJU-class patrol 18 59 CHAHO-class patrol (North Korea) 10 10 TB-11PA-class harbor patrol (North Korea)

Mine Warfare 23 18 19 24 Yukto-I/II-class MCM (North Korean 24-m design)

Amphibious 10 4 4 10 HANTAE-class medium landing ship (North Korean 50-m design)

100 60 60 96 NAMPO-personnel landing craft (North Korean 27.7-m design)

15 4 4 4 HANCHON-utility landing craft (North Korean 35.7-m design) 40 40 40 Kong Bang-series personnel landing craft

Infiltration # 7 7 7 Hand Grenade-class infiltration launches (U.S.) # # # # infiltration submersibles (Korea) # # infiltration craft (Korea) # 8+ 8+ 8+ Cluster OSPREY semi-submersible craft (Korea)

Auxiliary # 1 1 1 KOWAN-class submarine rescue ship

MISSILES Surface-to-Surface # # # # SS-N-2A Styx (Russian 4K40 Termit)

ARTILLERY Coastal Defense Guns # # # # 152-mm M-1937 # # # # 130-mm SM-4-1 towed # # 130-mm M-1992 # # # # 122-mm M-1931/M-1937

Anti-Submarine # # RBU 1200

MISSILES Coastal Defense Surface-to-Surface # # # # SSC-2B Samlet # # # # HY-2 (6 sites) (China) # # # # SS-N-2 Styx

Deployment

The West Coast Fleet is reported to operate from nine bases, while the East Coast Fleet has 12 bases; the fleets maintain approximately 420 and 570 vessels, respectively. A small number of coastal defense surface-to-surface missile batteries are operated by each fleet. Sixty percent of the navy's combat forces are forward-deployed.

Navy Headquarters Pyongyang

Yellow Sea Fleet Headquarters Nampo Bases: Pipa Got Sagon-ni Chodo-ri Pupo-ri Tasa-ri Sohae-ri Sunwi-do Yogampo-ri

East Sea Fleet Headquarters Toejo Dong Bases: Najin Wonsan Chaho Muchon-up Songjon Kimchaek Ksong-up Namer-ri Puam-Dong Pando Sanjin-dong Songjon Yohori

Issues

Russia has denied reports that it has helped North Korea with developing a sea-based nuclear program. The North Korean navy has been regularly implicated in the transshipment of narcotics and counterfeit currency. There have been sporadic naval engagements between North and South Korea for years, usually over their disputed maritime boundary. In 2004, North Korea warned that if the South Korean navy continued to engage in "serious provocation," naval warfare could ensue. Incursions continued to be reported in 2009. The navy was observed stepping up its amphibious landing training in June 2009, sparking South Korean concern over a possible invasion.

Plans and Programs

The North Korean fleet is rapidly aging. Given the economic and political situation, it is likely to receive little or no modernization, driving down Pyongyang's already limited combat potential. LATEST UPDATE: 1 July 2009 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Retrieved 110215 4:50PM-----http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/ships/amphib/w0001615.htmlHANCHON class**EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Ships -- Amphibious COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea **US/NATO code name or designation

SHIP LIST

4 HANCHON-class UTILITY LANDING CRAFT (LCU)

DESCRIPTIONLittle is confirmed about these utility landing craft except that they have a bow ramp, two machine guns, and are believed capable of carrying two tanks or up to 200 troops for a short distances. Characteristics are estimated.

STATUSFour units remain in active service. DISPOSALS: Five other units have been stricken.

BUILDER(S)

North Korea

USERS/PLATFORMS

North Korea Navy

CHARACTERISTICS

Displacement: 145 tons full load Dimensions: length 117 ft 2 in (35.70 m) overall beam 25 ft 9 in ( 7.90 m) draft 3 ft 9 in ( 1.20 m) maximum Propulsion: 3 Russian type 3D12 diesels; 600 total bhp; 2 shafts Performance: speed 10 knots range 600 nm at 12 knots Manning: 16 total Military lift: 2 tanks or 200 troops Combat Systems: guns 2 14.5-mm machine guns radar 1 Zarnitsa (Skin Head**) surface search

ISSUES AND NOTESNone.

OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 February 2009-------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/ships/smcombat/w0001639.htmlSOJU (PTG) class**EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Ships -- Small Combatants COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea **US/NATO code name or designation

SHIP LIST

7 SOJU-class GUIDED MISSILE PATROL CRAFT (PTG)

DESCRIPTIONA total of 15 to 17 units of this class were completed during 1981-1993. Vessels in this PTG class are North Korean-built versions of the Russian OSA-I class .** They have the same propulsion system, missile armament, 30-mm twin gun mounts and the electronics as the Russian OSA-Is.

STATUSAll seven craft are believed to be active.

BUILDER(S)

North Korea

USERS/PLATFORMS

North Korea Navy

CHARACTERISTICS

Displacement: approx. 220 tons full load Dimensions: length 141 ft 1 in (43.0 m) overall beam 24 ft 6 in ( 7.5 m) draft 5 ft 9 in ( 1.8 m) maximum Propulsion: 3 type M-503A diesels; 12,000 total bhp; 3 shafts Performance: speed 34 knots Manning 40 max. total Combat Systems: missiles 4 Styx (SS-N-2A)** SSM missile launchers guns 2 twin 30-mm/60 cal. (AK-230) AA radar 1 Rangout (Russian Square Tie**) surface search/ missile target acquisition 1 MR-104 Rys' (Russian Drum Tilt**) gun fire control

ISSUES AND NOTESNone.

OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 June 2006 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. -------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/sensors/sonar/w0003773.htmlFeniksVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- Pegas---- Shark Gill**---- Tamir---- HerkulesEQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Sensors/Electronics -- Sonars COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia **US/NATO code name or designation

DESCRIPTIONSurface Ships The early Soviet surface ships of the post-World War II period largely utilized the Tamir-5 series of high-frequency, hull-mounted sonars. They were succeeded from the mid-1950s by the Pegas-2 series sonars and then, after the late 1950s, by the Herkules series. Subsequently, various improved sonars were developed for the Soviet warships that began joining the fleet in the 1960s. By the 1960s, as the Soviet navy became more concerned with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and submarine detection, there was an effort to reduce frequencies. For at least the next two decades, the frequencies were reduced from the 20-30 kHz range to about 2-15 kHz. Bow-mounted sonars were mounted in some later surface classes, providing the optimum hull-mounted sonar position (i.e., away from machinery and propeller noises), while also providing some "d ampening" effect in rough sea operations. In addition, active bistatic detection became possible with the installation of variable depth sonar (VDS) in several surface combatants, beginning with the MOSKVA-class helicopter ships (operational in 1967). Towed sonar arrays have been sighted on Russian ships in the development and evaluation stage, but no deployment has been confirmed. Submarines Early post-World War II submarines with "new" sonar installations were primarily equipped with the Tamir-5L set. Submarines were subsequently fitted with active-passive Herkules and passive Feniks sonars. Beginning with the VICTOR III class** attack submarine (operational in 1978), the Soviets and Russians have deployed towed passive sonar arrays. Such systems seemed to have narrow-band processors, greatly enhancing their capability. Other submarine classes were fitted with similar towed arrays, inc luding the SIERRA-class,** AKULA-class ** and YANKEE-class** ballistic missile submarines converted to an attack submarine configuration. A Shark Gill ** low-frequency sonar was identified in newer submarine classes, including the MIKE**, SIERRA** and possibly OSCAR** classes. Aircraft Soviet fixed-wing ASW aircraft and helicopters carried air-dropped, expendable sonobouys that could provide active or passive submarine detection. These dipping sonars were adopted for smaller surface combatants (see below). Seafloor installations The Russian navy also employs moored, sea-floor acoustic systems in coastal and regional seas. These do not appear to have the range or capability of the U.S. Navy's SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System).

STATUSFirst developed between 1949 and 1953 for ZULU- and NOVEMBER-class submarines. Initial operational capability (IOC) 1953. In service in North Korea.

BUILDER(S)

Vodtranspribor, St Petersburg, Russia (design and serial production)

USERS/PLATFORMS

North Korea Navy submarines ROMEO class (Project 033)

ISSUES AND NOTESNone.

OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 October 2010 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. -----http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20110210&recordnum=13096North Korea: Pyongyang Says No More Military MeetingsFebruary 10, 2011The North Korean military says it will no longer meet with delegations from the armed forces of South Korea, Agence France-Presse reports. The statement was released on the North's official news agency. Two days of colonel-level talks with the South Korean military broke down on Wednesday when the northerners unilaterally walked out of the meeting. Seoul has called for an apology for the sinking of a South Korean warship and the shelling of a disputed border island. The statement from Pyongyang said that the South Korean military is only interested in maintaining high tension on the peninsula.

-------South Korea: Indigenous Cruise Missiles May Deploy EarlyFebruary 09, 2011The South Korea may field an indigenous ship-launched cruise missile ahead of schedule in response to the North Korean threat, says a military source cited by the Korea Herald. The Cheonryong (Sea Dragon) missile, with a range of more than 300 miles (500 km), could be deployed this year on Choong Moo Gong Lee Soon Shin-class destroyers, which are also known as the KDX-II class, said the unnamed source. Pyongyang has deployed anti-ship missiles along its western coast, which threaten South Korean warships, said the source. The navy sees the Cheonryong missiles as a counter to that threat. The deployment plans were reportedly accelerated after North Korea launched an artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyoeng island last November. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the Choong Moo Gong Lee Soon Shin class at: http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/ships/destroyr/w0004977.html--------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20110209&recordnum=13068North Korea: Delegation From Pyongyang Leaves Talks in PanmunjomFebruary 09, 2011Talks between North and South Korea ended abruptly on Wednesday after the delegation from Pyongyang walked out, CNN reports. The rivals were meeting for the first time in four months. The two sides did not reach an agreement about setting up high-level military discussions during this preparatory session held in the border area of Panmunjom. After less than five hours, the North Koreans left the table in a "unilateral" move, said the South Korean Defense Ministry. Pyongyang was said to be demanding a comprehensive agenda from both sides on possible military actions. Seoul wanted to limited discussion to last year's attacks by the North on a South Korean warship and a disputed border island.------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20110207&recordnum=13014South Korea: Drills With U.S. Expected To Emphasize N. Korean WMDsFebruary 07, 2011South Korea and the United States have agreed to strengthen a military exercise involving the simulated removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), reports the Yonhap News Agency. Participants in this year's Key Resolve exercises, scheduled for March, will practice finding and destroying North Korea's nuclear weapons and other WMDs, according to an unnamed military source. The focus of the joint drills was narrowed after Pyongyang in November revealed its uranium-enrichment facility. A group of specialists from the 20th Support Command in Maryland will take part in the exercise, said the source.------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20110201&recordnum=12932North Korea: More Nuclear Sites Suspected In North, Says ReportFebruary 01, 2011A confidential U.N. report prepared is said to indicate that North Korea may have developed secret nuclear facilities, the Washington Post reports. The White House had also expressed the belief that North Korea has additional nuclear sites beyond its Yongbyon plant. The U.N. panel of experts reportedly concluded that Yongbyon is just the visible face of a larger nuclear program. A visiting nuclear scientist who recently visited Yongbyon said he suspected that the facility's 2,000 centrifuges were built elsewhere.--------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20110126&recordnum=12842South Korea: Talks With N. Korea May Begin Next MonthJanuary 26, 2011South Korea has urged that preliminary military talks with North Korea be held next month, Agence France-Presse reports. The two sides have recently agreed in principle to hold high-level military talks as way to ease high tensions sparked by North Korean attacks against a South Korean warship and a South Korean island in disputed territory The Defense Ministry said it sent a message to North Korea suggesting a Feb. 11 meeting at the border village of Panmunjom. That meeting, should it take place, would attempt to set the date for higher-level military talks.-------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101217&recordnum=12243North Korea: S. Korea Warned To Cancel Its Planned Artillery DrillDecember 17, 2010North Korea has warned South Korea to cancel a planned live-fire artillery exercise or face an even deadlier attack than last month's barrage of Yeonpyeong Island that killed two civilians and two marines, reports MSNBC. Earlier this week, Seoul announced plans for exercises between Saturday and Tuesday on Yeonpyeong, which was shelled on Nov. 23. North Korean official news agency KCNA said the "intensity and scope" of its actions will be worse than the previous attack. The South has said its military activities are part of "routine, justified" exercises.-------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101216&recordnum=12214South Korea: Seoul Plans Artillery Drills For Yeonpyeong IslandDecember 16, 2010The South Korean military has announced plans to hold artillery exercises on the island recently shelled by North Korea in November, Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports. Live-fire exercises will take place between Dec. 18 and Dec. 21 on Yeonpyeong island, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Thursday. That island was hit by dozens of North Korean shells and rockets on Nov. 23, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians. Around 20 U.S. military personnel are expected to provide medical and communications support during the drills.-------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101215&recordnum=12190North Korea: Preparations Noted For Possible Nuclear TestDecember 15, 2010Activity at a North Korean nuclear test site in Punggye-ri in North Hamgyong province may indicate that preparations for a third nuclear test are underway, South Korea's Chosun Ilbo reports. The North has reportedly dug a tunnel more than 500 meters (1,640 feet) deep, said South Korean intelligence officials cited by the paper. At this rate, the North should reach a depth of 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) between March and May. It is possible to conduct nuclear tests at that depth, according to experts. There is also ongoing construction of a new building at North Korea's main nuclear site in Yongbyon, intelligence officials said. The construction at both sites appears to be continuing at a steady pace despite winter conditions, said the sources.-------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101208&recordnum=12062*********North Korea: Midget Subs Feature Torpedo Tubes, Say Sources In SouthDecember 08, 2010South Korean intelligence sources maintain that North Korea's newest midget submarines are equipped with torpedo tubes, reports the JoongAng Daily. The Daedong-B mini-subs are fitted with 13-foot (4-m) torpedo tubes, according to satellite imagery examined by South Korean and U.S. intelligence officials cited by the unnamed sources. The subs are said to be 56 feet (17 m) long, 13 feet (4 m) wide and 7 feet (2.2 m) high, with a ramp-shaped aft section to enable personnel to enter and exit the vessel. North Korea conducted intense exercises with the new boats in July as well as during the recent joint U.S-South Korean drills, according to a South Korean intelligence official.------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101203&recordnum=12001South Korea: Another Attack By N. Korea Will Result In Airstrikes, Says New Defense ChiefDecember 03, 2010The four-star general just named South Korea's new defense minister says Seoul will hit back with airstrikes against North Korea if it attacks the South again, the New York Times reports. In a parliamentary confirmation hearing, Defense Minister-designate Kim Kwan-jin said the military had "failed to carry out its basic duty" in defending against recent North Korean attacks. Kim said more aggressive rules of engagement were being prepared to allow for quicker and deadlier responses. "If the enemy attacks our people and territory again, I will use force to punish the enemy to make sure it doesn't even dare think about it again," he said Friday. A North Korean submarine was blamed for sinking a South Korean warship in March, killing 46 sailors. Last month, the North launched an artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyeong island, killing four people.

------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101129&recordnum=11904Iran: N. Korean Missile Obtained By Tehran, Says Leaked CableNovember 29, 2010American intelligence assessments suggest that Iran has obtained 19 advanced missiles from North Korea that could hit Moscow and Western Europe, Bloomberg News reports. The intelligence information is contained in a massive release of documents by WikiLeaks. The North Korean BM-25 missiles, based on the Russian R-27, might give Iran the "building blocks" for producing long-range missiles, according to a cable dated Feb. 24, 2010. The cable was given to the New York Times, but the paper declined to publish it at the Obama administration's request. The cables, which WikiLeaks began posting Sunday, seem to indicate that Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments began pressing the U.S. in 2008 to attack Iran. Washington denounced the leaks as potentially threatening ties with foreign governments. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the R-27 at: http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/missrock/strat/w0006019.html------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/missrock/strat/w0006019.htmlSS-N-6 Serb** SLBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- R-27 (Russian designation)---- RSM-25 Zyb (manufacturer's designation)---- mobile land-based SS-N-6 (possible North Korean variant)---- SS-NX-13** (radio command guidance variant)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Strategic COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia PICTURES OF: SS-N-6 Serb** SLBM

**US/NATO code name or designation

DESCRIPTIONThe SS-N-6 Serb** (Russian designation R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a single-stage, storable liquid-propellant missile designed for the Yankee-class nuclear submarine. It was developed in three main variants: The first three used an inertial guidance system, while the fourth variant (see Variants, below) used radio command guidance. Each Yankee-class SSBN carried 16 SS-N-6 missiles. The missiles could be launched while the Yankee was submerged and underway -- with a reaction time of about 15 minutes when under normal patrol status and in one minute at peak alert status. The submarine could maintain peak alert status for up to one hour. The design of the SS-N-6 is particularly notable for the placement of the rocket engines inside the fuel tank, reducing the external dimensions of the vehicle. The squat, cylindrical body of the missile was made of aluminum alloys, with the oxidizer and fuel tanks having a common bottom. A hermetically sealed container in the lower interior of the oxidizer tank contained the command and control systems, which eliminated the need for an instrument module. The sensors of the command system were placed on a gyro-stabilized platform. A single-chamber sustainer and a dual-chamber control engine comprise the propulsion system. Rather than the usual arrangement of four thrust chambers aligned on the stabilization axis of the missile, the SS-N-6 oriented the thrust chambers of the attitude control engine at an angle of 45 degrees from the axis. These design innovations, when combined with a lack of aerodynamic stabilizers and the metallic-rubber shock absorbers used to cushion the missile during loading, gave the entire launch tube smaller dimensions, assisting in fitting the system into the Yankee-class subs. To fire the missile, the tube was flooded and a gas bubble created by the docking adapter cushioned the hydraulic shock caused by igniting the engine in the tube. The missile's warhead contained a single 1-megaton multi-stage thermonuclear device. The missiles could be launched singly in 8-second intervals or as two volleys of eight missiles each.

PICTURES

STATUSThe SS-N-6 began deployment on March 13, 1968, and achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in early 1969. The missile was seen by the public for the first time during a parade in Moscow in 1967. The missile and its variants were withdrawn from Soviet/Russian service in 1993 with the deactivation of the last Yankee-class SSBN. Studies to develop the SS-N-6 missile were based on a 1961 proposal to develop a launch system with a light, single-stage missile for use against strategic land targets. The project was authorized on April 24, 1962. The first phase of testing consisted of 12 pop-up tests prior to 1966. In June 1966, a 10-month series of tests successfully completed 12 launches out of 17 attempts from a ground platform. Finally, six successful live launch tests were conducted from Yankee-class submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The D-5 launch system, designed for the SS-N-6, was the most successful system for launching SLBMs in the Soviet Union's arsenal. Over a period of 20 years there were 429 successful missile firings in 492 attempts.

BUILDER(S) Makeyev OKB, Russia (design bureau)

USERS/PLATFORMS North Korea (possible; see below)

CHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS All Variants Missile 41,667 lb (18,900 kg) Throwweight 1,500 lb ( 680 kg)

DIMENSIONS All Variants Configuration thick cylinder with smaller rounded re-entry vehicle (RV) on Mod 1, fuller section RV on Mod 3 Length 32 ft 10 in (10.00 m) Diameter 5 ft 11 in (1.80 m)

PROPULSION All Variants Engine single-stage liquid-fuel rocket Power 50,740 lb (23,000 kg) initial thrust

PERFORMANCE All Variants Trajectory altitude 339 nm (390 mi, 628 km) max CEP 1.0 nm (1.2 mi, 1.9 km) Launch depth 131-164 ft (40-50 m) Launch sea state 5 max Launch latitude up to 85 deg N Launch sub speed 4 kts max SS-N-6 Mod 1 Range 1,300 nm (1,497 mi, 2,409 km) SS-N-6 Mod 2/3 Range 1,600 nm (1,842 mi, 2,965 km)

WARHEAD SS-N-6 Mod 1/2 Warhead 1 x 1 Mt multi-stage thermonuclear device SS-N-6 Mod 3 Warhead 3 x 200 kt nuclear RVs

SENSORS/ELECTRONICS Guidance inertial

VARIANTSSS-N-6 Serb Mod 1Initial production variant. Later replaced in Yankee-class boats by Mod 3. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 2The Mod 2 was an upgrade that used more powerful engines and an improved guidance system. In Russian service, the missile was designated R-27U. Although designed to carry both single and multiple warheads, the Mod 2 carried only single devices. The upgrade to the missile was authorized on June 10, 1971. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 3Introduced MRV warhead to Soviet SLBMs. There was some debate as to the number of RVs carried, either two 600-lb RVs or three 400-lb RVs. The existence of a two-RV Mod 3 variant has not been confirmed by Russian sources. SS-NX-13Radio command guidance variant. Designated in Russian service as the R-27K, the SS-NX-13 had a nose cone with a terminal guidance system designed for use on both coastal radio-control installations and mobile targets at sea. It was tested in 1974, but never deployed. North Korean land-based mobile IRBMIn 2003, reports from North Korea indicated that Pyongyang was preparing to show a new missile at a military parade. Although the missiles were not displayed, reports by South Korean media in 2004 indicated the missiles were being deployed on mobile launchers staging out of two new bases. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes the new missile is based on the former Soviet SS-N-6 design, according to South Korean military sources. North Korea is believed to have obtained information and technology from Russia in the 1990s, U.S. officials said. There is no indication that Russia has been involved in the new North Korean program. If these reports about a North Korean missile are accurate, it would represent a significant advancement in North Korean missile development and design, given that the SS-N-6 is considered more sophisticated than other North Korean missiles. Pyongyang is also experimenting with a sea-based variant of the missile, for placement on and launch from ships and submarines, according to the July 30, 2004 issue of Jane's Defense Weekly. Such a development would give North Korean leaders a long-sought after way of striking at the continental United States. The land-based version of the North Korean SS-N-6 is said to have a range of 1,350-2,160 nm (1,550-2,485 mi, 2,500-4,000 km). The sea-based variant reportedly has a range of 1,350 nm (1,550 mi, 2,500 km).

ISSUES AND NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the forerunner of marine liquid-propellant rockets and incorporated many design and engineering innovations, including the following: all-welded missile body missile propulsors arranged in propellant and oxidizer tanks absence of empty (fuel-free) compartment use of metallized shock absorbers the missile is fueled with storable propellants and then enclosed automated control of pre-launch preparation and salvo firing Some SS-N-6 engines may have been kept for use in space launches.

OPERATIONAL NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the first "modern" strategic SLBM deployed in Soviet submarines. In October 1986, an SS-N-6 exploded on board a Yankee-class SSBN near Bermuda. The submarine sank or was scuttled three days after the explosion when salvage attempts failed. The accident underscored the danger of using liquid propellant in SLBMs, a risk Soviet SLBM designers accepted in order to achieve greater range and throwweight than their solid-fuel technology at the time could provide. LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. -------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101112&recordnum=11687North Korea: Report Reveals Pyongyang's Arms Trade, Including Nuclear WeaponsNovember 12, 2010The government of North Korea has exported around US$100 million worth of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons technology a year despite sanction imposed by the United Nations, says a new report cited by the Chosun Ilbo (South Korea) The arms exports have gone to several rogue nations, CNN reports. The 75-page report was compiled by a seven-member panel reporting to the United Nations Security Council. The study identifies Iran, Syria and Burma as recipients of Pyongyang's nuclear assistance. North Korea has been using overseas entities and shell companies to mask the financial transactions and get around U.N. sanctions, says the report. The release of the report this week had been delayed for six months by China, a U.N. diplomatic source said. The North Korean government had no immediate response.---------http://www.militaryperiscope.com/cgi-bin/news/archive/shownews.pl?date=20101102&recordnum=11497North Korea: Pyongyang Offers To Provide Torpedo SamplesNovember 02, 2010North Korea has offered to provide samples of its torpedoes in an attempt to back up its denial of responsibility for the sinking of a South Korea warship in March, Reuters reports. A team that included experts from the United States, Australia, Britain and Sweden concluded there was "overwhelming evidence" that Pyongyang was behind the sinking of the Cheonan, reported Agence France-Presse. Parts of a torpedo recovered at the scene were consistent with a North Korean weapon that Seoul had obtained seven years earlier, said the experts. In a statement, the National Defense Commission said it would provide a steel-alloy sample of one of its torpedoes to show it was different from aluminum-alloy torpedoes used by other countries and in the attack.--------North Korea: Iranian Missile Technology Shows Up In PyongyangOctober 20, 2010Weapons on display in Pyongyang show that Iran may be providing missile technology and know-how to North Korea, reports Aviation Week & Space Technology. This is the reverse of the traditional pathway from Pyongyang to Tehran On Oct. 10, for example, the BM25 Musudan missile -- already in Iranian service, according to Israeli officials -- was shown in a North Korean military parade in Pyongyang. This represented the first time that the road-mobile, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile had been shown beyond the North Korean military. The missile is a derivative of the Russian SS-N-6 submarine-launched missile, though lengthened for increased range. Also displayed was a No Dong ballistic missile with a tri-conic nose cone typically associated with Iran's Shahab-3 missile. Analysts suggested that the missile's configuration indicates that technical information acquired in Iranian test flights is being provided to Pyongyang. Paid Military Periscope subscribers can get more information on the SS-N-6, No Dong and Shahab-3 at: http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/nubiochm/nuclear/w0006019.html SS-N-6 Serb** SLBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- R-27 (Russian designation)---- RSM-25 Zyb (manufacturer's designation)---- mobile land-based SS-N-6 (possible North Korean variant)---- SS-NX-13** (radio command guidance variant)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Strategic COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia PICTURES OF: SS-N-6 Serb** SLBM

**US/NATO code name or designation

DESCRIPTIONThe SS-N-6 Serb** (Russian designation R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a single-stage, storable liquid-propellant missile designed for the Yankee-class nuclear submarine. It was developed in three main variants: The first three used an inertial guidance system, while the fourth variant (see Variants, below) used radio command guidance. Each Yankee-class SSBN carried 16 SS-N-6 missiles. The missiles could be launched while the Yankee was submerged and underway -- with a reaction time of about 15 minutes when under normal patrol status and in one minute at peak alert status. The submarine could maintain peak alert status for up to one hour. The design of the SS-N-6 is particularly notable for the placement of the rocket engines inside the fuel tank, reducing the external dimensions of the vehicle. The squat, cylindrical body of the missile was made of aluminum alloys, with the oxidizer and fuel tanks having a common bottom. A hermetically sealed container in the lower interior of the oxidizer tank contained the command and control systems, which eliminated the need for an instrument module. The sensors of the command system were placed on a gyro-stabilized platform. A single-chamber sustainer and a dual-chamber control engine comprise the propulsion system. Rather than the usual arrangement of four thrust chambers aligned on the stabilization axis of the missile, the SS-N-6 oriented the thrust chambers of the attitude control engine at an angle of 45 degrees from the axis. These design innovations, when combined with a lack of aerodynamic stabilizers and the metallic-rubber shock absorbers used to cushion the missile during loading, gave the entire launch tube smaller dimensions, assisting in fitting the system into the Yankee-class subs. To fire the missile, the tube was flooded and a gas bubble created by the docking adapter cushioned the hydraulic shock caused by igniting the engine in the tube. The missile's warhead contained a single 1-megaton multi-stage thermonuclear device. The missiles could be launched singly in 8-second intervals or as two volleys of eight missiles each.

PICTURES

STATUSThe SS-N-6 began deployment on March 13, 1968, and achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in early 1969. The missile was seen by the public for the first time during a parade in Moscow in 1967. The missile and its variants were withdrawn from Soviet/Russian service in 1993 with the deactivation of the last Yankee-class SSBN. Studies to develop the SS-N-6 missile were based on a 1961 proposal to develop a launch system with a light, single-stage missile for use against strategic land targets. The project was authorized on April 24, 1962. The first phase of testing consisted of 12 pop-up tests prior to 1966. In June 1966, a 10-month series of tests successfully completed 12 launches out of 17 attempts from a ground platform. Finally, six successful live launch tests were conducted from Yankee-class submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The D-5 launch system, designed for the SS-N-6, was the most successful system for launching SLBMs in the Soviet Union's arsenal. Over a period of 20 years there were 429 successful missile firings in 492 attempts.

BUILDER(S) Makeyev OKB, Russia (design bureau)

USERS/PLATFORMS North Korea (possible; see below)

CHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS All Variants Missile 41,667 lb (18,900 kg) Throwweight 1,500 lb ( 680 kg)

DIMENSIONS All Variants Configuration thick cylinder with smaller rounded re-entry vehicle (RV) on Mod 1, fuller section RV on Mod 3 Length 32 ft 10 in (10.00 m) Diameter 5 ft 11 in (1.80 m)

PROPULSION All Variants Engine single-stage liquid-fuel rocket Power 50,740 lb (23,000 kg) initial thrust

PERFORMANCE All Variants Trajectory altitude 339 nm (390 mi, 628 km) max CEP 1.0 nm (1.2 mi, 1.9 km) Launch depth 131-164 ft (40-50 m) Launch sea state 5 max Launch latitude up to 85 deg N Launch sub speed 4 kts max SS-N-6 Mod 1 Range 1,300 nm (1,497 mi, 2,409 km) SS-N-6 Mod 2/3 Range 1,600 nm (1,842 mi, 2,965 km)

WARHEAD SS-N-6 Mod 1/2 Warhead 1 x 1 Mt multi-stage thermonuclear device SS-N-6 Mod 3 Warhead 3 x 200 kt nuclear RVs

SENSORS/ELECTRONICS Guidance inertial

VARIANTSSS-N-6 Serb Mod 1Initial production variant. Later replaced in Yankee-class boats by Mod 3. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 2The Mod 2 was an upgrade that used more powerful engines and an improved guidance system. In Russian service, the missile was designated R-27U. Although designed to carry both single and multiple warheads, the Mod 2 carried only single devices. The upgrade to the missile was authorized on June 10, 1971. SS-N-6 Serb Mod 3Introduced MRV warhead to Soviet SLBMs. There was some debate as to the number of RVs carried, either two 600-lb RVs or three 400-lb RVs. The existence of a two-RV Mod 3 variant has not been confirmed by Russian sources. SS-NX-13Radio command guidance variant. Designated in Russian service as the R-27K, the SS-NX-13 had a nose cone with a terminal guidance system designed for use on both coastal radio-control installations and mobile targets at sea. It was tested in 1974, but never deployed. North Korean land-based mobile IRBMIn 2003, reports from North Korea indicated that Pyongyang was preparing to show a new missile at a military parade. Although the missiles were not displayed, reports by South Korean media in 2004 indicated the missiles were being deployed on mobile launchers staging out of two new bases. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes the new missile is based on the former Soviet SS-N-6 design, according to South Korean military sources. North Korea is believed to have obtained information and technology from Russia in the 1990s, U.S. officials said. There is no indication that Russia has been involved in the new North Korean program. If these reports about a North Korean missile are accurate, it would represent a significant advancement in North Korean missile development and design, given that the SS-N-6 is considered more sophisticated than other North Korean missiles. Pyongyang is also experimenting with a sea-based variant of the missile, for placement on and launch from ships and submarines, according to the July 30, 2004 issue of Jane's Defense Weekly. Such a development would give North Korean leaders a long-sought after way of striking at the continental United States. The land-based version of the North Korean SS-N-6 is said to have a range of 1,350-2,160 nm (1,550-2,485 mi, 2,500-4,000 km). The sea-based variant reportedly has a range of 1,350 nm (1,550 mi, 2,500 km).

ISSUES AND NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the forerunner of marine liquid-propellant rockets and incorporated many design and engineering innovations, including the following: all-welded missile body missile propulsors arranged in propellant and oxidizer tanks absence of empty (fuel-free) compartment use of metallized shock absorbers the missile is fueled with storable propellants and then enclosed automated control of pre-launch preparation and salvo firing Some SS-N-6 engines may have been kept for use in space launches.

OPERATIONAL NOTESThe SS-N-6 was the first "modern" strategic SLBM deployed in Soviet submarines. In October 1986, an SS-N-6 exploded on board a Yankee-class SSBN near Bermuda. The submarine sank or was scuttled three days after the explosion when salvage attempts failed. The accident underscored the danger of using liquid propellant in SLBMs, a risk Soviet SLBM designers accepted in order to achieve greater range and throwweight than their solid-fuel technology at the time could provide. LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.

http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/missrock/landatk/w0005119.html No Dong MRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- No Dong 1 MRBM (variant) ---- Ro Dong 1 MRBM (alternate designation) ---- Scud-D MRBM (alternate designation) ---- Shahab-3 MRBM (Iranian designation) ---- No Dong 2 (Upgraded variant)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater Nuclear/Biological/Chemical -- Nuclear COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: North Korea PICTURES OF: No Dong MRBM

DESCRIPTIONThe North Korean No Dong is a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), also variously identified as the Ro Dong-1 and the Scud-D. Variants are also in service with Pakistan (designated Ghauri, see separate record) and Iran (designated Shahab-3). The No Dong was based on the Scud series of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), but represents a significant departure from the North Korean practice of incremental improvements in weapons systems. North Korea developed the No Dong by adapting technology used in the entire variety of Scud-series SRBMs. The steel tankage of the Scud-A, the improved Isayev engine from the Scud-B and the lengthened cylinder for greater fuel capacity from the Scud-C are all combined in a single design. Although p lagued by early technical and financial problems, North Korea has designed a missile that is quite capable in the MRBM role and attractive to other states as an export product. Using a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket, the No Dong carries a conventional or chemical weapon-capable warhead. It may also be designed to carry a nuclear warhead, though the existence of such a warhead with the No Dong or its variants is unconfirmed among its users. The engines use TM-185 fuel, which is a mixture consisting of 20 percent gasoline and 80 percent kerosene. It also uses AK-27I for an oxidizer, which consists of 27 percent dinitrogen tetroxide and 73 percent nitric acid with an iodium inhibitor. The propellant feed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The startup and shutdown valves, initiated with pyrotechnic charges, are one-shot devices. To improve accuracy, the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in a toroidal high-pressure bottle in front of the missile's guidance section and heated by the turbine exhaust gases. Before launch, the missile is placed on a trajectory plane that will hit its target. As a result, the missile depends on the guidance system to keep the missile on its correct plane. Three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembl y controls the speed. Thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes. The No Dong is launched from a specially designed cross-country transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).

PICTURES

STATUSCurrently in low-rate production and in service with North Korea. Variants are in service with Iran and Pakistan. Development officially began in 1988, though work undoubtedly commenced earlier in the 1980s. Design objectives focused on: the creation of a missile capable of delivering a 2,205-3,307 lb (1,000-1,500 kg) warhead to a range of 540-810 nm (621-932 mi, 1,000-1,500 km); the establishment of a basic s ystem for future development of MRBMs and ICBMs; and the creation of a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. Flight Test Timeline May 1990 - U.S. intelligence observed the first prototype No Dong on a launch pad at Musudan-ri, North Korea. No missile launch was detected. Later, satellite photographs showed what appeared to be large scorch marks, possibly indicating a catastrophic test failure. June 1992 - More test activity was detected at Musudan-ri, but no flight test occurred. Japanese military sources indicate a second launch cancellation or failure. April 1993 - U.S. intelligence detected test activity at Musudan-ri. May 29-30, 1993 - First test flight of a No Dong missile as part of a four-missile launch operation. The other three missiles were Hwasong-5 and/or Hwasong-6 SRBMs. The No Dong flew 270 nm (311 mi, 500 km) to a target buoy in the Yellow Sea. Iranian and Pakistani observers were present for the tests. April 1994 - U.S. intelligence detected preparations for a test at Musudan-ri. Activity ceased for unknown reasons, but may have been due to North Korean negotiations with the U.S. underway in Geneva. Oct. 1996 - Another planned flight test by North Korea was cancelled. April 6, 1998 - Pakistan tested its first Ghauri 1 missile, later identified as a North Korean-produced No Dong. Pakistan claimed the missile had a range of 810 nm (932 mi, 1,500 km). North Korean observers may have been present for the test. July 22, 1998 - Iran conducted a first test of the Shahab-3, which was later identified as a No Dong. The missile exploded about 100 seconds into the flight. April 14, 1999 - Pakistan tested a Ghauri 2 missile with a claimed range of 1,080 nm (1,243 mi, 2,000 km). The missile was again identified as a North Korean No Dong. July 4, 2006 - North Korea launched at least one No Dong missile during a barrage of testing that saw Pyongyang fire seven missiles, the first of which took off minutes after the Discovery space shuttle lifted off from Cape Canaveral, Fla. All the missiles, which included a long-range Taepo Don g-2, landed in the Sea of Japan. The six medium-range missiles -- a combination of Scud and No Dong missiles -- were fired from Anbyon in Kangwon province. Estimates of the number of No Dong missiles in North Korean service vary widely. Japanese sources suggest from 15-100 missiles. A South Korean military source said North Korea had nine No Dongs deployed by early 1999. A paper in the 1998 Rumsfeld report indicated that North Korea had fielded only s mall numbers of the missile. Iran has approximately 20 Shahab-3s. U.S. inspection teams stationed in Iraq reported in 2003 that the country had been in unsuccessful negotiations with North Korea between 1999 and 2002 to purchase No Dong missiles and/or technology. There have been unverified reports that Egypt not only ordered No Dong missile assemblies and components to produce 50 missiles, but also conducted test flights in 2002. The estimated number of No Dongs in the North Korean inventory in 2006 generally ranged between 100 and 200 missiles. However, according to GlobalSecurity.org, the South Korean National Intelligence Service estimated in 2006 that North Korea had either deployed or produced at least 450 No Dongs. Some experts have reported that Syria has acquired the No-Dong medium-range ballistic missile from North Korea. Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Libya are all reported to have approached North Korea to procure the missile, however, there is no reported confirmation of exports, according to Jane's Strateg ic Weapons Systems, dated January 2009.

BUILDER(S)

Prime contractor: The 4th Machine Industry Bureau, Pyongyang, North Korea

Subcontractors: No. 26 General Plant, Kanggye, North Korea (missile subcontractor) Changgwang Sinyong Corp., Pyongyang, North Korea (exporter) May also be in domestic production in Iran.

USERS/PLATFORMS

Iran [N/A] North Korea [10] (No Dong 1/2) (estimates vary widely)

CHARACTERISTICS No Dong MRBM WEIGHTS Launch 35,825 lb (16,250 kg) Warhead 2,553 lb ( 1,158 kg)

DIMENSIONS Length 52 ft 6 in (16.00 m) Diameter 4 ft 4 in ( 1.32 m) Configuration cylinder with tapered nosecone, slightly smaller diameter cylinder at rear of missile, 4 clipped delta tail fins

PROPULSION Engine single-stage 1-chamber liquid-propellant rocket Thrust 58,643 lb (26,600 kg) Fuel TM-185 Oxidizer AK-27I Propellant mass 28,466 lb (12,912 kg)

PERFORMANCE Range 729 nm (839 mi, 1,350 km) CEP 208 yd (190 m) Launch preparation 60 min Burn time 110 sec Deployment mobile

WARHEAD Nuclear possible, but type unknown Chemical thickened VX Conventional 2,553 lb (1,158 kg) HE

GUIDANCE Type inertial

VARIANTSNo Dong-1 MRBM (Ro Dong-1, Scud D) An improved range variant alternately called the Ro Dong-1, Scud D and Scud Mod D. Characteristics are identical to those above, except that it carries a 1,676-lb (760-kg) warhead and has a range of up to 810 nm (932 mi, 1,500 km). No Dong-2Variant with a longer range, an improved guidance system and a smaller warhead. The No Dong-2 likely served as the design used by the North Koreans for the Iranian Shahab-3 and Pakistani Gauri (Hatf-5 , see separate record) missile programs. The Shahab-3 and Gauri are probably not exact copies of th e No Dong-2 since the North Koreans likely made modifications to the missile's dimensions and weight depending on the user nation's specifications. According to Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, dated January 2009, the North Korean No Dong 2 might also be the North Korean Musudan missile. Shahab-3 MRBM Iran uses the original shorter-range version of the No Dong. Iran may be experimenting with imported Russian design systems to increase guidance and accuracy, possibly explaining several failed missile flight tests (see separate record).

ISSUES AND NOTESNorth Korea has certainly received extensive technical support from Russian and Chinese scientists in developing the No Dong. The addition of Iranian and Pakistani efforts to this multi-national program have permitted the production of a wide variety of MRBMs based on the original No Dong design. Libya: Some reports have suggested that Libya may have also been involved with the development of the No Dong, with the intention of purchasing some missiles at a later date. Reports about the No Dong exports to Libya were shown to be false after Libya abandoned its WMD and missile programs in December 2003, and invited inspectors to verify the dismantlement of the programs, as noted in a study by Daniel Pinkston for the Strategic Studies Institute published in February 2008 -- which also estimated that at the time North Korea had about 200 No Dongs, said to be capable of striking Ja pan. Pakistan: No Dong sales to Pakistan in the late 1990s were made as part of a deal allowing Pyongyang access to technology and/or materials for a secret uranium-enrichment program. The international intelligence community is virtually unanimous in this conclusion. However, Islamabad insists its Gauri missile was developed indigenously. Iran: In early 1992, North Korea and Iran reportedly signed an agreement that included Iranian financial support to further development of the No Dong, as well as an option for Tehran to purchase No Dongs at a later date. One source says No Dongs were delivered to Tehran later in 1992. In M arch 1993, an Iranian military delegation visited Pyongyang, supposedly seeking 150 No Dong missiles. Nuclear proliferation: There has been speculation that some of the nuclear warheads assembled by North Korea may have been fitted to No Dong-1 and -2 missiles. It is unknown whether North Korea has been able to fit a nuclear warhead on a delivery device such as the No Dong.

OPERATIONAL NOTESNone. LATEST UPDATE: 1 October 2010 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. http://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/missrock/landatk/w0005522.htmlShahab-3 MRBMVARIANT(S) AND/OR ALTERNATE NAME(S):---- IRIS (space-launch variant)---- Shahab-3D (space-launch variant)---- Zelzal MRBM (alternate designation)EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Missiles/Rockets/Bombs -- Land Attack/Theater COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Iran PICTURES OF: Shahab-3 MRBM

DESCRIPTIONThe Shahab-3 (Meteor , Shooting Star) is an Iranian medium-range ballistic missile derived from the original design of the North Korean No-dong . Iran is believed to have received extensive help in designing the missile from North Korea. Russia may also have given assistance, allowing the Shah ab-3 to attain greater range and accuracy. It is also called the Zelzal-3 (Earthquake). The Shahab-3 is a legacy of Iranian financial assistance to North Korea, which combined Soviet technical information with Chinese contributions to produce the No-dong . In exchange, Iran received the results and began to work on the Shahab-3. Iran reportedly received a dozen No-dong missiles from No rth Korea by 1996 as the basis for the program. As with the No-dong , the Shahab-3 is believed to use steel tankage, an improved Isayev engine and a lengthened cylinder for greater fuel capacity. It is a single-stage liquid-propelled rocket and capable of carrying a convention or chemical weapon-capable warhead. It could also conceivably carry a nuclear warhead, though there is no confirmation of the existence of any nuclear warheads in Iran. The rocket uses a fuel mixture of 20 percent gasoline and 80 percent kerosene, with an oxidizer consisting of 27 percent dinotrogen tetroxide and 72 percent nitric acid with an imodium inhibitor. It is designed for launch from a specially designed cross-country transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). I ran is developing its own TEL based on a Mercedes Benz vehicle, though it may only be an adaptation of the North Korean launch vehicle design onto a new chassis.

PICTURES

STATUSInitial operational capability (IOC) in February 2000 with an estimated 15 missiles. Initial production began as early as 1999, with serial production reportedly starting in early 2001. Serial production capacity believed to be 20 missiles per year. Missile Testing In the first flight test on July 22, 1998, the test missile exploded after 100 seconds of flight and traveling 620 mi (998 km) downrange over northern Iran. It is unknown if the explosion was accidental or a deliberate termination of the test. Some analysts believe a deliberate detonation was h ighly unlikely and that the missile likely had problems due to steering vane disintegration failure or instrumentation/guidance failure. However, some experts believe the test was at least partially successful. A full end-to-end flight test of the Shahab-3 took place on July 15, 2000. The missile is believed to have used an engine purchased from North Korea, rather than one produced domestically in Iran. A subsequent test failed on Sept. 21, 2000, probably of a Shahab-3D (see "Variants" below), with the missile detonating shortly after liftoff. In July of 2003, Iran successfully tested the Shahab-3, then estimated to have a range of 746 miles (1,200 km) and a payload of 2,646 lb (1,200 kg). On Aug. 11, 2004, Iran tested the Shahab-3 missile. From Sept. 12-18, 2004, Iran conducted exercises including the launch of a strategic missile; there were no reports on the design. On Oct. 20, 2004, Iran launched what was said to be a more accurate Shahab-3 ballistic missile, with a range of 1,243 mi (2,000 km), according to Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. On Jan. 17, 2006, Iran tested a missile that may have been the Shahab-4, collecting flight telemetry information. In a Feb. 4, 2008, test flight of the Shahab-3, one of the jet vanes fell off during flight; however, the loss was no enough to cause critical instability. On Sept. 27, 2009, Iran conducted a successful test flight of the Shahab-3 missile, though the accuracy of the missile was called into question. By 2003, two Iranian ballistic missile squadrons were equipped with the Shahab-3. Unspecified strategic missiles were delivered to the military following testing in September of 2004. On Sept. 22, 2005, six Shahab-3 missiles passed the presidential viewing platform during a parade. Iran had the Shahab-3 on display during National Army Day on April 19, 2010.

BUILDER(S)

Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, Tehran, Iran (design bureau) Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, Tehran, Iran (design bureau) Acad. V.P. Makeyev OKB, Russia (original Scud-B design bureau) Isayev OKB, Russia (original engine design) Great Wall Industries Corp., China (guidance control, solid-propellant motor technology, telemetry equipment) State factories, North Korea (imported rocket motors)

USERS/PLATFORMS

Iran

CHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTS Launch mass 34,948-35,825 lb (15,852-16,250 kg) Dry mass 3,924- 4,806 lb ( 1,780- 2,180 kg) Stage mass 33,272 lb (15,092 kg) Warhead 1,676 lb ( 760 kg) or 2,176 lb ( 987 kg) or 2,553 lb ( 1,158 kg)

DIMENSIONS Length 52 ft 6 in (16.00 m) Diameter 4 ft 5 in ( 1.35 m) Configuration cylinder with tapered nosecone, slightly smaller diameter cylinder at rear of missile, four clipped delta tail fins

PROPULSION Engine single-stage one-chamber liquid-propellant rocket Thrust effective 57,433 lb (26,051 kg) actual 58,996 lb (26,760 kg) Fuel TM-185 (20/80 gasoline/kerosene) Oxidizer AK-27I (27/73 dinotrogen tetroxide/nitric acid with imodium inhibitor Propellant mass 28,466 mi (12,912 kg)

GUIDANCE Type inertial

PERFORMANCE Range 810 nm (932 mi, 1,500 km) max est. CEP 208 yd (190 m) Launch preparation unknown, probably around 60 min Burn time 110 sec Deployment mobile TEL speed 44 mph (70 kmh) TEL range 342 mi (550 km)

WARHEAD Nuclear possible, though no known warheads in Iran Chemical capable of carrying chemical warheads Conventional 2,553 lb (1,158 kg) HE

VARIANTSShahab-3D/IRIS A test on Sept. 21, 2000, may have been a test of the Shahab-3D, a liquid-/solid-propellant missile that Iran has reportedly been developing as a space launch vehicle, also called the IRIS booster. The IRIS launch vehicle consists of what appears to be a Shahab-3 first stage with a bulbous front se ction designed to contain a second-stage solid rocket motor and a payload. Such a design is unlikely to be used to launch a significant payload unless mated to additional stages below. The failure of the test may have represented a significant setback to the Iranian space program. Shahab-3D could a lso be a ballistic missile variant of the IRIS . The Shahab-3D strongly resembles the North Korean Taepo-dong 2 second and third stages, indicating possible Iranian and North Korean cooperation on a joint space program. Shahab-3BThe Iranians developed this variant in order to incorporate a steerable re-entry vehicle during the terminal dive phase of the missile's trajectory. The regular Shahab-3 has spin stabilization, but the 3B reportedly includes a rocket-nozzle control system. This nozzle-control system is supposed to enable the Shahab-3B to be guided and course-corrected during all phases of the missile's flight.

ISSUES AND NOTESIran announced that it successfully tested a solid-fuel motor for its Shahab-3 in May of 2005. The Shahab-3 previously was reported to use liquid-fuel technology. The Shahab-3 ballistic missile had been known as a single-stage device. Military experts said the development of a second motor demonstr ated a significant improvement in Iran's missile program. Former top Russian defense official Gen. Leonid Ivashov said he was not surprised by such progress.

OPERATIONAL NOTESAn unclassified report from the U.S. Defense Dept. has suggested that a variant of the Shahab-3 could reach the United States by 2015, as reported by Reuters. LATEST UPDATE: 1 November 2010 2011 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope. Published on Arms Control Association (http://www.armscontrol.org)

Home > Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North KoreaArms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea

This profile details which major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of North Korea, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Associations Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and TreatiesSignedRatifiedBiological Weapons Convention - - -1987Chemical Weapons Convention - - -- - -Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - - -- - -

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)-Announced its withdrawal Jan. 10, 2003.- - -1985

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons- - -- - -Outer Space Treaty - - -- - -Ottawa Mine Ban Convention - - -- - -

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, and has frequently exported missiles and related materials.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: None.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: North Korea has not filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:Despite having signed the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea reportedly maintains a biological weapons program. In 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that over the previous six months North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize [biological weapon] agents, and may have such weapons available for use.[1]

Chemical Weapons:North Korea is widely reported to possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, and sarin agents. According to U.S. military estimates, North Korea can deploy missiles with chemical warheads.[2]

Missiles:

* Ballistic Missiles: North Korea is actively expanding its ballistic missile arsenal and allegedly working toward developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It initially relied upon assistance from the Soviet Union and China to develop its arsenal, but North Korea is now a chief exporter of ballistic missile systems and technology. The North Korean military currently deploys short-range Scud and medium-range missiles. The inaugural flight test of North Koreas longest-range missile, the Taepo Dong-2, ended in failure about 40 seconds after launch on July 5, 2006. The sole flight test of its predecessor, the Taepo Dong-1, also failed in August 1998.

* Cruise Missiles:The most recent flight tests of surface-to-ship cruise missiles occurred in early 2003. General speculation is that North Korean cruise missiles are derived from Chinese Silkworm missile designs.

Nuclear Weapons:The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered in 1992 that North Korea had diverted plutonium from i