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11thGradeColdWarInquiry

Who’stoBlamefortheColdWar?

SovietPrimeMinisterJosefStalin,PresidentHarryS.Truman,andBritishPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchillposeforthefirsttimebeforetheopeningofthePotsdamConference,July7,1945.

NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministration.OfficeofPresidentialLibraries.HarryS.TrumanLibrary.

SupportingQuestions

1. WhattensionswerevisibleduringandimmediatelyafterWWII?2. HowdidthesetensionsturnintoactionsbytheU.S.andSovietUnion?3. WhatargumentsdohistoriansmakeaboutwhostartedtheColdWar?4. DoesitmatterwhoistoblamefortheColdWar?

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11thGradeColdWarInquiry

Who’stoBlamefortheColdWar?KentuckyAcademicStandardsforSocialStudies

HS1.HT.13HistoricalUnderstanding:ContextualizationandPerspectives:Analyzecomplexandinteractivefactorsthatinfluencedtheperspectivesofpeopleduringdifferenthistoricalerasandexplainhowperspectivesofpeopleinthepresentshapeinterpretationsofthepast.HS1.HT.14HistoricalArguments:Categorizeandprioritizevariousargumentsobtainedfromhistoricalsourcestohelpbuildavalidargument,includingcounterclaims,afterconsideringchangeovertime,historicalperspectivesandrelevanceofsources.

StagingtheCompellingQuestion

ReadTheAtlanticarticle“CancontainmentworkagainstmodernRussia?”anddiscusshowmodern-daytensionsbetweenRussiaandAmericaareinmanywaysacontinuationofColdWaraggressionsbybothsides.

SupportingQuestion1 SupportingQuestion2 SupportingQuestion3 SupportingQuestion4

WhattensionswerevisibleduringandimmediatelyafterWWII?

HowdidthesetensionsturnintoactionsbytheU.S.andSovietUnion?

WhatargumentsdohistoriansmakeaboutwhostartedtheColdWar?

DoesitmatterwhoistoblamefortheColdWar?

FormativePerformanceTask FormativePerformanceTask FormativePerformanceTask FormativePerformanceTask

Listanddescribethewaysinwhichtensionsemergedduringandafterthewar.

CreateaT-chartidentifyingaggressiveactionsbytheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesinthepost-warera.

Writeone-sentencesummariesofeachhistorian’sargumentonwhostartedtheColdWar.Selecttwopiecesofevidencethatsupporteachclaim.

Developaclaimsupportedbyevidencethatexplainstheextenttowhichassigningblameisproblematic.

FeaturedSources FeaturedSources FeaturedSources FeaturedSources

SourceA:ExcerptfromSpecterofCommunism,1994SourceB:ExcerptfromTheGlobalColdWar,2005SourceC:ExcerptfromOriginsofContainment,1985

SourceA:“PostwarPoliticsandtheColdWar:TimelineandTerms”SourceB:LetterfromTrumantoSecretaryofStateJamesByrnesSourceC:ExcerptfromAtStalin’sSide,1994

SourceA:ExcerptfromAmericaFacesRussia,1950.SourceB:ExcerptfromTheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,1941-1947,1972.SourceC:ExcerptfromFromColonytoSuperpower,2008.

SourceA:Excerptfrom“TheBlameGame,”2010

SummativePerformanceTask

ARGUMENTWho’stoblamefortheColdWar?Constructanargument(e.g.,detailedoutline,poster,essay)thataddressesthecompellingquestionusingspecificclaimsandrelevantevidencefromhistoricalsourceswhileacknowledgingcompetingviews.

EXTENSIONConductamocktrialwherestudentsputtheUnitedStatesand/ortheSovietUnionontrialforstartingtheColdWaranddecidewhetherthereshouldbeaconsequenceifeitherpartyisdeemed“guilty.”

TakingInformedAction

UNDERSTANDResearchthecurrentstateoftherelationshipbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStates,includingtheirrespectiveinfluenceonworldaffairs.ASSESSAssesstheconcernsexpressedbybothpowersintermsoftheireconomicandgeopoliticalrole.ACTWritealettertoagovernmentofficial(e.g.,ambassador,representative)thatmakessuggestionsforimprovingdiplomaticrelationsbetweentheUSandRussia.

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Overview

InquiryDescription

ThisinquiryleadsstudentsthroughaninvestigationofthecausesoftheColdWarbyexaminingeventsthroughtheperspectiveofboththeSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates.Byinvestigatingthecompellingquestion“Who’stoblamefortheColdWar?”studentsevaluatetheseeventsinconsiderationofthehistoriography,usingtheworkofseveralpreeminentColdWarhistorians,andtheconsequencesofassigningblametoeithercountry.Theformativeperformancetasksbuildonknowledgeandskillsthroughthecourseoftheinquiryandhelpstudentsrecognizedifferentperspectivesinordertobetterunderstandthewaysinwhichmutualconcernsandfearsculminatedinglobaltensions.Studentscreateanevidence-basedargumentaboutwhetheranyoneshouldbeassignedblameinstartingtheColdWarafterconsideringthetensionsthatemergedduringandafterWorldWarII,perceptionoftheactionstakenbytheUnitedStatesandSovietUnion,assessinghistoriographicalviewpoints,andconsideringhowassigningblameaffectsperceptionsoftheactionsofothers.

InadditiontotheKeyIdealistedearlier,thisinquiryhighlightsthefollowingConceptualUnderstandings:

HS1.HT.13HistoricalUnderstanding:ContextualizationandPerspectivesAnalyzecomplexandinteractivefactorsthatinfluencedtheperspectivesofpeopleduringdifferenthistoricalerasandexplainhowperspectivesofpeopleinthepresentshapeinterpretationsofthepast.

HS1.HT.14HistoricalArgumentsCategorizeandprioritizevariousargumentsobtainedfromhistoricalsourcestohelpbuildavalidargument,includingcounterclaims,afterconsideringchangeovertime,historicalperspectivesandrelevanceofsources.

Note:Thisinquiryisexpectedtotakethreetofive40-minuteclassperiods.Theinquirytimeframecouldexpandifteachersthinktheirstudentsneedadditionalinstructionalexperiences(i.e.,supportingquestions,formativeperformancetasks,andfeaturedsources).Teachersareencouragedtoadapttheinquiriesinordertomeettheneedsandinterestsoftheirparticularstudents.Resourcescanalsobemodifiedasnecessarytomeetindividualizededucationprograms(IEPs)orSection504Plansforstudentswithdisabilities.

StructureoftheInquiry

Inaddressingthecompellingquestion“Who’stoblamefortheColdWar?”studentsworkthroughaseriesofsupportingquestions,formativeperformancetasks,andfeaturedsourcesinordertoconstructanargumentwithevidencewhileacknowledgingcompetingperspectives.

StagingtheCompellingQuestion

ThecompellingquestioncouldbestagedbyhavingstudentsreadanarticlefromTheAtlanticconcerningColdWarstrategiesastheyconnecttodiplomaticrelationswithmodernRussia.Studentscandiscusshowbothparties

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wouldperceivethesuggestedactionsiftaken.Thisdiscussionshouldincludeconsiderationofwhatitmeanstoconductawarthatis“cold,”inhistoricalandmoderncontexts.

SupportingQuestion1

Thefirstsupportingquestion—“WhattensionswerevisibleduringandimmediatelyafterWWII?”—asksstudentstoconsiderhowtensionsbetweentheUnitedStatesandSovietUnionbegantoemergewhilestillalliedduringWorldWarII.Thisformativeperformancetaskasksstudentstolistanddescribethewaysinwhichtensionswereemergingduringandimmediatelyafterthewar.FeaturedSourceA,anexcerptfromMelvynLeffler’sTheSpecterofCommunism,looksspecificallyattheconcernsraisedbyWWIIoftheSovietUnionfortheirpost-warconditionsandsafety.InFeaturedSourceB,anexcerptfromTheGlobalColdWar,OddArneWestaddiscussesbothcountries’mutualfearsoftheotherattemptingtogaininfluenceinworldaffairs,therebyputtingtheirrespectivecountryatrisk.FeaturedSourceC,anexcerptfromDeborahWelchLarson’sOriginsofContainment,discussestheprogressionofincreasedtensionbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,withattentiontochangeinleadershipfromRoosevelttoTruman.

SupportingQuestion2

Forthesecondsupportingquestion–“HowdidthesetensionsturnintoactionsbytheU.S.andSovietUnion?”—studentsbuildontheirknowledgeofeventsleadingtotensionbetweentheformeralliesbysummarizingactsperceivedasaggressivebyboththeUnitedStatesandSovietUnioninthepost-warera.FeaturedSourceAisaninteractivetimelinefromGilder-Lehrman,whichincludesbothnationalandinternationaleventsthatimpactedthedevelopmentoftheColdWar.FeaturedSourceBisaletterfromPresidentTrumantoSecretaryofStateJamesByrnes,discussinghisviewoftheSovietgovernment’sactionsandhissubsequentgrowingimpatience.FeaturedSourceC,anexcerptfromtherecollectionsofStalin’spersonaltranslator,providestheSovietperspectiveofAmericanactions.

SupportingQuestion3

Thethirdsupportingquestion—“WhatargumentsdohistoriansmakeaboutwhostartedtheColdWar?”—buildsonstudents’assessmentofhoweventswereperceivedbythetwocountries.IttasksthemwithevaluatinghistoriographicalviewpointsconcerningresponsibilityfortheColdWar’sdevelopment.Inadditiontothepreviousfeaturedsources,thethirdsupportingquestion’sfeaturedsourceswillpresentprominenthistoriographicaltrendsonthesubject.FeaturedSourceAisanexcerptfromThomasBailey’sAmericaFacesRussia,representingtheorthodoxviewoftheColdWar,wherebytheSovietsareseenastheaggressornation.InFeaturedSourceB,anexcerptfromTheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,JohnLewisGaddistypifiesthepost-revisionistperspective,wherebyheseesneithersideaswhollyguiltyorinnocent.FeaturedSourceC,FromColonytoSuperpower,GeorgeC.Herringdescribesthedefensivenessandaggressionofbothcountries.Afterreadingthevariousviewpoints,studentswillcreateagraphicorganizercomparingandcontrastingtheargumentsconcerningresponsibilityforstartingtheColdWar.

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SupportingQuestion4

Inthefinalsupportingquestion—“DoesitmatterwhoistoblamefortheColdWAr?”—studentsareaskedtoconsidertheconsequencesofassigningblamewheninterpretinghistoricalevents.TheFeaturedSource,anexcerptfromCharlesTilly’sarticle,“TheBlameGame,”providesanassessmentoftheimplicationsofblameininterpretinghistoricalevents.Buildingonthepreviousformativetasks,studentsshouldconsiderthepowerofblameininformingperspectives.TheformativeperformancetaskasksstudentstodevelopaclaimsupportedbyevidencethatexplainstheimplicationsofassigningblametoeithercountryinstartingtheColdWar.

SummativePerformanceTask

Atthispointintheinquiry,studentshavebeenintroducedtoseveralactionsandperspectivesofsaidactionstakenbytheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,whilealsoconsideringtheimplicationsforassigningeithercountryblameforstartingtheColdWar.Studentsshouldbeabletodemonstratethebreadthoftheirunderstandingandtheabilitytouseevidencefrommultiplesourcestosupporttheirclaims.Inthistask,studentsareaskedtoconstructanevidence-basedargumentrespondingtothecompellingquestion“Who’stoblamefortheColdWar?”

Students’argumentslikelywillvary,butcouldincludeanyofthefollowing:

• Neithershouldbeheldresponsibleastheiractionswerenotmeanttobeaggressive,butrathershouldbeinterpretedasdefensiveinnature.

• Bothcountriesshouldbeblamedastheiractionsshouldbeinterpretedasaggressive,therebybothhaveresponsibilityinperpetuatingColdWartensions.

• TheSovietUnionshouldbeblamed.Theiractionswererightlyinterpretedasaggressive,therebyjustifyingtheUnitedStates’effortstolimitthegrowthoftheSovietsphereofinfluence.

• TheUnitedStatesshouldbeblamed.TheiractionswererightlyinterpretedasaggressiveattemptstomaintaintheirsupremacybylimitingtheinfluenceoftheSovietUnion.Thus,theSovietUnion’sactionswerejustifiedastheyweretryingtodefendthemselvesfromthegrowingAmericansphereofinfluence.

StudentscouldextendtheseargumentsbyconductingamocktrialwheretheUnitedStatesand/ortheSovietUnionareputontrialforstartingtheColdWar.Thiscanincludeadeliberationconcerninganappropriateconsequenceifeitherpartyisdeemed“guilty.”

StudentshavetheopportunitytoTakeInformedActionbyresearchingthecurrentstateoftherelationshipbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStates,asitisoftendescribedasbeingasecondColdWar.Studentsdemonstratetheyunderstandbyexploringdifferentactionsandperspectivesoftherespectivecountries.Theywillshowtheircapacitytoassesstheconcernsexpressedbybothpowersintermsoftheireconomicandgeopoliticalrole.AndtheyshowthattheycanactbywritingalettertoagovernmentofficialthataddressesthemutualconcernsoftheUSandRussiaandmakessuggestionsconcerningimprovingdiplomaticrelationsbetweentheU.S.andRussia.

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StagingtheCompellingQuestionFeaturedSource SourceA:BrianWhitmore,“CanContainmentWorkAgainstModernRussia?”TheAtlantic,2015.

Thesignsofthetimesareeverywhere.Estoniaiserectinga2.5-meter-highmetalmeshfencereinforcedwithbarbedwirealongmuchofitsborderwithRussia—andbackingitupwithhigh-techdrones,sensors,radars,andcameras.NeighboringLatviahasannouncedplanstobuildfencesalongitseasternfrontier.Polandplanstobuildnewstate-of-theartwatchtowersonitsborderwithRussia’sKaliningradexclave.

And,ofcourse,UkrainehasfloatedplanstobuildawallalongitsRussianfrontier.Aneweraofcontainment,itappears,hasbegun.Russia’sneighbors,waryofpolitelittlegreenmenappearingtostirupnewnon-declaredhybridwars,arebuildingwallsandbecomingvigilant.

AndsomeleadingWesterncommentatorsarecallingforarevivalofthespiritofGeorgeKennan’sLongTelegramandMr.Xarticle,whichcomprisedthephilosophicalbasisfortheWesternpolicyofcontaininganexpansionistSovietUnion.WritinginForeignAffairsinNovember2014,RutgersUniversity-NewarkprofessorAlexanderMotylcalledontheWestto“developaserious,steady,long-termpolicyresponsetoRussianexpansionism.Andthat,ofcourse,meanscontainment.”

Likewise,JamesGoldgeier,deanoftheSchoolofInternationalServiceatAmericanUniversity,wroteinSlatethat“arevivedstrategyofcontainmentisnecessarytocounterRussianaggression.”Soviet-eradefectorAleksandrGoldfarbmadeasimilarargumentinarecentblogpost.

So,toparaphraseKennan,cananewlyaggressiveMoscow“becontainedbytheadroitandvigilantapplicationofcounterforceataseriesofconstantlyshiftinggeographicalandpoliticalpoints,correspondingtotheshiftsandmaneuvers”ofRussianpolicy?

NATO’smovesatlastyear’ssummitinWales—settingupmilitaryfacilitiesintheBalticstates,Poland,andRomania,rotatingtroopsthroughcountriesonthealliance’seasternflank,andestablishinganewrapid-responseforcethatcouldassistendangeredmemberswithintwodays—certainlyseemlikestepsinthatdirection.Inaspeechthisweek,U.S.DefenseSecretaryAshCartersaidWashington“willtakeallnecessarystepstodeterRussia’smalignanddestabilizinginfluence,coercion,andaggression."

But1947thisisn’t.AndanyseriousattempttocontainVladimirPutin’sRussia—whichunliketheSovietUnionisdeeplyintegratedintotheglobaleconomy—willbearscantresemblancetoitsColdWarantecedent.ThisisbecauseunliketheColdWar,whentheworldwasdividedintotwohermeticallysealedsystems,today’sconflictbetweenMoscowandtheWestcomesatatimewhenRussiaisverymuchembeddedintheWestandhasprovenadeptatexploitingitstransparencyfornontransparentends.

AndunliketheSovietUnion,today’sRussiaisn’tanideologicalpowerseekingglobalhegemonythroughmilitaryexpansion.Itisessentiallyacrimesyndicatemasqueradingasastate.Putinandthemademenwhomakeuphisinnercircledeploycorruptionasatoolofstatecraftinordertoperpetuatetheirrule,expandtheirreach,andenrichthemselves.

Ina2012reportforChathamHouse,JamesGreenenotedhowPutinused“thecorrupttransnationalschemesthatflowedseamlesslyfromRussiaintotherestoftheformerSovietspace—andoozedbeyondit”toextendhis“shadowinfluencebeyondRussia’sbordersanddevelopanatural,‘captured’constituency.”

Towardthisend,Moscowhasusedeverythingfromshadyenergydeals,towebsofshellcompanies,tohotmoneyintheCityofLondon,tothefinancingofextremistpoliticalpartiesinEurope.Itssuccessindoingsoraisesthe

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economiccostofconflict,reducesresolvetoresistMoscow,andgivesRussiaaready-madelobbyinWesterncapitals.TheKremlinhaseffectivelyweaponizedglobalization.

RatherthananIronCurtainwitharmiesfacingoffacrosstheFuldaGap,themainfaultlineofthecurrentconflictisbetweenaWesternzoneoftransparencyandaMoscow-dominatedsphereofcorruption.Anycontainmentpolicy,therefore,needsfirstandforemosttolimitRussia’ssphereofcorruptionandextendtheWesternzoneoftransparency.

“Thefrontlinesofcontainmentarethenon-RussianstatesinthepotentialpathofRussianexpansion.Seeninthislight,adividedUkraineoccupiesthesameroleintoday’scontainmentstrategyasadividedGermanydidinyesterday’s,”MotylwroteinForeignAffairs.“Ukraineshouldthereforebetherecipientofsimilarfinancial,political,andmilitaryassistance.”

GeorgiaandMoldova,likewise,fallintothiscategory.Butanytruecontainmentoftoday’sRussiamustgobeyondthis.ItalsoneedstoincludearollbackofRussia’sabilitytoexploitandabusethedynamismandtransparencyofWesterneconomies.

PartofthisisinplacewithsanctionsthatdenyRussiaaccesstocreditfromWesternbanks.PartofitwouldrequiresheddinglightonthewebofshadowyshellcompaniesandstructuresRussiahasestablishedinEuropetolaundermoneyandstealthilybuyinfluence,aswellasbringingmoretransparencytothingslikeLondon’spropertymarket.

Itwouldalsoinvolve,asMotylnotes,“constrainingRussia’sabilitytouseenergyasaweapon.”ThisreducingEurope’sdependencyonRussiannaturalgas,andstrictenforcementofEUantitrustlegislationvis-a-visGazprom.

Andakeyweaponinreserve,ofcourse,includesbanningRussiafromtheSWIFTnetwork,whichmanagessecurefinancialtransactionsworldwide.Thethingaboutacrimesyndicateisthatitneedsalegitimateeconomytofeedoffof.AnddenyingPutin&Co.thiswouldgoalongwaytowardcontainingthem.

Accessedfrom:http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/russia-containment-putin-soviet/410968/

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“Thewar,[Stalin]nowsaid,wasagreatpatrioticwar.Theinvaderhadtoberepulsed,thefatherland

defended.Heceasedtalkingaboutrevolutionaryupheavalandcastideologyaside.ThiswasnothardforStalin,becausehehadlonginsistedthattheinternationalmovement’soverridingprioritywastosafeguardtheinterestsofSovietRussia.[…]IdeologyservedprimarilyasalensthroughwhichStalininterpretedthreatsandopportunities;revolutionaryfervorrarelymotivatedhisforeignpolicy.

“WhenAmericanandBritishemissariesarrivedinMoscowduringthesummerandfallof1941,theyfoundStalinrecoveredfromhisdepressionandindecision.Hetoldthemwhattypesofassistanceheneededfortheprotractedwarhenowenvisioned.Evenmorethanaid,Stalinsaid,herequiredasecondfrontinWesternEuropetodiverttheNaziwarmachineandliftthepressureonhisarmies.

[…]

“Thesecondfrontandthedefinitionofboundarieswouldbetheissuesmostfrequentlydiscussedatthegreatwartimemeetings.ButthesemattersalwaysremainedlinkedinStalin’smindtostillmoreimportantconcerns:thedefeatofGermanyandthepostwarcontrolofGermanpower.[…]

“InStalin’sview,Germanywasthegreatenemy—notonlyaperennialmenacetohiscountrybutathreattohisregime.AfterthebattleofStalingradattheendof1942,itseemedlikelythatGermanymustbevanquished.ButinStalin’smind,Germanywouldriseagain,justasithadafterWorldWarI.InNovember1943,attheTeheranConference,Stalinsaidhewantedtooccupy,disarm,anddismemberGermany,liquidateitsofficercorps,andforceittopayreparations.Evenafterthewar,StalinbelievedtheGermanswould‘recover…veryquickly.Givethemtwelvetofifteenyearsandthey’llbeontheirfeetagain.’Throughoutthelate1940s,hethoughtanewwarwouldcomeandthatGermanywouldinstigateit.

“StalinwasalsodeeplyconcernedaboutJapan.JapanhadintervenedagainsttheBolsheviksduringWorldWarIandhadbeenthelastoftheAlliestoevacuateSovietterritory.Duringthelate1930s,JapaneseandSoviettroopsskirmishedalongtheManchurianborderandfoughtseveralmajorbattles.StalinsoughttoneutralizetheJapanesebysigninganonaggressionpactin1941.AttheYaltaConferenceinFebruary1945hepromisedRooseveltthathewoulddeclarewaronJapanwithinthreemonthsaftertheendoftheEuropeanconflict.[…]InJuly1945,hetoldNationalistChineseForeignMinisterT.V.Soongthathewantedanallianceinorder‘tocurbJapan.’

“AttheendofWorldWarIIStalinrealizedthattheachievementofhisgoals—territorialgains,nationalreconstruction,andcontrolovertherevivalofGermanandJapanesepower—dependedoncooperationwiththeAllies,especiallywiththeUnitedStates.Hewasinclinedtobeagreeablebecauseintheshortrunhewasoperatingfromapositionofweakness,andhewasaltogetherawareofit.

“Stalinhadagreatdealtogainfromapolicyofcooperation.PostwaraidwouldexpediteSovieteconomicrehabilitation.[…]Mostofall,mutualcollaborationwouldmeanthathecouldshareinthecontrolofGermanandJapanesepower.Attheendofthewar,Germanywasdividedintofouroccupationzones.AlthoughtheKremlinhadalargezoneintheeast,thecoreofGermany’spotentialpower—itscoal,steel,metallurgy,andchemicalindustries—wasininthewesternzones,especiallyintheRuhr.StalinwantedtoshareinsomeformofinternationalcontroloftheRuhr.HealsosoughtarealstakeintheoccupationofJapan.

“Ofcourse,Stalin’sdesireforcooperationhadtobebalancedagainsthisothergoals.Hewouldnotcompromisehisbasicterritorialdemands,thatis,therestorationofthe1941borders.NorwouldheforsakeasphereofinfluenceinEasternEurope.Inthisregion,governmentsamenabletotheKremlin’sinfluencewerevitallyimportanttoStalin.[…]SovietsecurityrequirementsmandatedasphereofinfluenceinEasternEurope.Itwouldserveasabufferzoneagainstfutureinvasions,ameanstofacilitateandcontroltheevolutionofGermanpower,andasourceofrawmaterialsandreparationsforreconstruction.

SupportingQuestion1

FeaturedSource SourceA:ExcerptsfromMelvynP.Leffler,TheSpecterofCommunism:TheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,1917-1953(1994),pp.34-40.

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[…]

“MostofthenewevidenceemanatingfromtherecentlyopenedarchivesinMoscowandespeciallyfromthearchivesofEasternEuropedemonstratesthatSovietpolicieswereconfusedandcontradictory….”[…]

“Stalin’sapproachtointernationalaffairsattheendofthewarwasrelativelycautious.HewantedasphereofinfluenceinEasternEuropeandcontrolofGermanandJapanesepower,butatthesametimehewishedtosustainthewartimeallianceuponwhichSovietsecurityandreconstructiondepended.TothegreatdismayoftheCommunistsinFrance,Italy,Spain,andGreece,Stalindiscouragedrevolutionaryactionin1944and1945,justwhentheyfelttheirprominentroleinwartimeresistancemovementsandtheirpeople’sgenuinedesireforthoroughgoingreformsaffordedthemauniqueopportunitytogainpower.

“StalinknewthatCommunistseizuresofpowerwouldprovoketheBritishandtheAmericans.TotheextentthathecommunicatedwithCommunistsabroad,heinsistedthattheybehaveprudently,cooperatewithdemocraticgroups,andformcoalitionor‘newtype’governments.[…]

“SafeguardinghisperipherywascriticaltoStalin.Peacewasdesirableintheshortrun,becausehiscountryhadbeendevastated;butwarwaslikelyinthelongrun,sotheSovietUnionneededtobepreparedforeveryeventuality.[…]

“Stalinhadtoconsiderwhetherhisallieswantedtopreservethecoalitionand,ifso,whetherontermscompatiblewithhisownminimumsecurityrequirements.Inhisview,theatomicmonopolyboostedAmericanself-confidenceandmadetheUnitedStatesmoredeterminedtoseekcooperationonitsownterms.AtthePotsdamConferenceinJuly1945,whenPresidentHarrySTrumanintimatedtheexistenceofapowerfulnewweapon,StalinalreadysensedthattheUnitedStateswashardeningitsposition.‘Theywanttoforceus,’Stalintoldhisassociates,‘toaccepttheirplansonquestionsaffectingEuropeandtheworld.Well,that’snotgoingtohappen.’

“TheatomicbombingofHiroshimaandNagasakiputtheKremlinonthedefensive.[…]

“Stalinneverlaidoutaclearapproachtoanyoftheproblemsbeforehim.Hewaschieflyoccupiedwithsafeguardinghisownpower,hisregime,andhiscountry’ssecurityandinfluence.Beyondthesefundamentalconcerns,Stalin’sideaswereconfusedandcontradictory.HepossessednodistinctstrategyonhowtopursuehisambitionswhileretainingAlliedsupport.Heactedexpediently,ziggedandzagged,andutteredpiousclichés.NeitherhiscomradesinMoscownorforeignCommunistsnorAlliedstatesmencoulddiscernclearpolicies,becausethereweren’tany.”

[…]

“InsidetheSovietUniontherewasarenewedemphasisonideologicalpurification.ButthemeaningofthisforSovietforeignpolicywasambiguous.InhisfamouselectionspeechofFebruary1946,forexample,Stalinsaidthatthewarhadarisenas‘theinevitableresultofthedevelopmentofworldeconomicandpoliticalforcesonthebasisofmonopolycapitalism.’Thissoundedliketheresurrectionofideologicalcant,butwhenthespeechwaswidelyinterpretedintheWestasachallenge,Stalinsoughttocorrecttheimpression.IncarefullyorchestratedmeetingswithWesternreporters,hereaffirmedhisdesireforpeacefulcoexistence.HewasnothintingatawarbetweenCommunistsandcapitalists,hesaid,butsuggestingtheinevitabilityofconflictbetweenthecapitaliststhemselves,especiallytheBritishandtheAmericans.AlthoughStalinhopedtotakeadvantageoftheserivalries,healsowantedtocooperatewithhisformerallies.Andpreciselyhowhecoulddobothatthesametimehedidnotknow.

“StalinmayhavebelievedthatinthelongrunconflictwiththeWestwasinevitable.HeretainedvividmemoriesofWesterninterventioninbehalfoftheWhitesduringtheCivilWar;hebelievedthecapitalistdemocracieshadencouragedtheNazistoattackBolshevikRussiainthemid-andlate1930s;hewasembitteredbythedelayinthesecondfront;hewasinfuriatedbyWesterndenunciationsofhiseffortstoestablish‘friendly’governmentsonhisperiphery;hewasequallyexasperatedbytheirattemptstolimitthepostwarflowofreparationsfromGermanytoRussia;andhewasagitatedbythoughtsthatAmericanswouldusetheiratomicmonopolytoextractconcessionsandendangerSovietsecurity.

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“ButknowingthatfortheindefinitefuturehewasinaweakpositioninrelationtotheUnitedStatesandrealizingthattherewassomethingtogainfromcooperationwiththeWest,Stalinmovedcautiously.InPoland,Romania,andBulgariahecontinuedtohelptheCommunistsconsolidatetheirpower.Elsewhere,Sovietpolicywasrestrained.StalinurgedTitotoactprudentlyintheBalkans.TheKremlindidnotgivearmstotheGreekCommunistsandofferedlimitedaidtotheChineseCommunists.UnderpressurefromtheWest,StalinwithdrewSoviettroopsfromManchuriaandIran.

“Throughout1946andearly1947,Stalinstillbeckonedforcooperationboththroughhisrhetoricandthroughmany(albeitnotall)ofhisactions.TheSovietsnegotiatedseriouslyovertheGermanquestionattheMoscowforeignministers’conferenceinthespringof1947,andtheyalsoagreedtoresumetalksregardingtheunificationofKorea.NewevidencefromthearchivesinMoscowandtheformerGermanDemocraticRepublic(EastGermany)alsosuggeststhattheKremlinwasthinkingaboutpermittingmorepluralistpoliticsinsidetheirzoneinGermanyandofdismissingsomeofthehard-lineadministratorswhowereseekingtoSovietizeit.AndwhennoagreementwasreachedattheMoscowconference,StalintalkedprivatelytoGeorgeMarshall,theAmericansecretaryofstate,andreiteratedhisdesiretoreachanaccord.[…]

“Stalindidnotwantanall-outrifttooccur”(pp.34-40).

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“AlthoughmanyhistorianshaveexaggeratedthedomesticpressuresPresidentTrumanfacedafterWorldWarIIforanAmericanwithdrawalformanevilworld,itisclearthatthesupportmanyAmericansgavetopermanentmilitaryengagementsabroadandtoapolicyofinterventionintheThirdWorldcouldonlycomeasaresultoftherivalrywithSovietCommunism.TheimmenseriseinSovietpowerasaresultofWorldWarII–inwhichitwastheothermajorvictoriousstate–wouldhaveposedachallengetoanygreatpowerengagedinEuropeorAsia.ButitwastheAmericanideologicalinsistencethataglobalspreadofCommunismwould,ifnotchecked,resultfromthepostwarextensionofSovietmightthatmadetherivalrybetweenthetwopowersintoaColdWar.ToelitesintheUnitedStates,theriseoftheSovietUnionasaworldpoweralsomeanttheriseofanalternativeformofmodernitythatAmericanhadbeencombatingsince1917.AnycompromisewiththegreatpowerthatembodiedCommunistidealswouldhavebeenunlikelyinthelate1940s.ButtheSovietformofmessianicmodernismwasparticularlyunfortunateinreachingthepeakofitsinfluencejustastheUnitedStatesremovedthelastlimitstoitsglobalmission.‘Whatindeed,’askedtheStateDepartmentofficialJosephJonesin1955,‘arethelimitsofUnitedStatesforeignpolicy?”(p.25).

“SovietplanningforthepostwarworldbeganassoonastheGermanoffensivegroundtoahaltin1942.StalinwantedtoextendSovietinfluenceinEurope—crucially,alongitswesternborders,butalso,ifpossible,intoCentralEuropeandGermanyitself.ButtheSovietleaderhadtobeverycarefullywithpredictingthepreciseoutcomeofthewar.Whileconvincedfrom1942onthatGermanycouldnotwin,StalinexpectedthecapitalistpowerstoseekpeacewithGermanyafterthecollapseofHitler’sregime.FearfulthatsuchaseparatepeacewouldleaveGermanyfreetocontinueitswaragainsttheSovietUnion,Stalinneeded,ontheonehandtominimizefrictionwithhisalliesandtherebyreducetheirtemptationtothrowhimtothewolves,while,ontheotherhand,alsotominimizethechancesforaJapaneseattackontheSovietUnionintheeast,anattackthatStalinknewwouldmeantheendoftheSovietstate.[….]

Towardtheendofthewar—andfinallyconvincedthathisallieswerenotaimingforaseparatepeace—StalinbeganchoosingbetweenthedifferentMarxistperspectivesthathadbeenofferedtohimthroughSovietwartimeplanning.HisappetiteincreasedbytheSovietvictoriesontheEasternFront,theSovietleadernowforesawasecuritybeltalongitswesternborderconsistingofstateswhoseforeignpoliciesdependedontheSovietUnion.ButhealsoexpectedpostwarGermany—thebigprizeintermsofEurope’sfuturedevelopment—tomovetowardsocialismandanalliancewithMoscow.ThroughattackingaweakenedJapan,theSovietUnionwouldsecureitsinfluenceonthepostwarsettlementsinChinaandKorea.Elsewhereinthecolonies,theSovietUnionwouldalsostakeitsclaimsintheredivisionthatwouldfollowthewar.Stalinbasedtheseoptimisticperspectivesonthecontinuedcompetitionamongthemainimperialistpowers—BritainandtheUnitedStates—inthecomingbattleforspoils.Whiletheimperialistscontinuedtheirrivalry,theSovietscould—throughamixofdiplomacyandforce—becomeasocialistworldpower.

Onlygradually,between1944and1947,diditbecomecleartoStalinthatthepredictionofintenseimperialistrivalriesfortheredivisionofthepostwarworldwarwrong.Insteadofpowerscompeting,theweakEuropeanstates,includingBritain,soughtprotectionoftheirsecurityandtheinterestsofworldcapitalismassuchfromtheUnitedStates.Toseethisnew,unipolarcapitalistworldwasahard-wonrealizationfortheSovietleaders.ItdidnotfitanyoftheMarxistmapsthathadbeenofferedduringthewar,andithadtobeexplainedasatemporaryphenomenon,broughtaboutbytheWestEuropeancapitalists’needtoimportAmericancapitalandtechnology.WhatwascleartoStalinwasthataworlddominatedbytheUnitedStateswasmuchmoredangerousfortheSovietUnionthanasysteminwhichonecouldplayimperialistpowersoffagainsteachother.Theadventof

SupportingQuestion1

FeaturedSource SourceB:ExcerptsfromOddArneWestad,TheGlobalColdWar:ThirdWorldInterventionsandtheMakingofOurTimes(2005),pp.57-58.

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acapitalisthegemonymeantthataconcertedstrategyforstranglingthesocialiststatewasinthemaking,Stalinthought.

“TheimpositionofCommunistregimesintheEasternEuropeancountriesunderSovietmilitarycontrol,carriedoutbetween1945and1948,wastoagreatextentaresponsetothesenewandmorepessimisticperspectivesonwhatthepostwarworldwouldlooklike”(pp.57-58).

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“FDRbelievedthattheRussians’distrustoftheoutsideworldwasaproductoftheirexperience,andcouldbeovercomebymaintainingaconsistentpostureofpatience,generosity,andfriendlinesstowardthem.Specifically,byrefrainingfrompubliccriticismofSovietactions,providingthemwithgenerouslend-leaseaid,occasionallysidingwithStalinagainstChurchill,andavoidingretaliatoryactionswhentheRussiansengagedinprovocativebehavior,RoosevelthopedtoconvincetheSovietsthatAmericacouldbetrusted.OnceSovietsuspicionshadbeenundermined,Rooseveltfelt,as[Ambassador]Harrimandid,thathecouldpersuadetheSovietsthattheirsecurityandlegitimateforeignpolicyobjectscouldbemosteasilyachievedthroughcooperationwiththeUnitedStates;thus,collaborationwasintheirownobjectivebestinterests”(p.75).

“Sovietfoot-draggingonprojectsofmilitarycollaboration[duringWorldWarII]wascausedbyanumberoffactors—longstandingSovietsuspicionofforeigners,insistencebytheSovietsontheprincipleofreciprocityinalljointmilitaryoperations,thehighdegreeofcentralizationofauthorityintheSovietbureaucracy—noneofwhichwouldhavebeenaffectedbya‘tougher’U.S.negotiatingstanceorimpliedthreatstowithholdlend-leaseassistance.

“AccordingtooneSovietexpert,thealmostpathologicalsuspicionexhibitedbytheSovietstowardforeignersduringthewarwaspromptedbyStalin’srecognitionthatafterhostilitiesended,theUSSRwouldbeexhaustedandvulnerabletoexploitationbyhostilecapitalistpowers.EveryU.S.proposalformilitarycollaborationwascarefullyexaminedforulteriormotives,withtheresultthatbythetimeapprovalwasgranted,theproposedprojectwasineffective”(p.86).

“IftheSovietshadintendedtoestablishaone-party,monolithiccommunistregimeinanyEasternEuropeancountry,Rumaniawouldhavebeenthelogicalchoice.[…]YettheSovietsdidnottrytoreplace[anti-RussianRumaniangovernment]withacommunistgovernment”(p.120).

“HadHarrimanconsideredtheactionswhichtheSovietsdidnottakeinEasternEurope,hemighthaveinferredthatStalin’sprincipalaimwasnotthepromotionofcommunistdictatorshipsinneighboringcountries,buttheestablishmentofbroadlybasedcoalitiongovernments‘friendly’totheSovietUnion”(p.121).“ConfrontedwithSovietrudenessandarroganceonPolandandotherissues,Harrimandidnotweightevidenceaccordingtonormativecriteria.Hadhebeenmoredispassionateandanalytical,HarrimanwouldhaverealizedthatSovietpoliciesinEasternEurope,althoughoftenbarbaricbyAmericanstandards,neverthelesswereacomplextapestryinwhichthethreadofnationalsecurityappearedthroughout.HemightalsohaverealizedthecontradictioninherentinarguingthatSovietpolicywasmotivatedbyideologicalgoalsofcommunistrevolution,yetatthesametimeassertingthattheSovietswerereasonablemenwhowouldabandontheircauseinreturnfordollarstorebuildtheircountry.IftheSoviets’aimswastopromotecommunistdictatorshipsaroundtheworld,thenhowcouldtheUnitedStateseverdevelopacollaborativerelationshipwiththeSovietUnion,nomatterhowmanytimesweretaliatedbycuttingoffaidorplayingtitfortat?”(p.122-3).“TheambassadortoMoscowasmotivatedbynoothergoalthantoprovidethemostaccurateinterpretationofSovietforeignpolicyaimsandintentions.HeformulatedhypothesesaboutSovietaims

SupportingQuestion1

FeaturedSource SourceC:ExcerptsfromDeborahWelchLarson,OriginsofContainment:APsychologicalExplanation(1985),pp.75,86,120-3,124-5,141,158.

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inEasternEurope,andrevisedthemastheRedArmyadvancedonthecontinent.[…]Harrimandidnottrytodistort,reinterpret,orignoreevidencetopreservehisestimatethattheSovietswereconcernedaboveallelsewithhaving‘friendlygovernments’andpreventingtherestorationofthecordonsanitaire;nordidhetrytomaintainhisearlierjudgmentthattheSovietsgenuinelywantedPolandtobeindependentandwouldallowthePolestochoosetheirowndomesticpoliticalsystem.[…]BecauseofhisdisillusioninganddisturbingquarrelswithSovietdiplomats…heleapedtotheconclusionthattheSovietsweredeterminedtoimposetotalitariangovernmentsintheshadowoftheRedArmy”(p.123).

“Ill-informedabouttheimportantforeignpolicyissuesimpingingonthepresidency,bewilderedbytheconflictingadvicethrustonhim,yetanxioustoavoidappearinghesitantorindecisive,TrumanquicklyseizedonHarriman’sconcrete,common-sensicalsuggestions.Insucceedingweeks,TrumansoughttoimplementHarriman’s‘firmbutfriendly’quidproquopolicyinsuchareasaslend-leasepolicy,theSovietloan,andthePolishproblem”(pp.124-125).“TheresultsofappeasementinthethirtieshadconvincedTrumanthatonlywillingnesstousepreponderantforcedcoulddeteraggressors.‘WhocansaywhattheresultswouldhavebeenifFrancehadpreventedHitlerfromoccupyingtheRhinelandasshecouldhavedone—orifEnglandhadgonealongwithusinpreventingJapan’sgrabinManchuria,’Trumanaskedrhetoricallyina1944speech.VerylittleconcertedactionmighthavedeterredItaly’sconquestofEthiopia.‘TimelyactionmighthavemadeunnecessarythecostinlivesandresourcesnowbeingexpendedbytheUnitedNationstorestoretotheworldpeaceamongmen,’Trumandeclared.TopreventtheriseofGermanyandJapanmilitarism,Trumansupportedtheunconditionalsurrenderpolicyandforceddisarmament”(p.141).

“Yet,indiplomacy,styleandnuancecanconveysubstantialmeaning.TheRussiansmusthaveinterpretedTruman’sbluntnessandunwillingnesstoacceptSovietprerogativesinPolandasevidencethathehaddecidedtoabandonthepolicyofcollaborationnowthattheRussianswerenolongerneededtodefeatGermany.BeforehismeetingwithTruman,[Sovietminister]Molotovhadconfessedto[USambassador]DaviesthattheSovietswereworriedthat‘differencesofinterpretation’and‘complications’mightarisebecauseTrumanlackedfullinformationontheYaltaagreements.WithRooseveltalive,Molotovexplained,theSovietshadfeltthatanydifferencecouldbeworkedoutbecausetheyhad‘fullconfidence’inhissincerityandwillingnesstocooperate.TheSovietsdidnotknowTrumanastheydidRoosevelt”(p.158).

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Accessedfrom:https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/1945-present/postwar-politics-and-cold-war/timeline-terms

SupportingQuestion2FeaturedSource SourceA:Gilder-Lehrman,“PostwarPoliticsandtheColdWar:TimelineandTerms”

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SupportingQuestion2FeaturedSource SourceB:Truman,OfftheRecord,LettertoSecretaryofStateJamesByrnes(1946).

LettertoJamesByrnesHarryS.TrumanJanuary05,1946MydearJim:

Ihavebeenconsideringsomeofourdifficulties.AsyouknowIwouldliketopursueapolicyofdelegatingauthoritytothemembersofthecabinetintheirvariousfieldsandthenbackthemupintheresults.ButindoingthatandincarryingoutthatpolicyIdonotintendtoturnoverthecompleteauthorityofthePresidentnortoforgothePresident’sprerogativetomakethefinaldecision.ThereforeitisabsolutelynecessarythatthePresidentshouldbekeptfullyinformedonwhatistakingplace.Thisisvitallynecessarywhennegotiationsaretakingplaceinaforeigncapital,oreveninanothercitythanWashington.Thisprocedureisnecessaryindomesticaffairsanditisvitalinforeignaffairs.

AtSanFrancisconoagreementsorcompromiseswereeveragreedtowithoutmyapproval.AtLondonyouwereinconstanttouchwithmeandcommunicationwasestablisheddailyifnecessary.Thatproceduredidnottakeplaceatthislastconference.IonlysawyouforapossiblethirtyminutesthenightbeforeyouleftafteryourinterviewwiththeSenateCommittee.

IreceivednocommunicationfromyoudirectlywhileyouwereinMoscow.TheonlymessageIhadfromyoucameasareplytoonewhichIhadUnderSecretaryAchesonsendtoyouaboutmyinterviewwiththeSenateCommitteeonAtomicEnergy.Theprotocolwasnotsubmittedtome,norwasthecommuniqué.IwascompletelyinthedarkonthewholeconferenceuntilIrequestedyoutocometotheWilliamsburgandinformme.ThecommuniquéwasreleasedbeforeIevensawit.NowIhavetheutmostconfidenceinyouandinyourabilitybutthereshouldbeacompleteunderstandingbetweenusonprocedure.Hencethismemorandum.ForthefirsttimeIreadtheEthridgeletterthismorning.ItisfullofinformationonRumania&Bulgariaandconfirmsourpreviousinformationonthosetwopolicestates.Iamnotgoingtoagreetotherecognitionofthosegovernmentsunlesstheyareradicallychanged.Ithinkweoughttoprotestwithallthevigorofwhichwearecapable[against]theRussianprograminIran.Thereisnojustificationforit.ItisaparalleltotheprogramofRussiainLatvia,EstoniaandLithuania.ItisalsoinlinewiththehighhandedandarbitrarymannerinwhichRussiaactedinPoland.AtPotsdamwewerefacedwithanaccomplishedfactandwere,bycircumstances,almostforcedtoagreetoRussianoccupationofEasternPolandandtheoccupationofthatpartofGermanyeastoftheOderRiverbyPoland.Itwasahighhandedoutrage.

AtthetimewewereanxiousforRussianentryintotheJapaneseWar.Ofcoursewefoundlaterthatwedidn’tneedRussiathereandtheRussianshavebeenaheadachetouseversince.WhenyouwenttoMoscowyouwerefacedwithanotheraccomplishedfactinIran.AnotheroutrageifeverIsawone.

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Iranwasourallyinthewar.IranwasRussia’sallyinthewar.Iranagreedtothefreepassageofarms,ammunitionandothersuppliesrunningintomillionsoftonsacrossherterritoryfromthePersianGulftotheCaspianSea.Withoutthesesupplies,furnishedbytheUnitedStates,Russiawouldhavebeenignominiouslydefeated.YetnowRussiastirsuprebellionandkeepstroopsonthesoilofherfriendandally,Iran.

Thereisn’tadoubtinmymindthatRussiaintendsaninvasionofTurkeyandtheseizureoftheBlackSeaStraitstotheMediterranean.UnlessRussiaisfacedwithanironfistandstronglanguageanotherwarisinthemaking.Onlyonelanguagedotheyunderstand–”Howmanydivisionshaveyou?”

Idonotthinkweshouldplaycompromiseanylonger.WeshouldrefusetorecognizeRumaniaandBulgariauntiltheycomplywithourrequirements;weshouldletourpositiononIranbeknowninnouncertaintermsandweshouldcontinuetoinsistontheinternationalizationoftheKielCanal,theRhine-DanubewaterwayandtheBlackSeaStraitsandweshouldmaintaincompletecontrolofJapanandthePacific.WeshouldrehabilitateChinaandcreateastrongcentralgovernmentthere.WeshoulddothesameforKorea.ThenweshouldinsistonthereturnofourshipsfromRussiaandforceasettlementoftheLend-LeaseDebtofRussia.

I’mtiredofbabyingtheSoviets.

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“AtthePotsdamconferenceStalinfeltthatPresidentTruman,whomadenosecretofhishostileattitudetowardtheSovietUnion,hadfoundalike-mindedallyinChurchill.StalinbecameespeciallyworriedwheninPotsdamthetwoattemptedtoblackmailMoscowwiththeatombomb.Stalin’sresponsetothatthreatwasincreasedpressureontheEasternEuropeancountries,which,inturn,provokedahostilereactionfromtheWesternpowers.WhenChurchillmadehisFultonspeech,applaudedbyTruman,itbecamecleartoStalinthathishopesforpostwarcooperationwithBritainhadallalongbeennothingbutanillusion”(p.315).

[Stalin,speakingwiththeDeputyeditorinchieffortheWarandtheWorkingClassLevAbramovichLeontiev:]“Wewonthewar.Theenemyhasbeendefeated.Friendsareallaroundus.Newtimeshavecome.”[…]

“DidStalinreallybelieveatthattimethatanewerahadbegun,thatcooperationwiththeWesterncountriescouldbepreserved,thattherewouldbenomorewitch-huntsinourcountry,andthatbettertimeshadindeedarrivedfortheSovietUnionandtherestoftheworld?Vaststretchesofourlandlayinruins.Millionsofpeoplelivedinthesqualorofdugouthuts,lackingtheessentials.TheSovietUnionhadyettomakegoodonitspromisetojointhewaragainstJapan.Butthatwasregardedasashort-termoperation.Theprioritytaskonthenationalagendawastocreateconditionsoflifeworthyofhumandignityandtorehabilitatethedevastatedcountryside.ItispossiblethatatthetimeStalinstillbelievedthattheAmericanswouldhelpinthis.Maybehewasevenpreparedtocurbhisappetiteandtoworkoutacompromise?Afterall,hadn’tPresidentTruman,afterhisrecentmoveintotheWhiteHouse,providedassurancesthathewouldcontinueRoosevelt’spoliciesininternationalaffairs?

“Whowastoblamethattherelationsbetweenyesterday’salliesdeterioratedsoquickly?SomeWesternscholarsbelievethattheleadersofallthreeoftheprincipalcountriesintheanti-Hitlercoalitionwereequallyinterestedinnotkeepingupgoodrelations..Inmyopinion,rightaftertheendofthewar,theSovietleadershiptriedtopreserveanatmosphereoftrust,whileunderminingitinanumberofcasesbyitsactions.PartoftheblameisattributabletoStalin’ssuspiciousness,histendencytothinkintermsofthepastwar,hispreoccupationwithcreatingaroundtheSovietUnionazoneofbufferstateswithregimeshecouldtotallyrelyon.

“Allthat,ofcourse,provokedanappropriatereactionfromtheUnitedStatesandBritain.Butthenthosecountriesdidn’tgooutoftheirwaytopreserveafavorableclimate,either.Truman’srudeoutburstsinconversationwithMolotov,whowasonhiswaytoSanFranciscotosigntheUnitedNationscharter,gaveStalinreasontobelievethatthenewU.S.administrationwasdepartingfromRoosevelt’spoliticalcourse.Whenlater,atthePotsdamconference,TrumanattemptedtoblackmailtheSovietUnionwiththeA-bomb,Moscowperceivedthisasaseriousthreat.Inturn,Stalin’ssubsequentmoveswereinterpretedasaSovietthreattotheWest.ThelevelofconfrontationheightenedandtheColdWarbrokeout.Therewasevendagnerthatthesituationcouldescalateintoarmedconflict.

“TheUnitedStatesmountedaninternalcampaignagainstcommunism.TheSovietUnionrespondedwithnolessvirulentanti-imperialistdrive.Bothsideswerereadyingtheirnationsforaconfrontation,whiletheirpeoplestillpreservedthewarmfeelingsoffriendshipforgedovertheyearsoftheirjointfightagainstthecommonenemy.Inthesecondhalfofthe1940s,acampaigntocondemn‘cosmopolitanism’and‘foreignlifestyles’waslaunchedinourcountry.Ibelievethatithadtwoobjectives:

SupportingQuestion2

FeaturedSource SourceC:ExcerptfromValentinM.Brezhkov,AtStalin'sSide:HisInterpreter'sMemoirsFromtheOctoberRevolutiontotheFalloftheDictator'sEmpire(1994),344.

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topromotehostilitytowardthe‘newaggressor,’theUnitedStates,andtoreviveanatmosphereoffearathome.”

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“WhentheconflictcrashedtoacloseinEurope,westillcherishedasubstantialreservoirofgoodwillforthestout-heartedRussianswhohadsavedourskinswhilesavingtheirown.IftheKremlinhadchosentoconciliateratherthanalienateus,wenodoubtwouldhavebeenwillingtocontributegenerouslytotechnicians,materials,andmoneytotherehabilitationofwar-ravagedRussia.Butwithinafewmonthsourworstfearswerearoused,andthereservoirofgoodwillcrackedwideopen”(pp.319-320).

“Themythhassomehowgainedcurrencythat,ifRoosevelthadnotbeenstrickeninthehourofvictory,co-operationbetweenRussiaandAmericawouldhavebeenbroughttothehighlevelofwhichhehaddreamed.TheviewisheldbymanyadmirersofthelatePresident,andisalsovoicedbyCommunistsandotherSovietapologists,especiallythosewhoseekanexcusefordeterioratingrelations.But,whatevertheviewsofSovietspokesmen,theRussianmasses,knowingvaguelyofRoosevelt’sfriendlinessandopenhandedgenerositywithlend-leaselargesse,held—andperhapsstillhold—theirbenefactorinconsiderableesteem.Theproofisconvincing[….]thatRooseveltdiedknowingorstronglysuspectingthathisboldbidforconciliationhadfailed.ThesharpshiftinSovietpolicywasclearlydiscerniblebymid-March,1945…”(pp.321-322).“WhydidtheKremlinsorudelyslapasidetheprofferedhandofco-operationandfellowship?TheSovietshadneveralliedthemselveswiththewesterndemocraciesinspirit,andwhenthefightingstoppedtherewasanaturaltendencyfortheRussianmindtoreturnto—orremainin—theoldgroovesofantiwesterndistrust.SecretaryHullconcludedthatMoscowstartedtolaunchoutonitsindependentcourseasearlyas1944,whenitscentedfinalvictoryandfeltlessdependentuponthedemocraciesforaid.Aboutthesametime,andpresumablyforthesamereason,SovietspokesmenbegantostressoncemoretheorthodoxCommunistidealsofinternationalismandworldrevolution,quiteincontrasttotheiremphasisonnationalismduringthewartimecrisis. “Thisdisquietingdevelopmentwasentirelynatural.Communism,whichopenlyproclaimswarfareoncapitalism,couldnottrustthedemocraticworld,andMoscow’spolicywasnodoubtpermeatedbyanticapitalisticfears.SovietmisgivingswerefurtherfedbytheirresponsibleutterancesofcertainAmericannewspapersandpoliticalleaders….Tocooperate[withtheUnitedStates]wouldkillasubstantialpartof[theSovietUnion’s]reasonforexistence.Notonlywasittotheirpersonaladvantagetoharponwesternaggression,whethertheyreallyfeareditornot,butanoutsidebogeywouldproveusefulinquietingdisunityathomeandinarousinganalreadyexhaustedpeopletogreatersacrifices.

“TheSovietleadersatfirstwereinclinedtobelittletheatomicbomb,butgraduallytheybegantopromoteafearpsychosisamongtheirpeople.RichandpowerfulUncleSamhadthishorriblenewweapon,loadedandticking,andtheRussiansdidnothaveitin1945,anddidnotgetit,accordingtoourinformation,untilfouryearslater.ThealarmoflargesegmentsoftheRussianpeopleovertheso-called‘rattlingoftheatomicbomb’wasunquestionablyreal,especiallywhennolessafigurethanGovernorGeorgeH.EarleofPennsylvania,amongothers,couldproclaimin1946thatweshouldattacktheRussianswiththebomb‘whilewehaveitandbeforetheygetit.’

“ToAmericans,Sovietchargesofaggressionseemedludicrous.[…]Allwewantedwaspeaceandareturntoprewardays.SovietfearsofcapitalisticaggressionwerefurtherdeepenedbyourattitudetowardMoscow’sdealingswithitsweakerneighbors,notablyPoland,whosedemocraticstatushadpresumablybeenguaranteedatYalta.TheprotestsofthewesternAlliesagainstSovietencroachmentsmerelyconfirmedtheKremlin’ssuspicions,andprovidedtheRussianswithjustificationforbuildingup

SupportingQuestion3

FeaturedSource SourceA:ExcerptfromThomasA.Bailey,AmericaFacesRussia:Russian-AmericanRelationsfromEarlyTimestoOurDay(1950),p.334.

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anti-capitalisticpuppetsinneighboringcountriesbeforethedemocraciescouldfosteranti-Communistregimes”(pp.323-325).

“WithintheUnitedNationsorganizationtheSovietdelegatesfurtherantagonizedtheAmericanpublic.TheydidnotwelcomeinvestigationsofCommunist-supportedguerrillaactivityinGreece.TheypressedfortheostracismofFranco’sSpain,whichourpeopleatfirstfavored.ButSpain,asapotentialdikeagainsttheRussians,roseinrespectabilitywiththedemocraticnationsastheCommunistmenacebecamemorethreatening.Theviciouscirclewasagainatwork.TheRussians,havingdrivenustowardFranco,foundinouractionproofoftheirchargesthatwewereessentially‘reactionary.’TheSovietsalsovigorouslyopposedtheadmissionofnew‘fascist’membersintotheUnitedNations,suchasEireandPortugal.

“UnderscoringthesplitbetweentheCommunistandnon-Communstworld,theRussianspersistentlydeclinedtojoinmanyoftheorganizationssetupbytheUnitedNations,exceptthosefewfromwhichtheyderiveddirectbenefit.[…]TheconclusiongraduallyforceditselfuponmanythoughtfulAmericansthattheRussianshadnotjoinedtheUnitedNationsingoodfaith,butforthepurposeofshapingitordeadlockingitinsuchawayastosafeguardSovietinterests.MoscowmaywellhavehadinmindexploitingtheorganizationasanespionagecenterandaglobalsoundingboardforCommunistpropaganda”(p.329).“TheopinionwasrathergenerallyheldintheUnitedStatesthatnoonecouldquarrelwiththedesireofthewar-rackedRussianstohavewell-disposedneighbors.Butthereisaworldofdifferencebetweenafriendlyneighborandavassalstatewhoselibertieshavebeensubverted,whoseparliamentaryinstitutions(wheretheyexisted)havebeensweptaside,whosesovereigntyhadbeenextinguished,andwhoseforeignpolicyisdictatedbytheKremlin. “Andwheredoesdefenseendandaggressionbegin?Ifonemusthavea‘friendlystate’(sayPoland)onone’sflank,onemustalsohavea‘friendlystate’(sayGermany)onPoland’sflank,andonemusthavea‘friendlystate’(sayFrance)onGermany’sflank.Ifthislineofreasoningwerepursuedrelentlessly,therewouldbeonlyCommuniststates,andtheMarxiandreamofglobalconquestwouldcometrue.Thesituationhadbecomesoominousbythemiddleof1946thatapproximatelyhalfourpeoplewerepreparedtosaythattheSovietaimwasnotlocaldefensebutworlddomination.[….]

“ThegrimfactwasthatifItalyandFrancesuccumbedtotheCommunists,SovietpowerwouldsweeptotheEnglishChannel,andallEuropewouldfallundertheHammerandSickle.Thewesterndemocracies,notablyBritainandAmerica,wouldthenbethrownbackwheretheyhadbeeninthedismaldaysofDunkirkin1940,onlyinsomerespectstheirplightwouldbeworse.Ifanythingwastobedone,ithadtobedonequickly”(p.334).

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SupportingQuestion3

FeaturedSource SourceB:ExcerptsfromJohnLewisGaddis,TheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,1941-1947(1972),pp.359-361.

“HistorianshavedebatedatlengththequestionofwhocausedtheColdWar,butwithoutsheddingmuchlightonthesubject.Toooftentheyviewthateventexclusivelyasaseriesofactionsbyonesideandreactionsbytheother.Infact,policy-makersinboththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwereconstantlyweighingeachother’sintentions,astheyperceivedthem,andmodifyingtheirowncoursesofactionaccordingly.Inaddition,officialsinWashingtonandMoscowbroughttothetaskofpolicyformulationavarietyofpreconceptions,shapedbypersonality,ideology,politicalpressures,evenignoranceandirrationality,allofwhichinfluencedtheirbehavior.Oncethiscomplexinteractionofstimulusandresponseistakenintoaccount,itbecomesclearthatneithersidecanbearsoleresponsibilityfortheonsetoftheColdWar.

“Butneithershouldtheconflictbeseenasirrepressible,iffornootherreasonthanthemethodologicalimpossibilityof‘proving’inevitabilityinhistory.ThepowervacuumincentralEuropecausedbyGermany’scollapsemadeaRussian-Americanconfrontationlikely;itdidnotmakeitinevitable.Menaswellascircumstancesmakeforeignpolicy,andthroughsuchdrasticexpedientsaswar,appeasement,orresignation,policy-makerscanalwaysalterdifficultsituationsinwhichtheyfindthemselves.Onemaylegitimatelyaskwhytheydonotchoosetogothisfar,buttoviewtheiractionsaspredeterminedbyblind,impersonal‘forces’istodenythecomplexityandparticularityofhumanbehavior,nottomentiontheever-presentpossibilityofaccident.TheColdWaristoocomplicatedaneventtobediscussedintermsofeithernationalguiltorthedeterminismofinevitability.

“IfonemustassignresponsibilityfortheColdWar,themostmeaningfulwaytoproceedistoaskwhichsidehadthegreateropportunitytoaccommodateitself,atleastinpart,totheother’sposition,giventherangeofalternativesastheyappearedatthetime.RevisionistshavearguedthatAmericanpolicy-makerspossessedgreaterfreedomofaction,buttheirviewignorestheconstraintsimposedbydomesticpolitics.LittleisknowneventodayabouthowStalindefinedhisoptions,butitdoesseemsafetosaythattheverynatureoftheSovietsystemaffordedhimalargerselectionofalternativesthanwereopentoleadersoftheUnitedStates.TheRussiandictatorwasimmunefrompressuresofCongress,publicopinion,orthepress.Evenideologydidnotrestricthim:Stalinwasthemasterofcommunistdoctrine,notaprisonerofit,andcouldmodifyorsuspendMarxism-Leninismwheneveritsuitedhimtodoso.ThisisnottosaythatStalinwantedaColdWar—hehadeveryreasontoavoidone.ButhisabsolutepowersdidgivehimmorechancestosurmounttheinternalrestraintsonhispolicythanwereavailabletohisdemocraticcounterpartsintheWest.

“TheColdWargrewoutofacomplicatedinteractionofexternalandinternaldevelopmentsinsideboththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Theexternalsituation—circumstancesbeyondthecontrolofeitherpower—leftAmericansandRussiansfacingoneanotheracrossprostratedEuropeattheendofWorldWarII.InternalinfluencesintheSovietUnion—thesearchforsecurity,theroleofideology,massivepostwarreconstructionneeds,thepersonalityofStalin—togetherwiththoseintheUnitedStates—theidealofself-determination,fearofcommunism,theillusionofomnipotencefosteredbyAmericaneconomicstrengthandtheatomicbomb—madetheresultingconfrontationahostileone.Leadersofbothsuperpowerssoughtpeace,butindoingsoyieldedtoconsiderationswhich,whiletheydidnotprecipitatewar,madearesolutionofdifferencesimpossible.”

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SupportingQuestion3

FeaturedSource SourceC:ExcerptsfromGeorgeC.Herring,FromColonytoSuperpower:UnitedStatesForeignRelationssince1776(2008),pp.603-604.

“PolicymakingchangeddramaticallyunderTruman’sverydifferentleadershipstyle.Understandablyinsecureinanofficeofhugeresponsibilityinatimeofstunningchange,thenewpresidentwasespeciallyillateaseintheunfamiliarworldofforeignrelations.WhereFDRhadbeencomfortablewiththeambiguitiesofdiplomacy,Trumansawacomplexworldinblack-and-whiteterms.HesharedtheparochialismofmostAmericansofhisgeneration,viewedpeople,races,andnationsthroughthecrudestofstereotypes,andsometimesusedethnicslurs.HeassumedthatAmericanwaysofdoingthingswerethecorrectwayandthatthepeaceshouldbebasedonAmericanprinciples.Anavidstudentofhistory,hedrewsimplelessonsfromcomplicatedevents.Hepreferredblunttalktothesilkytonesofdiplomacy,buthistoughnessonoccasionmaskeddeepuncertaintiesandsometimesgothimintrouble.Hiscourageinfacinghugechallengesandhis‘buckstopshere’decisiveness—asharpcontrastwithhispredecessor’sannoyingrefusaltomakecommitments—havewonhimdeservedpraise.Butdecisivenesscouldalsoreflecthislackofexperienceandsometimesprofoundinsecurity.Anorderlyadministrator,againinmarkedcontrasttoFDR,hegavegreaterresponsibilitytohissubordinatesandinsistedupontheirloyalty”(p.599)

“TheUnitedStates’powerwasatitspinnacle,butitbroughtuncertaintyinsteadofsecurity,andAmericansfeltthreated,as[SecretaryofStateJamesF.]Byrnesputit,byeventsfrom‘KoreatoTimbuktoo.’TheyworriedaboutinstabilityinWesternEuropeandthestrategicallyvitalMediterraneanregion.NotreadytoscrapwartimecooperationwiththeUSSR,theywereincreasinglyalarmedbySovietbehavior.TheyespeciallyfearedthatanaggressiveStalinmightexploitglobalinstability.TrumanandByrnesthusveeredbetweentoughtalkandcontinuedeffortstonegotiate.Bytheendoftheyear,theadministrationhadbrandedtheonetimeallyasanenemy.

“AsithadbeencentraltothebeginningsofSoviet-Americanconflict,soalsoEasternEuropeplayedacriticalroleinthepostwartransformationofAmericanattitudestowardstheUSSR.HauntedbymemoriesofthedepressionandWorldWarII,U.S.officialsferventlybelievedthattheWilsonianprinciplesofself-determinationofpeoplesandanopenworldeconomywereessentialforpeaceandprosperity.TheUnitedStateshadnegligibleeconomicinterestsinEasternEurope,andU.S.officialsunderstoodpoorlyifatallthedeterminationofsomeofitsindigenousleaderstonationalizemajorindustries.TheysawthetrendtowardsnationalizationasathreattocapitalismandahealthyworldeconomyandattributedittotheimpositionofCommunismfromtheoutside.TheyvaguelyunderstoodSovietconcernforfriendlygovernmentsbutcontinuedtocallforfreeelectionsevenwheretheymightresultinanti-Sovietregimes”(p.600).

“Astheylookedoutacrossanunsettledworld,Americanssawotheralarmingsigns.Inthetensepostwaratmosphere,theytendedtoignorecaseswheretheSovietUnionhadkeptitsagreementsandactedinaconciliatorymannerandfastenedonexamplesofuncooperativeandthreateningbehavior”(p.601).

“ItremainsimpossibletodeterminewithcertaintywhatStalinactuallysoughtatthistime,butTruman’sassessmentappearsmuchtoosimplistic.TheSovietdictatorwasacrueltyrantwhopresidedoverabrutalpolicestate.Neuroticinhissuspicionsandfears,heslaughteredwithoutmercymillionsofhisownpeopleduringhislongandbloodyrule.Heruthlesslypromotedhisownpowerandthesecurityofhisstate.Hewasdeterminedtosecurefriendly—whichmeantcompliant—governmentsinthecrucialbuffer

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zonebetweentheUSSRandGermanyandtoguardagainstarenewedGermanthreat.Hewasalsoacleveropportunistwhowouldexploitanygivenhimbyhisenemies—orfriends.ButhewasacutelyawareofSovietweakness.HewasnoCommunistideologue.Especiallyintheimmediatepostwaryears,whenheneededbreathingspace,herefrainedfrompushingrevolutioninawar-tornworld.Hisdiplomacymanifestedapersistentstreakofrealism.Hedidnotseekwar.[….]Someofhisployswereintendedtosecureconfirmationofgreat-powerstatusfortheSovietUnion,othersmerelytogainabargainingedge.Somecommentatorshaveclaimedthatthis‘battle-scarredtiger,’asKennancalledhim,wasasskilledatoutwittingfoesashewasevil.Intruth,hemaderepeatedmistakesthatbroughtabouttheverycircumstanceshedesperatelysoughttoavoid.

“Americanscouldnotorwouldnotseethisinearly1946,andTruman’shard-nosedassessmentofwhatwasnowpresumedtobeadistinctSovietthreatseemedvalidatedfromeverydirection.InaFebruary9‘election’speech,StalinwarnedoftherenewedthreatofcapitalistencirclementandcalledforhugeboostsinSovietindustrialproduction.Thespeechwasprobablydesignedtorallyanexhaustedpeopletofurthersacrifice.EvenTrumanconcededthatStalin,likeU.S.politicians,might‘demagogueabitforelections.’ButmanyAmericansreadintotheSovietdictator’swordsthemostominousimplications.”[….]

“Lessthantwoweekslater,KennanunleashedontheStateDepartmenthisfamousandinfluential‘LongTelegram,’aneight-thousand-wordmissivethatassessedSovietpoliciesinthemostgloomyandominousfashion.[….]Inhighlyalarmisttones,hedeliveredoverthewiresalectureonSovietbehaviorthatdecisivelyinfluencedtheoriginsandnatureoftheColdWar.HeconcededthattheSovietUnionwasweakerthantheUnitedStatesandacknowledgedthatitdidnotwantwar.Butheignoreditslegitimatepostwarfears,andbyshowinghowCommunistideologyreinforcedtraditionalRussianexpansionismandportrayingtheSovietleadershipinnearpathologicalterms,hehelpeddestroywhatlittleremainedofAmericaneagernesstounderstanditsonetimeallyandnegotiatedifferences.Hewarnedofa‘politicalforcecommittedfanaticallytothebeliefthatwith[the]UStherecanbenopermanentmodusvivendi,thatitisdesirableandnecessarythattheinternalharmonyofoursocietybedisrupted,ourtraditionalwayoflifebedestroyed,theinternationalauthorityofourstatebebroken,ifSovietpoweristobesecure.’BythusdemonizingtheKremlin,heconfirmedthefutilityandevendangeroffurthernegotiationsandpreparedthewayforapolicyhewouldlabelcontainment.TheLongTelegramwasexquisitelytimed;arrivinginWashingjustaspolicymakerswereedgingtowardsimilarconclusions,itgaveexpertconfirmationtotheirviews”(pp.603-604).

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SupportingQuestion4FeaturedSource SourceA:Tilly,“TheBlameGame,”TheAmericanSociologist(2010),p.389.

“Farfrompublicdebate,wealllearnedcreditandblameaschildren.Fromearlyon,parentsblametheirchildrenformisdeeds,praisethemforaccomplishments,andtakecreditfortheirgoodqualities.Kidspickupthemessagebyexpectingcreditwhentheyaccomplishsomething,butalsobyblamingotherswhentheycan:‘Ididn'tdoit.Tommydid!’Wegrowupdemandingcredit,avoidingblameifpossible,blamingandgivingcreditviacellphones,blogs,onlinecommentaries,letters,anddailyconversations.AfewpeoplereceivehighlyvisiblecreditorblameintheformofNobelPrizes,AcademyAwards,orprisonsentences.Butonasmallerscaleeveryoneplaysthegameofcreditandblame.

“Givingcreditandblameusestheuniversalhumantendencytoperceive,describe,andremembersocialexperiencesasstories:simplifiedcause-effectaccountsinwhichAdoesXtoB,withoutcomeY(Tilly2006).Credit-andblame-givingfollowparallellogics.Theirstories'logicsrunbackwardfrom:

• Somenegativeorpositiveoutcometo

• Avalue(largeorsmall,negativeorpositive)assignedtothatoutcometo

• Someagentofthatoutcometo

• Ajudgmentofthatagent'scompetenceandresponsibilityfortheactionthat

• Producedtheoutcome

Thislogicawardssomeonewhodeliberatelykillsmanypeople(unlesstheyhappentobetheircountry'sofficialenemies)alargenegativescore-blame–andsomeonewhoknowinglysavesmanylivesalargepositivescore-credit.Thelogicisasortofjusticedetector.

“Mostofthetime,weandothersareassigninglesserscoresforsmallerderelictionsanddelights:failuretomeetdailyobligationsreceivesblame,unexpectedgenerositycredit.Muchthesamelogicappliesingossip,psychologicalcounseling,courtproceedings,responsestojobperformance,deliberationsofprizecommittees,onlinediscussions,politicalspeeches,andpublicopinionpolls.Lookfortelltalephrasessuchas‘Itwasherfault,’‘Hedeservesthecredit,butXgotitinstead,’‘We'reallgrateful,’and‘Admitthatyoudidit.’Givingcreditand(especially)assigningblamedrawus-themboundaries:wearetheworthypeople,theytheunworthy”(p.383).

“Creditandblamearenomeregame.InAmericanpubliclifeandacrosslifeingeneral,whogetscreditandblamematters.Itmattersretroactivelyandprospectively.

Itmattersretroactivelybecauseitbecomespartofthestorieswetellaboutgoodandbadpeople(includingpresidents),goodandbadbehavior(includingpoliticalbehavior),andwherewecamefrom(includingthefundamentalsofourpoliticaltradition).Itmattersprospectivelybecauseitindicateswhomwecantrust,andwhomweshouldmistrust.Dayafterday,peoplespendplentyofeffortassigningcreditandblame.Theytakeitseriously.Soshouldwe”(p.389).