10 February, 2004

1

Crisis communications: Lessons from „the learning curve”

How Could We Have Done It Better?

Communication of an Incident

by Ágota HantiDeputy Spokesperson of Paks NPP, Hungary

10 February, 2004

2

Antecedents

On 10 April, 2003

Serious incident in a cleaning pool in a pit in

the reactor hall of Unit 2 at Paks Nuclear

Power Plant.

The incident resulted in a hardly detectable,

low discharge, but without exceeding the

limit value.

And it resulted many other

things…

3

The series of events The communication of

events

Communication of an incident

10/04/2003:

•around 10 pm: radioactive gas

discharge from the cleaning

system.

•The works were stopped.

•Classed 2 on INES scale

(approved by HAEA).

11/04/2003:

• around 10 am: Countrywide

press release on the incident

(brief facts).

•Collective SMS to the regional

mayors (72)

•14.30: Another press release

on the classification on INES

scale.

The incident is hot news.

4


events16/04/2003:

•Removal of the cover of the

tank, new infromations on the

fuel assemblies (30 pieces,

suffered severe damage).

•The incident reclassified into

class 3 due to the latest facts.

•Global 2000: background

radiation measurements

17/04/2003:

• Press release on the

reclassifying.

•Intensive media reaction,

continuous asking for

interviews.

18/04/2003:

•Greenpeace demand accurate

data in the media.


5


events22/04/2003:

•Press conference in the

reactor hall in the precence of

journalists.

23/04/2003:

•Attack of the government for

the inadequate communication.

19/04/2003:

•The economic loss of the

company is approx. €200 000

per day.

23/04/2003:

•The emergency plan of the

national electric grid control

organistation to sustain the

safe energy supply.


6

Press conference in the reactor

hall


7

Press

conference


8


events01/05/2003:

•Greenpeace and Austrian

social democrats want

international investigation.

30/04/2003:

•The chief director of Paks and

the director general of the

HAEA in front of the

Environmental Committee of

the Parliament.

01/05/2003:

•Visit of the minister of

economics at the plant.


9

The ministers of economics and environment with the chief director


10


events06/05/2003:

•Appearance of the event in a

daily paper (the plant did not

informed anybody before the

first article).

07/05/2003:

•The prime minister request

urgent information.

•The higher radioactivity

ascribed to the fault of the

measurement.

03/05/2003:

•Gas production in the

damaged tank due to breach of

rules.

07/05/2003:

•Higher radioctivity in the

background at one of the

detectors.


11


events10/05/2003:

•A full page paid informative

material published in the top

papers (incident in details).

11/05/2003:

•The company’s own report.

12/05/2003:

•Daily press conference (two

locations)

09/05/2003:

•Ministerial officer for more

effective co-operation.


12

The commission of the ministerial

officer


13


events19/05/2003:

•An article in an austrian

tabloid about illegal operating.

•It came in light that the higher

radioactivity was not the fault

of the instrument (isotope

test).

13/05/2003:

•Greenpeace demonstration

against licence renewal.

14/05/2003:

•The Environmental Committee

of the Parliament in Paks.

19/05/2003:

•Higher radioctivity in the

background at one of the

detectors again.


14


events28/05/2003:

•SMS rumour about the

explosion of a unit.

30/05/2003:

•Report of the HAEA, the

responsibility of the plant.

06/06/2003:

•First press release of the

owners.

21/05/2003:

•Personal changes, Recovery

Project.

22/05/2003:

•Request of the IAEA for

independent investigation.


15


events10/06/2003:

•Public opinion pool, the

acceptance is the same, some

trust lost in the safe of the

plant.

12/06/2003:

•Greenpeace activists, need of

the police because of the

damages.

14/06/2003:

•The steps of the recovery

sketched for the press.

14/06/2003:

•First underwater videos, all

the fuel assemblies damaged.

19/06/2003:

•The IAEA starts its

investigation.


16

Public opinion poolPublic opinion poolDo you agree that there is a nuclear power plant

operating in Hungary?

6865

68 6763

7368

73

23

3025

2831

24 23 24

393

6579

5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1991.szept. -1995 (N=6944)

1996. márc.(N=1010)

1997. dec.(N=1382)

1998. nov.(N=1039)

1999. nov.(N=998)

2001. febr.(N=1051)

2002. május(N=1036)

2003. június(N=1017)

%

YesNo

No answer

17

The severity of the safety regulation at Paks NPP

4749

44 45 4543

242522

28 29 29 28 29

14 1517 16 15

1922

4 4 3 3 4 3

13

1 0 1 1 1 03

10 10 9 7 7 69

0

20

40

60

80

100

1990-1996(N=9953)

1997. dec.(N=1382)

1998. nov.(N=1039)

1999. nov.(N=998)

2001. febr.(N=1051)

2002. márc.(N=1008)

2003. június(N=1017)

%

very hardpretty hardadequatenot very hardnot hard at alldoes not know

Public opinion poolPublic opinion pool

18


events25/06/2003:

•Report of the IAEA, the

responsibility of the company

and the authority also.

26/11/2003:

•Final, 50th press conference

(CAD model).

01/07/2003:

•Two offers for the recovery

work, the russian fuel assembly

manufacturer win.

11/09/2003:

•Parlamentary investigation

committee (adequcy of

communication also).

Two months later: no

agreement on the report.


19

Parlamentary investigation

committee


20

Final, 50th press

conference


21

SummationThe series of events The communication of

events

•Re-classification

•Gas production in the

tank

•Higher radioactivity at a

detector

•Keeping all the regulations

•SMS to the mayors

•Daily press conference (50

total)

•Each material on the Internet•Follow up communication

•Deffensive

•Not accurate, definite, proactive

enough

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How Could We Have Done It Better?

Documents

10 February, 2004