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Samuel F. Mueller (October 2012) [Draft Version]

The Judeo-Christian Tradition in Jrgen Habermas Critical Theory

I

In this paper, I will show that the Judeo-Christian tradition constitutes an intellectual motif

with substantial meaning, which has its legitimate place within the history of political ideas.

While a detailed and conclusive analysis of the particular overlaps of Jewish and Christian

thought and their influence on particular philosophical traditions is indeed desirable, this paper

will only discuss this highly complex topic through the lens of Habermas theory. Habermas has10

made significant contributions to this discussion, but tends to leave his readers without too many

clues where to locate and how do comprehend the motif at stake within his own work as well as

the wider debate on this topic. Thus, the particular questions which guide my analysis are: Howcan we establish and add meaning to the notion of a Judeo-Christian tradition through a close

reading of Habermas work? What is the Judeo-Christian tradition, if one follows Habermas

different arguments and what does an engagement with this tradition has to offer for

contemporary critical theory as well as past and current public debates? I intend to answer the

raised questions by discussing two particular claims:

Firstly, I will show that Habermas refers to three overlapping stets of arguments with close

analytical and historical connections when it comes to the Judeo-Christian tradition. First,20

Habermas refers to the Judeo-Christian tradition when he adds to ongoing debates regarding the

impact of Jewish and Christian mystic thought on the Hellenization of Christianity and the


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significance of this development for the intellectual history of Europe; the term Judeo-Christian

tradition thereby appears as a broadinclusive but undifferentiatedterminology. However, at

the core of this development lies a more fundamental second analytical context, namely,

Habermas notion of Judeo-Christian mysticism. This particular motif concerns the impetus of

Jewish and Christian mysticism (of the 15th and 16th century) on the emergence and continuation

of a materialist and dialectical approach to philosophy, history, and politics. This aspect of

Habermas work constitutes the main focus of my argumentation. Third, it is possible to

distinguish an additional notion in Habermas thought, namely, his discussion of a Jewish-30

German tradition ofcontemporary critical theory. This third motif refers to the immense impactJewish philosophers had on the development of critical theory before and after World War II.

Secondly, following from this discussion, I will show that the Judeo-Christian tradition can be

conceptualized as a discursive tradition,1 which allows relating the motif of the Judeo-

Christian to notions of religious discourse and, hence, to certain definitions of religion, which

informs philosophical (secular) discourse. Furthermore, it has to be asked to what extent it is

plausible to then relate religious discourse to social criticism. This discussion provokes and is

driven by closely related questions which aim at a critical evaluation of Habermas theory as a

scholarly undertaking, which might (or might not) suffer (or profit) from an inherent distinction

between religious mysticism and secular philosophy. Hence, it has to be shown how the40

motif of the Judeo-Christian tradition and Judeo-Christian mysticism in particular constitutes

either a philosophical (secular) set of insights or represents a mystic (religious) type of

knowledge, or why this differentiation can actually not be applied to this problem.

1 I am borrowing this term from Talal Asad, though I am not necessarily adhering to his particular definitionof Islam () as a discursive tradition; cf. Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,Occasional Papers Series, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University (1986): 7.


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The explosive nature of my overreaching and very general argumentthat the Judeo-Christian

tradition constitutes an intellectual motif with substantial meaningthereby stems from a

different perspective and appropriation of the expression at stake. The same expression, as it can

be shown too, constitutes a powerful motif in past and current, popular as well as academic

debates. While this othernotion of a Judeo-Christian tradition used to be highly influential in

the United States before and after World War II,2 in recent years, especially European politicians

and policy makers emphasize a Judeo-Christian heritage or civilization, which is said to be50

somehow constitutive for a common European identity and culture. Consequently, European

Muslims as well as Islamic countriesespecially Turkey, who tries to become an EU-membersince more than 50 yearshave no stake in this common heritage, together with other

minorities and outsiders.3

Considering these modes of social and political exclusion, not only many European Muslims, but

also different critical scholars are indignant at the idea of a Judeo-Christian tradition. The

(Jewish and German) philosopher Almut Sh. Bruckstein Coruh, for example, claims that there

was never any Jewish-Christian tradition. It is an invention of European modernity and a myth

held dear by traumatized Germans.4 While the notion of traumatized Germans needs to be

scrutinized further, post-structural accounts of authors including Tala Asad and Elizabeth S.60

Hurd hold too that what is thought to be a Judeo-Christian tradition rather indicates a powerful

2 Wendy Wall, Inventing the American Way: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil

Rights Movement (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), 8-11, 132-162, 281-285; J. Terry Todd, TheTemple of Religion and the Politics of Religious Pluralism: Judeo-Christian America at the 1939-1940New York Worlds Fair, inAfter Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement, ed. by Courtney Benderet al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

3 Cf. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press,2003), 165-168; Elizabeth S. Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2008).

4 Almut Sh. Bruckstein Coruh, The Jewish-Christian Tradition Is an Invention, Qantara.de (Oct. 22,2010), accessed August 5, 2012, http://en.qantara.de/The-Jewish-Christian-Tradition-Is-an-Invention/8394c8463i1p162/.
http://qantara.de/http://en.qantara.de/The-Jewish-Christian-Tradition-Is-an-Invention/http://en.qantara.de/The-Jewish-Christian-Tradition-Is-an-Invention/http://qantara.de/


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discourse or a language with a particular grammar, configurative for Western identity

formations.5

Discourse refers hereby to historically constructed systems of knowledge and discursive

practices of broad and general social scope,6 which unfold their power in the contemporary

world, institute our perceptions of the self and the other, and determine as well as justify

political decision-making. In this context, the discourse behind the notion of a Judeo-

Christian tradition regards at its core the conviction that Christian as well as Jewish religious

knowledge, traditions, values, and norms together have been constitutive for the historical

emergence of liberal and secular, in other words, modern and Western states and societies.70

The idea of an Islamic cultural heritage, on the other hand, has been internalized by many as

being indicative for backward, authoritarian, and possibly dangerous social and political

worldviews and practicesas discourse analyses and genealogical approaches to the history of

modern societies criticize.7

If Bruckstein Coruh thereby considers Habermas as a traumatized German has to be left

undecided, especially since Habermas has abstained from using the now contentious terminology

in his most recent essays on the role of religion in contemporary societies and, hence, has

probably not been on Bruckstein Coruhs mind, when she made this argument. This particular

statement regarding traumatized Germans, who dearly hold on to a myth, however, is more

than an unfortunate formulation or random afterthought. This questionable polemic80

5 Cf. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press,2003); Elizabeth S. Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2008).

6 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall qtd. in Elizabeth S. Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in InternationalRelations (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008), 20.

7 Cf. Elizabeth S. Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2008), 1-64, esp. 46-64; Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam,Modernity (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003).


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disqualifies both the populist and anti-Islamic appropriation of the idea of a Judeo-Christian

tradition among Europes conservatives and the difficult and continuing process of

reconciliation between Jews and Germans after the Holocaust. Bruckstein Coruhs seemingly

progressive argument relapses into conservatism and possibly anti-Semitismquite in the way

Martin Walser once compared Auschwitz to a moral club. She elevates herself beyond

common German and, to some extent, common European historyof its making and remaking

nobody should be excluded indeed.

At the same time, this ambivalent notion of the traumatized Germans precisely directs us

towards the highly complex political and methodological intersection between the two notions of

the Judeo-Christian tradition. True, proponents of a Judeo-Christian tradition, who try to90

gather positive prove for the actual existence of a common Judeo-Christian heritage within

the field of historical studies, must fail and are likely to produce and cling to this type of

myth.8 However, no trauma can be overcome if one simply ignores the significance of

especially Jewish influences on contemporary critical philosophy.

Habermas develops his principle perspective on the influence of Jewish and Christian mysticism

on, first of all, F.W.J. Schellings philosophy, not alone as philosopher, but also as public

intellectual. Engaging with this historical and theoretical topic in Germany during the 1960s

and 1970s precisely meant to urge and promote a barely existent process of recognition of the

incommensurable harm, which had been done to Jews by Germans; of admission and recognition

of ones own guild and responsibility; as well as dialogue and reconciliation between Germans100

and Jews. In this regard, Habermas relates his findings on the influence of Jewish and Christian

8 Cf. Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and America since World War II (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1988), 40-53. Silk, mainly focusing on the U.S., concludes various controversies and positionsand thereby demonstrates the profound difficulties in establishing a Judeo-Christian tradition or heritage inpositive historical terms.


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mysticism on German philosophy precisely to the significance of Jewish critical theorists in

Germany after World War II.9

Seen from contemporary and post-structural perspectives, preventing the reification of the

problematic termunderstood as a popular motif and signifier for a powerful and highly

exclusionary discourse, concerning the construction of Western collective identities and

secular realitiesappears to be difficult indeed. The Judeo-Christian tradition, in its

function as popular expression and indicator for exclusive identity formations, reduces the

political intentions of a Judeo-Christian philosophyas impetus on the development of critical

theory andas impetus to public debates urging for an honest approach to German and European110

historyto absurdity. This problem, however, remains undetected by current critics of the

populist, exclusionary version of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

On the other hand, a Habermasian, philosophical or pragmatic research approach, which

rejects any notion of discourse that leaves the individual unconscious or deceived (much

different from the notion of an in principle disprovable ideology) has to answer the question, if

and to what extent this philosophical discussion of Christian and Jewish thought and its

significance for Western political theory is in danger to (involuntarily) contribute to the

assumed discursive formation behind the popular motif of the Judeo-Christian traditiona

problem which indeed relates to my above raised question regarding the differentiation between

mysticism and philosophy in Habermas work.120

As it becomes clear, the idea of a Judeo-Christian tradition stems from and speaks to different

historical context and political debates and, if one considers notions of the Judeo-Christian

9 Jrgen Habermas, The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers, in Religion and Rationality: Essayson Reason, God, and Modernity (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 57-59, 37-59.


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tradition in the United States during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s,10 even to different

geographical regions. Moreover, as outlined above, these particular contexts can be evaluated

methodologically from a post-structural as well as pragmatic perspective, in addition to

positivistic and historicist approaches.

In what follows, however, only Habermas notion of the Judeo-Christian will be discussed

more closely, before I will return to this overall discussion in my conclusion. This paper attempts

nothing more than to answer the basic questions outlined above: How can we grasp the Judeo-

Christian tradition in Habermas theory? In more particular terms, why and in what ways can130

we differentiate between the above claimed motifs of a Judeo-Christian tradition, Judeo-

Christian mysticism, and a Jewish-German tradition ofcontemporary critical philosophyas

they stem from Habermas work? And, how are the findings and perspectives behind these

motives conductive to the history and current impact of critical thought, especially with regards

to the role of religion in contemporary, capitalist societies?

140

10 Wendy Wall, Inventing the American Way: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the CivilRights Movement (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), 8-11, 132-162, 281-285; J. Terry Todd, TheTemple of Religion and the Politics of Religious Pluralism: Judeo-Christian America at the 1939-1940New York Worlds Fair, inAfter Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement, ed. by Courtney Benderet al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).


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II

To begin with, let me locate the contentious terminology in Habermas theory. In this regard, The

Theory of Communicative Action (published in 1981) can be seen as a dividing line and waymark

in the development of Habermas thought. Hence, the subsequent discussion will fall into three

parts: The notion of the Judeo-Christian before, in, and after The Theory of Communicative

Action (sections III, IV, and V of this paper). These three individual discussions are driven by

three basic questions: First, what is Judeo-Christian mysticism? Second, why does Habermas

reject arguments and implications stemming from Judeo-Christian mysticism, despite his

careful evaluation and close engagement with such aspects up till after The Theory of

Communicative Action? And third, why and under what conditions does Habermas return to150

implications subsumed under a rather open notion of a Judeo-Christian tradition after the

publications of his seminal theory? I will briefly introduce these three overall contexts before

subsequently discussing them in detail (in sections III, IV, and V) and, finally, discuss my

second main argument in the following parts (in section VI and VII).

First, before the Theory of Communicative Action had been published, Habermas engages deeply

with Schellings thought, especially in his doctoral dissertation, The Absolute and History,

published in 1954. One significant aspect of his dissertation as well as related essays is the

evaluation of insights from different Jewish as well as Christian mystics and their influence on

Schellings philosophy.11 At the same time, Habermas further debates the impact of mystical

thought on critical theory when he engages with theories from contemporary scholars and160

11 Jrgen Habermas,Das Absolute und die Geschichte: Von der Zwiespaeltigkeit in Schellings Denken (Bonn:H. Bouvier, 1954); cf. idem, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus:Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie undPraxis, 3rd extended ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 172-227. To my knowledge, neither of thesetwo texts has been translated into English; all translations, including their titles are my own translations.


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academic mentors. Among them are Ernst Bloch, Karl Loewith, Walter Benjamin, and Gershom

Scholem, whose ideas Habermas discusses in different essayspublished between 1960 and

1978 and compiled in Habermas Philosophical-Political Profiles.12 Habermas notion of

Judeo-Christian mysticism precisely emerges from these debates. As it becomes clear from

these works, Judeo-Christian mysticism cannot be understood as a concept; it has to be

analyzed as an intellectual motif; in other words, as a compound of different interrelated ideas,

which together constitute a certain tradition of thought and feed into a particular strand of the

history of political ideas.

Central to this motif is a particular concept ofmatteras well as temporality, constitutive for a

certain notion of materialism. These different ideas subsumed under Judeo-Christian170

mysticism provoke thinking an absolute beginning of the world, based in matter, and a final

overcoming of this world, possibly through a radical break. As it will become clear, Judeo-

Christian mysticism speaks to the idea of a revolution or the realization of a utopia. In this

context, Habermas can show that Schelling anticipates historical materialist and messianic

concepts of change through his engagement with Jewish and Christian mysticism. These notions

of history and change have been substantially theorized by Karl Marx (among others) and taken

further by, for example, Blochhence Habermas naming of Bloch, who he calls a Marxist

Schelling.13

Second, while Habermas deems Judeo-Christian mysticism as a highly important motif for the

development of critical thought, he is equally very skeptical of its prospects for future critical180

12 Essays on these different scholars have been published between 1960 and 1978 in different outlets. Theyare compiled in Jrgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).

13 Jrgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling (1960), in Philosophical-Political Profiles(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 61-78; idem, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zumMaterialismus: Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, inTheorie und Praxis, 3rd extended ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 215-219.


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approaches to philosophy and, more importantly, politics and society. Already throughout the

above mentioned texts, Habermas repeatedly concludes that the arguments and ideas subsumed

under and stemming from the motif at stake are ultimately insufficient to substantially critique

instrumental reason, rationalization, and reification. Especially in the first volume ofThe Theory

of Communicative Action, Habermas strictly refuses such concepts and thoughts as viable

solution to the colonization of the lifeworld,14 in other words, as an answer to the increasing

power of the administrative state and the market, demanding purpose rational behavior from

modern individuals, while value rational actions face their continued retardation. Instead, he

offers a change in paradigm

15

toward his twofold concept of value rationality and purposiverationality (drawing from Weber) and lifeworld and system.190

In this context, Habermas mentions Judeo-Christian mysticism only occasionally, almost

casually.16 For example, when he discusses Max Horkheimers and Theodor W. Adornos

paralyzing findings from the Dialectic of Enlightenment17 in The Theory of Communicative

Action, Habermas remarks in passing, At most, we can circle around this idea [of universal

reconciliation, or the unity of the identity and nonidentity of spirit and nature], drawing on

images from Judeo-Christian mysticism,18 to then referring to his earlier discussion in the

14 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique ofFunctionalist Reason (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 196.

15 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 366.

16

The following terminologies appear occasionally and can be located in The Theory of CommunicativeAction: Judeo-Christian mysticism, Jewish and Christian theology, Schelling, Jewish mysticism,Jewish-Christian religion, Jewish-Christian line of tradition; cf. Jrgen Habermas, The Theory ofCommunicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, MA: Beacon Press,1987), 383, 427; and idem, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critiqueof Functionalist Reason (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 251, 256, 295, 315.

17 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

18 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society .(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 383.


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consists of non-Greek motifs, which, as Habermas shows, feed into Metz concept of

anamnestic reason, which in turn can be grasped in Benjaminian terms: as the mystical force

of a retroactive reconciliation.26 These non-Greek motifs thereby refer exactly to insights

from the Christian mystic Jakob Bhme, as Habermas mentions explicitly in his discussion of

Metz approach, but also to the Jewish mystic Isaac Luria, who where both crucial to, first of all,240

Schellings philosophy. [T]his tradition, so claims Habermas after The Theory of

Communicative Action, transforms the experience of negativity of the present into the driving

force of dialectical reflection.27

As it becomes clear, despite his skeptical perspective on Judeo-Christian mysticism and its

potential for critical theory in The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas now clearly

considers the arguments stemming from this strand of thought and the contemporary theological

and philosophical debates they provoke as crucial for, for example, the critical engagement with

bourgeois religion28 in Europe and the U.S., which Metz critiques as endorsement and

reinforcement for those [Christians] who () already have abundant prospects and a rich

future.29 This perspective indeed includes the supposition that the intellectual motif at stake250

might bear significant value for future debates on the role of religion in modern, capitalist

societies.

Hence, we can observe three phases in Habermas thought, whereby the notion of the Judeo-

Christian functions, so to say, as a gauge regarding breaks and continuities in his theory: first of

all, Habermas engagement with Schellings philosophy, which is influenced by Jewish and

26 Ibid., 132.27 Ibid., 134, my italics.28 Johann B. Metz, Messianic or Bourgeois Religion? in The Emergent Church: The Future of Christianity

in a Postbourgeois World(New York: Crossroad, 1981).29 Ibid., 2; cf. Jrgen Habermas, Israel or Athens, or to Whom Does Anamnestic Reason Belong? in

Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).


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Christian mysticism and anticipates a materialist and dialectical approach to political theory,

while this debate as a whole urges and relates to an engagement with Jewish philosophy after

World War II; second, the rejection of theories which propose a radical break with history and

the introduction of his notion of communicative action, as a less paradoxical approach to

contemporary crises, especially in consideration of failed revolutions and the unexpected260

integrative power of late capitalism, which preceding theories cannot explain;30 and, third, the

reconsideration of Judeo-Christian mysticism, broadly referred to as Judeo-Christian

tradition, which is critical of a Neo-Platonic or Augustinian approach to the evolution of

Western philosophy and relates to current debates on the role of religion and secularism incontemporary societies. These arguments indeed need to be explained in more detail (throughout

the following sections III-V), especially with regards to the actual insights, which constitute the

motif of Judeo-Christian mysticism.

270

30 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 366-367.


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in particular through his appropriation of Luria and Bhmes insights, arrives at a materialist

turning point in his historical idealism, which anticipates significant aspects of Karl Marx

historical materialism.34

To explain some of the key aspects of this argument, Habermas demonstrates that Schelling

engages with Bhme as well as Lurias thoughts especially in order to overcome the Hegelian

notion of a course of the world, which, as it appears to Schelling, is inherently contingent. The

three different notions of a contraction of god are thereby supposed to together function as a

philosophical concept, which sets an absolute beginning and therefore creates the possibility to

think an end or final answer to a corrupted world, which seems to have no systemic origins and

to endlessly oscillate between alienation and reconciliationif one follows Schellings critique300

of Hegels philosophy.35 Most importantly, Schellings philosophical alternative to Hegels

thoughts not only includes a particular notion oftemporality, but also ofmatterand, hence, can

be interpreted as a cornerstone for a preliminary mode of historical materialist thinking, as one

can interpret Habermas position.

The absolute beginning of the world, according to Schelling, has to be conceptualized as to

precede history and the world as it is thought by Hegel. In this pre-historic past, matter (and

not the formal or pure thought, as in Hegel) constitutes an ultimate beginning. This type of

explanation would remain a merely rhetorical move, as Habermas points out, if it would not

institute the absolutein other words, the notion of a meaningful world, in which universal

truth can be found, which can be systematically grasped as a whole through philosophy (my310

(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 184; cf. Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (NewYork: Schocken Books, 1995).

34 Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus: GeschichtsphilosophischeFolgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie und Praxis, 3rd extended ed.(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 215.

35 Ibid., 180.


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interpretation)and, concurrently, shows how this (corrupted) world, can be overcome; as

Habermas states: how the conditions for the possibility of a break with the absolute might be

conceptualized.36 As Habermas shows eventually, Schelling does not succeed in this task.

Nevertheless, the insights and conclusion he draws are pathbreaking for the history of critical

theory.

Schellings approach, as Habermas demonstrates, bases in a theogenic explanation: The course

of the world is thought in terms of gods creation (pre-historic); human, self-imposed suffering

(us in history); and redemption (post-historic). As mentioned, to conceptualize an absolute

beginning, Schelling relies on three interrelated versions of the mystic notion of a contraction of

god: God, first of all, appears as a dual force, capable of judgment, punishment, and destruction320

(with his left hand) and, concurrently, able to grant mercy and love (with his right hand). In this

regard, Schelling introduces Bhmes thoughts, who compares gods wrath to pure darkness

and a harsh contraction, like water freezes to ice during a grim winter, as Habermas explains.

This power of contraction is understood as a mode of materialization, through which, not yet the

world, but god manifests himself as matter.37 Love or mercy alone is too fluid to allow the

world to come into being, as Habermas explains this motif further. Therefore, contraction, as an

in principle unmerciful and egoistic movement, is needed to bring matter about: something solid,

which grants the beginning of the world, which then inherits both egoism and love.38

Matter thereby relates to Schellings notion of nature. The first contraction, so states Habermas,

creates god as eternal nature.39 And, as it is important to show, nature appears in Schellings330

philosophy as both natura naturans and natura naturata. While the first perspective regards

36 Ibid., 184.37 Ibid., 184-185.38 Ibid., 187.39 Ibid., 185.


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nature as subject, productive and, so one might say, self-conscious or autonomous, the latter

regards nature scientifically as object.40 God as eternal nature41 concerns natura naturans.

The second contraction of god, now with Schelling referencing Luria, can be interpreted as a

retreat of god into himself: a self-interlacing or self-interlocking of god. Here, god is thought

as an, even in spatial terms, everything fulfilling instance, which, in the beginning, is the only

existing thing, surrounded by nothing but himself. Hence, in order to create the world, god has to

shrink, to literally make space for the world, as Habermas explains. This notion of

contractiongods retreat from himself into himself or entry into himselfis the act of

gods creation of the world.42 Even though without mentioning Luria by name in his dissertation,340

Habermas considers this difficult to think43 notion of matter through contraction in this work

too. To describe how Schelling relates non-existence or the not-being with matter, Habermas

speaks here of the provocation of [material] existence through non-existence.44

The third version, present within both Luria as well as Bhmes thoughts, concerns the fall of the

first human being, Adam Kadmon, from goda process, which is as well termed a

contraction. In this context, gods creation of an alter deus (Kadmon), which represents the

other absolute, happens out of gods love as well as Kadmons whish for individuality and

40 Jrgen Habermas,Das Absolute und die Geschichte: Von der Zwiespaeltigkeit in Schellings Denken (Bonn:

H. Bouvier, 1954), 142; cf. Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus:Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie undPraxis, 3rd extended ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 215.


42 Ibid., 185.43 Jrgen Habermas,Das Absolute und die Geschichte: Von der Zwiespltigkeit in Schellings Denken (Bonn:

H. Bouvier, 1954), 260.44 Ibid., 260, 259-263.


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freedom, which Kadmon, however, misuses.45 This last motif is, according to Habermas,

supposed to be the key for the conceptualization of a final answer or a desirable solution to the

problem of a corrupted world. If it is possible to succeed in thinking the myth from Adam350

Kadmon, to deduce the category of the other absolute from an definite beginning of the absolute,

then the practical desire to conceptualize the possibility for a definite end of the corruption in this

world can be satisfied in theoretical termsat least according to idealist standards, so states

Habermas. In that case, as Habermas claims further, it could be proven that the misery of this

world is not necessarily eternal.46

Furthermore, it is important to mention that Schellings perception of the world, understood as an

utterly corrupted present, is based in actual observations and experiences rather than logical

deduction, as Habermas points out. In this regard, Schelling speaks of a reversed order in which

the exterior governs over the interior.47 Habermas then brings the different notions of a

contraction of god together: The power of contraction, which works within all being things, is360

what Schelling calls the basis of all existence. Its nature is amphibolic: it detracts and founds at

the same time, as it is itself not-real but still the only instance which constitutes reality, because

it devours itself and escapes into itself and in this kind of concealment still gives ground to that

which alone shows itself. As long as such matter complies to love, love finds its nature; but if it

rises above love, calamity comes to power and with it the authority of the exterior over the

interior, of which the corrupted world perpetually bears witness.48

45 Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus: GeschichtsphilosophischeFolgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie und Praxis, 3rd extended ed.(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 185-186, 188.

46 Ibid., 188.47 Ibid., 186.48 Ibid., 187, my translation. The full quote in German language reads, Die Kraft der Zusammenziehung, die

in allem Seienden waltet, nennt Schelling die Basis, die der Existenz zugrunde liegt. Ihr Wesen ist


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Schellings notion of corruptiona state in which calamity comes to power and with it the

authority of the exterior over the interior49and of the particular relation between the exterior

and the interior (egoism and love, or alienation and reconciliation), need to be explained in more

detail. This investigation is necessary, in order to understand how Schellings appropriation of370

insights stemming from Jewish and Christian mysticism can be read as hidden materialism,50

which anticipates Marx historical materialism; in order to appreciate the radical conclusion

stemming from the motif at stake; and, in order to comprehend the difficulties and ultimate

failure of Schellings attempt to develop a idealist philosophy, which can rationally explain an

absolute end to the presently corrupted world.

In this regard, it is, first of all, necessary to emphasize the particular character of the mystic

notion of god and his relationship to the human, historical world. According the mystic

perspective, god constitutes matter. This notion of god closely interlinks god with nature. And, as

mentioned above, nature appears in Schellings philosophy as both subjective nature (natura

naturans) and objectified nature (natura naturata). While the first concept regards nature as380

productive and even self-conscious, the latter regards nature as object51matter beaten to

death, to speak with Marx.52 Strikingly counter to perceptions of god as they are promoted by

the Christian church, Judeo-Christian mysticism suggest that god (as natura naturans) is the

amphibolisch, da sie zugleich entzieht und grndet, als das selbst Nicht-Reale dennoch das alleinRealittsverleihende ist; weil sie sich in sich selbst verschlingt und flieht und in dieser Verbergung dennochdem allein sich Zeigenden Grund und Boden gibt. Solange sich solche Materie der Liebe fgt, findet dieseihr Wesen; erhebt sie sich aber ber die Liebe, gelangt das Unwesen zur Herrschaft, und mit ihm jene

Gewalt des uber das Innere, von der die korrumpierte Welt durchgngig zeugt (187).49 Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus: GeschichtsphilosophischeFolgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie und Praxis, 3rd extended ed.(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 187.

50 Ibid., 215.51 Jrgen Habermas,Das Absolute und die Geschichte: Von der Zwiespltigkeit in Schellings Denken (Bonn:

H. Bouvier, 1954), 142.52 Karl Marx qtd. in Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus:

Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie undPraxis, 3rd extended ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 215.


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foundation, material basis, and authorizer of his alter deus, Adam Kadmonus, the human

racebut not an authority in the present world.53 Hence, the concept of a contracting god stands

diametrically opposed to the condescending god. The conception of the world as created by god

through its contraction and retread is fundamentally different from the notion of god within

institutionalized Christianity, where God stands above the world and condescends to His

creation.54

From here, Schellings notion of a reversed relation between the exterior and interior, as390

constitutive for our presently corrupted world, gains lucidity. Our engagement with nature (or

matter, god, or, to speak with Marx, the realm of necessity55) has been driven by the principle

of egoism (and not love) to that extent that we are living in a present state of materialism, in

which naturewhich was supposed to be the basis for human societyhas been objectified and

turned into natura naturata or human made matter, which now dominates us.56 In this regard,

Habermas states that For Schelling as for Marx, the human race is the authorized, though unable

to control history, subject of history; hence, the reversed god.57 In other words, human kind

finds itself as impotent authority, as autonomous but unfree, unable to liberate itself from its self-

imposed conditions of a corrupted (capitalist) reality.


54

Ibid., 202.55 Marx qtd. in Habermas, Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus:Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie undPraxis, 3rd extended ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 218.

56 Cf. Jrgen Habermas, Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus:Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes, in Theorie undPraxis, 3rd extended ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 216-217.

57 Ibid., 217, my translation. The full quote in German language reads, Fuer Schelling wie fuer Marx ist dieMenschengattung selbst das autorisierte, obwohl der Geschichte nicht maechtige Subjekt der Geschichteeben ein umgekehrter Gott, (217).


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While the overlaps in Schelling and Marx theories have already been implicit in the preceding400

paragraph, Habermas relates the perspectives of the two philosophers more carefully. First of all,

while Schelling sees a widening gap between the present life of human beings and the natura

naturans, which can only be vaguely remembered,58 in Marx theory our physical engagement

or (alienated) labor with inorganic nature leads to the creation of our, human world and

eventually leaves us alienated from nature and ourselves.59 Moreover, both Schelling and Marx,

as Habermas points out, see the materialist reversion of our world expressed in the false

entity of the state, which institutionalizes the political authority of human beings over human

beings.

60

It is especially this conclusion, which reveals the anarchistic consequence

61

ofSchellings (and Marx) philosophy, pressing for a radical solution: the annulment of the

state!62410

In addition, both Schelling and Marx relate the cause of this materialist state of the present

world to the misguided actions of us and not to god or nature. The corruption of the world

cannot be ascribed to nature, but to the human being, as Habermas relates Schelling and Marx

theories; Irrespective of whether we, as Schelling does, presuppose an original identity between

human beings and nature or, as Marx does, disregard this questionboth authors ascribe this

specific notion of materialism, to which human life is subjected, to a egoistic principle.63

Adam Kadmons wish for individuality translates into the strive for private property and, hence,

Schellings cosmological egoism is deciphered as capitalism in Marx theory.64

58 Ibid., 214, 201.59 Ibid., 214.60 Ibid., 214, cf. 17261 Ibid., 175.62 Ibid., 214.63 Ibid., 216.64 Ibid., 216.


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As it becomes clear, Habermas is well aware of the far-reaching implications of those thoughts

and insights, which he subsumes under the notion of Judeo-Christian mysticismfor420

formulating critique as well as theorizing and provoking change. Hence, it has to be discussed

how and why Habermas rejects the intellectual motif of Judeo-Christian mysticism after

carefully elaborating its influence on the making of critical theory. To reach an answer to this

question, it has still to be clarified on what grounds Schellings theory fails in thinking the

logical conditions for a necessary and absolute end of history. This discussion will feed well into

Habermas criticism of Blochs theory and, in The Theory of Communicative Action, of

Horkheimer and Adornos critique of instrumental reason as well as Talcott Parsons notion ofthe telic system.

430


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IV

On what grounds does Habermas reject arguments and implications stemming from Judeo-440

Christian mysticism? Habermas counters concepts and ideas resting in this intellectual motif or

tradition of thought with his change of paradigm65 from a one-dimensional critique of

instrumental reason and reification to his recourse to Webers differentiation between value

rationality and purposive rationality, which is in turn constitutive for his twofold concept of

lifeworld and system. In order to comprehend, how and why Habermas approach opposes

Judeo-Christian mysticism in The Theory of Communicative Action, it is, first of all, necessary

to show, why Schellings concept of the absolute beginning does not lead to the possibility of

thinking an absolute end of history, and how this conclusion also applies to Habermas

criticism of Blochs critical theory. Through this discussion, Habermas criticism of Horkheimer

and Adornos critique of instrumental reason in The Theory of Communicative Action will450

clearly emerge as criticism of an approach, which is well in sync with notions of matter as well

as temporality, stemming from the context of Judeo-Christian mysticism. In other words,

Habermas skeptical position towards Schelling and Blochs appropriation of thoughts subsumed

under the motif at stake constitutes the (implicit) background and key to his perspective on

Horkheimer and Adornos theory. Habermas thereby criticizes the mentioned authors on

theoretical as well as practical grounds.

At the same time, Habermas perspective on Judeo-Christian mysticism becomes more

differentiated and controversial when he considers this motif in the second volume ofThe Theory

of Communicative Action, especially with regards to his critique of Talcott Parsons social



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theory. In this regard, Habermas stance on Judeo-Christian mysticism seems to suppose an460

opening towards a less skeptical perspective, since Jewish mysticism, as a worldview which

can accept human beings as fully autonomous actors, is suddenly positioned against and valued

over notions of religion and god, which assume a transcendence that is independent from

human communication66to be discussed hereafter.

On practical or empirical grounds, Habermas stresses the inability of contemporary critical

theorists to cope with and explain the highly dissatisfying consequences of political discontent

and social critique. Historical developments, such as the failure of the Russian Revolution,

leading to Stalinism; Fascisms capability to unify the masses and neutralize potential contention

and protest;67 and the the integrating powers of capitalism, especially in the United States,

where without open repression, mass culture bound [and binds] the consciousness of the broad470

masses to the imperatives of the status quo,68 appear to invalidate critical theories, which,

broadly speaking, are based in concepts and thoughts subsumed under Habermas notion of

Judeo-Christian mysticism, in other words, which operate on the basis of matter as natura

naturans and messianic concepts of history.

Schelling, Bloch, and Horkheimer and Adorno

In order to make this claim pellucid, it is important to explain why Schellings philosophy of the

Ages of the Worlddoes not lead to the desired conclusion of developing a logical and consistent

(idealist) theory. As Habermas clarifies, Schelling ultimately realizes (and admits) that he is

66 Ibid., 256.67 Ibid., 366-36768 Ibid., 367.


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radical change. Change, however, can equally mean failed revolutions, fascism, or transgression

into a tranquilized state of consumerism, instead of provoking critique, discontent, and final

reconciliation.500

In a similar vein, Habermas argues against Blochthe Marxist Schellingwho, according to

Habermas, tries to grant the practical necessity of an overcoming of the corrupted world a

warranty of theoretical necessity.75 This warranty stems from Blochs notion of matter, which

clearly incorporates ideas stemming from Judeo-Christian mysticism, while disregarding the

outlined insufficiencies of Schellings philosophy. According to Habermas, Bloch conceptualizes

matter (natura naturans) as engender[ing] and bear[ing] the patterns of its fertility out of itself

alone; matter is seen as the being-existing-in-possibility in such a way that the history of

nature points toward the history of humanity and is dependent on humanity.76 Hence, in

Blochs theory, if we follow Habermas, reconciliation with nature appears as a historically

necessary development, constituting the objective possibility of a realm of freedom in the510

future: Blochs utopia.77

Bloch, however, cannot explain how human beings and nature should develop the ability to

overcome the current state of the world. Blochs theory needed to incorporate human beings as

thepotentsubjects of history, who concurrently can rely on apotent nature, as we can see from

Habermas discussion. This notion of subjectivity, however, cannot be deduced from Judeo-

Christian mysticism, through which a concept of an absolute beginning emerges, which only

75 Ibid., 222.76 Jrgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling (1960), in Philosophical-Political Profiles

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 70.77 Ibid., 63.


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knows human beings as the reversed god78authorized, but impotent. Hence, Blochs

approach is in danger to become speculative and possibly even romanticist, as I interpret

Habermas critique.79 Habermas, as one has to admit, indeed thinks of human beings as potent

subjects as well. However, in Habermas case, this world has not to be overcome in the sense of520

a post-historic age or utopia, but can be changed within human history. Blochs work, on the

other hand, seems to promote a Philosophy of history () [,] outbid by metahistory, and the

historically observable situation no longer has any need for a rational discussion of its objective

possibilities, so critiques Habermas.80

Furthermore, the outlined ideas and controversies behind Habermas intellectual motif of Judeo-

Christian mysticism constitute the background and key to Habermas critique against Adorno

and Horkheimer in The Theory of Communicative Action. As I will show now, Horkheimer and

Adorno adhere to notions of matter and temporality as they stem from Judeo-Christian

mysticism, which set the overreaching parameters for some of their central thoughts. However,

the two authors have been more consequent in their conclusions than Bloch, what leads them to530

their paralyzing results, as they stem from theDialectic of Enlightenment.

To begin with, let me restate the quote from The Theory of Communicative Action, where

Habermas explicitly mentions the contentious expression. At the end of the first volume ofThe

Theory of Communicative Action, in chapter IV.2, The Critique of Instrumental Reason,

Habermas states here that At most, we can circle around this idea [of universal reconciliation,

or the unity of the identity and nonidentity of spirit and nature], drawing on images from


79 Cf. Jrgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling (1960), in Philosophical-Political Profiles(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 69-76.

80 Ibid., 64.


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Judeo-Christian mysticism,81 when evaluating Horkheimer and Adornos theory. Even thought

the intellectual motif is not further mentioned in this section of Habermas theory, it clearly

constitutes the foundation of this section ofThe Theory of Communicative Action, and can be

explicated as such.540

In this regard, Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno, quite like Schelling, lost their trust

in Hegel, who construed the self-movement of the spirit as a logical necessity in a specific

sense.82 Frustrated by their insight that human beings seem to be unable to grasp and reverse

their objectification gradually, Horkheimer and Adorno radicalize Lukacs (and also Marx)

notion of reification (or objectification), by untying it from the conditions of wage labor83 and

relating it to human subjectivity as such.84 As soon as man cuts off his consciousness of himself

as nature, all the ends for which he keeps himself alive () are nullified, as Adorno and

Horkheimer state; and, hence, the enthronement of means and ends () is already perceptible

in theprimordial history of subjectivity.85 Hence, any encompassing concept of reason,86 so it

becomes clear, has been lost with Kadmons fall from god. Without making the explicit550

connection to the Judeo-Christian background of human beings fall from nature, the mystic

idea of gods contraction clearly shines through Horkheimer and Adornos perspective, who tie

human existence to rationalization and reification or autonomy to egoism and (self-)

dominationin a dialectical engagement and inseparable. As freedom includes domination for

Horkheimer and Adorno, love is too fluid to exist without contraction, freezing, or egoism for


82 Ibid., 368.83 Ibid., 378-379.84 Ibid., 380.85 Horkheimer and Adorno qtd. in Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason

and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 380, my italics.86 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society

(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 380.


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Schelling and the Jewish and Christian mystics. This philosophy of history, as Habermas

concludes Horkheimer and Adornos view, opens up a catastrophic view of a relation between

spirit and nature that has been distorted beyond recognition.87

On the other hand, Adorno and Horkheimers perspective seems to include an original (pre-

historic) notion of truthsince we had to cut off our consciousness of ourselves as nature560

which promises eventual (post-historic) reconciliation, as Habermas suggests. [W]e can, so

he states further, speak of distortion only in so far as the original relation of spirit and nature is

secretly conceived in such a way that the idea of truth is connected with that of a universal

reconciliationwhere reconciliation includes the interaction of human beings with nature, with

animals, plants, and minerals.88 However, this notion of (post-historic) truth or reconciliation,

seen as an emancipation of man through the resurrection of nature89 can impossibly be

achieved by human beings, as Horkheimer and Adorno must admit, since there is no logical

explanation for a break of the dialectic between subjectivity and mutual objectification. This

admission clearly distinguishes these authors from Blochs notions of hunger, hope, and utopia;

it shows their compliance to Schellings logic and, consequently, must leave their theorizing in a570

state of paralysis.

On the other hand, Horheimer and Adornos implicit support for a certain notion of natura

naturans, keeps them from fully rejecting any chance for reconciliation (what concurrently

means a slight approximation of their perspective towards Blochs theory). In this regard,

Habermas finds that Horkheimer and Adornos inquiry concludes with a necessarily insufficient

solution: the authors offer their idea ofmimesis. Mimesis does notoffer the possibility for human

87 Ibid., 380.88 Ibid., 380-381.89 Ibid., 382.


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beings to reengage with nature through its imitation, as Habermas shows; they remain qua their

subjectivity caught up in the dialectical relation between freedom and subjugation. The idea of

mimesis only timidly suggests or implies the possibility for an integrated notion of reason.

Habermas explains that As the placeholder for () primordial reason that was diverted from the580

intention of truth, Horkheimer and Adorno nominate a capacity, mimesis, about which they can

speak only as they would speak about a piece of uncomprehended nature. They characterize the

mimetic capacity, in which an instrumentalized nature makes its speechless accusation, as an

impulse.90

Habermas critique of this perspective is exactly the removal of any possibility to raise social

criticism, since theory as well as action necessarily transgress into different modes of

domination, if one follows the argumentation of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. If we were

drawing on images from Judeo-Christian mysticism91 to find a solution to the outlined

problem, we would have to return to Blochs insufficient suggestions or might feel inspired for

more radical actions: Schellings notion of the annulment of the state. Habermas conceptual590

solution to Horkheimer and Adornos approach, on the other hand, is to refuse their

understanding of rationality only as purpose rationality and to add the Weberian notion of value

rationality to ultimately arrive at his final concept of lifeworld and system, constituting his

paradigm shift.

Parsons: [This and the subsequent parts need severe revision and have to be completed still]

The content of Habermas notion of Judeo-Christian mysticism as well as his rejection of this

perspective will become even clearer when one considers Habermas discussion of Parsons

90 Ibid., 382.91 Ibid., 383.


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social theory in the second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action. In this context,

Habermas critiques Parsons for his reliance on a sphere of ultimate reality in his social theory,

which, as Habermas states further, is a strategy not at all unlike that with which the late600

Schelling, who took the experience of Gods existence as his basic point of departure, introduced

his positive philosophy.92 While this statement needs to be discussed in detail, it is then of

particular interest that Habermas emphasizes in the same section of the book that Jewish

mysticism allows for a particular interpretation of god, which can be preferred over such

religious worldviews as well as theoretical approaches, which assume god to be independent

from human interactions and rational communication.

93

This argument puts emphasis onespecially Lurias idea of gods contraction, as self-interlacing, which, taken alone, disregards

the idea of a natura naturans and, more importantly, emphasizes human beings independence

from god. Hence, it seems to be plausible to Habermas to not only understand Jewish

mysticism as constitutive part of Judeo-Christian mysticism, emerging from Schellings610

philosophy and seen as a motif which speaks to particular, theoretically as well as practically

insufficient notions of history and change, but also to keep aspects of this tradition as separated

motifs, which then constitute the background for social critique in other philosophical and

political contexts. Discussing these arguments here will help to comprehend why and under

which conditions Habermas returns to the Judeo-Christian tradition in certain essays after The

Theory of Communicative Action as well as to point at Habermas difficult notion of religionas

a sociological and a philosophical category, or as related to theological and philosophical

deductions, lifeworld communication, and discursive traditions.


93 Ibid., 256.


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Let me briefly introduce Habermas critique of Parsons theory to then differentiate more

between his notions of Judeo-Christian mysticism, Jewish mysticism, and religion. In this620

regard, Habermas makes the following statement in the second volume of The Theory of

Communicative Action, in section VII.2, The Development of System Theory: Parson insists

that any talk of a telic system presupposes belief in a sphere of ultimate reality. (This strategy is

not at all unlike that with which the late Schelling, who took the experience of Gods existence

as his basic point of departure, introduced his positive philosophy.)94

According to Habermas, Parsons theory of modern societies appears to be torn in-between

action theory and systems theory. Indeed, Parsons approach is highly instructive for Habermas

own social theory and is analyzed at length in the second volume of The Theory of

Communicative Action.95 However, other than Habermas concept of communicative action as

the conceptual basis for his theory of the lifeworld (and the system), Parsons concept of action630

does not allow the induction of a comprehensive concept of society, as Habermas claims.96

As one of the particular aspects of Habermas critique against Parsons theory, Habermas shows

that over the course of its development, Parsons began to conceptualize actions (initially external

and somehow constitutive to the system or social systems) in terms of integrated action

systems so that actions ultimately lost their normative and value rational steering potential. The

actor or agent has been turned into an abstract placeholder within an action system; a

system, however, does not act but functions,97 as Habermas states.

94 Ibid., 251.95 Ibid., 199-203.96 Ibid., 204-205.97 Ibid., 235.


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As a consequence, Parsons has difficulties to integrate and explain not only the implications of,

but also the source for values and norms (which, in Habermas theory, are precisely

communicative actions, which constitute and derive from the lifeworld as social space and640

common horizon of values and norms). The conceptualization of the modern society in terms of

interrelating social systems, which function and correspond to an empirical environment, leaves

no space to consider and explain the presence of creative agents as well as normative contents. In

order to consider these aspects, Parsons integrates a notion of non-empirical or supernatural

environment,98 which is seen as an ultimate reality99 (a term which Parsons now introduces),

in addition to the empirical environment, of which both environments (empirical and non-empirical) are experienced in a mediated way. According to Habermas, however, the

introduction of this type of supernatural environment (alongside the empirical environment in

Parsons theory) does not solve the problem at stake, which we might translate into an

(analytically as well as politically) unsatisfying notion of passive human beings. Because values650

and norms are now influencing a social system from the outside, the agents still remain passive:

outside of the systems boundaries there are only conditioningnot steeringvariables,

explains Habermas.100

Habermas, as it becomes clear, refuses to accept this type of outside or transcendental sphere

as point of reference in modern societies. In this regard, Parsons arrives at a point where the

introduction of religion into his theory becomes necessary, next to science and technology, law

and morality, and autonomous artas the three value spheres, constitutive for Webers (and

Habermas) notion of culture. However, fully consistent with his own interpretation of Webers

98 Ibid., 248.99 Talcott Parsons qtd. in Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and

System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 248, 249.100 Cf. Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of

Functionalist Reason (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 247-249.


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theory of rationalization,101 Habermas refuses the reconsideration of any concept of religion

either in terms of a value sphere (a term which cannot apply to religion in Habermas theory) or660

even a transcendental point of reference, decisive for the choices and actions made by modern

human beings.102 [I]n the modern age, so states Habermas, science and technology, law and

morality, and autonomous art have been differentiated out of the context of religious-

metaphysical traditions and therefore do not stand on the same leveleither structurally or

historicallyas religious symbolism.103

In this regard, Parsons establishes his notion of the telic system, understood as a space where

the ultimate reality is transformed and, crudely speaking, manifests in values, norms, and

worldviews. While Habermas can derive different arguments from Parsons discussion of the

telic system to support his own conception of the lifeworld, his reference to Schellings

positive philosophy,104 precisely points at the problem of the notion of a presupposed670

experience of Gods existence.105 In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas cannot

accept any other resource for commonality (solidarity and identity) or the making of common

values and norms than (value) rational communication and consensus. Religious expressions

sacrifices, entreaties, prayers, as he stateshave to be evaluated as communicative practices

of human beings, as Habermas states; contemporary social-theoretical analysis, so he

101 Ibid., 143-272.102 As it becomes clear, already the appropriation of Webers theory of rationalization in volume one of The

Theory of Communicative Action blocks any analytical attempt to introduce a religious value sphere tomodern societies. This problem concerns the very core ofThe Theory of Communicative Action and indeed

affects Habermas current analytical possibilities of dealing with religion in the contemporary public spheresignificantly. However, this strand of my argumentation has to be developed further at another occasion.103 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of

Functionalist Reason (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987), 250.104 Schellings philosophy can indeed be read as negative philosophy in certain ways, as my previous

discussion has shown and, hence, Habermas use of scare quotes. Jrgen Habermas, The Theory ofCommunicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston, MA:Beacon Press, 1987), 251.



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concludes further, has simply no indicators for any independent or autonomous, transcendental

instance.106

While the Problem of this paper is not the validity of Habermas critique against Parsons, it is

indeed most crucial to evaluate Habermas notion of religion vis--vis his perspective on

mysticism and philosophy. In this regard, it is necessary to state my latest quote in full length;680

Habermas claims, But there are no indicators accessible to social-theoretical analysis for a

transcendence that is independentin this way from the communicative practice of human beings,

from their sacrifices, entreaties, prayers, no indicators for a god, who, to borrow an image from

Jewish mysticism, does not himself has to be redeemed through the efforts of human beings.107

Does that mean that Jewish mysticism somehow reenters the stage vis--vis other notions of

religion? With his reference to Jewish mysticism, Habermas seems to imply a certain notion of

contemporary religiosity, which only considers a secularized notion of Godas a tradition of

knowledge and belief, which is evaluated by us and might inspire social, political, and

philosophical worldviews.

[TO BE CONTINUED]690

106 Ibid., 256.107 Ibid., 256.


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V

Why and under what conditions does Habermas return to implications subsumed under a rather

open notion of a Judeo-Christian tradition after the publications of his seminal theory?

Discussion on:

Habermas, Jrgen. Gershom Scholem: Die verkleidete Tora (1978). In Philosophisch-Politische Profile,700

3rd ed., 377-391. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1981.

Habermas, Jrgen. Israel or Athens, or to Whom Does Anamnestic Reason Belong? In Religion and

Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, 129-138. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002.

Habermas, Jrgen. Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in the World. In Religion and

Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, 67-94. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002.

Metz, Johann B. Messianic or Bourgeois Religion? In The Emergent Church: The Future of Christianity

in a Postbourgeois World, 1-16 . New York: Crossroad, 1981 [1980].

Metz, Johann B. Anamnestic Reason: A Theologians Remarks on the Crisis in the

Geisteswissenschaften, in Axel Honneth et al. (eds.), 189-196. Cultural-Political Interventions in the

Unfinished Project of Enlightenment. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992.710

VI

[CONCLUSION]

NOTES

This differentiation between (Jewish and Christian) mysticism, on the one hand, and (secular)

philosophy, on the other, seems to be challenged as soon as Habermas remarks (on at least one

occasion) that German philosophy is inherently Protestant (in his paper on Bloch). However, I

will neglect this latter aspect for the moment and begin with outlining how Habermas

appropriates the different elements, which constitute what he perceives as Judeo-Christian

mysticism.

720


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Honneth et al. (eds.), 189-196. Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment.Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992.

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Salvatore, Armando. The Islamic Reform Project in the Emerging Public Sphere: The (Meta-) NormativeRedefinition of Shari'a. InBetween Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space,edited by Almut Hfert and Armando Salvatore. 89-108. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000.

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and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun, 212-235. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.

Habermas: Selected Bibliography

BOOKS

Habermas, Jrgen.Das Absolute und die Geschichte: Von der Zwiespaeltigkeit in Schellings Denken. Bonn: H.

Bouvier, 1954.


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Habermas, Jrgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of BourgeoisSociety. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991 [1962].

Habermas, Jrgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston,

MA: Beacon Press, 1987 [1981].

Habermas, Jrgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist

Reason. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987 [1981].

Habermas, Jrgen.Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996 [1992].

COLLECTED VOLUMES

Habermas, Jrgen. Theorie und Praxis, 3rd extended ed. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971.

Habermas, Jrgen. Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialismus: GeschichtsphilosophischeFolgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraktion Gottes. In Theorie und Praxis, 3rd extended ed., 172-

227. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971.

Habermas, Jrgen. Philosophisch-Politische Profile. 3rd ed. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1981.

Habermas, Jrgen. Gershom Scholem: Die verkleidete Tora (1978). In Philosophisch-Politische Profile,

3rd ed., 377-391. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1981.

Habermas, Jrgen. Philosophical-Political Profiles. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983 [1981].

Habermas, Jrgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987

[1985].

Habermas, Jrgen. Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992

[1988].

Habermas, Jrgen. Metaphysics after Kant. In Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, 10-27.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992.

Habermas, Jrgen.Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity. Cambridge, MA: The MITPress, 2002.

Mendieta, Eduardo. Introduction toReligion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, byJrgen Habermas, 1-36. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2002.

Habermas, Jrgen. Israel or Athens, or to Whom Does Anamnestic Reason Belong? InReligion andRationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, 129-138. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002.

Habermas, Jrgen. Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in the World. InReligion andRationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, 67-94. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002.

Habermas, Jrgen.Between Naturalism and Religion. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008 [2005].

PAPERS PUBLISHED IN JOURNALS

Habermas, Jrgen. Religion in the Public Sphere.European Journal of Philosophy 14/1 (2006): 1-25.

COAUTHORED AND EDITED VOLUMES

Habermas, Jrgen, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger.Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion. San Francisco:Ignatius Press, 2006 [2005].


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Habermas, Jrgen. Pre-Political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State. InDialectics of

Secularization: On Reason and Religion, by Jrgen Habermas and Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, 19-52. San

Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006.

Mendieta, Eduardo, ed. The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers. New York andLondon: Routledge, 2005.

Habermas, Jrgen. Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in the World. In The Frankfurt School onReligion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers, edited by Eduardo Mendieta, 303-326. New York andLondon: Routledge, 2005.

Habermas, Jrgen. Faith and Knowledge. In The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by theMajor Thinkers, edited by Eduardo Mendieta, 327-338. New York and London: Routledge, 2005.

Habermas, Jrgen. On the Relation between the Secular Liberal State and Religion. In The FrankfurtSchool on Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers, edited by Eduardo Mendieta, 339-350. New Yorkand London: Routledge, 2005.

Mendieta, Eduardo, Jonathan Vanantwerpen. The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere. New York: ColumbiaUniv. Press, 2011.

Habermas, Jrgen. The Political: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of PoliticalTheology. In The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, edited by Eduardo Mendieta and JonathanVanantwerpen, 15-33. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2011.

ONLINE RESOURCES

Habermas Forum. Bibliography: 1952 today. Edited by Kristian Hansen and Thomas Gregersen. AccessedSeptember 16, 2012, http://www.habermasforum.dk/index.php?type=bibliografi2.
http://www.habermasforum.dk/index.php?type=bibliografi2.http://www.habermasforum.dk/index.php?type=bibliografi2.

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