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Three-Party Authenticated Key Agreements and Its Applications- PCSs Roaming Protocol
李添福 (Tian-Fu Lee)國立成功大學資訊工程博士
Cryptography/ Network security/ Wireless networks communication/ Algorithmic graph theory/ Dat
abase and data engineering
2
Outlines
Three-Party Authenticated Key Agreements (3PAKA) Applications
Portable Communication Systems (PCSs) Roaming Protocol RFID Protocol E-Payment Protocol Electronic Medical Record Security and Privacy Vehicular Mobile Network
Proposed PCSs Roaming Protocol Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for PCSs Security discussion Computational comparison & Experimental Results
Conclusions
3
Three-Party Authenticated Key Agreements
An authenticated key agreement protocol is an interactive method for two or more parties to determine session keys based on their secret keys or public/private keys.
AuthenticationAuthentication
Key agreement / key exchangeSK
Secure communication
Trusted server
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Portable Communication Systems Roaming Protocol
Mobile Station
Visited Network Home NetworkPDA
cellular phone
notebook
5
RFID Protocol
Tag Reader Database Server
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E-Payment Protocol
BuyerSeller
E-Bank
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醫療資訊安全 - 電子病歷安全與隱私(Electronic Medical Record Security and Privacy)
IC card
Hospital
政府衛生行政單位電子病歷 Database
健保機關
一般民眾
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Vehicular Mobile Network
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Proposed PCSs Roaming Protocol
Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for PCSs
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Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for PCSs
RegistrationOn-line authentication processi-th Off-line authentication process
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Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for PCSs
MS VN
HN
Delegation ((x),K)
(x,v=gx)
Public key (v)
Proxy signature
Verify the signature by v
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On-line authentication process
Sing(msg.),K
VerifyK
MS (,K) VN (KVH; pk:v) HN (,KVH)
KIDMS
SK,h(token)
SK, token
Obtain SK Obtain SK
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i-th Off-line authentication process
ESKi(tokeni,h(tokeni+1))
Verify tokeni
Keep h(tokeni+1) Compute SKi+1
MS (SKi, tokeni) VN (SKi, h(tokeni)) HN
Compute SKi+1
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comparison
Previous Scheme: tokeni and tokeni+1 are independent. HN can forge tokeni Have not non-repudiation Charge Problem :
Mobile users deny has used services and refuse to pay. Overcharge mobile users for services that he did not request.
[IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 2005] Proposed Scheme:
All tokeni are chained by backward hash-chain and are decided by MS. HN cannot forge tokeni Have non-repudiation Pre-Compute and reduce the computational cost in MS.
[IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 2009]
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i-th Off-line authentication process
ESKi(tokeni)Verify tokeni
Keep tokeni = h(tokeni+1) Compute SKi+1
MS (SKi, tokeni) VN (SKi, h(tokeni)) HN
Compute SKi+1
Pre-compute and store h(1)(n1),
h(2)(n1) (=tokenn),
…, h(n)(n1)(=token2),
h(n+1)(n1)(=token1) token1
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Security Discussion
GSM MGSM Public-keybased scheme
Lee & Yeh'sScheme
ProposedScheme
Identity privacy No No No Yes Yes
Non-repudiation No No Yes No Yes
Mutual-authen.(MS-VN)
No No Yes Yes Yes
Easy key management
Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Low computational load
Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Good commu. efficiency
Yes Yes No Yes Yes
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Computational comparison of MS
*: Can be pre-computed in this entry.
hash function secret-key computation(encryption/decryption)
public-key computation(signature/verification)
GSM 2(n+1) 1(n+1) 0
MGSM 1(n+1) 1(n+1) 0
Public-key based scheme 0 0 2n
Lee & Yeh's scheme
On-line 2 1 1Pre.*
Off-line 3n n 0
Proposed scheme On-line (n+1)Pre.*+2 1 1Pre.*
Off-line n n 0
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Experimental Results
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Pre-comp.
on-line off-line1 off-line2 off-line3 off-line4 off-line5
period
time(
ms)
Lee and Yeh's Protocol
Proposed Protocol
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Experimental Results
84.2
84.22
84.24
84.26
84.28
84.3
84.32
84.34
84.36
84.38
84.4
Pre-comp.
on-line off-line1 off-line2 off-line3 off-line4 off-line5(Total)
period
time(
ms)
Lee and Yeh'sProtocol
Proposed Protocol
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Conclusions
Three-party authenticated key agreements and its applications
Proposed secure and efficient delegation-based authentication protocol for PCSs
Future researchesVehicular Mobile NetworkElectronic Medical Record Security and Privacy
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References
Lee, T.-F., Hwang, T. and Lin C.-L. “Enhanced Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange without Server Public Keys,” Computers & Security, Volume: 23, Issue: 7, pp. 571-577, October, 2004.
Wen, H.-A., Lee, T.-F. and Hwang, T. “A Provably Secure Three-Party Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Using Weil Pairing,” IEE Proc. Communications, Vol. 152, No. 2, pp. 138-143, April 2005.
Lee, T.-F., Liu, J.-L., Sung, M.-J., Yang, S.-B. and Chen, C.-M., “Communication-Efficient Three-Party Protocols for Authentication and Key Agreement”, Computers and Mathematics with Applications, Vol. 58, No, 4, pp.641-648, August, 2009.
Lee, T.-F., Chang, C.-C. and Hwang, T. “Private Authentication Techniques for the Global Mobility Network,” Wireless Personal Communications, Vol. 35,Issue: 4, pp. 329-336, December 2005.
Lee, W.-B. and Yeh, C.-K., “A new delegation-based authentication protocol for use in portable communication systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 4, no.1, pp.57-64, January 2005.
Lee, T.-F., Chang, S.-H., Hwang, T. and Chong, S.-K., “Enhanced Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for PCSs”, IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., Vol.8, No. 5, pp. 2166-2171, May 2009.