#1 Report from the senior naval officer of the HMS …...consortium criticalthe thinking Report from the senior naval officer of the HMS Highflyer Report made on December 7, 1917 by

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Report from the senior naval officer of the HMS Highflyer Report made on December 7, 1917 by the Senior Naval Officer of the HMS Highflyer, a British cruiser regarding the collision of the Imo and the Mont-Blanc.

#1Causes of the Halifax Explosion

H.M.S. Highflyer7 December 1917

… About 8.45 A.M., the French Steamer Mont-Blanc passed be-tween HMS Highflyer and the Dartmouth shore going toward Bedford Basin. At the same time, the Belgian Relief Steamer Imo was seen leaving Bedford Basin. The Mont-Blanc made one short blast on her syron [sic – siren] just after passing HMS Highflyer, which was acknowledged by the Imo with one short blast. The Mont-Blanc altered course to starboard [right] about one point and appeared to ease down, and the Imo ap-peared to maintain a steady course from the neck of the channel to HMS Highflyer. The Mont-Blanc shortly afterward made two short blasts and turned sharp to port [left] …. The Imo thereupon sounded two short blasts but still appeared to hold a steady course. Shortly after this, the Imo sounded three short blasts and was seen to be going eastern, her bows swinging to star-board [right]. This was a few seconds before the actual collision.

The Imo struck the Mont-Blanc on the starboard side … on the … bow [front of the ship], the angle appearing to be about 45 degrees. The two ships swung parallel to each other and parted a one, the Imo moving toward the Dartmouth shore and the Mont-Blanc toward No. 8 Pier ….

Fire broke out in the fore [front] part starboard side of the Mont-Blanc imme-diately after the collision and within five minutes flames were seen. These in-creased very quickly and came in distinct spurts that rose over one hundred feet and were thought to be the ignition of drums or barrels of oil. This continued until 9.08 A.M. when the ship, being close to the shore, there was a very violent explosion and dhe [sic – she] disappeared.

The crew of the Mont-Blanc were seen to abandon their ship immediately fire broke out and pulled towards the Dartmouth shore, where they landed.

-The Senior Naval Officer, Halifax

“The Halifax explosion,” The Canadian War Museum – George Metcalf Archival Collection. CWM 19890161-002

Comments in brackets are not part of the original document. They have been added to assist the reader with difficult words.


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The cause of the catastropheExcerpt from the newspaper article published in The Halifax Herald on December 8, 1917.


The Halifax HeraldDecember 8, 1917

… On Thursday morning the French steamer Mont-Blanc was steaming up the harbour with Pilot Frank Mackay in charge and reached a point opposite the northern terminals of the C.G.R., while the Belgian Relief steamer Imo was proceeding out in charge of Pilot William Hayes and they were approaching each other. For some inscrutable [incomprehensible / strange / odd] reason the Belgian steamer violated the rules of navigation and the result was that she col-lided with the Mont-Blanc. Soon the Frenchman burst into flames. She was loaded with 5000 tons of high explosives.The crew abandoned her and all escaped safely to the Dartmouth shore.

Then came the terrific explosion which destroyed the extreme south-eastern part of Halifax, caused the deaths of more than 2000 persons, and perhaps dou-ble that number rendered 5000 people homeless, and involved a property loss of from $12 000 000 to $15 000 000 … because someone had blundered, or worse.

Behind all as responsible for the disaster, is that arch criminal the Kaiser of Germany who forced our Empire and her allies into the fearful war.

“The cause of the catastrophe,” The Halifax Herald, December 8, 1917, http://www.virtualhistorian.ca/large-pages/newspaper/405 (Accessed November 6, 2011).



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Testimony of John L. MakinyExcerpt from the testimony of John L. Makiny, recorded during the Halifax Explosion Inquiry, led by Justice Arthur Drysdale. Makiny was the civilian captain of the Nereid, a tugboat that patrolled the Halifax submarine net defences during the war.


Testimonty of John L. MakinyThe Halifax Explosion Inquiry

Q.—Did you notice anything particularly about the speed at which the Belgian ship was coming? A.—She was coming quite a good speed; I could not swear just how rapidly; but there was quite a foam at her bow ….Q.—The French ship, about her speed? A.—She was I should positively swear not four knots; very slow; she eased a great deal more after she came on a ways; that is when I first seen her I am swearing to.Q.—Tell the signals you heard and the order in which you heard them, from both the Belgian ship, the Imo, and the French ship, the Mont Blanc. You heard whistles? A.—Yes.Q.—Which ship did you hear blow first? A.—I heard the Mont Blanc; the French ship.Q.—Whereabouts was she when she first blew? A.—Quite a distance below the Highflyer.Q.—What signal did she give? A.—Two blasts, no, one blast.Q.—The next whistle you heard? A.—She blew again.Q.—The French ship blew a second whistle? A.—Yes, one straight blast.Q.—What signal did you hear from the other ship? A.—Not any for a few moments.Q.—What blast or signal did you hear from the Belgian?A.—I heard two ….

“In the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada between the ship “Imo” (Southern Pacific Whaling Company, Limited, Owners) (Defendant), appellant and La Compagnie générale transatlantique (plaintiff), respondent record of proceedings, volume 1 Constant & Constant ... appellant’s solicitors, William A. Crump & Son ... respondent’s solicitors,” p. 12–13, from Early Canadiana Online - CIHM number (9_05977) http://www.canadiana.org/view/9_05977/0001 (Accessed November 6, 2011).



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Testimony of Aimé Le Medec Excerpt from the testimony of Aimé Le Le Medec, the captain of the Mont-Blanc, that was recorded during the Halifax Explosion Inquiry.


Testimonty of Aimé Le MedecThe Halifax Explosion Inquiry

Q.—Where was the Imo when they first saw her? A.—She seemed to leave Bedford Basin.Q.—In what part of the channel was the Imo? A.—The Imo appeared towards the land in the West—she was leaving the basin and he could see her towards the land on the west side ….Q.—What was done, if anything, on board the Mont-Blanc? A.—As he was seeing the boat on his port side he showed he had seen her and gave one short blast, and put his ship a little to the right, and inclined towards the land. Q.—Was any order given to the helmsman when he gave the short blast? A.—Yes sir, the order was given to go to the right, but as I was too near the land he could not go too much to the right.Q.—Was any order given to the engine room at that time? A.—I ordered to the engine room to go slow.Q.—Did he receive any signal from the Imo in answer to his one blast? A.—Yes sir, the Imo replied by two short blasts.Q.—Which was the first signal given by either of the ships to the other? A.—It was me gave one short blast meaning “I am going to the right.”Q.—Did the Imo change her course after giving the two short blasts signal? A.—I think so; but it is difficult for a ship against the land to find out if she is moving in one direction or not. The fact of giving two short blasts of the whistle does not imply that the vessel itself will go to the right or to the left—it might say I pass to the right or I pass to the left …. Q.—Ask him whether he gave any other signal from his ship? A.—A few seconds after he had a reply from the Imo he gave a new short blast and then he went to the right, and he stopped his engines immediately.A.—Did he get a second signal from the Imo? A.—Yes sir, he heard from the Imo a second signal of two blasts. Q.—At what distance from each other were the ships by this time? A.—About 150 metres ….Q.—How fast was the Imo travelling at the time? A.—Judging by the force of the collision the Imo should have had at the time a great speed.

“In the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada between the ship “Imo” (Southern Pacific Whaling Company, Limited, Owners) (Defendant), appellant and La Compagnie générale transatlantique (plaintiff), respondent record of proceedings, volume 1 Constant & Constant ... appellant’s solicitors, William A. Crump & Son ... respondent’s solicitors,” p. 12–13, from Early Canadiana Online - CIHM number (9_05977) http://www.canadiana.org/view/9_05977/0001 (Accessed November 6, 2011).



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The Halifax Herald article about the testimony of Frank MackeyExcerpt from a newspaper article published in The Halifax Herald on December 17, 1917 about the testimony of Pilot Frank Mackey in the Halifax Explosion Inquiry that was held after the explosion.


The Halifax HeraldDecember 17, 1917

… When Pilot Frank Mackey was called to the stand he said that he was forty-five years of age and had been a licensed pilot for Halifax for a little more than twenty-four years, in which time he had had no accident what-ever.

… [on the morning of December 6th] the Mont Blanc proceeded in to enter the Narrows …. As he straightened to go up thru the Narrows his ship was 320 or 330 feet from the Dartmouth shore. He was some minutes on that course before he saw the Imo. He first saw her foremast [front mast] and then as she cleared the land so that he could see her hull, he observed that she was showing white water under her bow and evidently violating the admiralty regulations, which require that a ship must go very slow at that point.

...Asked by Mr. Henry what he then did, the pilot said: “I established my proper location by one blast of the whistle.”

He said that the whistle worked promptly and distinctly and that at that moment the captain of the Mont-Blanc did not give any order. In a few seconds he heard two blasts from the Imo. “So as to remove any possibility of doubt,” declared Pilot Mackey, “I again blew one blast and again I got two blasts in return from the Imo. These blasts I plain-ly heard, and I changed my ship a little to starboard so that he could see my … bow plainly. I did this when I blew the two blasts for the second time.”

The pilot said that the helmsman promptly carried out his orders. At the time of the second one blast signal the vessels were about 400 feet apart and the Imo was still coming at con-siderable speed and crossing over into the Mont-Blanc’s water. There was not as much speed and foam, but she was still making quite a ripple at her bow.

Knowing the rules of the road as he did, Pilot Mackey said he considered it wise to obey the rule which in such emergencies empowered [allowed] him to use his own judgment to port to starboard or to stop. The Imo suddenly blew three blasts. Just before this she was twisting a little to starboard. About five seconds after the Imo blew the three blasts, Pilot Mackey said he saw her throwing a wake from her starboard propeller. The Imo flew quickly to starboard.

“Mont-Blanc was exceeding the speed limit on that fateful day of explosion,” The Halifax Herald, December 17, 1917, http://www.virtualhistorian.ca/large-pages/newspaper/413 (Accessed November 7, 2011).



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Responsibility of naval authoritiesExcerpt from a newspaper article published in the Halifax Morning Chronicle on December 20, 1917.


The Halifax Morning ChronicleDecember 20, 1917

It is imperative [necessary] that the public should know by whose authority the Imo was ordered to leave her anchorage in Bedford Basin at a time when it must have been plain to the competent naval authority that the two ships would meet in or near the narrow channel which leads from the inner harbour to the Basin. It is also imperative, not only for the purposes of this investigation, but for the City’s security in the future, to ascertain [discover] why a proper patrol was not maintained by naval craft to keep the course clear for the munitions boat. The naval authorities have a large number of boats of various sorts at their com-mand in this harbour, but so far as we have learned, none of them were em-ployed in escorting the Mont-Blanc on her way to Bedford Basin. Why? The pub-lic has a right to know, why these and other precautions which we might mention were not taken and, above all, why the risk of allowing these two steamers to meet … was taken.

As quoted in John Griffith Armstrong, The Halifax explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2002), p. 127.



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Important questions for the naval authoritiesLetter to the editor written by J. R. Middleton that was published in The Halifax Herald on December 21, 1917.


Letter to the editorThe Halifax HeraldDecember 21, 1917

After one of the most frightful disasters the modern world has known, the citizens of this city are being treated, under the title of “Enquiry as to the Disaster,” to the spectacle of several seamen and a pilot, being “examined,” and “cross-examined,” by eminent [dis-tinguished] counsel, in an effort to prove that one of the vessels in the collisions went to “port” [left] when she should have gone to “starboard,” [right] or that the other “blew her whistle once” or “twice,” as the leaning of counsel may be. Doubtless this is inter-esting to navigators …. Of what interest is it, however, to the citi-zen of this city who, in the fortunate case of being alive, finds himself, or herself, STRIPPED OF EVERYTHING which previously had made his, or her life?

What the people of this city want to know, and what they have got to know is:

WHY was the Mont-Blanc coming into Halifax?WHO was the naval officer who issued permission for her to come, and FROM WHOM did HE get the authority?WHERE lays the ultimate responsibility for permitting such ships to come into our midst ….

So far the Naval department have preserved a judicious [cautious] silence …. We now want their answers.

-J.R. Middleton

As quoted in John Griffith Armstrong, The Halifax explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2002), pp. 127–127..



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The Halifax Explosion Inquiry decisionExcerpt from the decision handed down by Mr. Justice Drysdale following the Halifax Explosion Inquiry.


Halifax, N.S.4 February, 1918

Sir,

… having heard all the witnesses that could throw any light on the situation, having conferred with the Nautical Assessors, I have reached the following con-clusions and desire to report as follows:… collision was caused by violation of the rules of Navigation.That the Pilot and Master of the Mont-Blanc were wholly [totally] responsible for violating the rules of the road. That Pilot Mackey by reason of his gross negligence [obvious neglect] would be forthwith dismissed by the Pilotage Authorities and his licence cancelled. In view of the gross neglect of the rules of Navigation by Pilot Mackey, the at-tention of the Law Officers of the crown should be called … with a view to a criminal prosecution of such pilot. We recommend to the French Authorities such evidence with a view to having Cap-tain Le Medec’s licence cancelled and such captain dealt with according to the law of his country ….The Master and Pilot of the Mont-Blanc are guilty of neglect of the public safe-ty in not taking proper steps to warn the inhabitants of the city of a probable [likely] explosion. Commander Wyatt is guilty of neglect in performing his duty … in not tak-ing proper steps to ensure the regulations being carried out and especially in not keeping himself fully acquainted with [aware of] the movements and intended movements of vessels in the harbour ….13. The regulations governing the traffic in Halifax harbour in force since the war were prepared by the competent Naval Authorities; that such traffic regula-tions do not satisfactorily deal with the handling of ships laden with explosives and we have to recommend that such competent Authority forthwith take up and make satisfactory regulations dealing with such subject; we realise that whilst war goes on under present conditions explosives must move but, in view of what has happened, we strongly recommend that the subject be dealt with satisfactorily by the proper Authorities.

Given under my hand at the City of Halifax this Fourth day of February, 1918.

(Signed) Mr. Justice Drysdale

As quoted in Michael J. Bird, The town that died: The true story of the greatest man-made explosion before Hiroshima (London, UK: Souvenir Press, 1962), p. 180.



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Accident or sabotage?Newspaper article originally published on June 14, 1922 in The Evening Echo, a Seattle newspaper. The article was republished in Halifax newspapers at the time.


Special to The Evening Echo: SEATTLE, June 14, 1922:

Solution to the mystery which surrounded the explosion … in the city at Halifax, Nova Scotia late in 1917 is believed by government agents in Seattle to have come with the suicide of William Johnson … a highly educated Finn chemist whose body was found by an Indian on Bacon Creek, Skagit County, last month. Agents of the United States and Canadian government say the chemist confessed not only to responsibility for the Halifax disaster but also admitted the slaying of two men, one a captain of a British transport ….

It has already been established that Johnson was in Halifax in the British trans-port service. An address at which he later resided in Halifax is known to agents ….

First information regarding the alleged confession and possibility of clearing the Halifax blast mystery came from J.R. Cox, Watchmen employed at Talc Mines on the Skagit River …. It was while talking with Johnson some days before his death, Cox told Seattle agents, that Johnson alluded to the Halifax explosion. Cox asked the chemist whether he could identify an unbranded high explosive powder. Johnson named it at once.

“Would Have Blown Up More: I had thirty-five pounds of a more dangerous explosive than that left after we blew up three ships in Halifax harbor during the war,” Johnson is alleged to have said. “If they had not discharged me, there would have been more ships blown up. We will be better prepared for them the next time they start a war.”

As quoted in Laura M. MacDonald, Curse of the narrows (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 340–341.



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Francis Mackey interviewExcerpt of an interview conducted by CBC Radio in 1967 with the pilot of the Mont-Blanc, Francis Mackey.

CBC Radio SpecialWith Francis Mackey

MACKEY: I came in on the Mont-Blanc. The ship in the first place, a ship bound in was supposed to have the right of way. No other ship was allowed to pass her coming out ….

We arrived on the examination ground. Ships were only allowed into Bedford Basin in daylight. It was late after-noon. And the man from the examining boat came alongside as they all had to do to find out what the ship’s cargo was and so on. Well I said, “Just wait a minute. You’re standing on top of five hundred tons of TNT now, both of us. The rest of her cargo is picric acid, dry and wet. And Benzol on deck. Now,” I says, “that’s a damned bad cargo.” I said, “What I’d like you to do is ask the examining of-ficer aboard the ship there. Ask or tell him there that I expect to get special orders for this ship through the night. Ask him if he can arrange it.” Next morning, daylight came and I was ordered to get underway. I asked him, “Are there any special orders in way of protection of the ship?” And he said, “No sire.”

We come up, arrived up at The Narrows. We were coming up as slow as we possibly could … and the other ship was coming down on his wrong side, answering my one blast with two, decidedly opposite to what he should do. He should have answered me with one and kept close to the Halifax side …. When he got down a little further he found it was nar-rowing up across it, see and he got cold feet and pulled it full speed astern [backwards direction] when he was on my starboard side and that’s when he cut her into me.

Comments in brackets are not part of the original document.

They have been added to assist the reader with difficult words.

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CBC: That’s when you hit?

MACKEY: Yeah he cut right into me …. The friction between the two plates of the two ships created a spark. We stood there until we couldn’t stand there any longer. I said, “The only thing to do is save our crew.” I said, “Get them in the boats.”… We pulled away from the ship. There was a navy tug going down past us and we hailed him and I waved to him, “Take us in tow.” Hollered but you might as well as holler at a post. Nobody could hear. Too much racket ….

CBC: Do you think the collision could have been avoided? What should have been done?

MACKEY: By not allowing the Imo out. He come out on his wrong side. Broke the rules come on the wrong side of a steamer on the wrong side up above The Narrows and then come down on the wrong side again and struck me …. There was no ship allowed to come out when a ship incoming was bound in.

CBC: Once the collision took place, could anything have been done to prevent the explosion?

MACKEY: No. No. The explosion she was out of business. Couldn’t do anything with her. No one was throwing water on her.

CBC: Could she have been taken in tow [pulled it by tugboat]?

MACKEY: Well it would … was just a ques-tion … you wouldn’t have been time to take her in tow and take her anywhere.

“Mont-Blanc pilot Francis Mackey recalls the explosion” CBC Radio Special, October 3, 1967, as quoted in Laura M. MacDonald, Curse of the narrows (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 289–290.

Causes of the Halifax Explosion


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Determining faultExcerpt from a journal article written by Captain Robert C.P. Power entitled “A look back at the collision of the Imo and Mont-Blanc with seventy-five years of hindsight,” published in Ground zero: A reassessment of the 1917 explosion in Halifax harbour in 1994.

#1

It is my conclusion that the Imo and Mont-Blanc had sighted each other long before the collision …. The position of the Imo when she made her turn would have placed the sun directly over the top of the Mont-Blanc. In The Narrows, with no wind and the amount of coal smoke in the atmosphere, anyone looking into the sun would probably have seen only an indefinite [vague] silhouette of any object in the glare of the water. The Mont-Blanc’s wartime grey would not have helped against the background of a haze with sun shining through it. When the Mont-Blanc sounded two blasts on its whistle and started to swing to port [left], those on the bridge [room or platform from which a ship is commanded] of the Imo were able to deter-mine her aspect and proximity and the danger of collision. Three blasts were made on the whistle of the Imo and the engine was put full astern [reverse] for a second time. Of course, at this point it was not possible to redeem [save] the situation and the collision resulted shortly thereafter.

It is my conclusion that both vessels can be faulted for not stopping entirely before the situation became critical. If the Inquiry was correct in finding that the collision took place in the centre of the channel, if not on the Hali-fax side, I find it difficult to understand why the captain of the Mont-Blanc chose to turn to port [left] towards Halifax when there was certainly enough water for his ship to turn to starboard [right] without danger of grounding.

Robert C. P. Power, “The Collision of the Imo and the Mont-Blanc,” in Alan Ruffman and Colin D. Howell (eds.), Ground zero: A reassessment of the 1917 explosion in Halifax harbour (Halifax, NS): Nimbus Publishing, 1994), p. 386–387.


Causes of theHalifax Explosion


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Local prejudice influences opinionExcerpt from a journal article written by Donald A. Kerr entitled “Another calamity: The litigation,” published in Ground zero: A reassessment of the 1917 explosion in Halifax harbour in 1994.

#2

Immediately following the explosion, a rumour began to circulate that the disaster was part of a nefarious [wicked] plot by the Kaiser and his evil cohorts, and that Halifax would be entirely flattened by a second enormous blast scheduled to go off a few days later. In addition, only four months ear-lier, Canada had passed a Conscription Act despite strong opposition from the province of Québec. It was easy for the local populace [population] to focus its anti-French sentiments [feelings] on the Mont-Blanc. It was well known that just prior to the collision the French vessel had made an inexpli-cable [unexplainable] alteration [change] of course towards the Halifax side. Rumours of a deliberate explosion increased when it was learned that the Mont-Blanc had not been displaying the red explosives flag. (At the inquiry it was very properly pointed out that the flag was to be displayed only when explosives were being “handled.” Captain Le Medec … correctly stated that to display the explosives flag on other occasions would have been to adver-tise the nature of the ship’s cargo and thus invite enemy activity.)

The print media were in a frenzy, repeating and exaggerating (if not invent-ing) each successive rumour. The sentiment against the Mont-Blanc was illustrated by an editorial comment in the Truro Daily News that the parties responsible for “such a needless collision” in clear weather “should be hung in good old fashioned style” from the yardarm.Donald A. Kerr, “Another calamity: The litigation,” in Alan Ruffman and Colin D. Howell (eds.), Ground zero: A reassessment of the 1917 explosion in Halifax harbour (Halifax, NS): Nimbus Publishing, 1994), p., 368.




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The Supreme Court weighs inExcerpt from a book written by lawyer Donald A. Kerr entitled “Another calamity: The litigation,” published in Ground zero: A reassessment of the 1917 explosion in Halifax harbour in 1994.

#3

In the course of his analysis, Mr. Justice Anglin found that the Imo “inexcusably” stayed on the wrong side of the channel until just before the collision. He conclud-ed saying: “While I incline to think that the Imo was the more blame-worthy of the two, I am not sufficiently satisfied of this to do otherwise than apportion [distrib-ute] the responsibility equally.”

The two remaining judges, Brodeur and Mignault, were French-Canadians and were understandably suspicious of the anti-French bias displayed by Drysdale and identified by their associate, Justice Anglin. In thorough [detailed] and well-rea-soned decisions, both of those judges found the Imo fully to blame, and the Mont-Blanc blameless. Both judges said … that the place of collision was almost imma-terial [unimportant]. It was necessary to go further back in time … and analyze the manoeuvres which got the ships to that place before attempting to assign respon-sibility. Both concluded that the Imo was in the wrong water at all relevant times, only getting over to its own side when it was too late, and that the violent alteration to port of the Mont-Blanc, although unwise in the circumstances, was understand-able and excusable. The Imo, they said, was solely to blame ….

Of the five Supreme Court judges, two were in favour of the Imo, two were for the Mont-Blanc, and one was of the opinion that both were to blame. The bout would have been a draw! Draws are unacceptable at the Appeal Court level, which is why there is almost always an uneven number of judges. A draw would mean that the appellant [appealing person/group] (Mont-Blanc) had failed to discharge the bur-den of upsetting the Drysdale decision, with the result that the case would go into the books as a complete win for the Imo. Brodeur and Mignault cannily [shrewdly] decided that they would not let that happen. Accordingly, in the final paragraph of each of their decisions, they said that while they would have held the Imo solely to blame, they were prepared to adopt the reasoning of Justice Anglin and find mutual and equal fault on the part of the two ships. Half a loaf was better than none. Thus it ended up as a three-two decision in favour of an equal division of fault.

Donald A. Kerr, “Another calamity: The litigation,” in Alan Ruffman and Colin D. Howell (eds.), Ground zero: A reassessment of the 1917 explosion in Halifax harbour (Halifax, NS): Nimbus Publishing, 1994), p. 373–374.




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Conclusions of Captain Louis DemersExcerpt from a book written by historian John Griffith Armstrong entitled The Halifax explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy, published in 2002.

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In reaching his conclusions, Demers [Dominion Wreck Commissioner] rather astonishingly placed moral considerations above rules governing maritime law. To the wreck commissioner’s mind, the weighing of evidence required no great efforts of deliberation. Demers’s notion was that Captain Le Medec and Pilot Mackey had indefensibly violated the rules of the road in the narrow waters. When Imo had sounded her two-blast to answer to Mont-Blanc’s single warning, Demers insisted that the latter should have at once placed her helm to port [turned to the left], sounded a signal of three blasts, and ordered her engines full astern [reverse the engines]. He also insisted that this obligation to defer immediately to Imo’s adver-tised intentions—normal procedure or no—was Mont-Blanc’s only proper recourse because only Le Medec and Mackey had knowledge of the very dangerous cargo their ship carried. Demers believed this knowledge carried with it an overriding obligation to take uncommon measures to avoid any prospect of collision ….

Interestingly, Demers considered Imo’s pilot and crew blameless. Pilot Hayes had himself been a victim of the disaster—“he has lost his life, and therefore cannot de-fend himself”—and Demers would not even blame him for not reporting the ship’s departure from Bedford Basin to the naval authorities.

John Griffith Armstrong, The Halifax explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2002), p. 191. This excerpt is reprinted with permission of University of British Columbia Press 2002. All rights reserved by the Publisher.



Documents

#1 Report from the senior naval officer of the HMS …...consortium criticalthe thinking Report from the senior naval officer of the HMS Highflyer Report made on December 7, 1917 by