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MALAYSIA: HOW CAN CIVIL SOCIETY PERSUADE THE ELECTION COMMISSION TO TABLE FAIRER CONSTITUENCY MAPS?   1. Introduction:   Malaysia has just started the Delimitation Exercise for the State of Sarawak on 5th Jan 2015 after a lapse of 10 years. This will be followed soon by the other 15 States. Malaysia has a long history of malapportionment and gerrymandering of the seats during delimitation so much so that the largest Parliament seat to smallest can be different by a factor of 9. This has enabled the ruling regime to stay on in power for the past 57 years. For the last general elections on 5th May 2013, the ruling party retained power with a minority of only 47.4% of the votes and yet won 60% of the seats.   Civil society has put in efforts over the past 3 years to learn how delimitation is carried out and to put up counterproposals during the Objections Hearing Period. But we are not optimistic that the Election Commission will treat our proposals fairly.   Question: 1.     We seek your advice on how to address the following issue  as the result of large differences in constituency size, the value of votes is not equal. For instance, a vote from the smallest constituency, Putrajaya (15,791 electors) is worth nearly 9 times the vote of the largest constituency, Kapar (144,369 electors).  We have analysed the maps and discovered that constituency size can be quite easily rebalanced to within +/ 20% of the average. What steps can we take to persuade the Election Commission to consider our studies and offer a better balanced constituencies?  2. Should the Election Commission refuse to consider our proposals or consider and reject them, is there any remedial action that we can take?    2. GOVERNING PROVISIONS FOR DELIMITATION IN MALAYSIA   2.1 References:   2.1.1: Malaysian Federal Constitution 

● Article 46 Composition of House of Representatives, ● Article 113 Conduct of Elections, ● Article 114 Constitution of Election Commission ● Article 116 Federal Constituencies, ● Article 117 State Constituencies 

http://bit.ly/FedConstiArticle46CompositionOfHseOfRepshttp://bit.ly/FedConstArticle113COEhttp://bit.ly/FederalConstitutionArticle114http://bit.ly/FedConstArticle116FederalConstituencieshttp://bit.ly/FedConst117StateConstituenciesProvisions

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● The Eight Schedule ● The Thirteenth Schedule (The main document covering principles and 

procedures for Delimitation as appended at the end.)   2.1.2: Elections Act 

● Section 9A. Certified or recertified electoral roll shall be deemed to be final: New Polling Districts (DM’s) shall be gazetted before they are valid. 

   2. 2.2: Key Points: 

● Article 46: The Election Commission (EC) has no power to determine the no. of seats. It is fixed by Parliament for each State under Article 46, which can only be amended with a ⅔ majority in Parliament. 

  

 Figure 2.1  What the table means is that the Electoral Quotient (EQ) which is the average number of electors per Parliamentary constituency varies from the smallest (Putrajaya) with 15,791 electors to the largest for Selangor with 93,766 electors. This is interState malapportionment, which is illustrated in the bar chart below  Figure 2.2. 

http://bit.ly/DelimitationEightSchedulehttp://bit.ly/DelimitationThirteenthSchedule

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 If all 222 Parliamentary constituencies are considered, we get Figure 2.3 for seats in increasing size. For the recent general elections in 2013 (GE13), it is seen that the small seats (blue) are won by the Ruling Party (BN) while large seats (red) are won by the Opposition.  

   

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The distortion was so large that it was theoretically possible for the Ruling Party to secure a simple majority with just 16.5% of the electorate in GE13. The actual results were quite close. They won’t a simple majority with just 17.4% of the electorate. For a properly apportioned delimitation, in theory, they should need at least 25.25% of the electorate to secure a simple majority for the first 112 seats. More glaring, they only manage 47.4% of the votes, yet secured 60% of the seats!  

  Within the States, it can seen that the Parliamentary constituencies are also malapportioned. Observe the 4 charts below. 

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  Article 113 Conduct of Elections: There must be a minimum of 8 years between end of a delimitation review and start of next review. The review must be completed within 2 years 

● Article 114 Constitution of the Election Commission: The King (Agong) shall appoint members of the EC which enjoys public confidence, meaning the EC is answerable to the public. In their claim of Efficient and Transparent (“Cekap & Telus”), they should put all efforts to ensure the public is wellinformed about their delimitation plans and to put it up in digital format online for maximum access to the public. 

●  

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Article 116 Federal Constituencies had a safeguard in 1957 which limited the variation between seat sizes to 15% from the electoral quota. This was raised to 33% in 1962 and remove totally in 1973, so much so, we have the largest seat 9 times the size of the smallest. Sadly, Malaysia now has the dubious distinction of “The Malaysian contest of May 2013 was evaluated worst on electoral laws (Malaysia: 33; global average: 64) and on the delimitation of voting district boundaries (Malaysia: 28; global average: 64). The score for district boundaries was in fact the lowest out of all countries in the world”  Southeast Asian elections worst in the world 

● Article 117 State Constituencies and Eight Schedule: On 16.01.1983, Section 4(2) was repealed by Act A584. 

(2) the number of elected members of the Legislative Assembly shall be the same as or a multiple of the number of the Federal constituencies into which the State is divided under Article 116 of the Federal Constitution. This was a safeguard to ensure that State and Federal Constituencies were kept within reasonable bounds in terms of voter population during delimitation. Today, this safeguard is no more, so much so, in Selangor, we have the voter population of a State Constituency (N18 Hulu Kelang  46,136 voters) larger than the Parliamentary voter populations of the 3 smallest Parliamentary seats (P92 Sabak Bernam  37,390, P93 Sg Besar 42,923, P95 Tanjong Karang 42,140) 

● Thirteenth Schedule prescribes the delimitation principles and procedures: The principles and procedures are so loose that the EC could delimit the smallest seat to be only ¼ that of the largest within the same State. 

  

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/02/19/southeast-asian-elections-worst-in-the-world/http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/02/19/southeast-asian-elections-worst-in-the-world/http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/02/19/southeast-asian-elections-worst-in-the-world/

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 Figure 2.3  The Thirteenth Schedule has no mention of land size, yet the EC in their new Delimitation Briefing 2014 (Taklimat Persempadanan Semula) has creative criteria such as towns having more than 60,000 voters and ABOVE (from public statements, we know the EC is thinking of capping it at 100,000 voters) while the rural seats is BELOW 30,000 voters.   The Sarawak EC Delimitation Proposals of 5th Jan 2015 (SyorSyor Persempadanan Semula) was especially egregious. The smallest State Constituency (DUN) N26 Gedong has only 6,340 voters while the largest N54 Pelawan has 31,388 voters, which is a factor of 5 !). For Parliament, the smallest P207 Igan 18,082 voters and largest P195 Bandar Kuching 78,394 voters – a factor of 434%!   ………………………………………………………………           

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MALAYSIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION THIRTEENTH SCHEDULE

(Articles 113, 116, 117)

PROVISIONS RELATING TO DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES

PART 1

DECLARATION OF AND PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES

1. The constituencies for the election of members to the House of Representatives and the Legislative Assemblies of the States shall, until altered in accordance with the provisions of this Schedule, be those first used for elections to the House or Assembly, as the case may be, pursuant to this Constitution or the Malaysia Act. 2. The following principles shall as far as possible be taken into account in dividing any unit of review into constituencies pursuant to the provisions of Articles 116 and 117— (a) while having regard to the desirability of giving all electors reasonably convenient opportunities of going to the polls, constituencies ought to be delimited so that they do not cross State boundaries and regard ought to be had to the inconveniences of State constituencies crossing the boundaries of federal constituencies; (b) regard ought to be had to the administrative facilities available within the constituencies for the establishment of the necessary registration and polling machines; (c) the number of electors within each constituency in a State ought to be approximately equal except that, having regard to the greater difficulty of reaching electors in the country districts and the other disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such constituencies; (d) regard ought to be had to the inconveniences attendant on alterations of constituencies, and to the maintenance of local ties. 3. For the purposes of this Part, the number of electors shall be taken to be as shown on the current electoral rolls. 3A. For the purposes of this Part, in any review of constituencies for the purposes of election to the House of Representatives, the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, the Federal Territory of Labuan and the Federal Territory of Putrajaya shall each be regarded as a State.

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PART II

PROCEDURE FOR DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES 4. Where the Election Commission have provisionaly determined to make recommendations under Clause (2) of Article 113 affecting any constituency, they shall inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Prime Minister accordingly, and shall publish in the Gazette and in at least one newspaper circulating in the constituency a notice stating— (a) the effect of their proposed recommendations, and (except in a case where they propose to recommend that no alteration be made in respect of the constituency) that a copy of their recommendations is open to inspection at a specified place within the constituency; and (b) that representations with respect to the proposed recommendations may be made to the Commission within one month after the publication of such notice, and the Commission shall take into consideration any representations duly made in accordance with any such notice. 5. Where, on the publication of the notice under section 4 of a proposed recommendation of the Election Commission for the alteration of any constituencies, the Commission receive any representation objecting to the proposed recommendations from— (a) the State Government or any local authority whose area is wholly or partly comprised in the constituencies affected by the recommendation; or (b) a body of one hundred or more persons whose names are shown on the current electoral rolls of the constituencies in question, the Commission shall cause a local enquiry to be held in respect of those constituencies. 6. In relation to any enquiry held under section 5 the Election Commission shall have all the powers conferred on Commissioners by the Commissions of Enquiry Act 1950 [Act 119]. 7. Where the Election Commission revise any proposed recommendations after publishing a notice thereof under section 4, the Commission shall comply again with that section in relation to the revised recommendations, as if no earlier notice had been published: Provided that it shall not be necessary to hold more than two local enquiries in respect of any such recommendations. 8. The Election Commission shall, having completed the procedure prescribed by this Part, submit to the Prime Minister a report on constituencies showing— (a) the constituencies into which they recommend that each unit of review should be divided in order to give effect to the principles set out in section 2; and (b) the names by which they recommend that those constituencies shall be known,

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or stating that in their opinion no alteration is required to be made in order to give effect to the said principles. 9. As soon as may be after the Election Commission have submitted their report to the Prime Minister under section 8, he shall lay the report before the House of Representatives, together (except in a case where the report states that no alteration is required to be made) with the draft of an Order to be made under section 12 for giving effect, with or without modifications, to the recommendations contained in the report. 10. If any draft Order referred to in section 9 is approved by the House of Representatives by resolution supported by the votes of not less than one-half of the total number of members of that House, the Prime Minister shall submit the draft Order to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 11. If a motion for the approval of any draft Order referred to in section 9 is rejected by the House of Representatives, or is withdrawn by leave of the House, or is not supported by the votes of not less than one-half of the total number of members of the House, the Prime Minister may, after such consultation with the Election Commission as he may consider necessary, amend the draft and lay the amended draft before the House of Representatives; and if the draft as so amended is approved by the House by a resolution supported by the votes of not less than one-half of the total number of members of the House, the Prime Minister shall submit the amended draft to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 12. Where the draft of an Order is submitted to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under this Part, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall make an Order in the terms of the draft submitted to him, and the Order shall come into force on such date as may be specified therein: Provided that the coming into force of any such Order shall not affect any election to the House of Representatives or a Legislative Assembly until the next dissolution of Parliament or the Assembly, as the case may be, occurring on or after the date.