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IETF OAuth Proof-of-Possession
Hannes Tschofenig
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Status Finished various specifications, including
OAuth Core: RFC 6749 Bearer Tokens: RFC 6750 Security Threats: RFC 6819
Discussion about an enhancement to Bearer Token security (now called “Proof-of-Possession”) since the early days of the working group.
Design Team work late 2012/early 2013, which lead to requirements, use cases, and solution strawman proposals: Symmetric Key Solution: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-05 Asymmetric Key Solution: draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk-03
These two documents have now been replaced by others specs.
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JSON Web Token (JWT)
Standardized version of an access token (and ID Token).
Uses JSON-based encoding + JWE/JWS for encryption/signature + claims.
Described in https://ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token/
WGLC finishedProof-of-Possession Token extends JWT and
embeds either a Public key (or a fingerprint of it), or Symmetric key (encrypted)
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PoP Token: Asymmetric Key Example
{
"iss":"xas.xboxlive.com",
"aud":"http://auth.xboxlive.com",
"exp":"1361398824",
"nbf":"1360189224",
"cnf":{
"jwk":{
"kty":"EC",
"use":"sig",
"crv":"P-256",
"x":"18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
"y":"-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
}
}
}
Binds a public key to the access token
[Keyed message digest/digital signature omitted.]
[Header omitted.]
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PoP Token: Symmetric Key Example{
"alg":"RSA1_5",
"enc":"A128CBC-HS256",
"cty":"jwk+json"
}
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"cnf":{
"jwk":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJB MTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5IjoiandrK
... (remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"
}
}
{ "kty":"oct", "alg":"HS256", "k":"ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKM YoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE" }
Binds a symmetric key to the access token
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I
Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
II
III
Architecture
Relevant document:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hunt-oauth-pop-architecture/
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I
Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
II
III
Variants: • Key Distribution at Access Token Issuance• Key Distribution at Client Registration
AS <-> Client Interaction
Relevant specifications:http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution/http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-oauth-proof-of-possession/
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Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
AS <-> Client InteractionExample: Symmetric Key
Request access token.I support PoP tokens
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Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
AS <-> Client InteractionExample: Symmetric Key
AS creates PoP-enabled access token
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Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
AS <-> Client InteractionExample: Symmetric Key
AS sends access token to Client & symmetric key
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AS <-> Client Interaction AS needs to bind a key to the access token.
Key can be an fresh and unique symmetric key, or (ephemeral) public key
This requires two extensions: New elements within the JWT to include the (encrypted symmetric
key) or the public key. JWT is also integrity protected. Mechanism for conveying ephemeral key from AS to client and for
client to provide directives to AS.
Details: draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution-00 Transport symmetric key from AS to client. Transport (ephemeral) asymmetric key from AS to client. Transport public key from client to AS. Algorithm indication
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Dynamic Client Registration Attempt to simplify developer interaction with AS when they
deploy client applications. Today, developers need to register various parameters
(manually), such as Authentication mechanism & client authentication credentials Redirect URIs Grant types Meta data (client name, client logo, scopes, contact information, etc.)
Also allows meta-data, including public keys, to be uploaded to AS.
Two documents: draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-metadata
WGLC in progress.
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I
Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
II
III
Building Blocks:a) Proof of possession of PoP keyb) Message integrity (+ Channel Binding)c) RS-to-client authentication
Client <-> RS Interaction
Relevant specification : http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-signed-http-request/
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Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
AS <-> Client InteractionExample: Symmetric Key
AS sends access token to Client & Authenticator
Authenticator= Keyed MessageDigest ComputedOver Request.
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Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
AS <-> Client InteractionExample: Symmetric Key
RS “unwraps” access tokenand obtains symmetric key.RS verifies authenticator. Shared
LongTermKey
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Channel Binding
Channel bindings bind the application layer security to the underlying channel security mechanism.
Various approaches for providing channel bindings: PoP public key use in TLS (as described in HOTK draft) tls-unique: TLS Finish message tls-server-end-point: hash of the TLS server's certificate:
Currently, no channel bindings described in <draft-richer-oauth-signed-http-request>
Be aware: Recently, new attacks have been identified with TLS-based channel bindings, see http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tls-3.pdf
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`I
Client
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
II
III
Variants:a) Token introspection b) Out-of-band
RS <-> AS Interaction [optional]
Relevant specification: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-introspection/
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Next Steps
Good time to review through the PoP specification bundle is now Provide feedback Ask questions
Re-chartering to include documents in the milestone list.
Implementation activities to see what works and what doesn’t.
Various open issues to resolve. Planning to schedule OAuth WG conference calls