1 I .

36 ' * I 7- .*

~ ! , b

SJlClUtT , Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00200019004 -5 I

CIA l M I 1 Iil!,,L. [I..: ; ,., C E N T R ~ . L I N T E L L I c 1 ~ N C E A G E N C Y

OFFICE OF MTIOIMI; ES"lZ8

19 December 1961

SUBJECT: Soviet Policy in the Wdce of the YXII Party Conareso

1. The essznce of the XXIZ Party Congreso w a ~ rsn attempt

by Khrushchev, u s i n 6 the moet dramatic EMB awilable to him,

tr, &e bindlng the domestic and foreign policies which he ha0

been developing over the lnst half decade.

taken great rislco and bas opened new pomibil i t ies , even radical

mea, i n Communist politics.

In eo doing, he b e

Internal Prob3.ems - 2. Khrushchev ha8 not had to fear for hie position since

the defetrt of the oo-called onti-party group i n 1957. Despite

t h l e victory, however, and despite the cult which eubsequently

developed around hie own personality, he has continually met vith

difficultiee within the party, and on tX0 counte. In the first

SECmET

Approved For Release 2 0 0 J ~ / ~ ~ 1 ! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 5 ; T 0 0 8 7 5 R 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 90040-2 9 . JL VI'JL. j,

plnce, i n the p e t year or two nthor high level leadero appar

t o have eucceoded i n l i m i t i n G the revlolono which he wiohed t o

nuke i n economic pr ior i t ieo (wester benefits for the conoumer)

and mil i tary policy (darn(pPdlna conventional forces and t- ~ a d i t i o n a l

doctrlne). In the oecond place, Khmhchev ha0 found the pnrty

appnratU0 which he inherited a far from oat3ofactory inotnrment

for carrying out his numerouo reforms.

party off ic ia l s were trained i n the StaUniot period t o execute

mechanically orderri fron above and t o regard the popuhtion as

recalci t rant ana untnmtwortZy oubjects.

bewildered, resentful, and concerned for t h e i r carear8 as Khrush-

chev demands of tinen that they disphy initirrtive, e l i c i t it from

others, ard rlraw the maeees in to a pooitive Identification Wit3

the regim.

The meat IooJorIty ctf

They have tended t o become

3. The oavage attack upon Stalin was meant, i n the doDeetic

context, t o break the enotionsi attachnent t o Stolin's person and

nethodn among these cadres.

Gtaliniat do&~~le , such as the proposition t h a t heavy industry m e t

a t all tines grow f a s t e r than l i e h t Induetry, which had beccm

inbedded i n . W e t ideology and etocd in the wciy of Muustchev's

reforne.

It was also uennt to discredi t cer ta in

The concurrent blackening of the onti -pr ty ~p.iup

- 2 -

SK!RET

Approved For Release 2005/06&iA : ~ i ! i ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 4 0 - 2

. _

- ____ - __ _._ __... - - . ____I_ ____c_--

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : ~~P85T00875R002000190040-2

for a new atyle of work and t o deotroy any lus t e r which the urce-

pentant and s t i l l a rcpxn ta t ive Molotov r e t a ins aa a . ' ccnsemt ive"

spokeomn mong the middle and lowsr reaches of the appnratue.

4. The full in te rna l comequences of the Congrsoo wi l l be a

long tlcb i n working themelvee out.

ceeded I n putting hlo etonp qJon the praoent era and e~tablishin~

a d i r e c t succeoeion t o k n i n .

of econonic and defenoe policy,, however, indicate tha t h i e propam

r e n i n sub&ec.t t u 80136 s o r t of consermm ~ m o ~ g the top lenders,

who shwe hie general outlook but cannot be equated t o the ter-

trorizec! yesr&n around S t c l i n . Redsing %he entire party apporntuo

In h i s own imge wlll, we believe, continue t o be a long and diffi-

cult procass. And anow critically-ninded e l e r sn t s of Soviet

society -- the youth, the cu l tura l i n t e l l l ~ e n t s i a , perhaps even

ydunaer party nenbers -- virtunlly the whole of Soviet h i s tory

has been brought i n t o queotion, and along with it the a c t i v l t i e e

of present party leaders durina t h a t period.

attack on Stnl in and the cult of Khrwhchev w i l l strengthen bellef

i n the party's claim t o wlsdon and the right of absolute leader-

ship.

Certainly Khrur;hchev has suc-

The present coapronise f o m l a t i o n f l

We doubt that the

These factore are mre likely t o work i n the long run toward

- 3 -

Approved For Release 20.05/06/22 : ~!85T00875R002000190040-2

t o conplicnte the problem whlch IChrwhchev'o nuccesocm m o t fnce .

5. The connoequences of the Conmos far Bloc relationo are

mch nore i m d i a t e and farreachin&. With surprioe attack

upon the proxy target of Albania, Khrurrhchev mde his th ird

attempt (the Rucharest n e e t i n 8 in June 1960, the MOECOW Con-

ference later in the year) to force a surrender upon the Chineoe

Comuniots. In doing EO, he chose a t ine of great Chinese we&-

ness. He ah30 gave his at tack the greatest poosible force, short

of OD exp l i c i t challenge, by mpLinc it with the condennation of

Stalinist principles and practices, thereby serving notice tha t

all who opposed hin could expect a sintlnr fats.

enouing two months Peipina, while wlthholdinG an equally dranntic

response, has nnde clear i t s deternination t o hold t o i t 6 poeitions.

It apprsrfi that a shwdown o f his tor ic proportions m y be lnnlnent.

Yet i n the

6. For Soviet pnllcy, thio is but the latest in n lonG ser ies

o f problem ond fa i lures orisin(3 from the Soviet leaders' basic ln-

ability to comprehend the force of rntionnlism and t o devise policies

which w i l l acconwdate it. For the Sino-Boviet confl ic t is at bottom

- 4 -

SECRET

Approved For Release 2 0 0 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . 5 ~ ~ ~ 7 5 R 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 4 0 - 2 L. . ' * . - I

7. W i l l there now be a Sinc-Bovlot o p l i t ? l l ic f tmt p i n t

t o note i o that, t o a grea t extent, t h i a opUt h i m ahworly oscurroil.

Econonic relaticma haw been oubotantially reduced,, and military

cooperatlw, never very hi&, i o minimal. Ihe en t i r e Comuniot

world liao been mndc axare of the deep differenceo betweel?. the two,

and each i o vicorouoly uoing all the weaponm of preocure and pcr-

nuaolon t o hold and enlarge I t a retinue of supportere. A t the

least, it appears cer tain tha t i’uU harnony cannot be rectored.

Y e t the question of whether the two p w r a , poioed now on the

brink of open polenics, W e th io final ete$an inportant one. remains

So lonc 08 they do not, the way remains open fo r a return t o

to le rab le cooperation and a mrface nppearrlnce of unityJ and t h e

@trains on other partleG con be kept vlthin mmfieable proportions.

If they do, the reoultiw hoetiJ2ty would probably be a o profound

as that which now divides the Cornunist and the non-Comunist

wDrld, and few Cormmist re@nee or prt iee would escape i t s e f f ec t s .

- 5 -

CVt I/ii/i-j;,i;.;k p . , , . :, \ , , ;

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190040-2

LWC d)h? t o cf)ntcnplztc t l i iu poonibility. Rnch ot13.1 hopco tlint

thc other rill1 i n tha h o t a n a l y o i n d c c thc conceooiono nccnouary

t o avold a finnl opUt, but w i t h a r nccxi prcmred t o r e t r ea t on

the Pmclwntal loflue of the locun of authority over worlcl Con-

m i o n . A t t h i s nomnt, much depands upon the cournc or Sovlot

offortn t o bring sown the Albanian leadero; nucocofl h e m would

deal rL m.Jor blow t o Chinem pretrmionn and t o any incUnntic)no

i n othw pnrtien to cocape Goviet donination.

t h u d l o are atpinot MOGCUW in thio cnnpaien, but wen if it

ouccceb, the preoent Chinese leadership w o u l d alwst car ta inly

return t o the Ue to ouboequently.

We bellcvc t h a t

3- In approloin8 Bino-Soviet re la t ions, we hove rep3.ml.y

atressed the meat benefito of o clooe al l iance t o the n a t i o n a l

lntereets of both partners cnd, conversely, the pea t looses which

each m i l oufYer xi-on a true rupture. Y e t the record of the past

eichteen months show a cnnsiotent refusal , on the wt of the

control over the Comunlst wvemnt.

Chinese haw! pe rc l s tmt ly proven unwilling t o remla content with

the role which the Soviets would amim then In that movenent.

Over the sffie period, the

- 6 -

SECRET

. . ~

._ - . .

... . . -

Ahroved For Release 2005/06/22 ~~~~P85T00875R002000190040-2 -. .

10. Ghou1.d ouch n Lrcdc occu , thc loc ic of i d c c ~ l o ~ i c u l con-

f l l c t an? tho kintory of Comuniot p t i o o cwrywhcro , d c c ! It likely

that the rcoult would be an a c r l m i o u o nnrl protmctcd atruralc.

Fnch nidc would bo inpelled t o p -och in Intoelf thc reponltczy of

iloctrinal truth ana t o call for the overthrow of the c o n p t l n g

Icaclclrohip. Commiatn everywhere WCRU b~ pressed t o doclnrc

thennelven; puree0 atid Rpllto would probably occur in ~ l c ~ n y prt‘ien;

N u r t h V i e t M n una North Karea, unable t o ouetcin a d d d l C mm, would probably eventually full on the Chinese oide.

11. In thece cIrcunstance8, the nilitary all lance betvoan the

USSR and Comm!iot China would becone inoprut ive. Alzeady, we

believe that it IR of dubious value to the Mnece ; should they be-

corn enbroiled in local hoe t i l i t l ee with tho US, we think tha t Sovlet

entrance Into the conflict would be far frou automtlc .

12. The outcone l e of c m n e hi;?bJy uncertain, and t h e CM

partner8 nny find a wny zo get pnblt the current tans3.ons. Even if

they do, we believe that the reoult vlll be an uneaoy and b t s t m t f l i l

- 7 -

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : Ga6.lRXDP85T00875R002000190040-2

tzucc!, r.nrlcecl by coopcratlon at vuriuuo timrj and placeo and by

cc~r~~w:titlon at othcro.

rclntionohip reoto upon an unotal~lo frmnilation, ,una that a brccch,

if it i o nvrjidod n w , wlll lone romin in t h e foropxmcl oa a

continulnc ponoibility .

In ohort, WT: 11cliovc thnt thc Girio-Swlct

- 8 -

SECRET

CIA ji$i-,i!;;j;?/- 0:;:: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RD~~5f00875R002000190040-2

. . . . ... .~ . .... - - ~ . . . .

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 ~~~~:#DP85T00875R002000190040-2

Forcicn Policy;

13. A contra1 Froblorn i n Sina-Sovtct contcntion hng bcon

policy tcwnrd tho non-CornmuriioI; world.

Eront, dcal of minrcpronontJition cn both cridc3.

n1lcr::klon t h a t t h c Chinese reqsrd General war no oi thor i n -

avitablo or deoirciblo, whilo a t d l i n g areumcnt insofor ns hc

cnn mako it, convincinc, i s not trw. Sirnilnrly, Chinoac charges

t h o t, Ktu?uohchcv'u strategy of pcaccful coexistcnoc is a dcnin l

of rovolutionary aims rare n gross polea ica l cxaggcrntion,

al.ttiough t h o zcal with which Molotov's p o r a l l c l c r i t i c i sms wcro

attacked a t tho Confireso suggcats t h a t t h i s indictment f i n d s

consfdcraN3.e rbsanance I n tho Sovic t and othcr pnrtioo.

This has involved u

Thus Khruschov'3

14. The pcuccful coexistoncc l inc , f a r from Scinp: an abandon-

ment of Sovict expansionist eoo13, is o t a c t i c a l p rcscr ip t ion

conaidcrably nor0 ef fect ivc than t h c canpound of hcavyhw~dcdnoss

tmd Isolat ionism which wa3 S t n l i n ' s foreign policy.

formed by an appreciat ion of thc manif old opportunities presontcd

by all t h e groat strains and disharmonics af thc non-Communi..;t

world -- national rivalry, colonialism, t h e d e s i r e for economic

development, thc yewning for pencc and &?;irm3ment.

coexiutcnce seeks t o capture these santAmentn a d tu rn them

It is in-

Peaceful

SECRET

Approved For Release 200 6/ 2 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190040-2 ?"i JhJ;$,q- 1;:::; ! . ". I

15. A t t he mmo timo, thi:] policy a l s o cmbrocuo thc pro-

ptwi'ti on t , b t pmern l nuclcor war would brinl: intolcrnblc dnrnaeu

upon tho TJSSR itoclf and ~ h o u l d thcrcfnro bc nvoidcd. Tho

Sovlut,a ibrc continuing t o dovclop t h c i r o1rc:idy Sormianblo

dcfcnoc: cstablishmmt.

riot rcf;cct, D scr ious cf l 'or t t o ochjcvc n dcciaivc, ndvantagc

ovcr thc Wcst, onc whjch would permit thorn t o launch gencrsl w a r

w i t h assurance of 3ucc030 n t some occcptnblc co3t. Ihthor, what

kc know of thcso propims, ond of t ho i r s t ro t cg ic thinking n~

w c l l , suggests t h a t thcy a r c aiming in t hc first instanco a t a

capabili ty l a rge enough t o doter a Wostern rcsort t o goncral war.

h r t h o r , thcy apparently belicvc tha t they have already in lnrgc

n1oasure achicved this cnd.

nut thc progrnrns proscntiy uridcrmy do

16. In addition t o dotorrence, the Soviets recognize thpt

tha forward pol ic ies which thuy wish t o purouo i ivolve some d o -

ment of risk, and t h a t they may not always be able t o control

thcsc r isks . In building tiisir forces, they arc probobly secking

- 10 -

17. Thc Sovict l w d c r s :Ire 3 l o r t t o servch out areas

whcro their m i l i t m y power con bc brought i n t o play t o shhld

Cotrmunist efforts t o advonco by onfcr means, such a3 i n t w n n l war

i n Southoost A3io o r p o l i t i c a l hlrlckmoil i n Bwl in .

howovur, t h a t tho USSR would wish to avoid d i r e c t involvcmont

i n l imi ted combat on t h e Bloc periphery and, i f such conf l ic t

should occur, t o minimize tho chances of oscnlnt ion t o gencral

war. Conscqucntly, i t would no!. i n most circumstanccg take tlic

i n i t i a t i v e t o expmd t h e s c o p ~ of such D conf l ic t .

of Sovic t commitmcnt and t h o a c t u a l circumstanccs of thc c o n f l i c t

would of cour3e determinc this decision.

Wo hcliovc,

The dcgrcc

Dut we b e l i o w tha t ,

Approved For Release 2005khki j ~ l . & r ~ 6 ~ # ) ~ 5 R O O Z O O 0 1 - 90040-2

. - . . . . - __ . . . . . . .. . . -. . . _.. . . .. .-. ~ . . . - .

Sl!!Cl1 l$T Apiroved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190040-2

10. Within t,hc l i m i t 9 c o t by t h c m appraisals, thc

Sov-lot, londoro have purposcf u l l y displnycd both mil i tancy

and conci l in t i on, a t vorioug timcs and i n variouI.] proporIA.ais

ns sccmcd moat profit,ablc t o thorn.

30) howcVx)r, t h o prc:;surc of t h c Cltdncsc ChdhIlgC 1 1 ~ 1 ~ helped

t o kcop tho 11hnrd" l i n o i n thc foroground. Thc t h r u s t of t h c

XXII Conpcos i n this ruspoct was t o rc:lssert tho USSR's in-

oistcnco upon full t a c t i c a l flexibility. Thus the USSR has,

,dong with thc continued 3tt,acko on Chincss posit ions, taken

a s o t of conci l ia tory moves such as removal of thc Ber l in dead-

line, aereoment on n disarmament i'orum, and publication of Adzhubcy's

inburview with tho 'JS F'residcnt,

Over t h o p33t year or

19. These measuro3 havc accompanied, not replaccd, t h o harsher

t a c t i c s which compriso the m i l i t a n t s ide of peaceful coexistence.

A t t h c same time Fifl 'nd has bcen bullied; atomic tests hnvo

bcen rcsumcd; Soviot mil i tary atrcngth hns bocn s t rcssad; tho

- 12 - SECRLT

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85TO0875R002000 1 ' 90040-2

, Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : d~-%b~85TO0675R002000190040-2

:itt:iCk:i on t h o uppoPcnt3 of po:icofd cacxi Jtonco woro rnc:int, or1J.y

t n niukl: room f o r n f u l l rango of mniicluvcr, not t o ncck o Ccnuinc

nccommodntir,n with thc Wwt,,

20. Currently, howcvci', S o v i v t foreign policy 13 hy no

mcmo complctcly frccd d tho prcssure3 toward mili tancy which

otcm from t h o Chincsc chnllmfic.

Moocow' 3 i n i t i o 1 reaction wuuld probably hc t o empha~ieo '!hnrd"

tactic:- i.n ordcr t o justify t i g h t o r control3 i n Et:otorn lzuropc

and t o demonotrate t h a t it was as vigorously anti-imperi:ilist

ns its Chi i l~so competitor,

niieht be q u i t e d i f f o r c n t ; D protrnct,ed break rnizht givc important

support t o t h a t tendcncy i n Soviet foreign pol icy which 3 w k s

t o put ro la t iono with thu Wc3t on n more s t a b l e footing.

conccivoblc tha t , fnced with b m ac t ive ly h o s t i l e Chin:! whose

Should an opcn brcnk occur,

Over t h e long run, the conscqucncco

It is

strcneth was growing, t h e USSR might i n t u t z come t o accopt, a t

l e a s t t a c i t l y , some mutual dol imitat ion of aims with the kkst and

thus some curb upon it3 universal aspirat ions.

21. For t h e present, n c v c r t h c l ~ b s , we conclude t h a t t h o

XRII Congross has i n i t i a t e d no marked depnrturcs i n t h e foru jgn

pol ic ies which h a w emorgcd under Khrushchuv' s leadership of t h c

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005f&?$,; qJA-RDP85T00675R002000190040-2 iILil!2, I;\,;: c!*,L*,/

. -- - .

, , . . - . --

. -

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : ~~k~~P85T00875R002000190040-2

!.V$ y kist five ymr3.

phnuc, ninrkinl: timo i n ordcr t o dotcrtrlinc whcthcr i t r i c a r l i c r

prc:;.;ui*ba w i l l brine t h c Wo3t t o the ncgot ini t ing t n b l c w i t h a t

l c n s t 3omo conccsaions o r whothcr another round of thrcats, and

perhaps cveri unilntcr i l l action, 13 rcquirod.

rupturo would not bo l i k e l y t o a l t e r t ho b a s i c Soviet p o s i t i o n

on Rcr l ln nnd Ccrmny, oinco nn importont elemcnt i n t h a t pos'ition

13 tho d c s i r o t o s t a b i l i z e t h c Soviet-controllud re[;hc d - i

Enst Gcrmany ;~nd, by extension, those of Eq: ';ern Europc,

On llorlin, tho USSIi i f 3 p rcocnt ly i n on in tur im

Ihcn a Sino-Soviot

22. I n t h e disarmamcnt field, wc perceive i n recent Soviot

movos no appreciable d e s i r e f o r agreements on terms which tho

Wcst would rceard a3 ncceptnblc. Inotuxi, the USSR continuco

t o regard t h i s as an arena for propaganda e x p l o i t a t i o n and, via

maneuverings nvcr parity and the composition of a f o r m , for

enhancing Sovict o to ture and cu l t ivn t ine n e u t r a l i s t opinion.

addi t ion t o the theme of gcncral m d completedisarmament, t h e

SovictS w i l l probably ala0 a g i t a t e such l imi ted measures a s

I n

r c g i o n a l schemc.3, aweemonts t o limit t h e spread of nuclear

weapons, and o thcr proposals tdtlich might i n h i b i t Westcrn de-

f ijnsc programs.

- a - SECRET

Apprpved For Release 2005/06/22 : Cl&~~I;fs5T00875R002000190040-2

rorvrrlinf: prospcctivo Soviet t n c t i c s in Southefist. Asia.

USSlt w i l l probab'ly continuo t o p r o w cnutiously i t 3 ndvmtrlEes

in Laoo nnd South Viotnam, sccking ~imul.tnnmusly t o advnncu

Thc

Commuri5.s.t prospccts thore, t u ovoid n major US lntorvcnt ion, -and

t o kcop Chincoe influcncc frotr, bccoming prcdomirr:int,.

r a d i w t l worscnjng of relnticrno bctwccn Moscow nnd l'clpinf:,

A f u r t h o r

howcvcr, could lend t o a breikdown of Bloc cocpcrotion it-, tlir:ne

vcnturco.

as much control a3 possible through t h c North Vietnarneoo rcgimc,

which, a t least i n i t i n l l y , would seck t o presorvc t h e Sovict

I n t h i o event, Moscow would probnhly t r y t o r e t a i n

voicc os a countorweight t o China.

24. I n recent y e a r s t h c USSR has conais tcnt ly lookcd upon

the undcrdovclopcd coun t r i e s of Asia , Africa, nnd Lat in fimoricn

as t h c prime t a r g e t s f o r its t a c t i c s o f pcncoful CoCxistcncc.

BcginninE i n about 1960, howcvcr, Soviot pronounccrnonts hive

bctraycd a sunw of disappointrncnt a t t h e f a i l u r e 02 somc of t h e

"older" ncu t ra l s , such as I-Jchru and Nasscr, t o movo from t h c

achicvcmont of independence i n t o a fu l l associat ion with Sov ie t

p o l i c i c s and thence along t h e pnth toward Communist control.

Ncvcrthclcss, the Sov ie t aoproisal of i t 3 prospects i n t h e m Lveas

ol.5

SECIUT

- - - - ____ _ _ - - - - - _- - - .- -- - - - . __ -

, Apptoved For Release 2005106122 : ~~~k%P85T00875R002000190040-2

c1,q 18 1, l , I < / \ l . li*A 0:. I ranainu h ighly optirniotic. Thuy continuo t o buliuvo t h a t , by

hmnca3inf: nnt.1-WR otorn rind : \n t ico lonia l sontimont, cxtcndirrg

judicious of fe ro of m i l i t a r y and cconomj c tlssistnncc, nnd

oponoorinfi t h c p o l i t i c n l ambitions of new govwnmcnl,o, thoy

can mnku inportant p i n s i n wcakunine Wootcrn posi t ions .ind prc-

pnring t h e ground for f u r t h c r advancu3, Thc Soviets will n o t

nbandon thosa s t o t o s which thoy hava unsuccessfully ~ o u ~ h t t o

draw into o c l i c n t rc lot ionship.

crcnoinply focus t h c i r main cnoreics upon Afr ica nnd Lat2n iuncrica

and, w i t h i n thcse continonto, upon the r a d i c a l n n t i o n n l i s t

lcndcrs who nru most easily set a g a i n s t Westcrn t ics 2nd thcrc-

forc most r c a d i l y lcd i n t o dcpcndcnce.

nrc:is w i l l continue to c o n f l i c t with, and normally t o t a k e

p r i o r i t y o w r , any dos i rc t o ndop5 (1 cc,ncil.iatory l i n e tTward the

mn jcJr Weotcrn powers.

But thoy will probably 5.- -

S o v i e t a c t i v i t y i n thcuc

- 16 - SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : C l ~ d ~ ~ 6 ~ ~ d J 7 k k O ~ W O l 9 0 0 4 0 - 2

. . . .. . . . . . . . . . ~. - ~

SECRW Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP8ST0087~~0~~00~,~!?040-2

I , a , . I , , ! ' , l , t l$ ! y

Postscript: Khrushchcv and tho US

Ono fonturo of Khshchcv ' s policy dcocrvcn q x c i i l l Inontion:

tiis mbivalcn t a t t i t u d o toward tho US.

tkc bulwark of rooction, tho main impcdimcnt t o his dcsitmo.

Rut Khrunhchov is contemptlrouo of weakness and respccts powcr,

aid ho has Q genuine admiration f o r hierico.

as tho oolf-made leodor of a oncc feeble and now newly powcrful

otatc, ho earnestly desires t h a t h i s succcsses and tbosc of h i s

country should bo ocknowledgcd by thc nation which is, i n h is

ultimate calculations, the only othcr one that r e a l l y C O W t 3 .

His pain a t Amcrican rebuffs, which his policivs and conduct re-

m l n r l y provoke, is thcreby tho p e a t e r .

accqtnnce as &n equal, and he makes i n t h i s mspcc t l i t t a l c

d i s t i n c t i m between h i s person a i d h i s c x n t r y .

doctrine t e l l s him t h a t the US i s il f a i l i n g g ian t and must, by

dcf ini t ion, hate and contcst him, an accolade from Americ.3 is none-

It is tho chicf onomy,

More than th ia ,

S t i l l , he wishes

Thus whilc h i s

theless necessary t o make his triumphs complete.

25XlA E - 17 -

SECHLT

Approved For Release 8 1 8 5 ) 9 1 ' ( ~ l b ~ ~ ~ 0 0 8 7 5 R 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 4 0 - 2