Strategic/Operational:1) Hannibal’s Flawed Strategy – Although Cannae would become a model of tactical excellence, Hannibal failed to link his battlefield victories to an effective overall strategy. While bringing the fight to Rome and peeling off Roman allies could have been a strong component of a comprehensive strategy, it wasn’t enough on its own. Rome was still active in Spain, and still able to grow and raise armies. Hannibal also made as many enemies as friends with his constant need for foraging. Though Hannibal tried to weaken Rome, he never seemed to want to finish the job. This allowed Rome to continue to build its power, eventually forcing Hannibal to defend his own homeland. Rome’s Fabian Strategy, on the other hand, was effective. By avoiding a fourth military disaster, Rome simply outlasted Hannibal. Ironically, the Romans ended up turning the tables on Carthage by using a derivative of Hannibal’s strategy to win the war. In 202 B.C.E., Scipio invaded Carthage, this time forcing Hannibal to react. But unlike Hannibal, Scipio went for the capital. This forced Hannibal to leave Italy and defend his home. The resulting Roman victory ended the war.

2) Unity of Command – Much has been made of divided command on the Roman side, with its alternating daily command. While it is certain that this created challenges, it did hold the Roman army together under the political realities of the day, where each consul had a chance to earn glory. While Varro commanded during the battle, the defenders of Paullus would later portray Varro as rash and impetuous. Regardless, both consuls had come to fight. It was only a question of when and where. Of tactical importance, though, was the fact that the two consuls rode on opposite ends of the Roman army. This made it virtually impossible to coordinate any decisions or changes in the center once the battle began. On the Carthaginian side, there was no question who was in command. Hannibal was able to develop and execute his plan while fully controlling his subordinate units. Hannibal’s army, although denigrated as mercenaries, were professional soldiers who had fought under his command for years. Even his newly recruited Gauls had served together for over a year by the time of the Cannae battle. Hannibal’s leadership and ability to command were on full display on the fields of Cannae.

Tactical:1) Maneuver – Cannae is renowned as one of the all-time classics of tactical maneuver. Although there is some debate as to how much of Hannibal’s plan, and his subsequent trap, was deliberate, there is no question that Hannibal exploited adroit maneuver to overcome and crush his Roman enemy. History does suggest that Hannibal visualized what would occur and designed a tactical approach to exploit it. Interestingly, although the Romans selected the narrower terrain on the southern side of the river to negate Hannibal’s cavalry advantage, Hannibal went along to use the terrain to constrict Romans’ numerical superiority and help him create his trap. The narrow battlefield funneled the Romans to such an extent that they lost unit fighting cohesion. As Roman commanders drove deep into the Carthaginian formation, they lost situational awareness of their flanks and rear. As the Romans continued to push forward into Hannibal’s trap, their fate was sealed.

2) Overconfidence – Consuls Paullus and Varro led the largest army that Rome had ever fielded, clearly outnumbering Hannibal’s forces. They believed in the invincibility of the Roman legions, especially the new super-legions that were reinforced and doubled. This fact made them confident in their normal head-on approach. They didn’t expect Hannibal to use their strength and confidence against them.

3) Mission Command – Hannibal demonstrated effective principles of mission command. Not only did he build a cohesive team, he prepared his men for the battle they fought. His subordinate leaders understood his intent on the field that day. Hasdrubal’s cavalry action encircling the Roman infantry to attack the allied cavalry from the rear, and the Libyan infantry holding their ground as the Romans passed – before turning in on them – both demonstrate the disciplined initiative Hannibal expected from his subordinates. The Roman commanders, on the other hand, trying to lead on horseback away from the crucial action, lost the ability to adjust their forces once the battle began. Against a brilliant tactician like Hannibal, they failed.

4) Leadership – Hannibal consistently demonstrated heroic leadership and command presence in battle. At Cannae, like his other battles, he led his men from the front, on foot, in the thick of the fighting. There is no question that Hannibal, through his personal actions, inspired his men to fight. Even during the difficult and confusing retrograde, as his line was breaking, Hannibal still managed to turn a massive infantry formation back on the Romans to complete their destruction.

Ancient and Medieval:

Cannae

Romans: 86,000 troops (including 6,000 cavalry), comprised of Romans and their Italian allies, commanded by co-Consuls Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus.

Carthaginians: 56,000 troops (including 10,000 cavalry), commanded by Gen. Hannibal Barca. Key subordinates included: Mago (Hannibal’s brother and co-commander of infantry), Hasdrubal (a relative and commander of heavy cavalry), Hanno (a nephew), and Maharbal (a relative and commander of light cavalry).

During the third century B.C.E., Rome’s growing power and influence around the Mediterranean created clashes with older, more established powers. One of these powerful city-states was Carthage. Rome and Carthage fought in three Punic Wars. The first (264-241 B.C.E.) involved influence over Sicily, the second (218-201) involved influence in Spain, and the third (149-146) focused on Tunisia and ended Carthage’s independent existence.

It was during the Second Punic War, after Hannibal had been handing Rome defeats and losses for nearly two years, when the Roman Senate had finally had enough. After raising the largest army they had ever fielded, they sent it against Hannibal, who had just seized an important grain supply depot at Cannae. But Hannibal was more than ready. On that fateful day, he handed Rome one of the most crushing defeats in history. Through superior tactics and leadership, Hannibal completely enveloped and destroyed the larger Roman army arrayed against him. And yet, despite his tactical brilliance and generalship, Hannibal would win the battle and still lose the war.

Nevertheless, Hannibal’s classic double-envelopment would become one of history’s great tactical masterpieces, inspiring military leaders for over 2,000 years. German Gen. Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen famously tried to expand Hannibal’s tactics to the strategic level, in a plan that failed to capture Paris in World War I. More recently, U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf claimed to have modeled Desert Storm on Cannae.1

Actions by Rome – In the third century B.C.E., the Roman Republic relied on alliances to dominate its non-Roman Italian neighbors. Rome built its army with citizen-soldiers drawn from the city and its surrounding farms, while allies sent troops as needed. The Senate ran Rome, where elites advanced through military fame. Each year, Rome elected two consuls for a one-year term. Because these consuls had only one year to make their mark, they were usually looking for a fight. Ordinarily, a consul led two legions, each of 4,200 men and with a similarly sized legion of alae (allied troops).

When Hannibal invaded Italy, Rome initially responded with direct force. In 218 B.C.E., 40,000 Romans attacked Hannibal’s 38,000 men at the Trebia River in Northwestern Italy. (Map 2) While around 10,000 Romans fought their way clear, the rest were killed or captured. A year later, on 21 June, 217, at Lake Trasimene in Central Italy, Hannibal ambushed a pursuing Roman consular army, killing 15,000 and capturing another 15,000.

Volume 1 H Issue 6

LESSONS LEARNED

DATE:August 3, 216 B.C.E.

LOCATION:Cannae, Southeastern Italy

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Lessons for Today’s Leaders

opposing forces

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Endnotes, Maps, and ImagesEndnotes: 1. Army Times, 7 June 2004, 29. 2. Gordon A. Harrison. United States Army in World War II—The European Theater of Operations: Cross-Channel Attack (Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1951), 112. 3. Ibid, 176-180, 246-267. 4. Ibid, 253-258. 5. Stephen E. Ambrose. D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994), 69. 6.

Thomas E. Griess, ed. The Second World War: The West Point Military History Series (Avery Publishing Group, Wayne, NJ, 1984), 290. 7. Cornelius Ryan. The Longest Day (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1959), 130-136, 263; Martin K.A. Morgan. Down to Earth: The 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Normandy (Atglen, PA, 2010), 185-186. 8. Stephen E. Ambrose. Pegasus Bridge, June 6, 1944 (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1985), passim. 9. Griess, 295. 10. Harrison, 313-317. 11. Griess, 298. 12. Flint Whitlock. The Fighting First (Westview, Boulder, CO, 2004), 178. 13. Griess, 299. 14.

Griess, 301. 15. US National D-Day Memorial, found at: dday.org. 16. www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/4111507.Omar_Bradley. 17. B.H. Liddell Hart. History of the Second World War (Putnam’s, New York, 1970). Maps: Maps are courtesy of USMA Department of History. Images: Photos from U.S. National Archives and Records Administration and author’s collection.

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Historical significance

Strategy & maneuver

Map 1: Hannibal’s Invasion Route

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