1 Avoidable and unavoidable aging in Europe François Héran I N E D 33 rd Global Conference, ICSW Tours, Vinci Congress Centre, 2 June 2008

1

Avoidable and unavoidable aging in Europe

François Héran

I N E D

33rd Global Conference, ICSW

Tours, Vinci Congress Centre,

2 June 2008

2

1. The factors of population aging

3

The 1st factor of population aging

Population aging high up the age pyramid (in French: "vieillissement par le haut")

Due to increased longevityThe first factor of aging in importance:a 4th floor added to the age pyramid

= "unavoidable aging"

4

Population aging high up the pyramid

0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

5

Population aging high up the pyramid (additional floor due to longevity)

0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

6

The French case: Age pyramids in 2005 and 2050 (INSEE demographic prospects)

Effectifs en milliers Effectifs en milliers

0100200300400500

Hommes

0 100 200 300 400 500

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Femmes

Âge

France, 2005 2050, scénario central

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The 2nd factor of population aging

Population aging generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas")Secular decline of fertility under replacement level, below 2.05 children per womandue to deep reasons ("2nd demographic transition") : – generalized participation of women in the LF– raising costs of education– more individual autonomy…

= "avoidable aging", open to pro-active policy (in principle)

8

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Population aging at the bottom (before)

9

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Population aging at the bottom (after)

10

The 3rd factor of population aging

Present impact of temporary rise of fertility: e. g. the backlash of the baby boom – In the first decades large birth cohorts

rejuvenate the age pyramid;– in the following decades, they make it

older

Strong factor but limited in time

"Unavoidable aging"

11

A temporary additional fertility (baby-boom) which first rejuvenates the population…

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

12

…but 40 years later makes it older

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

13

The raising number of deaths in Europe, 2000-2050 (for 100 deaths in 2000)

UN Prospects, central variant

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

1995-2000

2000-2005

2005-2010

2010-2015

2015-2020

2020-2025

2025-2030

2030-2035

2035-2040

2040-2045

2045-2050

France Italy

Poland Germany

U K Sweden

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Few deaths in France, for the time being

Female deaths by age in 2004

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110

Age at death

Nu

mb

er

of

de

ath

s (

tho

us

an

ds

)

Source : Insee register of deaths

Deaths of depleted cohorts born during

1st World War

Deaths of baby boom

cohorts

15

Life expectancy of life at birth, in selected industrial countries

60

65

70

75

80

85

France, f emales

Sweden, f emales

Spain, f emales

I taly, f emales

U K, f emales

U S A, f emales

France, males

Sweden, males

Spain, males

I taly, males

U K, males

U S A, males

16

Life expectancy of women

70717273747576777879808182838485

France

Spain

Italy

17


70717273747576777879808182838485

France

Spain

Italy

Sweden

U K

U S A

18


70717273747576777879808182838485

France

Spain

Italy

Sweden

U K

U S A

Russia

19

The 2003 heat wave in France: impact on WOMEN's life expectancy

81

82

83

84

85

86

20

The 2003 heat wave in France: impact on MEN's life expectancy

73

74

75

76

77

78

21

The French natural increase 2000-2050 (Insee prospects, medium variant)

-100 000

-50 000

0

50 000

100 000

150 000

200 000

250 000

300 000

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Natural increase

2. The burden of an expanding older population: not that heavy

What will be the impact of population ageing on the numbers of persons living

in an institution (retirement home, nursing home)?

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Great variations in the proportion of old persons living in residential cares

Among the over-75s, it ranges from– a few percent in Poland (2%), Italy, Spain

(4%)– to around 12% in France, the Netherlands,

Belgium, Ireland and LuxemburgCauses:– Different cultural models of family solidarity– A certain imbalance between supply and

demand for collective infrastructures of this kind

24

Proportion of persons aged 75+ living in an institution in different European countries (Eurostat, early 2000s)

25

Can we foresee the number of old persons living in an institution in

2030?Simply to provide the same level of coverage as today, the capacity of residential care should increase substantially in many countries– Around 70% in a couple of decades

But this is only a mechanical projection, which does not provide for– the impact of measures to enable old people

to remain in their own homes– the potential improvement in health status, if

disability-free life expectancy tends to increase faster than total life expectancy

26

Foreseeable increase (in %) in the number of personsliving in institutions in 2030, under two different

scenarios

120 140

27

The hypothesis of later institutionalization (Alain Monnier)

At ages 75-79, the proportion of persons living in an institution is quite low in the EU: rarely above 3%But the size of this age-group is still largeHence, 75-79 year-olds represent between 15% and 20% of the population in residential care in the north-western EU Member statesTherefore, slightly later entry into a retirement or nursing home (e.g. 5 years later, at age 80) would strongly limit the increase in capacity required : the demand would fall by 25 % in EU-15, and even more in the new Member states

28

Foreseeable increase (in %) in the number of personsliving in institutions in 2030, under two different

scenarios

120 140

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A realistic hypothesis

The hypothesis of later institutionalization is realisticIt corresponds– to the wishes of old people– to the priorities of current old-age policies

It will probably occur on a much larger scale than the very modest assumption used here (a 5-year postponement of institutionalization)

3. Can family policy or immigration policy counter population aging?

A graphic illustration of the widening gap between the rate of growth of the elderly and that of the population in active age (United Nations demographic

prospects, 2006 revision)

31

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 ITALY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

I TALY 65+

I TALY 15-64

High variant 15-64

I TALY 0-14

32

Source: UN demographic prospects (2006)

in a selection of EU countries compared to Russia and USA

The graphs give the growth of three age groups: 65+, 15-64, -15, indexed to 100, over 2000-2050Basis: the "medium scenario", prolonging the present trends, with a convergence close to 1.8 children per woman in 2050The "high variant" = an additional fertility of 0.5 child eventually 2.35 instead of 1.85 (a considerable change)

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An illustration of the divide between "avoidable" and "unavoidable" aging (2)

The widening gap between the 65+ and the 15-64 (or –15) curves displays the relative population aging– countering population aging would mean closing the gap

between the two curves ! (see last scenario of the UN report on "replacement migrations")

The slim difference between "medium" and "high" fertility variants illustrates the capacity of a pro-natalist policy to maintain the active population over time– A limited impact, compared to the impact of increased

longevity

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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 ITALY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

I TALY 65+

I TALY 15-64

High variant 15-64

I TALY 0-14

35

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 GERMANY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GERMANY 65+

GERMANY 15-64

High variant 15-64

GERMANY 0-14

36

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15UK 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

UNI TED KI NGDOM 65+

UNI TED KI NGDOM 15-64

High variant 15-64

UNI TED KI NGDOM 0-14

37

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 FRANCE 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

FRANCE 65+

FRANCE 15-64

High variant 15-64

FRANCE 0-14

38

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15SWEDEN 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

SWEDEN 65+

SWEDEN 15-64

High variant 15-64

SWEDEN 0-14

39

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 POLAND 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

POLAND 65+

POLAND 15-64

High variant 15-64

POLAND 0-14

40

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 RUSSIAN FED. 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

RUSSI AN FED. 65+

RUSSI AN FED. 15-64

High variant 15-64

RUSSI AN FED. 0-14

41

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 U S A 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

U S A 65+

U S A 15-64

High variant 15-64

U S A 0-14

42

Population des 65 ans et + et population des 15-64 ans

AFR. DU NORD 2000-2050 (pour 100 personnes en 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

N. Af rica 65+

N. Af rica 15-64

High variant 15-64

N. Af rica 0-14

43


AFR. SUB-SAHARA 2000-2050 (pour 100 pers. en 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Sub-S. Af rica 65+

Sub-S. Af rica 15-64

High variant 15-64

Sub-S. Af rica 0-14

44


INDE 2000-2050 (pour 100 personnes en 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

I NDI A 65+

I NDI A 15-64

High variant 15-64

I NDI A 0-14

45


CHINE 2000-2050 (pour 100 personnes en 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

CHI NA 65+

CHI NA 15-64

High variant 15-64

CHI NA 0-14

46

Conclusion (1)

Sweden, UK or France: a population policy supporting the fertility rate is able to maintain the active population over the next decadesItaly, Germany, Poland: it will fill but a part of the gapIn all EU countries, however, the increased longevity accounts for most of the population aging process (France is no exception)In spite of its strong fertility, USA will not escape from the aging processRussia will, to some extent. But this is bad sign: people have no time to grow older

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Conclusion (2)

Immigration policy cannot counter population aging in Europe; it brings only a slight retrospective correction to the fertility rates of 30 years ago– however, immigration is essential to maintain the absolute

numbers of active population and contribute to the good working of home care and institutional care

Finally, population ageing cannot be compensated forby any population policy– neither policy immigration– nor family policy

If population ageing is a demographic issue,it does not call for a demographic solution

Documents

1 Avoidable and unavoidable aging in Europe François Héran I N E D 33 rd Global Conference, ICSW Tours, Vinci Congress Centre, 2 June 2008