G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993JORGE C. PADERANGA,petitioner,vs.Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J. ELUMBA,respondents.A.E. Dacanay for petitioner.Uldarico Mejorada & Associates for private respondent.BELLOSILLO,J.:We are called upon in this case to determine the proper venue of an action to fix the period of a contract of lease which, in the main, also prays for damages.Sometime in 1973, petitioner JORGE C. PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, a partnership represented by its General Manager JOSE J. ELUMBA, entered into an oral contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within a building owned by petition in Ozamiz City.1The lease was for an indefinite period although the rent of P150.00 per month was paid on a month-to-month basis. ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY utilized the area under lease as the Sales Office of Allied Air Freight in Ozamiz City.On 4 April 1977, PADERANGA subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, which repossession was said to have been undertaken with the acquiescence of the local manager of ELUMBA,2although private respondent maintains that this is not the case.3At any rate, the validity of the repossession is not here in issue.On 18 July 1977, private respondent instituted an action for damages4which, at the same time, prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years, before the then court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City.5Petitioner, a resident of Ozamiz City, moved for its dismissal contending that the action was a real action which should have been filed with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where the property in question was situated.On 6 November 1978, respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan denied the Motion to Dismiss and held that Civil Case No. 2901 merely involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership raised.6Hence, venue was properly laid.Petitioner pleaded for reconsideration of the order denying his Motion to Dismiss. He contended that while the action did not involve a question of ownership, it was nevertheless seeking recovery of possession; thus, it was a real action which, consequently, must be filed in Ozamiz City.7On 4 December 1978, respondent judge denied reconsideration.8While admitting that Civil Case No. 2901 did pray for recovery of possession, he nonetheless ruled that this matter was not the main issue at hand; neither was the question of ownership raised. Not satisfied, petitioner instituted the present recourse.PADERANGA argues that inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the portion surrendered to him by the local manager of private respondent, as well as to fix the period of lease at five (5) years, Dipolog City could not be the proper venue of the action. it being a real action, venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies.ELUMBA counters that the present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental. ELUMBA further argues that the action is onein personamand notin rem. Therefore venue may be laid in the place where plaintiff or defendant resides at the option of plaintiff.Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between personal and real actionsvis-a-visactionsin personamandin rem. The former determines venue; the latter, the binding effect of a decision the court may render over the party, whether impleaded or not.In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent against petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an actionin personam,i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.9However, this does not automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract is also a personal action. For, a personal action may not at the same time be an actionin rem. InHernandez v.Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,10we held thus In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.An actionin personamis an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an actionin remis an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an actionin personamand not necessarily an actionin rem.Consequently, the distinction between an actionin personamand an actionin remfor purposes of determining venue is irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action filed is a personal action or real action. After all, personal actions may be instituted in the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.11On the other hand, real actions should be brought before the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject property or part thereof lies.12While the instant action is for damages arising from alleged breach of the lease contract, it likewise prays for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious, private respondent will be entitled to remain not only as lessee for another five (5) years but also to the recovery of the portion earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased premises under the original contract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the subdivided portion thereof.While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof.13The instant action therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner.14Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property,15such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.Respondent judge, therefore, in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED. The Orders of 6 November 1978 and 4 December 1978 of respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan are SET ASIDE. The branch of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City where Civil Case No. 2901 may be presently assigned is DIRECTED to DISMISS the case for improper venue. This decision is immediately executory.Costs against private respondent ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY.SO ORDERED.

JESSE U. LUCAS,Petitioner,- versus -JESUS S. LUCAS,Respondent.G.R. No. 190710Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:June 6, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:Is aprima facieshowing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review oncertiorari,we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.

The antecedents of the case are, as follows:On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)[2]before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72,ValenzuelaCity. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated toManilafromDavaoand stayed with a certain Ate Belen (Belen) who worked in a prominent nightspot inManila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish,Taft Avenue,PasayCity. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order[3]setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the case.On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment.He manifestedinter aliathat:(1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.[4]On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[5]Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an Order[6]dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case ofHerrera v. Alba,[7]there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: aprima faciecase, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish aprima faciecase considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to establish aprima faciecase, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is herebyDENIED.This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.SO ORDERED.[8]Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order[9]setting aside the courts previous order, thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing onJanuary 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.x x x xSO ORDERED.[10]This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence[11]allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition,[12]reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was noprima faciecase, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.[13]Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition forcertiorariin favor of respondent, thus:WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.[14]The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him. Respondents special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish aprima faciecase, thus:While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.x x x xAt the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establishprima facieproof. x x x If at anytime,motu proprioand without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.[15]Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.[16]In this petition for review oncertiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.I.AWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.I.BWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTA QUO.I.CWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.II.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURTA QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.II.AWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCEONTHE CASE OF HERRERA VS.ALBA,ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.[17]Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition forcertiorarithe courts lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b)Ex ParteMotion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does not state respondents name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion.[18]Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated inHerrera v. Alba.[19]Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.[20]In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the petition forcertiorariand merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.The petition is meritorious.Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory orderwhich neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismisscannot be questioned in a special civil action forcertiorari,which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismissbe the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorarion the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when ithas been tainted with grave abuseof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a)the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an actionin personam, in rem,orquasi in rem.An actionin personamis lodged against a person based on personal liability; an actionin remis directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an actionquasi in remnames a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.A petition directed against the "thing" itself or theres,which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,annulment of marriage,or correction of entries in the birth certificate,is an actionin rem.[22]

In an actionin personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceedingin remorquasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over theres.Jurisdiction over theresis acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.[23]The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an actionin rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. Anin remproceeding is validated essentially through publication.Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.[24]Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.If at all, service ofsummonsor notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.[25]This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.[26]Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding isadversarialwhere the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.[27]In this petitionclassified as an actionin remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate factsupon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.[28]A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.[29]

The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.In a motion to dismissa complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.[30]The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.[31]The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.[32]If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny themotion to dismissand require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.[33]The statement inHerrera v. Alba[34]that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish aprima faciecasethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. Aprima faciecase is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of aprima faciecase vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether aprima facieshowing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e.,the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public.[35]Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:SEC. 4.Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, eithermotu proprioor on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:(a)A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish aprima faciecase or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test.[36]In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of aprima faciecase, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish aprima faciecase which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.[37]The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must presentprima facieevidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition isGRANTED. TheCourt of Appeals Decisiondated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of theRegionalTrialCourtofValenzuelaCityareAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE,petitioner, vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent.To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court.For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision[2]and July 29, 2003 Order[3]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).[4]The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief[5]filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents.The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate,is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisionsx x x.[6]Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court.Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration.In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:x x x[T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get.The step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court.[7]The Antecedent ProceedingsOn January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents.SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,[8]specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy.They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss.Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial.His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum.Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum.x x x.x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x.[9]After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law.[10]It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle.Through its discourse, the courta quoopined at some point that the [e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.[11]After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision.Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.Hence, this Petition for Review.[12]This Court, in a Resolution[13]dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments.In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunity to comment, if they so desired.On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.[14]The IssuesIn his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:1.Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the courta quowas proper and valid;2.Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;3.Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;4.Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;5.Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,6.Whether or not the courta quohas jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.[15]During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:A.Procedural IssuesDid the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?Did it state a cause of action?Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?B.Substantive Issues1.Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?2.May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office?Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?The Courts RulingThe Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.Procedural Issues:Requisites of Petitionsfor Declaratory ReliefSection 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in part:Section 1.Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrumentandto seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.[16]The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[17]Justiciable ControversyBrother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened to be violated by petitioner.On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual controversy.Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.[18]The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test.It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein.Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,[19]what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS?He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) yields nothing in this respect.His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics.An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x.[20]Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government[;][21]and pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections,[22]which would then be violative of the separation clause.Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least.Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy.The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate.It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought.The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable[23]cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved.[24]In other words, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state.SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights.Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.[25]Cause of ActionRespondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or proven.Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by one party against the other.Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate.[26]According to petitioner, this subject matter is beyond the realm of an action for declaratory relief.[27]Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the courta quo.A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.[28]Its essential elements are the following:(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.[29]The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal.[30]However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply.The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.[31]Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect.We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x.[32]Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest.Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain.[33]The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.[34]To bolster its stance, SJS cites theCorpus Juris Secundumand submits that the [p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed orloss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.[35]SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents below)mightactively participate in partisan politics, use the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government.[36]During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics.They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger the issue raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents.In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was neverthelessno certaintythat such right would be invaded by the said respondents.Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.Legal StandingLegal standing orlocus standihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.[37]Interestmeans a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.[38]Petitioner alleges that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy;[39]it has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way.[40]They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[41]First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.[42]A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.[43]In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved.There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents.Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters is too general[44]and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence.Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.[45]Transcendental ImportanceIn any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering that the issues raised are of paramount public interest.In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized thelocus standirequirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.[46]Recently, after holding that the IBP had nolocus standito bring the suit, the Court inIBP v. Zamora[47]nevertheless entertained the Petition therein.It noted that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.[48]Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people.The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the governance of our country.The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it had never been decided before.The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court below.Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed.Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringentlocus standirequirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.Proper Proceedings Beforethe Trial CourtTo prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates theelementaryprocedure[49]that must be followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.[50]Prefatorily, the trial court may --motu proprioor upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a complaint[51](or petition, in a special civil action) that does not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action.[52]A complaint or petition should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which theparty pleading relies for his claim or defense.[53]It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.[54]Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer[55]within 15 days, unless a different period is fixed by the court.[56]The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.[57]The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.[58]If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days from service.[59]A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.[60]When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation).[61]Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary judgment in its favor.[62]Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor.[63]After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[64]Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.[65]After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings.It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.[66]If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial.If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.[67]After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,[68]which is a mandatory proceeding.[69]A plaintiffs/ petitioners (or its duly authorized representatives) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise.A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidenceex parte,and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.[70]The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial.[71]Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, the amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters considered.[72]The parties may further avail themselves of any of the modes of discovery,[73]if they so wish.Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,[74]in which the parties shall adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or defenses.By their written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the parties.[75]The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.[76]Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a written report on the matters referred by the parties.[77]The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court.[78]Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered.The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.[79]Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court in the instant case.First,with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS.Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy.It contained no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim.Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from the court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.[80]As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact[81]or of any specific violation of the petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect.Such deficiency amounted to a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated.The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings.Within the period set to file their respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period, an Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.[82]SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder.Supposedly, there were several scheduled settings, in which the [c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions of the parties.[83]The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records.Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order[84]dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their memoranda.Issued shortly thereafter was another Order[85]dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for resolution.[86]Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Motions were not heard.Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16.There was not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration.Pending the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties memoranda.But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.Furthermore, the RTC issued its Decision without allowing the parties to file their answers.For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues.If only it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.Parenthetically, the courta quofurther failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard upon questions involving the constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures.[87]Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court was utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court.All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the process described above -- the petition must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision must adhere to constitutional and legal requirements.First Substantive Issue:Fundamental Requirementsof a DecisionThe Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.[88]Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:Sec. 1.Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk ofcourt.In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:Sec. 2.Form and contents of judgments. --The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.x x xx x xx x x.Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented.They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.In many cases,[89]this Court has time and time again reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. inYao v. Court of Appeals,[90]discussed at length the implications of this provision and strongly exhorted thus:Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution.The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning.It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from decidingipse dixit.Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.InPeople v. Bugarin,[91]the Court also explained:The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions.It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning.x x x.Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.[92]InMadrid v. Court of Appeals,[93]this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of the courts findings as to the probable facts.The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented.Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve.Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state.Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition?What exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS?More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and conclusions?None were stated or implied.Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based.Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent.How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown?Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?Moreover, the courta quodid not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision.The importance of such portion was explained in the early caseManalang v. Tuason de Rickards,[94]from which we quote:The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition.To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief.So, what relief did the trial court grantor deny?What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare?Its final statement says, SO ORDERED.But what exactly did the court order?It had the temerity to label its issuance a Decision, when nothing was in fact decided.Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailed Decision.It claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads: Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.[95]We cannot agree.InMagdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,[96]the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the original Decision.The Court, however, held:x x xThe quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where there is a conflict between thedispositive partand theopinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.(Italics in the original)Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision.If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion ofthe trial court.It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition.Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.[97]Parts of a DecisionIn general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion.Theponentemay also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.[98]An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case.In some cases -- particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of the controversy and the issues involved.An epilogue may be a summation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance.It may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle.Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good decision.1.Statement of the CaseTheStatement of the Caseconsists of a legal definition of the nature of the action.At the first instance, this part states whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part describes the specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the plea of the accused.Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the offense for which the accused may be found culpable.As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from or graver than that charged.Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the proceedings regarding the plea of the accused.Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellate court would be futile.In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to mention the fact of the appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating the consolidation of the records of the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the courta quo.2.Statement of FactsThere are different ways of relating the facts of the case.First, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit.Second, under the synthesis method, the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judges best light.Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions are.Finally, through a combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of the facts.In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in the interest of fairness and due process.A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow.The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence.The plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the facts.Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and conclusions should be explained.On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved may partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former.Conversely, the lower courts patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented.Issues for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties.With few exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases.Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.3.Issues or Assignment of ErrorsBoth factual and legal issues should be stated.On appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the appellants brief, may be reproduced in totoand tackled seriatim,so asto avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court failed to consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case.But when the appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered.Note that appealed criminal cases are givende novoreview, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal.The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which depends the determination of the question properly raised.4.The Courts RulingThis part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case.Where there are several issues, each one of them should be separately addressed, as much as practicable.The respective contentions of the parties should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily.5.The Disposition or Dispositive PortionIn a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs.In case an acquittal is decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when the accused were set free.In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs.The following test of completeness may be applied.First,the parties should know their rights and obligations.Second,they should know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies.Third,there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues.Fourth,the case should be terminated by according the proper relief.The proper relief usually depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings.It may declare their rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific acts.The disposition must also adjudicate costs.The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence.But they should all be present and plainly identifiable in the decision.Depending on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious.At all times, however, the decision must beclear, concise, completeandcorrect.Second Substantive Issue:Religious Leaders Endorsementof Candidates for Public OfficeThe basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration.As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people.Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue.On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim.During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief.Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision.At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question.In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.[99]Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition.Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent.Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle.It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential