08850607%2E2015%2E992753

This article was downloaded by: [182.160.113.163]On: 08 June 2015, At: 21:28Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Click for updates

International Journal of Intelligence andCounterIntelligencePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

Spider Web: Al-Qaeda's Link to theIntelligence Agencies of the MajorPowersSergio E. SanchezPublished online: 15 May 2015.

To cite this article: Sergio E. Sanchez (2015) Spider Web: Al-Qaeda's Link to the Intelligence Agenciesof the Major Powers, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28:3, 429-448,DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.992753

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.992753

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (theContent) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

SERGIO E. SANCHEZ

Spider Web: Al-Qaedas Link to theIntelligence Agencies of the MajorPowers

Some U.S. counterintelligence officials fear that terrorist groups such asal-Qaeda may employ some of the same tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTPs) of intelligence collection as its state adversaries.1 Indeed, accordingto Justin R. Harber, al-Qaeda training media include lessons on how tocollect open source intelligence, conduct surveillance, interrogate detainees,and recruit agents working in a foreign government.2 Moreover, othersargue that al-Qaeda. . . the most backward, barbaric, bloodthirsty, andoppressive terrorist group on earthis under-resourced, given the UnitedStatess . . .massive, sprawling, multi-billion-dollar intelligence gatheringbureaucracy.3

Yet, many, perhaps most, are unaware that al-Qaedas intelligence andcounterintelligence TTPs originated with the intelligence agencies of themajor powers. And while the intelligence agencies of the United States,Britain, France, and Russia have adapted their TTPs to deal with theglobal threats of the day, al-Qaeda and similar groups have also evolvedthe fundamental intelligence TTPs they acquired from the major powers tosurvive in hostile operating environments.

429

Sergio E. Sanchez is a member of the adjunct faculty in the Political ScienceDepartment at the California State University at Chico, where he teachescourses in American government. A former intelligence officer in Germanywith the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, he was previously anintelligence analyst and strategic debriefer for the Air Force. Mr. Sanchezreceived his B.A. from the University of Marylands Maryland College andan M.A. from CalState Chico.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28: 429448, 2015

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online

DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.992753

Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

Al-Qaedas intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities originated withthe major powers of the 20th and 21st centuries, which have disseminated,indirectly and for the most part unintentionally through a spider web ofrelationships, these capabilities to al-Qaeda. By understanding, andacknowledging, the culpability of the best intelligence agencies in theworld, intelligence and counterintelligence officials will be better able tomore accurately assess al-Qaedas capabilities and develop appropriatecountermeasures.

EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON

Understanding the dissemination of intelligence TTPs, directly and indirectlythrough a spider web of relationships, from the intelligence agencies of themajor powers to al-Qaeda, can best be done through an analysis of opensource and publicly available, primary sources such as autobiographies,memoirs, and government documents, and secondary sources such as casestudies and literature reviews, to uncover the web of links involvingintelligence training from the early 1900s to 2001 between the majorpowers and Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and ultimatelyal-Qaeda. According to Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin, the strengthof [a] case study is that it can take an example of an activityan instancein actionand use multiple methods and data sources to explore it andinterrogate it. Thus it can achieve a think description of a phenomenon inorder to represent it from the participants perspective.4

Moreover, the utilization of multiple cases can [bring] together more thanone method and perspective (triangulation) [that can lead] to added textureand greater insight in analysis. This can enhance the validity of the researchresults.5

The main goal is to definitively demonstrate that intelligence TTPs sharedby the major powers with various allies and proxies have been disseminatedto various countries=non-state actors, and have ultimately made their wayinto al-Qaeda training camps and manuals. The U.S., USSR=RussianFederation, UK, and France are selected as the major powers to beanalyzed due to their roles in the global arena in the past hundred years.Al-Qaeda is used as an example because of the organizations resiliencesince the Wests Global War on Terror (GWOT) was announced in 2001.For example, Gaetano Joe Ilardi has highlighted the fact that

the worlds ongoing counterterrorism effort against al-Qaeda isunparalleled in its magnitude, allocation of resources, and level ofinternational cooperation. [Moreover,] the hazards for al-Qaeda areexacerbated by the nature of its operations, which have proven bothambitious and complex. Extensive planning and logistical preparations

430 SERGIO E. SANCHEZ

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

have been required, along with the direct involvement of a large numberof operatives.6

Yet the organization has survived the assassination of its leader, Osama binLaden in 2011 and the killing of many of his lieutenants, and continues topose a threat to U.S. national security.7

A better understanding of the genesis of al-Qaedas intelligence andcounterintelligence capabilities will assist analysts and pundits to moreaccurately assess al-Qaedas skills by helping overcome any nave attitudesstemming from the organizations provincial origins, or any biases ofOrientalism, the subtle and persistent prejudice against the Orient ingeneral, but specifically the Middle East, as described by the late ColumbiaUniversity professor Edward W. Said.8

This analysis highlights three clear instances where intelligence TTPs wereindirectly disseminated to al-Qaeda by the major powers. Unfortunately, theshortage of quantitative information, as well as the limited qualitative datafrom primary sources, due in large part to the sensitive nature of the topic,makes an all-inclusive case study extremely difficult to compile.

IRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND AL-QAEDA

At the beginning of the 20th century Irans military intelligence wasconsidered ineffective by the Iranian government, which resulted in theintroduction of French military intelligence officers to shore up the armysskills.9 According to General Hussein Fardust, it was only afterwell-experienced French teachers were brought into the country thatIranians learned the ABC [sic] of intelligence at the newly-established WarUniversity. French officers taught Iranians how to collect informationabout the enemys army, their positions and plans, and how to contain[the] enemys penetration attempts . . . .10

Moreover, even after the departure of French personnel from the WarUniversity prior to the outbreak of World War II, Iranian instructorscontinued to teach French intelligence TTPs, thanks to French Intelligencemanuals that were translated into Persian.11

Presumably, French TTPs were employed until 1957, when the IranianState Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) was formed, afterconsiderable effort by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). TheSAVAK was created, in part, to guard against the Soviet Committee forState Security (KGB) and the Soviet Military Main IntelligenceDirectorate (GRU), which had penetrated the Shah Mohammed Rezagovernment after he came to power in 1941.12 SAVAK, which wasstructured similar to Western intelligence organizations at the time, sentofficers to receive intelligence and counterintelligence training in the U.S.,

SPIDER WEB: AL-QAEDAS LINKS TO INTELLIGENCE 431

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 28, NUMBER 3

Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

and later in Israel.13 According to William H. Sullivan, the last U.S.Ambassador to Iran, although we never [knew] exactly how manyfull-time professionals the [SAVAK] embraced, [the U.S. governments]best estimate put the total [number of Iranian intelligence officers]somewhere in the vicinity of six thousand.14

Additionally, according to General Fardust, a former Deputy head of theSAVAK, British intelligence assisted the Shah in creating the SpecialInformation Bureau (SIB), an Iranian intelligence organization designed toserve as a clearing house for intelligence, similar to the British JointIntelligence Committee (JIC).15 Fardust was assigned to set up the SIB,having traveled to London to receive specialized training that familiarizedhim with British intelligence operations and procedures.16 Included in thetraining was intelligence and counterintelligence training, as conducted byBritish intelligence.17 Also significant is the fact that British intelligenceselected several candidates for the new organization;18 presumably some ofthe candidates were also working directly for British intelligence, perhapsas penetration agents who would give MI-6 undue influence over SIB.Consequently, any training that SIB members received from Britishintelligence was likely absorbed by post-revolution Iranian intelligence, aswas the case with CIA-trained SAVAK agents.Interestingly, Britain created its own secret network of intelligence

collectors, under the SAVAK, which MI-6 oversaw independently from theCIA, utilizing traditional British intelligence TTPs.19 MI-6s networkdemonstrated that British intelligence knowhow, specifically humanintelligence (HUMINT), was directly disseminated to Iranian agents.After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the new government abolished

SAVAK. According to Ali Tabatabai, who served as press counselor at theIranian Embassy in Washington, D.C., under the Shah, the SAVAK wasreplaced by the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (SAVAMA)shortly after the revolution.20 The existence of SAVAMA was laterconfirmed by Behzad Nabavi, an Iranian government spokesman, whostated that Revolutionary Iran needed an intelligence agency, but one thatdid not stray from religious precepts.21 Moreover, Ali Tabatabai notedthat SAVAMAs organizational structure, which consisted of nine bureaus,was almost identical to the organizational structure of SAVAK.22 Forexample, both organizations included bureaus to handle such matters as. . . cover personnel, collection of foreign intelligence, collection ofdomestic intelligence, surveillance of its own agents and security of its ownagents and security of government buildings, communications, finances,analysis of collected intelligence, counterintelligence, and recruitment andtraining.23 More important still was the fact that SAVAMA maintainedmany of the SAVAKs rank-and-file members, replacing only some of theorganizations previous chiefs.24 By maintaining SAVAK personnel, the



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

new Iranian government was able to maintain a continuity of CIA and MI-6TTPs originally entrusted to the Shahs security service.The post-revolutionary Iranian intelligence establishment incorporating

SAVAMA and other security organs was reorganized, and made to rest ontwin pillars: the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and theIslamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran,the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, and the RevolutionaryGuard.25

The Onset of the Party of God

Meanwhile, post-revolutionary Iran began to support Hezbollah (the Partyof God) in the summer of 1982 after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeliforces.26 Iran supplied approximately 2,000 IRGC soldiers in 1982 to serveas the nucleus of Hezbollah, a number that swelled to approximately 5,000by the end of the 1980s.27 Moreover, according to Carl Anthony Wege,Iran has been one of the most consistent sources of external support for[Hezbollah] in terms of bureaucratic links, operational support, finance,and political guidance.28 Of note is Irans operational support, which hasincluded using intelligence networks operating out of embassies to supportterrorist activities.29 Additionally, Iranian intelligence runs training campsto support operations of Islamist-oriented terrorist organizations.30

Interestingly, the security apparatus developed by Hezbollah, whichnumbered in the hundreds of operatives, provided its leadership withregular intelligence reports,31 thereby emphasizing the intelligencecapabilities that in large part can be attributed to training by Iranianintelligence.In time, Hezbollahs capabilities came to the attention of al-Qaedas

leadership who sought to increase their own capabilities. And, while someexperts disagree over the relationship between al-Qaeda, a Sunniorganization, and Hezbollah, a Shia organization, others have noted thatboth groups have in the past allied against common enemies.32 For example,Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, former U.S. National Security Councilstaff members, noted that a small group of al-Qaeda members visitedHezbollah training camps in Lebanon in the mid-1990s.33 Furthermore,according Ton Hays and Sharon Theimer, Ali Mohammed, a formerEgyptian intelligence officer, and later a U.S. Army sergeant, who in 2000pleaded guilty for his role in providing counterintelligence training,surveillance reports, and other support to al-Qaeda, Hezbollah agreed toprovide training to al-Qaeda in exchange for money and manpower.34

Indeed, direct relations between al-Qaeda and Iran were established whileOsama bin Laden, the organizations leader, was living in Sudan circa theearly 1990s.35 As part of the agreement, Iran agreed to provide al-Qaeda



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

with explosives, intelligence, and security training through what Matthew Levittand Michael Jacobson have referred to as Shiite entities, which presumablymeant Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.36

Troubling still, however, is the fact that circa 1995 Russias ForeignIntelligence Service (SVR), the successor to the KGB, provided the latestmethods of intelligence training to the Iranian MOIS,37 training thatwould be of immense value to Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.Lastly, according to Eben Kaplan, U.S. and European intelligence reports

dated circa 11 September 2001 (9=11), noted that Hezbollah and al-Qaedawere collaborating in money laundering, gun running, and various types oftraining.38 While the current status of the relationship between al-Qaedaand Hezbollah is unknown, given sectarian violence between Shia andSunni in Iraq and Syrianotice should be taken that a relationship existedin the past between both organizations, a relationship that involvedintelligence training. Indeed, according to a U.S. Department of Defense(DoD) document released by Wikileaks, and subsequently published by theNew York Times, Assessment of Afghanistan Travels and Islamic Duties asthey Pertain to Interrogation, counterintelligence techniques were . . . atleast discussed even in the most basic training programs.39 Therefore, atleast some intelligence and counterintelligence training was arguably sharedbetween Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, intelligence knowhow that was originallyentrusted to Iran by the major powers.In sum, the CIA and MI-6 helped establish the Iranian SAVAK under the

Shah and trained its personnel in intelligence and counterintelligence TTPsprior to the revolution of 1979. The post-revolutionary Islamic governmentretained SAVAK personnel as it established relations with Hezbollah,which benefited from intelligence training and support. Hezbollah, in turn,shared training and support with al-Qaeda in exchange for funds andmanpower. The United States has therefore indirectly and unintentionally,through a spider web of relationships, provided intelligence andcounterintelligence skills to al-Qaeda via Iran and Hezbollah.

PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND AL-QAEDA

Pakistans Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Directorates connection to theBritish should come as no surprise, given that the Pakistani army emergedout of the British Indian army after India gained its independence from theBritish Empire in 1947.40 In fact, Major General R. Cawthome, a Britisharmy officer, formed the Pakistani ISI Directorate in 1948, after theunsatisfactory performance of Pakistani intelligence during the Indo-PakistaniWar over Kashmir in 19471948.41 Moreover, Daveed Gartenstein-Rossnotes that the senior echelons [of the Pakistani army] were still Britishofficers who had opted to stay on [after independence], and importantly,



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

they were in turn succeeded by their native clones, men who saw the army asa unique institution, separate and apart from the rest of civil society andauthority.42 Thus, any intelligence training that British officers possessedat the time of their transfer to the Pakistani military was more than likelydisseminated to their subordinates and successors. In other words,Pakistans ISI has been infused with British Intelligence TTPs since itsinception.In time, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and ISI developed a

working relationship, which began during the Nixon Administration, andfocused on the Khalistan movement in the Punjab43a campaign toestablish a separate and independent Sikh state of Khalistan in the Indianstate of Punjab.44 Perhaps the best-known relationship between the ISI andthe IC involved the CIA and the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s.According to Gartenstein-Ross, the relationship between the CIA and ISIdeveloped on the ISIs terms, with Zia [the president of Pakistan from1978 to 1988] minimizing contact between the Americans and the Afghanmujahideen. This arrangement was mutually advantageous. It gave theAmericans plausible deniability, gave the Pakistanis access to a largeamount of American money, and allowed Pakistani officials to forge theirown relationships with the mujahideen.45

Additionally, the relationship between the ISI and the CIA resulted in theenhancement of the ISIs covert intelligence capabilities.46 For example,several ISI personnel received intelligence training in the U.S., and the CIAalso attached experts to the ISI as operational advisors.47

Likewise, the ISI established contacts with large numbers of mujahedeencommanders, supplying them with weapons,48 and presumably at leastsome rudimentary intelligence training, given the nature of the Pakistaniorganization as an intelligence agency. For example, agents would have tobe trained in surveillance and counter-surveillance of targets; maneuveringundetected behind enemy lines; clandestine communications; andconducting battle damage assessments, among other basic intelligencepractices. Additionally, more advanced intelligence tradecraft would havehad to be provided to some mujahedeen for the purposes of agenthandling and intelligence collection in Soviet-occupied areas denied to thePakistani ISI and the CIA. Moreover, during this time the ISI establisheda relationship with Osama bin Laden, the future leader of al-Qaeda.49

In 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, and withit the U.S.s covert support for the mujahedeen ended. However, the Americanendeavor, as noted by former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, resultedin short-term gain for longer-term pain,50 meaning that the immediate gainachieved by the U.S. in supporting the mujahedeen would cause lastingproblems for the country. For example, in his memoir Musharraf lamentsthat



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

We helped create the mujahideen, fired them with religious zeal inseminaries, armed them, paid them, fed them, and sent them to a jihadagainst the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We did not stop to think howwe would divert them to productive life after the jihad was won. Thismistake cost Afghanistan and Pakistan more dearly than any othercountry. Neither did the United States realize what a rich, educatedperson like Osama bin Laden might later do with the organization thatwe all had enabled him to establish.51

Later, in May 1996, bin Laden arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, along withvarious Arabs who had left the country after the Soviets had withdrawn.52

And while Musharraf asserted in his 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, thatal-Qaeda and other radicals including Uzbeks, Bangladeshis, Chechens,Chinese Uygurs, and Muslims from south India, Europe, America, and evenAustralia started to arrive in Afghanistan to help the Taliban cause,53

Mark J. Roberts has suggested that Pakistans motives for supporting binLaden were to solidify the Talibans control over the country, and thenestablish training camps for Kashmiri militants.54 In fact, the ISI allegedlyasked Saudi Arabian Intelligence for prior permission to sponsor bin Ladensince the ISI received Saudi funds to operate madrassas in Pakistan, and didnot want to sour its relationship with the Kingdom.55 And while Musharrafsuggests that bin Laden was in Afghanistan merely to assist the Taliban,Robertss assertion that the relationship between bin Laden and Pakistanwas more complex seems accurate. For example, the ISI requestedpermission from the Saudi Kingdom to sponsor bin Laden, an importantpoint because by this time the Saudi government disapproved of Osama andmay have attempted to assassinate him.56 But bin Laden had the ability toestablish training camps and attract large numbers of radical followers whocould assist the ISI in waging a covert war against India in Kashmir, whichwas exactly what the ISI wanted, and therefore justified its requestingpermission from the Saudis who might have been offended if notconsulted.57 In fact, according to Roberts:

Pakistani support to Kashmiri jihadists fundamentally changed thenature of the struggle. . . .Pakistani backing enabled the Kashmiris tosustain and expand what other- wise might have been a limited andshort-lived struggle. This expanded the conflicts scope by helpingorganize and insert large numbers of foreign militants into thestruggle. The foreign fighters were trained in the killing fields ofAfghanistan and paid and supplied by ISI. As late as 2002, 25 to 50percent of the terrorists fighting in Kashmir were ISI-recruited foreignfighters, not Kashmiris.58

Furthermore, Roberts notes that ISI personnel did not limit themselves tofunding al-Qaeda training camps, but also actively participated in training



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

militants.59 In fact, in 1998, when then-U.S. President Bill Clinton orderedmissile strikes against al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan inretaliation for the organizations role in the bombings of U.S. embassiesin Kenya and Tanzania, bin Laden escaped but several ISI officers werekilled in the attack.60 Given the fact that Pakistani intelligence officerswere actively training militants in al-Qaeda training camps, and based onthe fact that intelligence officers instructed courses, the training theyprovided most probably included ISI and CIA TTPs because thosetechniques were known to both the ISI and Hezbollah, and bothdisseminated their intelligence knowledge to al-Qaeda. This conclusion isfurther supported by author Lawrence Wrights claims that al-Qaeda ranseveral camps focused on intelligence and counterintelligence training.Wright also noted that intelligence training was part of al-Qaedas courseofferings at camps in Afghanistan prior to 9=11.61

The ISIs relationship with al-Qaeda persisted until 2001, when the U.S.issued an ultimatum.62 According to former President Musharraf, U.S.Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated strongly that

. . . not only that we [the Pakistani government] had to decide whether wewere with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose theterrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the StoneAge. This was a shockingly barefaced threat, but it was obvious thatthe United States had decided to hit back, and hit back hard.63

Despite that warning, according to Gartenstein-Ross, the ISIal-Qaeda linkscontinued as late as 2008, as noted by U.S. documents provided to thePakistani government linking at least one retired ISI intelligence officerwith al-Qaeda and the Taliban.64

In sum, as with Iran, Pakistans ISI Directorate was created and staffed byBritish army officers whose intelligence knowledge formed the core of theorganization. Later, the ISIs intelligence TTPs were enhanced by CIAtraining as both the ISI and CIA battled, by proxy, the Soviet Union inAfghanistan. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the ISIestablished links with the mujahedeen, and to an eccentric millionaire bythe name of Osama bin Laden. After the withdrawal of the Soviet armyfrom Afghanistan, the ISI maintained its relationship with formermujahedeen, including bin Laden, as it fought a covert battle with India inKashmir. The ISI had funded, supplied, and trained the Taliban, al-Qaeda,and other groups of radical militants that made their way to Afghanistanduring the 1990s as part of their covert war against India in Kashmir.Thus, intelligence TTPs were in all likelihood proliferated from ISI, whichitself originated with the British, and included TTPs from the CIA, as partof the spider web of intelligence relationships among the major powers andtheir allies, to al-Qaeda.



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

EGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND AL-QAEDA

Around the year 1910, in order to maintain colonial rule amidst growingnationalism in Egypt, the British government directed the creation of anEgyptian secret police apparatus that would centralize police intelligenceand analysis under one organizationthe Central Special Office (CSO).65

Moreover, the British, French, tsarist Russias Okhrana (the predecessor ofthe Soviet KGB),66 and other European powers established intelligencerelationships with the CSO in order to improve the organizationsintelligence capabilities and gain influence with the Egyptian leadership.67

In so doing, the great powers transmitted their intelligence TTPs to theEgyptian mukhabarat (Arabic for intelligence), continuing the spider webof intelligence partnerships.Initially, the British administration selected and installed the CSOs

director.68 In this way, Britain helped direct the Egyptian governmentsintelligence collection efforts until the late 1930s when British influencebegan to decline,69 paving the way for the American government toincrease its influence over the Egyptian monarchy.70

Shortly after the 1952 coup detat which ousted the Egyptian royal family,the new regime created the General Investigations Directorate (GID) withexpanded security powers, capabilities, and more importantly, directcontrol over the intelligence process.71 The GID sought to maintain arelationship with the newly-established CIA, benefiting from Americanintelligence training and funding.72 Included were CIA training manualsthat were disseminated to Egyptian officers, a noteworthy aspect given thatGamal Abdel Nasser, Egypts leader from 19561970, had been earlierreprimanded for passing a training manual to the Muslim Brotherhood.73

While the type of manual Nasser had passed to the Brotherhood is unclear,at least some military manuals were in fact making their way to theorganization.In fact, by 1953, senior Egyptian officials had discussed intelligence

suggesting that the army and police had been infiltrated by the MuslimBrotherhood.74 The Brotherhood, which spread throughout much ofEgyptian society,75 had also penetrated Egyptian intelligence by this point.For example, Egyptian nationalist intelligence officers supported theBrotherhood because certain of its elements were working with them ina covert war to oust British forces from the Suez Canal Zone between 1952and 1953.76

Further, in 1954 the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) wascreated, maintaining intelligence ties with the CIA.77 During this time theU.S. funneled millions of dollars to Egypt and the mukhabarat, some ofwhich were used to battle elements within the Brotherhood which, by thispoint, had fallen out of favor.78 However, by 1956 the CIAs relationship



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

with the Egyptian government, specifically with President Nasser, haddeteriorated to the point where the Agency wanted to remove him frompower.79 By this time Egypts foreign policy was notably turning towardsthe Soviet Union,80 giving the USSR greater influence in the region byvirtue of its relationship with a large Muslim country.In 1958, a formal intelligence relationship was established between Egypt

and the Soviet Union, a relationship that involved the KGB providingintelligence training to the Egyptian mukhabarat.81 Moreover, by 1967, theKGB was a major player in Egypt, at the cost of American influence,a development which reflected Nassers sentiments about the CIA.82

Shortly after Nassers death of natural causes in 1970, Vice PresidentAnwar al-Sadat took the helm of government, which some claim was inpart due to his relationship with the CIA.83 That after becoming the newleader of Egypt, Sadat began distancing his country from the Soviet Unionand aligning more with the West, which included mending ties with theCIA, should therefore come as no surprise.84

While the mukhabarat was rekindling ties with American intelligence, theEgyptian Brotherhood began to fragment, with some more radical memberssplintering from the main organization into smaller cells.85 One group wasMunazzamat Al Jihad, also known variously as Tanzim al Jihad, EgyptianIslamic Jihad (EIJ), or simply Jihad, an offshoot of al Tahrir al Islamiitself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhoodwhich in 1981 wasresponsible for Sadats assassination.86 Notably, Sadats assassin was anEgyptian military officer,87 highlighting how the military, and presumablyother organs of state, were penetrated by radical elements. Indeed, aleading member of EIJ was Abud al-Zumur, a retired lieutenant colonelfrom the Egyptian Military Intelligence Department (MID),88 who by virtue ofhis position was trained on the intelligence TTPs by both the CIA and theKGB, and thus strategically positioned to share his knowledge with hiscompatriots.Another key personality in EIJ was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,89 who later

traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet invaders, and whilethere met the Saudi Osama bin Laden.90 The two formed a personalrelationship in the mid-1980s, with Zawahiri serving as bin Ladenspersonal physician, and later a professional activist relationship whichlasted throughout the 1990s, subsequently merging al-Qaeda and EIJ in2001 under the banner of al-Qaeda.91

Bin Ladens nascent organization benefited from al-Jihads expertise in the1980s and 1990s. For example, an Egyptian special forces colonel, Saif al-Adel, arguably possessed knowledge of intelligence and counterintelligenceTTPs, based on both his military rank and the nature of his function asa special forces officer, assisted bin Ladens group in their fight against theSoviets and later in their jihad against the U.S.92 In 2001, Saif al-Adel was



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

indicted in New York for providing intelligence and counterintelligencetraining to al-Qaeda and al-Jihad in support of their war againstAmerica.93 Likewise, a former Egyptian major, Ali Mohammed, assisted al-Jihad in the 1980s by passing U.S. Army training manuals he acquired whilestationed as a supply sergeant at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of theU.S. Special Operations Command, and later trained bin Ladens men onintelligence and counterintelligence TTPs.94

In sum, the Egyptian mukhabarat was initially trained in Westernintelligence practices by the British government, then enhanced by France,Russia, and other European powers before the American governmentbecame Egyptian intelligences main benefactor. Later, under Nasser, theSoviet KGB replaced the CIA as the mukhabarats key ally before Sadatonce again reestablished ties between Egyptian intelligence and the CIA.During this time the Muslim Brotherhood penetrated various organizationsand had supporters in others, including the military and the intelligenceservices. As noted, the Brotherhood later splintered, leading one of itsoffshoots, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, to join with Osamabin Laden and al-Qaeda. This chronology illustrates how intelligence andcounterintelligence TTPs were disseminated by the major powers toEgyptian intelligence, which then, indirectly or directly through a spiderweb of relationships, passed them to the Muslim Brotherhood, whichultimately shared its knowledge with its al-Qaeda partners.

UNWISE SPREAD OF WESTERN TTPs CONTINUES

The U.S., Russia, UK, and France have indirectly, and some times directly,disseminated to al-Qaeda, and organizations like it, the intelligence TTPsthat have later been used to harm the West. While the U.S. and its allieshave attacked al-Qaeda central, killed bin Laden, and disrupted theorganizations ability to safely plan and execute attacks, much ofal-Qaedas institutional knowledge, with regards to intelligence andcounterintelligence TTPs, has been digitized and uploaded to theInternet.95 For example, the 180-page al-Qaeda training manual, MilitaryStudies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, which includes chapters oncounterfeiting, weapons training, security and espionage, can readily bedownloaded.96 Prior to the widespread use of the Internet, the manual hadto be replicated manually, handwritten page-by-page, a time consumingtask, but that is no longer the case.97

Likewise, the widespread dissemination of al-Qaeda intelligence TTPs hasbeen noted in such places as Jordan, where in 1999 security officialsdiscovered a six-volume set of training manuals on CD-ROM.98 Thisdiscovery was disconcerting because it highlighted the ease and availability



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

of intelligence training TTPs, allowing them to be made available to bothstate and non-state actors, such as the Democratic People Republic ofKorea and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), whichseek knowledge of the intelligence and operational TTPs of the majorpowers.More disconcerting still is the Wests continued dissemination of intelligence

and counterintelligence TTPs to unstable, and=or at a minimum, questionable,allies whose motivations and loyalties can and will change, and which mightfurther disseminate Western intelligence methods to the detriment of theU.S. and its allies. For example, President Bill Clinton signed an intelligencefinding authorizing the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)to train Palestinian Authority security personnel.99 At the time, YasserArafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) andPresident of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), feared inadvertentlystrengthening adversaries within the PLO and therefore decentralized hisintelligence services into two competing organizations, one located andoperating out of the West Bank and the other in the Gaza Strip.100 AfterArafats death, the Gaza Strip fell under the control of Hamas, an offshootof the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,101 while the West Bank is controlledby Fatah, under the PA.102 Thus, Hamas now controls the Palestinianintelligence organization in Gaza, with its CIA and FBI trained intelligenceofficers. Yet, this is only the latest iteration of cooperation between themajor powers and Palestine, with the USSR supporting the PLO in the1960s, and more recently Russias President Vladimir Putin offering to assistHamas in defiance of the West.103

Additionally, American intelligence organizations have trained andequipped Iraqi intelligence, which has been penetrated by state (Iran) andnon-state actors, and further disseminates Western intelligence TTPs.104 Infact, the Iranian government, through its IRGC and other intelligenceorganizations, has been one of the U.S.s major antagonists in Iraq, bothtraining and funding insurgents, as well as meddling in Iraqi internalaffairs.105 In so doing, Iran is utilizing its acquired TTPs, as well asdeveloping and enhancing its organic intelligence capabilities. GivenIranian ties to Hezbollah, whatever intelligence TTPs Iran develops orenhances to fight the Westor even collaborate with it in the muddledMiddle Eastwill make their way to Hezbollah.Similarly, the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

members have trained and equipped the intelligence and security servicesof Afghanistan, which like Iraq, have arguably been infiltrated by hostileintelligence, specifically Iran and the Taliban.106 Moreover, as U.S.intelligence and NATO prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, theirdeparture is creating a security vacuum with former assets becoming freeagents for hire.107



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

Lastly, U.S. intelligence is, as of this writing, training and equipping thesecurity services of Libya,108 and training rebels in Syria.109 Thedisconcerting aspect about U.S. efforts is that the loyalties of thoseinvolved cannot be guaranteed, and while the security interests of the U.S.and those it trains may currently align, that alignment cannot beguaranteed for the foreseeable future given the fluidity of events on theground in both Libya and Syria.In sum, the U.S. and its allies perhaps unwisely continue to disseminate

intelligence TTPs to friendly, yet questionable, allies whose motivations towork with the U.S. are dynamic and unstable. Americas allies today havethe potential to be its enemies tomorrow, or at minimum, passive-aggressivestates that sponsor, or facilitate, terrorism against the West. The U.S.trained the security services of the PA, part of which are now under thecontrol of Hamas, an ardent opponent of U.S. allies in the region andhostile to America. Likewise, the U.S. is currently training the securityservices of Libya, an unstable country, Afghanistan, an unstable country,and rebels in Syria, a war-torn country. Will Americas actions come backto harm its citizens? In other words, will the U.S. reap what it sowed?

UNDERESTIMATING THE OPPOSITION

Al-Qaedas intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, as well as thosesimilar non-state actors, tend to be perceived as unsophisticated, giventheir meager resources, when compared to those of the major powers. But,many intelligence officers and government officials are either nave aboutal-Qaedas ability to absorb and adapt intelligence TTPs indirectlyacquired from the major powers through a spider web of relationships andother links, or tend to have a prejudice towards the region (Orientalism).Intelligence and counterintelligence officers must now fully realize thatal-Qaedas capabilities are formidable, given their origin, and should adjusttheir own TTPs to address the threat more effectively.Future research should focus on other instances where intelligence TTPs

were disseminated to allies, or friendly regimes, only to be transferred toentities that seek to harm the West. Moreover, policymakers should focusmore resources to better understand the long-term effects of trainingunstable or capricious partners on intelligence, counterintelligence, andother operational TTPs and then perform a cost-benefit analysis todetermine if the transfer of intelligence training is in the best interest of theU.S. Additionally, for those instances where policymakers must act, stepsshould be taken in order to reduce the possibility or impact of anyblowback. Long-term strategic analysis regarding the dissemination ofTTPs is necessary, given that the average time in office for a Presidentof the U.S. is five years, and the average length of service for Secretaries of



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

Defense and State is less than that.110 This means that almost any importantdecision made by one administration will have to be addressed by itssuccessor, a situation that highlights the need for long-term studies thatoutline the pros and cons of sharing intelligence operations knowhow.

REFERENCES1Justin R. Harber, Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat FromNon-State Actors, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2009, pp. 221236.

2Ibid., p. 223.

3Robert Tracinski, Al-Qaedas Intelligence Service, RealClearPolitics.com, 2December 2010, available at www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/12/02/al-qaedas_intelligence_service_108123.html.

4Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin, eds., Theory and Methods in Social Research,2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011), p. 54.

5Lisa Harrison and Theresa Callan, eds., Key Research Concepts in Politics &International Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013), p. 11.

6Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Al Qaedas Operational IntelligenceA Key Prerequisiteto Action, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 12, December 2008,pp. 10721102.

7Brian Katulis, Understanding the Threat to the Homeland From Al Qaeda inthe Arabian Peninsula, Americanprogress.org, 18 September 2013, available athttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/09/18/74604/understanding-the-threat-to-the-homeland-from-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula/.

8Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).

9Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of FormerGeneral Hussein Fardust (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999).

10Ibid., p. 196.

11Ibid.

12William H. Sullivan, Savak, in Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton,1981), pp. 9499; Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations,International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 3,Fall 1997, pp. 287298.

13William H. Sullivan, Savak.

14Ibid., p. 96.

15Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of FormerGeneral Hussian Farhust, p. 146; Michael S. Goodman, Learning to Walk: TheOrigins of the UKs Joint Intelligence Committee, International Journal ofIntelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 4056.

16Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of FormerGeneral Hussein Fardust, pp. 149164.



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

17Ibid., pp. 162164.

18Ibid., p. 161.

19Ibid., pp. 175178.

20Michael Getler, Khomeini Is Reported to Have a SAVAK of His Own;Khomeini Reported to Have Own SAVAK-Style Agency, The WashingtonPost, 7 June 1980; Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.

21Reuters, Around the World; Iranian Says Secret Agency Isnt Like SavakUnder Shah, The New York Times, 1 June 1981.

22Michael Getler, Khomeini Is Reported to Have a SAVAK of His Own.

23Ibid.

24Ibid.

25Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.

26Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol. 17, 1994, pp. 151164; Graham E. Fuller, Iran, Lebanon, and theArab-Israeli Conflict, in The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991), pp. 119135.

27Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization; Sean Anderson and StephenSloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: ScarecrowPress, 2009).

28Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization, p. 157.

29Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.

30Ibid.

31Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization.

32Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship, Council on ForeignRelations, 14 August 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-hezbollah-relationship/p11275.

33Ibid.

34Dina Temple-Raston, The Closer, in The Jihad Next Door: The LackawannaSix and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), pp.8194; Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship; Ton Hays andSharon Theimer, Egyptian Agent Worked with Green Berets, Bin Laden,Associated Press, 31 December 2001.

35Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, The Iran-Al-Qaeda Conundrum,Washingtoninstitute.org , 23 January 2009, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum.

36Ibid.

37Bill Gertz, Russian Agents Teach Iranians How to Spy, The WashingtonTimes, 11 September 1995, available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/409352119?accountid=10346.

38Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship.

39U. S. Department of Defense, The Governments Guide to Assessing Prisoners,The New York Times, 24 April 2011, p. 2, available at http://www.nytimes.



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

com/interactive/2011/04/24/world/guantanamo-guide-to-assessing-prisoners.html.

40Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem, The Journal ofInternational Security Affairs, January 2009, pp. 112, available at http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/gartenstein-ross.php.

41B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers,2002); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.

42Ibid.

43B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 46.

44Virginia Van Dyke, The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and thePost-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions,Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 6, November 2009, pp. 975997.

45Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.

46B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 46.

47Ibid.

48Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A StateWithin a State?, Joint Force Quarterly, 16 March 2010, pp. 18, available atwww.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA517856; Pervez Musharraf, In theLine of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 208.

49Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A StateWithin a State?

50Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 208.

51Ibid.

52Ibid., p. 212.

53Ibid.


55Ibid., p. 106.

56Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11(New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 161162.

57Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A StateWithin a State?; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.

58Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A StateWithin a State? p. 107.

59Ibid.

60Ibid.

61Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11,p. 303.


63Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 201.

64Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

65Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009 (London: Routledge, 2010); Owen L. Sirrs,Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects, Intelligence andNational Security, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2013, pp. 230251.

66Benjamin B. Fischer, Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian ImperialPolice, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 19 March 2007,available at http://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/okhrana-the-paris-operations-of-the-russian-imperial-police/5474-1.html.

67Owen L. Sirrs, Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects.

68Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009.

69Ibid., p. 16; Owen L. Sirrs, Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents andProspects.

70Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: the CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in theMiddle East, Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 5, November 2004, pp. 663701;Owen L Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009.

71Ibid., p. 29.

72Ibid., p. 34.

73Ibid., p. 24.

74Ibid., p. 36.

75Ibid.; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.

76Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009, pp. 4243.

77Ibid., p. 44.

78Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action inthe Middle East, p. 678.

79Ibid., p. 680.

80Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009, 51.

81Ibid., p. 65.

82Ibid., Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of CovertAction in the Middle East.

83Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009, p. 117.

84Ibid.

85Ibid., p. 142.

86Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism,pp. 456457.

87Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009; Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East; Lawrence Wright, The LoomingTower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.

88Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of theMukhabarat, 19102009, p. 143.

89Ibid., Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.

90Ibid.

91Ibid., Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism.

92Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11, p. 129.

93U. S. Department of Justice, United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden Et Al.(New York, 18 October 2001).

94Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11, pp.181182.

95Abdul Hameed Bakier, Jihadis Adapt to Counter-Terror Measures and CreateNew Intelligence Manuals, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 14, 13 July 2006,available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=837&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1.

96Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11; DinaTemple-Raston, The Closer.

97Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11,pp. 302303.

98Ibid., p. 297.

99Shlomo Shpiro, Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in theMiddle East, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,Vol. 17, No. 4, Winter 20042005, pp. 575600; Jim Hoagland, Friends ofthe CIA, The Washington Post, 7 April 2002.

100Shlomo Shpiro, Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in theMiddle East.

101Central Intelligence Agency, The World FactbookWest Bank, 7 April 2014, p. 227,available at https:==www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html; Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism.

102Central Intelligence Agency, The World FactbookWest Bank.

103Talal Nizameddin, Squaring the Middle East Triangle in Lebanon: Russia andthe Nexus, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, July 2008,pp. 457500.

104Neil MacKay, Irans Spies, Sunday Herald, 24 December 2006, available athttp://search.proquest.com/docview/331301170?accountid=10346.

105Richard Spencer, Wikileaks: How Iran Devised New Suicide Vest for Al-Qaedato Use in Iraq, The Telegraph (London), 23 October 2010; Sudarsan Raghavanand Robin Wright, Iraq Expels 2 Iranians Detained by U.S., The WashingtonPost, 29 December 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122901510.html.

106Neil MacKay, Irans Spies; Shehzad H Qazi, The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency& the American Endgame in Afghanistan, Institute for Social Policy and



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

Understanding, 18 April 2011, available at http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

107Kimberly Dozier, Exclusive: CIA Falls Back in Afghanistan, The Daily Beast(Kabul, Afghanistan), 4 May 2014, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/04/exclusive-cia-falls-back-in-afghanistan.html.

108Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, and Michael S. Schmidt, Attack in Libya WasMajor Blow to C.I.A. Efforts, The New York Times, 12 September 2012.

109Greg Miller, CIA Ramping Up Covert Training Program for Moderate SyrianRebels, The Washington Post, 2 October 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-ramping-up-covert-training-program-for-moderate-syrian-rebels/2013/10/02/a0bba084-2af6-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_print.html.

110Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Washington,DC: CQ Press, 2011), p. 3.



Dow

nloa

ded

by [1

82.16

0.113

.163]

at 21

:28 08

June

2015

EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENONIRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND AL-QAEDAThe Onset of the Party of God

PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND AL-QAEDAEGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND AL-QAEDAUNWISE SPREAD OF WESTERN TTPs CONTINUESUNDERESTIMATING THE OPPOSITIONREFERENCES

Documents

08850607%2E2015%2E992753