08 Asmgcs Ocd Requirements Impl Level1

8/8/2019 08 Asmgcs Ocd Requirements Impl Level1

1/43

EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OFAIR NAVIGATION

EUROCONTROL

EUROPEAN AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

Operational Concept &Requirements for A-

SMGCS ImplementationLevel I

DAP / APT

Edition : 1.0Edition Date : 30/09/2003Status : Released IssueClass : General Public


2/43

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Document Title

Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCS Implementation Level I

EWP DELIVERABLE REFERENCE NUMBER:

PROGRAMME REFERENCE INDEX: EDITION: 1.0

EDITION DATE: 30/09/2003Abstract

Keywords

CONTACT PERSON: Paul Adamson TEL: UNIT: DAP / APT

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

STATUS CLASSIFICATION

Working Draft General Public

Draft EATMP

Proposed Issue Restricted

Released Issue

ELECTRONIC BACKUP

INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME:

HOST SYSTEM MEDIA SOFTWARE

Microsoft Windows Type: Hard disk

Media Identification:


3/43

Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCSImplementation Level I

DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page iii

DOCUMENT APPROVAL

The following table identifies all management authorities that have successively approvedthe present issue of this document.

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

A-SMGCS

Project Manager Paul Adamson


4/43

DSA / AOP Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCSImplementation Level I

Page iv Edition: 1.0

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the presentdocument.

EDITION DATE REASON FOR CHANGE

SECTIONSPAGES

AFFECTED

0.d 10/10/2002 First Draft for Review

0.e 15/10/2002 Comments from 14/10/2002 meeting all

0.f 28/11/2002 Comments from 24/10/2002 meeting all

0.g 08/12/2002 EUROCONTROL comments on version 0.f all

0.h 10/01/2003 Comments from 18/12/2002 progress meeting 1.3, 1.5, 1.6,6

0.i 12/03/2003 English wording checking All

0.j 04/08/2003 Hans Cool Comment 5.1

1.0 30/09/2003 Status : released issue I,II


5/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1

1.1 Scope of the document.............................................................................................................1

1.2 Structure of the document.........................................................................................................1

1.3 Reference Documents ..............................................................................................................2

1.4 Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................21.5 Explanation of terms .................................................................................................................3

1.6 Performance parameters ..........................................................................................................8

2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT................................................................................12

2.1 Objectives ...............................................................................................................................12

2.2 Services...................................................................................................................................12

2.3 Operations...............................................................................................................................12

2.4 Benefits ...................................................................................................................................13

2.5 Implementation Consideration ................................................................................................13

3. SERVICES..........................................................................................................14

3.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................14

3.2 Traffic context..........................................................................................................................14

3.3 Position of mobiles ..................................................................................................................15

3.4 Identity of mobiles ...................................................................................................................15

4. ROLES OF ACTORS..........................................................................................16

4.1

Controllers...............................................................................................................................16

4.2 Pilot .........................................................................................................................................18

4.3 Vehicle Driver ..........................................................................................................................18

4.4 Other operators .......................................................................................................................19

5. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES........................................................................20

5.1 Controller.................................................................................................................................20

5.2 Pilot .........................................................................................................................................20

5.3 Vehicle Drivers ........................................................................................................................20


6/43


Page vi Edition: 1.0

5.4 Other procedures ....................................................................................................................21

6. EQUIPMENT.......................................................................................................22

7. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................23

7.1 Methodology............................................................................................................................23

7.2 General principles ...................................................................................................................25

7.3 Surveillance Service Requirements........................................................................................31


7/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope of the document

This document aims at defining the operational concept and the requirements for A-SMGCS implementation Level I, i.e. how ATS is expected to evolve through theintroduction of the A-SMGCS Level I (surveillance).

Eurocontrol A-SMGCS Project Strategy and Definition of Implementation Levels areincluded in [D1] and [D2].

Note: The present document contains a draft version of the requirements in order tosupport validation activity. The document will be updated according to the validationresults.

1.2 Structure of the document

Introduction

Describes, in Chapter 1, the purpose of this document, its structure, the referencedocuments and gives an explanation of terms used throughout the document.

Operational Concept

Chapter 2 introduces the operational concept and principles associated to A-SMGCS Level I. Further definition of the concept is provided through the followingthree chapters :

Services Description

Chapter 3 presents the automated surveillance service for A-SMGCS Level I.

Roles of Actors

Chapter 4 presents the role of Level I actors in light of the surveillance service.

Operational Procedures

Chapter 5 introduces the operational procedures that are associated to Level I andbeing developed by EUROCONTROL in close coordination with ICAO.

Equipment

Chapter 6 presents equipment required for A-SMGCS Level I.

Operational Requirements

Chapter 7 contains the operational requirements associated to Level I, i.e. from anA-SMGCS user point of view, the general requirements attached to Level-Isurveillance service, the functionalities and interfaces needed (functionalrequirements) and the corresponding non-functional requirements (performances).Both normal and exceptional conditions (failure) are covered.


8/43


Page 2 Edition: 1.0

1.3 Reference Documents

[D1] A-SMGCS Project Strategy

[D2] Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels

[ICAO-SMGCS] ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Control and Guidance Systems(SMGCS) doc 9476-AN/927 First Edition 1986

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] ICAO European Manual on Advanced Surface Movement Control andGuidance Systems (A-SMGCS) AOPG, Final Draft, Nov 2001

[ICAO-Annex14] ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 8

[ICAO-4444] ICAO Doc 4444-RAC/501 RULES OF THE AIR AND AIR TRAFFICSERVICES

[AOS-Vol2] EUROCONTROL Airport Operations Unit, AOP Strategy Volume 2,Proposed Edition, Sept 2001

[EUROCAE-MASPS] EUROCAE WG-41, MASPS for A-SMGCS, Edition ED-87A, January2001

[AOPG-Procedures] ICAO AOPG2, Proposed Implementation of A-SMGCS Procedures andamendments to ICAO Documentation, 2002

[AOP-Req] EUROCONTROL Airport Operations Group, Advanced SurfaceMovement Guidance and Control Systems Concept Justification andUser Requirements, AOT/10 WP3, June 2002

1.4 Acronyms

ADP Aroport de Paris

ADS Automatic Dependent Surveillance

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast

ANSPs Air Navigation Service Provider

AMAN Arrival Manager

AOP Airport Operations Unit

AOPG ICAO Aerodrome Operations Group

AOT Airport Operation Team

A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems

ATC Air Traffic ControlATCO ATC Controller

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATS Air Traffic Services

AVOL Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level

CDG Charles De Gaulle

CDM Collaborative Decision Making

CFMU Central Flow Management Unit

CNS Communication Navigation Surveillance

DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung


9/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page 3

DMAN Departure Manager

DNA French Civil Aviation Authority

EC European Commission

ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference

ESARR Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirements

EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GBAS Ground based Augmentation System

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS Global Positioning System

HMI Human Machine Interface

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

LVP Low Visibility ProceduresMASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification

MLS Microwave Landing System

R/T Radio Telephony

RVR Runway Visual Range

SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems

SMR Surface Movement Radar

SRC Safety Regulation Commission

TMA Terminal Manoeuvring Area

1.5 Explanation of terms

This section provides the explanation of terms required for a correct understandingof the present document. Most of the following explanations are drawn from the A-SMGCS manual [ICAO-A-SMGCS], the ICAO Annex 14 [ICAO-Annex14] or theEUROCAE MASPS for A-SMGCS [EUROCAE-MASPS], in that case it is indicatedin the definition. [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definitions are used as a first option. In general,other definitions are only used where there is no ICAO definition. If not, it isexplained why another definition is preferred to the ICAO one.

Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS)

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

Systems providing routing, guidance, surveillance and control to aircraft andaffected vehicles in order to maintain movement rates under all local weatherconditions within the Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level (AVOL) whilstmaintaining the required level of safety.

Aerodrome

[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, andequipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for arrival, departure andsurface movement of aircraft.

Aerodrome movement


10/43


Page 4 Edition: 1.0

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition addresses only aircraft movement, we extended the definition to allmobiles.

The movement of a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) on the movement area.

Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level (AVOL)


The minimum visibility at or above which the declared movement rate can besustained.

Airport authority


The person(s) responsible for the operational management of the airport.

Alert


An indication of an existing or pending situation during aerodrome operations, or anindication of abnormal A-SMGCS operation, that requires attention/action.

Alert Situation

[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

Any situation relating to aerodrome operations which has been defined as requiringparticular attention or action.

Apron


A defined area on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposesof loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.

A-SMGCS capacity


The maximum number of simultaneous movements of aircraft and vehicles that thesystem can safely support within an acceptable delay commensurate with therunway and taxiway capacity at a particular aerodrome.

Conflict


A situation when there is a possibility of a collision between aircraft and/or vehicles.

Control


Application of measures to prevent collisions, runway incursions and to ensure safe,expeditious and efficient movement.

Cooperative mobile

Cooperative target [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition in which target is replaced by mobile (seemobile definition)

Mobile which is equipped with systems capable of automatically and continuouslyproviding information including its Identity to the A-SMGCS.


11/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page 5

Note : as several cooperative surveillance technologies exist, a mobile iscooperative on an aerodrome only if the mobile and the aerodrome are equippedwith cooperative surveillance technologies which are interoperable.

Cooperative surveillance

The surveillance of mobiles is cooperative when a sensor, named cooperativesurveillance sensor, collects information about the mobiles from an active element ofthe transponder type which equips the mobiles. This technique allows to collectmore mobile parameters than the non-cooperative surveillance, for instance themobiles identity.

The cooperative surveillance may be :

Either dependant on the cooperative mobile, when the mobile automaticallygenerates the information and transmits it to the surveillance sensor, forinstance via ADS-B;

Or Non-dependant on the cooperative mobile, when the mobile isinterrogated by the surveillance sensor, for instance Mode S Multilateration.

Data Fusion


A generic term used to describe the process of combining surveillance informationfrom two or more sensor systems or sources.

False Alert


Alert which does not correspond to an actual alert situation.

Note : It is important to understand that it refers only to false alerts and does notaddress nuisance alerts (i.e. alerts which are correctly generated according to therule set but are inappropriate to the desired outcome).

Guidance


Facilities, information and advice necessary to provide continuous, unambiguousand reliable information to pilots of aircraft and drivers of vehicles to keep theiraircraft or vehicles on the surfaces and assigned routes intended for their use.

Identification


The correlation of a known aerodrome movement callsign with the displayed targetof that mobile on the display of the surveillance system.

Identity

Aircraft identification [ICAO-4444] definition extended to all mobiles.

A group of letters, figures or a combination thereof which is either identical to, or thecoded equivalent of, the mobile call sign to be used in air-ground communications,and which is used to identify the mobile in ground-ground air traffic servicescommunications.

Incursion


12/43


Page 6 Edition: 1.0


The unauthorized entry by an aircraft, vehicle or obstacle into the defined protectedareas surrounding an active runway, taxiway or apron.

Intruder

Any mobile which is detected in a specific airport area into which it is not allowed toenter.

Manoeuvring area


That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,excluding aprons.

Mobile

A mobile is either an aircraft or a vehicle.

Note : when referring to an aircraft or a vehicle, and not anotherobstacle, the termMobile will be preferred to Target. The term Target will only be used whenconsidering an image of a mobile or other obstacle displayed on a surveillancescreen.

Modularity


Capability of a system to be enhanced by the addition of one or more modules toimprove its technical or functional performance.

Movement area

[ICAO-Annex14] , [ICAO-4444] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definitionThat part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,consisting of the manoeuvring area and apron(s).

Non-Cooperative mobile

Non-cooperative target [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition in which target is replaced by mobile (seemobile definition)

Mobile which is not equipped with systems capable of automatically andcontinuously providing information including its Identity to the A-SMGCS.

Non-Cooperative surveillance

The surveillance of mobiles is non-cooperative when a sensor, named non-cooperative surveillance sensor, detects the mobiles, without any action on theirbehalf. This technique allows to determine the position of any mobile in thesurveillance area and in particular to detect intruders. Examples of non-cooperativesurveillance sensors are the Primary Surveillance Radars.

Normal Visibility

Visibility conditions sufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control overall traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (correspond to visibility condition 1defined by ICAO [ICAO-A-SMGCS]).

Nuisance Alert


13/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page 7


Alert which is correctly generated according to the rule set but are inappropriate tothe desired outcome.

Obstacle

[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition extended to all mobiles.

All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile obstacles, or parts thereof,that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of mobiles or thatextend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight.

Participating mobile

Mobile whose identity is known by the aerodrome authority, and likely to move onairport movement areas. As illustrated in the Figure 1-1, a participating mobile iseither cooperative or non-cooperative.

ALL MOBILES

INTRUDERS

Cooperative

mobiles

Non cooperative

mobiles

PARTICIPATING MOBILES

Figure 1-1 : Types of Mobiles

Protection area

A protection area is a virtual volume around a runway, a restricted area or a mobile.This protection area is used to detect an alert situation. For instance, an alertsituation is detected when a mobile is on a runway and one or more mobiles enterthe runway protection area.

Reduced Visibility

Visibility conditions insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control overall traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (correspond to visibility conditions 2, 3,and 4 defined by ICAO [ICAO-A-SMGCS]).

Restricted Area

Aerodrome area where the presence of an aircraft or a vehicle is permanently ortemporarily forbidden.

Route


A track from a defined start point to a defined endpoint on the movement area.


14/43


Page 8 Edition: 1.0

Routing


The planning and assignment of a route to individual aircraft and vehicles to providesafe, expeditious and efficient movement from its current position to its intendedposition.

Runway Incursion

EUROCONTROL Runway Incursion Task Force definition

The unintended presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the runway or runwaystrip.

Stand


A stand is a designated area on an apron intended to be used for the parking of an

aircraft.

Surveillance


A function of the system which provides identification and accurate positionalinformation on aircraft, vehicles and obstacles within the required area.

Target

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition (this definition has been preferred to the [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition)An aircraft, vehicle or other obstacle, which image is displayed on a surveillancedisplay.

Note : when referring to an aircraft or a vehicle, and not anotherobstacle, the termMobile will be preferred to Target. The term Target will only be used whenconsidering an image of a mobile or other obstacle displayed on a surveillancescreen.

1.6 Performance parameters

This section provides the explanation of terms required for a correct understandingof the present document. Most of the following explanations are drawn from the A-SMGCS manual [ICAO-A-SMGCS], the ICAO Annex 14 [ICAO-Annex14] or theEUROCAE MASPS for A-SMGCS [EUROCAE-MASPS], in that case it is indicated

in the definition. [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definitions are used as a first option. In general,other definitions are only used where there is no ICAO definition. If not, it isexplained why another definition is preferred to the ICAO one.

Alert Response Time (ART)


The time delay between an alert situation occurring at the input to the Alert SituationDetection Element and the corresponding alert report being generated at its output.

Coverage Volume (CV)



15/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page 9

That volume of space which encompasses all parts of the aerodrome surface whereaircraft movements take place together with those parts of the surrounding airspacewhich affect surface operations.

Display Resolution (DR)


The number of individually addressed picture elements (pixels) along each axis ofthe display screen. (For a raster-scan display, the resolution is normally expressedin terms of the number of raster lines and the number of pixels per line.)

Information Display Latency (IDL)


The maximum time delay between a report, other than a target report, beingreceived by the A-SMGCS HMI and the corresponding presentation on the HMIdisplay of the information contained in the report.

Position Registration Accuracy (PRA)


The difference between the co-ordinates contained in the dynamic input data to the

HMI and the corresponding geographical position represented on the HMI display.

Probability of Detection (PD)


The probability that an actual target is reported at the output of the SurveillanceElement of an A-SMGCS.

Probability of Detection of an Alert Situation (PDAS)


The probability that the Monitoring/Alerting Element correctly reports an alertsituation.

Probability of False Alert (PFA)


The probability that the Control service reports anything other than actual alertsituations.

Probability of False Detection (PFD)


The probability that the Surveillance Element of an A-SMGCS reports anything otherthan actual targets.

Probability of False Identification (PFID)


The probability that the identity reported at the output of the Surveillance Element ofan A-SMGCS is not the correct identity of the actual target.

Probability of Identification (PID)



16/43


Page 10 Edition: 1.0

The probability that the correct identity of a co-operative target is reported at theoutput of the Surveillance Element.

Reported Position Accuracy (RPA)


The difference, at a specified confidence level, between the reported position of thetarget and the actual position of the target at the time of the report.

Reported Velocity Accuracy (RVA)


The difference, at a specified confidence level, between the reported target velocityand the actual target velocity at the time of the report.

Response Time to Operator Input (RTOI)


The maximum time delay between the operator making an input on a data entrydevice of an A-SMGCS HMI and the corresponding action being completed oracknowledged on the HMI display.

Surveillance Capacity


The number of target reports in a given period which the Surveillance Element isable to process and output without degradation below the minimum performancerequirements.

System accuracy

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definitionThe term accuracy generally describes the degree of conformance between aplatform's true position and/or velocity and its estimated position and/or velocity.

System availability


Availability is the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform a required function at theinitiation of the intended operation within an A-SMGCS area.

System Capacity

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] and [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The maximum number of simultaneous movements of aircraft and vehicles that thesystem can safely support within an acceptable delay commensurate with therunway and taxiway capacity at a particular airport.

System continuity


Continuity is the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform its required function without non-scheduled interruption during the intended operation in an A-SMGCS area.

System integrity



17/43


DSA / AOP

Edition: 1.0 Page 11

Integrity relates to the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the informationprovided by an A-SMGCS. Integrity includes the ability of an A-SMGCS to providetimely and valid alerts to the user(s) when an A-SMGCS must not be used for the

intended operation.System reliability


Reliability is defined as the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform a required functionunder given conditions for a given time interval.

Target Display Latency (TDL)


The maximum time delay between a target report being received by the A-SMGCSHMI and the corresponding presentation on the HMI display of the target positioncontained in the report.

Target Report Update Rate (TRUR)


The frequency with which target reports are output from the Surveillance Element.


18/43



2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

2.1 Objectives

The A-SMGCS level I intends primarily to enhance safety and efficiency of groundsurface operations through the introduction of the surveillance service.

The main objective is to enhance ATM operations, in particular visual surveillance(performed in SMGCS) by an automated system capable of providing the same levelof service in all-weather operations.

Level I surveillance forms a pragmatic first step in A-SMGCS implementation,allowing the progressive introduction of other A-SMGCS services such as Controland Guidance.

2.2 Services

At level I, A-SMGCS consists in the introduction of an automated system capable ofproviding airport traffic situational awareness through the identification and positionof aircraft and vehicles within a predefined area of interest.

The area of interest considered at Level I is defined as follows :

- manoeuvring area for vehicles;

- movement area for aircraft.

At level I, situational awareness is provided only to ATCOS.A-SMGCS level I will differ from an SMGCS in that it provides a surveillance servicethat is effective over a much wider range of weather conditions, traffic density andaerodrome layout.

In particular, an A-SMGCS Level I should be able to assist the controller inpreventing collisions between all moving aircraft and vehicles especially inconditions when visual contact cannot be maintained.

The application of A-SMGCS Level I will lead to reallocation of responsibilities forpositioning the mobiles when the controller cannot establish visual contact. Lessreliance is placed on the ability of the pilot or control authority to provide a visualsurveillance function.

2.3 Operations

Aircraft will operate on different aerodromes, not equipped with the same kind of A-SMGCS. Therefore, to facilitate aircrew operations, A-SMGCS categories need tobe defined corresponding to the implementation levels (I / II / III / IV), as well aspotentially required aircraft equipment. A formal agreement that aircraft will beequipped to provide cooperative surveillance (e.g. carriage of mode S transponder)may be needed.

Airport A-SMGCS category will be notified to airspace users in order to allowaircrews to anticipate provided services and applicable procedures.


19/43


DSA / AOP


2.4 Benefits

The main benefits to be enhanced from implementation of A-SMGCS level I will be

associated with, but not limited to, the maintenance of airport throughput in visibilityconditions 2, 3 & 4 and at night.

Significant improvements of aerodrome safety can also be achieved under goodvisibility conditions through enhanced ATCOs situational awareness.

2.5 Implementation Consideration

A-SMGCS Level I has to be modular to adapt to the needs of different aerodromesand to allow implementation of further A-SMGCS levels.

Design of interfaces and subsystems will be specific to individual airports, forinstance to airport configuration information or exchange of flight related data with

adjacent ATSUs.


20/43



3. SERVICES

This section further describes the (automated) services identified at A-SMGCS LevelI.

3.1 Overview

A-SMGCS Level I consists in the provision of a surveillance service to ATCControllers intended to assist them by providing :

a confirmation on a display of actual airport traffic visible or not by thecontroller;

the position, and the identity if available, of all mobiles, in particular

non visible ones (reduced visibility conditions, building hiding amobile,).

This service will display a synthetic representation of the ground traffic situation :

Traffic context (airport configuration);

Position of all vehicles on the manoeuvring area and of all relevant aircrafton the movement area;

Identity of all cooperative vehicles on the manoeuvring area and of allrelevant aircraft on the movement area.

Moreover, the controller needs to assess the speed of each mobile as he can do

visually today. For instance, it is possible to display the history of the mobilesposition (e. g. the 3 last positions displayed) to give him an idea of the mobile speedand its movement direction.

The controller should be able to confirm the identity of all participating mobilesthrough the application of identification procedures.

Traffic data should be provided, with an adequate accuracy and update rate, inorder to support ATCO decision making process.

3.2 Traffic context

Traffic context contains all data, except traffic information (mobiles position and

identity), which is necessary for the ATCO in its surveillance task, this includes :

Airport layout : geographical representation of various airport areas (TWY,RWY, ), their status (open / closed), the reason a runway or taxiway isclosed;

Reference points : holding points, stop bars (and other airfield lighting), RWYthresholds;

Fixed Obstacles (see definition in section 1.5);

Status of ATS systems (optional : local issue) : landing systems aids,ATIS;


21/43


DSA / AOP


Other data (optional : local issue) : meteorological conditions,

To complement surveillance data provided to the ATC controller, traffic informationis displayed in the traffic context. It means traffic mobiles should be seen in the

correct position with respect to the aerodrome layout and other traffic. For instance,if a mobile is on the runway, it must be seen on the runway and not outside therunway.

3.3 Position of mobiles

Position of all mobiles is necessary for the Controller in order to monitor the trafficand in particular to detect the intruders.

As controllers are responsible for the manoeuvring area, the surveillance servicemust provide the position of all mobiles on the manoeuvring area.

In addition, ICAO Aerodrome control functions ([ICAO-4444], paragraph 7.1.1)recognise local delegation to ATC for push-back control, therefore aircraft that areof concern for ATC (relevant aircraft) need to be identified as well on the apronprior to push-back.

Consequently, the surveillance service requires to cover the vehicles on themanoeuvring area and the relevant aircraft on the movement area (or relevant partof the movement area).

Detection and positioning of potential intruders is required, which implies the use ofa non-cooperative sensor.

3.4 Identity of mobiles

The identity of mobiles is necessary for the controller to communicate with the pilotsor vehicle drivers in particular to issue clearances. The surveillance service willdisplay the identity of all mobiles in a label attached to the corresponding target.

The automatic labelling of a mobile implies the use of on-board cooperativesurveillance equipment that provides mobile identity to A-SMGCS. Mode S or VDL-4transponders are examples of such an equipment.

Provided with the mobile identity, the A-SMGCS is then able to attach the identitylabel to the mobile target. In case a same mobile transponder is used for severalvehicles, ATC should have the ability to manually put the right call sign in theassociated label. This manual labelling shall remain exceptional.

In A-SMGCS level I, most of the mobiles known by the ATC authorities, calledparticipating mobiles, are expected to be cooperative. Therefore, participatingtraffic will be automatically labelled with its identity, which will then be confirmed byATC through the application of identification procedures.

As for position information, the identity labels are attached to relevant aircraft in themovement area and to vehicles in the manoeuvring area.


22/43



4. ROLES OF ACTORS

A-SMGCS actors take part in A-SMGCS operations as a user or contributor. Thissection describes the current respective role of the actors in SMGCS and theirevolution through A-SMGCS level I implementation.

4.1 Controllers

In the SMGCS current situation, the role of ATCO is to manage aircraft and vehiclesmovements in the manoeuvring area with respect to safety requirements andplanning constraints. The main tasks in relation with SMGCS are the following :

Identification of mobiles;

Issuance of clearances and instructions to all participating mobiles;

Monitoring the execution of the clearances;

Monitoring traffic situation on the manoeuvring area;

Information of pilots / drivers about traffic surrounding their aircraft / vehicleby R/T;

Guidance of the participating mobiles by R/T;

Alerting the participating mobiles by R/T.

The role of the controller will not really change with the implementation of A-SMGCSlevel I, but the above tasks will evolve in the sense that the surveillance service will

provide to the controller a new source of data about the traffic situation in all visibilityconditions. This new source of data will complement and could even replace theusual sources of traffic data. This is summarised in the following table :

VisibilityConditions

Sources of Traffic Datawith SMGCS Sources of Traffic Datawith A-SMGCS

Normal

Visual means

Mobiles R/T reports

A-SMGCS Surveillance Service (seedefinition in section 3)

Visual means

Mobiles R/T reports

Reduced

Mobiles R/T reports

A-SMGCS Surveillance Service (seedefinition in section 3)

Mobiles R/T reports

Table 4-1 : Sources of data for the Controller


23/43


DSA / AOP


Air Traffic Controller

Traffic

Situation

Picture

Traffic Context

Position, Identity

of Mobiles

Airport Traffic Context

Airport Traffic

Actions on

Traffic

Surveillance

Information

Figure 4-1 : ATCO role

As illustrated by the Figure 4-1, the traffic situation picture, containing traffic context,position and identity of the mobiles, is provided by A-SMGCS to the controller tohelp him performing its Control task by actions on the traffic via R/T. The controller

uses this surveillance information as following : The controller analyses the global view of the traffic situation;

The controller focuses on particular airport areas (runway for instance) ormobiles (landing aircraft for instance) requiring his attention;

The position of all the mobiles allows the controller to detect intruders, orparticipating mobiles without authorisation;

The identification of the mobile through its label allows the controller tocommunicate with the mobile by R/T;

The mobiles positions with respect to airport layout help the controller to set

up a traffic planning and provide guidance to the pilots / drivers; The controller monitors on the display that mobiles apply the clearances he

issued;

Mobile position compared with airport layout allows the controller to checkthe mobile is on the right way and to provide guidance to the pilot / driver;

Mobile position compared with airport areas status allows the controller toanticipate incursions in restricted areas and to alert the mobile;

Mobile position compared with other mobiles position allows the controller toinform the mobile on its surrounding traffic and to anticipate collisions withother mobiles and to alert the mobile;


24/43



Information on A-SMGCS status (failures,) which could affect safety allowsthe controller to apply the appropriate procedure.

4.2 Pilot

In the SMGCS current situation, the role of the pilot is to navigate his aircraftfollowing ATCO instructions and clearances provided through R/T, and with the helpof visual aids and ATCO. The main tasks related to SMGCS are the following :

Report its position to ATCO by R/T;

Monitor surrounding traffic to prevent collision by visual means and trafficinformation provided by ATCO.

The role of the Pilot will not change with the implementation of A-SMGCS level I.Contrary to the controller, the above tasks will not evolve as the pilot will not have

access to the surveillance service.However, the use of a A-SMGCS level I will have the following impact on the pilotwork :

Reduction of R/T report

Since the controller knows the position and identity of aircraft provided by A-SMGCS, it is possible that some aircraft position reports be not necessary anymore.This statement has to be confirmed by the definition of the procedures related to theuse of A-SMGCS.

Cooperative sensor checking

Since aircraft are supposed to provide their identity through cooperative surveillancesensors, aircrew should check that this piece of equipment operates satisfactorily onboard and should use it in the correct manner.

4.3 Vehicle Driver

In the SMGCS current situation, the role of the driver is to drive his vehicle followingATCO instructions and clearances provided by R/T, and with the help of visual aidsand ATCO. The main tasks related to SMGCS are the following :

Report its position to ATCO by R/T;

Monitor surrounding traffic to prevent collision by visual means and traffic

information provided by ATCO.As for the pilot, the role of the driver will not change with the implementation of A-SMGCS level I. However, when the controller knows the position and identity ofvehicles, provided by A-SMGCS, it is possible that some vehicle position reports arenot necessary anymore. It has to be confirmed in the procedures related to the useof A-SMGCS.

Moreover, if the vehicle is equipped for A-SMGCS, for instance with a transponder,the driver should check the equipment is activated and should use it in the correctmanner.


25/43


DSA / AOP


4.4 Other operators

If not automatic, one or more operators are needed to update the traffic context

required by A-SMGCS, this includes : MET data, visibility conditions (including transition between visibility 1,2,3

and 4),

Airport Configuration : runway in use, open taxiways,

List of participating mobiles,


26/43



5. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The implementation of A-SMGCS level I requires the review of SMGCS proceduresand the definition of a new set of operational procedures to be applied by ATCcontrollers, pilots and vehicle drivers.

In addition, procedures benefiting from A-SMGCS surveillance service are beingharmonised on a European level. The activities on procedures are carried out byEUROCONTROL in close cooperation with ICAO. The following section purpose isto present the categories of procedures associated to A-SMGCS Level I.

5.1 Controller

For the controller, it is necessary to define the procedures for the use of A-SMGCS

as a surveillance means for positioning and identification of the mobiles, like thosealready defined for the use of radar.

For each procedure, conditions under which they can be applied must be defined.Examples of application conditions are the status of the A-SMGCS and the visibilityconditions. The A-SMGCS status may be nominal mode, failure mode or OFF. Forinstance, when a surveillance sensor breaks down, A-SMGCS status switches intofailure mode. When A-SMGCS will not function correctly enough to be used as asurveillance means, its status should be OFF. The limits between the differentsystem status will be accurately defined with their associated procedures.

As in the current SMGCS situation where specific procedures (LVP) apply when thevisibility is reduced, procedures will also differ according to the visibility conditionswhen A-SMGCS level I is implemented. The procedures to be applied under eachvisibility condition have to be defined.

The surveillance service provided by A-SMGCS level I is automatic, but mayexceptionally require manual actions from the controller or other operator. Inparticular, when the identity of a participating mobile is not automatically provided byA-SMGCS, the procedures must define how the controller can perform theidentification of such a mobile (i.e. the use of identification procedures). This manuallabelling shall remain exceptional.

5.2 Pilot

In A-SMGCS level I, there will be limited changes to pilot responsibilities. Asexplained in section 4.2, the pilot must check if the equipment operates correctly. A-SMGCS category of each airport, defining its A-SMGCS level, and the aircraftequipment required to interoperate, is expected to be determined in, for example,the aeronautical publications. Procedures will be written to describe the use of theA-SMGCS equipment in the aircraft.

5.3 Vehicle Drivers

In A-SMGCS level I, there will be limited changes to vehicle drivers responsibilities.As explained in section 4.3, the driver must check if the A-SMGCS equipment of its


27/43


DSA / AOP


vehicle operates correctly in case it is equipped. Procedures will be written todescribe the use of the A-SMGCS equipment in the vehicle.

5.4 Other procedures

Procedures to determine the A-SMGCS category of each airport (A-SMGCSlevel, cooperative sensors,)

Procedures to provide A-SMGCS surveillance data to other users. Even ifCollaborative Decision Making is not expected to be implemented at level I,surveillance data can be provided to other users such as airport operators,airlines, handling agencies to support them in managing their fleets.

Procedures for users licensing.


28/43



6. EQUIPMENT

The aim of this section is to present the equipment required by A-SMGCS level Iwithout favouring any technology.

Firstly, to display the traffic situation picture to the controller, an HMI is needed. Onthe HMI screen, the traffic context and traffic information (position and identity)should be provided, with an adequate update rate to give a continuous flow of trafficinformation.

To provide the position of any mobile, it is essential that some means of surveillancebe available to enable the system to detect non-cooperative targets includingintruders and obstacles. An example of non-cooperative surveillance sensor is theSurface Movement Radar.

Non-cooperative surveillance sensors are not able to provide the identity of themobiles, therefore a system providing cooperative surveillance is likely to berequired. For cooperative surveillance, targets need to be equipped with a means ofcommunicating position and identity information to the A-SMGCS. An example ofcooperative surveillance sensor is Mode S Multilateration. The sensor may also bedependant of the mobile for instance when using ADS-B to broadcast the positionand the identity of the mobile.

The Surveillance element for an A-SMGCS will therefore comprise several sensorsystems. As shown on Figure 6-, the information from these systems sensors will becombined by a data fusion process to provide a comprehensive surveillancepackage displayed on the controller HMI.

Airport Surface Movements

Cooperative

Surveillance

sensors

Non-cooperative

Surveillance

sensors

Data Fusion

PositionPosition +

Identity

External

Data

Traffic

Context

ATCO

Figure 6- : Surveillance Service


29/43


DSA / AOP


7. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

7.1 Methodology

From a methodological point of view, it is proposed to define 3 levels ofrequirements for an A-SMGCS system :

Service level

Functional level

Architectural level

7.1.1 Service level

At the service level, the A-SMGCS system is seen as a black box providing servicesto users. This black box interacts with the users but also with its environment andother external systems. At this level, the requirement analysis allows to define theoperational requirements from a user point of view and to identify the environmentalconstraints and the interfaces with external systems.


Airport Traffic

Services to users

A- SMGCS

System

Figure 7-1 : Service level

7.1.2 Functional level

At the functional level, the requirement analysis interacts with the A-SMGCS systemwhich is seen as an interaction of different functions.


30/43



Services to users

A- SMGCS

FunctionsFunction A

Function B

Function C


Airport Traffic

Figure 7-2 : Functional level

7.1.3 Architectural level

At the architectural level, the requirement analysis defines the physical componentsof the A-SMGCS system which executes the different functions defined previously.

The functions are mapped onto the physical architecture.

Services to users

A- SMGCSArchitecture


Airport Traffic

Figure 7-3 : Architectural level


31/43


DSA / AOP


This document does not aim to identify all the above requirements, but focuses onlyon the first level : operational requirements. These operational requirements arepresented in the following sections. Most of them are drawn from ICAO

requirements [ICAO-A-SMGCS]. In that case, the ICAO requirement number isgiven as a source.

7.2 General principles

The requirements related to System Design, Evolution, Operational Range,Responsibilities, Interfaces and Environmental Constraints are listed as "GeneralPrinciples" while requirements specific to A-SMGCS services are listed in specificsections.

7.2.1 Assumptions

Cooperative

All participating mobiles shall be cooperative.

Sensors and Data Fusion

It is expected that more than one type of sensor and a data fusion unit may beneeded to meet the following requirements.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 5.5.2.1.3

7.2.2 Requirements

Op_Ds-1-Modularity to fit aerodrome needs

An A-SMGCS shall be composed of different modules required for particular userneeds or technological choices.

Note 1 : Each aerodrome has its own operational needs and technologicalconstraints. So each aerodrome will only implement the A-SMGCS modules fittingits needs and its technological choices in order to minimize the cost of its A-SMGCS. Consequently, A-SMGCS consists of many elements which, whenintegrated, are designed to meet the specific operational requirements of an

aerodrome.Note 2: The combination of modules used for any A-SMGCS Level shall ensure thatthe requirements of this Level are met. It implies that minimum modules arerequired, i.e. cooperative surveillance.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.4.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 1.8.2

Op_Ds-2-HMI design

The A-SMGCS design concept must be built upon the integration of the fundamentaland principal system elements and facilitate the upgrading of those elements whilstmaintaining, where possible, the same HMI and references. This is important whenconsidering harmonisation, familiarisation and training requirements, and will allow


32/43



the evolution of the system design through to a full A-SMGCS with the minimumnegative impact on the users ability to interface with the system.

Source : [EUROCAE MASPS] 2.5.2

Op_Ds-3-Interoperability

Standards like Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) shall be writtenand used to permit interoperability between the A-SMGCS elements developed bydifferent manufacturers.

Note : Such interoperability will help to maximise commercial and economic benefitsfor the manufacturer, service provider and user. It should also encourage timelyimplementation by avoiding a proliferation of different specifications.


Op_Ds-4-Standardized Data Format

The data interchange between systems should be performed in a standardizedformat in order to ensure an adequate exchange of information. ASTERIX will be thestandard to be used for surveillance data.

Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.6.21.2

Op_Ds-5-Self-checking system

A self-checking system with failure alerts shall be in the system design.


Op_Ds-6-System status

Equipment which shows control data shall both be fail-safe and fail-soft.

Note : The term "fail-safe" in this context means that sufficient redundancy isprovided to carry data to the display equipment to permit some components of theequipment to fail without any resultant loss of data displayed.

The term "fail-soft" means that the system is so designed that, even if equipmentfails to the extent that loss of some data occurs, sufficient data remain on the displayto enable the controller to continue operation without assistance of the computer.


Op_Ds-7-Failure effect

In case of a failure of an element of an A-SMGCS, the failure effect shall be suchthat the element status is always in the "safe" condition.

Note : For instance, the element shall not provide wrong data which could impact onsafety.


Op_Ds-8-Self-restartable

An A-SMGCS shall be self-restartable.



33/43


DSA / AOP


Op_Ds-9-Restart

The restart of an A-SMGCS shall include the restoration of pertinent information onactual traffic and system performance.


Op_Env-1-Aerodrome

An A-SMGCS should be capable of being installed at any aerodrome.


Op_Env-2-Flight operations

The ground elements of the system shall be sited so as not to affect flightoperations.


Op_Env-3-Equipment

Any A-SMGCS equipment sited close to the movement areas should be :

a) lightweight;

b) frangible where appropriate; and

c) capable of withstanding the effects of jet blast.

Note : It is understood that any A-SMGCS equipment installed in the movementarea will comply to obstacle limitations requirements in Annex 14, Volume I.


Op_Env-4-Adverse effects

The system shall have adequate immunity to adverse effects such as :

a) radio interference, including that produced by standard navigation,telecommunications and radar facilities (including airborne equipment);

b) signal reflections and shadowing caused by aircraft in flight, vehicles or aircraft onthe ground, buildings, snow banks or other raised obstacles (fixed or temporary) inor near the aerodrome environment; and

c) meteorological conditions or any state of the aerodrome resulting from adverseweather in which operations would otherwise be possible.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.5.1.1, 3.6.6.1

Op_Env-5-Radio Spectrum

Those elements of A-SMGCS which require the use of radio spectrum shouldoperate in properly allocated frequency bands in accordance with appropriatenational and international radio regulations.


Op_Env-6-Interference to Other Systems

A-SMGCS equipment shall not cause interference to standard radio navigation,surveillance and communication systems.


34/43




Op_Evo-1-Operational Change

An A-SMGCS shall be capable of accommodating any operational change of theaerodrome after being installed, for instance a physical change in layout (runways,taxiways and aprons), or a change in the aerodrome procedures, rules...

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.6.15.2, [EUROCAE MASPS] 1.8.3

Op_Evo-2-Technological Change

An A-SMGCS shall be capable of accommodating any technological change afterbeing installed.

Note : as several technologies are candidates to A-SMGCS implementation andthese technologies evolve, technological changes are very likely. These changescan be driven by performance enhancements or cost decrease reasons, but also byother ATM services which share systems with A-SMGCS.


Op_Evo-3-HMI impact

A-SMGCS evolution shall have a minimum negative impact on the users ability tointerface with the system. This is important when considering harmonisation,familiarisation and training requirements.


Op_Evo-4-Modularity for A-SMGCS levels

The design principle of an A-SMGCS shall permit modular enhancements such asimplementation of further A-SMGCS levels.

Note : A-SMGCS will evolve from a SMGCS by progressive enhancements to matchthe desired level of operations. The competent authority will determine, inconsultation with the users, whether existing SMGCS needs to be upgraded to A-SMGCS. A-SMGCS for each aerodrome will comprise a different mix of modularcomponents dependent upon operational factors.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.4.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 1.8.2

Op_Evo-5-Cost of evolutions

The design principle of an A-SMGCS shall permit system enhancements at minimalcost.


Op_If-1-User interface

A-SMGCS shall enable users to interface efficiently.


Op_If-2-Operator interface

A-SMGCS shall enable operators updating traffic context or configurating thesystem to interface efficiently.


35/43


DSA / AOP


Op_If-3-Interface with mobiles

A-SMGCS shall be capable of interfacing with all cooperative mobiles in order tocollect the required traffic data. In particular, it shall interface with existing and future

embedded systems.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.6.21.1

Op_If-4-Interface with ground systems

In order to fully benefit from an A-SMGCS by all parties concerned, the systemshould be capable of interfacing with the following ground systems :

- Air traffic management (ATM), including Integrated Initial Flight PlanProcessing System (IFPS), departure management, etc.

- Approach surveillance system to take into account airborne aircraft;

- Stand mangement systems;

- Existing and future ATS systems;

- MET systems;

- Visual aids;

- Any other system as part of the Collaborative Decision Making Process(CDM).


Op_If-5-Interference with ATC

The operation of A-SMGCS interfaces should not interfere with other ATC

responsibilities, such as the observation of aerodrome activity and the requirementsto provide alerting service.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.6.20.1

Op_Range-1-Visibility conditions

A-SMGCS shall be capable of operating in all visibility conditions.

Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.2.4 and 3.2.5

Op_Range-2-Capacity

A-SMGCS shall be able to handle all traffic movements on their area of interest at

any instant time.Note : Since capacity is a site-specific parameter, the determination of the maximumnumber of aircraft on the manoeuvring area should be based on the assumed peaktraffic at the aerodrome. Aerodromes continually strive to increase capacity andtherefore the number of movements, and hence aircraft and vehicles will probablyincrease over time. The A-SMGCS capacity figure should be sufficient to cater forexpansion of this nature and reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that it issufficient.


Op_Range-3-Mobile types 1


36/43



An A-SMGCS shall support operations involving all aircraft types and all vehiclestypes.


Op_Range-4-Mobile types 2

An A-SMGCS shall be capable of adaptating to cater for future aircraft types andvehicles types.


Op_Range-5-Speeds and Orientation

The system shall be capable of supporting operations of mobiles within the followingparameters :

- minimum and maximum speeds for aircraft on final approach, and runways;

- minimum and maximum speeds for aircraft on taxiways;

- minimum and maximum speeds for vehicles; and

- any heading.


Op_Range-6-Velocity

The A-SMGCS should cover the following speeds:

- 0 to 50 kts for aircraft on straight taxiways;

- 0 to 20 kts for aircraft on taxiway curves;

- 0 to 80 kts for aircraft on runway exits;

- 0 to 250 kts for aircraft on final approach, missed approach and runways;

- 0 to 80 kts for vehicles on the movement area; and

- 0 to 10 kts for aircraft and vehicles on stands and stand taxilanes.


Op_Resp-1-Users

Although the responsibilities and functions may vary, they shall be clearly defined forall users of A-SMGCS.

Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.3.1

Op_Resp-2-Assignment

An A-SMGCS shall be designed so that the responsibilities and functions may beassigned to the following :

a) the automated system;

b) controllers;

c) pilots;

d) vehicle drivers;


37/43


DSA / AOP


g) airport authorities;

h) system operators.

Note 1. - The allocation of functions and/or responsibilities might differ depending onvisibility condition, level of automation and level of implementation of an A-SMGCS.A different division of functions among the control personnel (e.g. betweenauthorities responsible for aerodrome movement control and apron managementservices) may also be necessary as a result of possible changes in procedurescaused by automation.

Note 2. - ATC will be responsible for the management and overall operation of thesystem. When certain functions will be delegated to automated elements of thesystem, responsibilities for the integrity and reliability of those functions lie with theservice providers, certification authorities, manufacturers and software suppliers.

Note 3. - When A-SMGCS is in operation, pilots remain responsible for the safety

and control of aircraft.Note 4. -At level I and II ATC controllers and pilots are the only critical decisionmakers. Their decisions are based on surveillance data which have a specifyintegrity.

Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.3.2

Op_Resp-3-A-SMGCS category

Airport authority shall be responsible for notifying the A-SMGCS category operatingin its aerodrome and the procedures that may be applied.

7.3 Surveillance Service Requirements

Op_Mon-1-Equipment Status

The operational status of all A-SMGCS equipment shall be monitored by the system,and alerts shall be provided when the system must not be used for the intendedoperation.


Op_Mon-2-Performance

Monitoring of the performance of an A-SMGCS should be provided such thatoperationally significant failures are detected and appropriate remedial action isinitiated to restore the service or provide a reduced level of service.


Op_Mon-3-Data

The A-SMGCS shall perform a continuous validation of data provided to the userand timely alert the user when the system must not be used for the intendedoperation.

Note: As an exemple when a mobile is still on his area of interest, the system shallcontinuously detect the mobile, otherwise the user shall be timely alerted.



38/43



Op_Mon-4-Back-up

The system shall allow for a reversion to adequate back-up procedures if failures inexcess of the operationally significant period occur.


Op_Mon-5-System Failures

Operationally significant failures in the system shall be clearly indicated to thecontrol authority and any affected user.

Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.6.5, 3.7.5.4

Op_Mon-6-Failure Alerts

All critical elements of the system should be provided with audio and visualindication of failure given in a timely manner.


Op_Perf-01-Probability of Detection

The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle or object is detected and reported atthe output of the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall be 99.9% at minimum.

Note 1 : The output of the surveillance element means at the output of the processwhich builds a comprehensive surveillance package after fusion of data provided bythe different surveillance sensors.

Note 2 : Some ATS providers request a Probability of Detection of at least 95%,while the Probability of Detection is 99% for an Primary Surveillance Radar, and

95% for a Surface Movement Radar. The value of 99.9% could be achieved bycombining several surveillance sensors, e.g. cooperative surveillance sensors.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 5.5.2.2.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3

Op_Perf-02-Probability of False Detection

The probability that anything other than an actual aircraft, vehicle or object isdetected and reported by the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall notexceed 10E-3 per reported target.

Note 1 : The surveillance element means at the output of the process which builds acomprehensive surveillance package after fusion of data provided by the differentsurveillance sensors.

Note 2 : Some ATS Providers request a Probability of False Detection less than 1%.


Op_Perf-03-Probability of Identification

The probability that the correct identity of an aircraft, vehicle or object is reported atthe output of the surveillance element shall be 99.9% at minimum.



39/43


DSA / AOP


Note 2 : Some ATS providers request a Probability of Identification of at least 99%while the Probability of Identification required for Mode S radars is 99.9%.


Op_Perf-04-Probability of False Identification

The probability that the identity reported at the output of the surveillance element isnot the correct identity of the actual aircraft, vehicle or object shall not exceed 10E-3per reported target.


Note 2 : The value of 10E-3 for Probability of False Identification is alreadyrequested by some ATS providers and accepted by manufacturers.


Op_Perf-05-Position Accuracy

For the surveillance service, the allowable error in reported position shall beconsistent with the requirements set by the control task of the controller : 12 m.

Note:

For Reported Position Accuracy (RPA), ICAO specification recommends a value of7.5m ([ICAO-A-SMGCS] 4.3.3.1).

For [EUROCAE MOPS], a value of 7.5m (95% level of confidence) is recommended.

For [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.2.1, a value of 12m would be reasonable for the

surveillance service. The argument leads to the need only to place an aircraft withinthe width of a taxiway, or at least to be able to determine unambiguously which oftwo parallel taxiways an aircraft is using. If we therefore consider a typical taxiwaywidth of 24 m it would be reasonable to require an RPA for taxiing aircraft of 12metres.

At level II, when the control service is also provided to the controller, [EUROCAEMASPS] 3.2.3 and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] 4.3.3.1 agree to consider a value of 7.5metres for RPA. This value is required by the control service and not thesurveillance service. This figure seems to be a little more demanding than theperformance of existing tracking and labelling systems, using SMR as a source(confirmed by BETA project).

To take into account the level distinction made by EUROCAE, we propose a valueof 12 metres for RPA when the position is used by the surveillance service.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.1.2, 4.3.3.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3

Op_Perf-06-Position Resolution

The mobile position resolution shall be at least 1 m.

Sources : [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3

Op_Perf-07-Altitude Accuracy


40/43



Where airborne traffic participates in the A-SMGCS, the level of an aircraft whenairborne shall be determined within 10m.

Note : Justification has not been provided for the need of aircraft altitude for A-

SMGCS and for the value of its accuracy. However, it has been decided to keep thisrequirement as such in the document because it is provided by ICAO. If no moreinformation about this requirement is provided so far, the validation activity willdetermine the status of this requirement.


Op_Perf-08-Update rate

Where appropriate, the update rate of an A-SMGCS shall be consistent with therequirements set by the control task of the controller : 1s.

Note : [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3 and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] 4.3.5 require the updaterate should be at least 1s. For example, in one second, an aircraft rolling at 10 ktscovers a distance of 5 meters. A vehicle at 35 km/h, will move of 10 metres. In thatcase, the position displayed to the controller can differ of 10 metres from the actualposition before being updated with the new reported value. If we take the maximumspeed of 50kts for aircraft on straight taxiways ([ICAO-A-SMGCS] 4.2.4.2), thedisplayed position can differ of 25 metres.


Op_Perf-09-Integrity

A-SMGCS shall preclude failures that result in erroneous data provided to the users.

Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.3.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.1.1.1

Op_Perf-10-Availability

The availability of an A-SMGCS shall be sufficient to support the safe, orderly andexpeditious flow of traffic on the movement area of an aerodrome.

Note : Some ATS providers require an availability of 95.5% per year, and anunavailability less than 1 hour per day.


Op_Perf-11-Reliability

A failure of equipment shall not cause:

- a reduction in safety (fail soft); and

- the loss of basic functions.


Op_Perf-12-Continuity of Service 1

An A-SMGCS shall provide a continuous service.


Op_Perf-13-Continuity of Service 2


41/43


DSA / AOP


Any unscheduled break in continuity shall be sufficiently short or rare as not to affectthe safety of mobiles.


Op_Perf-14-Recovery time

When restarting, the recovery times of A-SMGCS shall be of a few seconds.


Op_Serv-01-Service

A-SMGCS shall provide the surveillance service to the users.

Op_Serv-02-User

The users of the surveillance service shall be all control authorities concerned in the

manoeuvring area of the aerodrome.

Op_Serv-03-Airport Traffic Situation

The surveillance service shall continuously provide the following airport trafficsituation :

- Traffic Information ;

- Traffic context.

Op_Serv-04-Traffic information 1

The surveillance service shall continuously provide the following traffic information :

- Position of all vehicles on the area of interest for vehicles, including intruders ;

- Identity of all cooperative vehicles on the area of interest for vehicles ;

- Position of all relevant aircraft on the area of interest for aircraft, including intruders;

- Identity of all relevant aircraft on the area of interest for aircraft ;

- History of the mobiles position (e. g. the 3 last positions displayed).

Op_Serv-05-Traffic information 2

The traffic information may optionally include other information about traffic, such as:

- vehicle type ;

- aircraft type ;

- aircraft gate;

- ...

Note : this is a local issue to be decided by the ATS provider.

Op_Serv-06-Area of interest for vehicles


42/43



The area of interest for vehicles shall be the manoeuvring area.

Op_Serv-07-Area of interest for aircraft

The area of interest for aircraft shall be the movement area, plus a volume aroundthe runways for aircraft on approach to each landing runway direction, at such adistance that inbound aircraft can be integrated into an A-SMGCS operation andthat aerodrome movements, including aircraft departures, relevant missedapproaches or aircraft crossing the relevant active runways, can be managed.

Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.5.1.1, 3.5.1.4, 3.5.1.5

Op_Serv-08-Traffic context1

Traffic context provided by the surveillance service shall contain all data, excepttraffic information (mobiles position and identity), which is necessary for the ATCO inits surveillance task.


The traffic context shall at least include :

- Airport layout : geographical representation of various airport areas (TWY, RWY,) ;

- Reference points : holding positions, stop bars (and other airfield lighting), RWYthresholds ;

- Fixed obstacles.



The traffic context may optionally include (local issue) :

- Status of runways and taxiways (open / closed);

- The reason a runway or taxiway is closed;

- Status of ATS systems : landing systems aids, ATIS;

- Other data : meteorological conditions,


Op_Serv-11-PositionEach mobile shall be seen in the correct position with respect to the aerodromelayout and other traffic.

Note : It means for instance, if a mobile is on the runway, it must be seen on therunway and not outside the runway. The position accuracy is given in anotherrequirement.

Op_Serv-12-Label

The surveillance service shall provide to the user the ability to manually put the rightcallsign in the label associated to a vehicle equipped with a mobile cooperativeequipment used for different vehicles.


43/43


DSA / AOP

Op_Serv-13-Transition

A seamless transition should be provided between the surveillance for an A-SMGCSand the surveillance of traffic in the vicinity of an aerodrome.
