HILADO v CIR/CTARegulation in question: General Circular V-139 of the CIR, which revoked V-123. New rule states that losses of property which occurred during WWII from fires, etc. are deductible in the year of actual loss/destricution, where the previous rule allowed even outside that year.What happened: In his 1951 ITR, P included P12837.65 as deductible losses due to a war damage claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Comm under the Rehab Act of 1946 (said claim was not to be paid until US Congress would make further appropriation; claimed to be a business asset). This was originally allowed, but later, the SOF issued the said ordinance, and the losses was disallowed as deduction and P3546 deficiency income tax was collected. Said assessment was affirmed by the CTA.I: Whether or not General Circular No. V-123 is a valid implementation of the law.- On the deduction: It should be deducted from 1950 at the very least, because the last installment he received was in 1950 (so any losses would begin at that point). It is not a business loss because the collection is dependent on US Congress (it was in fact part of the law)-- keep in mind that prior to this act, there was no law allowing for the claims.- As for the circular: The issuance was an interpretation of Sec. 30 of the Tax Code, which was originally construed to make the non-payment a catalyst for deduction for losses, but the SOF doubted as to the soundness of the circular, and sought the opinion of the SOJ, who said that the compensation began long after losses, and prior to that, there was no assurance of their compensation.- At any rate, the NIRC itself states that losses are allowed as deduction only during the year the loss is incurred. Such an improper interpretation cannot possibly give rise to a vested.- On the claim that there was no taxable year due to the war: Tax laws are laws of the occupied territory, and in fact they were enforced by the Japanese.--VICTORIA'S MILLING v SSCRegulation in question: SSS Circular No. 22 of 1958: renumeration/earnings will now include premiums due to the SSS, as well as all bonuses, OT, and other media of remuneration.What happened: P protest the circular, questioning the propriety of the change in the rule, and saying that it is invalid for lack of authority to promulgate without approval of the President, and for lack of publication in the OG. SSC ruled that the circular is an administrative interpretation that need not meet Presidential approval or be published.I: Whether or not C #22 is an interpretative regulation that does not require Presidential approval.- There is a distinction between an administrative rule and an administrative interpretation. When a rule is promulgated, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, but when it interprets and renders an opinion, it is merely that-- there opinion (advisory). The former requires a procedure for validity, while the latter does not need that-- it is merely subject to the court's final interpretation.- C #22 was issued in light of RA 1161, which previously didn't include such bonuses in the remuneration value, but which was amended by RA 1792 to only exempt remuneration in excess of P500. The problem now is where the bonuses and the like end up, and this is what the SSC did-- interpret that seeming void in the law.- The circular merely purports to advise employers on how they should compute the monthly compensation-- such is an interpretation that does not require approval by the President. At any rate, the SSC was held to be correct in its interpretation-- the removal of bonuses as separate items, which are still paid, would warrant inclusion in compensation. The definition under the new law, after all, allowed for such a situation due to the change in terminology.--PERALTA v CSCRegulation in question: CSC Resolutions 90-497 and 90-797, where absences on the day prior to a SatSunHol would be considered also as absence during that SatSunHol. Such was used as basis for deduction of pay due to lack of leave credits.What happened: DTI deducted salary based on his absences, which included Saturdays and Sundays immediately succeeding an absence. He inquired on the matter, and it was supposedly allowed based on the said CSC Resolutions (Chairman -> CSC -> MR affirmed). During the pendency of the case, a new resolution was promulgated where employees were not required to work on SatSunHol. It also revoked the rule on absences on the day preceding those days. It seems the case was moot, but for reasons of public interest, the Court ruled anyway.I: Whether or not the CSC Resolutions were valid intepretations of the law.- The CSC interpreted RA 2625, which amended the RAC, and construed that the computation of leave without considering SatSunHol only referred to employees with leave credits as the letter of the law only seems to refer to those with full pay.- Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Such actions may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law or abuse of power or GAD conflicting with either the letter/spirit of a legislative enactment.- The intent behind RA 2625 could be gleamed from Sen. Tolentino's sponsorship, where he stressed that SatSunHol should not be used in the computation of leave, as employees are not required to work on those days. It does not distinguish between those with and without leave credits. Hence there can be no absences on those days. And even before this amendment, the RAC did not distinguish.- Effect: Operative fact doctrine applied due to practical reasons, but P was given the deductions.