06 Eisenman. the End of Classical

8/20/2019 06 Eisenman. the End of Classical

1/17

THE END

OF

THE

CL SSIC L

CHAPTER 3

The End

of the

Beginning theEnd

ofthe End


2/17

' º 'm a..&SSfQl

Architccture from the fifteenth century to the prescnt bet>n under the influence of three

· f i c u o n ~ . N o m ~ t h s t a n d m g the apparent succession

of

architectural styles. cach

ith

its

0\\11

label-classicism. neo·classicism, romanticisrn. modcrnism. post·modernism. and

so

on into the

futurc-thcsc lh r('('

fictiorn;

have

persisted in one form or another for

five

h11nd red years. They are represe

11tation, reaso11

and

his101y.

1

Each of

the fictions

hat.I

;in

underl

ying

purposc: rcprcscntalion

was

to

emhody the

idea

of

meaning:

rcason

was lo cod

i

fy

the

idea of Lruth:

history

was to

recover the idea

of

the timeless

from

the

idea of

change.

Because of he persistcncc of these

c a t e g o r i e ~ . it

\\ill be necessal') to considcr this period

as manifesting a continuity architectural thought. TI1is continuous mode of thought can

be

reforred

to as 11 1: classical.

was not until the

lat

e twentieth century that thc classical could be appreciated

asan

abstract systemofrelations. Such rccognilion occuntd because the architecturc of tbe early

part oí thc twent ieth ce11lury ltself carne to be considcrcd part ofhistory. Thus il is now pos·

sible

to

sec that. although stylistically different from previous architcclures, "modem"

architecture exhibits a ststcm of rclalions similar 10 Lhe classicaJ. • Prior to lhis time. the

classical

\V3S taken

to be eitherS}'llOn)mous

ith

";udtitecture•

conceived

oí

as

a continuous

tradition from antiquity

or.

by the mid-nineteenth Cl'ntury. a historicizcd Sl)'ic. Todar the

pcriod

of time dominated by

the classical ciln

Ul' ~ c c n

as au

·episteme.

to

emplor Fou ·

tenn- a continuous pcriod ofknowledgc thal includes the early twcnticth cc nlury.•

Despite thc pr

ocla

imcd

11.1pture in

botb id

eolo¡iy

ami

slylc

associated

wilh

the Modern

Movement, the three fictions have never been qul"•tioned and so remain intact. 11lis is to

say Lhat architecture sincl' tite mid-fiftecnth ccntury aspired to be a paradigm of the

classic

of

that which

is

timekss.

mta11111gfi1l

and

1me.

1

n

thl


3/17

the ir timelessness depended on a necessa ry historicity.

Th

is

shif

t.

as

ha5 = bec1

gested, occurred because language hacl ceasecl to intersect with r p r s e n t a ó o n r - , ; . ~

?: .

because it was

not 111eaníng

but a messag

e

that

>vas

displayed

in

the object.

Modern architecture clairned to rcctify and liberate itself rom the Renais::.a.no::

f

of representation by asserting that it was

not

necessary for architecture iO r ~

. o a : : :

another

architecture; architecture was

so

lely to embody its own

fimction.

ith

ilie

-

tive condusion tbat form follows function, modem architecture introduced the idea ~ 2

building should express - that is. look like - its function. or like an i m of funai ll

it should manifest the rationality

of

its

proct>.sses of

production and composition .- TI:::;:s.

in its effort to distance itself from the earlier representational traditiou, modem axcno:a:

ture attempted to s trip itself of the outward trappings of "class ical " s¡yle.

This

proa:s.s

reduction was caJJed

abstractio11

A column without a base

and

capital was thoueh: ~ ¡ e ~

abst:raction. 111us reduced, form was believed to embody function more "hon

estlr

5 .xh -

column

looked

more

like a

real

column

, he simplest possible load-ca rf)

ing

eleme¡::;

:he

one

provided with a base and capital bearing arboreal or anthropomorphic motif".

This

reduct

ion to pure fUnctionality was, in fact,

not

abs traction; it was an

atieI:; :lC

represent reality itself ln this sense func:tional goals mere )•replaced thc orders oí

,,,..-tjcz;

compositi

on

as lhe starting poinl for arch itectmal design. T11e moderns· attempt ~

•·realism• with

an

u ndecorated, functional object was a

fi

ction equivalen to lhe s

imulac -

of the classical in Renaissance represen tation. For whaL made runct ion any more i := · ¡

source of imagery

than

el

ements

chosen from

ant

iquity? The idea of ftmction.

in

this

e

lhe message of utility as opposed to the message of anliqui

ty

, was raised toan ~

proposition a

self-evident starting point for design analogous to typology or

hislllric::z :

quotation. The

moderns

' attempt to

represenl

realism is, then, a manifestation ,,,

the

same

Jiction wherein meaning and ' 'alue reside

ou

tside the world ofan architecture ·a:: zs..•

in whicl1 representation is about its own meaning rather than being a messag , of

previous

me

aning.

Functionalism turned out to be yet another styl istic conclus ion; this

on

e based ll i

scientific and

tedm

ical positivism, a simulation of efficiency. From this perspecm-e

~

Modern Movemen t can be seen to be contin uous with the ard1itec

hir

e that p recede(j

Modern ard1i te

ctur

e t

her

efore failed to embody a new

va

lu e in itself. For

i

hying

to

mbi r

a rch

itettu

r


4/17

UDOf

WlCW SKAl

decorated shcd is a building 1hat functions as a billboard, where 30 kind of imagery

(excl'pl its interna functiou) - letters, palterns. cven architectural elemenls- convcys a

mtssage

accessible to all.

n

this

sense

lhe stripped-down "abstractions" of

modemism

are

still referential objects: technological rather than lypological ducks.

llut the post·rnodernists fail

lo

make another dislinction wbicl1 is exemplified

in

Vcnturi's

comparison

of

the Doges' Palace in Vcnice, which be calls a decorated shed. and Sanso·

vino·s library

anoss 1hc Piana

San

Ma

r

co,

which

he

says is a duck.9 TI1is obscurcs the

more significant distinction between architecturc "as

is"

and archilecture as mcssage. Thc

Dogcs' Palace is nota decorated shed bl'cause it was not representationa l oíanother arcbi·

tecture: lts signilicance camc directly from the meaning cmbodicd in the figmes 1hem·

seh'cs; i was

an

architecture •as is." Sansovino's library may seem to be a duck, but only

beca use it

fa

lis inlo the history of library types. Thc use of the orders

on

Sa nsovinds library

spcaks not lo lhe function or type

of

the library. but rather to the rcpresenlation

of

a previ·

ous architecture.

The fas:;ides

of Sansovino's library contain a rnessagc. not

an

inherent

meaning; they are signhoards. Venturi's misreading

ofthesc

buildings seems motivated

by

a prcference for the decorated shcd. Whilc the replicalion of lhe orders had signilicance in

Sansovinós rime {in thal lhey definc


5/17

strategy for arriving ata predetermined goal;

it

was the mecbanism bv wh'cl •

order, represented in lhe orders, was translated into a speciñc fo1m. R e a a i n ~ ~

cosmological goals

of

Renaissance composition, Enlightenment arcbitecruré ' ~

rational process ofdesign whose ends were a product of

pur

e. secular reason

ratM-d:=

divine or

na became the moral and aesthetic basis

of

modern architecture. And the

re

prt>sen?>,o;--"'

ta

sk

o íarchitecture in

an ag

e of reason was to portray its own modeos of

kn

owing.

At this point in the evolution ofconsciousness

so

meth ing occurred: reason turna s:s

focus onto itselfand thus began the process ofits own undoing. Queostioning its º 11

~

ami

mocle of knowing, reason exposed itself to be a fiction." The proccsses for -nowu:::=

measurement

, Jogical proof, causality- tu.rned

out

to be a network of value-laden

ments, no more than effective modes of persuasion. Values were dep

en

den

on

ano:ber

tclcology, anothe r end fiction, Lhat of rationality. EssenLially, then, nothing had

changed from the Rcna issancc idea

of

origin. Whclhcr the appeal was to a div

ine o:-:mt

ural order. as in the ñfteenth century. orto a rational technique a11d t)•pological fünC'11ln. a:

in

Lhe

post-Enlightenment period, it ul

ti

mateJy amounted to the same thing to the jea

that architecture's value


6/17

senled an aesthetic of the expeiience of (the persuasiveness of and desire

for)

reason.

Analysis, and the íllusion

of

proof, in a continuous process thal recalls Nietzsche's charac·

terization of

.

trnth," is a uever·ending series of figures, metaphors, and metonymies:

/11

a

cognitive

environment i11 which reason lias been

revealed

to depend 11 a belief 11 lmowl·

edge,

therefore to

be

irreducibl¡•

met(lphoric.

a

dussiml architccture

- that

is,

an arc/1itecture w/1ase

proccsses o raniformatio11 are va/ue- ade11

strategies grow1ded

on self-evide11t ora priori origins

tvill alwo

ys be a11

arcltitectu o

restatement a11d not

o

epresmtatio11, no

matter

liow ngeniously

tJie

01igins

are sele.cted

for tl1is

tra11sfom1atio11, 11

01

·

/1ow

inl entive

tlie

lrcl/1sfonnatio1i

is.

Architectural rcstalcmeul. replication.

s

a nostalgia for the seauity ofknowing. a belief

in the contimtity of\Vestern lhought. Once analysis and reason replaccd sel

f evi

dcncc

as

thc

means by which tmth was rcvcaled, the classic or timeless guality of h·uth ended and the

need for verification began.

The Fiction of

History:

The

Simulation

of

the

Timeless

l11e

tbird "fiction"

of

cfassical Western architecture

is

that

of

history. Prior to the mid-fifteenth

cenlury, lime was conccived n o n d i l e t i l l } from antiguity to the Middle Ages there was no

concept

of

the "

ro

rward movemeut" oflime. Arl did

nOl

seek its justification in tcrms ofthe

past or future; il was ineffable and timeless. Jn ancient Greece the temple and the god were

one and t

he same; architecturc was divine and na tural. For this reason itappeared "class

ic

"

to the "dassical" epoch that followed. The

dassic

could not be represented or simulated. it

could on ly be. In its straightfonvard assertion of itsclf t was nondialectical and timeless.

In mid·fifteenth century the idea

of

a tempqral origin emerged, and with it the idea

of

the

past. This intenupted the eternal cycle of time

by

positing a

fi.xed

point of beginning.

Hencc the loss

of

the timeless, for the existence

of

origin requi red a temporal reality. The

attempt of the dassical to recover the timcless tumed, paradoxically, to a time-bound con·

cept ofhistory as a source oftimelessness. Moreover, the consciousness oftime's forward

movement carne to explain" a prncess ofhistorical change.

y

the nineteenth centtir)• this

process was secn

as

"dialectical. With dialectical time carne the idea of the zeitgeist, with

cause and effect rooted

n presentness-that

is, with

an

aspired-to timelessness

of

the pres

ent.

ln

addition to its aspiration to timelessness. the

s

pirit

of

the age" held that

an

a pri·

ori relationship existed between history and ali its manifestations at 3ll} given moment. t

was necessary only to identify the governing spiril to know what style

of

a1·chitectut·e was

properly

ex-press

ive of. and relevant

to

, he time. Implicit was the notion that man shonld

always be "in

harmony -or at

least in a non-disjunctive relation- with his time.

In its polcmic rejection

of

the histo1y that preceded it, the Modern Movement

attempted to appeal to values for tlüs (harmonic) relationship othcr than those that embodied

the eternal

or

universal. In see

in

g itself

as

superseding the values

of

the preceding archi

tecture, tbe Modern Movement substituted a universal idea of relevance for a universal idea

o

history, analysis of progr;un for analysis of history. t presumed itself to

be

a va lue-free

and collective form

of in

ten'ention,

as

opposed to the virtuoso individualism and informed

connoisseurship personified

by lhe

post-Renaissance architect. Relevance

n modern a.rchi

tecture carne to lie in embodying a va lue other than the natural or divine; the zeitgeist was


7/17

Q:OO TAllWSIW

seen

to

be contingent and

of

the present, rather than as absolure

and e ermi

difference in value between prcsenlness and the uni\'ersal-between the

O l l C

-

~

oí

1he zeítgeíst and the elernal \'alue

of

the dassical-only re


8/17

The result. thcn.

of

seeing classicism and modemism as part

of

a single historical con·

tinuity is the understanding th;it lherc are no longer any se

lf-

cvident values in representation.

reason, or history

to

confer legitimacy on the object.

TI1is

loss

of

sdf.evídenl valuc

allows

th

e timeless

lo e cut

free from thc meaningful and the truthfuL lt pcrmirs lhe ;iew that

there is no one truth (a timeless lruth). or onc meaning (a timeless meaning}. but merely

the timeless. When the possibihl:) is raiscd that the nmeless can

be

cut adrift from the

limeful (history).

so

too can thc timelcss be cut

away

from universality

to

produce a time·

lessness which is no1 u11i

vc

rsal. This separation makes

it

unimportant whethcr origins are

na rural or dh•inc or fi.mctional; tlitts.

il

is no longer nccessary 1 produce aclassic-that is,

a timeless-architecture b) recoursc to thc dassical valucs inherent

in

representation,

reason,

and histOl).

he

Not

Casslcal:

rchitectu

re as Fl

ctlon

TI

e

necessity

of

the

quot

ation

marks around

thr

term

fiction

is

now

obv

iou

s.

The three

'ictions jusi discussed can

be

seen not as fictions but rather as simulations. As has bccn

:>aid. fiction becomes simulation when

it

does not recognize its condition as fiction, when it

:ries to simula ti' a condition

of

reality. truth. or non-fiction. The simulation

of

representation

m architecture has led, first ofali ,

toan

excessive conccntration of invenl

i\'C

cnergies in thc

re

presentational objcct. Whcn

co

lurnns are seen as SLJrro

ga te

s oftrees

ancl wirtclows

rescm·

ble the portholes

of

ships. architcclural elements become representalional figures canying

an

in

ordinate burclcn ofmcaning. 1n othcr disciplines representation is not the only pur·

po

e of figuration. In literarurc. for example. metaphors and similes hai;c a

ider

range

of

applic

ation-poetic

, ironic. and thc

like-and

are not limited to allegorical or referential

functions. Conversely.

in

r c h i t c c t u r ~ only one aspecl of the figure is tra


9/17

architecn

ll"e

r a t i o n a l l )

for

strategics and solutions are ves tiges

of

a goal-0nenred ~ ~ =

the world.

lfthis

is

Lhe

case.

Lhe

question becomes. What can be the model for archr

:rc;-;

7

whcn thc esscnce of what

was

efíecUve in

the

classical model- the pr

esu

med r ~

value

of

structures, representations. methodologíes

o

o

ri

gins a

nd

ends. a.nd

processes-has been shown to be

a

simulation?

Jt

is

not possible to answer such a questíon with

an

altemative

mo

d

eL

But a

series

f

characterístícs

Glll

be proposed lhal typify this apoda, this loss in

our

a p t o o ~

tualize a new model for architechire. These characteristics, outlined below, arise

from thi

which cannot be:

thcy

forrn a structure of

abs

e

nces

. • The

pu

rpose in proposing

them

tS

nat

to reconstitute what

has

just been dismisse

cl

, a model for a

t11eo

ry ofarch

itecture-

for ~

such models are ultimately futile. Rather what is bcing proposed is an e

xp

ansi

on - o n :

the limilaUons presented

by

the classical model to the realizalion of r

l i i

ú t rt as ª " 1n c-

pendeut o u r s ~ free

oí externa values- classical or any

other-that

is, the

i l l l e r s e ~

of the meaningjree, the rbitr ry

ancl

thc timeless in the artificia

l.

The meaning-íree, r b i t r a ~ and timeless c1eation ofartificiality in th is sense

mus: be

distinguished from what Baudrillard has called simulation": '; it is

notan

attempt to r

~

the dassical distinction between reality and representation-thus again making :m:hí=

ture a set

of

conventions simulating the real; il is , rather, more like a ilissimula·ior_

Whereas simula ion allempts

to obliterate the difference between real and imagin

aT\

·

D ·

simulation leaves untouchecl the difference between reality

and

illusíon. The t i o ~ - . . i ; ;

between dissimulation and reality is similar to the signification embodied in the

mas..l;; tbe

sign

of

pretending to be no/ what one is- that is, a sign

whicl1

seems not to s ignify

3"J·

thing besides itself (the sign

of

a sign,

or

the

negation

of

what is behind it

).

Such

a: .:;,..

simulation in architecture can be given the provisional title of the "not·classical : As d <

simu

lation is not the inverse, negative, oropposite

of

simulation, a "not·dassical"

r h i ~

is not the inverse, negative, or opposite.

of

class ical arcbitectu

re;

it is merely different from a ;

other than. A "not-dassical"

aTch

itecture is no longer a certification ofcxperience ~

tion of history. reason, or reality in the present. lnstead, it may more appropriately e descr.. ie:

asan other

manifestation,

an

architecture as is, now as a

fi

ction.

It

is a reprcscntation

of

itsáf.

of

its own valucs

and

interna) experience.

The claim that a "not·classical" architecture is necessary, that

ít

is proposed

by

the

ne

epoch or the rupture in the continuity of history. would be another zeitgeisl argument. The

"not

·d

assical" rnercl)• proposes an end

lo

the dominance of classical values in ordc-r

w

rev

eaJ

other values. ft proposes,

nota

new

val

ue

ora

new zeitgeist, but merely

an

other

con

dition-one of

reacling architecture as a text. There is nevertheless no question that

li;:S

idea

of

the read

ing of

architecture is initiated

by

a zeitgeist argument that today the cb


10/17

O m O USJUl

The ndof the

eg

inning

.\n origm of1alue implies a stale ora condition oforigin before valuc has been gil-en to it.

A beginning is such a condition pr i

or

lo a valued origin. 1n order to reconstruct tbe time·

ess the

stat

e of

as is

of face va lue .

one must

begin: bcgin by eliminating thc lime-bound

concepts

of

the classicaJ. which are primarily origin and end. The cnd

of

the beginning is

abo the e nd

of the

beginning

of

valuc. But it is not possible to go back to thc carlier,

pre

h1'1oric state of gyace, thc Eden of timelcssness before origins

and cnds

were valued.

\Ve

must begin in lhc present- withOll l necessarily giving a value to presentncss. The attempt

to

re

construct the timeless today

must

be a fiction which recognizcs the fictional ity oí its

º 11

task-that

is , it should nol attempt to simulate a limcless reality.

As has

been suggested above, latent in Lhc

das

sical appeal to

origi11s is

the more gen

eral problem

of

cause and elfect. This formula, part

of

the fictions

of

reason and histot;

•.

rt'duces architE'ct11re loan "added

10

"

or

• incssentiaJ• object by making it simply

an

cffect

of certain causes trndcrstood as origins. This problem is inhcrent n ali ofclassical architec

rure. i

nduding

its modernist aspee . T

he

idea

of

architcctu

l e

as something "aclded to" rather

:han

somethrng

with its own being - as adjectival rather than nominal or

ontological

eads

to

the perccption

of

architecturc as a practica de..-icc.

As

long as architecture

is

primarily

de\icc designated for use

and

for shelter-that is, as long as il has r i g i n in programmatic

functio s il will alwa¡•s 'onstilule

an

effect.

But once this "sclf.evident" characlcristic ofarchitectme is dismissed

and

archltccture

is seen as having no a priori origins -whether functional . divine.

or l u r ~ l l t e m

t i v

+lctions for the origin

can

be proposed : for example.

one that

is arbilm1')'.

one

that has no

enernal

va

l

ue

dcrived from meaning. truth,

or

timelcssness.

lt is

possiblc to imagine a

beginning internally consistent but no1 c.onditioncd by or contingent on historie origins

with supposedly S(•lf-evi

dent

values. '

7

Thus,

while classical origins were thought to have

their source

in

a divine or

natural

ordE'r and modem origins were held to derive their value

from deductive reason , "not-dassical' origins can be strictly arbitrar)". simply starting

j)'lints. without value . They can be artificial and rclative, as opposed

1

natural, divine, or

uni..-e

rsal. Sud1 artificiality delermined beginnings can be free of universal values

l>eca

use

they are

me

rely arbitrary points in time, when the ard1ilcclural process com

me

nces. One l'xample of an artificia l Ol'igln is a graft, as in the genetic insertion of

an

alíen

body into a hosl to provide a new rcs ult. ' , As opposed to a collage

ora

monta

ge

. which lives

'"ithin a

cont

ext a11d alludes lo

an

origin, a grafi is

an

im'

ented

site, which

does

not

so

much have objecl characteristics as thosc oí process. A graft

is

not

n

itself genetically arlll·

y

. lis arbitrariness is

in

its freedom frorn a valuc system

of

non-arbitrariness (that is,

the classical). is arbitrary in its provision ofa choice of reading which brings

no

exlernal

;alue to the process. Bul further. in its artificial and relative nature a graft is not in itself

necessarily

an

achievable result, bul mcrely a site

tha1

contains motivation for aclion- that

:s. the beginning ofa process.'

0

). otivation lakes

something

arbitrary - thal is, something

in

its artificial state which

;< not obedient toan externa Slrttclure of values - and implies an action anda movement

concerning an interna structw·e which has an inherent order and an interna logic. This


11/17

raises the question of the motivation or purposc from an arbitrary origin. How can sorne-

thing

be arbitrary and non-goal-oricnted butstill be intcrnally motivatcd? Every state h

be argued, has a motivation toward its own being-a

motion

rather than a direction lb"t

because architecture cannot portra¡r

or

enact

reason

as a value


12/17

..

oO

1111 CWSlW

the arbitrary orig

in

cannot be known in advance

(in

a cog11it

iv

e sense), it does aot depend

on know ledge dcrived from

1hc

classical lradition and thus cannot engender a strategy.

In this context architcctural form is revealed as a "place oíinvention• rather lhan as a

subservient representation

of

anothcr

ard1i1ecturc oras

a strictly

practica

l

devicc

.

To

invent

an archi tecture is to a

llow

architecturc 10 be a

cause:

in order to be :1 cause, it musl arise

from

something outside a directcd strategy

of

composition.

The end

of

the end also concerns

tl1c

end

oí

the object represcntation as 1hc only

metaphoric subje-c1 in architecwre. In the pasl thc metaphor in architecturc was used to

convey such f o r c ~ s as tensio

n,

compression, extension. and clongation; these were quali

ties tbat could be seen,

if

not literally in the objects t h e m ~ e l v e s tlien in rhe relationship

between objects. The idea of 11e metaphor here has notliing

to

do with the quahties gcn

era1

ed

between bu ildings or between buildings and spaces:

rnther,

1t has

10

do witli the idea

that the internal process itselfcan genera

e

a kind ofnon-represenutional figuration

in

the

object. This

is

an appeal not

to

the classical aesthetic

of

the object, but to the potential

poetic oían architectural text. Thc problem, then, is to distinguish texts from representa·

tions.

to convcy

the

idea

that what one

is

sccing,

t11e

material object,

is

a tcxt rather than a

series

of

image refcrences

to

othcr objects or values.

This suggests the idea of ard1itecture as "writing· as opposed to ard1itecture as image.

What

is

being "wrillcn• is not thc objectitselí i ts mass

and volume b

ut 1he act oímassing.

This

idea gives

a metaphoric

body to

the act

oí

architecture. lt

tl1en

signals its

re-ading

through

an

other system of signs. called

traces ª

Traces are not to be read literally. since

they

have

no other

value tlian

to signa the

idea

that therc is a reading e\·ent and

tha1

read

ing should

take

place;

trace slgnals the

idea

10

rea

d.

Thus a trace is a partial or fragmen

ta )'

sign; it has no objecthood. lt signifies an action that is in process. In this sense a trace

is no1 a simulation of reality;

it

is a dissimulation because it

reveals

itselfas distinct from

its

fonner

reality. t does

not sinrnlate

tl1e real,

but represents

and records

the

action

inherent

in a fonncr or future reality which has a value no more or lcss real han the trace itself. TI1at

is, trace is unconccmedwith forrning an imagc whidi is tl1e rcpresentation of a previous arclti

tecturc or

of social

customs and usages; rather, il

is

concemed with the marking-litcrally

thc

figuration of it

s own internal processes. Thus the trace is tite record of motivation.

the

reco rd

of an action, notan image oíanolhcr objec

t·

origin.

In

this case a ·not-classic:al" architecture begins acthcly

to

itl\'olve an idea

of

a reader

conscious of bis own identity as a reader rather than as a user or obsen·er. t proposes a

new reader distanred írom

any

externa]

yaJu

e system (particularly

an

architectural·histori·

cal system). Such a reader brings no prior competence to 1he act of reading olber than an

identi1y

as a reader. That is. sud1 a reader has no preconceh·ed knowledge of

what

archi·

tccture should be

(in

terms

of

its proportions,

te:\."tures.

sea e. and the

like):

nor does a •not

classica1

" architecture aspi

re to

make itself understandable through these preconceptions.1•

The competence of he reader (of ard1itecture) may be defined as the capacity to dis·

tinguish a sensc

o

knowing from a sense

ofbelieving

At any given time t11e conditions for

"knowledge" are "deeper• han philosophic conditions: in fact,

they

provide the possibility

of distinguishing philosophy from líteraturc, science rrom magic, and religion from myth.


13/17

UDOfTll CIASSIW

The new competcnce comes from the capacit}' to rcad per se. to know how to read, and

more importan

tl

y, to know how

toread

(bul not necessarily decode) architccture as a text.

Thus the ncv. "object mus t have the capacity to reveal itself firsl ofali as a text. as a read

ing evenLThe archítectural ficrion proposed here differs from the classical ficlion in íts pri·

mary condition as a text

and

in the way it is read: the new reader is no longer presumed to

know the na

tu

e

of

truth in the objec

t.

e ith

cr

as a represcn1a1ion

of

a ralional origin

oras

a manifestation of a universal set of rules govcrning proportion. harmony, and ordering.

Bul further, knowing how 10

decodc

ís

no longer importa.ni; simply, language in this con·

text is no longer a code to assign meanings (that

rl1is

means thar). Tbe activit}' of reading is

lirst and foremost in the recognition

of

something as a language (that

il is).

Reading, in this

sense. rnakes availab

le

a

leve of icatio11

rathcr

tha11

a

level

of meaning or expression.

Tberefore.

to

propase

1he rnd of

the bcginning

and

thc

end of

the

end

1

is lo proposc

the end ofbeginnings and

ends ofvalue-10

propose

an olher

•1imeless· spacc ofim•en·

tion. lt is a "timeless"' space in the present '"ithouta determining relalion toan ideal fuhire

or 10

an

idealizcd past. Architechrre in 1

he r resent

is scen as a process of inventing

an

artificial past and futureless presenl. lt remcmbers a no·longer future.

This

paptr

is basal 011 llm

:e

verifiable

assumplions

or

values:

timeless originless.

endltss) arcl1iteclure;

n o 1 1 - r e p r ~ s e 1 1 1 a t i o 1 1 a l

objectless) arcl1itecture; and artificial

arbilrary,

reaso11/ess)

archi

tectu

re.

Notts

t Jean Baudrillard,

Si11114 atio11s (Now

York: Semío1cxt(c), 198})• 83. Je3n Baudrillard porlr•y• tho: period begln·

níug in thc fií1icar is often confu.«I \>ilh 1he ide• of he •cbssic" •nd wilh the •l)liSlic rncthod o í das3i·

rism.• That which is classic, according to Joseph Rykwert. itwokes the idt• of •nciem and ••ernpl•ry"

•nd

sug·

gests a

uthority

and disunclion' : it is a model of ''ha1 is excellent or ol thr fina rauk. ~ 1 o r r ; - ilnport.an1.ly. h

implies ns 0011 urnelessness. thc uka that it i :::

ñ ~ l

r:ank atan)'

tin1P.

C l a ~ s k i s : m . as oppoc;td to thc classical.

";U

be

deñncd h• ..,

as

a method

of

attempting lo

rmduce

a ·dassic"

r ~ u l t b)•

appealing lo a •cJ•ssíaJ• poSI.

Thi•

a


14/17

UIDOfTH(

ClASS

lt l l

J· Michcl Fou e church in the fiftcenth ccnn1ry w•s similar.

How

el'cr.

lt

Is quite anothcr mattcr

to

overla)

thc tcn1plc front \\ith the triu1nphal

ard1.

See

R.

Wirtko\\'er.

Ar,f1irmumf

P r i n c i p l ~ in rJ c

Age

of u n 1 t A n i s n ~

(Ne\\• York:

\V. W.

Norton. 1971). and also

D.

S. Cha1nbcrs,

Patrous and

Artisis in rht Rt ttaissanc¿ (London:

MacMillan. 1970).

lt is

35

if Alberti \\'ere saying that \\

"'ilh lhe au

lh

Ol'it) or God hl que-st

ion

. 1n-a111nus t l'f'SOfl

to thr. 5)111001,:; of

Ws

O\\

D

Pº'\'er to

re:ril

)- tbe church. Thus. the use of the triu1nphal arch becon1es a n1essage on the

f ; J ~ i l d é oí

S:.utt'.A.Jtdrc:i

r:s1h

cr than an embodintt1H ofits inhe.rtnt me3 ning.

7.

Jeff Kipnis. from a seminar ot lhe Graduate School

of

Design. HOJ"-ard Univer-ity. Ul Febnmy 1984. "F

orm can

·

not

follo\V

func.tion until func.tio11 {induding but nor linúted

t

use)

h.a

fi.rsr eniergcd .as a pos.sibílny of form ..

8.

Roben Venluri, Dtnise Scon

·a rO\vn, 2nd

Stt\'tn

Ittnour. l ittn1ingfrou1 Uu ~ ht Forga.:1.e n Sj'fltlu:ili-.nn

of

Ar l1llrc11oral

Form

, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Pre>s. '977) 8¡

9. See the film,

Dq·und

U1opla:

CJ1mv¡i11g

A1rio•des ' Amtn.:an

Ar.hit .ruu ¡ . ; ~ . ,

York \liclr.iel

B l o c ~ w o o d

Pruductions,

198})

.

10. Baudrilfard,8. 9. ln rcfccring to thc

dcod1 of

thc reality

of

God, Baudrillud 'S, M c t i ¡ ~ i a l des¡¡air came

fi·om the idea that thc in1ages concealed notbing at .all .and dlat in fact ther

\•.-ere

not un.ages but acrually

pctfect shnulacra,"

u . leone BattL;ra Alberti,

011

Pni111i11g

(New Haveu

: Vale Uníversity f'ress, 1966). 68

-74

12

. 1'.1on·is Kline, Mcultt111at

-

cs.: 111.t l A ~

of

Ctrla inry (NM'' Yorlc Oxíord Univers:ifl• Press. 1980).

5.

1

3.

Martín Heidegger, "On lhe Fssence

ofiruth.

in

Basi

c \Vrifoigs ed. Oovid Farrell Krell

(New

York: Harperand

Ro'''· 1977).

133.

E r ~ O C ) '

¡

e 1he esseruial counter·essence lei 1he p l i r n o r ~ i a l essenct" of1n1th. Erranc)

1

opetls


15/17

DOfnn cwm:.o.L

itselfupas the open region for cvcry oppositc csscntial r u t h Ertoncy the concealing

of

what is concealed

belong to the pritnordiaJ essen·ce

oí

truth

..

14. Cille• Odcuze. "Plato

•ad

thc Sinmlacrum." Oaober. no. 27 (Wintcr 1983). Deleuzc uses o slighdy difforent

terminolog)' to •ddress

a

very similar set of ssues: he d]sCTL>Ses the rlotonic distinction between model, copy.

and "

simulacromH

as a

n ~ n s

of :.ssigning

\•:ilue Jnd

hi

er.ard1ical

position to objecls and ideas. He e

xploiins

the ovcnhro\\•of Platonii;1n .as

Lhe

suspension oí tht a priori valut·Jaden

'Status of U1t

Pla.tonic ropy in ordtr to

"raise up shnulacra.

to

3$St rt their

rig.ht:s

ove r icous ar copies. The

problt"nl

no longerconct':rus the distlnction

Essence{Appearanoü• original and copy buth

m o d ~ I

ond reproduction. Of the

at

least h\'o

dh

·ergent series in1eriorized in the sin

1u1acru

.m neithe-r can be

assigned as ori :,rinal oras

copy.

lt doesn't

evc.n

\Vork

to

ilt\'oke the rnodeJ of he Other,

becau,:,e

no

nlode1

rcsi5"ts

thc ,..,rtigo

of

thc simulacrum· (52.

¡3).

Simulation

is use<

here in a

sense

which dosely

ap¡>roximates

Deleuie's

use

of

copy

or

kon,

while

dissimulation

is

conceptuallyveryclose to his descript

íon of

he prt-Socratic símulacr•.

1 · Oauclrillard, z.. In

th.e

cssay MThc Precession

of

Sin1uJ3cra

.

· 83udrill:i.rd ~ C L L . ' > s e s the

nruure of

im11la1inn 3nd

tite hnplicahun

ur

prescnt·day

s1n1\tlacra

oa our

pcrccption

of he

nan1reof

reality :ind representation: "Sonle·

Uting

has diSllppeared; the sovercign differcncc

bcl\\'CCll

thcm (d1c

real

and • • . símulation models) that

w3s

the abst.raction·s

charm."

16

. Br1 can produce sclf·evident

p r o c c . d u r e ~

that have

a.o lotem;i,I

n1otivat

ion.

18. The idea ofarbitrary or artificial m ~ i i s sense musi be distinguished from thc classical idc3 of 3rchitcc:turc as

al'tificíti1 uah1re or from the idea

of

the arbitrarincss oí

rr.he

sigu in language .A.rbitrary in L h l ~ conlext means

having no natur.d conncction. ThC' insight that origins a:re a contingency of languagf" is h:ased on an

appeaJ

to

re-.a.ding: the origin can be arbitrou-y because it

is

contingient on a reading that brings its

O\

Vll strategy \vith iL

i9 . Jonathaa Culler,

On D


16/17

IHD DfTMI CWSICAL

\lmttion ducid4tes he hettt0g•noígraft..

1

ts uscd In this

papt

rmy

, . , ~ bttn pl.ccd UllCOfüCÍOUSI) in. .-ed

hett

m •

"º'

tlut

cJ,,.,.I)

r? '-'Ork .u m m t r . t l ) f e t t \ ~ niponttnt

oí

dt:t..01npositiot1. \Vhllc cxt"nsion

is

anr

tnove

rneut

fro

rn un origin (or

:in initial condition).

Jnodifi(..ation ¡,a

spccific

fon11 oí

e.xtensicnl

co11ct1rned

"'lth presen;ng thc cvtdcnce ()f

11i-

tiol

ample. throush no •ddítion

º'

sublroclion oí

111a1tin¡¡uíshcd from )acque• Dtrrid.-S

115• ofthc

renn. for

~ m e l a d i t t e t l ~ ·

"''""" th• i d ~ of •Jifl•n:nce· to

the

fact that tt is impossible 10 ~ b t t ' p t t - ~ as: an ennt)·. "'lhr prC 'i< nCt oí nmtian ts conct-1\0lblt' unh ulSOfaras

"'


17/17

º'

nuCUS.Sf

CAl

>J. W• have

alwa¡s

rcad "rchile.)ing th>i >rchil«turc is m ~ ¡ languagc. We FTad whethcr we know whai l • ~ g we are readin11

or

noL \Ve

can n-ad Frt"nth

,,;1

h

ou1

undtf')Qnding Frtn(h

. 'e c:an knO\\ o m ° n ~

1s spcakin3 n o n s ~ u s e

or

noli>e. Beforc

t

:are

con1petcn1 coread

aud u11dcrstand ¡lOt'IT) '

r

can kno'v sornc.•th111¡J

to be

ia

ngu:igc:. Readiug

in

this coutext is

not

conccmcd

ith dt:eoding for

rncarüng

or

for J>Ol lic

content but

r.ather

for

ind•tiition.

25. C. F. Franco Rtlla. "Tempo drl la fine e tempo delfiniZto· fThe Age oí

End

and

lh4'

Age of the fk:¡mning).

CmobrJ a

48. no. 498 99 O•n.-F. 1984 :

to6-8.

n

••

•imilarit)' 10

1he

lltl< of

Fnncn

Rella's

art1de

is

COÍll·

cldcn1al, for IV<

use

the trrms ..l>.:ginn ng" ond "cud . for e1uir.Jy diRertm p u r p o ~ • s . Rrlla i d e n t i f i c ~ the pres

rnl

s

the a¡¡e

of

lhe cnd.Sl•tang

tb>t tht

par.tdo:ucü re.:uh

of

pro¡¡rcss

has

b.en lo t roaie • culiurc

1hot

simul·

tan

Documents

06 Eisenman. the End of Classical