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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

THE FUTURE OF ALLIED AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE,

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

GENERAL REPORT

Philippe VITEL (France)General Rapporteur

www.nato-pa.int 20 November 2016

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1

II. NATO AIRBORNE ISR: LESSONS AND ADAPTATION........................................................2A. LESSONS LEARNED: NATO AIRBORNE ISR IN THE RECENT PAST......................3B. NATO ISR ADAPTATION..............................................................................................4

1. Joint ISR...............................................................................................................42. NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force...............................................53. Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS)........................................................................5

III. MAJOR AIRBORNE ISR EFFORTS IN ALLIED STATES......................................................6

A. NATIONAL EFFORTS...................................................................................................6B. EUROPEAN COOPERATION.......................................................................................9

IV. TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN AIRBORNE ISR................................................................9A. AIRBORNE ISR IN THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT................................9B. DATA PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION...............................10C. THE BALANCE OF MANNED AND UNMANNED AIRBORNE ISR SOLUTIONS.......12D. OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES..........................................................12

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS...................................................................................................13

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................14

SELECT AIRBORNE ISR PLATFORMS..............................................................................15

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the words of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty”. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is a critical component to dispel the ‘fog of war’ – and in times of hybrid warfare, the ‘fog of peace’ as well. Accurate intelligence can provide a decisive advantage. Indeed, Napoleon once said that “war is 90% information”.

2. Today, NATO’s security environment is characterised by growing uncertainty, instability, and risks. Asymmetric threats combine with conventional challenges posed by potential state adversaries. On NATO’s eastern Flank, a militarily resurgent Russia has illegally and illegitimately annexed Crimea and continues its military aggression in eastern Ukraine. On their southern Flank, Allies face an increasing flow of foreign fighters as well as the terrorist organisation Daesh 1

and other radical extremist groups. In this context, advanced airborne ISR systems become ever more crucial to reduce uncertainty and inform political and military decision-makers – both at the strategic level and in concrete military operations.

3. In 1794, the French army used the hot air balloon L'Entreprenant for observation during the Battle of Fleurus, which marked the first time airborne ISR made a decisive difference to the outcome of a battle. Since, airborne ISR has become an integral part of the armed forces. Over the last 15 years, in particular, airborne ISR has repeatedly proved its worth for NATO, directly supporting its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Airborne ISR was an integral part of NATO’s past operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. Today, Allied ISR systems monitor Russian snap exercises near NATO territory, survey the flows of migrants to Europe, and support the fight against terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa.

4. In early 2016, NATO has taken several decisions that demonstrate the immense utility of ISR:

- In the Aegean Sea, NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 conducts reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance activities in support of the efforts by Greece, Turkey and Frontex (the European Union’s border agency) to stop illegal trafficking and illegal migration;

- In response to the ongoing civil war in Syria, NATO has stepped up its ISR activities along the Turkish-Syrian border;

- Allies participating in the coalition against Daesh with Airborne Early Warning and Control national assets were allowed to task NATO’s fleet of Boeing E-3A Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to fill national requirements.

5. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Heads of State and Government took the latter decision further and agreed in principle to provide “direct NATO AWACS support to increase the coalition's situational awareness”, planned to start in autumn 2016. Allies made it clear, however, that this contribution did not make NATO a member of the coalition. Furthermore, Allies agreed, in principle, “on a possible NATO role in the Central Mediterranean, to complement and/or, upon European Union request, support, as appropriate, the EU's Operation Sophia”. The Operation is the EU’s effort against migrant smugglers and traffickers in the Southern Central Mediterranean. One of the capabilities that NATO could provide, if asked, would be ISR.

6. Increased intelligence sharing, including as part of Allied ISR, has long been an elusive goal for NATO. Recently, however, the momentum has been shifting. The 2010 Strategic Concept,

1 Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and Syria1

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approved at the Lisbon Summit, called for enhanced intelligence sharing “to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented”. To that end, Allies decided to “continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO’s contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against [the threat of terrorism] including through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing”. The so-called Lisbon Package called upon Allies to acquire “key enabling capabilities – including information systems for more effective decision-making and command and control, and improved arrangements for sharing intelligence”. The momentum continued at the 2012 Chicago Summit where NATO launched the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative to better synchronise and integrate NATO ISR. At the 2014 Wales Summit, the Defence Planning Package reconfirmed ISR as one of NATO’s top priorities. NATO’s Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, with the Global Hawk unmanned aerial system at its core, is on track to be available to NATO in 2017. Furthermore, as a result of from the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance has begun the process of defining options for a follow-on capability for NATO’s AWACS when the last plane will be grounded in 20392. At the Summit, Allies also agreed that they “will further improve our strategic anticipation by enhancing our situational awareness, particularly in the east and south and in the North Atlantic”. They argued that the “ability to understand, track and, ultimately, anticipate, the actions of potential adversaries through Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and comprehensive intelligence arrangements is increasingly important”.

7. The report has been prepared to inform the parliamentary debate on airborne ISR within the Alliance. It builds upon previous work on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and next-generation aircraft within the Science and Technology Committee (STC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). The report was first discussed at the STC meeting at the NATO PA Spring Session in Tirana, held on Sunday 29 May 2016. Since then, it has been updated, revised, and expanded for discussion and adoption at the STC meeting at the NATO PA Annual Session in Istanbul on Sunday 20 November 2016. Valuable insights for this report were gained from a roundtable at the US National Defense University in Washington DC in April 2016, hosted by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Committee members heard from and discussed with Lieutenant General John N.T. Shanahan, Director of Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) in the Office of the US Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, as well as representatives from Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Silent Falcon UAS Technologies, and Textron AirLand. The report examines the following topics:

- the role of airborne ISR, including in recent operations and the current and future strategic environment;

- major airborne ISR efforts in Allied states;- NATO ISR adaptation; and- trends in airborne ISR.

II. NATO AIRBORNE ISR: LESSONS AND ADAPTATION

8. At the most fundamental level, the goal of ISR is to collect data and information and transform it into intelligence that informs military or political decision-making. While surveillance is the persistent monitoring of a target, for example NATO airspace, reconnaissance is a more targeted activity in order to answer particular questions, such as tracking down a vessel of interest in the Mediterranean Sea. Data can come from any source in any of the military domains (air, cyber, land, sea, and space), for example from human intelligence, airborne systems, or satellites systems. As such, airborne ISR is only one element of the total ISR network. Gathered information must be processed to produce intelligence, which can then be disseminated and

2 The decision to fly the NATO AWACS fleet until circa 2035 is still pending final confirmation by the 16 Allies who fund the NATO AWACS programme. This confirmation is unlikely to occur before 2018.

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utilised to make informed decisions, prevent surprises, command and protect military forces, and engage the enemy.

9. As opposed to satellites, airborne ISR platforms can flexibly and rapidly move to where they are needed. Compared to ground-based intelligence, they provide a bird’s eye perspective. Therefore, airborne ISR can provide real-time intelligence for tactical needs, but can also produce strategic intelligence for situational awareness. Airborne ISR is thus not just an enabling capability, but a core element of politico-military decision-making. However, airborne ISR’s major limiting factor is predominantly a lack of suitably trained manpower related to aircraft operations, maintenance, and capacities for intelligence analysis.

A. LESSONS LEARNED: NATO AIRBORNE ISR IN THE RECENT PAST

10. Despite the widespread use of airborne ISR throughout the 20 th century, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point for modern ISR: the rise of asymmetric non-state adversaries and rapid technological developments in unmanned capabilities has made airborne ISR a prominent feature of recent military activities, not least in support of tactical operations.

11. Airborne ISR in support of ongoing missions on the ground came into its own in the non-NATO coalition efforts in Iraq. The strategy of providing actionable intelligence directly to small units was made possible because of the surge in airborne ISR assets with full-motion video equipment. Endowed with timely and accurate information, commanders in the field had the ability to strike with surprise and move troops at the right time to the right place. Hence, on the tactical side, individual units benefited from intelligence specific to their current mission. Such highly decentralised control of operational ISR gives commanders a great tactical advantage through flexibility and speed. Integrated and often forward deployed capabilities for analysis and dissemination allowed analysts to confer with and help commanders decide whether to conduct a raid, call in an airstrike, send another collection asset, or continue to observe. Indeed, enhancing ISR to ground commanders was often more important than simply adding air support. On the strategic level, military decision-makers were also provided with an unprecedented level of situational awareness for successful planning and conducting counter-insurgency operations. The characteristically fluid nature of counter-insurgency operations made apparent that no universal approach to ISR management exists. Instead, ISR must remain dynamic as requirements emerge unexpectedly and evolve continually.

12. Arguably, airborne ISR was and remains even more important in the larger, less developed, and mountainous Afghanistan than in Iraq. In Afghanistan, airborne ISR provided the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with intelligence to protect soldiers and convoys and presented a first line of defence against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). By creating a safer environment for troops to operate in, airborne ISR also facilitated ISAF’s engagement with the Afghan population, an integral part of the counter-insurgency strategy. However, the major success within this context came when airborne ISR assets were ‘massed and layered’ on prioritised targets, thus creating an ‘unblinking eye’ for the commander. In other words, multiple airborne ISR platforms with multiple sensors conduct surveillance and reconnaissance support to the same mission. However, to achieve this effect requires rigorous prioritisation of targets. Thinly spreading airborne ISR assets to support multiple commanders might seem the most efficient use of these platforms, but time and again it has proved not to be the most effective use. Meanwhile, in addition to their ISR role, armed UAVs, operated by trained pilots, regularly engage in strikes against insurgents and their infrastructure. Operations in Afghanistan showed the importance of tightly integrating airborne ISR into the planning and execution of operations and made clear that often the biggest challenge lies not in eliminating targets, but in finding and pinpointing them. Indeed, the level of training required to successfully conduct this sort of ‘find’ mission should not be underestimated.

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13. Both manned and unmanned airborne ISR platforms supported the 2011 air operations to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in Libya. NATO’s AWACS aircraft contributed ISR capabilities with their advanced sensors, and performed the crucial function of commanding and controlling all Alliance air assets. Tactically, UAVs were particularly useful for operations over densely populated urban areas because they were able to fly lower and offer a more precise picture of the situation on the ground than manned aircraft. Strategically, the vastness of Libya demonstrated the need for long-endurance ISR assets to enhance situational awareness.

14. Despite these significant contributions, the employment of airborne ISR in the Libyan operation revealed numerous deficiencies. ISR platforms with full-motion video capability were not available for the first five days of the operation. As a result, pilots struggled to distinguish the rebels from the forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi and to identify rapidly moving targets, which are much harder to strike than fixed targets such as weapons storages. Especially after the pro-Gaddafi forces abandoned their conventional posts, differentiating between the different military factions proved nearly impossible without persistent ISR assets that could identify patterns of movements. The lack of ISR capabilities also inhibited accurate battle damage assessment and led to strikes on targets that had already been eliminated. The uncertainty about availability of assets and their late arrival in the theatre stopped the planners use of aircraft efficiently. Moreover, the limited availability of sufficient infrastructure for processing, exploitation, and dissemination underscored the importance of secure, integrated communication across the forces connected to an integrated network to process and analyse intelligence. Finally, as many as 80% of ISR missions over Libya were covered by the United States, with France and the United Kingdom providing most of the rest. However, it should be noted that airborne ISR is not just full-motion video. The true benefits of airborne ISR are reaped when imagery is fused with signals intelligence and radar intelligence. However, this was also a challenge during the Libya operation.

B. NATO ISR ADAPTATION

15. The deficiencies identified in the Libyan operation in particular spurred renewed emphasis on the need to enhance NATO’s airborne ISR capabilities. On the behest of France and the United States, Allies decided to develop better integration and interoperability of airborne ISR assets. Moreover, Libya also demonstrated the need for more ISR assets outside the circle of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

1. Joint ISR

16. As mandated by the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO is currently establishing a Joint ISR (JISR) capability which will be capable of bringing together data and information from national ISR assets, NATO AWACS, and NATO AGS. In the 2014 Unified Vision exercise in Norway, Allies successfully trialed the JISR concept, linking satellites, manned and unmanned airborne ISR platforms, naval vessels, ground sensors, and human intelligence.

17. Security concerns, national procedures, and technological constraints still pose many roadblocks for intelligence-sharing. However, once a JISR capability is fully established, Allies should be able to share ISR data and information securely and relatively seamlessly, reflecting NATO’s aim to move from the “need to know” to the “need to share” principle. To make the goal a reality, NATO will facilitate training of ISR experts, enhance information assurance, adapt doctrines and procedures, and establish a viable communication and information systems architecture. In February 2016, the NATO Response Force successfully demonstrated the JISR concept, prompting NATO defence ministers to declare that JISR had reached initial operational capability.

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18. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allies agreed to “expand the scope of our JISR initiative, making the most effective use of Allies' complementary JISR contributions to enhance both strategic anticipation and awareness.” Allies also stated that they “intend to work together to promote intelligence-sharing, as appropriate, by using NATO platforms and networks and optimising use of multilateral platforms and networks to enhance overall JISR efforts, including but not limited to the JISR Smart Defence project.”

19. In June, the Unified Vision 2016 trial took place across Allied territories with 400 participants from 17 Allied states working across 10 sites. Participants were required to respond to several complex scenarios, including convoy protection, hostage rescue, domestic terrorist threat and ballistic missile defence. In particular, the participants trialed the emerging concept of federated processing, exploitation, and dissemination. Today, expertise relevant to particular military missions is distributed across an often complex network of professionals. The concept of federated processing, exploitation, and dissemination describes the ability of armed forces to leverage expertise within these multi-node network-centric relationships.

2. NATO’s Airborne Early Warning And Control Force

20. Since 1982, the Alliance has operated a fleet of AWACS aircraft through NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force). The NAEW&C Force, NATO’s largest collaborative effort, is one of the few military assets owned and operated by the Alliance. With their long-range radars and passive sensors, the 16 AWACS aircraft can detect air and ground targets over long distances. AWACS’ wide range of missions includes air policing, support of counter-terrorism efforts, non-combatant evacuations, embargoes, initial entry, crisis response, and show-of-force activities. While AWACS has not been designed as an ISR platform, it can support ISR operations and conduct air, maritime, and ground surveillance of areas the size of Central Europe. For example, the E-3As can coordinate and provide direction, management, and protection of JISR systems.

21. It has been proposed that NATO's E-3As undergo their final lifetime upgrade. The Final Lifetime Extension Programme should cost roughly USD1 billion and will enhance the identification system, upgrade the cockpit with digital technology, and improve communication systems. NATO does not currently plan to upgrade the radar system, and some critics have argued this could degrade AWACS capabilities towards the end of the E-3A's lifetime. NATO is also working on integrating AWACS and AGS to enable the systems to communicate directly. Furthermore, an Alliance Future Surveillance and Control group has been working under the governance of NATO’s Committee of National Armaments Directors in order to assess what capability might follow on when the AWACS aircraft reach the end of their lifespan in 2035-2038.

22. Importantly, the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué declared that the Alliance “needs to have a follow-on capability to the E-3 AWACS” by 2035. A crucial decision was thus taken: Allies “decided to collectively start the process of defining options for future NATO surveillance and control capabilities”. As a follow-on capability is essential, time short, and costs significant, the Rapporteur urges the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the STC in particular to pay close attention to this process as it unfolds.

3. Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS)

23. Responding to a call by NATO defence ministers, going back to 1992, for a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability, NATO is currently on track to use AGS in 2017. At the heart of the AGS system are five Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft, which will be operated by NATO on behalf of the Allies. Fifteen Allies came together to acquire the Global Hawks. France and the

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United Kingdom have announced they would provide NATO with contributions in kind3. The Global Hawks are equipped with radars capable of surveying moving targets on the ground and collecting imagery over land and water in any light or weather. Despite its capabilities, AGS should not be seen as a panacea for all of NATO’s ISR needs.

24. AGS will be able to contribute to a range of missions such as protection of ground troops and civilian populations, border control, maritime safety, the fight against terrorism, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance in natural disasters. However, AGS is likely to be oriented towards deliberate missions as opposed to supporting fluid tactical operations, as its tactical ISR capabilities are limited. For example, the Global Hawks do not possess electro-optical/infrared sensors and electronic warfare or signals intelligence capabilities. Hence, there is a need for Allies to complement the AGS missions with such sensors so as to make best use of the platform in any situation or, in the medium term, for AGS to be upgraded with additional sensors so as to improve its utility and value for money. During the Warsaw Summit, significant progress was noted. Initial operational capability is planned for 2017 and full operational capability for 2018. The main operating base for AGS is located in Sigonella, Italy. The first Global Hawk is scheduled to arrive in Sigonella by the end of 2016.

25. NATO’s main ISR capability, the AGS programme should not, in the long term, rely solely on drones and only focus on information-gathering. Since analytical capabilities are based on a human factor, it is up to NATO to make the effort to train the personnel involved. To this day, France alone has a training course on how to operate mobile sonars which will benefit all. It is also necessary to recommend that all AGS actors be trained in image interpretation and intelligence production taking into account the entire chain of human resources/training/exercices in order to best use and exploit all future NATO capabilities. In this context, it seems appropriate to expand on the training sessions offered by the NATO School.

III. MAJOR AIRBORNE ISR EFFORTS IN ALLIED STATES

26. Over the last several years, some Allies, in particular European Allies, have recognised their ISR capabilitity gaps and have initiated steps to remedy shortfalls and build up adequate ISR capabilities. This section presents a brief overview of a number of concrete major airborne ISR initiatives at national, bilateral, and multilateral levels, with a focus on operational and strategic ISR and battle management platforms. Such a brief overview cannot be exhaustive, in particular given the size of the market: in 2015, registered amounts for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance amounted to USD99 billion; and by 2020, the market is projected to grow to USD125.5 billion. The Rapporteur therefore invites fellow Committee members to share further information during the STC meeting at the 2016 Annual Session.

27. Several points should be kept in mind while reading this section. First, as noted already, ISR is much more than airborne ISR platforms. For a holistic picture of Allied ISR capabilities, it is necessary to look beyond aircraft platforms. Second, many modern military systems not exclusively tasked with ISR can perform such missions. For example, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jet possesses considerable ISR capabilities. Third, ISR innovation does not only originate with the large-scale projects described in this section. As the Committee heard at the airborne ISR round table in Washington DC in April 2016, key innovations often emerge from small- and medium-sized enterprises as well.

A. NATIONAL EFFORTS

3 The Allies who are acquiring the Global Hawks are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States.

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28. Canada is currently upgrading its Lockheed CP-140 Aurora aircraft, a variant of the Lockheed P-3 Orion. It is designed for maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, and search and rescue. The upgrade of Canada’s four Auroras costs around CAD550 million, extending their lifespan until 2030.

29. After some delays, Boeing began with a mid-life upgrade of France’s four E-3F AWACS in 2013. The total cost of the modernisation amounts to USD466 million. Two of the upgraded E-3Fs have already been delivered. In terms of medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, France decided in April 2016 to buy 14 Sagem Patroller UAVs for the French Army. They will replace 20 Sagem Sperwer UAVs which have served as an interim solution since 2004. Cost estimates of EUR300 million have been reported. First delivery is expected in 2018. France also remains committed to acquiring 12 General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper UAVs in the period from 2014 to 2019. Three of them are already in service, with a further delivery of three Reapers expected in 2016. Costs are estimated to be around EUR670 million. Of the 22 long-range maritime patrol aircraft of the French Navy, the Breguet Atlantique 2, 15 will be upgraded for at least EUR400 million, ensuring that they can fly until 2032. The first modernised aircraft is planned to be delivered in 2019. In March 2016, the French Navy also received its eight and last Falcon 50 Marine Surveillance aircraft.

30. In 2013, Germany cancelled the planned acquisition of five Northrop Grumman Euro Hawks, derived from the RQ-4 Global Hawks. The aim was to fill a signals intelligence gap, which was the result of the retirement of its five Breguet Br.1150 Atlantique aircraft in 2010. The Ministry of Defence has already put EUR600 million into the programme. The German Armed Forces are aiming to recapitalise some of the money spent, especially concerning the sensor payload. Payload testing has thus resumed on the Euro Hawk in 2016. Future options include integration of the payload into the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton, the US Navy version of the Global Hawk; the NATO AGS versions of the Global Hawk; or into a business jet aircraft. To bridge the time until a new European medium-altitude long-endurance UAV becomes available by 2025 (see below), the German Armed Forces plan to lease three to five IAI Heron TP aircraft for about EUR600 million, starting in 2018. The Heron TPs will be leased in an unarmed version, but the German government has not ruled out that they could be armed at a later stage. Germany has also embarked on a modernisation of the Navy’s eight Lockheed AP-3C Orion aircraft. The programme will run until 2023 and will extend their lifetime to 2035. Total costs will amount to more than EUR570 million.

31. Greece is modernising its version of the Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, the P-3B, to extend its lifespan and enhance functionality. The programme was officially launched in mid-2016 and is slated to cost USD142 million.

32. Italy is buying two Gulfstream G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning aircraft for a total of USD750 million to conduct airborne early warning and electronic communications intelligence. The first aircraft is currently being outfitted for delivery. The Italian Air Force is also procuring three unmanned Piaggio Aerospace P.1HH Hammerhead UAV systems, based on Piaggio's P180 business jet, to fill the requirement for a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV. In late 2015, Italy has also gained the long-sought approval of the US State Department to arm its fleet of Reapers.

33. The Netherlands joins France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States as Reaper users. The country has ordered four Reapers, for total costs of about EUR300 million. Full operational capability should be achieved by 2017.

34. Poland has established a dedicated UAV airbase, as it runs several programmes to significantly expand its airborne ISR capabilities. In total, the Polish military aims to acquire some 350 UAVs by 2019. For example, to fill the medium-altitude high-endurance requirement under

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the Zefir programme, Poland’s Ministry of Defence is currently considering Reapers, the General Atomics MQ-1C Gray Eagle, and the Elbit Hermes 900. Under the Gryf programme, Poland plans to acquire 12 tactical UAVs by 2022 from a Polish company working with international partners. WB Electronics and Thales have put forward the Watchkeeper UAV, and the Polish Armament Group and Elbit the Hermes 450.

35. Spain has also ordered four Reapers, for total costs of about EUR170 million. Full operational capability should be achieved by 2020. Together with the other Allies employing Reapers, Spain is in discussions on whether to create a joint training unit.

36. Turkey is buying four Boeing B-737 AWACS aircraft for a total of USD1 billion, with the last aircraft currently being tested before delivery. Turkey has several ambitious unmanned programmes underway as well. The Turkish Aerospace Anka UAV is a medium-altitude long-endurance system for reconnaissance, target detection/identification and intelligence missions with its electro-optical/infrared and search and rescue payloads. An Anka UAV had its first mission maiden flight in February 2016. The Baykar/Kale Kalip Bayraktar UAV is another medium-altitude long-endurance system for tactical reconnaissance and surveillance. The Bayraktar slated for delivery to the Turkish Armed Forces will not be armed, but the company is currently testing the Bayraktar with mini smart ammunition.

37. In the wake of the Strategic Defence and Security Review of November 2015, the United Kingdom has decided to invest heavily into enhancing its airborne ISR capabilities. The UK is still in the process of acquiring three Boeing RC-135W Rivet Joint Airseekers, for a total cost of around GBP650 million. Two aircraft have been delivered, and the third one is slated for delivery by the end of 2017. Two Airbus Zephyr high-altitude UAVs will be purchased for operational trials. The solar-powered Zephyr is designed to operate for up to 45 days at a time at altitudes of up to 70,000 feet (21km) so as to remain clear of the weather and commercial air traffic. The Zephyr could fill a gap between aircraft and satellite capabilities. In terms of maritime surveillance aircraft, the UK has signed a contract for nine Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft. Costs are estimated at GBP3 billion over the next decade. The first arrival is expected in the 2019/2020 timeframe. In terms of medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, the UK will buy 20 General Atomics Certifiable Predator B Protector UAVs for a total of GBP415 million to replace ten Reaper UAVs in a programme running until 2023.

38. The United States continues to build up its already considerable airborne ISR fleet. For example, in 2016 the Air Force will receive 29 new Reapers; the Army will have an additional 17 Gray Eagles available; and the Navy is set to obtain 3 Tritons. Beyond 2016, more of these and similar platforms will follow. For example, over 100 Poseidon aircraft are planned to be commissioned in total. In terms of strategic ISR, the Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady, a high-altitude ISR aircraft, will be retired by 2019. The Air Force is working on integrating U-2 technology into Global Hawks to fill some of the missions carried out by the U-2. Lockheed Martin’s Skunkworks is working on an optionally manned tactical reconnaissance aircraft, called the TR-X, to potentially fill the U-2/Global Hawk requirements after 2025. The Air Force is examining how the capabilities of the ageing Boeing E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft can be recapitalised. For a start, the Air Force is studying how long the E-8 can continue to fly, with results forthcoming in March 2017. Three teams of defence companies are currently contracted to propose early ideas on where JSTARS capability could migrate: Northrop Grumman, L-3, and Gulfstream are working on a solution based on the G550 business jet; Lockheed Martin and Bombardier on a Global 6000 business jet solution; and Boeing on a B-737-700 commercial airliner offer. Experts agree that an active electronically scanned array will have to replace the passive radars onboard the E-8. Despite these efforts, critical voices, especially in Congress, have already pointed to a looming shortfall by 2025. The US Army also runs the Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System (EMARSS) programme. The Army plans to field 12 aircraft that live up to the new EMARSS standard, with an option to

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acquire 20 additional aircraft. In June 2016, L-3 conducted a maiden flight of a Beechcraft King Air 350ER, which will be converted to the EMARSS standard. The Navy has recently decided to transform the controversial Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike effort into a programme to develop a Carrier Based Aerial Refueling System with ISR capabilities. From 2017 to 2021, the Navy plans to invest USD2 billion into this effort.

B. EUROPEAN COOPERATION

39. Defence analysts argue that European states are 10 to 15 years behind when it comes to the abilitity of its defence industrial base to develop large UAVs. That said, European defence companies have engaged in worthwhile research and development efforts with such systems as the BAE Taranis, Dassault nEUROn, EADS Barracuda, and EADS Talarion. Over the last two years, two projects to remedy this situation have crystalised.

40. In November 2015, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain came together to let the European defence industry conduct a study on the development of a European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS). The definition study will last two years and will identify achievable operational capabilities, define system requirements and perform preliminary design activities. If the states decide to move from the study to development and production of a system, first delivery could occur by 2025. The German Ministry of Defence has taken the lead in the study, assuming EUR18.6 million of the study’s cost, with the other three partners contributing EUR13.8 million. Airbus Defence and Space, along with Leonardo-Finmeccanica and Dassault as partners, is reported to be contracted to conduct the study. Airbus has estimated that developing a European MALE RPAS will cost EUR1 billion. Importantly, the project will not be limited to the four partner states, but could open up to other countries in the future.

41. France and the United Kingdom are conducting a feasibility study called Future Combat Air System, amounting to GBP120 million and set to conclude by the end of 2016. The study will examine the potential joint development of an unmanned combat aircraft system. The project involves BAE Systems, Dassault, Finmeccanica Airborne and Space Systems, Rolls-Royce, Snecma/Safran and Thales. Already, the French and UK governments have committed to a next phase, which will prepare the development of a demonstrator aircraft by 2025 and a potential full operational capability by 2030. Together, France and the UK plan to invest USD2.2 billion into the project.

IV. TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN AIRBORNE ISR

A. AIRBORNE ISR IN THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

42. The Alliance will continue to face asymmetric threats, and the risk of a confrontation with near-peer competitors is on the rise. NATO and individual Allies must thus balance the need for airborne ISR capable of gaining tactical advantages during asymmetric operations and of gathering intelligence in conventional missions in contested airspaces.

43. Efforts against terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Daesh will remain a battle of intelligence. Terrorists are rapidly moving targets, often capable of blending into the local population and resurfacing only to strike. Moreover, the recent experience from the Middle East and North Africa shows that terrorists thrive in large, often inaccessible areas where they can train and plan operations without being spotted. Hence, long-endurance airborne ISR will continue to be vital, as it can provide continuous and extensive coverage. At the tactical level, the counter-insurgency environment’s decentralised nature makes it imperative that ISR assets are controlled as far forward in the field as practical, so that units that can rapidly exploit the collected

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information. Pushing such ISR forward also includes, at times, pushing the requisite intelligence analytical support forward too, so that intelligence analysts are able to work hand in glove with the supported commander. Supporting airborne ISR systems are often the main determinant of what a unit can or cannot do in the field. Their control at the tactical level will thus likely become even more decentralised. Furthermore, recent operational experiences have shown that platforms will increasingly need to integrate ISR with lethal capabilities, shifting from being gatherers to being hunters.44. The use of most current airborne ISR platforms is limited to operations in uncontested airspace. However, a number of potential adversarial states are expanding their Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) assets, increasingly closing off airspace for many ISR assets. Air defence systems could dramatically shift the balance of power in a theatre of operations and prevent projection of air power. The proliferation of missiles and their increasing precision pose challenges to ISR missions. Electronic warfare capabilities can focus on communication nodes such as satellites and ground-based stations. There are numerous, typically cheap, ways to interfere with the electromagnetic signals of airborne ISR assets and render them useless. Cyber-attacks can fatally disrupt ISR networks and command and control systems, thus paralysing even the most sophisticated ISR aircraft.

45. To prevent vulnerabilities, future airborne ISR platforms should focus on more than just sensor capability, imagery exploitation, and aircraft endurance. Self-defence and even self-repair capabilities will be increasingly important. This can include laser warning systems, radar warning receivers, electronic attack or jamming systems, and even towed decoys. Another important requirement for survivability is low observability. Next-generation airborne ISR platforms will need to be stealthy as a number of states field integrated air defence systems that can only be penetrated by stealth platforms.

46. Moreover, operations in A2/AD environments will not be exclusive to potential conventional conflicts with near-peer competitors. Irregular warfare will see non-state actors who possess guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles. Just as the combination of persistent overhead surveillance, networks, and guided weapons puts insurgents at risk in new ways, the proliferation of these weapons will allow these groups to challenge NATO forces in new ways as well.

B. DATA PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION

47. Over the last 15 years, the interplay between operational requirements and technological developments has meant that sensor technologies of airborne ISR platforms have made great strides. Multiple sensors can hone in on and monitor a single target almost persistently, and wide area surveillance systems can continuously track enemy movements in an area the size of a city. Traditional technologies like electro-optical and infrared sensors continue to improve, and new technologies are emerging. For example, certain sensors in development possess multi-spectral imaging which allow one to survey ever-larger areas, while multi-wave radars seek to pierce buildings and other structures.

48. As a result of this evolution in sensor technology, data collection capabilities will continue to grow – and with it the need to process ever larger volumes of data. Even the most advanced collection system is of little use if it lacks the analytical infrastructure to process and exploit the data. The emergence of big data, i.e. high-volume data sets comprised of a wide range of data types and sources which are collected and distributed at a high velocity, adds to the complexity of the ISR task. As the growth in data collection capabilities currently outpaces the growth in data processing capabilities, new technologies and methods are thus needed to extract value from large datasets. This requires changes in numerous areas.

49. First, airborne ISR needs to be more tightly integrated into the full intelligence network, where analysts can rapidly process, fuse, and interpret data from multiple sources. So processed,

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intelligence needs to be disseminated to the right users at the right time. To achieve the desired integration, armed forces need to better link their separate national and international efforts in intelligence, operations, and command and control and move away from compartmentalised efforts. Better intelligence sharing across military branches and among Allies and partners will also be vital. A common technological architecture and a common institutional framework would facilitate collaboration. Accordingly, ISR strategies, tactics, techniques, and procedures have recently been reformed within NATO. A multinational ISR research and development programme known as MAJIIC24 has been at the forefront of developing standards for the sharing, searching, and dissemination of ISR data. MAJIIC2 completed its work at the end of 2015 and many of its results are being deployed both within NATO itself and by NATO Allies. However, there remains an enduring need to train and exercise personnel according to such new reforms.

50. Second, improved computing will be crucial to enhance the management of the vast amount of information. Cognitive computing and artificial intelligence capable of processing volumes of data within the span of seconds promise significant improvements in processing and exploiting incoming data. Emerging technologies will enhance real-time processing of multi-source data onboard of airborne ISR platforms and thus increase their capabilities to correctly recognise objects and targets. Gradually, sensors might be capable of fully automated target recognition. In parallel, human analytical performance can be dramatically enhanced through employment of adaptive, interactive, and integrated technical systems that are revolutionising the man-machine interface. This has, for example, enabled the increasing autonomy of unmanned systems and individualisation and mobility of control systems, bringing rapid and easy access to information. The next airborne ISR research and development effort should focus on machine to machine ‘cueing and tipping’. For example, if a UAV sees a target with a wide area sensor, it can ‘cue and tip’ another UAV to automatically investigate further with a more sensitive camera. Within the context of big data, ISR exploitation also requires a degree of automation as human intelligence professionals become a scarce resource who should not be used to watch hundreds of hours of full-motion video.

51. Third, enhanced connectivity can increase the effectiveness of ISR sytems enabling them to communicate with each other. New data links have provided high-bandwidth connectivity for command and control of airborne ISR assets and data transfer, for example to stream full-motion video directly from ISR air support to forward-deployed ground forces. Developments in machine-to-machine communication, driven by developments of cloud computing and big data analytics, can further streamline processing, exploitation and dissemination and provide enhanced speed, and accuracy at greater volumes of information. Enhancing fast and secure connectivity of airborne and ground-based platforms will, for example, support real-time tactical intelligence, providing crucial advantages in fast-paced operational environments. The cyber domain also empowers commanders to rapidly make decisions, communicate them, and thus achieve results at speeds that were previously unimaginable. In the past, ISR tended to be mostly about platforms. Today, it is about the full ISR architecture. Robust, reliable, and secure information and communications networks are key enablers, allowing for automation (connecting data to data), and visualisation (connecting people to data).

52. One of NATO's roles is to define the formats for the developing and sharing of information and its link to intelligence. In this context, Allies made an important decision at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. They recognised that “NATO intelligence reform must be an ongoing, dynamic process”, as the importance of intelligence in NATO activities continues to grow. Thus, Allies “agreed to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division to be led by an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. The new Assistant Secretary General will direct NATO's

4 Multi-intelligence All-source Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coalition 2 (MAJIIC2), comprised of nine Allies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and supported by the NATO Communications and Information Agency.

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intelligence and security activities, ensuring better use of existing personnel and resources, while maximising the efficient use of intelligence provided by Allies.”

C. THE BALANCE OF MANNED AND UNMANNED AIRBORNE ISR SOLUTIONS

53. Airborne ISR has become increasingly unmanned, allowing far greater endurance. This enables operators to follow adversaries persistently and confront them at the time and place chosen by themselves rather than the adversaries. The costs of operating UAVs are generally still lower than manned systems, not least due to much higher fuel efficiency. Even though the costs will rise as UAVs become increasingly sophisticated, their long endurance and low risk compared to manned assets make UAVs an attractive ISR platform for situational awareness, rapid reaction, surveillance of high-value targets, identification of IEDs, and other missions. When armed, the combination of high-tech ISR and precise air-to-ground strikes provides a crucial military capability. The limitations of unmanned solutions vary according to system and operational requirements. A single unmanned mission requires a far larger ground crew than manned assets, for example. Also, operational, technical, and legal issues must be resolved for the use of unmanned assets in shared airspaces.

54. Despite the ascendancy of unmanned solutions, the tactical ability and agility of manned airborne ISR remains critical to support ground operations. Airborne ISR can be conducted either by specifically designed ISR manned aircraft or by aircraft whose missions are not primarily focused on ISR missions, but still have substantial ISR capabilities due to the increasing sophistication of on-board sensors. For example, stealth capable manned aircraft, equipped with ISR technologies and information-transfer mechanisms, can provide critical information particularly in a non-permissive environment where UAVs are vulnerable.

55. Optionally piloted platforms, typically helicopters, but also fixed-winged aircraft, offer flexible operating options. Due to their low logistical footprint, they are easy to deploy and discreete, thereby complementing drones. However, there are capacity limitations related to the need to accommodate a human pilot. As levels of autonomy and trust increase, the optionally piloted variant is likely to be less attractive for complex ISR missions.

56. Furthermore, airships or tethered balloons offer several weeks of operability, though this should be weighed up against their flaws: they lack reach and are unarmed.

57. Due to their dependence on meteorological conditions, drones must be part of a comprehensive ISR system including satellites, ships and ground equipment. Capacities currently being developed also require developing ICS (Information and Control System) capacities in parallel.

D. OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES

58. Advances beyond improved sensor technology will provide further impetus to increase the capabilities of airborne ISR platforms. Efforts to miniaturise technology will yield ever smaller unmanned systems that will be able to operate in dense urban environments and even inside buildings. New materials can, inter alia, lighten and strengthen platforms, reduce radar visibility, provide armour, and improve engine performance. Technical advances mean that it is becoming increasingly possible to develop materials with unique properties. For example, adaptive (morphing) structures dramatically lower visibility. Such “smart materials” can be significantly changed in a controlled fashion by external stimuli and make a vehicle on an ISR mission practically undetectable. Moreover, the removal of conventional flight control surfaces can provide a dramatic improvement in electromagnetic signature or offer increased endurance through weight-savings. Capitalising on advances from the civil sector, hybrid and alternative energy sources are being implemented in airborne ISR systems. Research is underway on solar,

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biomass, hydrogen, and all-electric power possibilities. Engine technologies are also capitalising on commercial developments to meet higher speed and efficiency demands. Increasing operational time from hours to days and weeks should allow continuous operations in areas without an established infrastructure to produce comprehensive intelligence. Ever-higher resolution, combined with long endurance, will enable not only to monitor upholding of agreements on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and ceasefire, but also to detect illicit activities, such as human trafficking or arms smuggling. It will also enhance the chances for successful strike missions, thus having an important deterrent effect.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

59. The risks and threats NATO is facing in both the short- and long-term are complex, coming from multiple directions and varying in characteristics. Therefore, NATO’s laudable initiatives to develop highly advanced airborne ISR capabilities need to be implemented on time and in the right way. The next time the Alliance engages in military operations, it cannot afford to learn how to do joint ISR during the operations, as happened in Libya where the usability of airborne ISR was dramatically limited, due primarily to a lack of trained personnel able to coordinate the available ISR effectively as well as a level of incompatibility of US and European systems. Interoperability needs to further increase, especially as future operations are likely to be conducted in ever-more contested airspaces. As potential adversarial states increase their military power, and insurgents obtain better weaponry, NATO and individual Allies must be ready to conduct airborne ISR in Anti-Access/Area Denial environments.

60. Improved intelligence sharing is absolutely crucial within member states, among Allies, and between the Alliance and partners. Currently, demand for airborne ISR is outpacing supply. Political will is necessary to develop needed capabilities: in short, airborne ISR platforms to collect information and analytical capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate it. Only then can NATO’s JISR initiative be successful. While there is a healthy stock of airborne ISR in the Alliance, NATO is still far too dependent on US assets. Initiatives to develop European UAVs should thus be fully supported by Allies.

61. The Alliance has committed itself to 360° situational awareness and continued strategic anticipation. Airborne ISR is the key to delivering this. So far, Allied airborne ISR has focused too much on tactical support of ongoing operations; strategic intelligence capabilities must continue to be improved. The Warsaw Summit Communiqué rightly emphasised this point. New technologies provide still more options to surveil vast areas for days and weeks. If the Alliance learns how to effectively incorporate this capability into strategic planning and decision-making, it can gain significant advantages. To that end, a new ISR research and development effort for NATO should be considered by Allies, now that MAJIIC2 has come to a close.

62. The constrained fiscal environment forces defence planners to prioritise, making it difficult to maintain capabilities in tactical ISR support while building up strategic ISR. However, given the strategic uncertainty in the transatlantic security environment, balancing both the tactical and strategic capabilties will be needed. The 2016 Warsaw Summit once again reaffirmed the need to increase NATO’s ISR capabilities and adapt current initiatives. Striving to live up to the Wales Defence Investment Pledge remains of utmost importance.

63. As Lieutenant General Shanahan argued in front of the Committee, the thirst for additional ISR is always insatiable. So the important questions for the military and policy makers become: what is the purpose of ISR? What is ISR asked to do? And how how much ISR is enough? Ultimately, national parliamentarians need to answer these questions when passing defence budgets. The Rapporteur therefore hopes that this report can contribute to finding the right answers, which are so crucial for the Alliance in an age of strategic uncertainty.

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY(For further information on sources, please contact the Committee Director)

Boland, Rita, “Air Force ISR Changes After Afghanistan”, Signal, 1 May 2014, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=air-force-isr-changes-after-afghanistan

Canan, James, “ISR in Today’s War”, Aerospace America, March 2010Datla, Annand and Robert Haffa, “Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in

Contested Airspace”, Air & Space Power Journal, May-June 2014Fransico, Mike and Deptula Dave, “Air Force ISR Operation”, Air & Space Power Journal, Winter

2010Greenleaf, Jason R., “The Air War in Libya”, Air & Space Power Journal, March-April 2013Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “Air and Space Power in NATO: Future Vector”, Kalkar,

Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, October 2014Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Present Paradox – Future Challenge, Kalkar, Germany:

Joint Air Power Competence Centre, March 2014Kimminau, Jon, “A Culminating Point for Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal, November-December 2012Morton, Tyler, “Manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Air & Space

Power Journal, November–December 2012Odierno R., Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastrachio, “ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,”

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter 2008PR Newswire, Global C4ISR Market - By Platform, Region and Vendors - Forecasts and Trends

(2015-2020), PR Newswire, 9 March 2016

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SELECT AIRBORNE ISR PLATFORMS

MANNEDBoeing E-3F AWACS

Maximum altitude: 12,500 mMaximum crew: 23Maximum speed: 1,111 km/hMaximum endurance: 11 hoursMaximum range: 8,000 km

Boeing E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

Maximum altitude: 12,802 mMaximum crew: 34Maximum speed: 945 km/hMaximum endurance: 9 hours

Boeing P-8A Poseidon

Maximum altitude: 12,500 mMaximum crew: 9Maximum speed: 907 km/hCombat endurance: 4 hoursCombat range: 2,222 km

Boeing RC-135W Rivet Joint

Maximum altitude: 15,200 mMaximum crew: 30Maximum speed: 933 km/hMaximum endurance: 12 hours Maximum range: 5,550 km

Breguet Atlantique 2

Maximum altitude: 9,100 mMaximum crew: 12Maximum speed: 648 km/hMaximum endurance: 18 hoursMaximum range: 7,963 km

Lockheed AP-3C Orion

Maximum altitude: 10,668 mMaximum crew: 13Maximum speed: 750 km/hMaximum endurance: 15 hoursMaximum range: 4,400 km

Lockheed CP-140 Aurora

Maximum altitude: 10,668 mMaximum crew: 10Maximum speed: 750 km/hMaximum endurance: 17 hoursMaximum range: 9,300 km

Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady

Maximum altitude: >21,336 mMaximum crew: 1Maximum speed: 805 km/hMaximum endurance: 12 hours Maximum range: >9,600 km

UNMANNED

Sagem Patroller

Maximum altitude: 6,000 mMaximum crew: 0Maximum speed: 200 km/hMaximum endurance: 20 hoursMaximum range: 180 km Mission payload: >250kg

General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper

Maximum altitude: 15,240 mMaximum crew: 0Maximum speed: 444.5 km/hMaximum endurance: 27 hoursMaximum range: 1,850 kmMission payload: 1,746 kg

General Atomics MQ-1C Gray Eagle

Maximum altitude: 8,840 mMaximum speed: 309 km/hMaximum endurance: 25 hoursMaximum range: 400 kmMission payload: 488 kg

General Atomics Certifiable Predator B

Maximum altitude: >13,716 mMaximum speed: 370 km/hMaximum endurance: 40 hours

Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk

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Maximum altitude: 18,288 mMaximum speed: 575 km/hMaximum endurance: >34 hoursMaximum range: 22,779.6 km Mission payload: 1,360 kg

Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton

Maximum altitude: 16,000 mMaximum speed: 575 km/hMaximum endurance: 24 hoursMaximum range: 15,186 kmMission payload: 2,500 kg

IAI Heron TP

Maximum altitude: 13,716 mMaximum speed: 207 km/hMaximum endurance: 36 hoursMaximum range: 350 kmMission payload: 1,000 kg

Piaggio Aerospace P.1HH Hammerhead

Maximum altitude: 13,716 mMaximum speed: 732 km/hMaximum endurance: 16 hoursMaximum range: 8,150 kmMission payload: 227 kg

Turkish Aerospace Anka UAV

Maximum altitude: 9,144 m Maximum speed: 217 km/hMaximum endurance: 24 hoursMaximum range: 4,896 kmMission payload: 200 kg

Baykar/Kale Kalip Bayraktar UAV

Maximum altitude: 7,315 mCruise speed:   130 km/hMaximum endurance: 24 hoursMaximum payload: >55 kg

Elbit Hermes 450

Maximum altitude: 5,486 mMaximum speed: 176 km/hMaximum endurance: 18 hours Maximum range: 200 km

Elbit Hermes 900

Maximum altitude: 9,144 mMaximum speed: 220 km/hMaximum endurance: 36 hours Maximum range: 2,500 km

Watchkeeper UAV

Maximum altitude: 4,572 mMaximum speed: 176 km/hMaximum endurance: 16 hours Maximum range: 200 km

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