Leysens, A. (2008), The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Fugitive or Guru?. Pelgrave.One cannot attribute a unified approach to the Frankfurt School. However, shared assumptions, premises and ontology can be discerned in the works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, etc. Habermas is usually discussed separately, because his work substantially re-interprets and expands on the premises and dynamics of CT (Held, 1980:15) (72).Under Horkheimer (1st phase), the research program of the Institute was to be guided by a strategy of interdisciplinary materialism. This meant that Marxist political economy would have to be supplemented by other disciplines to advance a more comprehensive understanding of society. (74)The underlying value assumption of CT is to emancipate humans from all forms of domination. The reference here is to emancipation from the domination that is encapsulated within the capitalist system of production and exchange. It also means emancipation from a form of science (positivist science) that has been instrumental in perpetuating status quo power relations. CT also attempts to connect theory to practice, and envisages social-political transformation. in short, a fundamental assumption of critical theory is that every form of social order entails some forms of domination and that the critical-emancipatory interest underlies the struggles to change those relations of dominant-subordination (Brown, 1994:147) (79)Horkheimer and Adorno (in Dialectic of Enlightenment) view domination as something which emerged from the post-Enlightenment ascendancy of instrumental reason. Domination is not only the result of the inequalities generated by capitalism, but arises out of the need of humans to control nature and other humans. (80)The first phase of CT attempted to bridge between the positivistic and humanistic approaches to knowledge generation in social sciences.Horkheimer also criticized approaches to knowledge that maintain a rigid distinction between subject and object. The two cannot be viewed separately from one another, because the one is influenced, in a dialectical manner, by the other. The subject is affected by material conditions while in turn material conditions can be influenced by the subject. Thought (our accounts of reality) and the objects that are our focus are contextually dependent of who we are and where we are located in history. (81)Horkheimers major concern with traditional theory is that it does not reflect in upon itself. It does not locate ideas in society; it views itself as autonomous from the society in which it functions. CT, on the other hand, is not concerned with perpetuating the status quo, but to strive for a unity between theory and practice, to bring about transformation. (82)it was, I think, one of Pirandellos characters who said that a fact is like a sack it wont stand up till youve put something in it (Carr, 1961:11)Habermas discussed the three bases on which the generation of knowledge depends and how they relate to human interest. He referred to these as knowledge-constitutive interests and identified three: empirical-analytic (the deductive-nomological model of positivist, the cognitive interest being technical control) , historical-hermeneutic (understanding the meaning through textual interpretation and acknowledging the role of the interpreter in arriving at conclusions about historical meaning and the connection with his/her own world. The cognitive interest is practical), and critical (uncover the hidden ideologically determined relations of dependence and explore the possibility of changing them. The cognitive interest is emancipatory). (Habermas, 1972:308-311). He does not reject any of these methods per se, but the ideological claim that they are the only type of legitimate knowledge, or the standard by which all knowledge is to be measured. (84-85)CT aims to locate ideas in historical context. It must point out the gap between ideas and reality. This, Horkheimer proposes, can be done through the method of immanent critique, pointing out the contradictions between the ideas/values that are propagated for a society and reality (practice). (85)A CT of society reveals that concepts do not reflect reality. Thought and being are not identical. Concepts are part and parcel of a constantly changing reality and they therefore have a justificatory purpose. Concepts are intersubjective; they are formed, maintained and changed by structure and agency. Explanation revolves around showing how theories and concepts mask relationships of domination and how they cannot encapsulate absolute truths, but are always historically contingent: Materialism, unlike idealism, always understands thinking to be the thinking of particular men within a particular time. It challenges every claim to the autonomy of thought (Horkheimer) (86)LinklaterLinklaters approach emphasises the need for a CT of IR to incorporate aspects of various perspectives, so as to provide an all encompassing framework which is able to give an empirical account of how to move towards the goal of human emancipation. His earlier work explicitly aims to connect a CT of IR to the FS and specifically to Habermas (90).He draws on Habermas in identifying three modes of enquiry: Realism is concerned with power, and uses the positivist method; Rationalism is concerned with order and uses the hermeneutic method; Revolutionism focuses on emancipation and uses critical social theory.These three modes of thought interact in a dialectical, progressive manner. Practical Realism (Linklaters rationalism) is concerned with the meaning of diplomatic practice, and how states adhere to certain norms and principles in international society. This focus on meaning can be associated with the hermeneutic method.(91)Rationalism, according to Linklater, combines neo-Realisms focus on power and anarchy with a concern for the normative underpinnings that lead states to cooperate around shared principles and values. This is an outcome of its practical interest with order, consensus and legitimacy. There are, in other words, moral considerations which must also be taken into account and which act as a constraint on the actions of sovereign states.Rationalism, then, is more concerned with the question of how an international community can be expanded from a set of principles that are universally binding. For this reason it is closer to the revolutionist project which is concerned with change. International order must, ultimately, depend on norms which are universally acceptable and which facilitate the creation of a community of states (Linklater, 1990:21) By focusing on the possibility of an ethic of communication, Habermas recovers CT and the emancipatory project, which is aimed at trying to expand the area of social interaction that is subject to universal moral principles. (93)A CT of IR must (in terms of the dialectical development of perspectives) take on board the achievements of the positivist and hermeneutic methods, as well as the strengths of Realism and Rationalism.(94)Richard AshleyAshley associates Habermas historical-hermeneutic form of knowledge creation with traditional or practical Realism. This variant of Realism is more concerned with meaning and an understanding of states, power, national interest and diplomats that is historically as well as contextually anchored. (Ashley, 1981:227) He argues later that the generative potential of CR can be built on by the development of a dialectical competence model. (Ashley, 1986) (97)Ashleys dialectical competence model aims to offer a more self-reflective approach to knowledge generation in IR. It draws and tries to salvage the usable (more interpretative) aspects of CR (or practical realism). For Mark Hoffman, practical realism fares better than neo-Realism because it focuses on the norms and culture of the international system and investigates how states arrive at a consensus in a system without an overarching sovereign. In the end, however, practical realism also does not step out of itself to consider the ideological component hidden within the approach (how the norms, values and rules shape the reality of the system of states). By not doing so, it contributes to the maintenance of the status quo and ends up engaging in problem-solving. Ashleys attempt to salvage and use some of Realisms core insights cannot hope to succeed, because such an approach would have moved so drastically from the core assumptions of political realism that it would be a misnomer to speak of it as a critical realist theory of IR (Hoffman, 1987:240) (102)