03 Tauscher

Remarks on Phya pa Chos kyi seng geand his Madhyamaka Treatises

Helmut TauscherVienna

In 1995 Leonard van der Kuijp made a photocopy of a manuscript ofPhya pa1 Chos kyi seng ge’s dBu ma shar gsum kyi stong thun availablein the West. It was the first text by Phya pa ever seen outside of Tibet, andquite a sensation within Tibetan studies; an edition of this text was publishedin 1999.2 Meanwhile a number of texts by Phya pa – though most probablynot his complete oeuvre – have been discovered in the Fifth Dalai Lama’slibrary at Drepung, and facsimile editions thereof are available in the bKa’gdams gsung ’bum, volumes 6-9, published in 2006. In recent years, thisfact led to an increasing interest in Phya pa’s works among both Tibetanand western scholars.

Nevertheless, no major study on Phya pa’s Madhyamaka interpretationhas been published yet;3 to the best of my knowledge, the excellent work byKevin Vose, Resurrecting Candrakīrti. Disputes in the Tibetan Creationof Prāsa�gika,4 although it does not deal with Phya pa exclusively, is up tonow the only scholarly work that discusses and analyses greater parts ofthe Shar gsum; it does, however, not take into consideration Phya pa’sother treatises. Earlier publications dealing with or touching upon Phya pa5

concentrate on his contribution to Tibetan logic and epistemology, whichwas known from quotations and references by other authors, in particularby Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), and also more recent works6 focus onthis topic. One short article (in Japanese) deals with Phya pa’s interpretationof the Ratnagotravibhāga.7 Several scholars, however, are recently workingon Phya pa’s Madhyamaka or have presented papers at conferences on

1 Alternative spellings of this name are “Phywa pa” and “Cha pa”.2 TAUSCHER 1999a.3 See TAUSCHER 1999b, 2003.4 VOSE 2009.5 See e.g. KUIJP 1978, 1983; JACKSON 1987; TILLEMANS 1989; ONODA 1986, 1992;

KELLNER1997.6 See several chapters in Hugon 2008a, Hugon 2008b, 2009 and forthcoming a, b,

c; STOLTZ 2007and forthcoming.7 KANO 2003.

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this topic, e.g., Pascale Hugon, Ritsu Akahane, James Blumenthal, JongbokYi, and Dorji Wangchuk. Others are touching upon Phya pa in papers dealingwith early bKa’ gdams pa, like Thomas Doctor, Kevin Vose, or Kazuo Kano.8

Still, the studies of his Madhyamaka treatises have not yet advanced toa degree that would allow for a comprehensive survey of his Madhyamakaposition. Therefore this paper presents – still, one decade after the firstpublication of the Shar gsum – only preliminary remarks. It does not touchupon subtle philosophical issues and problems, and it is restricted to basictopics and general observations in connection with the Shar gsum stongthun and the bDen gnyis ’grel ba, a commentary to Jñānagarbha’sSatyadvaya-vibha�ga (SDV). It also raises the questions – however,without claiming to provide answers – why Phya pa as an Mādhyamika hasbeen practically forgotten by the tradition itself, and whether the critiquevoiced against Phya pa by later dGe lugs pa authors is justified. Based onthe two texts mentioned, it also shows Phya pa’s (direct or indirect) impacton later – in particular dGe lugs pa – Madhyamaka exegesis.

Although Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) was arguably one ofthe leading scholar of his time, only a little biographical data9 is known apartfrom the years of his birth and death.

• In the fields of his particular expertise, i.e. Madhyamaka and Pramā�a,Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge was a disciple of rGya dmar pa Byang chubgrags; Padma dkar po even states that he was best of rGya dmar pa’sstudents.10 Thus he represents – via Khyung Rin chen grags pa andrGya dmar pa – the third generation in the transmission lineage of rNgogBlo ldan shes rab (1059-1109) who is considered as the founder of theSvātatrika tradition in Tibet.11

• At the age of twenty he acted as a tutor of important hierarchs likethe First Karma pa, Dus gsum mkhyen pa, and Phag mo gru pa atgSang phu sNe’u thog, for several centuries the center of monasticscholarship.

• For 18 years he presided at gSang phu sNe’u thog as abbot. Byamspa kun dga’ ’byung gnas in his gSang phu gdan rabs even relates a35–year period of abbotship.12 However, as Phya pa passed away at

8 This information I owe to Pascale Hugon, personal communication.9 See KUIJP 1978: 355.10 Padma chos ’byung, 190b.11 See TAUSCHER 1995, n.4.12 See ONODA 1989: 205f.

Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and his Madhyamaka Treatises 3

the age of 60, this would mean that he was appointed abbot at the ageof 25, which seems rather unlikely.

• Among his disciples we find renowned scholars and teachers like“the eight mighty lions” (seng chen): gTsang nag pa brTson ’grusseng ge, Dan bag pa sMra ba’i seng ge, Bru sha bSod nams seng ge,rMa bya rTsod pa’i seng ge (= rMa bya Byang chub brtson ’grus),rTsags dBang phyug seng ge (a teacher of Sa skya Pa��ita), Myangbran Chos kyi seng ge, lDan ma dKon mchog seng ge and gNyal paYon tan seng ge,“the four Jo sras”: ’Khon Jo sras rtse mo, rNgog Jo sras ra mo, Khu Josras ne tso and gNyos Jo sras dpal le, “the four wise ones” (shes rabcan): ’Gar dBang grub, Kong po ’Jag chung, Lho pa sGog zan and Barpu pa,“the three who attained spiritual realisation” (grub thob): Dusgsum mkhyen pa dPal chos kyi grags pa, Phag mo gru pa andgSal sto sho sgom, and bSod nams rtse mo, the second Sa skyapa hierarch.

• Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge was renowned as a great philosopher andscholar, in particular he was and still is well known for his achievementsin logic and for his contributions to the development of bsdus grwa.However, he is never mentioned as a particular great and kind-heartedreligious leader.

All of Phya pa’s works had been missing for several centuries. They wereunknown not only to western scholarly research, but also to the TibetanBuddhist tradition. When listing the works ascribed to Phya pa, already’Gos lotsāva gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) in his Deb ther sngon po admitsthat some of them he had not seen personally, but only heard about. He liststhe following works: Commentaries on the Five Treatises of Maitreya,Pramā�aviniścaya , Satyadvaya-vibha�ga , Madhyamakāla�kāra ,Madhyamakāloka, Bodhicāryāvatāra, “and other texts”, as well as therespective abridged summaries (bsdus pa), Tshad ma’i Yid kyi mun selwith commentary, Yid kyi mun sel without commentary, a long and a shortsummary of the Madhyamaka system (dBu ma bsdus pa che chung), and,unseen by ’Gos lotsāva, a Phyi nang gi grub mtha’ bsdus pa and a Shesbya gzhi lnga’i bshad pa.13

In addition, Shākya mchog ldan (1428-1507) mentions a commentary onthe Pramā�a-vārttika among Phya pa’s works.14 However, although Phya

13 Blue Annals: 332f.14 Tshad ma’i byung tshul: 12.

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pa apparently knew the Pramā�a-vārttika,15 it remains doubtful whetherhe really did write a commentary on it.16

Nevertheless, Shākya mchog ldan seems to be the last Tibetan masterwho probably knew – and read – Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge; he quotes apassage of some 3.5 folios from the Shar gsum stong thun and refutes itin detail.17 Of course, Phya pa’s works must have been extant during the17th century, as their manuscripts were discovered in the Fifth Dalai Lama’slibrary, but there is no evidence as to whether or not they were actuallyread and studied.

By the 19th century they were apparently known only from hearsay,i.e., from references like the one in the Deb ther sgon po. A khu Rinpo che Shes rab rgya mtsho (1803-1875) includes Phya pa’s works inh i s Tho y ig , 18 w h i c h L o k e s h C h a n d r a c a l l s a n “ a u t o c h t h o nbibliography of books which were already rare or of extraordinaryvalue in the Tibetan world”. 19 However, one cannot avoid theimpression that missing texts, desiderata, are equally included. Thetexts listed are – with only minor deviations – the same that already’Gos lotsāva had mentioned:

In the section of “stages of the path, purification of the mind, etc.” (lamrim blo sbyong sogs kyi skor): a commentary on the Bodhicāryāvatāra;in the Madhyamaka section: commentaries on theSatyadvayavibha�ga, Madhyamakāloka, Madhyamakāla�kāraand Uttaratantra; a “long” and a “short summary of Madhyamaka”(dBu ma bsdus pa che chung);in the Prajñāpāramitā section: a Prajñāpāramitā commentary (pharphyin �ikka);in the section of logic and epistemology (rnam ’grel gyi skor): acommentary on the Pramā�aviniścaya, a Tshad ma’i bsdus pa Yidkyi mun sel together with an auto-commentary, a Tshad bsdus Yid kyimun sel alone (rkyang pa), and a Shes bya gzhi lnga’i bshad pa;in the siddhānta section: a Phyi nang gi grub mtha’i rnam bzhagbsdus pa.20

15 One verse is quoted in Shar gsum; see Tauscher 1999, n. 91.16 Cf. Kuijp 1978: 357.17 Lung rigs rgya mtsho rgya mtsho 14: 518,5–522,6; 522,6-533,2.18 dPe rgyun dkon pa ’ga’ zhig gi tho yig. Don gnyer yid kyi kunda bzhad pa’i

zla ’od ’bum gyi snye ma. See Lokesh Chandra 1963: 637ff.19 Lokesh Chandra 1963: 629.20 Op. cit.: 637-677, Nos. 11076, 11317-11321, 11473, 11803-11806, 11910.


In the bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum (vol. 6: 185 – vol. 9: 598) not all thetexts are included which are listed above; on the other hand, a number ofworks are contained which are not mentioned in later sources:21

1. dBu ma bden gnyis kyi ’grel ba / dBu ma bden pa gnyis rnam parbshad pa yi ge nyung ngus gzhung gsal bar byed pa.

2. ---/ dBu ma bden pa gnyis kyi don bsdus pa.3. dBu ma snang ba’i ’grel ba / dBu ma snang ba’i gzhung gi don

rigs pa’i tshul dang myi ’gal zhing blo chung bas kyang bde blagdu rtogs pa byis pa’i ’jug ngos su sbyar ba.

4. dBu ma rgyan gyi ’grel ba / dBu ma rgyan gyi ’grel pa rgya cherbshad pa.

5. dBu ma’i de kho na nyid bsdus pa / dBu ma de kho na nyid kyisnying po.The alternative – and apparently more “popular” – title dBu ma shargsum gyi stong thun is given on the title page. Most probably thistreatise represents the longer version of the dBu ma bsdus pa chechung mentioned by ’Gos lotsāva and A khu Rinpoche; the shorterversion, which is not extant, might have been a “summary” (bsdusdon / don bsdus pa), consisting in a structural outline (sa bcad) ofthe same text.

6. sPyod ’jug bsdus don / Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jugpa’i don bsdus pa.

7. --- / bSlab pa kun las btus pa’i don bsdus pa; a fragment of 13 lines.8. Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bsdus (pa’i) don.9. Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos (kyi tshig dang don

gyi) rgya cher bsnyad pa phra ba’i don gsal ba.10. Theg chen mdo sde rgyan gyi legs bshad yang rgyan nyi ’od gsal

ba / mDo sde rgyan gyi bshad pa.11. Theg (pa) chen (po) mdo sde rgyan gyi lus rnam bshag.12. Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i bsdus don.13. Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel ba / Tshad ma rnam par g e s

pa’i ’grel bshad yi ge dang rigs pa’i gnad la ’jug pa’i shes rabkyi ’od zer.

14. Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel.15. bDe bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa’i gzhung rnam par ’byed pa.

21 The titles are quoted in the form in which they appear in the catalogue (dkarchag) of the bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum and the volume-dkar chag. Alternativetitles given in the colophons are separated from the first entry by an oblique.In cases where the difference between dkar chag and colophon consist inmerely a few additional syllables, these are given between brackets.

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16. So thar mdo’i ’grel ba.17. ’Od ldan zhes bya ba’i mikk tshig don rab gsal (ba).18. dGe tshul rnams kyi bslab pa’i rim pa ston pa’i rnam bshad /

Thams cad yod par smra ba’i dge tshul rnams kyi bslab pa’i rimpa ston pa’i rnam par bshad pa.

Taking into consideration that Phya pa chos kyi seng ge is renownedmainly for his achievments in the field of logic and epistemology, thereare strikingly few works on this topic. In fact, there are only two textsextant: one independant treatise, the Yid kyi mun sel, and one commentaryon Dharmakīrti’s Pramā�aviniścaya, the Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i’grel ba. A third one, the Shes bya gzhi lnga’i bshad pa, is apparentlyknown only from hearsay; the Yid kyi mun sel without auto-commentaryand the Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i bsdus don have most probablynot to be counted as separate works. I am only pointing out this fact,without any attempt to interpeting it, as this, at the present stage, wouldmean mere speculation.

As a Mādhyamika, Phya pa chos kyi seng ge is generally considered tobe a strict Svātantrika. However, when using the terms “Prāsa�gika” and“Svātantrika”, usually one thinks of this distinction as Tsong kha pa and thedGe lugs pa school make it, who put great emphasis on this issue and itsontological and epistemological implication. During Phya pa’s lifetime, itonly started to develop, and it was restricted to the methodological questionwhether a prasa�ga or svatantra type of reasoning should be used to provenon-substantiality. The ontological and epistemological implications22 werenot yet thought of, and even the definitions of prasa�ga and svatantra werenot the same as in later centuries.23 At the present stage of research, it is notclear at all whether Phya pa is actually to be classified as a Svātantrika evenaccording to the dGe lugs pa interpretation of the term; this question still hasto be clarified in detailed analysis.

Whatever the results of this analysis will be, in general terms, ’Goslotsāva states that Phya pa “wrote many refutations of the works of theācārya Candrakīrti”,24 and a similar statement is made also by Shākya mchogldan.25 The exegetical tradition that Phya pa follows is clear already fromthe titles of the works. His only independent Madhyamaka treatise, the dBuma de kho na nyid kyi snying po or dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun,

22 Cf. TAUSCHER 1995: 122f.23 On this topic, see TAUSCHER 2003.24 Blue Annals: 334.25 dBu ma’i byung tshul: 234,6: ... Zla ba’i bstan bcos kyi tshig don gnyis ka la

dgag pa’i rnam grangs shin tu mang po yod pa’i bstan bcas mdzad.


the “Summary of the crucial points26 (in the teachings) of the three(Svātantrika) Madhyamaka (masters) from the East” (dbu ma [rang rgyudpa] shar gsum), follows the tradition of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarak�ita andKamalaśīla. In another explanation, the expression dbu ma shar gsum refersto the main works of these masters, i.e. the Satyadvayavibha�ga ,Madhyamakāla�kāra, and Madhyamakāloka.27 Exactly on these textsPhya pa composed his Madhyamaka commentaries. These Indian mastersare known to strongly emphasise the strict method of independent syllogism(svātantrānumāna) in accordance with the tradition of Dignāga andDharmakīrti within Madhyamaka argumentation. Phya pa equals, or evenexceeds, them in this respect.

Accordingly, the greater part of his main Madhyamaka treatise, the Shargsum stong thun, is dedicated to demonstrating the importance of reasoningby means of an independent syllogism (svatantra) and to explaining thissyllogism. The overal structure of this text seems to be influenced byJñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibha�ga; it consists of three main sections:“Ascertainment of the objects of cognition” (shes bya nges bar bya ba),Mahāyāna practice, and buddhabhūmi.

The first one, covering some 85% of the entire text, is a discussionof the two real i t ies (bden pa gnyis) . I t consists of two parts :“Distinction (dbye ba)” and “Definition/ characteristics (mtshan nyid)of the two realities”.

The greatest part of this latter section on mtshan ñid is dedicated to the“Negation of true(ly established) entities” (yang dag pa’i dngos po dgagpa), consisting of a “Refutation of the object of negation being negated byprasa�ga” (dgag bya thal ’gyur gyis ’gog pa sun dbyung ba) and apresentation “How an [independent] syllogism negates discursivedevelopment” (rjes dpag gis spros pa ’gog pa’i tshul).

The first of these sub-sections comprises as main topics an “Expositionof the opponent’s [i.e. the ‘Prāsa�gikas’] system” (gzhan kyi lugs dgodpa), discussions why “It is not correct not to accept the use of svatantra”(rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba khas mi len pa mi ’thad pa) and why “Aprasa�ga is unable to negate a realistic position” (thal ’gyur gyis dngospor smra ba ’gog mi nus pa), and a short presentation of Phya pa’s ownsystem (rang gi lugs rnam par gzhag pa).

The second sub-section presents mainly a detailed discussion of theindependent syllogism suited to proving all-pervading emptiness,

26 On the term stong thun, meaning “summary of the crucial points”, cf. theexplanation of Tshig mdzod chen mo: gnad don stong phrag du ma thun thundu bsdus pa ste spyi don; vgl. YOSHIMIZU 1996: 7.

27 See TAUSCHER 1999b: n. 2 and 3.

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structured according to its individual parts: dharmin, sādhya, hetu,pakadharmatā and vyāpti.

In general, one of the favourite topics of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge –apparently it could almost be called an obsession – is the classification ofprasa�ga and the svatantra implied by them (rang rgyud ’phangs pa), therespective prasa�gavparyaya of the Indian pramā�a tradition. As relatedby Shākya mchog ldan, he classifies the prasa�ga into 18 types, five ofwhich do not imply a svatantra as a contra-position, three of which implya svatantra of “own type” (rang rigs), and ten a svatantra of “heterogeneoustype” (gzhan rigs). This classification is taken over by Sa skya Pa��itaKun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182-1251) in a slightly extended form, which ishanded down by Shākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge(1429-1489).28

In both the Shar gsum stong thun and the bDen gnyis ’grel ba, Phya parefers to this classification in the context of discussing the relation of the tworealities, based on the passage of the Sa�dhinirmocanasūtra which teachesfour unacceptable consequences – though technically speaking not in theform of prasa�ga – implied by each of the alternatives in the position that“the characteristic of the conditioned and the characteristic of the ultimateare non-different or different” (’du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang | don dampa’i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin pa’am | tha dad pa zhes zer ba).29

Phya pa reformulates the consequences stated in the sūtra in the form of aprasa�ga , and he gives the respect ive implied svatantra orprasa�gaviparyaya in each case.

In most of the cases Shar gsum stong thun and in bDen gnyis ’grelba agree, but in two cases there is a significant divergence.

Under the assumption that the conditioned and the absolute are different(in nature), it follows:

1) “Suchness (tathatā) would not negate the proliferation (prapañca)of appearing phenomena.”

Shar gsum stong thun does not state the type of the prasa�ga:“Consequently, someone who understands emptiness does not eliminate theimputation (samāropa) of an (ultimately) real nature on appearingphenomena, because he does not understand their nature.” In analogy to thesecond consequence, it can be taken as a prasa�ga (with the logical reason)of non-perception of the pervading property (khyab byed mi dmigs pa,vyāpakānupalabdhi).

28 See ONODA 1986: 81f. and 1992 85f.29 SNS 3. 3-5. For a discussion of the respective passage in the Shar gsum thong

thun see TAUSCHER 2003: 213-218.


It implies a svatantra with the logical reason of essential property (rangbzhin, svabhāva): “He (who understands emptiness) understands theirsubstance [by understanding emptiness], because he removes imputation[of an ultimately real nature] on appearing phenomena through [its] removalby the experience establishing imputation [of an ultimately real nature] asbeing removed.”30

Basically the same prasa�ga is formulated slightly differently in bDengnyis ’grel ba, but classified as a prasa�ga with (the logical reason) ofperception of what is pervaded by the incompatible (’gal bas khyabpa dmigs pa, viruddhavyāptopalabdhi): “The understanding of the absoluteas emptiness would not devaluate the imputation of the conventional beingof (ultimately) real nature, because something different from the conventionalis understood.”

It implies a svatantra with the logical reason of [perception of] whatis incompatible with the pervading property (khyab byed ’gal ba[dmigs pa], vyāpakaviruddha-[upalabdhi]): “Because [by understandingthe absolute] the imputation [of an ultimately real nature] on the conventionalis devaluated, [understanding the absolute] is not understanding somethingdifferent from the conventional.”31

2) “Emptiness would not be suited to being suchness (de bzhin nyid).”Here, Shar gsum stong thun names a prasa�ga (with the logical

reason) of non-perception of the pervading property (khyab byed midmigs pa’i thal ba) and, again, gives the implied svatantra with the logicalreason of essential property (rang bzhin gyi rtags):“Because emptiness did not consist in the nature of appearingphenomena, i t would not be the t rue proper ty (chos nyid) ofappearing phenomena.”“Because [imputation of an ultimately real nature] is removed by establishing[emptiness] as true property [of appearing phenomena] through inference;

30 Shar gsum stong thun: 6,2-7: stong nyid … ’jal ba po des snang ba la bdenpa’i dngos po’i sgro ’dogs mi gcod par thal te snang ba’i bdag nyid mi ’jalba’i phyir ... sgro ’dogs sel bar grub pa’i myong bas bsal bas snang ba lasgro ’dogs sel bas de’i rdzas ’jal lo.

31 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 195,1 (plus insertion in the margin): don dam pa stongpa nyid du ’jal ba des kun rdzob pa ’di dngos por yod pa’i sgro ’dogs la myignod par ’gyur te | kun rdzob kyi bden pa las gzhan ’jal ba’i phyir … kunrdzob la sgro ’dogs la gnod pas kun rdzob las gzhan ’jal ma yin. For the typeof prasa�ga and implied svatantra, and its origins in Indian Buddhistphilosophy, see KAJIYAMA 1998: 133 and 83.

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therefore, as it is the true property, [emptiness] is the nature of appearingphenomena’.”32

bDen gnyis ’grel ba, too, gives the same set of a prasa�ga with (thelogical reason) of perception of what is pervaded by the incompatible(’gal bas khyab pa dmigs pa) and an implied svatantra with the logicalreason of [perception of] what is incompatible with the pervadingproperty (khyab byed ’gal ba [dmigs pa]) as in the previous case. Again,apart from the different classification, there is no obvious essential differencefrom Shar gsum stong thun:“Consequently, freedom from proliferation would not be the true propertyof the conventional, because these two are mutually exclusive.”“Because [mutal exclusion] is invalidated by ascertaining through inferencethat [freedom from proliferation] is the true property [of the conventional],(these two) are not mutually exclusive.”33

The type of prasa�ga and implied svatantra mentioned by Shar gsumstong thun in these two cases correspond to the fourth (according to Shākyamchog ldan, No 13 in Go ram pa’s list) of Sa skya Pa��ita’s “prasa�gasimplying an heterogeneous svātantra (rang rigs ’phen pa)”. The typegiven in bDen gnyis ’grel ba appears, slightly modified, only in Go rampa’s accout (No 12: ’gal ba’i khyab bya dmigs pa – khyab byed dang’gal ba de dmigs pa). In Shākya mchog ldan’s list, we find two pairs thatcould – possibly – be referred to:No 5: prasa�ga with the logical reason of perception of what is pervadedby something incompatible with the essential property (rang bzhindang ’gal ba’i khyab bya dmigs pa, svabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi) –implied svatantra with the logical reason of perception of the essentialproperty being incompatible with the pervading property (khyab byeddang ’gal ba’i rang bzhin dmigs pa, *vyāpakaviruddhasvabhāvopalabdhi),No 13: prasa�ga with the logical reason of perception of the essentialproperty being incompatible with the pervading property (khyab byeddang ’gal ba’i rang bzhin dmigs pa, *vyāpakaviruddhasvabhvopalabdhi)– implied svatantra with the logical reason of perception of whatis pervaded by something incompat ible with the essent ia l

32 Shar gsum stong thun: 6,10-13: stong pa nyid snang ba’i ngo bor mi gnaspas snang ba’i chos nyid ma yin par ’gyur te ... rjes dpag gis chos nyid dugrub pas bsal bas chos nyid yin pas snang ba’i ngo bo yin no.

33 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 195, insertion in the margin, 2: spros bral kun rdzobpa’i chos nyid ma yin par thal te | de gnyis phan tshun spangs pa’i phyir... chos nyid du rjes dpag gis nges pas gnod pas chos nyid yin pas phantshun spang ma yin.


p r o p e r t y (rang bzhin dang ’gal ba’i khyab bya dmigs pa ,svabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi).34

According to the formulation, No 5 might be closer to bDen gnyis ’grelba than No 13, but both of them are listed by Go ram pa separately (Nos 3and 9), so that an identification of bDen gnyis ’grel ba with either of themdoes not seem to be justified.35 Specialists in the field of logic andepistemology will have to decide this question.

3) “For appearing phenomena the mere negation of a real thing wouldnot be suited to being the essential property (svabhāva).”

This consequence poses some problems. The text of Shar gsum stongthun appears to be incomplete in the manuscript edited in Tauscher 1999aas well as in the bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum, which represents a differentmanuscript. The latter, however, provides a variant reading, in the light ofwhich my previous attempts to hypothetically reconstruct the originalmessage of the text36 do not apply any more.

The prasa�ga can now be read as: “This mere negation of person(pudgala) and entity (dharma) for the conditioned would not be suchness,because [suchness] is different from the conditioned.”37 However, theproblem remains that it is called “a prasa�ga refuting an affirmedpervasion with the logical reason ascertained by valid cognition” (khyabpa khas blangs pa rtags tshad mas nges pa’i sun ’byin pa’i thal ba).Could this be a paraphrase of the technical term “non-perception of thepervading property” (khyab byed mi dmigs pa)? In this case, the addition“ascertained by valid cognition” would be a general rather than a distinctivedescription of the logical reason, similar to the expression “conventionallyproving” (tha snyad sgrub pa) in the same context.38 The implied svatantra,which is missing here, would have to operate with the logical reason ofessential property, just as above.

It would also agree with bDen gnyis ’grel ba, where a prasa�ga of non-perception of the pervading property is given. The type of implied svatantra

34 The translation of the terms follows largely Kajiyama 1998: 84. Shākya mchogldan lists three more types of prasa�ga which bDen gnyis ’grel ba couldtheoretically refer to (Nos 9, 10, 15). However, they include the categoriesof cause and effect, which do not apply in the context of the relation betweenthe absolute and the conventional; thus, they are not taken into account here.

35 Cf. Tauscher 2003: 218.36 See TAUSCHER 2003: 215.37 Shar gsum stong thun: 6,15f.: ’du byed la gang zag dang chos khegs pa tsam

de de bzhin nyid ma yin par ’gyur te ’du byed las gzhan yin* pa’i phyir.* 6,16 ma yin; ma is deleded in bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum: 7. 22,2.

38 Cf. TAUSCHER 2003: 214, n. 32.

Helmut Tauscher12

is not mentioned, but, again, it should be one with the logical reason ofessential property.39

4) “The gnosis of the Buddha would be defiled and pure at the same time.”In this case Shar gsum stong thun and bDen gnyis ’grel ba agree on a

different type of prasa�ga,40 i.e. the one with the logical reason of essentialproperty, implying a svatantra of non-perception of the pervadingproperty (No 2 of Sa skya Pa��ita’s list, No 14 of Go ram pa):“Defilement and purification would occur simultaneously in one mentalcontinuum, because it embraces a ‘real thing’ as well as perceives emptiness.” “Defilement and purification do not occur simultaneously for the Buddha,because this is invalidated by authoritative scripture; therefore theconditioned and emptiness are not seen separately.”41

bDen gnyis ’grel ba formulates a very similar prasa�ga and implied svatantra.42

With regard to the unacceptable consequences of the assumption thatthe absolute and the conventional are not different (with regard to thecharacteristic distinction [ldog pa, vyāv�tti]), Shar gsum stong thun andbDen gnyis ’grel ba agree in all four cases.

For consequence 1) “Emptiness would be suited to being cognized bydirect perception of ordinary beings,” and 2) “Emptiness would be a support(ālambana) for the obstructions (āvara�a),” they both give a prasa�gawith the logical reason of the essential property (rang bzhin, svabhāva)which implies a svatantra with the logical reason of non-perception of thepervading property (khyab byed mi dmigs pa, vyāpakānupalabdhi).43

For consequence 3) “Also physical (rūpin) and non-physicalphenomena would be without divisions, because they are non-differentfrom emptiness with regard to the characteristic distinction,” and 4) “Itwould not be necessary to seek emptiness in a way other than through

39 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 195,2-4.40 Shar gsum stong thun states explicitly only the type of the implied svatantra.41 Shar gsum stong thun: 7,3-8: ... kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam byang

rgyud cig la dus cig du ldan par ’gyur te | bden pa’i dngos por yang zhen lastong pa nyid kyang mthong ba’i phyir ro ||… lung gis gnod pas sangs rgyasla kun nas nyon mongs dang rnam byang dus cig tu myed pas ’du byed dangstong pa nyid so sor gzigs pa myed.

42 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 195,4f.: spros bral legs par gzigs pas rnam byangdu’ang ’gyur la | kun rdzob spros bral gyis dben pa’i spros bcas gzigspas kun nas nyon mongs su’ang ’gyur bas | kun nas nyon mongs dangrnam byang dus cig du’ang ’gyurdus cig tu myed par lung nas bshad pas de gnyis phan tshun spangs par ma gzigs.

43 No 2 in in Sa skya Pa��ita’s list of prasa�gas implying a heterogeneoussvatantra, as related by Shākya mchog ldan. Shar gsum stong thun: 12,1-8;


seeing and hearing, viz. through contemplative endeavor, because it is non-different from appearing phenomena with regard to the characteristicdistinction,” both texts state a prasa�ga with the logical reason of theperception of what is pervaded by the incompatible (’gal bas khyabpa dmigs pa, viruddhavyāptopalabdhi), and an implied svatantra with thelogical reason of perception of what is incompatible with the pervadingproperty (khyab byed ’gal ba dmigs pa, vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi).44

The diverging classification of the prasa�ga for the consequences 1) and2) of the position that the absolute and the conventional are different in naturecould reflect a development in Phya pa’s prasa�ga classification – nothing isknown about the relative chronology of his works. However, it could alsorepresent an error of the actual “author” of either text, presumably of thebDen gnyis ’grel ba. The colophons of both the bDen gnyis ’grel ba and itsbsDus don say: “composed by the logician monk Chos kyi seng ge” (rig(s)par smra ba’i dge slong Chos kyi seng ges sbyar pa). Nevertheless, there issome evidence that evokes the impression that one of the texts or both arelecture-notes taken by some pupils rather than Phya pa’s own writing; ofcourse, there is no “proof” for this – admittedly rather personal and speculative– assumption. If it is correct, it would by no means be a unique situation;several examples are known within the Tibetan tradition, where the explanationsof a master were actually written down by a student, and nevertheless the textis transmitted under the authorship of the master. In general, one can concludenothing from this fact. Here, however, it might have some significance.

The specific classification of the prasa�ga can serve as one evidence forthis assumption, but only if it is viewed in combination with others, e.g., thereference to this classification in a context, where it is obviously out of place.

Within the commentary on SDV 6, the section “Refuting the application of(the term paramārthasatya) to a conceptual basis of characteristics, i.e. an affirming

bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 195,7-196,2.The specification khyab byed mi dmigs pa forthe implied svatantra of the first consequence is missing in bDen gnyis ’grelba: 196,1. In the discussion of the second consequence, the text of Shar gsumstong thun is corrupt in TAUSCHER 1999a: 12,6-8 as well as in the bKa’ gdamsgsung ’bum vol. 7: 26,3f.: yang stong pa nyid snang ba dang ldog pa tha midad pas sgrib pa’i dmigs par ’gyur zhes pa{’i} [rang bzhin gyi] thal ba dangsgrib pa’i dmigs pa ma yin pas snang ba dang ldog pa tha mi dad ma yin zhespa{’i/’nag rang bzhin gyi thal bas} khyab byed mi dmigs pa’i rang rgyud’phen pa’o || {…} to be deleted, […] to be amended; cf. TAUSCHER 2003: n. 40.

44 Shar gsum stong thun: 12,9-15; bDen gnyis ’grel ba:196,2-4 (reads khyabbyed ’gal ba instead of khyab byed ’gal ba dmigs pa). For the type ofpransa�ga and implied svatantra, see above and n.31..

Helmut Tauscher14

negation” (de mtshan gzhi snang bcas ma yin dgag la ’jug pa dgag pa)45 has asub-division: “Proof of pakadharmatā” (phyogs chos sgrub pa). Within that, wefind a sub-section “Proof by logical argumentation in the case of a differentunderstanding of the meaning of the scriptural authority” (lung gi don gzhan durtog pa la rigs pas bsgrub pa). “Scriptural authority”, in this case, refers to aquotation from the Dharmasa�gītisūtra: “Not seeing anything/something particularis seeing reality” (’ga’ yang mthong med pa ni de kho na mthong ba’o), and thediscussion is exactly on the question whether ’ga’ yang should be understood as“anything (i.e. everything whatsoever)” or “something particular”. In fact it is adiscussion on the Yogācāra concept of self-perception (rang rig, svasamvedana).46

This section, in turn, has a very short sub-section entitled “The prasa�gaimplying [a svatantra] proving pakcadharmatā in the (syllogism mentionedbefore)” (de’i phyogs chos sgrub byed ’phen pa’i thal ba). It consistsof nothing but the identification of the passage in SDVV commented on,and the name the particular type of prasa�ga and implied svatantra:

“To the objection that (cognition) is not established without theprojection of aspects, it is replied: ‘If one assumes that it [perceives] itsown picture …’ [SDVV 157,29f.]. ‘Because of the projection of aspectsit follows that the object of experience and the experiencing subject are ofdifferent substance’ is a prasa�ga with the logical reason of essentialproperty. ‘Because they are not of different substance, there is no placefor a projection of aspects’ is a svatantra (with the logical reason) of non-perception of the pervading property.” 47

This is definitely not the topic here, and the sa bcad heading is equallymisplaced in the given context as dealing with the prasa�ga classification

45 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 202,5-213,8.46 This discussion poses a general problem. Like Jñānagarbha, also Phya pa

opposes the Yogācāra position, which interprets ’ga’ yang as referring toparakaliptasvabhāva only, and understands it in the strict sense ofeverything whatsoever”. On the other hand, he dedicates much space in hisShar gsum stong thun to refuting the position that the absolute reality isnot an object of cognition (don dam bden pa shes bya ma yin) (18,7-22,17),and he strictly defines the objects of cognition as the basis for distinction(dbye gzhi) of the two realities (1,17-2,2; see also below). At the presentstage, I am unable to offer a solution for this seeming contradiction.

47 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 204,1f.: (gnyis pa ni) rnam pa ma gtad par ma grubpo zhe na rang snang par khas len na [SDVV 157,29f.] zhes gsungs te |rnam pa gtad pa’i phyir myong bya myong byed rdzas tha dad par thalzhes rang bzhin gyi rtags kyi thal ba yin la | rdzas tha dad myed pas rnampa gtad sa myed ces pa khyab byed mi dmyigs pa’i rang rgyud yin no.


in general. Of course, this judgement is based on a personal impression,and the specific approach to the question might not be particularely“scholarly”, but it suggests itself to imagine the concrete “classroom”situation: Phya pa, in the course of discussing the given topic, points outthat here, again, it is the case of a prasa�ga of this and that kind (whichthey might have talked about the previous day), and the student, knowingthe master’s obsession, notes down exactly this as the crucial point.

Fortunately, the bDen gnyis bsdus don provides an opportunity toscrutinize suspicions with regard to the overall structure of the bDengnyis ’grel ba. The bsDus don is nothing but the structural outline(sa bcad) of the SDV(V) according to the interpretation of Phya paChos kyi seng ge, or rather, to Phya pa’s explanations of of this text.As the example below will demonstrate, it is by no means sure that itis also the structural outline of that bDen gnyis ’grel ba wich is extantamong Phya pa’s writings. To a large degree, it agrees with the sabcad of the bDen gnyis ’grel ba, but there are also considerabledivergences: sub-divisions mentioned in one text, but not in the other,and diverting titles of the sections, etc. Unfortunately, one of the moreessential divergences occurs exactly at this part icular sect ioncommenting on verse 6 of the SDV; it provides no help at all with thequestion whether the sa bcad section “de’i phyogs chos sgrub byed’phen pa’i thal ba” is authentic.

The ’Grel ba does not mention any division for the chapter “Proofby logical argumentation in the case of a different understanding of themeaning of the scriptural authority” (lung gi don gzhan du rtog pa larigs pas bsgrub pa) as such. It starts with stating the Yogācāra position,that ’ga’ yang mthong ba med pa means “not seeing parakalpita” –indicated as “[bstan pa]” in the chart below –, and it structures only itsrefutation, which consists of three parts: “The opponent’s position”(gzhan lugs), “It’s refutation” (de sun dbyung pa) and “The ownposition” (rang lugs).

Helmut Tauscher16

Abbreviated sa bcad of the chapter lung gi don gzhan du rtog pa la rigspas bsgrub pa in the bDen gnyis bsdus don and bDen gnyis ’grel ba

(Figures in round brackets after the section-titles denote the number of sub-sections mentioned in the text; amendments to the text are given in square brackets;figures in separated columns indicate the verses from SDV used as pratīka(pratīkas from SDVV are not mentioned); the entry “none” denotes that no pratīkais given for the respective section, neither from SDV nor from SDVV.)


This third section consists of the two main parts mentioned in the bsDusdon as the two divisions of the entire chapter: “Refutation of seeingparatantra and parinipanna” (gzhan dbang dang yongs grub gzigspa dgag pa) (ad SDV 6a-c), and “Refutation of [the assumption] thatparatantra belongs to the absolute” (gzhan dbang don dam nyid la dgag pa)(ad SDV 6d).

That means that the initial part containing the presentation and refutationof the opponent’s position in the ’Grel ba is included in the first main sectionof the bsDus don, represented by the first sub-section, “Dispute” (rgolba). This correspondence between “Dispute” in bsDus don and “Itsrefutation” (de sun ’byin pa) and “Opponent’s position” (gzhan gyi lugs)in ’Grel ba is attested by the use of the same pratīkas of SDV(V) inboth texts.

The section “Proof of pervasion” (khyab pa bsgrub pa, 312.23 in ’Grelba, 132.3 in bsDus don) is not subdivided in ’Grel ba. However, accordingto the pratīkas quoted, together with the first sub-section of the following“It’s refutation” (de sun dbyung ba, 312.24), it covers the same passagesof SDVV as bsDus don 132.31 to 132.332.

All these details show that the two sa bcad do agree basically, but areconsiderably divergent with regard to the detailed structure of the text/lecture. For this fact, two possible explanations are self-suggesting.a) They do not refer to the same lecture. In this case it can be ruled outthat both of them are based on an actual “text” composed by Phya pa; oneor both of them represent lecture notes by students taken on the occasionof two different lectures of Phya pa on the same topic. b) They do refer tothe same lecture, but due to the fact that Phya pa’s explanations on thissection are quite sophisticated and given from various points of view,coming back to the same passages (+ pratīkas) several times, his studentsarrived at different opinions on the actual strucure of the lecture. A thirdtheoretically possible alternative need not be taken into consideration: thetwo texts are based on different lectures, and confusion about the structureoccurs in addition.

Apart from that, the sa bcad of the bDen gnyis ’grel ba show featuresthat would not – again in a personal and unscholarly judgment – be expectedwith an analytical mind like Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge: The sections de sun’byin pa ([B]) and de sun dbyung ba ([B] 2) denote exactly the same partof the discussion, and also ... de dgag pa ([B] 133) serves largely the samepurpose. This is – at least – clumsy.

However, inconsistencies within a sa bcad are to be found elsewhere,too, and they do not necessarily represent an evidence against Phya pa’sdirect authorship of the text. In the Shar gsum stong thun, e.g., the sections

Helmut Tauscher18

48 This system is described in detail in HUGON 2009: 52ff.

112.4 “Presentation of the own system” (rang gi lugs rnam par gzhag pa),112.5 “Avoiding the (unacceptable) consequence taught in the autoritativescriptures in this (context) (de la lung nas gsungs pa’i thal pa spang ba),and 112.6 “Avoiding the mistake, that the position of the two realities identicalin nature (implies) an absolute(ly real) nature” (bden pa gnyis dngos pogcig pa’i phyogs la don dam pa’i dngos po grub par thal ba’i skyon spangba ) are, in fact, sub-divisions of 112.3 “Negation of (the position that thetwo realities) are non-different with regard to the characteristic distinction(ldog pa ta dad myed pd dgag pa), rather than sections on the samelevel. Of course, the respective doubts could be extended to the Shargsum stong thun as well, but the evidence is certaily not significant enoughto justify this.

All the “summaries” (bsdus don) contained in the bKa’ gdams gsung ’bumunder the authorship of Phya pa show an interesting peculiarity, the “recursive sabcad”. On several occasions, in particular within longer enumerations of divisions,sub and sub-sub-divisions, the titles of the subordinate sections are listed – in arather unique manner – before the superior one. E.g., in the hypothetical case ofa section consisting of four sub-sections, the second of which, in turn, containsthree further divisions, and the third of two, a sa bcad in “normal” style wouldread: x la bzhi | (1)… dang | (2) … dang | (3) … dang | (4) … | gnyis pa lagsum | (21) … dang | (22) … dang | (23) … | gsum pa la gnyis | (31) … dang| (32) … |. Here, however, immediately after the announcement of four sub-sections of the particular chapter, a list of nine headings would follow: x la bzhi |(1) … dang | (21) … dang | (22) … dang | (23) … kyis/pas | (2) … dang | (31)… dang | (32) … kyis/pas | (3) … dang | (4) … |.48

This particular style of sa bcad writing appears in the bDen gynisbsdus don as well as in the rNam nges bsdus don, the sPyod ’jug bsdusdon, the small fragment of the bSlab btus bsdus don and also in the rGyudbla ma’i bsdus don, but it is not known – at least not to me – in any othertext of the Tibetan exegetical tradition. Unless we want to assume that allthese bsdus don texts were written down by the same student – I wonderwho that might have been – of Phya pa’s, who had developed his ownindividual style of writing sa bcad, the “recursive sa bcad” has to be seenas reflecting a caprice of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge himself.

As for Phya pa’s oeuvre in general, for centuries all of his works havebeen considered lost; only in the last fifteen years they keep re-appearing,and the question arises, why this might have been so? To the best of myknowledge, there was no politically motivated ban of his works, as was thecase with the writings of some Sa skya authors like sTag tshang lotsāvaetc., or treatises that propagated the gzhan stong theory. Irrelevance, too,


can hardly have been the reason. Phya pa’s influence on the development ofthe Tibetan, in particular the dGe lugs pa, Pramā�a and bsdus grwa traditionsis well attested and has been studied by various scholars; but his Pramā�aworks shared the fate of his other writings. Similarly, Phya pa seems to haveinfluenced also the development of Tibetan Madhyamaka exegesis. – Thequestion remains, why was his work forgotten by the local tradition? Asstated initially, the present paper does not claim to answer this question.Ronald Davidson, however, provides an answer: “Because of his contrarious[!] disposition, Chapa’s ideas were cited later by Sakya Pa��ita as the pre-eminent expression of Tibetan doctrinal innovation, which was the kiss ofdeath for Chapa’s proposals.”49 A note to this passage refers to two chaptersin JACKSON 1987, but they do not contain any statement by Sa skya Pa��itathat could be interpereted in this way. Instead, there is a quotation of Shākyamchog ldan’s Rigs gter rnam bshad, which reads: “That reasoning of Phya pa… ignores all the excellent expositions in the basic treatises and merely putstogether with great zeal what had not been expounded.”50

Regardless of whether Sa skya Pa��ita or Shākya mchog ldan evaluatedPhya pa in this way, it certainly did not mean “the kiss of death” for hisproposals. Accusations of that kind were rather frequent at that time, and avery similar statement Shâkya mchog ldan make also about Tsong kha pa:“The rin po che Blo bzang … made his own analyses with the argumentationsof a logician, and as a support he quoted many passages from authoritativescriptures, which he arranged [according to his intentions], although they didnot fit; so he established many tenets with regard to Madhyamaka and Yogācāra,Sûtra and Tantra, that were previously unknown.”51

Accordingly, possibly in a direct response to this accusation of Shākyamchog ldan’s, when praising the achievements of Tsong kha pa, lCang skyaRol pa’i rdo rje (1717-1780) says: “Thus, this venerable one [Tsong-kha-pa] … was never tainted by the fault of oversimplification and fabrication;he went back to the thought of each of the founding scholars and adeptsand, in addition, he went back to the word of the Conqueror.”52

49 DAVIDSON 2005: 280.50 Rigs gter rnam bshad: 473,5: gang yang phya pa’i rigs pa ni || … || de yis

gzhung nas legs bchad nas || kun la yid rton med byas nas || ma bshad nangyis sbyor bar zad ||; text and translation of JACKSON 1987: vol 1, 170f. + n. 20.

51 Shākya rnam thar 341,6-342,2: rin po che Blo bzang pas … khong rang gi rtogge’i rigs pas rnam par dpyad cing |rgyab rten du mi ’grig bzhin du bsgrig pa’ilung mang po drangs nas dbu sems dang | mdo sngags kyi grub pa’i mtha sngonchad ma grags pa’i rnam grangs ches shin du mang po dag ’jog par mdzad do.

52 mDzes rgyan 303,19-304,4: des na rje btsun ’di nyid kyis … bla chos dangrang bzo’i nyes pas nam yang ma gos par rang rang gi srol ’byed pa po’i

Helmut Tauscher20

pa� grub rnams kyi dgongs pa la gtugs shing de yang rgyal ba’i bka’ danglegs par gtugs te …; translation of LOPEZ 1987: 269.

53 See VOSE 2009: 57.54 See, e.g., JACKSON 1987: Vol. 1, 170.55 See above, n. 17.56 dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris: 77b5f.: Cha pa la sogs pa bod kyi mkhas pa rnams

kyis kyang | gzhan gyis btags pa’i chos can la rang rgyud mi rung bar ’chaddo ||; text and translation of TILLEMANS 1984: 383 and 365.

Unlike contemporary western universities, where “innovation” is a magicword which opens many doors – to fundings, among others –, middle ageTibetan Buddhist tradition did not appreciate this idea at all. Exegesis had tobe an explanation of the Buddha’s word and in harmony with the expositionsof the teachers of the old days, in particular with the Indian masters.Nevertheless, the great minds of all times were – naturally – innovative.

It is not by chance that here Tsong kha pa is chosen as an example. Heand Phya pa seem to be contrary in their views, the former being a declaredPrāsa�gika, the latter an inveterate Svātantrika. However, most probablythey are very much alike in many ways. Of course, there are manydivergences, e.g., with regard to explaining the Buddha’s perception of theconventional,53 but also agreements on basic questions. Besides, both ofthem were apparently in opposition to the mainstream interpretations oftheir times, and both of them were innovative.

Apparently, the dGe lugs pa tradition does not share the opinion thatthere might be similarities between Phya pa and Tsong kha pa in theirMadhyamaka interpretations. Generally, Phya pa is viewed as somebodywho represents wrong positions, although he is respected for his achievmentson the “path of reasoning”.

However, concrete references to Phya pa’s Madhyamaka position areprimarily to be found within the writings of Shākya mchog ldan.54 He alsoquotes and refutes two chapters of Shar gsum stong thun, which discusswhy it is not justified not to accept an independent proof and refute thevalidity of a prasa�ga in refuting a realistic position.55

In dGe lugs pa literature Tsong kha pa (1357-1409) and mKhas grub rjedGe legs dpal bzang (1385-1438) refer to Phya pa; later authors mention hisname only in identifying opponents (kha cig) in Tsong kha pa’s writings.Usually they all do so in rather vague formulations like “somebody like …”(… la sogs pa; … lta bu). The following survey does not claim completeness.

• Tsong kha pa: “Phya pa chos kyi seng ge and other Tibetan scholarsalso said that a svatantra was inappropriate in the case of a [non-existent] subject imputed by non-Buddhists.”56


• mKhas grub rje states that “somebody like Phya pa” takes “unreal” (bden med)as “established in reality” (bden grub), because he does not distinguish between“fit to withstand investigation by logical analysis which investigatesthe absolute” (de kho na nyid dpyod pa’i rigs pas dpyad bzod) and “establishedby logical argumentation” (rigs pas grub pa). The same misunderstanding, hesays, is also the reason for rNgog lotsāva’s position that absolute reality isnot an object of cognition (don dam bden pa shes bya ma yin).57

• ’Jams dbyangs bshad pa’i rdo rje Ngag dbang brtson ’grus (1648–1721) more or less repeats mKhas grub rje’s statement.58

When discussing various unacceptable identifications of the basis ofdistinction (dbye gzhi) of the two realities, ’Jams dbyangs bshad pa mentions“objects that are not imputed” (sgro ma brtags pa’i yul). He does not givea name here, but he might refer to Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (see below).• A kyā yongs ’dzin (1740-1827) mentions Phya pa as a representativeof a definition of the object of negation (dgag bya) which is too wide,which leads to taking conventional reality (sa�v�tisatya) as inexistent.59

• Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me (1762-1823) andBlo gros rgya mtsho (1851-1930 ?), commenting on verse 7 of Tso�kha pa’s rTen ’brel bstod pa legs bśad sñi� po, identify “those whountiringly adhered to the path of reasoning” (rigs lam), but could notunderstand the essence of Madhyamaka with “Phya pa etc.”60

Tsong kha pa’s reference to Phya pa would certainly not represent amajor issue of controversy, and, in fact, his evaluation of Phya pa does notappears not to be clearly and fundamentally negative; with his predecessors,it is definitely the case. However, their “accusations” become increasinglyvague, the later the authors are, and very strong doubt arises as to whetherthey really knew Phya pa. The suspicion seems to be justified that theymerely repeated standard opinions that were never questioned.

57 sTong thun chen mo 145,3f.: de kho na nyid dpyod pa’i rigs pas dpyad bzoddang rigs pas grub pa gnyis ma phye pa’i dbang gis sngon dus kyi mkhenporNgog lo lta bu yang don dam bden pa shes bya ma yin par bzhed pa dang| Cha pa lta bu yang bden med bden grub tu smra ba la sogs pa’i nor pa chenpa rnams byung ba yin no. See CABEZÓN 1992: 143.

58 mChan bzhi: 283,5; cf. TAUSCHER 1995: 165.59 Lam rim brda bkrol 167,6ff.; see TAUSCHER 1995: 166f.60 rTen ’brel bstod pa legs bœad sñi� po: v. 7: gzhung lugs mang thos rigs pa’i lam

du yang | | ngal ba med [corr. : mang] bsten mngon par rtogs pa yi || yon tan tshogskyis mi dman du mas kyang | | ’bad kyang rtogs par ma gyur gnas de ni||Drang nges yang snying 421,2f.: ... rigs lam la ngal ba mang du bsten pa Phya pa chosseng sogs sang chen brgyad du grags pa dang …; cf. Drang nges dka’ ’grel 7,2f.

Helmut Tauscher22

61 Shar gsum stong thun: 58,7-77,20.62 Op.cit.: 58,9-64,15 (61,4-62,14).63 Op.cit.: 70,4.64 Op.cit.: 70,1-72,15.65 Lung rigs rgya mtsho:14, 519,7.66 dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris: 78b1ff. see TILLEMANS 1984: 384 and 367.67 See above and n. 31 and 33.

What does Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge himself say on these points?Tsong kha pa’s remark tha t Phya would hold a sva tantra a s“inappropriate in the case of a [non-existent] subject imputed by non-Buddhists” can certainly not be verified. In his Shar gsum stong thunhe takes great pains to demonstrate exactly the opposite. One chapteris entitled “Refutation of (the position) that the object of negation[which is substantiality propagated by realistic systems] is negated bya prasa�ga” (dgag bya thal ’gyur gyis ’gog pa sun dbyung ba)61. Theposition that a svatantra is in-appropriate for doing so is dealt with inthe sub-section “Formulation of the opponent’s system” (gzhan gyilugs dgod pa)62 within that chapter. He even states that a prasa�ga is“utterly incapable of refuting the object of negation” (dgag bya gtandgag mi nus pa)63.

However, the chapter title “Inadmissibility/impossibility of refutingthe realists by prasa�ga” (thal ’gyur gyis dngos por smra ba ’gogpa mi ’thad/nus pa),64 Shākya mchog ldan quotes with an amendment“... by prasa�ga alone (thal ’gyur rkyang pas …)”.65 This wouldindicate an agreement with Kamalaśīla’s position as it is pointed out byTsong kha pa in his dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris, viz. that both methodshave to be applied.66

One passage in the bDen gnyis ’grel ba points to the same direction.In the course of discussing the second consequence mentioned in SNS toresult from the assumption that the conventional and the absolute are differentin nature, it reads: “The mutual exclusion (of the conventional and theabsolute) is invalidated by the prasa�ga … and the thereby impliedsvatantra …” (… thal ba dang | de la … rang rgyud ’phangs pas phantshun spangs pa la gnod do).

On the other hand, in the context of the first consequence, within thesame two lines of the manuscript, apparently the svatantra (alone?) refutesthe faulty view: “The svatantra … implied by the prasa�ga … implicitlynegates the difference (of the absolute) from the conventional” (… thalbas … rang rgyud ’phangs pas kun rdzob las gzhan yin pa shugs lakhegs ste). 67


In the context of this paper it would lead too far to discuss in detailPhya pa’s understanding of concepts like “fit to withstand investigationby logical analysis which investigates the absolute” (de kho na nyiddpyod pa’ i r igs pas dpyad bzod ) and “es tabl ished by logicalargumentation” (rigs pas grub pa), and his exact definition of the objectof negation. However, no justification for the respective evaluations bymKhas grub rje and A kyā yongs ’dzin is evident in Phya pa’s writings.

For the time being, let us return to the question of Phya pa’sinnovations. Regardless of whether or not Davidson’s judgment quotedabove (see above, n. 49) is to the point, to some extent Phya pa iscertainly innovative, just as Tsong kha pa is. Of course, they both do notpropagate the same Madhyamaka exegesis, but they are certainly veryclose with regard to basic ideas, and they both stress the same or similartopics and problems.

In his very basic approach, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge is not innovativeat all. One would rather call him “conservative” in maintaining the exegeticaltradition of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarak�ita and Kamalaśīla, and strictly rejectingthe works and the tradition of Candrakīrti, which were only recentlyintroduced to Tibet.

His combining Madhyamaka and Pramā�a methods and ideas, too, isnothing “new”. He might exceed his predecessors in this respect, butbasically he continues the tradition of the Indian masters mentioned above,and of rNgog lotsāva.

At the present stage, his innovations can be seen on two levels, a) structuraland b) doctrinal.

a) The overall structure of the discussion of the two realities (bden pagnyis) that Phya pa set out in his Shar gsum stong thun became the modelfor all later Tibetan – in particular dGe lugs pa – treatises on this topic:

Distinction of the 2 realities (bden pa gnyis kyi dbye ba)Basis of distinction (dbye ba’i gzhi)Mode of distinction (dbye ba’i don), i.e., the discussion of the

four possible kinds of difference between the two realities. In this context,Phya pa bases his discussion of whether the two realities are the sameor different in nature or with regard to their to the characteristicdistinction (ldog pa, vyāv�tti) on SNS 3,3-5, and this sūtra passagebecame the locus classicus for this kind of discussion in later centuries,up to the present time.

Ascertainment of the number of realities (grangs nges pa)Meaning of the terms (ming gi don)

Characteristics of the two realities (bden pa gnyis kyi mtshan nyid).b) As already stated, a detailed analysis of Phya pa’s doctrinal position

and, accordingly, an evaluation of his doctrinal innovations are not yet

Helmut Tauscher24

possible. Thus, this paper will concentrate only on very basic concepts.They might appear to be merely formal issues, but each of these topicsdeals with an essential aspect of a complex ontological system, implies allthe other topics, and focuses on the same doctrinal essence; each of themcould serve as a complete description of the system.

1) Absolute reality (don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya) is an object ofcognition (shes bya). It is not clear whether this position is to be counted asan “innovation”, but it certainly is in strict opposition to rNgog lotsāva andprobably other contemporaries of Phya pa. This topic touches a majorontological issue, as it counts the absolute among the “existing things”, anddoes not only interpret it as a particular way of viewing reality. This questionis of major importance also in Tsong kha pa’s writings.68

2) Identification of the object of negation (dgag bya): In Tsong kha pa’sexegesis, this expression turned from a general and neutral term (“that which isto be negated”, pratiedhya) into a technical term, denoting everything that isopposed to absolute reality and the cognition thereof. It has to be properlyidentified in order to arrive at a correct understanding of emptiness (śūnyatā).69

In Phya pa’s usage of the term, we find first traces of this development.3) Basis of distinction (dbye gzhi) of the two realities: Apparently,

Phya pa was the first one to introduce this category into Madhyamakaexegesis. Again, it is a crucial ontological issue, and, although this pointhas already been mentiond under the “structural innovations” of Phya pa,it is of doctrinal relevance.

Later discuss in a more or less detailed way what could be taken, andactually is taken, as a basis of distinguishing the two realities. It is not clearin all cases who’s position is actually referred to:70

• appearance as such (snang ba tsam) – ascribed to rNgog lotsāvaby ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa71

• the nature of (all entities) from matter to omniscience (gzugs nasrnam mkhyen bar gyi ngo bo)

• objects that are not imputed (sgro ma brtags pa’i yul) – Phya pa (?)• objects of cognition that are not investigated and analysed (ma

brtags ma dpyad pa’i shes bya), “mere entities that aredifferentiated by means of different sorts of cognition”

• cognition as such (blo tsam) – Sa skya Pa��ita, Go ram pa• reality/truth as such (bden pa tsam)

68 See TAUSCHER 1995: 326-341.69 Op.cit.: 73-177.70 See TAUSCHER 1995: 181ff.71 dBu ’jug mtha’ dpyod: 514,1ff.


• dependently originated things as such (rten ’brel tsam)• objects of cognition as such (shes bya tsam) – ascribed to “some

(masters) of the old days” (snga rabs pa ’ga’ zhig) by Rongston Shes bya kun rig (1357-1449), and to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags(*1055) by Go ram pa to; Tsong kha pa

If ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and Go ram pa are right in ascribing suchposition to rNgog lotsāva and, respectively, to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, it is,of course, not justified to credit Phya pa with the introduction of the dbyebzhi debate into Madhyamaka exegesis. However, it is doubtful whetherthese two older masters really did operate with these categories; therespective statements might be correct in essence, but not in detail.72

Among these positions, only the one of Phya pa (if he is really referredto in this case) and of Tsong kha pa operate with ontological categories; allthe others are mainly epistemological. Tsong kha pa’s position has to bestressed in particular. In his exegesis this is an important point, because, inhis view, the two satyas should cover everything existent, i.e., all objects ofcognition. This is the basis for taking both satyas as “conventually existent”(tha sñad du yod pa), i.e. as ontological and not as epistemologicalcategories, with all its implications. This fact becomes clear, e.g., from Śākyamchog ldan’s critique on the interpretation of the basis of distinction as “theobjects of cognition as such”. It argues that “object of cognition” (shesbya) and “existent” (yod pa) have the same range of meaning, whereasconventional reality (sa�v�tisatya) is not necessarily existent.73

Again, we have to ask the question: what does Phya pa really say onthat topic? For him, the basis of distinction is “the basis of definition assuch” (mtshan gzhi tsam), i.e., the the object of cognition (shes bya) or theobject of valid cognition (tshad ma’i gzhal bya), or, in other words, “that whichis charcterized as an object of cognition”. In the Shar gsum stong thun he says:

“It is suitable to take as the realm of mind (blo’i yul) that nature(of things) which is constituted after abolishing its opposite by validcognition; therefore, the ultimate and the conventional reality haveto be distinguished, after taking the mere basis of definition (i.e.that) which is signified as object of cognition, as the basis.

Further, as the characteristic distinction (ldog pa, vyāv�tti) of anobject of valid cognition (tshad ma’i gzhal bya) is an implyingnegation, it is only conventional reality; nevertheless it is suiting asthe basis of distinction of the two realities, because the basis of

72 Cf. TAUSCHER 1995: n. 374.73 Lung rigs rgya mtsho: 15. 3,6ff.; see TAUSCHER 1990: 42f.

Helmut Tauscher26

definition which is an object of valid cognition pervades all non-implying and implying negations.”74

In the introduction to this passage he even uses the same reason thatTsong kha pa gives for taking “objects of cognition as such” (shes bya tsam)as the basis of distinction, however, in a slightly different context:

“As no base of the objects of cognition does exceed the two realities,the meaning of the two realities shall be ascertained correctly by logicalargumentation.”75

Similarly, in the bDen gnyis ’grel ba, the basis of distinction is definedas “an object of cognition”, i.e., a basis of definition which is suiting as asupport for the conventional designation “definiendum” (mtshon bya) or“object of cognition” (shes bya) (… mtshon bya shes bya’i tha snyadrten du rung ba’i mtshan gzhi shes bya).76

“Objects that are not imputed” (sgro ma brtags pa’i yul) are notmentioned. Of course, taking into consideration Phya pa’s definition as it isrelated by Shākya mchog ldan: “(Valid cognition) is pervaded by being anon-erroneous mode of cognition and by being able to eliminate (erroneous)imputation”77 this is implied, but that does not put it into contradiction withTsong kha pa’s position.

’Jam dbyangs bshad pa is not of this opinion. He argues that in this casealso mirage and magical appearance would not fall under “imputed bydefective sense faculties”.78 According to dGe lugs pa position they areconventional reality, however, only in their aspect of the “appearing object”(snang yul), not as a “conceptual object” (zhen yul); as such they wouldbe non-existent. Taking this differentiation into consideration, by Phya pa’scondition for “valid cognition”, i.e. the ability to eliminate imputation, onlythe appearing object would be excluded from being imputed by defectivesense-faculties; the conceptual object would be excluded from being an object

74 Shar gsum stong thun: 1,17ff.: tshad mas ’gal zla bsal nas rnam par gzhag pa’i ngobo blo’i yul du byar rung bas shes byar mtshon pa’i mtshan gzhi tsam gzhir byasnas … don dam pa’i bden pa dang … kun rdzob kyi bden pa gnyis su dbye’o ||de’ang tshad ma’i gzhal bya’i ldog pa ni ma yin dgag yin pas kun rdzob kyi bdenpa kho na yin yang tshad ma’i gzhal bya’i mtshan gzhi ni med dgag dang ma yindgag mtha’ dag gi khyab byed yin pas bden gnyis kyi dbye ba’i gzhir ’thad do.

75 Op.cit.: 1,12f.: shes bya’i sa thams cad bden pa gnyis las ma ’das pas bdengnyis kyi don phyin ci ma log par rigs pas nges par bya ba ste.

76 bDen gnyis ’grel ba: 194,5f.77 See KUIJP 1983, 77–78.78 See TAUSCHER 1995: 116, 247ff.


of valid cognition and, thereby, from being classified as basis of distinction. Thatmeans, Phya pa would be in total harmony with Tsong kha pa, if he would arguein that way; however, he does not. In Svātantrika manner, he distinguishes betweencorrect and wrong conventional reality. So, formally, ’Jam dbyangs bshad pa’scritique is correct: with Phya pa’s definition of the basis of distinction being valid,mirage etc., indeed, should not depend on “imputation by defective sense faculties”.

Either Phya pa uses the term “imputation” in a narrower sense than thedGe lugs pa tradition does, or we have here a case of real inconsistency, ashortcoming of a not yet fully developed system.

4) The difference between the two realities. The relation between thetwo realities could be:

• Different things (dngos po tha dad pa) with a distinct functionalefficiency each, like “pot” and “cloth”,• the “difference of negated identity” (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad pa),which means that the one does not have the same nature (bdag nyid) as theother, even though they have no distinct functional efficiencies, like “real”and “unreal”,• “identity in nature and difference with regard to the distinguishingcharacteristics” (ngo bog cig la ldog pa tha dad pa),• pseudo-difference (tha dad lta bu), as it is the case with synonyms.79

The first and the last alternative are merely theoretical and need not bediscussed in detail.The “difference of negated identity” poses a problem, as it sounds like atautology, and the actual meaning of the term is still unclear.80 It implies thedifference of two things, one of which is unreal, and it means that they are“undeterminable as being the same or different” (de nyid dang gzhan dubrjod du med pa, tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīya). This explanation isgiven by Dal po pa She rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1361),81 and he might also bethe opponent who uses this definition as an argument.82

Although Phya pa propagates this kind of relation in the context of thethree kāya of the Buddha,83 he strictly opposes it with regard to the tworealities and Phya pa refutes at length.84 His main arguments are that underthe condition that emptiness and the conventional reality were not identicalin nature:

79 Shar gsum stong thun: 2,3ff. Tsong kha pa, discussing the same topic in theLam rim chung ba (300b1ff.) mentions only the first three alternatives.

80 Cf. TAUSCHER 1995: 188ff.81 bKa’ bsdu v. 12-14b (366,6-367,2).82 Shar gsum stong thun : 3,18.83 Op.cit.: 145,14f.84 Op.cit.: 2,15-9,17.

Helmut Tauscher28

• śūnyatā [as a synonym of ultimate reality] and conventional realitywould not be of identical nature (stong pa ñid dang kun rdzob ngo bogcig ma yin pa). That would mean that things are established as ultimatelyreal, because they were essentially different from their emptiness andthere was no connection between these two.• An emptiness that was of the same nature as the appearing things couldnot be their ultimate reality (ngo bo gcig pa’i stong pa ñid don dam pa’ibden pa ma yin pa). In this case, the realisation of ultimate reality wouldnot be opposed to the concept of and the clinging to ultimately real things;liberation would be impossible, or ultimate reality would not exist at all.

Tsong kha pa, too, discusses this kind of difference in some detail.However, he does not actually refute it, but accepts it as the position ofsome “masters of the old days” (snga rabs pa).

With regard to their own position, however, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge andTsong kha agree: the two realities are “identical in nature, but different withregard to the characteristic distinction” (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa).

Phya pa and most of the later dGe lugs pa authors – though not Tsong kha pa– base the respective discussion on the four unacceptable consequences taught inSNS 3, 3-5 for the assuption that the ultimate and the conventional are non-different and for the assumption that they are different. These consequences havealready been dealt with (see above pp. 6-10) and need not be repeated here. Ithas, however, to be noted that SNS speaks only of a position that “the characteristicof the conditioned and the characteristic of the ultimate are non-different or different”(’du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang | don dam pa’i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yinpa’am | tha dad pa zhes zer ba). Phya pa and the dGe lugs pa authors interpret“non-different” as “non-different with regard to the characteristic distinction” (ldogpa tha dad med pa) and “different” as “different in nature” (ngo bo tha dad).

The passage of SNS, however, leaves room for various interpretations.In later centuries it was used as a scriptural evidence for other positions aswell, like the “difference of negated identity” (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad)between the two realities, or the two realities being “identical or different inno way whatsoever” (gcig tha dad gang yang ma yin pa).85

These few examples might suffice to show that Phya pa did have someimpact on the Tibetan Madhyamaka exegese; much more research work is neededto fully understand it. But why has he been neglect for centuries? Is it possiblethat the Mādhyamika Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge was ignored by the later traditionmerely because of his “bad reputation” as a strict Svātantrika (even if this reputationmight not be fully justified)? Most probably, this question will never be answered.

85 Cf., e.g., TAUSCHER 1995: 191.


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