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Transforming the company Avoiding the Black Swans Success Factors and core beliefs in Value Assurance Istanbul, April 2012 Mobily CIO Summit CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY Any use of this material without specific permission of McKinsey & Company is strictly prohibited

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Page 1: 02 McKinsey and Co

Transforming the company

Avoiding the Black Swans

Success Factors and

core beliefs in

Value Assurance

Istanbul, April 2012

Mobily CIO Summit

CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY

Any use of this material without specific permission of

McKinsey & Company is strictly prohibited

Page 2: 02 McKinsey and Co

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Introducing Enrico Benni

▪ Senior Partner – Abu Dhabi

▪ Managing Partner IT Consulting

Middle East – previously

leading IT consulting in China

▪ Leader of the global ERP/Value

Assurance McKinsey practice

▪ Co-Leader of the global

McKinsey IT architecture

practice

▪ Has served CIOs on large

transformations across

sectors, in particular in

Telecom, High Tech and

Logistics

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To strengthen its client service capabilities, McKinsey created the

business technology office

To enhance our value proposition to clients, McKinsey

launched the Business Technology Office (BTO) in

1997 to build knowledge and expertise in technology

and IT-related matters

Since its launch McKinsey BTO has gained extensive

experience in helping (multinational) businesses with

technology related top management issues. The BTO

has completed 3,600+ projects around the world with

over 920 clients

Over the last years, McKinsey BTO has built up a global

presence in 56 offices in 29 countries to serve

companies in an increasingly global economy

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Today’s presentation

Turning research into action:

Core beliefs in Value Assurance

Collaboration of McKinsey and Oxford:

Research findings about success factors

for large-scale IT projects

Managing strategy

and stakeholders

Excelling in core

project management

practices

Mastering technology

and content

1

2 3

4

Building team and

capabilities

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Today’s presentation

Turning research into action:

Core beliefs in Value Assurance

Collaboration of McKinsey and Oxford:

Research findings about success factors

for large-scale IT projects

Managing strategy

and stakeholders

Excelling in core

project management

practices

Mastering technology

and content

1

2 3

4

Building team and

capabilities

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IT projects are now so large and complex

they can bring whole companies down

▪ Lord Chancellor’s

Department

▪ Courts Computer

System

▪ 328% over budget

▪ 167m USD

▪ Canadian fire arms

registry

▪ 37,000% cost

overrun,

IT system ‘only’

160% over budget

▪ Total cost for the

tax payer 834m

USD and mounting

▪ Design finished in

2001 – differences

in development

software

▪ More than 12

months delay to

market; 26% drop

in share price

▪ Resignation of

Noël Forgeard

▪ After failing a

$1.4bn IT

modernisation

▪ Kmart started a

$500mio SCM

project

▪ The combination of

two failed projects

forced Kmart into

bankruptcy

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Cost overruns in the public sector are not new

6

The citizens of Nicomedia, Sir, have spent 3,318,000 sesterces, on an aqueduct; which they abandoned before it was finished and finally demolished.

Then they made a grant of 200,000 sesterces towards another one, but this too was abandoned, so that even after squandering such enormous sums they must still spend more money if they are to have a water supply.

Pliny to Emperor Trajan (AD 110)

Steps must be taken to provide Nicomedia with a water supply, and I am sure you will apply yourself to the task in the right way.

But for goodness sake apply yourself no less to finding out whose fault it is that Nicomedia has wasted so much money up to date.

It may be that people have profited by this starting and abandoning of aqueducts.

Let me know the result of your enquiry.

Trajan's response

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Key Research Question

Is this anecdotal

evidence represen-

tative for IT projects?

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This McKinsey-Oxford collaboration was chosen

“No. 1 Idea To Watch" by HBR (09/11)

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We studied a total of 2,092 projects,

worth EUR 204 billion

Rest

2

US

Europe

40

Private

Sector

35

Public

Sector

65

Stan-

dard

SW 7

Integration

Project

1

Other

12

IT Archi-

tecture

9

IT Infra-

structure 8

Custom

development

72

Office

Information

9 ERP

28

MIS

25

Other 20

Customer

facing 4

Transaction

2

Administration

12

0.01

10

10

5

1 0.10 100 1,000 10,000

Location Sector Project type System type

Actual Project Size (2010 EUR millions), percent

Largest academic database

▪ 2,092 projects and programmes

▪ Average size of EUR 90m (median 1.8m)

▪ Average duration 2.5 years (median 2 yrs)

▪ Total portfolio value of EUR 204bn

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7 questions I always wanted to ask about projects

Are lines-of-code riskier than steel-and-concrete?

What is the value of benefits management?

I

Are private and public sector different? II

Is standard software better than bespoke solutions? III

Should we be afraid of big projects? IV

Should we be afraid of long projects? V

VII

What is the value of experience? VI

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Hypothesis I – Risk of ICT Projects

Engineering

projects are less

risky than ICT – by

a magnitude

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Key finding – Black Swans matter more than averages

in the world of megaprojects

Ø 27%

IT projects

Thin-tailed distribution

Infrastructure projects

1 Thin tails: not more than .7% projects are outliers outside these bounds

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Frequency Percent

Cost Overrun Percent

▪ If IT projects had thin tails all1 projects

would end up between

-30% and +48%

▪ In reality 15% IT and 8% infrastructure

projects run out-of-control

▪ IT projects 20 times more likely to run

out-of-control than expected: more than

2300% over-incidence of outliers!!

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Black swans have high cost, schedule and benefit

risks, which are hidden in the fat tails of ICT portfolios Risk comparison, average percent

Outliers

cost overrun

+197 Cost

overrun

+68 Schedule

overrun

All projects

+27

+55

+49 – Benefits

shortfall

Projects with

cost overrun

+70

+60

-1

▪ Even if the average cost overrun is low, risk of cost overruns is high

▪ Black Swans mean very high cost and schedule risks

▪ And all the projects with a downside risk show significant risk

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The commercials The calculus

▪ EUR 10m fixed price

contract

▪ 18 months duration

▪ Costs are equally

distributed over contract

length

▪ 10-30% profit margin

▪ Best case

– 3m profit

– 7m cost

▪ Monthly burn-rate

– Profit: 170 thsd

– Cost: 390 thsd

The impact ▪ 5 months delay wipe out annual profit

▪ 8 months delay wipes out all profits

▪ In the worst case (10% margin) 2 months

eat up all profits

▪ ø55% schedule risk = 18 + 10 months

Schedule risk requires vendors

to respond, e.g., cutting costs

Why are these risks so crucial?

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Hypothesis II – Risk of ICT Projects

Public sector ICT

projects are more

risky than private

sector projects

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0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

Schedule escalation

Frequency (%)

0

5

10

15

20

25

-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

Cost escalation

Frequency (%)

Black Swans are as common in the private sector as they

are in the public sector!

Public sector Private sector

▪ Black Swan risk is the same!

▪ Cost overruns and schedule overruns statistically not different

▪ Public sector much larger risk of budget cuts to its projects!

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Hypothesis III – Project Types differ in Risk

Don't do bespoke

software – use tame

technology, ideally

COTS (commercial-

off-the-shelf)!

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Different types of ICT projects have significant differences in performance

Average

High Risk

19%

Custom Development 32%

Standard Software 42%

IT Architecture

0%

27%

IT Infrastructure 2%

Integration Project

71%

26%

20%

18%

43%

26%

75%

45%

50% ()

5%

Project type

Average

cost overrun

Average

schedule overrun

Average bene-fits

shortfall

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Hypothesis IV – The bigger the riskier

Bigger projects are

riskier than smaller

projects

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Surprisingly, smaller projects have higher cost risk variability…

ICT average

ICT projects

Cost overruns Percent

Project Budget EUR millions

750 500 250 2,250 2,000 1,750 1,500 13,750 1,250 1,000 0

-100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

▪ Very weak linear trend

▪ Bigger budgets don't increase the relative cost overrun

▪ Expected risk in monetary terms grows linearly not exponentially

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Hypothesis V – The longer the riskier

Longer projects are

riskier than shorter

projects

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The longer the project, the higher the expected cost overrun

Cost overrun

Percent of initial budget

Project duration

Months -100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180

ICT average

ICT projects

▪ Every additional year increases the

expected cost overrun by 16.8% and

schedule overrun by 4.8%

▪ As project duration lengthens,

the probability of becoming an outlier

increases, esp. for projects > 3 yrs

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Black Swan risk highest for large projects, however expensive

is better than long Probability of Cost Black Swans

10-30

million

20%

L

6%

1-2 years

29%

30-350

million

XL

31%

2-3 years

Cost Black

Swans

Cost Black

Swans

Actual size

Duration

11%

>350

million

XXL

27%

4+ years

▪ Highest risk =

stuck in the middle

▪ Short is better

than small

▪ Expensive better

than long

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Black Swan risk highest for large projects, however expensive

is better than long Probability of Cost Black Swans

5-20

million

9%

L

12%

1-2 years

14%

20-200

million

XL

28%

2-3 years

Cost Black

Swans

Cost Black

Swans

Planned size

Duration

13%

>200

million

XXL

41%

4+ years

▪ Short and small is

best

▪ Expensive better

than long

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Hypothesis VI – We need Masterbuilder

More experienced

project managers are

a key to successfully

managing risks

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Is grey hair an achievement? Risk profile

Work experience

<10 10-14 15+

Cost overrun 16% 1% 32%

Schedule

overrun 2% 15% 61%

Benefits

shortfall -49%

Black Swan

events 0% 0% 19%

▪ Initial hypothesis:

the more work

experience, the

better the project

performance

– Mind over

machine

– Young brains –

new methods

▪ However, we find a

struggle between

"Master builder"

and "Fire fighter"

Ø size (m) 0.9 4.3 141

Ø duration

(months) 9 11 32

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Is grey hair an achievement? Risk profile adjusted for size and duration effects (ANCOVA)

Work experience

<10 10-14 15+

Cost overrun 40% 28% 23%

Schedule

overrun 4% 18% 63%

Benefits

shortfall -48%

Black Swan

events 8% 7% 17%

▪ Initial hypothesis:

the more work

experience, the

better the project

performance

– Mind over

machine

– Young brains –

new methods

▪ However, we find a

struggle between

"Master builder"

and "Fire fighter"

Ø size (m) 0.9 4.3 141

Ø duration

(months) 9 11 32

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Hypothesis VII – Benefits management is key

Lack of benefits

management is the

single most important

deficiency in ICT

project performance

management

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A key challenge to projects is Benefits Management Risk profile

Cost overrun Schedule overrun Black Swans

Benefits not

measured 32% 36% 17% 85%

Benefits

measured -7% 122% 7% 15%

▪ Benefits force projects to think about

output and outcomes

▪ Cost-benefit-based performance

management seems to motivate

managers to trade off schedule for

cost/benefits

▪ With benefits management black swan

risk decreases

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The challenge is

black swans, more

than it is average

overruns

7 answers to re-think megaproject management

Are lines-of-code riskier than

steel-and-concrete?

What is the value of benefits management?

I

Are private and public

sector different?

II

Is standard software better

than bespoke solutions?

III

Should we be afraid

of big projects?

IV

Should we be afraid

of long projects?

V

VII

What is the value

of experience? VI

Knowing output and

outcomes reduce risks

Not on average, but

more Black Swans!

Budget cuts are the

only unique issue!

No – one is late, the

other more expensive!

Short and small are

best, long is worse

than big

Master builders matter

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Today’s presentation

Turning research into action:

Core beliefs in Value Assurance

Collaboration of McKinsey and Oxford:

Research findings about success factors

for large-scale IT projects

Managing strategy

and stakeholders

Excelling in core

project management

practices

Mastering technology

and content

1

2 3

4

Building team and

capabilities

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Risk comparison

1 Cost increase over regular cost

SOURCE: McKinsey Oxford Reference Class Forecasting for IT Projects Study

Root cause analysis identifies 4 key dimensions

that explain most project failures

"Missing focus"

▪ Unclear objectives

▪ Lack of bus. focus

"Content issues"

▪ Shifting requirements

▪ Technical complexity

"Skill issues"

▪ Unaligned team

▪ Lack of skills

"Execution issues"

▪ Unrealistic schedule

▪ No active project

planning

Rough cost overrun disaggregation (percent)

Projects >EUR 10M with cost overrun

+44%

-67%

Cost overrun1

Schedule overrun

Benefits shortfall

+90% 2

1

23

16 18

90

Unexplained

cause

21

11

3

4

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Turning research into action: core beliefs in mega-project management

along 4 dimensions

Based on empirical findings,

successful mega-project delivery builds on 4 pillars

… leading to a

"Value Assurance" framework

organized in 4 building blocks

Delivering value

Mastering

content

Excelling in

project delivery

Building

team &

capabilities

▪ Project focus is "on time, in budget, in scope" and not enough

"in value" (only 15% of projects measure value)

▪ Value focus is essential in all project phases to ensure

alignment with business

1

▪ Mastering and reducing complexity (e.g., by modularizing

ambitious technology efforts) is key to success

▪ Built on solid understanding of technology, masterful design,

focusing on functionality that "makes a difference", ensures

effective solutions for front-line use

2

▪ Only "team of experts" bringing together best internal resources

across organizational boundaries and external specialists can

deliver a transformation

▪ At same time, organizations seek to sustainably improve

internal delivery capabilities, reducing dependency on external

vendors

3

▪ Research shows long projects are more likely to fail –

requirements change, momentum suffers, people rotate over time

▪ Squeezing time out of project schedules and adhering strictly

to schedules is a key to success

4

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▪ Project creates vendor dependency

▪ Project manager is subject-matter

specialist with limited project manage-

ment experience

▪ Project team that's available

▪ Users "accept"/Users are "trained"

From (traditional approach) To (holistic approach)

▪ Unspecified goals

▪ Scope grows over time

▪ Unclear business case

▪ IT-driven project

▪ IT goals ("output")

▪ Realistic, concrete goals

▪ Stable scope

▪ Solid budget, clearly articulated value drivers

▪ Business-driven project

▪ Business goals ("outcome")

▪ Project creates new legacy system

▪ 1000-pages+ design documents

▪ Ivory-tower solutions

▪ Technical migration

▪ Solution contributes to IT strategy

▪ Design excellence where it makes a

difference

▪ Solutions with front-line impact

▪ Full-scale organizational mobilization

▪ Client remains master of own destiny

▪ Project manager is empowered expert or

“Master Builder”

▪ Project team that's capable

▪ Users specify, design, test, coach, etc.

▪ Risks reported

▪ Focus on cost/budget

▪ Administration of project plan

▪ Issues are surprises, long debated

▪ Risks managed

▪ Focus on value delivery

▪ Progress and critical path transparent

▪ Issues identified early, problems solved fast

Delivering value

1

Mastering content

2

Building team & capa-bilities

3

Excelling in project delivery

4

Traditionally

neglected

Achieving a step-change improvement in mega-project delivery

requires a much more holistic approach in all dimensions

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1 Content may depend slightly on project subject (e.g., ERP, Core system replacement, O&O, PMM)

The “Value Assurance” approach combines key capabilities

in the 4 dimensions

Building team &capabilities

2 3

4

1

Deliveringvalue

Masteringcontent 1

Excelling inproject delivery

Objectives Key capabilities

▪ IT architecture, infrastructure1

▪ Functionality design/optimization1 ▪ Quality assurance1 ▪ Migration and roll-out strategy (technology,

organization)1 ▪ Project scoping/scope control1

Address all content

aspects involved in the

project, and ensure

they are addressed in

best possible way

2

▪ Team alignment (e.g., stakeholders, project) ▪ End-to-end-change mgmt. (organization and

mindset) ▪ Capability building (incl. Master Builders)

Address cultural

aspects through

"softer tools"

3

▪ PMO and project set-up ▪ Requirements and change request mgmt. ▪ Masterplan mgmt. incl. critical path ▪ Status reporting ▪ Issues/risk mgmt. ▪ Rollout control and quality gates

Execute project mgmt

processes with rigor

and professionalism

4

Examples follow

▪ Continuous alignment with business strategy ▪ Stakeholder mgmt.

▪ Proactive risk identification and mitigation

▪ Business case mgmt. ▪ Vendor mgmt. (incl. selection, contract

negotiation)

Continuously ensure

aspired value delivery,

involving all

stakeholders

1

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Starting point for proactive risk identification is framework

of 13 typical risk/success factors in 4 categories …

Proactive risk identification and mitigation

VALUE ASSURANCE 360

Overarching goal

Minimize project

risks

Project risk factors

Qualified and motivated project team?

Sustainable mix of internal and external resources?

Experienced project manager?

User involvement to shape solution?

Standardized, proven software technology?

Proven methodologies and tools?

Reliable estimates and plans, appropriate transparency

about project status?

Well-defined business case?

Alignment of major stakeholders?

Minimized, stable project scope?

Robust vendor contracts with clear responsibilities?

Executive support?

Clear objectives?

Insufficient

capabilities?

Unproven

technology?

Non-robust

project mgmt

practices?

Missing/insuf-

ficient strategic

alignment?

Categories

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… where “good” is defined by simple “Golden Rules”

Categories Golden Rules – In a well-run project …

… the project motivation is 1 sentence, the project objectives fit on 1 page

… the business case is still positive if the costs double and the benefits are halved

… there are clear decision rules how to overcome a deadlock between

stakeholders (there is a final decision maker)

… delivery is broken down in modules that do not last longer than a year

… contracts assign end-to-end responsibilities

… there are monthly one-on-ones between project manager and executive

sponsor(s)

… the project manager has done it before

… everyone in the leadership team has a clear leadership role

… leadership is not outsourced

… frontline users are continuously involved

… there are not only green lights in the status reports, but they show a "healthy

level of pain"

… every approach, every tool has been used before

... the underlying technology is not "bleeding edge", but has been proven in

comparable references

Missing/insuf-

ficient strategic

alignment?

Insufficient

capabilities?

Non-robust

project mgmt

practices?

Unproven

technology?

Proactive risk identification and mitigation

VALUE ASSURANCE 360

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Client example – Stopping a too expensive and too long

healthcare system implementation

Client situation

▪ Revamp core Health

Care Mana-gement

System USD 500m

invest

▪ Planned

implementation time

of 8 years

▪ Project at green-light

decision

What was the output?

▪ Project stopped

at green-light

decision

▪ Rightsizing of

project together

with McKinsey

team started

▪ Aligning

duration and

cost of the

project with risks

of HCMS

projects

▪ Project compared to similar projects

▪ Schedule too long for invest and invest

too high – making it a high risk project

▪ Comparable HMS projects invested max.

USD 250m and needed max. 3-4 years

Question

▪ Are these estimates

realistic?

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Performance of IT Mega projects (1/2)

Total Project Spend

($ MM)

300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700

Number of Companies 12 7 6 11

Number of Projects 15 8 6 12

Average spend ($ MM) 352 451 540 647

Average time to

completion (Months)

44 56 49 33

Cost Overrun (%)

Average Overrun (0.9) 25 (1.8) (0.9)

25th percentile (1.8) (1.4) (3.5) (1.8)

75th percentile 200 200 60 26

NOT EXHAUSTIVE

Development type • Supply Chain

management

• Operations

Management e.g. call

center, work force

management etc

• Case management

system for managing

healthcare costs

• GIS systems

• Operations management

(e.g. fleet management,

facility management etc)

• Content management

systems

• Document management

systems

• Emergency management

Spend on services and

development(%)

~80% ~80% 80-90 80-90

Geographies • US • US • US, Germany • US

Total Man hours* (MM) • 3.7 • 4.8 • 5.7 • 6.8

* Back calculated using spend on services, assuming average rate of $80 per hour

Across Industries

Cost over runs are measured from the point when the project got Green light for execution

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Performance of IT Mega projects (2/2)

72

NOT EXHAUSTIVE

* Back calculated using spend on services, assuming average rate of $80 per hour

MaximumAverage

Healthcare N=20

Total Project Spend

($ MM)

~4707216

Average time to

completion (Months)

34 4824

Minimum

Cost over runs ( %) 25 270(1.8)

Man hours (MM) * .76 5.0.17

Cost over runs are measured from the point when the project got Green light for execution

Examples of Projects ▪ Federal Health Information Exchange of the Dept. of VA

▪ Integrated Clinical Database of the U.S. Airforce

▪ HC Claims Management of Dept. of Health

Geographies

represented

Geographies

represented

▪ US

Business Case Management

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5 questions to take away

What risk do I carry around in my IT project

portfolio?

All traffic lights green, on time, in budget – but

how are my most critical projects REALLY doing?

Are my project managers empowered enough –

are they allowed to “refuse take-off”?

As the stakeholder, am I “reported to” – or am I

actively solving problems?

Who is calling the shots – me, the customer,

or the vendor?