010152 - Operations of Stackelberg's Corps at Liaoyang

8/13/2019 010152 - Operations of Stackelberg's Corps at Liaoyang

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F o rt L ea ve nwo rt h, K a n s a s ,1 June

UBUOBANDUU FOBI T h e D i r e o t o r f Second Year C l a s s , The CoramandandG en eral S t a f f S c h o ol t F or t L ea ve nw or th , K an sa s.

SUBJECT? Group JBeaearoh.

I . PAPBBSAOCOliPAHYINGi1* A B ib l iography f o r th ia s tud y .Z. A ak etc h show ing th e d is p oa it io n a a t i ia o y a n g .

I I . THBSTUDYPRESENTED*Operations of S ta ok el b er g' s Corp*a t L ia oy ang.

HISTORICAL FACTS J^UTING TO THS SUBJfiCT.

The I S i b e r i a n Corpa o f th e fiussian was formed a t L ia oy an g,Manchuria dur ing th e e a rl y part o f th e s um e r o f 1 90 4 from t r oo p sn ew ly a r r i v e d i n t h e t h ea te r o f o p e ra t io n s , and i t s command was e n t r u s t e d t o L ie ut en an t G en eral Baron S t a o k e lb e r g . ( 1 ) A t th at tim e i t scompos i t ion u& s, i n g en er al t a s f o l l o w s :

.^ B a t t al i on s : S qu ad ron s: Guns : M achine..gu na1st D iv is io n : 12 : : 3 2 :8th;Di1ri*lan : 1 : : 32 :Cavalry t : 20 i 6 t 6Tota l 2 4 #> ^70 6The In fa ntr y d i v is i o n s had b ee n form ed e a r l y i n 1904 1 t h e

1st from fo ur r eg im e nt s o f aat S ib e ri an B i f l e s , and the 9 th fromtroops o f the s ta n di ng army, i n a d d it io n t o the a bo ve the c or ps hadone sapper b a tt al io n * ( 2 )( 1) a eio h 1 67 .( 2 ) B eioh 1 61 f 167.

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road from the Liatung Peninsul a, through Liaoyang,tothe northeast*(5)

Organisationofthe Ground*The defensive positionatLiaoyang had been selected and

organizationofthe ground accomplishedinconsiderable detail priorto its occupation. (6) Bedoubts, trenches and artillery positionshad been constructed along the h e i g u sto beoccupiedby the 1stand 9th divisions; wireand obstacles had been installed, and effortshad been madetoconceal the exact locationofthe positionbysod-ding the parape ts. Millet, which grew toaheightoften feet,inthe vicinityofLiaoyang, (7)hadbeen cutinfrontofthe trenchesto provideafieldoffire for Infantry. The sector tobeoccupiedby Stackelberg's Corps was probably better organized than the otherCorps sectors.(6)

Hlaulon.I h e 1 S ib e ri an c orp s was charged w ith th e d efe ns e o f th e

rigfct s e c t o r o f th e L iaoyang advanced p o s i t i o n . General p la n s fo rthe de fense w ere known to G eneral S ta o icelberg pr io r to the w i th draw al from A nsha nti en , and he had made a reco nna is sa nce o f the (? )c orp s s e c to r p r i or t o i t s o ccu pa tio n* E x t ra c ts from K uropatkinJsord er f or th e o p er a ti on , dated 16 A ug ust, 1:15 Aid, p e r ta i ni n g d i r e ct ly to th e i S ib er ia n Corps f ol lo w :

" i n c as e o f a fu rth er advance of th e enenay th e a m p w i l lf i g h t i n th e f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n M ayetutt, ' ia tz u y in g , H s ia oy an g ts u,Hftinlitun f Wij&kow, Kuchiatzu , yayuohi, HSiaopu, SanwtnUu, Tatzupu,Hsikuantun.

Lieutenant: General Bar^a Stacke lberg , I S iber ian Corps ,

(5 ) Belch 2 0 6 . Br Of 3 , 4 . Qr. 210 .(6 ) Or Of 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , Br Of 5*(7) BOB2 34 t2 3 5 , 3 6 ,2 3 7 . Chas 1 4 9 . Gr Of 6 , 7 .( 6) B elch 2 1 0 ,2 1 1 . Qr, Of 7 5 .(9 ) fie ioh 210


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The A r t i l le r y was d iv id ed i n t o groups of two b a t t e r i e sand d is po se d i n g en er al a s f o ll o w s : Two b a t t e r ie s near Chuangc h ia t u n , f a oi n g w e st ; two w est of the u an da rin r oa d, n or th o f thespur o ut by th at road from th e r id g e n or th of H * ia oy an gt2 u; two i n rear of th e f i r s t d i , and two in rear of \ i * seoond d ip e as t ofthe Mandarin road; and two in saddle o f pangohiatunKanpalichuangroad* (13)

The 2 d, 3 5th and 3 dth i&ast S i b er ia n B i f l e r e g im e n t s , th e4th B a t t e n of the 1st iia st S ib er ia n A n i l l e r y B rig ad e, the 2dT ra ns -B a ik al Cossack B a t te r y , and th e 1 st tiaat S i b e r ia n sa pp erB a tt al io n were i n i t i a l l y held in corp s re se rv e e as t o f th e v i l l a g eo f Shoushanpu. (14)

C olo ne l Gurko, w i th e ig h t sq uadron s o f c a v a l r y , was on the l e f t , i n the v i c i n i t y of Nfcnpaliohuang, w atchin g th e v a ll ey o fTaseu Brook and m a inta in ing canm unicat io n w ith the m S iber ia n C o rp s. ( 15 )

The fr on ta ge o f th e corp s i n t h i s p o s i t i o n was about5 1-2 m iles*(16 ) D isp os i t io ns of the m Corps, on the l e f t o fth e I Corps (S ib er ia n) and o f the l a t t e r corps l e ft a gap betw eenthe two c o r p s , on b oth s i d e s o f Taasu i*rooK, of about 3 ij n ii es (1 7)

Opposing For ceg.Fo llowing up the withdrawal from Anshant ien the Japanese

sp en t the &9th August i n p re pa rin g fo r t he a t ta c k o f th e ad vancedL iaoyang p o s i t i o n . (1 6) Japanese f o rc e s opposed to S t ao k e lb e rg ' s(13) Beich 214, 215. UID?(14)Or Of ZZ r of 65.(15)BrOf66* M1D2 61.(16)Bow201 Br Of 74*117) Bow 199 . jfieioh 211 . Gr Of 9 . (16) UID2 6 2 , 6 3 . r . Of 1 4, 1 6, 1 6. Bow 1 99 .

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c o n si st ed of the Seoond Arng ( l e s s the 4 th p i v i a i o n h eld a v a i l a b l efor employment by General Headquarters) f and a n a d d i ti on a l d i v i s io n ,the 5 t h, which a tt ac ke d west o f a'atsu Brook* (J&) Tho p la n o f a t ta ck on the f ro n t h e ld by til* I S i b e r ia n Corps a s announced by t heJ apanese Seoond Army the n ig h t o f 29~30 A ugust were in g enera l a s f o l l o w s ;

The 3d D i v is io n (13th f i e ld A r t i l l e r y a tt ac he d) was t ocro s s the Sha Ho AM, 30 A ugust and adva nce betw een the Taerh Hiniu ch uang road and the r a il w a y , a g a i n s t th e h e i g h t s s o u th e a st ofShoushanpu.

The 6th D i v is io n , c r o s s in g the & * # o a t th e same h ou r,was to advance a lo ng the road w est o f the i l # a y through the v i l lages o f Tunta i , Tayaot im, Tajbungohi, L iohiehpu and Liuehiasaoc h i a t i u .

The 4 t h D i v i s i o n , s u b je o t t o o rd er s of G eneral H eadq u a rt er s, was t o assem ble a t t he so uth er n edge of H s i ng l un g t ai .

The A r t il lo r ^ B r ig ad e, l e s s regim ent a tt ac h ed t o t h e3d D iv is io n , was to f o l l o w e d 6 th D i vi si on , T^e foot a r t i l l e r ywas to p ro ce ed t o T u t ai ts u *

The 11th Kobi Brl$p.te vas to march a t 5:00 i j | t and f o l low the r&ilviay to Shaho v i l la .ge

As has a lr ea ty t e e n s t at e d the 5 th D i v is io n was t o a t t ac h w est o f Ta9su Brook. (2 0)

Br Of 105 . Or Of(2 0) Gr Of 2 3 , 2 4 . Br. Qf 65T 66*


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Operations30Troops of the I S ib er ia n Corps were a l er t ed a t th e f i r s t

s i g n s o f th e J ap an ese ad van ce b efo re d a y li gh t on th e m orning o f 30A ugust by G eneral S t ao k e lb e r g, who was h im s e lf on t he s oe ne a t 4 :0 0AM. (21) Contact was f i r s t made i n fron t of the p o s i ti o n s h eld bythe 3d and 3 4th a s t S ib e ri an fiegim ents* (2 2) &ven b e fo re the a t tack St&ckelberg had requested reinforcements from the arny commanderand a s econd reques t had been made be fo re rep ly had been rece iv edto the f ir s t* (23) S ar ly in the day he s h if te d a regim ent of theCorps rQ&erv*, th e 3 5t h a st S i b er ia n , t o JP&ngohiatun and a t 9*00AM p laced two b a t t a li o n s of th at regim ent a t the d i sp o s al o f Gene r a l K on dratovieh , of the l e f t grou p. (24) f f o r t s of th e Japanesewere d ir ec te d a t th e g ip betw een the I and I I I S ib e r ia n c o rp s, andth e 6 th D i v i s i o n was a tt em p t in g a n envelopem en t of th e r i g h t f la n k .

As th e t er r ai n a lo n g 'la ssu Brook was covered w ith the t a l l m i l l e tth e enemy was a b l e t o move u n fo re se en up th e v a ll e y o f th e b r o ok .( 26 )The env elop ing 6 th D iv i s io n was delay ed by the muddy co nd i t i o n o fth e ground due t o r a in s on th e m orning o f th e a t ta c k and was nota b l e t o e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f between a 'aoh aooh iatai and p aic hia la ok uo wou n t i l 9 i3 0 AM and th e e n t ir e d i v is i o n d id not a r ri ve u n t i l 11*00AM* (2 6) The movement o f t h i s d i v i s i o n had b een under c on sta nt o b serv at ion from a cap t ive ba l loonftndrcGeneral s taa ke lb erg 's advancedo b se r va ti on p os t o n Shoushanpu h i l l . ( 27 ) A S no r e s er v e s had a s y e t

(21) Beioh 215.0r Of29.(22)Beioh(23)dr Of 67f68.Gr Of 22.(24)BrOf68.Gr Of 29*(25)Br66*Gr Of 4.(26)Br69.Gr Of 33.(27)Br Of89.Gr Of 30.

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been made availab le to him by the army commander it was necessary forGeneral Stackelberg to meet the envelopement from hi s own resources.But due to the delay caused by the soft going and General Mishtshenko'sftrnty Cavalry staokelberg \*as enabled to strengthen h is right to meetthe a t tack of the 6 th Divi sion* fie had succeeded in ge t t ing rein* forcements from the army reserve in response to a request madeaboutnoon. This force consi sted of the 12th Siberian infantry fieg iment.twoba ttalions of the 19th East Siberian fiifle Regiment and oneanda h alf b a t te r ie s of a r t i l le r y * (26) One b a tt a li on of the 36th E astSiberian fiifle regiment was sent from corps reserve to prolong the r ight near the vi l la ge of Huangohiatun; another battal ion of thatregiment joined the 3d t st Siberian fiif le f ltgiment on General Gerngro8sv l e f t , while the rem aining ba t ta l io n was p la ced a t the d isposalof General Kondratovich* ?his reduced the or iginal corps r**erv* toone bat ta lion of the 36th Sast S iber ian fiifle fieg iaent and threebat ta lions o f the 19th ast S iberian fiifle Begiment. (29) The twoba tt a li ons o f the 19th were used to r ei nf or ce the l e f t d i vi si on* (30)The 12th Siberian fiif le f iegiment marching to reinforce the 1Corpsfrom general reserve madea surprise attack against the Japanesel e f t i n the v i c in i t y of YuohiachuangUu, a t the r equest of the 1 stEast Siberian fiifle fiegiment with considerable success . The eneny*aa driven from the v ill a ge of Chouchiaputaut and the envelopeiftg, attack weakened for the time being, on that f lank.

(26) GrOf 32 , 33* fir Of 69 , 90 , 91* (29) BrOf $0, 91* GrOf 36* (30) GrOf 36. BrOf

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The attack of the 6 th Div i sion aga inst the west o f Shoushanpu heights commenced shortly afte r noon with the right brigade9which had developed ahead of the l e f t br igade. This a t tack a lthoughpressed with v igor later in the a fternoon *as readi ly stopped by thereinforced r ight sec tor of the 1 S iberian corps. Theattack: was imdein a p iece-m eal nanner and in i t s i n i t i a l s ta ge s ju s la ck in g i n a r t i ll e r y support* (31)

Theattacks of the Japanese on this day were stopped alongthe ent ire front of the Corps. The we ll -p laced RussianA rt i ll ery a^dthe switching of U* f i re hadbeen a great factor in n&inta ining thedef ense , i*ny tim es during the day f i r e of the Ar t i ll e ry norm allysupporting one sector had been switched to the support of anothers ec to r with the t e l l in g r e su l ts p o ss ib l e by fla nk in g f i r e . Theattackers, a lthough possessing a ,preponderance of ar t i l le ry were unable to s i l ence that of the defenders, and uponoooaslons even to obtain equal f ire power. (32)

3o successfully had the Japanese attack been stopped onthe front o f the I S iberian Corps tha i la te in the a fternoon General s taokelberg wasable to send the fo llowing report to h i s Com*mander in Chief: "Fightin g p roceed ing a l l lo ng the f ro n t, mosts ev er ely a ga inst c ente r and r i ght .ring. A ll Japanese e f fo r t s tocapture Mayetun, Gutsiatsy and our center ar t in vain . 7,'e have noty ielded an inch of ground in the center and on our wings1!

(31) GrOf 33 , 34 , 36 . br Of 8 9 , 9 0.(32) GrOf 29, 30 26. br Of 8 7 , 8 6 .(33) GrOf 36. br. Of 9 1 .

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fantry flegiment, with the twelve guns attached to i t , took over thedefense of the extreme righ t wing by ocoujjying the railway embankmont between Chuantsiatun and yutsiatachuantsy. General Gurko'sCavalry remained on the l e f t f la nk, i n general reserv e e a st ofShoushanpu were the fol lowing: one ba ttal ion from eaoh of the 3dand 19th Rifle aegimenta; the 17th and 20th Hif i e f iegiments, onebattal ion of the 9th Siberian infantry fieglmant, the Bast SiberianSapper Battalion and the 4th Battery, 1st East Siberian fiifle Art i l l e r y Brigade* S t ao ie lbe rg had at h i s d ispo sa l t h is day 36 ba t ta l ions o f Infantry and 76 guns* Of these 9 bat tal ions and 8 gunswere held i n reserve* Al l but 2 3 -4 ba t ta l io ns of t h i s r eser vewas spent during the day . (37)

Baron Oku, commanding the Japanese secondwhich with the 5th Divis ion opposed the I Siberian corps* in i t ia teda ct io n the nigh t of 30-31 August to g et a l l a va ila b le a r t i l l e r y i n to posi t ion s where i t could support the attack the following day*As resul t the attack was nowsupported by 234 f ie ld , or mountainguns, and 12 heavy ba t t e r i e s , a l l w ith in e f fe c t iv e range of theposi t ion held by Staokelberg's Corps (3,000 to 4 ,000 meters) (36)

Prior to the ar t i l l er y preparation and before daylighta t tacks were madeagainst that sa l i ent port ion of the corps front ,held by the reinforced 34th East Siberian Hif ie regiment , by theJapanese 5th infantry Brigade and some units of the 5th Divis ionon i t s l e ft * S ince these a tt ac ks were made pr io r to day lig ht

(37) GrOf 40, 41*(36) GrOf 41, 42* BrOf 105*

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they p os se ss ed th e ch a ra c t er i st i c s of n igh t a t t a ck s , and a re 90 re ferred to by some historians* Theadvancing troops were soon disoovered by the Russians and the a t tack stopped by a rt i l l er y and r i f le f ir e * F lanking f i r e from a r t i l l e r y near S i n li tu n a ga in a id ed inh a l tin g the a s s a u l t . (39) An a tta ck made a t th e sam hour by th eJapanese 34th Infantry agains t the sector he ld by the 36 S iber ian fiifle Begiment gained some i :Ht*al success , and withstood two local cou nter-a tta ck s but the l o s s e s re s u l tin g were so great that t h isregiment was comparatively us ele ss for the remainder of the day andwas reverted to reserve that n ight* (40)

iso lated and unsystematic attempts of the 3rd JapaneseD ivi sion t o storm the p o s i ti o n on th e l e ft o the 1 Siberian Corpshaving f a i led everywhere in s p i t e of 5one few in i t ia l s uccess esHeadquarters, second Array, fearing for the lef t wing, decided tosend the 12th and 43d Kobi regiments in support of that wing.They deployed on the l e ft of th e 3d D ivi sion f i l l in g the gap b e tween that d iv i s ion and the 6 th Division* (41) The experiencesof the 34th Begiment however* d id not inc i t e a repe t i t ion of theassaul t unt i l the ar t i l l e ry had prepared the way* (42)

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followed succeeded in ca rry ing a po rti on of the front l i n e trench esin t hi s se ct or a t t h e expense of heavy losse a in k il le d and wounded.General Staokelberg reinforced the threatene d aecto r with a ba t ta l i onof the 3d a at Sibe ria n flifle regiment and a bat tery of A r t i l l e r yfrom the ge ne ral re se rv e , (43) (The defend ers succeeded in ho ld in gthe second lin e of trenches in thi s se cto r furt he r a tt a ck s onthe Heights held by the 3d Siberian Jtiegiment likewise produced in-de ci siv e r e su lt s * As before s ta te d the 34th Japanese jgegiment wastoo weakened for another assault and the Kobi Brigade was unable toadvance. (44)

On the west front of the Corpa a tt a c k s of th e Japan ese6th and 4th div isi on s had been equally unsucce ssful* During theearly hours elements of the 6th Division, 13th and 48th regiments,had attem pted to s ur pr is e the v il l ag es of uayetun and Kuchiatzu.The a tt a c k s were soon disco vere d and de fe at ed . Another atte m pt tocapture these villages was launched about 4:00 M by th e 24 thBrigade . Again the Huasians etopped the at ta ck s and in fl ic te dheavy c a s u a l ti e s upon the enenty* machine gun f ir e seems to haveplyed an important ro le in stoppin g these a tt a c k s , (45) The of-fensive power of the attackers at this point was thus used up earlyin the day and the defenders app are ntly experience d no grea t dif-fi c u lt y in ho ldi ng throughout the remainder of the day, (46)

About 4:00 Ptf the 4th Japan ese D iv is io n, which had a s -sisted in the attack with i ts Arti l lery and some infantry, seems to.have been released from its status as General Headquarters reserve.The Second Japanese Anqy then decided to use th is di vi si on i n ex -(43) Br of 1069 109. Or Of 48*(44) Or Of 50.(45) Gr Of 52. Br Of 110,(46) Gr Of 53. Br Of 110.

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t en d in g th e envelopem ent of t h e B usa ia n r ig h t* ( 47 ) O rders werei s su e d but a c t i v i t i e s of G en eral id ish oh en ko 's Arn / c av a lr y on th efm ssia n r ig ht c re at ed u b e l i e f i n th e minds of th e Japan ese thata r us siu n c ou nter o ff en si ve was about t o be i n i t i a t e d on th at fla nkand t he f ro nt o f t he 4 th D i v i s io n was changed t o m eet su oh an a t ta ck . T his maneuver s o d ela yed th e d i v is i o n i n i t s en velop in g;; a t ta ck t ha t d ark ness p re ve nte d i t s engagement* (46)

At 7 30 PM the a r t i l l e r y f i r e ceased on both s i d e s , andsoon t he re a ft er the sm all aroe f i r e . Heavy r a in s et in * About th attim e K urop atk in fs order a r ri ve d to carry out " D i sp o s it io n No* 3" I tarranged f o r th e I S ib e ri an Army Corps t o c ro ss to the r ig h t bank ofT aitz u. (49) For th is contingency S ta ok elb erg . i n the course ofth e a ft er n oo n , had a lr ea dy g iv e n d i r e ct io n s to h i s su bo rd in ate l e a d e rs for b rea kin g o ff the a c t i o n gra du ally and f o r th e r et re at * (50 )E va cu atio n o f th e p o s i t i o n was begun a t 9 ;0 0 PM She trains;.had a l ready been s en t n o rt h, and t he A r t i l l e r y f ol lo w ed n ex t* ih% i n fantryv ery a bly w ith drew i n e ch el on * from the l e f t w ith ou t b e in g d is co v er e dby th e enemy* G urkofs Cavalry co ve red the r e tr e at on the l e ft and i nth e c en te r. The 1 st fiast S ib e ri an flifle R egim ent, a c t in g a s -e arguard held Shoushanpu heigh ts u n ti l 3:QQAM, 1 September* withdrawing then a lo ng the M andarin road on Idaoyang w ithout be ing pres s ed . ( 51 )

On the fligh t Bank o f the Taltx u*Staoke lberg 9s Corps was t o have p la ye d a n im portan t r o l e

in G eneral J turo pa tk in 's p la n fo r crush ing the J apa nese 1 s t Army o nth e r ig h t bank o f th e l a i t z u B i v e r. (5 2) The Corps c on ce ntr ate d on

(4 7) Gr Of 5 6 . flr Of 1 10 .(46) Gr Of 55* br Of 111* (49 ) Gr Of 5 7 . Br Q f i l l l ,( 5 0) Gr Of 5 7 . br Of 1 11 .(5 1) Gr Of 6 7 . 5 8 .(5 2) Or.Of 1 46 . 1 49 . br Of 1 26 . 1 29 .

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th e north s id e of th e r iv e r i n accordance w ith the a mp p l an . 0 92 Septem ber i t advanced and c o nt ac te d the enem y, b at a f t e r a n a d v ance guard a o t io n I t w ithdrew a t 6 30 PM to flsla ota lienkou , and som etim e a f t e r m id nigh t f e l l baok t o L i u li n k ou . ( 59 ) At 6.1OO AM,3d Septem ber K urop atk in I ss ue d o rd e rs f or th e r e t r e at of th e w holefiussian Army to Jtudken. (54)

The o p er a ti on s of th e I S i b er ia n corps a t U * oy an g c on s i s t e d p rim a rily of a p a s s iv e d efe nse of what i s known a s th e ad*vanced p o s i ti o n so uth o f th at c i t y , (55 ) The Corps was s u cc e ss *f ul i n h old in g i t s p o s i t io n a ga in st the a tt ac ks of the Japanese30-51 August , a lthough opposed by the Japanese Second Aray andth e 5th D i v i s io n , su pp orted by a preponderance of a r t i l l e r y . (56 )D arkness on the 31 A ugust found the Corps .undefea ted; heavy l o s s* e s had b ee n i n f l i c t e d on th e enemy and o nly minor s u c c e s s e s onn e g l i g i b l e im portance had been ga in ed by the a t t a c k e r s . ( 57 )Much of the assa ul t power.had been removed Cfom Ahea t ta ck in g t ro opsby t h e i r maqr f a i l u r e s Accom panied by heavy l o s s e s . ( 58 ) ih*ff a i l u r e s and l o s s e s had been caused by a co mb in atio n of a r t i l l e r y , r i; ?l e and m achine gun f i r e , o f t en com ing from a no th er s e c to r of the defense l oc a te d on'a f la nk . (59)

She works c on str uc te d on th e f ro nt o f th e 1 S i b e r i an Corps p r io r t o th e a t ta c k on 30 August a l s o g r e a tl y a s s i s t e d th e d efe nd er s. (60) o b st ac le s placed i n fr on t of the tr en ch es

1 ) Br Of 136. Or 1 43 , 1 50 . (68)G r Of 4 4 f 4 5 t 4 6 . ( 64 ) Br.O f 153.G r Of 1 6 7. Br Of 1 1 1 .( 55 ) Gr Of 5 6 . Br Of 115* (5 6) G r. Of 2 3 , t & Of 1 05 . (59)G r 0 f ^ 3 3 f 3 4 , 4 5 f 4 6 t(57) Gr Of 67 . Br Of 115, 111 . 4 7 , 4 e , 4 f 5 2 f 6 3 , 6 4 . Br.Of 1 0 6 f1 0 7 ,1 0 69

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apparently proved a great handicap to the at taokera . (61)

Except in a few instances where counter at tacks weremade to rega in lo s t t ranchest or ground, rea*rve% were used tor ein fo rc e the troops i n l i n e , or to extend the l in e t o meet th re at*ened envelopements* (62) Since he on 31 August that the bulk ofthe Army would withdraw north of the Taitzu that night, and sincecounter at tacks were not required to ef fect his withdrawal Genera l S ta ck *lb erg i s h ardly su bjec t to cr i t i c is m for not d e l iv ering determined counter attack* on that date .

Contrary to the co-operation displayed by the defenders in the p la c in g of su pp or tin g and f la nk in g f i r e s , both a s t oart i l l er y support of the infantry and among infantry uni t s f co operation aud co-ordination was lacking in iAe e ffo rts of the a t ta ck ers, in fantry attac ke d before i t s su pporting a r t i l l e r y wasin pos i t io n , and evidence o f a well -timed co-ordinated a t tach bythe ent ire army i s missing. Fronta l a ttacks were made by the 5 th,and 3d Divis ions before the enveloping 6 th pi visi on had even reached i t s developing area . ven brigades , reg iments and bat ta l ions made separate at tacks* The defenders were thus able to meet thea tta ck s i n d e t a i l , s h i f t r es er ve s and f la nk in g f i r e s .

(60) GrOf 1,2,34,4 1,46,51 ,52Br. Of 106,107.(61) Gr. Of 34 ,41 ,4 6 ,51 ,52 .Br Of 106,107.(6Z) GrOf 56. BrOf 110,111.

16.


19/19

IV . CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHORThe o p er a ti on s o f S t a a k e lb e r g 's Corps a t L iaoyang 1 1

luF/rates from th e b e gi nn in g o f o p er at io n s 50 A ugust to t he b e g i n n in g o f th e r e t re a t t o Mudkenf on b oth the o f fe n s i ve and d e fe n si ve i d e e , th e im portance o f c o -o p er a ti on i n war* A lthough i t can notbe s a id t ha t a w e ll c o- or d in a te d a t ta c k by th e f or ce s o pp osin gth e I S i b e r ia n C orps would have b ee n s u c c e s s fu l i n d r i vi n g t he fiuseian a from the d e fe n si ve p o s i t i o n i t s ch an ces o f s u cc e ss would h av ebeen g rea ter than tho se .o f the :p i ece -m ea l m ethods emplo yed. Thea r t i l l e r y w ith th e a t ta c k er s was g iv en no opportu nity to c le a r theway fo r the in fa ntr y p rio r t o the i n i t i a l a s s au l ts upon th e w e l l -organized p o s i ti o n , the r e su l ts were f ai lu r e a t a c os t of greatl o ss e s in k i l l e d and wounded* on the d ef en siv e s id e w e ll -p la c edand c on cea led a r t i l l e r y was n ever s i l e nc e d by h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r yand g iv e good su pp ort th ro ug ho ut, l e a s t p r es se d s e c t or s s w it ch edt h ei r f i r e to hard p re ss ed s e ct o rs * C o-op eratio n on the one s id eand the lack of i t on the oth er was a d e ci si ve fa cto r i n the o pera t io ns o f S ta o ke lberg ' s C orps a t Li&oyang*

Documents

010152 - Operations of Stackelberg's Corps at Liaoyang