01. Service Specialists Inc. vs. Sheriff of Manila

7/28/2019 01. Service Specialists Inc. vs. Sheriff of Manila

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G.R. No. 74586 October 17, 1986

SERVICE SPECIALISTS, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,vs.THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, DEPUTY SHERIFFENRIQUITO A. VIOLETA and ROY DIAZ, respondents.

FERIA,J.:

Feb. 25, 1985 Petitioner (Service Specialists Inc.) filedan action for replevin and damages against PrivateRespondent (Roy Diaz) with the RTC-Manila (Branch L),docketed as Civil Case No. 85-29444.

After Private Respondent had filed his answer, apre-trial conference was set by the lower court (ofwhich the counsels were duly notified) and theywere commissioned to secure the presence of theparties they represented.

Both Private Respondent and his counsel failed toappear at the pre-trial and Private Respondent wasdeclared as in default, as prayed for by Petitioners

counsel.

Aug. 9, 1985 After Petitioner had presented itsevidence ex-parte, RTC-Manila rendered a decision infavor of Petitioner. Private Respondent was ordered topay P83,412.76 as his total obligation, and to pay thecosts of suit.

Dec. 10, 1985 After the decision became final, RTCgranted the motion for execution filed by Petitioner.

Dec. 24, 1985 Private Respondent filed a petition forrelief from judgment. The case was assigned to Branch

XII of the RTC-Manila, and docketed as Civil Case No. 85-34098.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the groundsthat:

o Petition was filed out of time;

o It failed to indicate a good and substantialdefense;

o It failed to show the fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable negligence relied upon as basis for the

petition; and

o It was not filed in the same court and in the samecase as required by Section 3 of Rule 38.

Private Respondent filed an opposition to saidmotion to dismiss.

Mar. 21, 1986 RTC-Manila (Branch XII) issued an orderdismissing the petition for relief for lack of jurisdiction tohear & determine the same.

Apr. 2, 1986 Private Respondent filed a notice ofappeal from the order of dismissal to the IAC(Intermediate Appellate Court).

Apr. 9, 1986 A writ of execution was issued, pursuant tothe order of execution issued by the RTC-Manila (BranchL) on December 10, 1985.

Apr. 28, 1986 Respondent Deputy Sheriff issued anotice of levy & sale of the properties of PrivateRespondent.

However, on the date of the auction saleRespondent Sheriff refused to proceed with theauction because of the protest and appeal of PrivateRespondent to the IAC.

Hence, Petitioner filed the present petition for mandamusto compel Respondents Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff toproceed with the sale at public auction of the propertiesof Private Respondent, pending appeal from an ordedismissing a petition for relief from said judgment.

ISSUE/HELD:

W/N the Petition for Relief could prosper NO.

RATIO:

1. Private Respondent correctly states that "after thedecision (Civil Case No. 85-29444) had already becomefinal and executory, and appeal was no longer available

and feasible under the ordinary course of law, petition forrelief from judgment is the most available remedy."

HOWEVER, he did not comply with the provision ofSec. 2 of Rule 38 which reads:

Sec. 2 - Petition To Court Of First Instance For ReliefFrom Judgment Or Other Proceeding Thereof Whena judgment or order is entered, or any otheproceeding is taken, against a party in a Court ofFirst Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, oexcusable negligence, he may file a petition insuch court and in the same case praying thatthe judgment, order or proceeding be set

aside.

The petition for relief from a judgment of the CFI must befiled in the same court that rendered the judgment andin the same case wherein the judgment was rendered. Ifthe court finds the allegations of the petition to be true, itshall set aside the judgment and try the principal caseupon its merits, as if a timely motion for new trial hadbeen granted therein. (Braca vs. Tan)

In the case at bar, Private Respondent filed his petitionfor relief also with the RTC-Manila, but he did not file it in


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the same case: He filed it in another case, Civil Case No.85-34098.

Branch XII of RTC-Manila to which Civil Case No. 85-34098 was assigned could not take cognizance ofthe petition for relief, because it was not the samebranch of the court which rendered the judgmentfrom which relief was sought.

It was Branch L which could properly take

cognizance of said petition and which could orderthe judgment complained of to be set aside andproceed to hear and determine the case as if atimely motion for new trial had been granted, if itfound the allegations thereof to be true (Sections 6and 7 of Rule 38).

2. Private Respondent, however, contends that in hispetition for relief from judgment, one of the Respondentstherein named was the judge himself who presided overCivil Case No. 85-29444, for which reason the petitioncould not be filed in his sala.

This is erroneous. The judge who rendered thejudgment is not a party in a petition for relief fromsaid judgment.

A petition for relief from judgment is not like apetition for certiorari wherein the judge is made aparty respondent because he is alleged to haveacted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion (Sections 1 and 5 of Rule65).

In a petition for relief from judgment, the petitioner

claims that due to extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake,or excusable negligence, he has been unjustlydeprived of a hearing or has been prevented fromtaking an appeal.

3. Private Respondent further contends that in view ofhis appeal from the order dismissing his petition forrelief, the final and executory judgment rendered againsthim in Civil Case No. 85-29444 could no longer beexecuted.

This is untenable. In order to stay execution, it wasnecessary for Private Respondent to obtain a writ ofpreliminary injunction in accordance with Section 5of Rule 38.

Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Relucio: Whileit is true that in ordinary cases, by the perfection ofan appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over itsjudgment, and cannot order its execution, thejudgment adverted to refers to one which has notattained finality because of the timely appealtherefrom.

o Such is not applicable to an appeal from an ordedismissing or denying a petition for relief fromjudgment, under Rule 38, because the judgmentfrom which relief is sought is already final andexecutory. And the only way by which theexecution of said judgment could be suspendedis that prescribed in section 5 of Rule 38.

If the lower court does not grant preliminaryinjunction, the appellate court may grant the same.

4. Private Respondent further argues:

2nd paragraph of Sec. 2 of Rule 41 provides: Ajudgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject toappeal, and in the course thereof, a party may alsoassail the judgment on the merits, upon the groundthat it is not supported by the evidence or it iscontrary to law.

In Vda. de Sayman vs. Court of Appeals, it was held

in an appeal from the denial of a petition for relief,the appellate court is not limited to the issue ofwhether or not the denial was correct.

There is no question that a judgment or order denyingrelief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike anorder granting such relief which is interlocutoryHowever, the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 2 of Rule 41 maygive the erroneous impression that in such appeal, theappellate court may reverse of modify the judgment onthe merits.

This cannot be done because the judgment fromwhich relief is sought is already final and executory.

If the appellate court finds that one of the groundsexists (fraud, accident, mistake or excusablenegligence) and, that the petitioner has a goodcause of action or defense, it will reverse the deniaor dismissal, set aside the judgment in the maincase and remand the case to the lower court for anew trial in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38.

If the petition for relief is against an orderdisallowing an appeal for having been filed out oftime and the petition is denied or dismissed, in theappeal from the denial or dismissal the appellatecourt must also be apprised of the merit of the caseof the party who assails such denial or dismissal.

o If the appellate court finds a justifiable groundand a meritorious case, it will reverse the deniaor dismissal and allow the appeal from thedecision in the main case.

5. Petitioner in its Reply urges the SC to make a findingthat the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of


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time, as this would render the discussion on the merits ofthe petition moot and academic.

It maintains that a copy of the decision againstPrivate Respondent must have been received byAug. 29, 1985, the date when its counsel received acopy thereof; that the 60-day period for filing apetition for relief should be counted from said date;and that when the petition for relief was filed onDecember 24, 1985, 117 days had elapsed.

On Sept. 1, 1986, the SC required Private Respondent tofile a Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply, particularlyspecifying the date on which his counsel received a copyof the decision.

Unfortunately, Private Respondent did not file aRejoinder and merely reiterated the evasive andconfusing allegation in his petition for relief, asfollows:

The aforesaid Decision/Judgment of respondentJudge actually came to the knowledge of PrivateRespondent on Nov. 29, 1984, when he himselfwas requested by their counsel to sign a pleading(Omnibus Motion), after said counsel of recordinformed him of the existence of Petitionersmotion for issuance of writ of execution, datedOct. 3, 1985, and set for hearing on Nov. 29,1985.

The failure of Private Respondent to comply with theresolution supports Petitioner's contention that thepetition for relief was filed way beyond thereglementary period of 60 days after the Petitionerlearns of the judgment (Section 3 of Rule 38),inasmuch as said period begins to run from the datethe lawyer is notified of the decision.

Moreover, an examination of the record alsosupports Petitioner's contention that PrivateRespondent has resorted to dilatory tactics in thecase at bar.

6. The main ground of the petition for relief is that nonotice of the scheduled pre-trial conference was sent toPrivate Respondent himself, as such notice was sent onlyto the counsels. Private Respondent claims that this isnot the notice of pre-trial contemplated by law.

This claim has no merit. In Taroma vs. Sayo: while service of such notice to party may be madedirectly to the party, it is best that the trial courtsuniformly serve such notice to party through hiscounsel at counsel's address with the expressimposition upon counsel of the obligation ofnotifying the party of the date, time and place of thepre-trial conference and assuring that the partyeither appear thereat or deliver to counsel a writtenauthority to represent the party with power tocompromise the case, with the warning that a party

who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared(as) in default.

7. Private Respondent merely filed a notice of appeal tothe IAC from the order dismissing his petition for reliefThe appeal should have been made to the SC through apetition for review on certiorari.

8. The writ of execution in this case was issued on Apr. 91986. The levy on execution was made within thereglementary period of 60 days after its receipt byrespondent Deputy Sheriff. Consequently, the sale onexecution may properly proceed.

It is the ministerial duty of the lower court to order theexecution of its final and executory judgment, and it isthe legal duty of Respondent Sheriffs to enforce theorder of execution.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, respondents Sheriff andDeputy Sheriff of Manila are directed to proceed with thesale at public auction of the properties of PrivateRespondent which had been levied upon on execution.

Mayor vs IAC

Nature: petition for review of resolutions of the

IAC declaring the petition for review of

petitioner Pablo Mayor abandoned and

dismissed and denied his motion for

reconsideration for being filed one day late.

Facts:

- April 18, 1983 Carmen and Edmundo Angeles

(mother and son) file an ejectment case

against petitioner Pablo Mayor w/ the MTC of

Pasay.

- After trial on the merits the complaint wasdismissed in favor of petitioner.

- Plaintiffs Angeles appealed to the RTC of

Pasay which reversed the decision in their

favor on August 19, 1985.

-Petitioner received lower court (RTC reversal)

decision on August 29, 1985.


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- Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration on

the 15th day of the period (from receipt of the

decision) September 13, 1985.

- The resolution denying the motion for

reconsideration was received by the petitioner

on September 30, 1985.

- October 1, 1985 he filed for motion forextension for 15 days to file for petition for

review to the Appellate Court (until the 16th of

October).

- The appellate court granted the said

extension October 8, 1985.

- Petitioner files the petition for review on the

16th of October.

-On January 30, 1986 the Appellate Court

issues a resolution citing that no petition for

review was filed within the reglementary

period and as such the case is deemed

ABANDONED and DISMISSED.

- Petitioner filed MFR citing the filing of the

petition for review on October 16, 1985 at

2:44pm as shown in the Registry Reciepts and

Registry Return Cards affirmed by the Clerk of

Court who cited mere miscommunication of

the fact of filing to the ruling judge andrecommended the reinstatement of the

appeal.

-Notwithstanding the recommendation the

appellate court denied the MFR declaring the

petition 1 day late:

Given that the petitioner filed his MFR

on the last day of the period for filing an MFR

or Appeal, and having received the denial of

such MFR on the 30th

of September he hadonly until the next day Oct 1, 1985 to file the

appeal. But petitioner had filed for an

extension on October 1 (and the extension

was counted from September 30 the last day

of the period), thus the filing of the petition for

review was still 1 day late when it was filed in

October 16, 1985. (Since 15 days from Sept 30

is on October 15)

- Petitioner argues that the extension

period should be counted from October

1 which was the last day of the period

for appeal.

Issue: W/N the petition for review w/ the

Appellate Court was filed within the

reglementary period.

Held: Yes, the petitioner filed his motion for

reconsideration w/ the trial court on on Sept

13, 1985 (15 days after receiving the Courts

decision reversing the MTC). The motion

having been denied and petitioners having

received notice thereof on September 30th

under Sec. 3 of Rule 41 of the ROC, the last

day to perfect appeal was on October 1. The

right to file the petition for review would have

expired on October 1 not Sept 30. When the

petitioner asked for an extension of 15 days to

file the petition for review, the 15 day period

no longer includes Oct 1 because that day was

already given to him by Rule 41. The 15 day

period is on top of October 1. It started on

October 2 and ended on October 16.

The error of the respondent court

becomes more apparent if we assume that the

petitioner asked only for a one day extension,

the last day for the filing of the petition wouldhave been October 2. If he asked for two days

it would have been October 3. But since he

asked for 15 days the expiry date is the 16th of

October when the petition was filed by the

petitioner. (first day excluded Oct 1, last day

included Oct 16)

Lloren case: Petitioner filed his MFR on the 15th

day of the period w/in w/c he may perfect his

appeal that day should be excluded so that

when he received copy of the order denyinghis motion for reconsideration he had still 1

day within which to perfect his appeal. This

period of one day should be computed again in

accordance with the rule above cited by

excluding the day of receipt and including the

next day.

Juan Merino vs CA and Cirilo AlarconAug. 25, 1983; Abad Santos, J.


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Facts: January 18, 1972- Merino filed an

ejectment suit against Alarcon in CityCourt of Manila. City Court decidedagainst Merino.

Merino appealed to CFI Manila. CFI triedthe case de novo and on January 9,

1973, CFI ruled ordering Alarcon tovacate.

Feb. 16, 1973- Alarcon filed notice thathe was appealing to CA the findings ofthe facts not supported by substantialevidence

March 7, 1973- Alarcon filed Record onAppeal, which was approved by JudgeMariano V. Agcaoili on March 31, 1973.(Mariano V. Agcaoili inherited the casefrom a retiree, Judge Mariano V.Benedicto.)

April 12, 1973- Judge Agcaoili cancelledhis inadvertent approval of March 31pending a hearing on WON the case isstill appealable to CA (according toAgcaoili, a CFI decision in a caseappealed to it from a city court isalready final and not appealable) andWON a motion for execution filed byMerino should be granted.

May 30, 1973- Judge Agcaoili ruled thatthe case is not appealable to the CA,nullified the approval of the Record on

Appeal of Alarcon, and issued a Writ ofExecution for Merino.

Alarcon went to CA, which reversed theCFI (CA reinstated the order approvingRecord on Appeal, and nullified the writof execution). CA relied on the ruling bySC in Jose Mota vs CA. The Mota rulingheld that cases falling within theexclusive jurisdiction of city courts andappealed to CFIs are appealable to CAby ordinary appeal; appeals by petitionfor review are proper only in cases triedby MTCs as courts of record and whenthe judgment of MTC is affirmed in fullby CFI. CA disagreed on the Mota rulingbut applied it because of its position inthe hierarchy of courts.

Merino went to SC.

ISSUE/HELD and RATIO:WON a case which falling within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the city court and appealed to

the CFI is still appealable by ordinary appeal toCA. NO.

Sec 45 of Judiciary Act of 1948, as amendedby RA 6031- Appellate Jurisdiction. XXXXXXIn cases falling under the exclusive origina

jurisdiction of municipal and city courts whichare appealed to the courts of first instancethe decision of the latter shall be finalProvided, That the findings of facts containedin said decision are supported by substantiaevidence as basis thereof, and the conclusionsare not clearly against the law and

jurisprudence; "

The Court cited the opinion of JusticeGuillermo Santos in CA, who later became SC

justice, disagreeing with the Mota case: RA6031 modified RA 5433 in the sense that whileunder the latter - RA 5433 - only fina

judgments or decisions of the CFI entered inthe exercise of appellate jurisdiction whichaffirms in full the judgment of the MunicipaCourt or City Court are made final, the former -RA 6031 - modified and extended the rule tothe effect that the decisions of the CFI in theexercise of its appellate jurisdiction oveinferior courts shall be final in all cases. RA6031 in saying that CFI decision is final didnot make distinctions whether it is inaffirmance, modification, or reversal of MTCdecision. Appeal to CA for CFI decisions incases originally falling within the jurisdiction ofMTC is by petition for review, not ordinaryappeal, WON the CFI decision is affirming theMTC decision in toto or modifying or reversingthe same.

SC also cited CA Justice Ricardo Puno, who, ineffect, agreed with Justice Santos: thatRepublic Act 6031 operates to abolish thedistinction under Republic Act 5433 wherein

only adjudications by the CFI affirming in fulthe judgments of the municipal or city courtsbecame ipso facto final; and that decisions ofcourts of first instance rendered in theexercise of their appellate jurisdiction shouldnow be considered final, in all cases.

SC abandoned Mota ruling.

Aquino, concurring: Under section 45 of theJudiciary Law, decisions of the Court of FirstInstance in cases exclusively cognizable by


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inferior courts (like the ejectment case in theinstant case) are final as long as the findingsof facts contained in said decision aresupported by substantial evidence and theconclusions are not clearly against the law and

jurisprudence. Such decisions may bereviewed by CA through a petition for review.

The same rule is followed in section 22 ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides thatsuch cases shall be appealable by petition forreview to the Intermediate Appellate Courtwhich may give it due course only when thepetition shows prima facie that the lower courthas committed an error of fact or law that willwarrant a reversal or modification of thedecision or judgment sought to be reviewed.

Melencio-Herrera, concurring: theabandonment of the Mota ruling means thatthere should now be no distinctions on WONthe CFI affirmed in full the MTC decision. Thefinality of decisions of CFI is subject to thecondition that the finality of those decisionsrests on the condition that the "findings offacts therein are supported by substantialevidence as basis thereof, and the conclusionsare not clearly against the law and

jurisprudence" (Sec. 45, Judiciary Act, asamended by RA 6031).Dela Cruz v Paras

Facts:

Pedro San Miguel, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, commenced a"Complaint for Partition of Real Estate"before the CFI of Bulacan against PabloSan Miguel. The complaint sought thepartition of Lot No. 4543 of theLolomboy Estate.

Pablo San Miguel disclaimed co-ownership and asserted exclusive

ownership of Lot No. 4543.TC judge ordered the dismissal of thecase for "apparent lack of interest in theprosecution of the respective claims ofthe litigants."

Eleven years thereafter, Pedro againfiled a complaint for partition againstPablo. This time, the complaint prayedfor the partition of Lot No. 4543 and LotNo. 3269.

Pablo filed his answer, pleading thereinthe defense ofres judicata.

After preliminary hearing, the JudgeParas dismissed the case "insofar as Lot4543 is concerned" in view of theprinciple ofres judicata.

The case was ordered to proceed withrespect to Lot 3269 and the partieswere ordered to present a project ofpartition within 10 days.

Petitioners interposed their appeal fromthis judgment. On said date, their noticeof appeal, appeal bond and record onappeal were filed.

Judge approved petitioners' correctedrecord on appeal but "insofar only asLot No. 3269 is concerned ... becausethe case with respect to Lot 4543 haslong become FINAL, cannot be appealedanymore.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorariand/or Mandamus in the CA and it was

elevated to the SC.

Issue: WON the decision was final and

appealable

Held:Yes

Ratio:

Interlocutory or incidental judgments ororders do not stay the progress of anaction nor are they subject of appeal"until final judgment or order isrendered for one party or the other."

Test to determine whether an order orjudgment is interlocutory or final: "Doesit leave something to be done in thetrial court with respect to the merits ofthe case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if

it does not, if is final." A court order is final if it puts an end to

theparticularmatter resolved or settlesdefinitely the matter therein disposedof, such that no further questions cancome before the court except theexecution of the order. The term "final"

judgment or order signifies a judgmentor an order which disposes of the causeas to all the parties, reserving no further


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questions or direction for futuredetermination.

The central point to consider is,therefore, the effects of the order onthe rights of the parties.

A court order, on the other hand, ismerely interlocutory in character if it isprovisional and leaves substantial

proceeding to be had in connection withits subject. The word "interlocutory"refers to "something interveningbetween the commencement and theend of a suit which decides some pointor matter but is not a final decision ofthe whole controversy."

In the case at bar:

The said order is a final disposition of

the whole controversy between theparties with respect to the ownership ofLot No. 4543. It is absolute andconclusive on all questions in regardthereto.

The trial court's order is not a merenarrow acceptance of privaterespondent's plea ofres judicata. It hasmore the far-ranging effect ofconfirming Pablo's claim of exclusiveownership of Lot No. 4543. It importsthat Pablo is the sole owner of this

specific lot; as a result of which Pedrossuccessors-in-interest stand to sufferthe loss of what they claim is theirrightful share thereto.

This dismissal order has the effect andconsequences of a dismissal on themerits under Section 3, Rule 17 since itwas neither without prejudice nor basedupon lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-47432 January 27, 1992

UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RAFAEL VERENDIA,TEODORO GALICIA and MARCELINAGALICIA, respondents.

Tan, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariseeking thereversal of the decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals promulgated on April 29, 1977 which reversedand set aside the decision of the Court of First Instanceof Manila, Branch XVII dismissing the complaint withcosts against the plaintiff; and its resolution datedNovember 11, 1977 denying the motion forreconsideration.

The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy atbar are as follows:

On December 15, 1962 private respondents RafaelVerendia, Teodoro Galicia and Marcelina Galiciapurchased from petitioner Universal Motors Corporationtwo (2) Mercedes Benz trucks at a cash price ofP33,608.27 each payable within ninety (90) days.

The private respondents made several paymentsamounting to the sum of P7,100.00 which were appliedto the principal, interest and to the expenses incurred in

executing and registering a deed of chattel mortgage infavor of petitioner. For failure of the private respondentsto pay the cash price of P67,216.54 for the two vehicleswithin the 90-day period, their account was re-scheduled to allow them a period of thirty (30) monthswithin which to complete the payments.

On June 3, 1963 private respondents executed apromissory note in favor of the petitioner for the sum ofP74,064.40 covering the re-scheduled account therebypromising to pay the same in monthly installments atthe rates stipulated on the promissory note with interestthereon at 12% per annum until said promissory note is

fully paid.

As of September 16, 1965, the balance of said accountwas P40,945.31 with the accrued interest thereon. Butdespite repeated demands, the private respondentsfailed to comply with their foregoing undertaking, so thaton January 4, 1966 the petitioner commenced acomplaint for the recovery of the unpaid balance amongothers with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Private respondents in their Answer with Counterclaimadmitted the principal allegations of the Complaint,

except that they insisted that their outstanding accountwas only the amount of P28,911.10 as of October 31,1965.

The petitioner then filed a motion for summaryjudgment, but the same was denied by the lower courton January 9, 1967.

When the case was called for hearing on February 9,1967, neither the private respondents nor their counselappeared despite due notice, hence upon motion of thepetitioner's counsel, petitioner was allowed to present


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evidence ex-parte. On the basis of such evidence, thelower court on February 10, 1967 rendered judgment infavor of the petitioner.

On April 8, 1968, after re-hearing the case on motionfiled by private respondent Rafael Verendia, the courtrendered a decision the dispositive portion of which ishereunder quoted as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the Court hereby reiterates its judgmentdated February 10, 1967, and againorders the Defendants, Rafael Verendia,Teodoro Galicia and Marcelina Galicia,to pay, jointly and severally to thePlaintiff, Universal Motors Corporation,the sum of P47,732.35, with interest atthe rate of 12% per annum on one-halfof the principal balance of P69,672.66from February 10, 1967, until fully paid,plus the further sum equivalent to 25%

of the amount due as attorney's feesand the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. (Amended Record onAppeal, pp. 52-53)

From said decision, the private respondents interposedan appeal before the respondent Court of Appealsraising the following errors, to wit:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED INRULING THUS:

During the hearing, the Defendant,Rafael Verendia, attempted to provethat he was not indebted to plaintiff butthat he had overpaid his obligation to itin the sum of P12,407.32. Thisallegation . . . is absolutely withoutmerit . . .

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED INALLOWING EXECUTION PENDINGAPPEAL. (Rollo, p. 38)

On May 28, 1968 petitioner filed a motion for executionpending appeal which was granted by the trial court inits order of July 13, 1968. However, petitioner could notfind any visible properties belonging to privaterespondents that may be levied upon, and, therefore,the writ of execution could not be carried out andremained unenforced.

The respondent court reversed the decision of the trialcourt and rendered a decision promulgated on April 29,1977, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision ishereby reversed and set aside and inlieu thereof, a new one is rendered (a)dismissing the complaint with costsagainst the plaintiff in both instances,and (b) ordering restitution to thedefendants by the plaintiff of whateveramounts, inclusive of the P5,500.00 andP25,000.00 covered by the receipts,

Exhibits 3 and 4, which the latter mayhave received from the former in excessof the amount due under the promissorynote, Exhibit A, with interest at the legalrate from the date with overpayment.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 43)

On June 17, 1977, the petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration of the aforementioned Court of Appealsdecision. However, respondent court in a resolutiondated November 11, 1977 denied the motion finding no

cogent reason to disturb the questioned decision.

Hence, this present petition raising six (6) assignment oferrors, which are as follows:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALSCOMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN

ALLOWING PRIVATERESPONDENTS, WHO HAVEEXPRESSLY ADMITTED THEIRLIABILITY TO THE PETITIONER INTHEIR ANSWER TO THECOMPLAINT, TO MAKE A COMPLETETURNABOUT AND, NOT ONLY DENYTHEIR LIABILITY, BUT EVEN CLAIMOVERPAYMENT.

II


ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENTSTO CHANGE THEIR DEFENSE WHEN

THEY HAVE NOT, AT ANY STAGE OFTHE PROCEEDINGS, AMENDEDTHEIR PLEADINGS AND, WHEN THEYINTRODUCED THEIR EVIDENCETHEREON, THE SAME WAS DULY

AND SEASONABLY OBJECTED BYPETITIONER.

III



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NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRINCIPLEOF ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE TOPRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELYERRED IN EXONERATING PRIVATERESPONDENTS FROM ANY

LIABILITY TO PETITIONER.

V

THE COURT Of APPEALS GRAVELYERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATERESPONDENTS HAVE OVERPAIDPETITIONER.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE RESULT OF THEAPPEAL INTERPOSED BY PRIVATERESPONDENT VERENDIA WILLINURE TO THE BENEFIT OF THEOTHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTSWHO HAVE NOT APPEALED THEDECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.(Rollo, pp. 102-103)

Finding the first five issues interrelated, the petitionerdiscusses them jointly and submits that the findings ofthe respondent court are erroneous for the following

reasons:

First, in the answer filed by respondentsto the complaint,they expresslyadmittedthat theywereindebted to petitionerin the amountof P28,911.10 as of October 23, 1965.(pp. 7-10, Amended Record on Appeal)

Second, in the same answer, privaterespondents declared that "there was nonecessity for plaintiff to retain servicesof counsel as defendants never ranaway from a valid obligation" and that"the institution of this action for whichthe defendants do not deny and neverhave they denied (their obligation)"compelled them to retain the services ofcounsel and incur expenses. (Pars. 6and 8, pp. 9-10 Ibid)

Third, private respondents have notatany stage of theproceedings amendedtheir pleadings

and when they introduced their evidenceattempting to show overpayment of theiraccount with petitioner, the introductionand admission thereof wereduly objectedto by petitioner, . . .considering that private respondentshave not amended their answeradmitting liability of their obligation tothe plaintiff, they are bound by such

admission.

Fourth, the principle ofestoppel, isapplicable to private respondents, . . .,therefore, their admission of the liabilityin their Answer to the Complaint isbinding upon them and they may nolonger deny the same, much less claimoverpayment.

Fifth, it is presumed that privaterespondent Verendia in the conduct of

his business affairs, followed theordinary course thereof (Rule 131, sec.5, Par. Q). If, as he claims, he hasoverpaid the petitioner, why did heimmediately confirm to Sycip, Gorres,Velayo & Co. that he owed petitionerP28,911.10? It is not the naturalreaction of a man who sincerelybelieves that he has no obligation at all;it is, on the contrary the natural reactionof a man who knows that he is indebted.. . .

Finally, if private respondent Verendiawas honestly convinced that his accountwith petitioner was only the muchsmaller amount that he is claiming, whydid he still allegedly pay P25,000.00 (incash yet) to Manuel Seeping (p. 21, tsn,Jan. 22, 1968), which supposedlyresulted in an overpayment.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, pp. 108-111)

In sum, the petitioner stresses that where there isambiguity in a questioned decision of the Court of

Appeals, the doubt should be resolved to sustain thetrial court.

Finally, in support of its argument that the appealinterposed by private respondent Verendia should notinure to the benefit of the other private respondents whodid not appeal, the petitioner emphasizes that the casecited by the Court of Appeals entitled Municipality ofOrion v. Concha, 50 Phil. 679, declares that where the


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liability of the debtors is joint and several, the judgmenton appeal will not affect those who do not appeal.Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals, in its decision statesthat the liability incurred by the obligors under thepromissory note is solidary, the decision should affectonly the private respondent Verendia. Hence, insofar asthe other private respondents Teodoro Galicia andMarcelina Galicia are concerned, the decision of thetrial court, which they did not appeal is, therefore,

already final and executory.

In contradiction to petitioner's contentions, privaterespondents insist that all the arguments of petitioneractually require the court to examine and contrast theoral and documentary evidence submitted by theparties. Private respondents emphasize that the task ofexamining documentary proofs or exhibits is a task forthe Court of Appeals and not this Court.

Private respondents stress that this case does not fallwithin the exceptions where the Supreme Court can

review on appeal the final and conclusive findings offact of the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the private respondents maintain that it ismerely discretionary whether the court may allow thepleadings to be amended and that such failure does notaffect the result of the trial of the issues.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

We already stressed in the case ofBustamantev. Hon. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 89880, February 6,1991, 193 SCRA 603, 608-609) that "(a)s a rule,findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final andconclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal,provided, they are borne out by the record or are basedon substantial evidence. However, this rule admits ofcertain exceptions, as when the findings of facts areconclusions without citation of specific evidence onwhich they are based; or the appellate court's findingsare contrary to those of the trial court. (Sese v.Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 66168, 31 July1987, 152 SCRA 585)"

Furthermore, only question of law may be raised on a

petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of theRevised Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals islimited to reviewing and revising the errors of lawimputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It isnot the function of the Supreme Court to analyze orweigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction beinglimited to reviewing errors of law that might have beencommitted. Barring, therefore, a showing that thefindings complained of are totally devoid of support inthe records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as toconstitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings

must stand for the Supreme Court is not expected orrequired to examine or contrast the oral anddocumentary evidence submitted by the parties.(Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corp.,G.R. 82670, 15 September, 1989, 177 SCRA 618)

The respondent court opined that the record consistingof both the oral and documentary evidence presented inthe case outweighed the findings of fact of the trial

court.

The apparent conflict between the findings of theappellate court and that of the trial court is due to thefact that evidence was presented ex parte in the lowercourt while the evidence of the private respondentswere presented only on appeal. Hence, the trial courtdecided the case on the basis solely of the evidence ofthe petitioner while the respondent court reached adecision with the advantage of weighing and analyzingboth the evidence of the petitioner and the privaterespondents.

Bearing in mind these facts and in the absence of anyshowing that the findings complained of are totallydevoid of support in the records, such findings muststand and be admitted as final and conclusive.

Anent the petitioner's contention that the respondentcourt committed an error in allowing privaterespondents to change their defense when they havenot at any stage of the proceedings amended theirpleadings, We quote the pertinent portion of Section 5,Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

. . . Such amendment of the pleadingsas may be necessary to cause them toconform to the evidence and to raisethese issues may be made upon motionof any party at any time, even after

judgment; but failure so to amend doesnot affect the result of the trial of theseissues. . . .

In other words, judgment may still be rendered not onthe basis of the issues alleged, but on the basis of theissues discussed and proved in the course of the trial.

(Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, Vol. I, SecondEdition, 1989, p. 303) Hence, the failure of the privaterespondents to amend their pleadings in order toconform to the evidence presented will not at all affectthe result of the trial.

Finally, the petitioner's claim that the result of theappeal interposed by private respondent Verendia, oneof the solidary debtors will not inure to the benefit of theother private respondents who did not appeal is devoidof merit.


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In the recent case ofCitytrust Banking Corporationv. The Court of Appeals and William Samara, G.R. No.92591, April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 553, 563, We alreadyruled that "the Court will not allow the absurd situationwhere a co-defendant who is adjudged to be primarilyliable for sums of money and for tort would be chargedfor an amount lesser than what its co-defendant isbound to pay to the common creditor and allowed tocollect from the first co-defendant. Such a situation runs

counter to the principle of solidarity in obligations asbetween co-defendants established by a judgment forrecovery of sum of money and damages . . ."

The Court therein noted the modification made by therespondent court which ordered not only the appellanttherein but both "defendantsjointly and severally" topay the new amount. It explained that though, as amatter of procedure, the modification shall be appliedonly to the appellant, substantial justice and equity alsodemand that the decision should be interpreted to referto the non-appealing defendant as well. There exists astrong and compelling reason to warrant an exceptionto the rule that a judgment creditor is entitled toexecution of a final and executory judgment against aparty especially if that party failed to appeal. (Olacao v.National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38[1989]; Quigui v. Boncaros, 151 SCRA 416 [1987];Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 148[1990])

It is obvious that the respondent court committed noerror in ruling that its decision inures to the benefit of allthe private respondents regardless of the fact that onlyone appealed. It is erroneous to rule that the decision of

the trial court could be reversed as to the appealingprivate respondent and continue in force against theother private respondents. The latter could not remainbound after the former had been released; although theother private respondents had not joined in the appeal,the decision rendered by the respondent court inured totheir benefit. When the obligation of the other solidarydebtors is so dependent on that of their co-solidarydebtor, the release of the one who appealed, provided itbe not on grounds personal to such appealing privaterespondent, operates as well as to the others who didnot appeal. It is for this reason, that a decision or

judgment in favor of the private respondent who

appealed can be invoked as res judicata by the otherprivate respondents.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that therespondent court committed no error in reversing thedecision of the trial court and in dismissing thecomplaint in favor of the private respondents.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and thedecision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Roman Catholic Archbihop of Manila vs. CA,

Sps. Reyes

Facts:

Lease agreement was executed by RomanCatholic (RC) as lessor and Sps Reyes overa lot in 1985. The spouses were given theright of pre-emption, with first priority topurchase the property if RC offered it forsale.

Intending to have a firewall constructed,the spouses had the property located; theydiscovered that the adjacent owner's fence

encroached upon 30.96 sqm of the leasedlot. They requested RC to makeadjustments to correct the encroachmentproblem. Because RC failed to do so, theywithheld payments as "leverage" againstRC and to force RC to make corrections.

1987, RC informed the sps in a letter of itsintention to sell the lot. Although the spsconveyed their interest in buying the lot, nodeal was finalized. 1989, sps reiteratedtheir desire to purchase the lot in responseof RC's demand for 68K unpaid rentals.

1989, RC offered to sell the lot at2,127.45/sqm. Sps argued that it should besold to them at 1,600/sqm, the prevailingprice when the lot was first offered for salein 1987.

No agreement was reached so the sps filedan action for specific performance anddamages before RTC-Manila, w/ adjustmentof the encroached portion as first cause ofaction and prayer that RC be compelled tosell it to them at 1,600/sqm as 2nd causeof action (claiming that there was already a

contract of sale). RC's MtD was not immediately resolved. RC

filed its Answer w/ Counterclaim for rentalpayment owed. RC also filed a motion for

judgment on the pleading of unpaid rentalson 439.34 sqm of the 470 sqm leased lot.

RTC in an Order (Oct 17) denied RC's MtDinsofar as the first cause of action isconcerned but granted it for the 2nd causeof action. The case was allowed to proceedwrt to the 1st cause of action, but not with


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the 2nd. RTC dismissed the 2nd COA becthere was no definite offer and acceptanceas regards the sale of the lot and the leasecontract gives the sps only a right of pre-emption.

RTC acted on RC's Motion for Judgment onthe Pleadings (relative to the counterclaimfor rental) and rendered a Partial Judgmentwherein the sps were ordered to pay RC108K+ representing rental arrearages.

RTC: sps were obligated to pay rent afterhaving admitted that they deliberatelydefaulted in payments. Since there's noissue as to the non-payment of rentals, atleast on the occupied area (439 sqm),partial judgment on the pleadings iswarranted.

Sps filed a notice of appeal to the CA,raising 3 issues: the lawfulness ofdismissing 2nd cause of action; the

propriety of holding that there's no contractof sale; ordering the payment of rentalarrearages.

RC moved to dismiss >> denied; MR >>denied.

CA: case before CA is a single appeal anddoes not necessitate multiple appeals evenif it involves an Oct 17 Order and Partial

Judgment on Oct 18. Hence, even if only anotice of appeal was filed w/out a record onappeal, the appeal was perfected.

1993, CA affirmed RTC's Oct 17 Order but

reversed the Partial Judgment. Case wasordered remanded to determine the exactamount of the rentals. CA held that theinsufficiency of sps' 2nd cause of action ispatent from the face of the complaint, but,wrt the rental, evidence tendered a validissue w/c could not be resolved merely onthe pleadings.

RC filed MR >> denied. Thus this petitionfor review, raising only procedural issues.

RC: This case involves multiple appealswhich, therefore, necessitates the filing ofrecord on appeal for the perfection of theappeal. While MtD was granted for thesecond cause of action (to compel sale),the case was left to proceed in connectionwith the encroachment issue. With thefiling of the notice of appeal, the entirerecords of the case were elevated to theCA, leaving the RTC bereft of any recordwith which to continue trial. When a partial

judgment is rendered in the case, the

original record of the case should not betransmitted to the appellate court in caseof an appeal from such partial judgment.Without the records of the case, trial on theunresolved issues cannot proceed. As morethan one appeal is permitted in this case, arecord on appeal is required and the periodto appeal should be 30 days.The sps failedto file record on appeal, hence, their appeashould have been dismissed.

Issue: Does this case involve multiple appeals,where a record on appeal is necessary toperfect the appeal?

Held: NO. Multiple appeals are allowed inspecial proceedings, in actions for recovery ofproperty with accounting,in actions forpartition of property with accounting,in thespecial civil actions of eminent domain and

foreclosure of mortgage.

The rationale behindallowing more than one appeal in the samecase is to enable the rest of the case toproceed in the event that a separate anddistinct issue is resolved by the court and heldto be final.

The disputes in the case below forspecific performance have arisen from thedemand to make adjustments on theproperty where the adjacent owner isalleged to have usurped a part thereof, the

exercise of the right of pre-emption and thepayment of rental arrearages. A ruling onthe issue of encroachment will perforce bedeterminative of the issue of unpaidrentals. These two points do not arise fromtwo or more causes of action, but from thesame cause of action. Hence, this suit doesnot require multiple appeals. There is noground for the splitting of appeals in thiscase, even if it involves an Order granting(and denying) a motion to dismiss and aPartial Judgment granting a motion for

judgment on the pleadings. The subjectmatter covered in the Order in the Partial

Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lesseerelationship, lease contract and parcel ofland. Splitting appeals in the instant casewould, in effect, be violative of the ruleagainst multiplicity of appeals. Since a casehas not been made out for multipleappeals, a record on appeal is unnecessaryto perfect the appeal.


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Issue 2: Does the Court of Appeals havejurisdiction over an appeal from theRegional Trial Court raising onlyquestions of law?

Held: No. But in this case, CA has jurisdictionbecause appeal raised questions of fact andlaw.

Petitioner contends that the issues raisedon appeal to respondent court are purequestions of law over which the SupremeCourt has exclusive jurisdiction. Since theOrder and the Partial Judgment renderedby the trial court were based exclusively onthe admissions and averments contained inthe parties' pleadings, an appeal therefrominvolves only pure questions of law.

SC >> Decisions of the RTC may bedirectly reviewed by the Supreme

Court on petition for review only ifpure question of law are raised.

According to Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e) ofthe 1987 Constitution1, the SC may reviewdecisions of a lower court, such as theRegional Trial Court where only errors orquestions of law are raised, pursuant to lawor the Rules of Court.

BP 1292 states that the general rule is thatappeals from the RTCs shall be broughtbefore the CA unless it is properly to beelevated to the Supreme Court inaccordance with (a) constitutionalprovisions, (b) B.P. Blg. 129 and (c) theprovisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Portions of Section 173 of the Judiciary Actof 1948 which have not been repealedlikewise provide what cases fall within the

1Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari asthe law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgment and orders oflower courts in:

(e) All case in which only an error or question of law is involved.

2CA shall exercise (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final

judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional TrialCourts . . ., except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of theSupreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of thisAct, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

3Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. . . .

exclusive appellate jurisdiction of theSupreme Court.

From the foregoing provisions, thefollowing principles may be formulated:decisions of the Regional Trial Court maybe elevated directly to the Supreme Courton certiorari in criminal cases where the

penalty imposed in death or lifeimprisonment, including cases arising outof the same occurrence and in all othercase in which only errors or questions oflaw are involved. When the Constitutionstates that cases involving questionsof fact or mixed questionsof fact andlaw should be appealed to the Court ofAppeals, it merely restates in anotherway the principle that if onlyquestions of law are raised, thesecases should be elevated to the

Supreme Court.

Circular 2-90, number 4 (c)4, likewiseindirectly states that cases from the

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court mayprovide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as hereinprovided, in

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed isdeath or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which,although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or whichmay have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that

giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether theaccused are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories or whethethey have been tried jointly or separately; xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review,revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of courtmay provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts as hereinprovided, in xxx xxx xxx

(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law areinvolved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or

jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next precedingparagraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact andlaw, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and thefinal judgment of decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised,reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writofcertiorari.

44. Erroneous Appeals. An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court

or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall bedismissed. xxx xxx xxx

(c) Raising issues purely of law in the Court of Appeals, or appeal bywrong mode. If an appeal under Rule 41 is taken from the Regional

Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and therein the appellant raises onlyquestions of law, the appeal shall be dismissed, issues purely of law notbeing reviewable by said court. . . .

(d) No transfer of appeals erroneously taken. No transfers of appealserroneously taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals towhichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will beallowed; continued ignorance or wilful disregard of the law on appeals wilnot be tolerated. (Emphasis supplied.)


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Regional Trial Court raising only questionsof law should be taken to the SupremeCourt since appeals under Rule 41 fromRegional Trial Court to the Court of Appealsinvolving only questions of law "shall bedismissed, issues purely of law not beingreviewable by said court."

From the foregoing, it is clear that theCourt of Appeals does not exercisejurisdiction over appeals from theRegional Trial Court which raise purelyquestions of law. Appeals of this natureshould be elevated to this Court.Notwithstanding the confirmation of thislegal rule, still, the instant petition cannotbe granted because the appeal broughtbefore the Court of Appeals by privaterespondent spouses does not involvequestions or errors of law alone, there

being factual issues to be resolved.

There is a question of law when the issuedoes not call for an examination of theprobative value of evidence presented, thetruth or falsehood of facts being admittedand the doubt concerns the correctapplication of law and jurisprudence on thematter.

The Court finds that they are not purelyquestions of law. Specifically, when Sps.

Reyes questioned the conclusion of the trialcourt that there was no meeting of theminds between lessor and lessee regardingthe sale of the leased property, privaterespondent raised a factual issue. Similarly,the issue of whether or not there was aperfected contract of sale necessitates aninquiry into the facts and evidence onrecord.

Dispositive: CA affirmed.

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZFAUSTINO, ROGELIO

FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOBOBANIAAND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN vs. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR andCARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANKOF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N.ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, RegionalTrial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, September14, 2005, G.R. No. 141524, CORONA,J.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgmentand titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversionwith preliminary injunction before the RTC RoxasOriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of ForesDevelopment, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of thePhilippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namelyFe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.In the course of the proceedings, the parties filedvarious motions with the trial court.May 16, 1997-RTC Judge Rosales, resolved the motionsas follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declarerespondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of ForesDevelopment in default was granted for their failure tofile an answer, but denied as against the respondentheirs of del Mundo because the substituted service osummons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banksmotion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was deniedbecause there were hypothetical admissions and mattersthat could be determined only after trial, and (3) themotion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of deMundo, based on prescription, was also deniedbecause there were factual matters that could bedetermined only after trial.The heirs filed a MFR of the order denying their MTD onthe ground that the RTC could very well resolve the issue

of prescription from the bare allegations of the complainitself without waiting for the trial proper. February 12, 1998 RTC dismissed petitionerscomplaint on the ground that the action hadalready prescribed. March 3, 1998- Petitioners allegedly received acopy of the order of February 12, 1998 dismissingthe complaint. March 18, 1998 (15th day) Pets filed a MFR July 1, 1998- RTC issued another orderdismissing the MFR July 22, 1998 Pets received the order of July 1dismissing their MFRJuly 27, 1998 (5 days later) - Pets filed a notice ofappeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

August 4, 1998- court a quo denied the notice oappeal, holding that it was filed 8 days late. This wasreceived by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a MFR but was denied in an ordedated September 3, 1998. Petitioners assail the dismissal of the notice of appeabefore the CA via a petition for certiorari and mandamusunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed theinotice of appeal. They received on July 22 the final orderof July 1 denying their MFR and so the 15-dayreglementary period to appeal started to run only on July22. They filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998only five days had elapsed and they were well within the

reglementary period for appeal.CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-dayperiod to appeal should have been reckoned from March3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998order dismissing their complaint. According to theappellate court, the order was the final orderappealable under the Rules. the (P)erfection of anappeal within the reglementary period and in the mannerprescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliancewith such legal requirement is fatal and effectivelyrenders the judgment final and executory. Petitioners filed a MFR of the CA decision but wasdenied Petition for review under Rule 4


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Issue 1: WON the final order, which receipt triggersthe start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, isthe February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint.HELD1: NO. The order dated July 1, 1998 denyingtheir motion for reconsideration was the finalorder contemplated in the Rules. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 daysfromnotice of judgment or final orderto appeal thedecision of the trial court.A final judgment or orderis one that finally disposesof a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do withrespect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,considering the evidence presented at the trial, declarescategorically what the rights and obligations of theparties are; or it may be an order or judgment thatdismisses an action.

ISSUE 2: WON the appeal to the July 1, 1998 order wasfiled within the 15-day reglementary period.HELD 2: YES. In the rules governing appeals to SC and to the CA,particularly Rules 42-45 the Court allows extensions oftime, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, forparties to file their appeals. These extensions may

consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rulesand to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal theircases, the Court deems it practical to allow a freshperiod of 15 days within which to file the notice ofappeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the orderdismissing a motion for a new trial or motion forreconsideration. The fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to theRegional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for reviewfrom the Regional Trial Courts to the Court ofAppeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicialagencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governingappeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.The new rule

aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, tobe counted from receipt of the order denying the motionfor new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full orpartial) or any final order or resolution. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal on July 27,1998 or five days from receipt of the orderdenying their motion for reconsideration on July22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was wellwithin the fresh appeal period of 15 days. Thispronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be takenwithin 15 days from notice of judgment orfinal orderappealed from. The use of the disjunctive word orsignifies disassociation and independence of one thing

from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in thesense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use ofor in the above provision supposes that thenotice of appeal may be filed within 15 days fromthe notice of judgment or within 15 days fromnotice of the final order, which we alreadydetermined to refer to the July 1, 1998 orderdenying the motion for a new trial orreconsideration.

RATIOThe right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a partof due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and maybe exercised only in the manner and in accordance with

the provisions of law. Failure to do so often leads to theloss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute andprocedural rules. (BP 1295 and Rule 41, Section 36) The perfection of an appeal in the manner andwithin the period permitted by law is not onlymandatory but also

jurisdictional.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/141524.htm - _ftn17The appeal period previously consisted of 30 days7. BP

129 reduced this appeal period to 15 days. The raisond etre behind the amendment was to shorten theperiod of appeal and enhance the efficiency anddispensation of justice. There are extraordinary situations that merit liberaapplication of the Rules. In those situations wheretechnicalities were dispensed with, our decisionswere not meant to undermine the force andeffectivity of the periods set by law. But wehasten to add that in those rare cases whereprocedural rules were not stringently appliedthere always existed a clear need to prevent thecommission of a grave injustice. Our judicial systemand the courts have always tried to maintain a healthybalance between the strict enforcement of

procedural laws and the guarantee that everylitigant be given the full opportunity for the justand proper disposition of his cause.The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-181998) remains and the requirement for strict compliancestill applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomessignificant only when a partyopts to file a motion fornew trial or motion for reconsideration. In this mannerthe trial court which rendered the assailed decision isgiven another opportunity to review the case and, in theprocess, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.Dispositive: remanded to the CA for furtheproceedings.

5

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen(15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment

or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the

period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment

appealed from. x x x6

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall

be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of thejudgment or final order appealed from. Where a record onappeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appealand a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the noticeof judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timelymotion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extensionof time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall beallowed. (emphasis supplied)

7Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken byserving upon the adverse party and filing with the trialcourt within thirty (30) days from notice of order o

judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and arecord on appeal. The time during which a motion to set asidethe judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall bededucted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements ofRule 37.But where such motion has been filed during office hours of thelast day of the period herein provided, the appeal must beperfected within the day following that in which the party

appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/141524.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/141524.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/141524.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/141524.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/141524.htm#_ftn17


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First Aqua v. BPI

FACTS: Petitioners First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc.

and CBN International Corporation were the plaintiffsin Civil Case No. 99-930filed in RTC Makati.

Respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands

was the defendant in that case.

On October 16, 2000, the trial court rendered a

summary judgment dismissing the complaint.Petitioners received a copy of the judgment on

October 27, 2000. Hence, they had fifteen days to file

a notice of appeal. Instead, on November 6, 2000, or10 days after, they opted to file a motion for

reconsideration which was denied in the order dated

January 30, 2001.

Petitioners claim they received a copy of the January30, 2001 order onFebruary 16, 2001 and that they

filed a notice of appeal on the same day.

On February 19, 2001, the trial court gave due course

to the notice of appeal on the premise that the samewas filed within the prescribed period.

Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion to

declare the October 16, 2000 judgment final allegingthat petitioners notice of appeal was filed out of time.According to respondent, the January 30, 2001 order

was sent to the address of petitioners counsel and

was received there by a certain Lenie Quilatan onFebruary 9, 2001.

Hence, petitioners had only five days left to file the

notice of appeal counted from February 9, 2001, or

until February 14, 2001. Thus, the February 16, 2001filing was out of time.

Petitioners disputed respondents allegation and

maintained their position that the reckoning point of

the remaining 5-day period should be the date of theiractual receipt which was February 16, 2001.

They also claimed that Quilatan, who

allegedly received the January 30, 2001 orderon February 9, 2001, was not in any way

connected to them or their counsel.

On March 30, 2001, RTC ruled for the respondents. :

the Registred Letter No. B-341 sent by the Courtto R.Z. Francisco and Associates was duly delivered

and received by Lenie Quilatan, an authorized

representative, on February 9, 2001. It is therefore nottrue that the receipt of the Order denying the motion

for reconsideration was on February 16, 2001 but

rather it was on February 9, 2001, thus making the

appeal interposed to have been filed out of time.

On certiorari, the Court of Appeals affirmed RTC

ISSUE: WON the notice of appeal was filed on time.

YES!!

The actual date of receipt of the notice of denial ofthe motion for reconsideration dated January 30, 2001

is a factual issue which the trial court and the Court of

Appeals have already ruled on. Accordingly, this

Court, not being a trier of factsand having no reasonto reverse the said finding, holds that the date of

receipt of the January 30, 2001 order was February 9,

2001.

However, we disagree with the lower courts finding

that the notice of appeal was filed late. In the recent

case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in theRules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal

their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow afresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice

of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted fromreceipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new

trial or motion for reconsideration.

In the light of this decision, a party litigant may nowfile his notice of appeal either within fifteen days

from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen

days from the receipt of the order denying the motion

for reconsideration.Being procedural in nature,

Neypes is deemed to be applicable to actions pendingand undetermined at the time of its effectivity and is

thus retroactive in that sense and to that extent.

Petitioners notice of appeal filed on February 16,2001 was therefore well-within the fresh period of

fifteen days from the date of their receipt of the

January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001.


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LULLETE S. KO and ARLETTE SIMPLICIANO

BASILIO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.Jan 20, 2006

Facts:

- Petitioners filed for Annulment of

Mortgage, Extra-judicial ForeclosureSale, Annulment of TCTs and Deed of

Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction and Restraining Order

against PNB. They alleged that the

mortgage and the foreclosure

proceedings were null and void since

there was no written consent from

them as beneficiaries of the

mortgaged property. PNB denied the

claim and alleged that the

petitioners in fact gave their consent

to the mortgage.

- Petitioners and their counsel failed

to attend a scheduled trial. So upon

motion of PNB manifesting that werenumerous occasions in the past when

plaintiffs and their counsel did not

attend which showed that there was an

apparent lack of interest on the

part of plaintiff to prosecute the

action, the complaint was

dismissed by TC on April 27, 2005.

- Petitioners filed MR claiming that

they have been continuously

pursuing negotiations with PNB to

purchase back the property. PNB

countered that a period of three

years had elapsed but petitioners

failed to prosecute their case.This

MR was denied.

- Hence the petitioners filed a Petition

for Review on Certiorari under R45

with SC.

Issues:

1. PROCEDURE: WON the petitioners

correctly filed for a Petition for

Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

NO!

2. MERITS: WON the petitioners failed

to prosecute the action against PNB.

YIZ

Held:

1. Petitioners erred in filing a petition

for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court instead of

filing an appeal with the Court of

Appeals.

Section 3, Rule 178of the Rules of

Court provide that an order of

dismissal for failure to prosecute

has the effect of an adjudication

on the merits, petitioners'

counsel should have filed a

notice of appeal with the

appellate court within the

reglementary period.

The proper recourse was an

ordinary appeal with the Court

of Appeals under Rule 41, which

provides that to perfect an appeal all

that is required is a pro forma notice

of appeal with the court that

rendered the judgment appealed

from, to wit:

8

SEC. 3.Dismissaldue to fault of plaintiff. If, for nojustifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the

presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to

prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to

comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the

complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of the defendant

or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right

of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or

in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an

adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by

the court.


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Rule 41, Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. ' The appeal to the Court ofAppeals in cases decided by the Regional TrialCourt in the exercise of its original jurisdictionshall be taken by filing a notice of appealwith the court which rendered thejudgment or final order appealed from andserving a copy thereof upon the adverse party xx x. (Emphasis supplied)

The rules of procedure do not existfor the convenience of the litigants,but to enhance the efficiency of ourjudicial system. They are not to betrifled with lightly by mereinvocation of 'substantial justice.Balindong v. Court of Appeals:

Hence, rules of procedure must befaithfully followed except only when forpersuasive reasons, they may be

relaxed to relieve a litigant of aninjustice There should be an effort onthe part of the party invoking liberalityto explain its failure to comply with therules. The policy of the courts is to giveeffect to both procedural andsubstantive laws, as complementingeach other, in the just and speedyresolution of the dispute between the

parties.

2. In every action (there is an equaland opposite reaction joke), theplaintiff is has the duty 1. toprosecute with utmost diligence anddispatch and 2. minimize theclogging of the court dockets. Theexpeditious disposition of cases is asmuch the duty of the plaintiff as thecourt.

In the case at bar, three years havesince lapsed from the filing of thecomplaint (May 3, 2002) and theorder of dismissal (April 27, 2005).Petitioners' failure to prosecutetheir case and proceed with thetrial during the span of threeyears leads to no otherconclusion than that petitionershave no interest in seeing theircase terminated at the earliest

possible time; or that petitioners'case is unmeritorious from inception.

Basmayor v. Atencio

October 19, 2005

Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

TESDA Director Cueva informed Basmayor,

a computer operator that she had accumulated31 and a half days of absence without official

leave in violation of the CSC Memo Ciric. No41. He advised Basmayor to personally appear

before or explain in writing to the TESDARegional Office on or before October 2, 2000,

the reason for her absence with a warning that

failure to take the proper action within theperiod would mean her implied resignation

and would be dropped from the rolls

On October 18, 2000, she received a

Memorandum informing her that her service

shall be effective October 3, 2000. She later

received another memo informing her that shewas dropped from the rolls (Nov. 3)

Basmayor sent a letter complaint to the CSC

in Davao City charging Atencio,

Administrative Officer of TESDA for

falsification of official document, grossneglect of duty, inefficiency and

incompetence in the performance of official

duties and dishonesty. She claims that shecalled the TESDA Regional Office several

times but Atencio always informed her that

Director Cueva was not around. She was laterinformed on Oct. 23, 2000 that Cueva was in

Australia. She alleges that Atencio forged

Cueva's signature in the Nov. 3 Memo tomake it appear that Cueva, who was at that

time in Australia issued the memo.

Atencio denied and explained that she was

instructed to issued the memo throughfascimile machine and she submitted a

certification by the director.


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Basmayor's complaint was dismissed by the

CSC for failure to include a certification ofnon-forum shopping. She filed an amended

complaint but was dismissed also.

Basmayor filed an Appeal Memorandum with

the CSC Chairman.

The CSC Chairman granted the appeal and

ordered the Regional Office to take

appropriate action. The latter found that therewas no prima facie case and dismissed the

complaint for falsification of official

document, gross neglect of duty, inefficiency

and incompetence in the performance ofduties by Atencio.

July 18, 2001 Basmayor filed a separate

action before the Regional Office seeking her

reinstatement which was dismissed for lack ofprimary jurisdiction. CSC Regional Office

held that the proper forum for her

reinstatement was the grievance committee ofTESDA

July 23 Basmayor appealed the Order to the

CSC Central Office which dismissed hercomplaint against Atencio

Aug. 2 CSCCO dismissed her petition for

reinstatement

January 24, 2002 CSCCO remanded the

case to the Regional Office because it held

that the latter should take cognizance of the

petition for reinstatement because it wasrelated to the administrative complaint againstAtencio.

Basmayor filed an MFR she wants her

admin complaint resolved.

CSCCO denied her MFR and affirmed the

order of the CSCRO and dismissed the

petition for reinstatement

April 15 Basmayor filed an appeal before

the CA with prayer for TRO.

CA dismissed petition outright for defects:

CSC Resolution mere photocopy; petition did

not contain a concise statement of facts andissues involved and the grounds relied upon

for review. CA held that there was no reason

to grant the TRO and that the CSC should

have been impleaded.

CA denied MFR on Sept. 12, 2003

The issues raised by petitioner in this case are:

(1) Was TESDA Regional Director Cueva

effectively absent so that the memorandum

issued during his effective absence was

without effect? (2) Is the certification that theDirector ordered the issuance of the

memorandum, a written testimony, not

admissible in this case? and (3) Should theCSC be impleaded as respondent?

Issues: WON the SC has jurisdiction in this case. NO

The instant petition did not raise as issues any error

committed by the CA.

In petitions for review or appeal under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, the appellate tribunal is limited to the

determination of whether the lower court committedreversible errors. The errors which are reviewable

by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari

from a decision of the Court of Appeals are only

those allegedly committed by said court. It is the

burden of the party seeking review of a decision of

the Court of Appeals or other lower tribunals to

distinctly set forth in her petition for review, not only

the existence of questions of law fairly and logically

arising therefrom, but also questions substantial

enough to merit consideration, or show that there are

special and important reasons warranting the review

that she seeks. If these are not shownprima facie in

her petition, this Court will be justified in summarily

spurning the petition as lacking in merit.

Here, the petitioner ignores the dismissal of her

petition by the Court of Appeals on technical grounds

and raises instead issues unrelated to reasons for thedismissal of her appeal by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner had not alleged any error in the Court of

Appeals resolution that she seeks to correct, except

for the ruling that the Civil Service Commission

should be impleaded as respondent. Hence, these

deficiencies are sufficient grounds to deny this

petition outright. Also, as the issues raised are not

purely questions of law and they are not cognizable


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by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45,

the SC cannot exercise their jurisdiction.

With regards as to the probative value of the

certification made by Director Cueva, the Court held

that the SC is not a trier of facts.

*** Equally noteworthy, the CSC dismissed the

charges of falsification of public document against

Atencio for lack ofprima facie evidence; the CSCRO

No. XI found the signature of the director was not

forged; that Atencio issued the memorandum upon

instructions of the director; that based on records,

petitioner violated the Civil Service Rules on the

number of allowable absences; and that petitioner wasproperly informed of her offense and her dismissal.

These were affirmed by Director Cueva in the

memorandum issued on November 3, 2000. Such

findings made by an administrative body, which is

supported by the records, is accorded not only respect

but even finality. Hence, after a careful scrutiny of the

records, the SC decided not to disturb the CSC

findings.

As to WON the CSC should be impleaded as

respondent in this case, the correct procedure, as

mandated by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, is not to

implead the lower court or agency which rendered the

assailed decision.

The Court emphasized that review is not a matter of

right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be

granted only when there are special and important

reasons therefor.

GAMIAO V PLAN [G.R. No. L-57102 (June 29, 1982)]

Nature: Certiorari

Ponente: Abad Santos

Facts:

Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyanceannulment of deeds of sale and damages with CFIsabela. With prior leave of court, the complaint wasamended to include 3 more plaintiffs.

After issues had been joined, the respondent judgeissued the dismissal order motu proprio and in opencourt, without conducting a pre-trial conference othe parties on June 22, 1981, the date set for pre-tria

purposes. Said order held that the land in question was

originally a public land which was disposed of by theBureau of Lands and culminated into a certificate oftitle in (Private Respondent) Cadelinias name. It thendismissed the case on the ground that the Director ofLands has control over the disposition of PublicLands. It scheduled, though the hearing for thecounter-claim.

Petitioner filed instant case, invoking Sec. 2, Rule 42which governs ordinary appeals from CFI to the SC(But this is wrong. Its really pursuant to RA 5440)

The Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the

appeal on the following grounds:1. For being filed prematurely and/o

unseasonably, contrary to Rule 65, Sec. 1and

2. The error allegedly committed by therespondent Judge is an error of judgmentwhich can be reviewed by means of anappeal, and not by certiorari.

Issue/s: WON the procedure taken by petitioner isproper

Held:YES

Ratio:

Respondents wrongfully assume that the instantpetition was filed as a special civil action pursuant toRule 65.

Substantially, however, counsel for petitioners has

filed a petition pursuant to RA 5440 (An Act toAmending Sections 9 and 17 of the Judiciary Act of1948) albeit he did so unknowingly9. This petitionwas filed within the reglementary period of 30 daysfor civil cases.

RA 5440 was approved on September 9, 1968.According to Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, it is not

well-known to lawyers, especially provincialpractitioners. Accordingly, as part of the continuinglegal education of some members of the bar, quotedhereunder is the pertinent provision of the aforesaidAct, to wit:

o Sec. 3. The Supreme Court shall provide by rulefor the procedure governing petitions for writs ofcertiorari to review judgments mentioned inSection seventeen of Republic Act Numbered

9 No mention whatsoever which among the grounds in Sec. 17 of RA

the case falls under. Sorry, this case confuses me. I dont know why itshere and what its trying to say. Basta hindi daw under Rule 65 nor Rule

42.


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Two hundred ninety-six, as amended by this Actand the effect of the filing thereof on thejudgment or decree sought to be reviewed. Untilthe Supreme Court provides otherwise, saidpetitions shall be filed within the period fixed inthe rules of court for appeals in criminal or civilcases or special civil actions or specialproceedings, depending upon the nature of thecase in which the judgment or decree sought tobe reviewed, was rendered; the filing of saidpetition shall stay the execution of the judgmentssought to be reviewed; and the aforesaidpetitions shall be filed and served in the formrequired for petitions for review by certiorari ofdecisions of the Court of Appeals.

o Sec. 17. Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt. The Supreme Court shall have originaljurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,other public ministers, and consuls; and originaland exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for theissuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition andmandamus against the Court of Appeals.

"In the following cases, the Supreme Court shallexercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with

Courts of First Instance:"1. In petition for the issuance of writs ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quowarranto, and habeas corpus; and

"2. In actions brought to prevent and restrainviolations of law concerning monopolies andcombinations in restraint of trade.

"The Supreme Court shall have exclusivejurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify oraffirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court mayprovide, final judgments and decrees of inferiorcourts as herein provided, in

"(1) All criminal cases involving offenses forwhich the penalty imposed is death or lifeimprisonment; and those involving otheroffenses which, although not so punished,arose out of the same occurrence or whichmay have been committed by the accusedon the same occasion, as that giving rise tothe more serious offense, regardless ofwhether the accused are charged asprincipals, accomplices or accessories, orwhether they have been tried jointly orseparately;

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