007 Political Development Analytical and Normative Perspectives Gabriel a. Almond

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Comparative Political Studies

DOI: 10.1177/001041406900100401 1969; 1; 447 Comparative Political Studies

Gabriel A. Almond Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives

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447

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Analytical and Normative Perspectives

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

GABRIEL A. ALMOND is Professor of Political Science atStanford University and currently a fellow at the Center forAdvanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. A past Presidentof the American Political Science Association (1965-1966),Professor Almond is the co-author of Comparative Politics: ADevelopmental Approach (1966J and The Civil Culture (1963),as well as co-editor of The Politics of the Developing Areas(1960).

IF YOUTH IS an excuse for impetuosity, confusion, and error, then we needto be somewhat charitable in dealing with the theory of political develop-ment. As a special field of interest in political science it is hardly more than tenor fifteen years old. It was the breakup of empire and the national explosionafter World War II that provided the challenge. As political scientists moved intothe unfamiliar ground of Asian and Middle Eastern traditionalism, Africanprimitivism, and Latin American stagnation and instability, the approaches andvocabularies of the other social sciences thoroughly penetrated the field.

It was not only the infancy of this new theoretical interest, the novelty of theproblems, and the convergence in it of several different intellectual traditions andvocabularies, but perhaps even more, the powerful incentive somehow to cometo grips with the problems of political development, which help account for itsintellectual turgidity and much of the polemic that now engages people in it.

It may be useful to dwell for a moment on the positive pay-offs of this newinterest in political science. As we have observed the phenomena of the new andrapidly changing nations in recent years, and have sought to explain them andsay something sensible about their future prospects, we have been drawn back tosome of the fundamental questions of political theory. We have had to askourselves again what politics is; what are its varieties; what causes them to

change; and how they affect and are affected by their environments.

THE CONCEPTUAL VOCABULARY OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

As some of the pioneers in the study of the new nations moved into the field,it became clear that the existing conceptual schemes and vocabulary of politicalscience would be inadequate to cope with problems of description and explana-tion of politically relevant patterns and processes. An Apter (1955, 1961) and



448

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES

Coleman (1958) in Africa, a Pye (1962) and Riggs (1965) in Southeast Asia, aWard (1959) in Japan, a Weiner (1962) and Frey (1965) in South Asia and in theMiddle East, were compelled to reach into the cornucopias of sociological,anthropological, and psychological theory in order to describe the traditionaland transitional phenomena they were observing, and to explain the difficultiesbeing encountered by efforts to introduce modern political and legal institu-tions. Thus, as one goes through these writings, one encounters the

gemeinschaft-gesellschaft dichotomy of Toennies, the concepts of traditionality,rationality, and charisma of Max Weber; the concept of functionality in

Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown; the concepts of system and the patternvariables of Talcott Parsons; the notions of functional and structural requisitesand prerequisites in Marion Levy; and other concepts and terms coming fromsociological theory.

Psychology and psychoanalysis similarly entered into the conceptual schemesand vocabularies of some of the people working in this field; in particular, thework of Everett Hagen (1962), Lucian Pye (1962), and David McClelland(1961). The notions of servo-mechanism and feedback developed in cyberneticshave entered into the conceptual vocabulary through the work of Karl Deutsch(1963) and David Easton (1965). More recently, as political scientists havesought to come to grips with the public policy aspects of political development,economic concepts have begun to effect our approaches and vocabularies.

As in the biblical parable of the tower of Babel, political theory, like mankindin that primordial age, &dquo;had one language and few words&dquo; (Genesis 11:2). Withthis one language and few words, it had erected the &dquo;proud tower&dquo; of the

supremacy of European and particularly Anglo-American institutions. Andbecause of this great sin of pride, the Lord had come down, confused ourlanguage, and we could no longer understand one another’s speech (Genesis11:7). It would seem to me that the principal challenge to political theory, atthe present time, is to pull ourselves out of this conceptual confusion and findsome common and acceptable ways of looking at the developmental aspects ofpolitical systems.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM CONCEPT

Let me suggest some concepts on which I believe most of us can agree. First,the notion of a political system is probably here to stay. When David Easton’sbook, The Political System (1953), first appeared, I experienced one of thosemoments of intellectual liberation; when a concept comes along that gives one’sthoughts an ordered structure. My early years as a practicing political scientistwere in the great days of &dquo;separation of powers iconoclasm&dquo; when the &dquo;in&dquo; term



449

for the empirically oriented political scientists, who were studying &dquo;invisible

government&dquo; or the informal aspects of politics, was the political process.The notion of political process, as it was expressed in the writings of such

men as Pendleton Herring (1929), Elmer Schattschneider (1937), and PeterOdegard (1928), implied interaction and interdependence among the institutionsand structures of politics, but the interdependence was treated bilaterally. Oneexamined the relations between pressure groups and Congress, the bureaucracy,political parties and legislatures, or another might look at the relationshipsbetween the judiciary, and the legislative and executive processes. Process

implied relationship and interaction, but not the full notions of multidirectionalinteraction and of equilibrium and disequilibrium which are implied in theconcept of system.

The notion of system as elaborated in David Easton’s first book simplypressed for the acceptance of the view that the component parts of politics&dquo;tend to cohere and to be mutually related.... such phenomena form in otherwords a system which is part of the total social system and yet which, forpurposes of analysis and research, is temporarily set apart&dquo; (1953). This was thenotion that I was looking for, that somehow codified my own implicit paradigmof the interdependence of the components of politics.

This concept made it possible for me to codify a substantial body of researchwhich had been treating political, legislative, executive, administrative, andjudicial actions, as interdependent elements in a broadly coherent process ofconversion of demands into political system performances of one kind oranother. This may sound quite tame and obvious these days, but I believe it

represented a genuine change in paradigm.The concept of system came to David Easton via the work of Talcott Parsons.

Parsons’ system concept in elaborated form, first appears in his Toward aGeneral Theory of Action (1951), which appeared a year or two before thepublication of Easton’s book. From that point on, my theoretical interests havediverged somewhat from those of David Easton’s and Talcott Parsons’, just asthey have diverged from one another. While they have moved increasingly in thedirection of theoretical formalization, drawing on general systems theory andmore recently on cybernetics, I have been plowing a muddier course attemptingto draw the notions of system and function closer to the main currents of

empirical research in political science.What I have in mind is that Easton’s propositions about what goes on in the

black box of the political system have been kept generically simple. He speaks ofinputs of demand, and support and outputs (Easton, 1967), while I have beenstuffing into the black box functional and structural categories which haddeveloped in the creative decades of the empirical political research of the firsthalf of the present century. In particular, I sought to bring up to date the classic



450

system-functional theory of separation of power doctrine by adding in thefunctions made visible and structurally separate as a consequence of thedemocratic revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and theemergence of popular suffrage, political parties, associational interest groups,and mass media of communication. Drawing on the notions of system andfunction it was possible to take another look at the substantial literature dealingwith these themes and translate them into a structural-functional polemic; forthis is essentially what it was. The empiricists were attacking the legalists on thegrounds that their attributions of function to governmental structures bore littlerelation to reality and that there were fundamentally important structures whichtheir separation of powers schemes didn’t take into account at all.

It is the generic model of a political system which, in my opinion, is mostvulnerable to the criticisms which have been made of the application of systemsconcepts to the study of politics. As long as the model is kept simple and genericit is vulnerable to the criticism of Gouldner (1959) who argues that the use oforganismic or mechanical system analogies creates an impression of close inter-dependence and reciprocity of the parts of the system and of a kind of

equilibrium which it rarely, if ever, obtains in social reality. It is this genericconcept of system which has also been vulnerable to the criticism that it is an

essentially conservative and static model.Briefly, the model of political system that I have been advocating is one that

stresses the coherence and interdependence of parts or variables, but whichleaves provisional and as a coding device the identification of the variables, andleaves open the question of how coherent and how interdependent these parts orvariables are. The variables which I have identified refer to generally observedphenomena that affect political systems. Thus, the functional variables of

political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, aggregation,communication, and the like, were names given to processes which had beenwidely treated in the literature, and about which there was a fund of theory andhypotheses as to how they affected or were affected by other variables in thepolitical system. The exercise was indeed heuristic. But when we look down ournoses at &dquo;heuristic&dquo; theory, we ought not to forget that without it we wouldarrive at no &dquo;hard&dquo; theory, properly speaking.

PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISM

My own system-functional model has been a probablistic one from thebeginning. Thus, when I argued that the introduction of associational interestgroups into a political system affects the operations of all of the other

components of the political system, I was deliberately leaving open the question



451

of the extent to which and the ways in which such a change affected the othercomponents. If one stays close to the historical record of man’s experimentswith politics and to the research regarding relationships among politicalphenomena, it is quite clear that we are not dealing with the relatively closemeshing of structures and processes characteristic of machines and organisms. Inother words, the more generic our notion of system and function is, the morelikely is the analogy to political reality to be remote and even misleading. Onecan summarize this by saying that the theoretical tradition which moves in thedirection of increased simplification and formalization confronts this danger ofsuggesting forms of relationship inappropriate to the phenomena under investi-gation. On the other hand, an approach to theory which moves quickly frommodels to concepts, to indicators, to the empirical study of relationships amongvariables, gives us some hope of relevance. I am not suggesting that formal andgeneric models are of no use whatever. What I am recommending is an approachwhich moves continually back and forth between formalization and empiricalresearch.

In this age of the uneven development of the sciences, it will often appearthat a concept arising in physics, biology, psychology, sociology, or economicswill have relevance to politics. But since these concepts are models of a

particular kind of reality, they will carry with them the peculiar properties ofthat reality. The concepts may be versatile and powerfully suggestive, but theirversatility is limited. Thus having stolen the notions of system and function frombiology (via anthropology and sociology), the best strategy to follow is to

examine interdependence and coherence of parts in real political systems, andthen come up with a model or set of models more directly relevant to politicalphenomena.

In general, I favor a relatively informal approach to theory. Laying out thevariables which interact in the processes of political conversion, or classifyingpolitical systems, might be compared to the first sketch of a geographer whomakes a rough map from existing information before he gets down to the hardjob of measuring the contours and features of the terrain. Those of us whoadvocate the course of low and middle level theorizing and reject generaltheorizing as a branch of metaphysics, are unaware or only partially aware of ourown general theoretical orientation. No one can escape having one. We can onlydiffer in the extent to which we make it explicit. I have favored an approach togeneral theory which might be viewed as a preliminary sketching operationfrequently disciplined by contact with reality.

I have suggested that the concept of system surely will survive as an analyticaltool in political science. It has already been adopted as an assumption of inter-dependence of components and of coherence of parts in most of the

subdisciplines of political science. One reads of the international political



452

system; one reads of legislative systems; and of particular legislative committeesas systems. The separation of function and structure in the analysis of politicalphenomena similarly is here to stay. We take it so for granted that we forget thata generation ago the examination of political institutions and processes usuallybegan with the assumption that there was a necessary relationship betweenstructure and function. The notion of structural-functionalism which I find mostuseful is one that starts from the assumption that structures are usually, if notalways, multifunctional, and that one of the principal tasks of empirical researchon political systems is to ascertain what functions are being performed by whatstructures.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS DEPENDENT AND

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Perhaps one other notion has some prospect of survival. This is the

proposition that in characterizing the properties of any political system we haveto relate the interaction of three sets of variables. At another point I argued that

Our analytical framework has to enable us to relate three aspects of thefunctioning of political systems. We need functional categories in order todescribe and compare political systems at the level of their performance-as systems interacting with other systems in their domestic and inter-national environments. We need functional categories which will enable usto describe and compare political systems according to their internalconversion processes. And finally we need functional categories in order todescribe and compare political systems according to their maintenance andadaptive characteristics. Modern political theory will consist in good partof a logic which will enable us to relate changes in the performance ofpolitical systems to changes in internal process and conversion patternsand changes in recruitment and socialization patterns [Almond, 1967:14] .

I would put this somewhat differently today, and suggest that a soundstrategy of research on the theme of political development would have to look atinteraction as it affects political development from a number of different

perspectives. First, we might look at political development, treating the inter-national and domestic environments as a set of independent variables, with thepolitical system as a set of dependent variables. This is the perspective that isadopted by Barrington Moore in his Social Origins of Democracy and Dictator-ship (1966). The principal shortcoming of this creative work of scholarship isthat he acts as though this is the only relevant perspective to take regardingpolitical development. In other words, he views social stratification and social



453

class as the dominating causal factor in developmental processes. Another

perspective which we would need to take involves viewing the political system asa set of independent variables and looking at its outputs into the domestic andinternational environments and their consequences as the dependent variables.This is the approach which has been adopted by Holt and Turner (1966) in theirpioneering study.

But these two research perspectives are not the only ones which we need toadopt. We have to examine the interaction of the structures and functions withinthe political system itself. Thus a set of changes in the social structure andculture of the society may affect socialization and recruitment processes to thevarious roles and institutions in the political system. They may also affect theflow of demands and supports into the political system and thereby set inprocess a pattern of changes in the conversion processes of the political system,e.g., an increased differentiation of roles, or a change in the culture of inter-action within the political system. In other words, we have to be able to look atthe specialized processes which take place within the political system alter-natively as independent and dependent variables. Thus one can do research onthe consequences of changing patterns of socialization for patterns of articu-lation and aggregation. Or turning it around, one can look at the effects of

changes in the political infrastructure on patterns of socialization and recruit-ment. It is this kind of research which will tell us more about what kinds of

systems political scientists are dealing with as compared with other kinds ofsocial systems, organismic systems, or mechanical systems. These research

strategies also should begin to move us in the direction of tested statements ofprobability of relations between variables which will gradually turn our heuristicmacro-theories into proven propositions cumulated in an orderly way.

DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND TIME SERIES

Once we begin to break down these concepts of system and function into setsof interacting variables for which we can devise indicators we are at the

beginnings of a process of working out developmental patterns as empiricaltheory. It would then become possible, setting aside the question of the avail-ability of data, to lay out the development of specific political systems in termsof statistical series based on aggregate data: measures of change in socialstructure and in culture, measures of change in political socialization patterns,measures of change in recruitment to political roles, measures of change in therates of demand, measures of change in the operation of interest groups, politicalparties and the media of communication, measures of change in the coalitionmaking and bargaining processes in legislative bodies, measures of change in the



454

size and division of labor and function within the bureaucracy, measures ofchange in the magnitudes and kinds of political outputs, and measures of changein the domestic and international environment resulting from these outputs.We can foresee the development of a kind of polimetrics, although we should

recognize that our problems of data availability and analysis will surely proveeven more intractable than those which have confronted the economists.

Nevertheless, we can be sure that substantial efforts will be directed toward

solving these problems, since their solution promises so much by way ofexplaining why political systems developed in particular ways. Furthermore, wecan observe how system and functional concepts constituted an essential stage in

moving the study of political development to a more scientific level. For thesystem-functional assumption led us to look for the relevant sets of interactingvariables.

But there is another line of criticism of system-functional theories of politicaldevelopment which has to be confronted. In recent years the argument has beenadvanced that political systems theory leaves out the phenomena of leadershipand problem-solving behavior; in other words, it tends to be a mechanistic

model. The general tenor of this criticism both from the economists and politicalscientists is that the approach to political development via the notion of leader-ship and problem-solving models is a superior alternative to system-functionalapproaches. Again, I believe that there is much validity in this criticism. Butwhen it suggests an approach to political development theory via the notion ofleadership and problem solving as an alternative to system-functional conceptsthen I would suggest that it has gone too far. For system-functional conceptsput us in the position of being able to account for the setting and processwithin which leaders make choices and seek to solve problems. From a develop-mental point of view the problem-solving behavior of leaders effects changes inthis problem-solving context and process, in other words changes in the structureand culture of the system. Thus, the development of adequate theory in the fieldof political modernization has to be able to adopt both of these approaches andstrategies.

DEVELOPMENT AS PROBLEM SOLVING

If one looks at the histories of specific political systems, it is quite clear thatthere are points in time which might be characterized as crisis periods, periods ofgreatly increased pressures for structural and cultural adaptation coming to bearon the political system, such as wars, revolutions, or threats of revolutions. Forexample, if we were to represent the historical experience of such countries asBritain, France, and Germany, in the form of sets of quantitative indicators such



455

as I have sketched out above, these crisis points would be reflected in the formof large quantitative variations in the values of the variables, i.e., rapid increasesin the rates of demand, rapid declines in the incidence and intensity of support,radical fluctuations in the relationships between the conversion processes, andsharp increases or decreases in the various categories of political system output.

If we are to work out a theory of political development which can help usexplain, predict, and contribute prudent notions of how to control the processesof political development, we need to look at these crises, or disequilibriumsituations, not simply as a set of related shifts in the values of our indicators, butalso as exercises in problem-solving on the part of political elites. Closeexamination of these crisis periods may give us answers to two essential

questions. The first of these has to do with the constraints which limit the

options of political leaders in different historical-cultural contexts and thus enterinto the causation of development; and the second are the capacities forproblem-solving behavior characteristic of the political elites of different

political systems. To be able to build this approach into development theory weneed to look at history as a universe of man’s experiments with politics. If weadopt this point of view and examine this universe of political decisions

rigorously, we may improve our own capacity for &dquo;experimentation&dquo; in politicalsystem problem-solving in the contemporary world.

If changing a political system in preferred ways is dependent on our ability toanticipate how the system will respond to the changed values of one or morevariables, then surely we need a system theory in order to be able to do this. Ifwe want to be able to explain why political elites manipulated some variablesrather than others in specific historical contexts, we shall have to be able to takeinto account the environmental constraints which limited their options; and theproblem-solving propensities which affected their ability to perceive the optionsavailable to them or to select among them.

Again, there is a growing effort among scholars to exploit historical data as ameans of improving our theory of development. I have one or two notions whichI would like to contribute to this impulse to exploit historical material andhistorical cases. Let us make the assumption that our data problems can besolved and that we can lay out the trends of development of the British, theFrench, the German, and other political systems in quantitative series which willshow the relationships between environmental changes, system maintenancevariables, system conversion variables, and political outputs or capabilities. Atcertain points in these statistical series for Britain (e.g., the Tudor Revolution,the Civil War, the Restoration, the Reform Act of 1832, etc.), we would observesubstantial fluctuations in the relationships between these sets of variables.

We might speak of these periods as critical choice points, periods of rela-tively acute disequilibria, during which political elites make significant



456

&dquo;system-development&dquo; decisions.If we were to take the Reform Act of 1832 as an illustrative case, we would

first have the job of describing the British political system of the eighteenthcentury (Ostrogorski’s &dquo;Old Unity&dquo;) as a political system in relative equilibrium.If we had the quantitative data, we might be able to describe this equilibrium interms of relatively stable rates of interaction between inputs, conversion

processes, and outputs. When we come to examine the crisis surrounding theReform Act we will have to translate environmental pressures into politicalissues, and translate conversion processes into conflicts over issues amongdifferent elements of the political elite, and into the problem-solving propen-sities of these elites.We would then have to follow through the system changes which result from

this process of issue formulation and conflict resolution. For this we would turnto our statistical series again to observe the linkages between changes in theenvironmental and system variables. In the specific case of the Reform Act of1832, the changes in the suffrage and the units of representation resulting fromthis decision precipitated a change in the size and the composition of theelectorate. This in turn created opportunities for new types of politicalentrepreneurship or leadership (the party organizer, the demogogue) with skillsin mobilizing and organizing large numbers of relatively uneducated electors.The activities of these demogogues and organizers would be reflected in

increased rates of mobilization, affiliation, and participation. We would also haveto observe the consequences of this decision on the kinds of demands that

subsequently were brought to bear on the political system: demands to limitagricultural protection; demands to confront problems of welfare resulting fromindustrialization and urbanization; and demands of other strata on the

population for access to the vote and political influence.In laying out this approach to the study of historical crises experienced by

political systems and their consequences for political development, I have beenapplying to the political sphere an approach which Albert Hirschman haspioneered in the field of the economic development theory. In his Strategy ofEconomic Development (1958), he suggests that economic development maymost usefully be viewed as a sequence of disequilibria; and that our ability toexplain developmental processes is enhanced when we examine the way in whichchanges in any component of the economic system are linked &dquo;backward&dquo; to thesupply side of the economy, or &dquo;forward&dquo; to the demand side of the economy.In order to apply Hirschman’s notion of disequilibrium and linkage in the chainof political development, we need some model of the political system. Without ithow can we develop hypotheses regarding linkages in the process of change? Inhis stimulating book, Journeys Toward Progress ( 1963), Hirschman also providesus with a model that may be of use to us in the analysis of political crisis and



457

problem-solving. He specifies a simplified type of political situation in which oneor two issues confront the decision-makers, and in which it is possible to specifywhat the preference rankings of the various elite factions with respect to theseissues are. He then tries to demonstrate the conditions under which problems aresolved &dquo;reformistically&dquo; or &dquo;incrementally,&dquo; or through some revolutionarychange in the political system. The principal value of Hirschman’s &dquo;reform-

mongering&dquo; model is that it suggests how we might proceed in developing andapplying a &dquo;crisis and problem-solving model&dquo; in the study of politicaldevelopment.

While I do not wish to underemphasize the great difficulties that we wouldencounter in adapting Hirschman’s notions to the study of political develop-ment, it appears to me that his work suggests the appropriate relationshipbetween systems analysis and problem-solving analysis. It is quite evident thatwe need both.

My comments suggest that political development theory after havingborrowed from sociological, anthropological, and psychological theory, nowmust turn to economic theory and methodology, and must learn how to utilizethe enormous data bank of history in the development of a rigorous theory ofpolitical development. The incentives are very great indeed. If we observe thedrift of political history in terms of interacting system and environmentalvariables treated wherever possible in quantitative terms, and if we view crisesand systemic changes in the development of political systems in problem-solvingterms, what is now a groping confusion in political science should graduallyacquire some versatility in the explanation of the past, in forecasting the future,and advising policy-makers.

NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The contemporary literature dealing with political development and

modernization is concerned with the avoidance of three forms of error:

unilinearity, teleology, and ethnocentrism. Most of us who contribute to thisstill somewhat turgid field of inquiry have violated these tabus. The eightproperties referred to by Ward and Rustow (1964) as aspects of a modern polity,the &dquo;development syndrome&dquo; first formulated by Coleman (1965) and thenadopted by some of my colleagues on the Committee on Comparative Politics(Pye, 1966), the criteria of political modernization suggested by La Palombara(1963), the four measures of effective institutionalization listed by Huntington(1967), the three major characteristics of political modernization listed byClaude Welch (1967), the criteria listed by David Apter (1967), and S. N.Eisenstadt (1966), and other trait lists, criteria, and definitions of political



458

development or modernization, reflect a remarkable consensus. If they come outwith different numbers, this is principally the consequence of the level of

generalization at which they are operating and the specificity or selectiveness oftheir definitions. Thus one can move quite logically from Coleman’s three-folddevelopment syndrome to the Ward and Rustow eight-fold list of traits.

Whether we call this set of trends a movement toward a &dquo;world culture,&dquo; a&dquo;development syndrome,&dquo; &dquo;political modernization,&dquo; &dquo;political development,&dquo;or &dquo;political change,&dquo; it seems quite evident that all of us have been writingabout movement in a particular direction.

HANG-UPS ABOUT EVALUATION

Our particular anxiety about unilinearity grows out of the resolve to avoidthe error of our forefathers in political theory who, a generation ago, weresublimely confident that Anglo-American democracy and parliamentarismrepresented the highest attainment of man’s political talents and that all otherpolitical systems would inevitably follow in this same direction. What we ineffect have been trying to say is that there is a general trend in a broadly similardirection, but that the end products, insofar as we can foresee them, representrather distinct variations on similar themes. If we are thinking of the broaddirection of change, then I suppose we can conceive of this as a unilinearmovement. If, on the other hand, we are examining more closely the way inwhich different cultural and structural starting points have interacted with aparticular mode of impingement of the same set of cultural innovations, then wemight wish to stress the multilinear pattern of political development.

It is symptomatic of the primitive state of theoretical work in this field thatwe should be so anxious about the words we use and the definitions of our

concepts. Biologists and psychologists speak of the growth and development oforganisms, of human growth and development, assuming that the concept ofdevelopment includes breakdowns, decay, decline, even the death of the

organism. The literature on economic growth and development is not

embarrassed by the fact that economies fluctuate in national product, that somestagnate, and some decline. We are not bound by the connotations of the wordswe use to label our concepts. These should be viewed as open terms whichacquire content as we use them to order and explain reality. If we are talkingabout the direction of change, it would seem to be a fair summary of what wehave all been saying that there is a common direction, but that the differingcombinations of variables produce different routes in some broad and apparentlycommon movement through time. And while we are still exorcising ourselvesfrom the sins of our fathers who saw this trend of political change in too narrow



459

and simple terms, we at the same time are trying to explicate a more realistic andempirically based notion of homogeneity of development. Hence, our theory isturgid and suffused with anxiety. We have to be quite instrumental and secularabout these things. Concepts are intellectual instruments. Their test of utility liesin their ability to help us find our way in the real world.

The teleological error carries an even graver risk to the salvation of our soulsas political scientists. For this brings us back to the very beginnings of theideology of modernization. While the Enlightenment tended to reject dogmaticreligion and the notion of any simple divine intervention and control overhuman affairs, a more diffuse belief in the realization of divine purpose throughhuman action and aspiration was quite common among the philosophes. Thusthe triumph of reason with all that it meant in man’s relation to the cosmos, tonature, and to his fellows, was viewed as in a sense a realization of divine

purpose. Natural law notions have little resonance in contemporary politicaltheory and political science. And yet implied in the ideas of a spreading &dquo;worldculture&dquo; and &dquo;demonstration effect&dquo; is the proposition that confronted withsimilar stimuli and opportunities human beings seem to come up with verysimilar responses and solutions. It is the principal thesis of Marshall Hodgsonthat the great cultural innovations of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries gave aparticular direction to human history. While there was much coercion in thisprocess of cultural diffusion, surely much of this trend in the spread of thesecultural innovations can only be accounted for by means of &dquo;demonstrationeffect.&dquo; The &dquo;late modernizers&dquo; such as the Germans, the Russians, and the

Japanese, and the &dquo;late, late modernizers&dquo; such as the Chinese, the Indians, theLatin Americans and the Africans, wanted or want to modernize themselvesbecause they perceived or perceive in science, in technology, in education andcommunication, in bureaucracy and political association, a set of ways of

realizing human potentiality and capacity more effectively than their owntraditional ways. Even the conservative and traditionalistic elites who seek toisolate themselves from this spreading world culture have to accept some part ofit if they are to prevent themselves from being overwhelmed by the whole.Surely there is implied in the notion of modernization and development someteleological element, not that of divine purpose, but the pressure of humanaspiration and choice toward a common set of goals employing similar

instrumentalities. If this be teleology, then make the most of it.Finally, there is the error or ethnocentrism. No transgression has greater

capacity to strike fear in the hearts of contemporary social scientists. The

nineteenth and early twentieth century notion of progress and the view thatprogress was embodied in western civilization and particularly in its Anglo-American variant remains in our memories as the great moral error of western

political theory. The disappointment of these expectations of progress has also



460

constituted proof that our moral error was compounded by scientific error.Thus, all kinds of warning bells go off when we write and talk about thedirection of change. We hesitate to use terms such as &dquo;backward,&dquo; &dquo;un-

developed,&dquo; or even &dquo;underdeveloped.&dquo; Terms such as &dquo;westernization&dquo; and&dquo;democratization&dquo; are conceptual hot potatoes, since they are all bound up inmemory with the naive arrogance of the political theory of Britain and Americaof a generation ago.

This s relativistic hang-up interferes with our efforts to deal with

developmental processes. An open-eyed reading of the history of the last fewcenturies makes it unambiguously clear that the principal components of thestream of change which we think of as modernization began in the west.Certainly Britain, France, and the Iberian peninsula were the principal centersfrom which these innovations diffused. At the present time it is even true thatthe process of diffusion continues to be one of westernization, although if one isfocussing on the scientific and technological revolutions, the center seems tohave shifted to the United States. But as far as political influences and innova-tions are concerned, the age of Western European-American dominance nowseems to have passed. The pattern of diffusion is increasingly polycentric.

I believe we can quite safely use notions such as westernization as long as wehave in mind processes of diffusion susceptible to empirical study. To say that aparticular institution or process or even general cultural trend started in oneplace at a particular period and then moved to other parts of the world does notin itself constitute a judgment of superiority or virtue. It is merely an importantbit of information which helps us explain how and why political developmenttook on particular proportions in different parts of the world.

These concerns with avoiding the errors of past political theory can besummed up in the resolve to avoid being normative, evaluative, judgmental, andimputing superiority or inferiority to political systems. Can we really be seriousabout such a resolve? Surely we are deeply concerned with measuring andcomparing the performance of political systems. The problem is not in

comparing performance, but rather in the way we make such comparisons, andhow we evaluate the differences that we discover.

MEASURING PERFORMANCE

The problem of measuring performance is relatively simple for the economist.He finds it possible to sum up the productivity of an economy in a single figureof gross national product. He can also provide us with a set of figures on thevarious components which make up this gross national product and its

distribution among different groups in the population.



461

Measuring performance is not the same thing as judging or evaluatingperformance, but it is impossible to judge or evaluate without measuring. Onejudges or evaluates according to norms or objectives of one kind or another. Butin judging whether or not a political system is performing according to a givenset of norms or standards it is not enough simply to come up with a set ofperformance measures. One must somehow relate these performance measures tothe objectives and strategies of the political system’s decision-makers, therebyevaluating the rationality and efficiency of elite behavior, and to the pressuresand demands that are brought to bear on the system from its domesticand international environments, thereby taking into account the constraints thatlimit the choices of elites.

Surely this capacity to measure and evaluate performance is one of the

principal goals of political theory. Our conflicts and inhibitions about beingnormative and evaluative get in the way of this essential concern of politicaltheory. Our resistance over measuring and evaluating performance is the

consequence of, not only the past errors of political theory and our resolution toavoid repeating them, but also the very complexity of the problem of

measurement and evaluation.

Particularly in modern times, but surely in the past as well, the politicalsystem has served as the principal device available to societies for the effectiveattainment of collective goals. Threats from the international environment,failures of other institutions in the society, failures of the economy, the family,the community, the church, end up as demands on the political system. Hence,there is no single measure of the performance of a political system and themeasurement problem seems to be complex almost to the point of impossibility.But to say that there is no single measure of performance is not the same thingas saying that it is impossible to cope with the problem of political measurementand evaluation.

Let me suggest for a moment a variety of ways of speaking about theperformance of the political system. These categories of system performancewhich I shall be discussing, should not be viewed as a logically distinct andcomprehensive set of categories for the measurement of performance, but ratheras a kind of preliminary code for &dquo;pretesting&dquo; purposes. They are a set of codingcategories preliminary to operationalizing and empirical research which mightbring us closer to a reliable set of indicators of performance. No apologies shouldbe needed for this kind of exercise, but we have become theoreticallyself-conscious, and I want to make it quite clear at this point, that this is anessentially heuristic exercise. The preliminary code which I am proposing is a wayof beginning to think in rigorous terms about how political systems interact withtheir environments.



462

Regulative Performance

Surely one salient category of political system performance is the regulationof human behavior and social relationships. With the exception of quiteprimitive and undifferentiated political systems every political system engages insome set of regulatory activities-i.e., it punishes crime, it compels performanceon contracts, and the like. Performance in this dimension differs from one

political system to another according to (1) the number and kinds of actionsregulated; (2) the intensity or the severity of the regulation; (3) the procedurallimits on the regulatory activity. Each one of these subcategories can betranslated into indicators, and through the use of scoring and scaling devices thesubcategories of performance may be measured, and perhaps combined in somekind of overall &dquo;regulatory score.&dquo; Thus, it should be possible to measureregulative performance over time for a single political system, assuming theavailability of information, and to compare one system with another accordingto these regulatory scores.

Extractive Performance

Another practically universal requirement of a political system is its ability toextract resources from its domestic and international environments: money,goods, persons, services. The extractive performance of a political system can bemeasured according to the kinds of objects extracted, the amounts extracted,and the proportion extracted as compared with the available stores. Quiteobviously we are involved here, as we were in the discussion of regulativeperformance, with a large number of indicators. To combine them into a singleextractive performance score would surely be a difficult process. Nevertheless,the possibility is worth exploring. On the other hand, the notion of trying tocombine regulative scores with extractive scores and arrive at some singlemeaningful number or proportion hardly seems to make any sense at all.

If we could stop at this point and offer a measurement of political systemperformance in regulative and extractive terms, we would be dealing with acomplex analytical and research problem, but one still not complicated enoughto suit our needs. For in addition to these regulative and extractive criteria ofperformance, we cannot escape the measurement of participatory and

distributive performance-essentially the performance criteria which have beenintroduced into the concept of political development in the last two centuries.Again we have somewhat complex dimensions of performance to describe.



463

Distributive Performance

Suppose we begin with the distributive dimension. We have to be able to saysomething relatively rigorous about what is being distributed-economic goods;services such as education, health and sanitation; and other values such as status,prestige, and safety. We have to be able to say something about who thebeneficiaries of these distributions are and who are not. It would be relevant inan effort to measure distributive performance to get some notion of whatproportion of the total social product is being distributed by the political systemin comparison with other social systems. Again, without minimizing the

difficulties, it is at least conceivable that one could arrive at a set of distributiveor welfare scores, perhaps even a combined distributive score. But just as wehave difficulty adding our regulative score to our extractive score, we also havesimilar difficulty in the notion of combining our distributive score to the othertwo.

There are two other aspects of political system performance which are of adifferent order than the three we have already discussed. One of these is theresponsive performance of the political system, and the other has to do with therates at which the political system is accumulating reserves of support, orconsuming such reserves.

Responsive Performance

The measurement of political system responsiveness again involves a varietyof indicators. It is not the same kind of category of performance as are the firstthree. The first three are measurable outputs of the political system entering intoand affecting other social systems within the society and other societies in theinternational environment. What we are dealing with when we speak ofresponsive performance is a set of ratios of demands to outputs or responses. Weare talking about a set of ratios since we should be concerned here with whosedemands are being responded to in what proportion by the political system.

But participation in and of itself tends to be a valued activity and may beviewed as a demand. And when a political system legitimates participatoryactivity on the part of different groups of the population, it may be said to beresponding to these demands. Thus, such indicators as voting turnout, and otherforms of participation in the activities of political parties and election

campaigns, membership in politically oriented voluntary associations such aspressure groups, participation in demonstrations, writing letters to politicalofficials, and the whole range of participatory activities, if legitimated, may betaken as components of a responsiveness score even though these participatoryactivities are not translated into other kinds of political system output such asregulation, extraction, and distribution.



464

I have no intention of making these measurements of performance seem easy.But in this day of large-scale research resources and sophisticated researchtechnologies and methodologies, it is not unthinkable that the responsiveperformance of political systems can be measured with relative accuracy andthat some meaningful overall score of responsive performance can be computed.Thus, it may become possible for us to make more rigorous comparisons in thisarea of performance for a particular political system over a period of time, oramong a number of political systems.

Political Capital Accumulation

A fifth category of political system performance has to do with its reserves (itscapital), its performance in creating such reserves, or in consuming them.Elsewhere I have referred to this as the &dquo;symbolic capability&dquo; of the politicalsystem. Political systems differ one from the other, and the same systems differover time to the extent of the reserves of support on which they can draw andon the rates with which such reserves are being accumulated or consumed. Suchreserves may be accumulated instrumentally through a kind of favorable balanceof &dquo;indulgence over deprivation&dquo; over a period of time. Thus, a successful oreffective political system in foreign conquest, in the maintenance of peace, inthe maintenance of internal order, in the growth of the economy and/or afavorable distribution of its product, creates loyalty, commitment, and support,on which the political system can draw in times of stress or threat, crop failures,famine, or depressions. Such reserves may also be affected by symbolicperformances of one kind or another. Thus, political elites may review pastaccomplishments, triumphs and successes as a means of drawing on existingreserves of support or creating them. Promises of future performance maysimilarly create reserves of support in times of stress. Public monuments,parades, holidays, political rites and rituals, may also have this quality ofcreating reserves of support and commitment.

The measurement of this process of creating or consuming reserves of supportand commitment is complex. We know how to survey populations and get someindications of the distribution and intensity of loyalty and alienation. It is muchmore difficult and inherently more problematic to attempt reconstructions ofreserves of support and commitment in the past. Even for contemporarypolitical systems it is difficult to separate the processes which contribute to ordeplete these reserves of political capital. And yet the behavior of politicalsystems under stress, their ability to cope with crises, hinges to a considerableextent on the availability of these reserves. We shall have to come to grips withthese problems of measuring political capital accumulation as well.



465

INCENTIVES FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Despite many difficulties, the incentives for moving toward greater rigor inthe measurement of performance are very great indeed. We already observe thebeginnings of efforts to solve these intellectual problems. The recent work ofNeubauer (1966) and Dahl (1967), the Cross-Polity Survey (Banks and Textor,1967). The World Handbook of Political Indicators (1966), Bertram Gross’social accounts (1966), Anderson’s comparative analysis of the performance ofLatin American political systems (1967), and recent work on American politicalperformance (see Jacob and Vines, 1965), are illustrations of efforts to move inthis direction. The data bank movement promises to facilitate these efforts atmeasuring the magnitudes of political system performance and their changesover time.

What are the principal incentives that now seem to be directing the energiesof an increasing number of political and social scientists to the problems ofmeasuring system performance? I would argue that there are three principalincentives here and all of them have to do with improving our ability to evaluatepolitical phenomena and processes.

The first incentive which comes to mind is the development of what onemight call a cost-effectiveness approach to the conversion process of politicalsystems, and the structures and cultures which are associated with these

processes. Let me illustrate. If we have good measures of the flow of inputs andoutputs in political systems over a period of time, we should be able to relatecultural and structural changes in political systems to fluctuations in these ratesof performance. Thus, as bureaucratic institutions develop and become

rationalized, the volume of political output should increase and the cost per unitof political output should decrease. We should improve our ability to evaluatethe efficiency of different organizational solutions to problems of resourceextraction, regulation, and welfare distribution.

On the side of political system responsiveness, we should be able to relate thedevelopment of extra-parliamentary party organization to an improved ratio ofdemands to outputs. Similarly, we should be in a position to relate increases inthe organization of associational interest groups to an improved ratio ofdemands emanating from such groups to outputs. The increased spread andimpact of the mass media of communication should similarly be associated withan increased mobilization of demand and an improved ratio of demand tooutput. Each one of these hypotheses assumes that &dquo;other things remain equal.&dquo;Formulating and testing hypotheses of these kinds should enable us to specifyother significant variables which affect these relations between the cultural andstructural characteristics of political institutions and the performance level ofpolitical systems. We shall discover that among the other variables which affect



466

these relations between institutions and performance are the size of the resourcepool on which political systems draw, and the magnitude, intensity, and varietyof demands being made on them from their environments. Moving in thedirection of a cost-effectiveness political theory should enable us to take intoaccount more systematically and rigorously these constraints on political systemperformance, and in particular its capacity to respond to demands.A second incentive for improving our ability to measure the performance of

political systems is the development of an approach to political analysis whichwill enable us to say something cogent about the problem-solving performance ofpolitical elites. If we have good measures of the flow of demands and outputsand the magnitude of the system’s political reserves, it should become possibleto evaluate the decisions made by political elites using models of rational choice.Here the analytical procedures involve ascertaining the goals and policyobjectives of elites and relating these to the actual performance level of thepolitical system and to its potential. Are the policy goals of the political elitesattainable given the available resources of the political system and competingdemands for the uses of these resources? To what extent are the regulatory goalsof the political elites consistent with their responsiveness goals? To what extentare their extractive goals of the political system realted to their welfare goals?What the measurement of political system performance has to offer to this formof political analysis is a substantial increment of rigor. It is one thing to arguefrom logical premises that one cannot distribute what one has not extracted orthat the increased scope and intensity of regulation may reduce substantially thecapacity for political participation. Empirical research can tell us somethingabout how these conflicts can be resolved, and the variety of ways empiricalpolitical systems have confronted contradictions such as these, and their

consequences.

Finally, the improvements in the reliability of our data on political systemperformance should enable us to come to grips with the ethical properties ofpolitical systems. The incentive here is very great indeed. What I am suggesting isthat we shall soon be moving on a substantial scale across the now forbiddenboundary between so-called empirical and normative theory. We may not be farfrom a capacity to compute &dquo;justice&dquo; scores, &dquo;liberty&dquo; scores, &dquo;welfare&dquo; scores,and &dquo;adaptiveness&dquo; or &dquo;versatility&dquo; scores for political systems. Indeed, by thedevelopment of such scoring techniques, we should be able to compute the ratesat which political systems historically or in the contemporary world haveimproved or deteriorated from an ethical point of view.

Broadly speaking, the empirical basis for the evaluation of a political systemcan be viewed as a set of scores of performance according to standards specifiedby political elites, social scientists, or philosophers, and corrected for theconstraints imposed by conditions in its environments. I am not arguing that



467

evaluation will consist solely of operations of this kind, but only that it is

inescapable that evaluation will rely increasingly on rigorous measures of thesekinds. The measurement of performance according to standards and values willnot tell us which values to select, what priorities we ought to give them, nor willit enable us to invent new ways of evaluating political systems. But in relation tothis last point, it may very well be that the empirical study of the normativeperformance of political systems will in itself generate a kind of valueinventiveness and imaginativeness.

&dquo;ETHICAL&dquo; SCORES

It would be intriguing to beg the Sibyl to unroll her scroll a bit and let uspeek into the future of our discipline, when empirical political theory hascrossed the boundary and connected up with normative political theory. Simplyfor purposes of loosening up the imagination, let me speculate on how one mightgo about computing a &dquo;justice&dquo; score. I would suggest that a justice score wouldconsist of a set of per capita rates of regulatory acts, over a period of time,emanating from a particular political system, weighted for the salience of theareas regulated and the severity of the regulation, and corrected for

opportunities available to the objects of regulation to participate in the

determination of the content, scope, and intensity of the regulatory rules, andfor procedural protections in their enforcement.

It is quite evident that different political theorists will have different

approaches to the measurement of political performance according to definitionsof justice. But once we have begun to handle measurement according to norms inthis way, we will have substantially reduced the fuzziness of the ideologicalpolemic about the nature of justice and the attribution of justice or lack ofjustice to particular political systems or classes of political systems.A &dquo;liberty&dquo; score might be defined as the adult per capita rates of

participation in the recruitment of political elites and in the processes of makingpublic policy, corrected for the range and salience of human behaviors andinteractions not subject or rarely subject to governmental intervention, andfurther corrected for opportunities for procedural protection in the enforcementof regulations.A &dquo;welfare&dquo; score might be thought of as a measure or set of measures of the

rates of distribution through the political system of various kinds of benefitsamong different groups in the population compared with measures of theresources available and of the needs of these various groups. Needless to say,each one of the terms which enter into the computation of such a measure orscore would require further specification. At the present time, we have very little



468

experience with such a measurement problem as determining &dquo;needs.&dquo; And yet,everyone would agree that we cannot come to grips with the welfare propensitiesof a political system without systematically relating the distribution of benefitsto the incidence of needs. Our contemporary war on poverty implies a set ofnorms of minimum welfare, and these in turn are based on what different groupsdemand; but increasingly we base these estimates of needs on what we thinkpeople ought to have, drawing on medical, psychological, social and politicalcriteria.

I list these &dquo;ethical&dquo; scores simply for illustrative purposes. One can conceiveof other approaches to the scoring of political system performance involvingethical criteria. We would need an &dquo;adaptability&dquo; score which would enable us tocompare the performance of political systems according to their versatility inresponding to pressures of different kinds without significantly altering theirinstitutions and processes. Surely in political development theory we cannotescape some ethical confrontation of what we might call &dquo;growth systems.&dquo; I

have in mind political systems in which elites plough back &dquo;political earnings&dquo; inorder to develop greater or new capacities, and in postponing the immediatedistribution of benefits and limiting responsiveness in the interest of improvedrates of future performance. At the present time, we evaluate systems such asthese mainly by calling them names such as &dquo;authoritarian&dquo; or &dquo;totalitarian.&dquo;We are in the beginning stages of a discipline of &dquo;polimetrics&dquo; which will

transform our structural, functional, and cultural approach to politicaldevelopment into measures of relations in probabilistic terms. We shall soon beable to build into our theory of political development, propositions about therelationships between structural and cultural changes to criteria of efficiency orcost effectiveness to criteria of the rationality or irrationality of elite

problem-solving behavior, and to include trends in the attainment of ethicalaspirations. We shall have to escape from the shadow of our forefathers in

political theory, overcome our fears of repeating their mistakes, courageouslyaccept these invitations to adventure in creative political theory, and take therisks of making mistakes of our own.



469

REFERENCES

ALMOND, G. A. (1967) Political Theory and Political Science. New York: McGraw Hill.ANDERSON, C. W. (1967) Politics and Economic Change in Latin America. Princeton: D.

Van Nostrand.APTER, D. (1967) The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.--- (1961) The Gold Coast in Transition. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.BANKS, A. and R. TEXTOR (1963) A Cross-Polity Survey. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.COLEMAN, (1965) Education and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.--- (1958) Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of

California Press.

DAHL, R. A. (1967) The Evaluation of Political Systems. New York: McGraw Hill.DEUTSCH, K. (1963) The Nerves of Government. New York: Free Press.EASTON, D. (1967) An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics.--- (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.--- (1953) The Political System. New York: Alfred Knopf.EISENSTADT, S. N. (1966) Modernization: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

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FREY, W. (1965) The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge: M.LT. Press.GOULDNER, W. (1959) "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory." Symposium

on Sociological Theory. New York: Harper-Row.GROSS, B. (1966) The State of the Nation: Social System Accounting. London: Tavistock.HAGEN, E. (1962) On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood, I11.: Dorsey.HERRING, P. (1929) Group Representation Before Congress. New York: McGraw Hill.HIRSCHMAN, A,(1963) Journeys Toward Progress. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.--- (1958) Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.HOLT, R. and J. TURNER (1966) The Political Basis of Economics. Princeton: D. Van

Nostrand.HUNTINGTON, S. P. (1967) Political Development and Political Decay. In Political

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JACOB, H. and R. VINES (1965) Politics and the American States. Boston: Little, Brown.LA PALOMBARA, J. (1963) Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton

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McCLELLAND, D (1961) The Achieving Society. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand.MOORE, B. (1966) Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. Boston: Beacon Press.NEUBAUER, D. (1966) On the Theory of Polyarchy: An Empirical Study of Democracy in

Ten Countries." Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale Univ.ODEGARD, P. (1928) Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League. New York:

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PARSONS, T. and E. SHILS (1951) Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge:Harvard Univ. Press.

PYE, L. W. (1966) Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown.--- (1962) Politics, Personality and Nation Building. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.RIGGS, F. (1965) Thailand. Honolulu: East-West Center Press.RUSSETT, B. (1966) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale

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SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. (1937) Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall.

WARD, R. (1959) Village Japan. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.--- and D. A. RUSTOW (1964) Political Mobilization of Japan and Turkey. Princeton:

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WEINER, M. (1962) The Politics of Scarcity. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.WELCH, C., ed. (1967) Political Modernization. Belmont: Wadsworth.



Documents

007 Political Development Analytical and Normative Perspectives Gabriel a. Almond