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Matthew Resnick

11/05/16

ENC 2135-0025

Cole

The Morality and Strategic Justification of the Atomic

Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

On the morning of August 6, 1945, a little after eight, 21-year-old Eiko Taoka rides in a

streetcar with her infant son. The morning was calm, as Hiroshima was fortunate enough to not

have seen many bombs since the onset of World War Two and, for most civilians, the war was

far away. As Eiko and her son sit in a newly available seat on the bus, without any warning or

noise, a flash blinds the streetcar’s passengers as the energy of 15 kilotons of TNT in the form of

heat comparable only to the surface of the sun is released less than a kilometer away

(“Hiroshima… Bombing Timeline”). Eiko recalls looking down at her son just after the blast,

“He looked at me and smiled at my face which was all

bloody. I had plenty of milk which he drank all throughout

that day. I think my child sucked the poison right out of my

body. And soon after that he died. Yes, I think that he died

for me” (“Hibakusha Stories”). Eiko’s son was one of about

80,000 people that would die in Hiroshima that day, and

more would die in Nagasaki three days later. The bombs

certainly ended the war, as the Japanese Empire surrendered

soon after, but it was clear to the world that –in the 0.15

Woman breastfeeds her child in Nagasaki the day after the bombing (“65th Anniversary”)

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microseconds it took a uranium bullet to fire and start a nuclear chain reaction– war had changed

forever.

The atomic bombings were a particularly violent end to a particularly violent war, but for

many, the philosophy of the bombings does not stop there. As chaotic as war might ostensibly

be, sense must be made of such uniquely destructive events. Why Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Why

civilians, mostly? Did nuclear weapons need to be used at all? Sometimes the answers to

questions like these still remain in classified folders in a military archive, and sometimes there is

no clear answer at all. However, with the information that is publicly available, concrete answers

can be produced and the bombings can be understood. In the over 70 years since August 6, 1945,

it has become evident that the bombings, regardless of unique military strategy pertaining to

nuclear weapons, were morally justified in the scope of the greater war and were crucial to both

short-term and long-term plans that would ensure a period in the future without major

international conflict, a time of much needed global relief after the horrors the world witnessed

during World War Two.

After the B-29 that delivered the first nuclear payload, the Enola Gay, was on her way

home after detonating the bomb, co-pilot Captain Robert Lewis remarked, “My God, what have

we done” (“Immediate Aftermath”). It is plausible that most people behind the Manhattan

Project thought this one way or another, because estimates, theory, and predictions probably

seemed insignificant once one saw the size of the destruction. Even some of the most

aggressively militaristic of individuals were shocked and frightened by the raw power of the

bombs, as McNelly wrote that General Douglas MacArthur remarked, “My abhorrence of war

reached its height with the perfection of the atomic bomb” (42). Yet, putting aside the symbolic

implications the bombs had on society as a whole, the truth of the bombings of Hiroshima and

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Nagasaki is that they were perhaps the most merciful of all of the options the United States

military had at their disposal, to both sides, for ending the war. According to historian Ward

Wilson, conventional air attacks on mainland Japan, which had been going on since March of

1945, in many instances caused more destruction than the atomic bombs and in one firebombing

raid there were even more casualties than in either of the nuclear bombings (167). Thus, the

strategic bombings of two cities, serving to both destroy some industrial capability and to show

the power the U.S. had at its disposal, would kill many people but in the long-run would save

many more because they would be the last bombs

dropped in the war. Not to mention, there was much

careful thought that went into the atomic bombings,

and those who planned it knew very well the ethical

implications. According to Jones, there was a

committee whose sole responsibility was to pick

targets for the bombings, and even ruled a city out

because of its “great religious and cultural

significance to the Japanese” (529). Part of the plan

of the bombs was to give the Japanese time to

surrender after they saw what just one bomb could do, President Truman even himself even gave

a stern warning to the government and people of Japan, as he is recounted by Ward Wilson as

stating explicitly that the weapon was nuclear and that if they did not surrender, the country

would see “a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth" (178).

It is therefore evident that not only was the significance of the bombings, both ethically and

symbolically, understood by U.S. military leadership, but alternatives would have had much

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more grim outcomes. The people of Japan seemed to recognize these ideas after the war was

over and, for the most part, blamed their own government for the destruction wrought by the

atomic bombs and the war in general. An early post-war survey by the United States Strategic

Bombing Survey found that 35% of Hiroshima and Nagasaki residents thought that the bombings

were the fault of their own government and 29% of respondents thought that the bombings were

simply a result of the nature of war (Sadao 96).

Over the course of World War II, one way or another, approximately 70 million people

died as a result of the war, a higher death toll than any other single conflict in world history. The

U.S. itself lost over 400,000 soldiers (Halloran). Every country involved in the war wanted it to

end as soon as possible and wanted to stop the vast deaths of their own people, and every country

had their own plan for achieving this. In the end, it didn’t take much to stop so much suffering,

just 140 pounds of Uranium and 14 pounds of Plutonium, but the plan to actually execute the

war-terminating action was a monster. Before the nuclear option was considered, alternatives

needed to be ruled out. There were the aforementioned ethical concerns with traditional

firebombing, plus it was apparent that they had not been effective in causing the Japanese to

submit, and an invasion of the main islands was considered by top officials to have had

devastating consequences for the United States

Military if attempted. In discussing the issues

with a land invasion of Japan, historian D. M.

Giangreco wrote that estimates during the war

suggested that as many as a million U.S.

soldiers would perish during the first month of

the assault, more than two and a half times the U.S. deaths for the Pacific and European theaters

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to date combined, and that it would have been an operation that would have lasted into the next

year (94-5). With no alternatives that would provide a quick end to the bloodshed, President

Truman and top military officials had to turn to the Manhattan Project for the solution, regardless

of ethical concerns whether or not they are baseless.

Direct military strategy was not the only factor in the decision to use the bombs, as the

U.S. public would likely not have tolerated even risking U.S. lives if a better option existed. A

poll by the Denver National Opinion Research Center in 1943 revealed that 62% of Americans

believed that the Japanese “will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as

possible,” compared to the 22% that believed the same thing about the Germans (Borg 238-9).

The American people had witnessed the atrocities Japan committed against its enemies and were

horrified by them. Had any Americans died while the nuclear bombs could have been used,

surely the U.S. government, including Truman and every official making the decision, would

have been endlessly chastised by the public for not instead taking what they might have

considered a reasonable action against a ruthless enemy. A Gallop poll shortly after the war even

showed that 85% of Americans “approved the use of the bomb” and a Roper poll showed that

nearly 23% wanted to drop more bombs before the Japanese could surrender (Sadao 98-9).

Some historians believe there was another possible option to ending the war quickly

without any loss of U.S. life, however without the atomic bombs this view has no rational basis.

The day of the second atomic bombing, August 9, 1945, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(now the Russian Federation) invaded Japanese-controlled Manchuria, breaking a peace

agreement between the countries. Ward Wilson writes that any Japanese plans other than

surrendering “was [impossible] once the Soviets invaded” (163). He went on to say that the

Japanese government would have been motivated to lie and say that they surrendered due to the

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atomic bombs because it would be far less shameful of a defeat than if it was because of having

an inferior military to the Soviets at that point in time (164). Although, if this was the case then

the U.S.S.R.’s invasion alone would not have caused them to stop fighting, as previous Japanese

strategy during the war would indicate that they would fight until the last man if shame and

dishonor awaited them if they didn’t. The atomic bombs alone also may not have ended the war,

since “the scale of the atomic bomb was not radically different” from conventional air raids

(Wilson 169). Thus, the Japanese surrender was contingent upon both the Russian invasion and

the atomic bombings; even if the Soviet invasion hypothesis is true, the Japanese still needed the

atomic bombs as an excuse to surrender unconditionally.

For President Harry Truman, the bombs’ function in ending the war was not the only

significant reason for using them to do so. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the

United States from 1607 to 2012 sums up the post-war atmosphere concisely: “The second

maiming of Europe and the collapse of its empires in Africa and Asia opened international

relations to a bewildering array of conflicts that carried the potential for wider wars” (Millett et

al. 440). Truman knew two enormous threats loomed over the horizon that he intended to get

ahead of: more countries developing nuclear weapons and the growing power of the Soviet

Union and communism. While not officially declared, it is commonly held that part of Truman’s

motivation for using the bomb was “to put the Russians on notice with regard to post-war

adventurism” (Goldberg 118). It was not outlandish to believe that the Soviet Union would

attempt to seize territory outright in some regions and politically influence others in the unstable

period after the end of the war, after all, as historian Timo Toivonen writes, the Soviets signed a

non-aggression pact with pre-war Germany with the intention of seizing Finland, effectively

allowing the war to begin in the first place (473). Truman understood this well and wanted

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Russia, and every country for that matter, to know the power the United States possessed and

that if necessary he would unleash it. Not to mention, had there been any possibility that the

Soviet invasion would have been successful alone, then by not using the bombs the United States

would have allowed the Soviet Union a more significant role in ending the Pacific war, in effect,

as Jason Nicholls puts it, “[extinguishing] the prospect of Soviet influence on Japan’s future”

(63).

In the unfortunate event that the demonstration of the power of the atomic bombs was not

enough to deter future use of nuclear weapons, it seemed as though U.S. military officials wanted

to know the exact effect of the bombs, likely for

application for later use and for improvement of the

current bomb designs. Both bombing missions had

with them two additional bombers, the Great Artiste

and Necessary Evil for Hiroshima and the Great

Artiste and Big Stink for Nagasaki, whose primary

purpose it was to photograph the damage done by the

bombs and measure various effects (“Hiroshima…

Planes and Crews”). It is also reported that Hiroshima

was the first target for the bombs because it hadn’t

been bombed much conventionally during the course of the war, so damage caused by the atomic

bombs could be assessed more accurately (“Why Hiroshima?”).

Perhaps the most important result of the use of the atomic bombs in Japan at the end of

World War II was its effect on later nuclear weapon policy from early after the war until present

day and ultimately the role and prevalence of war in general. By demonstrating what a nuclear

Aerial photo of Nagasaki before and after the bomb (“65th Anniversary”)

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weapon could do once detonated and that not only could it be possible to make one, but the

United States was capable of producing them, the U.S. had opened the doors for other

scientifically and economically advanced countries to produce them as well, one of the earliest

and most dangerous of these countries being the U.S.S.R. This posed a significant threat to every

living being on the planet because a war between two nuclear-capable countries could mean an

exchange of many atomic bombs which would cause untold destruction and global irradiation.

Millett et al. writes that, “Truman doublet he would ever again order the use of atomic bombs

unless the Russians struck first” (445). The Soviets felt similarly once they successfully

developed their own bomb in August of 1949 (Millett et al. 445). This understanding of a

“mutually assured destruction” (known colloquially as “MAD”) ensured that as long as major

countries possessed nuclear weapons they would not engage in all-out war, for fear of destroying

the planet or at least “[blowing] a hole clean through the earth” as Millett et al. recounts

President Truman’s phrasing (445). Fallen.io, a website that tallies the deaths of World War II,

notes that, “the largest 44 economies have not battles each other since World War II” and that

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“more people died fighting in World War II than in all of the wars since” (Halloran). Although it

is a rather counterintuitive concept, the propagation of nuclear weapons, incited by their use on

Japan in August of 1945, is directly responsible for a period of relative peace that is unparalleled

in world history.

It has been over 70 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by the

only nuclear attack ever carried out, and the decision to execute the bombings still does not sit

right with some. If it did, this matter would not be a common debate so long after the actions

were actually carried out, but such a seemingly bizarre undertaking as to justify an extremely

violent endeavor as the atomic bombings will almost certainly always be the center of much

controversy. That being said, indubitable historical analysis reveals that at the time the nuclear

option was mercy for both countries involved and that ethical concerns were not only not ignored

by officials being the bombings, but were taken into consideration along the way to the final

decisions. And for the sake of the war-wear world, the atomic bombings were essential for the

short-term peace caused by an allied victory in the war and the long-term, continuing peace as a

result of the bombings’ effect on global nuclear weapons policy.

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Annotated Bibliography

Borg, Dorothy. "Attitudes toward Japan." Far Eastern Survey 12.24 (1943): 238-39. JSTOR.

Web. 06 Oct. 2016.

This article discusses the results of a number of surveys done in the United States during

the height of the war in the Pacific that concern attitudes towards the Japanese. Not only were the

surveys conducted during the time of the subject of my paper, but the article was also written

during this time. This data, and its analysis, will be important as I discuss how the attitudes of the

soldiers, and the U.S. as a whole, would not have permitted a drawn out, more bloody end to the

war, whether or not nuclear weapons were used. The author, Dorothy Borg, was a historian

specializing in American and East-Asian relations. Though she was not an academic professor,

she did publish many works and the source I have selected appears in a peer-reviewed journal.

Giangreco, D. M. "''A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas'': President Truman and

Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan." Pacific Historical Review 72.1 (2003): 93-

132. JSTOR. Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

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This source discusses the estimates for U.S. casualties in the event of an invasion of

mainland Japan and Truman’s knowledge of these estimates. I use this source to talk about the

strategy of using the atomic bombs to end the war instead of alternatives.

Goldberg, Stanley. "Racing to the Finish: The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki." The

Journal of American-East Asian Relations 4.2, Special Issue—Above the Mushroom

Clouds: Fiftieth Anniversary Perspectives (1995): 117-28. JSTOR. Web. 02 Oct. 2016.

This source covers a relatively wide range of concepts all relating to the strategies, ethics,

and data that were considered before the decision was made to drop the bombs. This source

could serve a number of purposes and will likely be referenced numerous times in my paper as it

contains a wealth of information on what was on the minds of this behind the Manhattan Project

as well as the general public. The author, Dr. Stanley Goldberg, was a historian and physicist

who studied both military history and military science, and actually died while writing a

biography of one of the key figures behind the Manhattan Project.

Halloran, Neil. "The Fallen of World War II - Data-driven Documentary about War &

Peace." The Fallen of World War II. N.p., 25 May 2015. Web. 12 Sept. 2016.

This source covers many casualty statistics, which I used as evidence for various points,

including my discussion of the peaceful period after World War 2. I also used screen-captures of

the video and the video itself as multimodal aspects of the paper.

"Hibakusha Stories." Hiroshima and Nagasaki Rembered. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

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This source discusses stories of the survivors of the Hiroshima bombing. I use one such

story to open the paper in order to humanize the distant, cold statistics of the death caused by the

bombs.

"Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombing Timeline." Atomic Heritage Foundation. N.p., n.d. Web. 23

Oct. 2016.

This source covers the minute by minute (sometimes millisecond by millisecond)

proceedings of the dropping of the atomic bombs, along with facts about the bombs. I use the

timing of the events and some of the facts to describe the bombings during the introduction.

"Hiroshima and Nagasaki Missions - Planes & Crews." Atomic Heritage Foundation. N.p., n.d.

Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

This article centers around the bombers used to execute the atomic bombings with

detailed information on the function of each plane. I utlize the article to demonstrate the hidden,

more long-term plans of the bombings to do more than just end the war.

"Immediate Aftermath." Hiroshima and Nagasaki Remembered. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Oct.

2016.

This article outlines the devastation caused by Little Boy and the reactions of the crew of

the Enola Gay. I use this source to reveal the thoughts of at least one crew member in order to

show the general feeling of those behind the bombings and open a discussion of ethics.

Jones, Vincent C. "The Atomic Bombing of Japan." Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic

Bomb. Washington, D.C.: Center of

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Military History, U.S. Army, 1985. Hathi Trust Digital Library. Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

This is a rather extensive source on the military’s relationship with the bombs, but I

specifically reference a section in which the author discusses the decision to not bomb Kyoto,

which I use to make the appeal that thought did in fact go into the ethical side of the bombings.

McNelly, Theodore, and Clark Hosmer. "General MacArthur's Pacifism [with

Comment]." International Journal on World Peace 6.1 (1989): 41-60. JSTOR. Web. 06

Oct. 2016.

This source covers the opinions and attitudes of one of the most prominent generals of

WWII (and American history), Douglas MacArthur. This source will serve to express a sampling

of how military authority figures viewed the atomic bombings. The source shows how

MacArthur, a traditionally aggressive military commander throughout the early 20th century, very

nearly became a pacifist after he saw the power of the bombs. The primary author, Theodore

McNelly, was not only a historian in American-Japanese relations with a Ph.D from Columbia

University, but also served in General MacArthur’s office just after the war ended as an analyst

in the Civil Intelligence Section.

Millett, Allan R., Peter Maslowski, and William B. Fies. "Cold War and Hot War." For the

Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. 3rd ed.

New York: Free, 2012. 440-74. Print.

This is a chapter from a college-level textbook that specifically covers military strategy

during the cold war. I used it to discuss post-war thoughts on nuclear weapons and mutually

assured destruction.

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Nicholls, Jason. "The Portrayal of the Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki in US and English School

History Textbooks." Internationale Schulbuchforschung 25.1/2, Curricula, Schulbücher

Und Unterricht in Nord- Und Südamerika/Curricula, Textbooks and Education in North

and South America (2003): 63-84. JSTOR. Web. 02 Oct. 2016.

This article, while primarily discussing how textbooks in different countries discuss the

history of the bombings, also spends a good deal of time outlining various reasons for the bombs

being dropped and various perspectives on how the bombings were executed. This source

provides some unique insight into the thoughts and strategies that went into the bombings as well

as public perceptions in the U.S. and the U.K. afterwards, which will do well to broaden the

foundation of my argument when it comes to the military strategy portion, rather than ethical

considerations like other sources often cover primarily. There is not much widely circulated

biographical information on the author, Jason Nicholls, other than that much of his research

focuses on the contents of school textbooks. The article I’ve selected does appear in a peer-

reviewed journal, however.

Sadao, Asada. "The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions

of the A-Bomb Decision, 1945—1995." The Journal of American-East Asian

Relations 4.2, Special Issue—Above the Mushroom Clouds: Fiftieth Anniversary

Perspectives (1995): 95-116. JSTOR. Web. 06 Oct. 2016.

This source primarily covers the Japanese public’s perspectives on the bombings as well

as the Japanese public’s relations with the U.S. public as a result of these perspectives. This

source will provide a unique Japanese side of post-war attitudes that many of the other sources

neglect to cover. Such a unique store of information will be useful in depicting the political and

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ethical fallout of the bombings for both the victim country and, by proxy, the United States as

well. The author, Asada Sadao, is a Japanese professor of Diplomatic History with a Ph.D from

Yale University, and has received many awards for his historical research on Japanese-American

relations in both Japan and the United States.

"65th Anniversary of Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Drop." Web log post. Amusing Planet. N.p., 08

Aug. 2010. Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

This blog post shows many photographs from just after the bombings. I use two of the

photographs, one of a woman breastfeeding and another of the damage wrought in Nagasaki, as

multimodal components to bring the reader closer to the raw violence rather than just words on

the screen.

Toivonen, Timo. "War and Equality: The Social Background of the Victims of the Finnish

Winter War." Journal of Peace Research 35.4 (1998): 471-82. JSTOR. Web. 23 Oct.

2016.

This source mainly discusses the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland,

which I use to demonstrate the land-hungry nature of the Soviet Union and how it posed a threat

post-war, an aspect of the long-term strategy of using the bombs in Japan as a deterrent.

"U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, June 19, 1946." Truman Library. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

This source is a survey of the damage caused by the bombs and includes a chart of the

deaths in both bombings. I use this source in my ethical discussion to compare the deaths to

those from conventional weapons.

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Wilson, Ward. "The Winning Weapon?: Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of

Hiroshima." International Security 31.4 (2007): 162-79. JSTOR. Web. 02 Oct. 2016.

This article mainly discusses whether or not the atomic bombs were necessary to make

the Japanese surrender. Specifically, it acknowledges that perhaps a ground invasion may not

have been a better alternative, but it suggests a few reasons, based on declassified documents

pertaining to strategic positions of various countries near the end of the war, on why even a

ground invasion may not have been necessary. This source will be crucial in discussing what

short-term strategies might have been, how relevant they were in the overall decision, and the

ethical consequences of whether or not they were relevant. The author, Ward Wilson, is an

expert on nuclear weapons theory and international relations at the British American Security

Information Council, and the article I selected appears in a peer-reviewed journal on global

security.

"Why Hiroshima?" Hiroshima and Nagasaki Remembered. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Oct. 2016.

This article concerns the decision to make Hiroshima the first target for dropping an

atomic bomb due to it being easy to assess the damage the bomb caused in that city, which I use

to discuss the long-term plans and nuclear weapons policy.