Governance challenges in KP & FATAPosted on January 10, 2011 by admin786| 1 CommentBy Owais Ahmed Ghani

Devolution of government implies taking government to the doorsteps of the public and partnering with the public but not necessarily placing the administration under the public’s control! The civil service of the country is composed of fellow citizens but it seemed as [the devolution exercise was afflicted by the obsession that the bureaucracy in Pakistan was manned by aliens!!

The Civil Service, in essence, is no more than a tool/instrument of management for managing the affairs of a country, albeit, a very powerful tool which will obviously require elaborate procedures and safeguards to be followed for beneficial results! The results obtained will entirely depend on the skill of the manager of this powerful tool. A competent and trained manager will obtain good results. Conversely an incompetent and untrained manager will do more damage than good! Pakistan’s complicated and varied social complexion and structures has given it the reputation of a country difficult to govern. The Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa poses even greater difficulties on account of the following historically inherited administrative anomalies:- The FATA Tribal Agencies federally managed via the Governor under the FCR for illaqa-sarkar (27% area) and Riwaj for illaqa-ghair (73% area) and where the Parliament has no jurisdiction yet F AT A is granted full representation in both the National Assembly and Senate! (But not in the Provincial Assembly!) The Frontier Regions (FR) nominally under the Governor but provincially administered as Tribal Areas under FCR by DCOs/Commissioners of adjacent districts! The FRs have membership in the Senate and National Assembly but not in the Provincial Assembly and yet certain parts of FR-Bannu possess voting rights in provincial elections! The PATA Districts ie old princely states merged into Malakand Division) now provincially administered under a regular district administration and police with full representation in the National and Provincial legislatures but presently functioning with a judiciary and magistracy under the Sharai-Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 (and not the normal code of law!). The Malakand Protected Area a part of PATA with the difference that policing is performed by the Malakand Levies a federal force commanded by the DCO (ie no provincial police jurisdiction!). The Kala Dhaka Tribal Area managed under an ad hoc arrangement by an Administrator appointed by the Provincial Government employing an unclear mixture of tribal riwaj, laissez-faire and expedient administrative measures and yet the area has full representation in both

National and Provincial legislatures! The Kohistan District which is pm1ly tribal area but managed as a provincial district! And also given full representation in both national and provincial legislatures! The spillover of militancy from Afghanistan into FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the aftermath of the 9/ll incident and invasion of Afghanistan by US forces and the consequent induction of the Pakistan Army into FATA delivered another major body blow to the FATA Political Administration when army authorities started direct dealing with the militants and their tribal interlocutors and the political agent/administration was sidelined and lost influence and credibility. In the process the tribes and their maliks, whose effectiveness traditionally depended on state patronage and guidance, could not stand up to the well-armed and better organised militants and, in the process, the state lost its most important instrument of administrative control and a potential counter-force to the militancy. Under the government’s current anti-militancy strategy (being followed since January 2008) several administrative initiatives have been implemented such as restoration of divisional conm1issioners, strengthening of PA’s role, reformed administrative system in PATA etc. These measures and the issues and problems narrated above have all combined to create considerable confusion in the minds of both public and officials about the current shape and working of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s administration system. This confusion is further compounded by a plethora of proposals for reforms in govenm1ent systems being proposed by all and sundry ranging from the simple restoration of magistracy to the raging debate on whether FATA be a separate province or be merged with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa! All periods of upheaval bring forth both pressures and opportunities for reform of any stagnating system The current upheaval afflicting Pakistan bring us this same message of “Reform or Perish” in a forceful way. Simultaneously, this period also offers us a conducive environment where ail stakeholders within the public and government sectors are mentally ready to accept major reforms to the system as long as it will ensure that the society is rid of the violence and insecurity that grips it. This article is an attempt to 1irstly clear the confusion regarding the current but continuously evolving shape of administration structures in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and, secondly, to shed some light on the future directions of reform being shaped by pressures and forces generated by the ongoing upheaval afflicting the country in general and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in particular. It is hoped that this compilation will give an insight into the thinking and approach of both policy-makers and civil service officials for meeting the multi-faceted challenges posed to governance in these tumultuous times and provide useful guidelines for successor governments and administrations in maintaining the pace and continuity of the reform process. It must be understood though that there is

no going back to the old pre-militancy status quo. Fundamental weaknesses have been revealed in our governance systems especially in FATA. The capacity of “collective responsibility” of individual tribes to ensure order and security in their respective areas is severely weakened which translates into the need for a much higher state presence in the tribal areas in the future. The “hamsaya” and the “nanawati” elements of tribal Riwaj, which enabled militants/criminals to find sanctuary in FATA, need revisiting. The “ld1assadar” policing system has proved hopelessly inadequate and a permanent Levy force is needed to replace it. The contours of a new social contract are continuously emerging in FATA and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. A word of caution! We must strongly resist the temptation to implement sweeping reform programmes simply for the sake of spectacular impact! Malakand is an instructive example where all the princely states of Swat, Dir, Chitral and Malakand were, at the stroke of a pen, merged in 1969 with mainstream Pakistan without proper preparation. This resulted in ad hoc and poor governance leading to public disenchantment and progressively increasing agitation which eventually burst out into a full-fledged insurgency and which has now taken a huge national effort at great cost in lives and resources to control. We cannot afford such a blunder in FATA. An incremental approach to reform FATA is strongly recommended in order to enable society and government to adjust to each incremental change and also enable review and fine tuning as we move forward along the path of administrative reforms. May the Almighty guide us in our sincere endeavours! Administrative structures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa / FATA: Administration Organogram: The Organagram illustrates the two separate but closely related administrative systems of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA i.e. one for Districts and PATA under the administrative control of the Chief Minister / Provincial Secretariat and the other for FATA and FRs under the administrative control of the Governor via the newly established FA TA Secretariat. The two administrative streams, which are still evolving, are depicted here in parallel with administrative linkages, coordination linkages and constitutional linkages shown for clarity. The Judiciary and Frontier Corps, being separate entities but closely related to governance and administration, are shown in italics. The Chief Secretary: The Chief Secretary continues to be the linchpin of the administration and performs an invaluable coordinating role between the offices of the Governor and the Chief Minister and exercises control and coordination of both the Settled Districts Administration and FATA Administration through the ACS (Home) and the ACS (FATA) respectively. Apex Committee for Policy Coordination (ACPC): Lack of coordination and cooperation (even confidence and trust!) between the political office of the Chief Minister, the civil service administration of the Chief Secretary, the Governor

as the Federal Government’s representative and the Military (11 Corps HQ and Frontier Corps) was a major handicap preventing an effective counter to the militancy gripping FATA. Feeble, uncoordinated and sporadic counter-actions failed to check the militancy and brought the state into discredit. Resultantly, the militancy bloomed into a full-blown insurgency by 2007 which increasingly spread to districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and threatened to destabilize the entire country. In view of this, a consultative and coordinating forum called the Apex Committee was created in early 2008 with the Governor as the Convener and the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary and the Commander 11 Corps as members. Coopted members such as Ministers, Home Secretary, IGP, IGFC, ACS (F) etc were invited to attend on need basis. Free discussions and non-attribution were adopted in its proceedings and no record notes were taken. As a result, exemplary understanding, coordination and team-work was developed between all arms of government which proved to be the all important factor behind the outstanding successes achieved in the anti-militancy campaign in years 2008 and 2009. Due to the continuing anarchy and conflict in neighboring Afghanistan, the problem of militancy and terrorism is predicted to persist for several years albeit at a much lower level and intensity. Therefore the need for such a consultative and coordinating forum will remain critical for effective counteraction and good governance. It is therefore proposed to give it a formal shape under the label of Apex Committee for Policy Coordination (ACPC) with the office of Secretary to Governor providing administrative support. Law and Order Coordination Committee (LOCC): The implementation of policy decisions of the ACPC is proposed to be carried out by the LOCC to be convened by the ACS (Home) with all implementing agencies such as IGFC, CFC, lGP. ACS (F) as members and Commissioners, DIGs, DCOs, PAs as coopted members. The Home Secretary’s office will provide administrative support to this committee. At present, such a coordinating forum already exists which will be formalized as a properly notified body. Divisional Commissioners: The office of the Divisional Commissioner was revived in January 2008 to restore the much needed coordinating link between the Political Agents and neighboring DCOs and to create coordination between various other agencies located at division level such as the Sector Commander (Brigadier) of the Frontier Corps (FC), the DIG Police, Zonal Commander Frontier Constabulary (FCB), Additional Commissioner (FRs) etc. Since their revival, the Commissioner Offices have proved their worth in coordinating counter-militancy efforts at the field level. The Commissioner is also envisaged to act as the first appeal forum for complaints against political administrations of FATA. It is emphasized that the role of the Commissioners is still evolving as there are several other functions and authorities that are being proposed to

be vested with them. Four-Tier District Administration (The Malakand Model): The organogram depicts the 4-tier District set-up being implemented in PATA districts of Malakand Division which was evolved after much discussions and deliberations on the newly emerging scenario and needs in the aftermath of the insurgency /militancy which, has, in truth, shaken the state and society and revealed many flaws in our administrative policies and systems. This new Malakand Model could become the model for all Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The Illaqa will be the basic unit of administration in a district and will correspond to the area jurisdiction of a Thana (police station). Under Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, the Illaqa Qazi and the Administration/Magistracy headed by an EAC will be co-located with the Thana to form a single administration complex for easier coordination and public access and convenience. In addition a Musalehati Jirga, an alternate dispute resolution body, and an Aman Committee (under Special Police Rules) for community policing will be set-up at every Thana level. The Musalehati Jirga has already been under trial for almost two years in selected areas and has proved its worth in enabling cheap and speedy justice to the public and drastically reducing case load on the Judiciary and the Police. The Tehsil will be the next higher unit of administration comprising of 2 to 4 lllaqas and administered by an ACO. The next higher level of police (DSP/ ASP) and the Judiciary (Izafi Zilla Qazi) will be co-located with the ACO in a Tehsil Complex. In addition, the Tehsil will be the focal point for all development and social sector services including education, healthcare, water supply, roads etc and all the Line Departments/Local Govt. Nazim set-up will be co-located at Tehsil level. To improve reach of government and enable easy public access to government, the number officials in every district ‘will be appropriately increased. This will constitute true devolution of government/functions! The Zilla (District) administration will supervise the Tehsils and coordinate with the Provincial Government and Federal Government departments in its area and will comprise of the DCO/District Magistracy, the DPO (district police), the Zilla Qazi (judiciary). The District Nazim/Local Government set up will be retained both the Tehsil and District levels for managing all development and services departments and their activities. The Division headed by the Commissioner bas been revived for reasons already explained earlier. The Zone Commander of Frontier Constabulary (FCB), the Sector Commander of Frontier Corp (FC), the RPO/DIG of Police and the locally-deployed Army(in view of the current militancy) have established their corresponding set-ups at the Division level and therefore the Commissioner has the all-important role of coordinating with them in matters of law enforcement, other security related issues (intelligence, judiciary matters etc.) and also administrative and development matters of both districts and adjoining tribal agencies. In this respect, the proposed Divisional

Policy Coordination and Implementation Committee (DPCIC) convened by the Commissioner is a key forum for ensuring enhanced coordination District Government / Nazim System: While the District Government set-up has been found wanting in the areas of law and order and administration but their role in the social sector service delivery and development programs have proved useful and ensured valuable public ownership and participation. An additional benefit is their usefulness in grooming new political leadership for the future. Therefore it is proposed to retain the Nazim system for these functions with the DCO in a supporting and coordinating role. The judiciary has been unable to perform magistracy functions satisfactorily. Therefore Law and Order, Administration, Magistracy and Revenue responsibilities will vest solely with the DCO who “will report to the Chief Secretary/ACS(Home/Commissioners in these matters. ACS (F) and the FATA Secretariat: The current upheaval/militancy in FATA has exposed many weaknesses and shortcomings in the policies and administrative systems being followed in FATA. An extensive study commissioned by the Government resulted in the Sahibzada Imtiaz report which made recommendations for reform and which led to the establishment of a separate dedicated FATA Secretariat under the ACS (FATA) in year 2006. In a short period, the FATA Secretariat has proved its worth by creating excellent coordination for the counter-militancy strategy being currently followed with outstanding successes over past two years. Simultaneously the FATA Secretariat is working on socio-economic development programs for this long neglected area. Capacity building for better governance, efficient project monitoring and implementation and transparent financial management are being focused upon. Results are now beginning to show. Irrespective of whether FATA eventually becomes a separate province or is merged with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, a dedicated secretariat under a senior officer reporting to the Chief Secretary will continue to be required for administering FATA in view of its unique complexities. Therefore, it is advisable to continue to strengthen the FATA Secretariat. Frontier Regions (FRs): The FRs are the most poorly governed areas. They are administered by an APA who is not even located in the area and who reports to the DCO of the adjoining district whose attention is generally monopolized by the multitudinous issues of his district and thus has little time to spare for the FR. The APA has only a small, ragtag and generally ineffective Khassadar force at his disposal for enforcement of law and policy under FCR. The result is that FRs have long become a sanctuary for all types of criminals, kidnapper and hijacker gangs, smuggling and counterfeit currency activities, illegal arms trade and, lately, for militants! Therefore it is proposed to upgrade the administration in FRs by placing the APAs of two adjacent FRs clubbed together under charge of an Additional

Commissioner who will report directly to the concerned Commissioner. The APAs will be located inside the FR area for hands-on management and their position strengthened by providing them a well-equipped Levy Force and by co-locating Frontier Corps forces. At an appropriate juncture in the not too far future, FRs may be considered for conversion into settled areas as part on the adjacent districts or as separate districts. — To be continued The writer is Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

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ONE RESPONSE TO GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN KP & FATA

1. babur ghani | January 8, 2012 at 4:27 pm | Reply

Written by Babur GhaniPakistan recently suffered through what may be termed as the worst law and order situation in its turbulent history. Of course, each event in history has a multitude of factors as its cause, but the two that can be cited as primarily responsible for this case would have to be the war in Afghanistan, and the insurgency in Swat. Being at the forefront of both these conflicts, the North-West Frontier Province is, understandably, the worst hit. This was further complicated by the inability of both the provincial and the federal government to respond effectively, as was harshly felt during the Swat IDP crisis. The province was in a vicious cycle where the government could not control the insurgency due to (among other things) a dearth of infrastructure and state machinery, and the insurgents were hence easily able to destroy (if not commandeer) what little infrastructure there was.An even greater cause for the government’s inability to deal with the situation, than the lack of infrastructure, was the lack of a clearly communicated policy and clearly demarcated jurisdictional bounds. At times during the recent turmoil, multiple agents or branches of government (like the Army, the civil administration, political entities, etc.) would be dealing with the insurgency leadership in a rat-race for glory, constantly undermining each other’s efforts and over-stepping jurisdiction, which at once not only hampered the state’s ability to deal with the insurgency but also tarnished its image and dependability.The situation required not only a better, more fluid communication of policies and directives among the different parts of the state machinery, but also the formulation of

a thoroughly thought-out and coherent strategy for dealing with a well-defined problem. This, in fact, was one of the things most lacking in previous attempts of the State to deal with the problem of extremist insurgencies, and hence, a major cause of their failure. This was especially true when the M.M.A. was ruling in the province and, well, Musharraf was the President – a chapter in our past best remembered as the catalyst (if not the genesis) of the problem. That, however, is a part of our past that we can put behind us, although never completely forget, lest our appreciation for democracy fades from our national consciousness and we find ourselves the subjects of some sort of “patriotic general” once again. Perhaps we could say a prayer every night, that the likes of Altaf Bhai never have to return to the country.Now though, is an ideal time to focus on solutions for the problems we are faced with. Simply by sincerely addressing the root causes of our problems, Democracy has an opportunity to rectify some wrongs, perhaps even deliver on some of its promises, and hence, make itself worthy of the appreciation of this nation. These problems are multifarious and complex, no one is denying that, but (paradoxically) it can’t be denied either that they are simple to solve and easy to overcome, if only we had multi-partisanship, sincerity of intentions among the ruling and a disregard for personal interests in favor of “justice and fairness” – things that shouldn’t be too hard to find in a decent democracy (in principle, at least).It is hardly inconceivable that Pakistan be a flourishing nation and a stable state with a vibrant economy; all we need is infrastructure investment towards education, health, security, shelter, roads – the basic services a state is expected to provide. One major change (some would even call it sacrifice) that we have to make in our prioritization of infrastructure investment is to focus on the least fortunate, at the expenseof our better developed regions, in an attempt to curtail socio-economic inequality – another primary cause of our complex problems. The tribal areas will remain “tribal” (connotations intended) as long as there are no hospitals, universities and industries there. I hope this is a redundant statement, but the residents of Swat and Waziristan are equal in status, both as human beings and more importantly as Pakistani citizens, to the residents of (say) Islamabad and Lahore.The following discussion is based on a paper titled “THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE IN THE TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) AND NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE”, written by the Governor (N.W.F.P.) Mr. Owais Ahmed Ghani.The Governor (referred to as ‘the author’ in the rest of my paper) was kind enough to offer me a (yet unpublished) version of his paper (henceforth referred to as ‘the paper’ or ‘the document’), with a view towards suggestions, possible objections and perhaps

some critical analysis. The methodology followed in writing this paper is reflective of this objective; most of the content of this paper is a direct response to the opinions and claims expressed in the document, or an analysis of these. Quotation marks are used to refer to the words (as and where) used in the document. These are differentiated from all other references by the use of single quotes.FOREWORDThe Suri system worked well for Sher Shah Suri, and even for the Mughals and the British, because it was (as intended) a good revenue collection system; it was never aimed at social development (albeit some might have occurred as a by-product of its design) because the ruling class was always outsiders, so that the well-being of the locals was never high on their priorities. No doubt this was consistent with the norms of the time, when empires needed colonies for revenue generation, and generally speaking, no manner of cruelty or violence was considered beyond employable towards the extraction of said revenues (as in the mentioned example of the sikha-shahi) so that even an insignificant display of civility (in the shape of generosity or fairness) went a long way to win the respect and gratitude of the ruled (not that we can actually talk about fairness in such contexts, like taxing a person’s faith – jizya).That is to say, although certain perspectives suggests that the ruled peoples of the world may have, in fact, benefited from their encounter with the cultures that have ruled them, courtesy of the exchange of ideas and technology, it would nevertheless be fruitless for such advocates of human inequality to argue that the benefits to the subservient culture outweighed (or was even comparable to) the harm and damage it caused them, or even that the original aim of the encounter (generally a war) or the intentions of the invaders was to help or profit the subservient culture (as indeed the theory of “White man’s burden” tried to justify). Exploitation is exploitation, whether it is done with a gun to one’s head or with a smile on one’s face; the only difference between the exploitation of the Sikhs (“with its predilection for banditry”) and the British (with their “reputation for being efficient administrators”) was that the former was less perverted, more sincere (even in their exploitation) while the latter was more sugar-coated and at the same time more systematized (even institutionalized).Even “wise and prudent governments” that have come to rule this area (since 1947) have hardly ever really been “of the people” (so to speak), but rather, they too have been outsiders (at least perceived as such by the ruled, especially once they’ve come to power), so that their intentions behind the continuation of the “time-tested” tradition of exploitative governance are (to say the least) suspect. After all, the system clearly favors the rulers at the expense of the ruled. “The character and needs of our society”,

even if they ever were in congruence with the policies instituted by the rulers, have at least changed (if not evolved) towards a more democratic spirit of public participation and public responsibility. In spite of the reservations one can (justifiably) have towards “democracy” as a system, it can not be denied that democracy (in a true and non-perverted sense) not only ensures social development, but also emancipation since it entails a possibility of reclamation of society for the dispossessed. Hence, rhetoric aside, democracy may indeed be the best revenge (always served cold, in the case of democracy), not only against the ‘enemies of democracy in Pakistan’ (as they might be called) but also against the eternal enemies of the inhabitants of these lands who are not very fond of the idea of empowerment for the common man, but would rather see him struggling with non-issues while the fruit of his labor is consumed by (I don’t want to say ‘bourgeois’, so let’s just say) the ruling class.Therefore, it may sound a little naïve when surprise is expressed at display of dissatisfaction over the performance of governments, “at various junctures in the 60 plus years history of Pakistan”.The reason behind the failure of reform attempts (by “both political and military” governments) is frustratingly simple – sincerity of intentions (or rather the lack thereof). I have underlined the phrase ‘sincerity of intentions’ because I believe it is of paramount importance as far as policy-making is concerned, and I think that I’ll be talking about it more than once in this discussion.Possible reasons for the administration system’s “steady decay over the past decades” might include insincerity of the reformers, the ruling classes’ determination to keep the ruled from developing, and maybe even the fact that the Suri/British system is being kept alive (on life-support, I might add) in spite of the needs of the society having clearly evolved.Political parties and military regimes are both ruling-class (at least alternatively), in our case, generally coming to rule from above rather than from within. The bureaucracy is, in principle, an administrative instrument at the government’s disposal, but in practice, threatening to become a ruling-class in its own right. If these three institutions were to cooperate, things would be much more favorable for Pakistan. But alas, these three vie for power amongst themselves, and the ultimate victim is the average Pakistani citizen. Again, as far as I am concerned it’s a question of sincerity of intentions.The devolution program had many shortcomings and flaws, but I humbly disagree that one of them was the fact that “it sought to tamper with the age-old, time-tested structure laid down by the Suri Sultan”. The Suri system is not a verse from the Holy Book, so that it is not beyond critical analysis and reform. The problem with this attempt

was that “it was poorly advised, hastily worked out and a ‘Defang the DMG’ mindset was evident”. Besides, the grassroots democracy scheme was really more of a military dictator’s pledge to the international community, that he would eventually return the country to democracy. The intentions behind the act were grossly insincere.It is a very interesting and important claim (that the rise of militancy in the aftermath of 9/11 “could have been controlled” if the civil services had remained intact) if it can be qualified and substantiated. However, notice that the Nazim system was never extended to the FATA, where the DMG remained all-powerful, and yet we witnessed the rise in militancy.Why are the “historically inherited administrative anomalies” still part of our system. That is, historically these distinctions between different areas might have made sense, especially in the context of revenue collection, administration and policing, but why have they still not been sorted out in the last 60 years. If the members of the tribes want this system to continue, it is a little unfair since they seem to say that they would like the rights citizenship entails, but not the duties and responsibilities; ‘representation, but no taxation’. If we as Pakistanis want to help them develop by exempting them from certain taxes and laws, it certainly doesn’t seem to be working since there hasn’t been any significant development in the past few decades. The only party that might havesomething to gain from maintaining the status quo would be the group that has attained power as a result of this system (although the system’s real object should be the empowerment of the common man).Here the author seems to have identified a major cause of the recent turmoil (especially in terms of the governance debacle), namely the “direct dealing” (p.3) between the Army authorities and the militants and their tribal interlocutors, sidelining the PA who thereby lost influence and credibility. As with any reform (-ulation of policies), some damage is caused by shifting focus from a long-standing focal-point (in this case the PAs).The Army developed diplomatic relations with the militants, not to probe for a peaceful dissolution of the conflict, but to increase their influence in policymaking and their relevance in the country’s political situation. Thus the actual branch of the government responsible for this task (i.e. the PAs and Maliks) was rendered irrelevant. Once more, the fiasco can be attributed to a grave dearth of sincere intentions.Does the author agree with “the government’s current anti-militancy strategy (being followed since January ’08)”? If so, they should be owned up to (as indeed it seems from the line “outstanding successes achieved in the anti-militancy campaign in years 2008 & 2009”, p.6).

It is claimed that “these measures” have added to the confusion regarding “the current shape and working of NWFP’s administration”. Is that only because of a general lack of communication between different branches of government (i.e. the policies themselves are sound, hence the “successes”), in which case something like the author’s current document may be just what the doctor ordered.The current situation is being exacerbated by “a plethora of proposals for reforms” coming from all sides. What agencies or organizations does the author deem fit as a source of reform proposals? Is the current document not a reform proposal, but merely elucidatory of “reform being shaped by pressures and forces generated by the ongoing upheaval”.Since we have a “conducive environment where all the stakeholders are mentally ready to accept major reforms”, and “there is no going back to the old pre-militancy status quo”, and the tribal elements of nanawati and hamsaya and collective responsibility “need revisiting”, and “the contours of a new social contract are emerging in FATA”, would this not be an ideal time to terminate the “peculiar situation” status of FATA and FRs, and bring them under ‘normal’, ‘conventional’ laws; of course every society has a right to live by the laws acceptable to themselves, but surely there is such a thing as universal laws (as derived from the inalienable rights of human beings, and I am not referring to the Geneva convention either).Three main arguments are generally presented for retaining the FATA system as it was since before independence. Firstly, the pushtun way of life (pukhtunwali) may not always be at ease with the British law that is prevalent in the rest of the country, for example the tribesmen hold their right to bear arms very dear. There is quite a bit wrong with this line, since the majority of NWFP is pushtun and despite being under regular law, pushtunwali is followed religiously. Secondly, since the area is sparsely populated,policing, administration, tax collection, etc. is a bit difficult, so that as far as Her Majesty’s government was concerned, they could just live their lives however the liked, as long as they didn’t come in conflict with Her Majesty’s interests. But now we should own up to these challenges, since they are actually part of the federation and the nation; we have to provide them administration (and not just exploitation), law and order, economic development, and most importantly, social development. For example, these tribal areas, because they are underdeveloped, may still remain exempt from certain taxes (after becoming one with mainland NWFP), provided such exemption directly leads to improvement in the living standards of the least fortunate (rather than becoming a loophole for conducting illegal trade of non-custom paid luxury vehicles).

Third, and perhaps most importantly, because these areas are the frontiers of the empire (kind of like a buffer zone with mainland Afghanistan), they are given a special status in terms of administration, legislation and general conduct of life. But now that the situation in Afghanistan is changing in so many ways, the implications for a frontier region have changed significantly.As conceded in the document, things have changed in the FATA, like the emergence of concepts like individual liberty which has resulted in the weakening of the “collective responsibility” element, or the abuse of “humsaya” and “nanawati” concepts by foreign militants for seeking refuge. Of course one does not advocate myopic “sweeping reforms” that would do more harm than good, especially in cultural terms (since the tribal culture is one of the last remaining specimens of pure pukhtun culture). But even just by looking at the general socio-political trends in the FATA, it is evident that people wish to improve their lot and the will towards enterprise is very much present. And why not; who wouldn’t want to improve their standard of living (not necessarily just in the economic sense, but at least in the social sense). Hence, it is strongly recommended that FATA be normalized (like the rest of the province), and in effect, rid it off the chains of mental oppression (that tries to convince them that they can not live under normal laws like the rest of us) that is clearly just a legacy of our colonial past.CHAPTER 2: ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES IN NWFP/FATAThis section lists and describes the functioning of different organizations and agencies that constitute the state apparatus for the administration of the province (and FATA), along with suggestions on their workings and some reform proposals. In my humble opinion, the following are the main issues that can be further discussed.ROLE OF THE ACPCThe “Apex Committee for Policy Coordination” is the present government’s response to the “lack of coordination and cooperation” between the major players (in terms of policy implementation), that is cited as the primary cause of the previous regime’s inability to respond effectively to the rise in militancy. It comprises of the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary and the Commander 11 Corps (as permanent members), and invites other members to attend on a need basis.As such, it should (in principle) wield a lot of influence and power. As always, power can both be abused, or it can be put to good use. For instance, an office such as this can easily subvert the will of the parliament, if its members were to collude. But on the other hand, much good can come from this office if its intentions remain sincere and both the goals pursued and the means employed benefit the people.For example, this office could act as the source of policy communications to all other

offices that are directly under the authority of each member (since it pretty much covers all the branches of government), in spite of the “no notes” policy that affords trust and confidence to the arrangement. In fact, one might even go as far as suggesting that this office itself be considered competent to come up with policy recommendations, in the mental absence of the actual policy-making body (i.e. the parliament, which is generally distracted by non-issues, like the recent ‘fake degrees’ episode), not that such policies could be contrary to the expressly communicated wishes of the parliament.As was previously discussed in the paper, lack of proper communication of policies, along with a “plethora of proposals for reforms” has created “considerable confusion in the minds of both public and officials about the current shape and working of NWFP’s administration system”. The conflict of jurisdiction that arose from the fact that different branches of government tried to undermine each other’s efforts for personal glory is commonly cited as a major reason for the government’s failure to stem the militancy early on. This office has come into being as a remedy for the situation; it could go a step further and not only remove the confusion but also save this situation from ever arising again, by effectively expressing policies to all elements serving the state.THE DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONERS V/S THE DISTRICT NAZIMSThe divisional commissioner’s office “was revived in January 2008” (p.7), after it had been scrapped by the Musharraf regime to make way for the district Nazim system. In some provinces of the country the process is still underway, but the current government has announced its intention of discontinuing the Nazim system.The author is convinced of the need for reviving the commissioner’s office, but at the same time the need for the retention of the Nazim system is also expressed. Obviously one does understand the benefits of retaining an already existing system for some(however few) advantages, as opposed to scrapping the whole thing. But are those advantages comparable to the costs of retaining the system?The document concedes that “the District Government set-up has been found wanting in the areas of law and order and administration”, which in fact is their actual job. The author does, however, credit them with good performance with respect to “social sector service delivery and development programs”. It might sound naïve to criticize the District government set-up on grounds of suspicion of misappropriation of funds (because, let’s face it, which organization or department can honestly claim to be clean), but if they are going to be hardly as good as the rest (if not worse), then why abolish the Division in the first place? And now that the Divisional Commissioner has been revived, this point seems a little redundant. Another minor benefit of this system,

according to the author, is its “usefulness in grooming new political leadership for the future”. A valid point, but hardly significant enough to retain the whole system; besides, good investments in education is the way to go for future political leadership.THE NIZAM-E-ADL REGULATIONThe reference to the NAR with reference to Malakand implies the continuation of the Sharia law imposed after the fall of Swat to the Taliban. Of course, there is nothing wrong with Sharia law on its own, and it would be very welcome if it were opted for by the people and adopted constitutionally, rather than the way events transpired in actual history. Now, that the TTP has been defeated in Swat, and the terms of the ‘peace treaty’ are no longer applicable any way (in fact, the TTP itself violated the treaty way before its fall), why are we still under the same system of Qazi courts. As the documents mention, such alternate courts are a good way of settling small disputes and “delivers speedy justice” thereby reducing the load on the regular courts. A better way of solving the problems faced by the regular judicial system of the country is to address the problems faced by the judicial system, rather than instituting alternate courts (under duress).THE ROAD AHEAD FOR FATAThe question of normalizing FATA by combining it with mainland Pakistan has been touched a few times by the author, and despite being unclear about the details (whether it should be a part of NWFP or a separate province), he is clearly in favor of abolishing the “peculiar situation” status that FATA has had under the Frontier Crimes Regulations. The only thing that worries me a little is when the document talks of increased urbanization and state presence in FATA, which would obviously be detrimental to the culture and traditionalism that part of the province is so cherished for. Hence, extreme care needs to be taken when treading these waters, lest we end up making a Pandora from something beautiful.CHAPTER 3: THE GOVERNOR AND GOVERNANCE IN NWFP/FATATo be perfectly honest, this section presents the greatest challenge to me (as a reviewer) in this whole project, which itself has not been easy, since this is really my first exposure to the subject, at least at this level. The other chapters, however, are more accessible to me since they have a lot more to do with history, political philosophy, ethics, etc. This section is made even more difficult by the fact that it constitutes a description of the professional responsibilities of my primary target audience – the Governor of N.W.F.P.Nevertheless, this does not imply that the section is beyond review, or that the author is infallible, even when he is clearly the most authoritative source on the subject. The

point I’m trying to make here is that I can not advise the author on the conclusions that are based, among other things, on practical experience in the field (of which I personally have none). For example, the paragraphs titled “Governor’s Jirgas: An Institutional v/s Populist Approach” and “Conferences and Meetings with ACS(FATA) and PAs” are clearly issues that are best understood by someone who has dealt with them practically in the field. My analysis, therefore, will relate more to logical consistency of the arguments, and perhaps some political and moral implications of these arguments.Governor’s Role in the ProvinceA major conclusion drawn here is that “it is desirable that the NWFP Governor restrict his administrative actions and public dealings to his domain of FATA and the Universities (as Chancellor)” (p.11). If this were to be the case, how is the office of the Governor expected to “take up the interests of the Province with the Federation” (once it has been restricted to FATA and the Universities), or even “represent the Federation in the Province” and safeguard its interests. How indeed, is the office of the Governor expected to create “good coordination and working relationship” with the other highest offices in the province, without violating this restriction. Why would the Governor’s office even be interested in improved “coordination and working relationship” in the province, when it has nothing to do with the province. One way of solving this puzzle is perhaps by looking at the Governors in other provinces; do they restrict their offices to the Universities and primarily “creating good coordination and working relationship” in the province, or do they have other responsibilities in the province as well.Another issue raised in this paragraph is governors sometimes being “unable to resist the lure of populist politics”, thereby “encroaching on the provincial government’s turf which invariably leads to friction”, a problem exacerbated “when the governor and the Chief Minister belong to different parties or groups”. This has to be an issue in any province, and not just a problem particular to NWFP. Hence its relevance to the topic at hand is somewhat debatable. But more importantly, there have to be better solutions to this problem, than altogether abandoning the Province, especially when it is not a peculiar problem arising only in this one Province. Perhaps we could look at how other provinces deal with this problem of finding harmony between the office of the representative of the Federation, and the province.The Political AgentThis section, again, is based more on the Governor’s practical experience in governing a province, and particularly the FATA, since the office of the political agent is peculiar to the FATA. My analysis, therefore, will focus more on the logical, political, social, moral and perhaps even historical aspects of the discussion.

“The PA is the face of the state in the tribal areas”, so that “bypassing the PA” turned out to be bad for the “image and status” of the state, thereby resulting in the state’s inability to deal with militancy in the tribal areas. The obvious solution, then, seems to be going back to the future, by “center-staging the PA” (basically an attempt to undo what turned out to be a bad move), as indeed was carried out by “a deliberate policy” in 2008. But perhaps a better way to have dealt with this problem, than going back to the state of affairs that brought us to that point (pre-2008, the point when the PA had to be bypassed), would have been to address the causes of our state of affairs since 9/11 (if not earlier).Granted, the tribal areas are underdeveloped, economically, politically, perhaps even socially. But we have to concede that we (by which I mean the state of Pakistan) are a primary cause of their underdevelopment, our criminal neglect of the responsibility to actively develop the areas that fall under the domain of the Federation. A primary way in which the state of Pakistan has obstructed development in the tribal areas, aside from lack of direct investment, is the continuation of the ‘peculiar status’ they were under since the Raj, and all the baggage it carries with it, namely the FCR (and the accompanied lack of fundamental human rights), the almighty PA and the Maliks. As I have mentioned previously, we desperately need to move forward and unshackle ourselves from the oppressive legacy of our long deceased colonial masters.The FCR, as I have previously mentioned, and indeed I intend to discuss further at a later point in this paper, has no interest in the development or well-being of the people it governs, as it was only intended to be expedient and convenient (for the British, not the natives). It violates all modern conceptions of human rights and liberties, and calling them ‘azad qabail’ doesn’t change the fact. For a more elaborate critique of the FCR, and its inconsistency even with the constitution of Pakistan, particularly from a legal perspective, refer to the paper titled “FATA: Challenges and Responses” written by Dr. Faqir Hussain (Secretary, Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan). For now, I would like to focus on the Political Agent system.The PA system was, again, instituted by the British with the same intentions – expedience and convenience. It invests all of the State’s power in one office, and that is clearly too much power for one person; not even a President or Prime Minister enjoys such power, perhaps a dictator, but nothing short of that. How is there to be any notion of accountability in such a system. But I suppose that doesn’t bother anyone when even the judiciary does not have jurisdiction there. The PA is not even bound by the tribal Jirga of elders. These things might have been justifiable under a Colonial system (even then hardly), but they are positively disgusting in what claims to be a democracy.

This is not to say that the conclusions drawn by the author are not suitable in the current framework; quite the opposite. But the system itself is quite outmoded and out of touch with current realities, and hence needs to be completely out rooted and replaced with a more appropriate system. Of course until such time, the conclusions of the author based on the current system, are (let’s just say) a relevant and apposite outcome of practical experience gained from managing a system at the highest level.CHAPTER 4: CONTOURS OF A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT IN FATATerritorial/Collective Responsibility and “Sterr Maliks”The British Colonial administrators introduced the concept of collective responsibility for the tribal areas, whereby the whole of the tribe was to be held responsible for ensuring peace and security in their areas, in return for exemption from major taxes, normal laws and the judicial system. This was not done in an attempt to establish civil rights or to provide development opportunities for the natives, but rather to absolve themselves from having to administer the area like the rest of India. Hence the end of the colonial administration and the birth of a free democratic nation should have been enough to end that system. But even if we were to ignore the malicious intentions behind this arrangement, it would still fail to justify itself under the present circumstances.Aside from exemption from major taxes, which the tribal areas deserve even in a regular system of administration (as a form of affirmative action), there is nothing in the “collective benefits granted to the tribes of FATA” (p.14) that is actually beneficial to the people of these tribes. But even if this were to be ignored for the moment, the tribes were supposed to ensure peace and security in their regions, something they have clearly not been able to do in the post-911 world. Hence even if the tribal leaders (like the Maliks, perhaps) were to speak in favor of continuing the system, the state of Pakistan would be under no obligation to do so, since the tribes were unable to uphold their part of the deal. Although to be sure, no sincere leader of the tribal areas would sincerely advocate the continuation of a system that has brought them as a community to this point in history. A simple argument against such blind traditionalism (one that favors maintaining the status quo in spite of ground realities) is just to look at where it has brought us; this system has been in place this whole time, how well has it worked?It is true that FATA is not an easy place to manage, administratively. This was primarily the reason the British came up with all those alternative administrative measures and systems, so that they don’t have to spend too much energy and resources on managing an area with almost no revenue to speak of. But the British were colonial administrators, and as such, their primary objective was revenue generation and exploitation, and ‘that is why our forefathers fought the struggle for independence’. So you would expect

things to change after the British had been fought off and we had our own independent nations, to live under laws acceptable to us and to flourish and develop ourselves without externally imposed obstacles. Unfortunately, after Pakistan was founded in 1947, not much changed for the tribal areas, since we simply chose to continue the same discriminatory and unjust system that had been instituted by our colonial masters. And how did we justify such a criminal decision? Well, the Maliks voted in favor of it.Before putting this question before the Maliks for the purpose of voting, perhaps someone should have asked who the prime beneficiaries of continuing this system are, and who benefits from the dissolution of this system. Clearly, the Maliks themselves are the prime beneficiaries of this system, since the system simply throws money, power and position into the laps of the Maliks; Maliks would simply cease to exist if the system were abandoned. The institution of Maliks simply empowers one person at the expense ofthe whole society, only because it is expedient and easy. It is quite unfair and a medievalist instrument of social control, especially in a democracy, as it facilitates favoritism and nepotism. This then is also an answer to the question about who benefits from the dissolution of this system – clearly, the people.Granted this is far from easy, abolishing the present system and instituting a more fair and just system, and it will “require huge resources”, that “may not be available for some time”. Nevertheless this is something that has to be done, in the name of normalizing FATA and providing its residents with their fundamental rights. Of course, an incremental approach is always preferable to sweeping revolutions, but the target should be actively pursued rather than actively avoided and evaded, as it has been for these last 60 odd years.Review of Tribal Riwaj on “Nanawati and Hamsaya”The traditions of Nanawati and Hamsaya, even if they are inseparable “components of tribal riwaj”, have a lot of room for abuse, not just by anti-state elements, but by any kind of criminal elements looking to commit a crime. As such, “the time has come”, not just to limit this practice to the agencies, but to discourage it altogether, unless perhaps for minor offences. These are again medievalist practices that society should itself decide to put an end to. The same applies to the practice of ‘Swara’; even if it has been practiced for a million years, it is still disgustingly shameful and just wrong.Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)I have previously expressed my opinion of this ‘law’, and not in any uncertain terms, however, since the author is trying to justify the continuation of this law, I shall

endeavor to demonstrate the inconsistency of the argument, and the law it defends. Needless to say, I strongly advise the author to revise his position on this subject.The author cites a “protest against the Prime Minister’s announcement in 2008 to repeal the FCR” as primary evidence for “across the board support (for the FCR) amongst the resident tribes of FATA”. Further testimony for this fact, as per the author’s view, is provided by “the fact that only non-resident/city dwelling tribesmen in the settled districts spoke up in favor of repeal”. There are some very simple logical fallacies in this line of reasoning. A “protest” does not prove “across the board support”, unless each and every person from FATA (each and every member of the ‘board’) took part in this protest, which is not verifiable (if not physically impossible); even if one member of the ‘board’ were to disagree, the support would not be across-the-board. On the other hand, the fact that some people did speak “up in favor of repeal”, does disprove across-the-board support for the FCR.Those who protested the repeal obviously had vested interests in the continuation of an unjust and exploitative system, perhaps even a system that had unfairly advantaged them at the expense of the rest of the society. The people in power are always in favor of maintaining the status quo, since it was this very status that has helped bring and keep them in power. It is always the disadvantaged and the underprivileged part of society that advocates change in the positive direction, change that would perhaps improve their lot and curtail their inequality vis-à-vis their economic and social betters. Hence it is quite understandable that the people in FATA that had enjoyed better economic and social status than their fellow citizens, particularly on account of the provisions of the FCR,would protest the repeal of the FCR. On the other hand, the primary beneficiaries of this repeal, and hence its (prospective) prime supporters, are the disadvantaged and underprivileged residents of FATA. Unfortunately, they probably never even heard of the repeal because they don’t read the paper or watch the news on cable, or even have a concept of fundamental rights and particularly their right to protest. In fact, I can even imagine a few of them being duped into taking part in the protest against the repeal, perhaps attracted by some kind of financial incentive, or merely a lack of understanding of what the protest really means. But even if the 6 Billion odd members of the present human civilization were to protest something, it still couldn’t make a wrong right, or a right wrong.“Graduated response system”! Please, what ever became of free will and individual responsibility? “Economic blockade” is punishing (quite severely) a whole tribe for one man’s actions; “hostage taking” is holding a different man responsible for a grown

man’s actions; “lashkar-kashi”! I thought we agreed on this; we are normalizing FATA, and that means no more medievalism. This is exactly the kind of thing that eventually leads to public flogging of women accused of adultery. I hate to disagree, but I feel the FCR requires more than “some reform”; perhaps a good kick square in the nuts, for all the misery it has caused.Extension of Political Parties ActYes, this is a good step in the right direction, but perhaps we could go a step further and stop treating FATA as a ‘special child’ (handicapped, retarded, unable to live according to the rules applicable to ‘normal’ areas) based on its “peculiar status”. Of course one can not deny the rampant economic underdevelopment and outright deprivation, and for this it deserves preferential treatment as it was caused by our neglect, but we have to stop treating it as an anomaly, a peculiar case, incapable of development. FATA is just as normal as any other area; anything that applies to other areas (especially in terms of development) applies to FATA; it is not incapable of development, the only thing missing is investment and proper administration.Expansion of the Protected Areas (the Illaqa Sirkar)Again, I agree with most of what is being said and done, with the exception of the possibility of a “merger of FATA into NWFP” (p.15). I understand that it is only mentioned as one of the two possible options, and that the author is reluctant to commit his support in favor of one against the other. However, I have to note that if the intention behind the “mainstreaming of FATA” is the economic and social development of FATA and its residents, then the best way of doing that is not putting it under NWFP. Being under the administration of NWFP is not really the surest or fastest way of developing; look at where it has gotten NWFP.TARRUCI Project – Urban Centers for Social Transformation of Tribal Areas“Walled townships” (p.16)? Walled? Even in the Middle Ages such exclusionary tactics proved counter productive, and this is ‘The Great Wall of China’ we are talking about, not some ‘puny wall of Pakistan’. And while we’re on the subject, what’s with the wall around Hayatabad in Peshawar? Are these people (the ones on the outside of the wall) not human enough for our hospitals and markets? And then we blame them forbeing illiterate; how are they expected to go to school in the first place? This is just the kind of unfair deprivation that leads to disillusionment with the society that ultimately leads to violent retaliation in the form of crime or terrorism.Land Reclamation and Irrigation ProjectsAll these steps are in the right spirit and direction, but much more needs to be done. I can’t help thinking that much more can be gotten out of the land; FATA seems to be

brimming with economic growth capacity. I understand that this is only a euphemism for being terribly underdeveloped, but that only adds to the urgency of the need to do more. Perhaps take a look at ‘the arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State’ for a better idea of a more modern and pro-active approach to post-war reconstruction and capacity building. It is like the TARRUCI project, in spirit and in terms of its aims and objectives, only much more inspired and inspiring.Don’t be afraid of change. Change, especially the good kind, the kind you’d like to bring about, can be a good thing. It is especially desirable when the current conditions are less than ideal, as indeed is the case with our dear Country and our beloved Province. What happened in the past is history, and it may be a good thing to learn from, but it’s not something to dwell on. Presently however, we are in an ideal position to bring about this change, you perhaps more than anyone. Perhaps even do something that completely transforms the face of FATA (even NWFP), for the better of course. Become the leader that people remember and appreciate for modernizing (not in a bad way), perhaps even industrializing, all in all making a completely desolate land a paradise for life on Earth, like the founder of U.A.E. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, or even Mao Zedong

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