ΜΟΝΟΠΩΛΙΑΚΟΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΟΛΙΓΟΠΩΛΙΑ …users.uom.gr/~esartz/teaching/BusEcon/Sec7.pdf · Στο παραπάνω παράδειγμα υπάρχουνδύο

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  • . . 11

    7

    ,,,,

  • . . 22

    ( , ) ( ).

    Q

    D

    D

    , ,

  • . . 33

    = - Q :

    , , Q = q1 + q2 + ..., :

    Q

    1- =

    1111

    1 qQ

    Q

    1-

    q

    1 ===

    , 1, .

  • . . 44

    13

    D1

    MR1

    D2

    D

    Q Q2 Q3 Q1

    MR

    OK

    MR2

    1

    23

    4

    Q. D1( . (Q1, P1) (Q2, P1). D2. Q3 Q4, ...

    Q4

  • . . 55

    D2

    D

    Q

    OK

    MR2

    MMK

  • . . 66

    ,

    .

    , .

  • . . 77

    1. 2. ( )3. 4. (, ,

    )5.

    i.

    ii. iii. (

    )iv. ( )

  • . . 88

    1. 3 4

    2. Herfindahl index

    : = 20% = 30% = (0.2)2 + (0.3)2 + (0.5)2 = 0.38 = 50%

    = 20% = 30% = 0.04 + 0.09 + 0.0625 + 0.0625 = 25% = 0.255 = 25%

    =

    =

    12

    2 iS

  • . . 99

    3. (concentration curve)

    Lorenz

    100

    10050%

    50%

    Gini =

    0 Gini 1

    +

  • . . 1010

    Lerner

    : =

    - =

    - =

    )1/-(1 Z=

    Ze1 =

    =

    =

    =

    2

    2

    2

    e1

    OK - T eT

    e -

  • . . 1111

    , , ..

    , .

    .

  • . . 1212

    .

    2 ( ) 3 6.000.

    6.000

    10.000 10.000

    6.000D

    ATCMC

    Minimum

    efficient

    scale

    P

    Q

    P

    Q1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6() ()

  • . . 1313

    , 4 9.000 .

    6.000

    10.000 10.000

    6.000

    MC

    ATCMC1P

    Q

    P

    Q1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6

    () ()

    MR

    Profit

    D

  • . . 1414

    1 2 3 . 5 7.500. 2 4.5 (2 .). 1 1 . .

    1 3 .

  • . . 1515

    10000

    80007500 7500

    6000

    1 2 3 4 50 1 2 3 4 50

    ATC ATC

    7500

    1 2 3 4 50

    P P

    Q Q

    P

    Q

    D

    10000

    LossProfit

    1 2

  • . . 1616

    :

    -: .

    (0, 0)(-1, 4.5)-

    (4.5, -1) (2,2)

    -

    1

    2

  • . . 1717

    Cournot

    .

    : = bQ Q = q1 + q2: TCi = ciqi i = 1,2

    max 1 = ( bQ)qi ciqi

    = bq1 bq2 bq1 c1 = 0

    2bq1 bq2 = c1 (1)1

    1

    q

    Cournot

  • . . 1818

    :

    2

    2

    q

    = 0 2bq2 bq1 = c2 (2)

    1 q1 =

    2 q2 =

    2

    1 q21 -

    2bc -

    12 q

    21 -

    2bc -

    3bc 2c- q

    4bc 2c- q

    43

    q41

    4bc - 2c-2 q

    q21

    2bc-

    21 -

    2bc- q

    211

    211

    121

    1

    121

    1

    +=

    +=

    ++

    =

    =

    (3)

    Cournot

  • . . 1919

    (3) 2 :

    b3c2c- q

    b6)c2c-2(

    122

    12

    +=

    +=

    b6cc23c--3

    3b

    c2c-21

    2bc-q

    212

    2122

    +=

    =+

    =

    Cournot

  • . . 2020

    :

    q1

    q2

    2

    1

    2bc- 1

    3bc2c- 21 +

    3bc2c- 12 +

    2bc- 2

    Cournot

  • . . 2121

    Stackelberg

    Cournot, . ( ) , .

    Stackelberg.

    . 2. , :

    Stackelberg

  • . . 2222

    b2c2c-q

    0 cbq)c(21 0

    q

    qcq q21

    2bc-bbq-

    122

    2212

    2

    22221

    22max2

    +=

    =+=

    =

    q

    , , q2 1.

    Stackelberg

  • . . 2323

    b4c23c-q

    b4c2c2c-2

    b2c2c-

    21

    2bc- q

    211

    121

    1211

    +=

    +=

    =+

    =

    2 Cournot

    C2

    S1

    1212

    C2

    S2

    q q

    b3c2c-

    b2c2c-

    q q

    +>

    Stackelberg

  • . . 2424

    .

    Cournot :

    b3cc-2Q

    b3c2c-

    b3c2c-qqQ

    21c

    1221c2

    c1

    c

    =

    =+

    ++

    =+=

    Stackelberg:

    b4c2c-3Q

    b2c2c-

    b4c23c-qqQ

    12s

    1221s2

    s1

    s

    =

    =+

    ++

    =+=

    Stackelberg

  • . . 2525

    >

    b3cc-2

    b4c2c-3 2112

    9 6c2 3c1 > 8 4c1 4c2 2c2 + c1 > 0

    Qs > Qc

    :

    >

    b2c-

    b3cc-2 121 Qc > Qm

    Cournot .

    : Qs > Qc > Qm

    Stackelberg

  • . . 2626

    Stackelberg :

    q1

    q2

    2

    Cournot

    2

    Stackelberg

    m2q

    Stackelberg ( ) 1.

    m2q

    Stackelberg

  • . . 2727

    Cournot .

    . . 1 2, 2.

    Nash 1 2 2 1.

  • . . 2828

    Nash

    (1,2)(0,0)

    (0,0)(2,1)

    , . Nash .

    . .

  • . . 2929

    Nash .

    Nash .

    1) .

    Nash-(, ) (-).

    (first-mover advantage).

    (1,2)(0,0)

    (0,0)(2,1)

  • . . 3030

    2)

    . , .

    (-1,3)(1,0)

    (0,-1)(0,0)

  • . . 3131

    . .

    , .

    Counot .

  • . . 3232

    () :

    . , ( ). 2 , . .

    , .

  • . . 3333

    () -

    .

    (i) tit-for-tat

    . .(ii) (tiger strategy)

    .

    tit-for-tat .