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Participation, Transparency and Accountability:

South Korea, Brazil and the Philippines

Brian WamplerNovember 2, 2013

bwampler@boisestate.edu

Rebuilding state institutions: incorporating both participation and transparency mechanisms

What is the “PROBLEM” that participation is meant to solve?

Institutional development will vary significantly based on moment of intervention in policy cycle Policy formulation Policy implementation End-of project-Auditing

Carefully linking the political and policy interests of government officials (supply-side) and citizens (demand-side).

Supply-side

What types of authority are government officials willing to delegate to citizens? What is the level of risk acceptable to government officials?

Key issues to be considered: Use of multi-channel forums (in-person, online; consultative, binding) Engage citizens and CSOs at multiple stages of the budgetary cycle Cover a range of policy issues (education, basic infrastructure) Interlocking Institutions (Federal, across policy arenas, multi-channel Retrain public servants and technical experts to work directly with

citizens Reward local Governments and country-level agencies to work

directly with citizens

Demand-side

Demand-side: How will citizens and CSOs be able to use newly delegated authority? Can citizens simultaneously pressure and partner with government officials? Citizens have formal opportunity to exercise some

combination voice, vet, vote and veto

Include citizens and CSOs in discussions about the problems that the new institutions is designed to solve

Build capacity among CSOs Provide meaningful feedback loops Auditing and Monitoring can be carried out by citizens and

CSOs

Range of participation

Voice: The ability of citizens to express ideas, preferences, and opinions within and parallel to formal state-sanctioned bodies. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can also represent citizens’ voice

Vet: The ability of citizens and CSOs to review documents and information provided by government officials. Better quality vetting produces more informed voice

Vote: Citizens vote on policy proposals that emerge from civil society or from the government. A “binding” vote would be the strongest form of vote; it entails a public vote being translated into direct action. A “consultative” vote might be on general policy lines.

Veto: Citizens and citizens have the authority to reject policy proposals, year-end reports, and audits.

S

2006 2008 2010 2012

Brazil 50 60 60 36

Croatia 33 33 40 36

El Salvador 33 53 47 14

Ethiopia

Indonesia 0 7 7 19

Jordan 0 27 13 11

Kenya 17 33 73 39

Mexico 33 27 53 25

Moldova

Philippines 50 47 67 53

South Korea 84 80 93 92

Tanzania 0 40 0 14

UK 50 67 67 56

US 84 87 87 58

Open Budget Survey, Participation Indicators

South Korea, Brazil, Philippines

South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-based participation

Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel state-building

South Korea: Rebuilding the state with mixed forms Participation and Oversight

Open Budget Survey, 2012Participation

South Korea Brazil Philippines

Overall Score on Index 75 71 48

Participation Score 92 36 53

Formal requirement for public participation

Exists and is strong

Exists but could be improved

Exists but could be improved

Mechanisms developed by the executive for participation during budget planning

Exists but could be improved

Exists but could be improved

Exists but could be improved

Mechanisms developed by the executive for participation during budget execution

Exists and is strong

Does not exist Exists but could be improved

Feedback by the executive on use of inputs provided by the public

Exists but could be improved

Does not exist Exists but is weak

Key Similarities

South Korea Brazil Philippines

Year of new Constitution

1988 1988 1988

Decentralization

1995 1988 1991

Renewal of civil society

Labor and student opposition during late 1980s

Mass-based opposition to military regime during 1970s and 1980s

Mass-based opposition to President Marcos during 1980s

Key DifferencesSouth Korea Brazil Philippines

State Capacity Strong Mixed: Significant variation in state capacity across regions and policy sectors

Mixed: Significant variation in state capacity across regions and policy sectors

Social cleavages Low Moderate to High

High

HDI, 2012 .909 .730 .654

Civil Society Technical Capacity at time of Democratic Transition

Moderate to low Moderate to Low Low

Current Civil Society Technical Capacity

High Moderate Mixed—Small cluster of NGOs with high capacity

S

South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-

based participation

Three Plus One Fiscal Reform (2004)

South Korea: Distinguishing Features

Digital Brain: Leveraging IT to provide timely and easy to manage information

Extensive formal opportunities for expert-based participation

Participation largely involves policy experts and NGOs appointed by government officials

Local governments, encouraged by President Roh (2003-2008), promote “ordinary citizen” participation. Participatory Budgeting is used by local governments

Korea: Key Outcome

Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel state-building

Participatory Budgeting (Subnational, mainly municipal) 100+ cities adopt; billions of US dollars spent on PB projects

Public Policy Management Councils (Federal in structure) 65,000 with 300,000 elected citizens-volunteers

Policy Conferences (Federal in structure) 83 since 2003; 6-7 million participants

Multi-year Planning process (Federal, state, municipal) 19 national councils + 350 civil society

Brazil: Distinguishing features

Multi-channel approach; wide diversity of issues

Mirrors Brazil’s Federal structure

Mass-based participation; elections used to select civil society representatives

Limited formal access to federal budgetary processes

Brazil: Outcomes

Participatory Budgeting Increase in spending on health care, sanitation; decrease in infant

mortality; Effects grow stronger over time (Touchton and Wampler, forthcoming)

Public Policy Management councils National-level councilors shape Federal policies, both at proposal and

implementation stages (IPEA 2012)

Policy conferences Holding conferences increases Presidential Decrees is policy arena

(Pogrebinschi)

Multiyear Planning Process Projects proposed by CSOs are included 4-year Planning document

(Teixeira)

Philippines: Rebuilding the state with mixed

forms Participation and Oversight

Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti-corruption

Seal of Good Housekeeping (Race to the Top for municipalities)

Budget Partnership Agreements (Agency-CSO agreement)

Bottom-up Budgeting Approach (Poverty reduction

Citizens’ Participatory Audits CSOs

Philippines:Distinguishing Features

Mix of citizens and policy expert participation

Reform at both local and country-level

Effort to empower citizens and CSOs

Participatory Auditing is important; Extensive effort to limit corruption

Philippines: Outcomes

Recent reform efforts: Too new to evaluate

Earlier reforms

Community-Driven Development (World Bank) Increased participation Empowerment-oriented

Monitoring programs led by CSOs Reducing corruption

Local level (Naga city) Increases in Participation

Voice, Vet, Vote and Veto

  South Korea Brazil Philippines

Voice Expert; Policy-oriented

Mass-based + elected volunteers

Mass-based + elections of CSOs + Expert CSOs

Vet Robust Exists and is getting stronger

Exists and is getting stronger

Vote Exists for policy experts;Exists but is very weak for ordinary citizens

Exists at local level (PB);Consultative vote in councils and conferences

Exists at local level

Veto Non-existent Exists but is weak Exists but is weak

4 Key lessons

Political Will: Election of political reformers to presidency is crucial because it creates necessary political will to implement reform; In all three countries, the president’s political coalition established the contours of reform.

Civil Society: Renewal (increased density + new actors and issues) of civil society increases attention on basic governance issues; Engaged CSOs provides necessary partners for government reformers

State Capacity: The degree of state capacity strongly affects the type of reform undertaken and the pace of reform. We should expect more limited measurable effects when state capacity is weak.

Direction of change: The shape of institutional rebuilding is strongly affected by the political and geographic source of reform. Top-down/Center-periphery reforms are distinct from bottom-up/perhiphary-center reforms.

Key Lessons: Demand-side

Elite-based model Improves quality of debate; produces more equal negotiating partners;

Allows government and civil society to check power of entrenched business groups and bureaucrats

Key problem: Selection of policy experts; Independence of policy experts

Mass-based model Expands public debate and range of issues discussed; Promotes

empowerment but CSOs remain at information and knowledge deficit Key problem: General debate rather than specific details

Mixed model Empowers citizens and CSOs; allows for a variety of venues to

participate; promotes a wide-range of actors Key problem: What is the basis for different types of representation?

Key Lessons: Supply-Side

Governments and CSOs need to first identify the “so-what” problem that participation and transparency-oriented reforms would solve.

Country-level government can incentivize improvements in governance by rewarding local governments and agencies that introduce new programs and policies

Establishing formal institutions is first step; ensuring CSOs and citizens can make meaningful use voice, vet, vote and veto is step two.

Participation can included at multiple stages depending on the problem that government

Other Participation Reforms

Community-Driven Development (World Bank): “An approach to local development that gives control over planning

decisions and investment resources to community groups (including local governments).” CCD core course

International Labor Organization Convention 169 (UN agency Establishes Prior, informed consent for Tribal and Indigenous Populations

over local development issues 22 countries have ratified

Audits: Participatory and Social

Participatory Budgeting: Thousands of cities and districts across world Citizens directly engage each other and government officials in the

allocation of a small percentage of the government’s local budget.

Community-Driven Development

Indonesia (KDP)-:Villagers submit proposals to community coalitions of nominated village facilitators. Participants vote for specific projects. All transactions public with citizen engagement from planning to implementation.

Benin: Projects selected by elected management committees and tied to ministries to direct in policy and information-sharing.

Azerbaijan: Sub-projects proposed by local CSOs, community selects for implementation. Regional coordination is half CSO and half government for information, expertise, monitoring

Scaling-Up: Expanding CDD in

Indonesia Original Kecamatan Development Program expanded in

2007 National Program for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas

Nation-wide coverage with over 5,000 kecamatans and over 34 million beneficiaries

Since the first KDP has “financed over 109,000km of small roads, 17,000 bridges, 40,000 clean water systems

Increased upward mobility in PNPM areas (2.1%), real per capita consumption gains in PNPM areas (9.1%),

Participatory Budgeting Peru

Project Context 2003 national Participatory Budgeting Law requires all municipal-

level districts (1821) to use participatory budgeting processes Methodology

National government spearheading PB well-positioned to innovate at local level

All districts form local coordination councils to implement participatory budgeting programs; All Districts form Oversight committees, which is geared toward enhancing social accountability over the implementation phrase

Results A few key districts (municipalities) have produced robust results.

Most districts have produced limited results due to limited civil society participation; Most participation involves CSO representatives rather than individual citizens

Source: A New Social Contract for Peru: An Agenda for Improving Education, Health Care, and the Social Safety Net

India’s 100-Day Work Plan

100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum wage.

Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works.

Project methodologySocial Audits: Local governments are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken and the daily wage rate; List of employees is included

India’s 100-day Work Campaign

Project Context

100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum wage.

Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works.

Methodology Social Audits: CSOs trained to monitor implementation, Local

governments are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken, the daily wage rate, and list of contracted employees

Results Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption

Limited CSO capacity

Participatory Budgeting Uganda

Project Context Decentralization initiated in 1995

DFGG Intervention and Methodology National government initiates three levels of citizen engagement

Municipal officials meet with national government; Municipal governments meet with citizens; Municipal governments meet again with national government

Projects must meet national development guidelines

Results Initial results are reported as minimal, but mot important change is

opening budget to public scrutiny.

Source: Africa Good Governance Programme on the Radio Waves

Right to Information Campaign Rajasthan, India

Project Context Local governments have control over resources to implement small and

medium-sized public works projects; perceptions of corruption

Methodology CSO Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan organized demonstrations to

pressure local government officials to release information on public works programs due to wide-spread perceptions of corruption

CSO obtained copies of publicly available contacts, bill, receipts pertaining to project, which they then compared to actual practices

Public meetings are held to show to the community the extent to which the implementation matches formal contracts

Results Scaling-up as program moved from local to state level;

Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption Source: Community Oversight of Construction

Final lessons

Key opportunities Link type of participatory venue to so-what problem

Elite involvement Empowerment Expanding participation

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