() John Bednarz - Functional Method and Phenomenology. the Wiew of Niklas Luhmann

7/29/2019 () John Bednarz - Functional Method and Phenomenology. the Wiew of Niklas Luhmann

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Human Studies 7.'343-362 (1984). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.FUNCTIONAL METHOD AND PHENOMENOLOGY: THE VIEW OFNIKLAS LUHMANN

JOHN BEDNARZ Jr.Seton Hall University

Since its introduction as a method of social scientific investigation 1functional analysis has been exposed to a variety of criticisms. Amongthese are the reproaches that its basic concept - the function - isvague and imprecise, that it involves value judgments or that it is in-sensitive to problems of social change. One of the most serious criti-cisms, however, comes from Kingsley Davis ~ who calls into ques tionthe very independence of the functional method itself. Of course thisdoes not mean that, as Davis (1959, p. 379) recognizes, "...the workdone under the functional label is poor and unscientific..." It merelymeans that the method employed to obtain these results is actually inno way (Davis, 1959, p. 379), "...distinct from other sociologicalmodes of analysis." Whereas it may have been useful - Davis usesthe word "strategic" - in the past to speak of a functional mode ofanalysis as separate and distinct from other modes of sociological analy-sis, Davis believes that any such talk is essentially meaningless today.The reason for this is essentially historical. In trying to establish itselfas a science of equal rank with the other sciences sociology had to over-come what Davis refers to as "obstacles". On the one hand there wasthe encyclopedism and reductionism o f Comte and Spencer and on theother hand the ethics and social reform of Le Play. The method intro-duced by Smith and Durkheim viewed itself as distinct from those em-ployed by Comte, Spencer and Le Play precisely because it was notinfec ted with thei r particular drawbacks.

In any event, the gradual overcoming of the various obstacles to theestablishment of a science of sociology was accompanied by the devel-opment of a unif ied sociological method , according to Davis. 3

To speak of a separate functional method, today, different from


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3 4 4t h e o n e w h i c h d e v e l o p e d h is t o ri c a ll y w o u l d b e , i n D a v is ' v ie w , t o r e t u r nt o t h e i n it ia l s o c io l og i c al s i t u a ti o n . T h e f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o d i n t r o d u c e db y S m i t h a n d D u r k h e i m a n d p a s se d o n t o P a r so n s a n d M e r to n t h r o u g hM a l i n o w s k i a n d R a d c l i ff e - B r o w n is n o l o n g e r c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e o b -s t a c le s f a c e d b y i ts i n it i a to r s . T h e o b s t a c l e s h a v e b e e n o v e r c o m e a n dt h e f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o d h a s b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e u n i f i e d c a u sa l -s c ie n ti fi c m e t h o d . A n d o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h is i n c o r p o r a t i o n c a n s o c i o lo g yc l ai m t o m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s c i e nc e : t h e e x p l a n a t i o n a n d p r e d i c -t i o n o f ( so c ia l) p h e n o m e n a .4

I n c l u d e d i n t h i s v i ew o f th e s o c i ol o g ic a l m e t h o d i s t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o no f t h e c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n t o t h a t o f c au s a l r e l a t io n w h i c h is t h e s o u r c eo f s e r i o u s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h N i k l a s L u h m a n n t r i e s t oo v e r c o m e b y r e v a l u a t i n g t h is r e l a t io n .

I IB y i n c o r p o r a t i n g f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o d w i t h i n t h e u n i f ie d s c i e n ti f ic m e t h -o d s o c i o l o g i s t s w e r e u n a v o i d a b l y l e d , s a y s L u h m a n n , t o v i e w f u n c -t i o n s as t h e e f fe c t s o f p e r f o r m a n c e s ( c a us e s) w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h em a i n t e n a n c e o f c o m p l e x l y s t r u c t u r e d u n i t i e s ( s y s t e m s ) . W h e n f o r m u -l a ti o ns l ik e " c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f a s y s t e m " , " s o l u t i o no f s y s t e m p r o b l e m s " o r " f u r t h e r i n g t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o r a d a p t i o n o f as y s t e m " i n d i c a t e s i m p l e c au s al r e l a ti o n s , f u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s a s-s u m e t h e f o r m o f f i x e d r e la t io n s b e t w e e n c a u se s a n d e f f e c t s. W i t h th i si n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , c o m e s t h e p r o b l e m o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r - i .e .e x p l a i n i n g - c a u se s ( t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f sy s t e m - m a i n t a i n i n g p e r f o r -m a n c e s ) o n t h e b as is o f t h e i r e f f e c ts . I f s t ri c t s c ie n t if i c m e t h o d o l o g yr e q u i re s t h e e x p l a n a t i o n a n d p r e d i c t i o n o f e m p i r i c a l d a t a t h r o u g h t h ed e t e r m i n a t i o n o f in v a r ia n t r e l a ti o n s b e t w e e n p a r t i c u l a r c a u s e s a n dp a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s t h a n t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t f u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o nc a n n o t a c c o m p l is h . " F o r , " a s L u h m a n n ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 9 ) r e c o g ni z e s, " e v e rs in c e t h e c a u sa l r e l a t io n r e c e iv e d a u n i v o c a l t e m p o r a l s e ns e ( w h i c h i tp o s s e ss e d n e i t h e r f o r G r e e k n o r m e d i e v a l t h i n k e r s ), e f f ec t s o f a n yk i n d c o u l d n o l o n g e r e x p la i n t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f c a us e s. 's O f c o u r s e ,s o c i o l o g i s t s w e r e a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h i s s e r i o u s p r o b l e m a n d t r i e d t or e m e d y i t b y q u a l if y in g t h e ir e ff e c ts w i t h w h a t L u h m a n n r e f e r s t o a s" a n a u x i l i a r y c a u s a l c o n s t r u c t i o n " (e ine kausale Hil fskonstrukt ion)w bA ch w o u l d , i n L u h m a n n ' s ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 1 ) w o r d s , " . . . e x p a n d t h e e f f e c t si n t o a n a c c e pt a b le e x p l a n a t o r y f o u n d a t i o n . '6 H e m e n t i o n e s t h r e e o ft h e " c l a s s i c a l" d e v i c e s c o n t r i v e d b y s o c i o lo g i s t s i n o r d e r t o o v e r c o m e


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345their serious methodological problem. The first, which Luhmann at-tributes to Malinowski, was to re fer functional explanations to "needs"which were equated with the causes (motives) of actions performed tosatisfy these needs. This device, however, leads inevitably to the equa-tion of imagined effect and the cause of its production. The result isa t autology which vitiates the explana tory power of the function. 7But if one does not equate need and motive then problems arise of theirseparate empirical determination, the logical relation between themand the empirical verification of this relation. 8 In either o f thesecases the result is unsatisfac tory.

A second device employed by sociologists in order to overcome theproblem of functional explanation was the famous theory of equili-brium which was - not accidentally - borrowed from biology whereit proved to be very fruitful. In this case functional explanat ion wasformulated in terms of systems which maintained themselves "in equi-librium" against a changing environment which produced "distur-bances" within the system. The disturbances released or triggeredbuilt-in structures and processes (causes) which brought the systemback into a state of equilibrium. 9 Here again the concept of funct ionis int erpret ed as an effect, viz. of s tructures and processes of equi-librium. But while the theory of equilibrium may have worked quitewell in biology where a clear-cut criterion of equilibrium - viz. death -existed, no such criterion could be found for the social dimension."A social system is not fixed according to type like an organism.An ass cannot become a snake even if such a development would benecessary for its survival. A social order however can experience pro-found structural changes without surrendering its identity and con-tinued existence. '1 In this sense the transferral of the mode l of equi-librium from biology to the social sciences remains "stuck in vagueanalogies and metaphors" as Luhmann says. This too militates againstthe validity of functional explanations.

The third auxiliary construction Luhmann mentions is the conceptof functional reciprocity? I This concept is unsatisfactory fo r thesame reasons as in the cases of the theories of needs and equilibriumbecause it makes the same presuppositions: the equation of needs andcauses and the possession by systems of mechanisms for the preserva-tion of equilibrium.

In each of these cases (needs, equilibrium, functional reciprocity)the additional qualification of functions in order to meet the standardsof scientific methodology, Luhmann believes, have essentially failed.The reason for this is to be found, he thinks, in the above mentioned


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346subordination o f the concept o f function to that o f causal relation andthe consequent att empt to establish invariant relations between particu-lar causes and particular effects. When this is done one not only placeshimself before the alternative of choosing between mechanical explana-tion via causes or teleological explanation via effects but he also makesa crucial ontological presupposition which shares with an importantphilosophical tradition the belief that the unity of any complex struc-ture is substantial. 12 In other words, the permanence of a complexlystructured unity (system) is to be found in its essence which was,"...def ined as an object ... which contained in itself only the propertiesco mmon to all objects belonging to a class... ''13 Any metho d whichmakes this presupposition proceeds by excluding whatever is variable,i.e. in our case, it seeks to establish constant (invariant) relations be-tween particular causes (performances) and particular effects (func-tions). By fixing these invariant relations it hopes to establish lawswhich will meet the rigorous scientific standards of explanation andprediction. Luhmann wants to indicate that the historical functionalmethod inherited this ontological presupposition from a philosophicaltradition that interpreted permanence in terms of an underlying, un-changing substance. 14

Despite these criticisms - with which he fully agrees - Luhmann be-lieves that functional method can, nonetheless, accomplish preciselywhat Davis said it cannot: establish itself as an independent met hod.But in order to do this it must, as it were, undo what sociologicalhistory has done , i.e. it must disincorporate itself from the unifiedscientific method. This, then, introduces a radical change not only infunctional methodology but also in the concept of the function it-self) s

As long as func tional analysis viewed its task as the es tablishment ofcausal laws the concept of function was interpreted as an effect to bebrought about by system maintaining performances, i.e. the functionalrelation itself was an invariant one between a particular cause and aparticular effect. Some of the serious problems involved with thismet hod have been indicated above. Rather than trying to circumventthese problems by a further qualification of the concept of functiona s a n e f f e c t Luhmann believes that the real drawback to this methodis the very attempt to discover functional laws (invariant relations)between a particular cause and a particular effect. For him the task orgoal of functional method is not the discovery of, "...an invariant ormore or less probable relation between particular causes and particulareffects ... ra ther (it is) the e s t a b l is h m e n t o f t h e f u n c t i o n a l e q u i va l e n ce


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347o f s ev e ra l p o s si b le c a u se s f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f a p r o b l e m a t i c e f-f e c t . ' ' ~ A change in the concept of func tion is thereby introduced. Itis no longer interpreted as an, "...effect to be caused, (but) rather (as)a regulative meaning-schema that organizes a domain of comparison ofequivalent performances. '7 Thereby the functional meth od becomesone of comparison, a comparison of alternative possibilities that havenothing in co mmo n except that they provide a solution to a problem. 18The advantage that the comparative method enjoys results from thefact that since it does not try to establish invariant relations betweencauses (performances) and effects (system-maintenance) it ther ebydoes not fall victim to all the criticisms of the causal-scientific version.As far as Luhrnann is concerned, the most important change resultingfrom this reinterpretation of the concept of function itself is the re-versal that occurs in its relationship with the concept of the causal rela-tion.

If functions are interpreted as effects of system performances thenthis means that they are species o f causal relations? 9 But when theyare rather understood as regulative meaning schemas which organizedomains of comparison this relationship is reversed. In this case then,"...the function is not a specific kind of causal relation, r a th er t h eca u s a l r e la ti o n i s a cas e o f a p p l i ca t i o n o f f u n c t i o n a l o r d er in g . "'2This can be explained in the following manner. Ever since the rise ofmodem science the concept of causality has been infected with aproblem which Luhmann likes to call the "problematic of infinity,"one that classical and medieval philosophers were able to avoid onlyinsofar as they tried to reduce the chain of causal connections to asingular ground of being, wether it was water (Thales), the idea of theGood (Plato), the unmoved first mover (Aristotle) or God (MiddleAges). In doing this a finitude is introduced into the c oncept of causali-ty because there was an end (of some kind) to the series of causal con-nections. Modem science, on the o ther hand, recognizes tha t everyeffect has infinitely many causes and that every cause has infinitelymany effects. This understanding of causality is the one which ulti-mately forms the basis of the difficulties that social sciences have hadin trying to establish causal relations. Of course, the ce ter i s -par ibusphrase can always be invoked to circumvent this problem. But, as Luh-mann (1970, p. 16) notes, then, "...these statements (the ones includingthe ce ter i s -par ibus phrase J.B.) do not possess any empirical value ifthe exclusion of all other causal factors cannot factually be carriedout. ''2~ Funct iona l method , however, recognizes the "problematicof infinity" and attempts a more modest approach of (arbitrarily)


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3 4 8h o l d i n g c o n s t a n t o n l y o n e c a u s e o r o n l y o n e e f f e c t a n d u s in g t h i s a st h e s t a r t in g p o i n t f o r a n a ly s is . T h e c a u s e o r e f f e c t h e l d c o n s t a n t i n t h isw a y c a n b e u s e d a s a r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r t h e in v e s t i g a ti o n o f f u n c t i o n a le q u i v a l e n t e f f e c t s o r c a u s e s a s t h e c a s e m a y b e . T h e f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o nt h e n , i n d i s t i n c ti o n t o t h e c a u s al , d o e s n o t h o l d b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a lc a u s e a n d i n d i v id u a l e f f e c t b u t r a t h e r a m o n g c a u s e s - f r o m t h e p o i n to f v i ew o f an e f f e c t ( a r b i tr a r il y ) h e l d c o n s t a n t - o r a m o n g e f f e c t s -f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v ie w o f a c au s e ( a rb i t r ar i ly ) h e l d c o n s t a n t . I n t h i sc a s e t h e n , a c a u s al r e l a t io n e x p r e s s e s t h e l im i t c a s e o f f u n c t i o n a l o r d e r -i n g , i . e . t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n o n e c a u s e a n d a n e f f e c t ( a r b i t r a r i l y ) h e l dc o n s t a n t o r b e t w e e n o n e e f f e c t a n d a c a u s e (a r b i tr a r il y ) h e l d c o n s t a n t .

A s c a n b e s e e n f r o m t h i s , f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , n o w u n d e r s t o o d a sr e g u la t iv e m e a n i n g s c h e m a s , ar e e s ta b l i s h e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f c a u s a lr e l a ti o n s b e c a u s e f u n c t i o n s a r e n o l o n g e r u n d e r s t o o d h e r e e x c l u s i v e l ya s p a r t i c u la r e f f e c t s o f p a r t i c u l a r c a u s es . :2 T h e m e t h o d e m p l o y e dt h e r e f o r e c h a n g e s t o a c o m p a r a t i v e o n e w h i c h s e ek s t o i n c l u d e r a t h e rt h a n e x c l u d e f u r t h e r e q u i v a l e n t p o s s i b i l i ti e s . :3

I I IA l l c o m p a r i s o n r e q u i r e s a p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e f r o m w h i c h a l t e r n a t iv ep o s s ib i li t ie s c a n b e c o m p a r e d . A c c o r d i n g t o L u h m a n n , a f u n c t i o n i s t h er e l a t io n b e t w e e n t h is r e f e r e n c e p o i n t a n d t h e a l t e rn a t i v e p o s s i b i l it i e s . ~4O n e o f t h e m a j o r d i ff ic u l ti e s fo r f u n c t io n a l m e t h o d t h e n b e c o m e s th a to f d e f in i n g th i s r e f e r e n c e - p o i n t b e c a u s e , a s L u h r n a n n ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 5 6 )a d m i ts , " V i e w p o i n t s f o r c o m p a r i s o n c a n b e c h o s e n q u i te a r b i t ra r i l y .O n e c a n c o m p a r e a c t io n s f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e ir d u r a t i o n o rt h e ir c al o ri e c o n s u m p t i o n o r fr o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f th e n u m b e r o ft h e ir o n - l o o k e r s w i t h o u t i n fl u e n ci n g t h e t r u t h o f t h e r e su l t o f t h ec o m p a r i s o n b y t h e c h o i c e o f t h e v i e w p o i n t . ''2 s T h e f u n c t i o n a l - i .e .t h e c o m p a r a t i v e - m e t h o d w o u l d o p e r a t e , a s i t w e r e , i n a t h e o r e t i c a lv a c u u m i f i t w a s n o t s u p p l e m e n t e d b y a t h e o r y o f so c ia l s y s t e m sw h i c h w o u l d " c o n c r e t i z e " , " . . .t h e c la ss o f f u n c t i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n ta l te r n a ti v e s .. .s o t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n s o r p r e d i c t i o n s b e c o m e p o s s i b l e . ''26I t c a n d o t h is b e c a u s e i t i n t e r p r e t s r e f e r e n c e - p o i n t s a s p r o b l e m s a n da ll s o c ia l s y s t e m s a re , a s L u h m a n n - r e l y i n g u p o n B l a u - n o t i c e s ," p l a g u e d " w i t h p r o b l e m s . 27 F u n c t i o n s a r e f u lf ff lle d n o t i n s o f a r a s ad e t e r m i n a t e c a u s e is f o u n d f o r a d e t e r m i n a t e e f f e c t b u t i n s o f a r a sd i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s a r e f o u n d t o b e e q u i v a l e n t i n t h e i r a b i l i t yt o s o l v e a p a r t i c u l a r s y s t e m p r o b l e m . I n t h e la n g u a g e o f c a u s e a n d


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3 4 9e f f e c t t h i s m e a n s t h a t a f u n c t i o n is n o t f u lf f il e d w h e n o n e d i sc o v e rst h a t A c a u s e s B b u t w h e n o n e d i sc o v e rs t h a t A , C , D , e tc . a r e e q u i v a l e n ti n t h e i r ab i l i t y t o c au s e B . :8

I t c a n b e a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , th a t t hi s m e t h o d s til l d o e s n o t m e e t t h em e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s c i e n c e : e x p l a n a t i o n a n d p r e d i c t i o n .L u h m a n n r e c o g n i z e s t hi s. H e a d m i t s ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 6) t h a t , c o n s i d e r e da b s t r a c t l y , " T h e r e f e r e n c e p r o b l e m s o b v i o us l y d o n o t " e x p l a i n " t h ef a c t u a l o c c u r r e n c e o f d e t e r m i n a t e p e r f o r m a n c e s . T h e y h a v e p r e c i s e l yt h e o p p o s i t e m e a n i n g : t o r e f e r t o o t h e r p o s s ib i li ti e s . ''2 9 T h i s is al sot h e r e a s o n t h a t h e c a n s a y ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 8 ) t h a t , " T h e v a l i d it y o f f u n c t i o n -a l a n a l y si s d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n w h e t h e r i n t h e i n d iv i d u a l c a s e t h e p r o b -l e m is s o l v e d , t h e e f f e c t o c c u r s , t h e s y s t e m c o n t i n u e s t o e x i s t . ' '3 N e v e r t h e l e s s , e x p l a n a t i o n a n d p r e d i c t i o n a r e p o s si b le w i t h i n t h e c o n -t e x t o f c o m p a r a t iv e f u n c t io n a l m e t h o d w i t h t h e r e a l i z a ti o n th a t , " . . .as y s t e m m u s t s o lv e s e v e ra l p r o b l e m s . ' '3 1 T h i s r e a l iz a t i o n c o m e s a b o u t ,h o w e v e r , o n l y a f t e r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a t h e o r y w h i c h w ill m e e t t h em e t h o d o l o g i c a l n e e d s o f f u n c t i o n a l a n al ys is . A c c o r d i n g t o L u h m a n nt h is i s a s y s t e m s - t h e o r y f o r w h i c h c a u s e s a n d e f f e c t s , a s f u n c t i o n a lv i e w p o i n t s , b e c o m e p r o b le m s , n I t t h e n b e c o m e s th e t a s k o f f u n c t io n a la n a l y s is t o t r y t o f i n d d i f f e r e n t p o s s ib l e s y s t e m p e r f o r m a n c e s w h i c hc a n s e r v e as s o l u t io n s t o t h e p r o b l e m - i .e . r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f c o m -p a r i s o n - i n q u e s t io n . L u h m a n n ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 4 1 ) , h o w e v e r , is q u i c k t oa d m o n i s h , " . . .t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e d p r o b l em s . . . a re n o t s i m p l y i d e n ti c a lw i t h t h e f u n c t i o n a l r e f e r e n c e - p r o b l e m s . '3 3 T h e r e a s o n f o r th i s is t h a tt h e s e l e c t i o n o f a n y o f t h e po s si bl e s o l u ti o n s in d i c a t e d b y t h e r e f e r e n c ep r o b l e m b ri ng s w i th i t u n f o r e s e e n c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h a p p e a r a s n e wp r o b l e m s o n d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m le ve ls . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e s o l u t i o n o fo n e p r o b l e m - o r b e t t e r y e t , o n o n e s y s t e m le v e l - c r e a t e s f u r t h e rp r o b l e m s o n o t h e r le v els . A l l s y s t e m p r o b l e m s c a n n e v e r d e f i n i ti v e l yb e s o l v e d . L u h m a n n r e f e r s t o t h i s s t a t e o f a f fa i rs a s t h e p e rm a n e n c e o fp ro b l e m s . T h e l a tt e r, h o w e v e r , s h o u ld n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a d e f e c tw i t h i n s y s t e m s n o r a s a n e m b a r r a s s m e n t f o r s y s t e m s - t h e o r y . It is , i nf a c t , v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h e re o t ic a U y , a n d f o r m o r e t h a n j u s t o n e r e a s o n .O n t h e o n e h a n d i t m e a n s t h a t t h e p e r m a n e n c e o f a s y s t e m , 3a " .. .i sn o t s u i t a b le a s r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r f u n c t i o n a l i s t a n a ly s is , '3 s f o r w i t ht h e u n c o v e r i n g o f e v e r n e w s y s te m p r o b le m s n e w s y s t e m p e r f o rm a n c e sa r e c o n n e c t e d t o g e t h e r in t o d i f f e r e n t s t r u c tu r e s p e r m i t t i n g t h e s y s t e mt o u n d e r g o p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s w i t h o u t s u r r e n d e ri n g i ts i d e n t i t y ? 6A n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , th e p e r m a n e n c e o f p r o b le m s - o n d if f e re n tl ev e ls - m a k e s e x p l a n a t i o n a n d p r e d i c t i o n p o ss ib l e b e c a u s e n o t a llf u n c t i o n a l l y e q u i v a le n t p r o b l e m s o lu t io n s a r e e u f u n c t i o n a l w i t h re g a r d


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350to problems on o ther system levels. Indeed only very few - eventuall yonly one - will have the fewest dysfunc tional consequences. The seare the ones which are the best or most likely to occur and in terms ofwhich explanation and prediction occur.Of course, all of this requires concrete analysis for, "Which valuesbelong to such a funct ional class or variable is a matter of empiricalknowledge and by no means arises out of the formulation of thereference point. ''37 The reference point (problem) however does guidethe investigation for these values and provides a criterion for their in-clusion in the class. Again, analysis reveals the subsequent problemsarising from the insertion of one value (solution) and thereby con-tributes to the narrowing of the members of this class to those - orthe one - which are (is) least dysfunctional. Explanat ion and pred ic-tion then become possible within the context of functional analysis.

Luhmann illustrates what is meant here with the case of role con-flicts in social systems.38 Role conflicts, considered abstractly, can besolved in any number of ways. The different ways are the alternativepossible solutions to the reference problem. Yet since the alternativepossibilities are functionally equivalent it would seem that the resultsthis method could yield would be, at best, ambiguous because, simplyfrom the point of view of the problem (role conflicts), there wouldbe no way to choose between the various possible solutions. But whena particular concrete system is analysed by means of the comparativemethod the flexibility in the selection of the various possible alterna-tive solutions of the refe rence problem is greatly reduced. Take the caseof the solution of role conflicts in a large bureaucracy and in a smallfamily. Although the possible solutions, considered abstractly -- i.e.with out regard to any particular system - remain the same for bot hlarge bureaucracy and small family, the o the r problems these respectivesystems have to solve restricts the choice in the solution to the prob lemof role conflicts.

The institutionalization of precedence claims and the separation ofpersons and situations which might occasion conflicting behavior areamong the functionally equivalent solutions to the problem of roleconflict in social systems. But while the separation of persons andsituations which might occasion conflicting behavior is a genuine pos-sibility in the case of large bureaucracies this solution comes into con-flict with another problem which exists only for intimate groups:communicative openness without any restrictions concerning whatcan be discussed. According to Luhmann, then, small families willtend to solve their problems of role conflicts by means of pr ecede nce


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351claims, especially in the form of vocational roles. Otherwise the prob-lems that arise through the separation of persons and situations - theneglect of communicative openness and its subsequent personalitystrain - would have to be compensated in some other way.

The restriction of choices among possible alternative solutions tothe reference problem - condit ioned by the other problems a socialsystem must solve - permits a prediction of which alternative thesystem will select. Only because of this preditability does Luhmann(1970, p. 18) believe that, "...a problem can function as the basis ofan explanation and as the valid ground o f an analysis. '39 Funct ionalanalysis can, therefore, meet the methodological requirements ofscience as long as it is not considered abstract ly.

IVWhat has been said so far has been in preparation for a presentationof aspects of Luhmann's interpretation of functional method whichcome very close to certain phenomenological investigations of the laterHussefl and Schutz. The similarity is most clearly exhibited in theconcepts of "probl em" and "alternative possibility".

We have already seen that an integral - perhaps the essential - con-cept in the comparative functional method is the reference-pointfrom which alternative possibilities can be compared. Without thisthere can be no comparison and therefore no comparative functionalmethod. We have also seen that, for Luhmann, this reference-pointassumes the form of a problem for which the alternative possibilitiesare, then, solutions. Given this presentation we can see in Husserl'slater writings - particularly Erfahrung und Urteil - a close4 similarityin his thinking between the concepts of "problem" and "alternativepossibilities". The similarity comes out most clearly in Erfahrung undUrteil section 21 where Husserl explains the difference between prob-lematic and open possibility. 41

In investigating the origin of dif feren t modes o f predicative judg-ments (certainty, possibility, probability) in pre-predicative experienceHusserl makes use of the distinction between open and problematicpossibilities. These are two entirely dif fer ent modes of possibility forwhich the modalizing consciousness, in each case, has a basically differ-ent origin: in the case of open possibility naive certainty and in thecase of problematic possibility doubt.

It is part of the intentional structure of consciousness according to


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3 5 2H u s s e r l t h a t i n t h e p e r c e p t u a l f i e ld o b j e c t s p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s o n l yp e r s p ec t iv a l ly . E a c h o n e o f t h e se p e rs p e c ti v e s ( p e r c e p t u a l n o e r n a t a ) ,h o w e v e r , c a rr ie s w i t h i t a h o r i z o n o f c o - i n t e n d e d p e r s p e c ti v e s ( a n t i c i p a -t i o n s ) o f t h o s e s id e s w h i c h ar e n o t a c t u a l l y p e r c e iv e d . M o r e o v e r , e a c ho n e o f t h e s e p e r sp e c t iv e s - s u c h a s t h e b a c k o f th e s p h e r e a t w h i c h Ia m n o w l o o k i n g - is c o - i n t e n d e d e m p t i l y , i .e . i n d e t e r m i n a t e l y b u t , a tt h e s a m e t i m e , w i t h a n ai v e c e r t a i n t y . I a n t ic i p a t e , w i t h n a iv e c e r t a i n t y ,t h a t t h e o b j e c t w h i c h I a m n o w p e r c e i v i n g w i ll e v i n c e a b a c k - s i d es o m e w h a t i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e f r o n t -s i d e a n d p os s e ss i ng s o m e c o l o r .F o r i n s t a n c e , i f t h e o b j e c t w h i c h I a m p e r c e iv i n g is a s p h e re I a n t i c i p a t e ,w i t h n a i v e c e r t a i n t y , t h a t t h e b a c k - s id e , p e r h a p s , w i ll b e li k e t h e f r o n t -s i d e in s h a p e a n d s iz e a n d t h a t i t w i l l b e c o l o r e d . S i n c e I h a v e n e v e rs e e n t h i s o b j e c t b e f o r e I d o n o t know w h a t t h e b a c k -s id e o f t h e o b j e c ti s l ik e . 42 I t m a y b e s p h e r i c a l li k e t h e f r o n t w h i c h I a m a c t u a l l y p e r -c e iv i ng o r it m a y b e d e f o r m e d in s o m e w a y . I t m a y b e o f t h e s a m ec o l o r a s t h e f r o n t o r o f a d i f f e r e n t co l o r. M y n a iv e a n t i c i p a t io n s , w h i c ha r e g i v e n i n i m a g i n a t i v e p r e s e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , can b e d i s a p p o i n t e d- f o r i n s t a n c e , w h e n I g o a r o u n d t h e s p h e r e a n d s e e t h a t i t i s i n f a c td e f o r m e d . I t is c e r t a in , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e n a i ve l y a n t i c i p a t e d b a c k - s i d eo f t h e s p h e r e w i l l b e o f some s h a p e a n d some c o l o r w h i c h is o t h e r w i s ec o m p l e t e l y u n s p e c i f ie d b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e i n te n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r eo f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . A n y p o s s i b l e s h a p e a n d a n y p o s s i b l e c o l o r c a n m e e tt h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s . I c a n i m a g i n e t h e b a c k -s i de a s u n i f o r m l y s p h e r i c a lo r o f a n y i r r e g u l a r s h a p e . C o r r e l a t i v e ly I c a n i m a g i n e t h e b a c k - s i d e a so f t h e s a m e c o l o r a s t h e f r o n t o r o f a n y o t h e r c o lo r . T h e s e p o s s ib i l it i e s- o f s h a p e a n d c o l o r - a r e, th e r e f o r e , r e f e r r e d to b y H u s s e r l a s " o p e n " ,i .e . c o m p l e t e l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e w i t h i n a d e l i m i t e d h o r iz o n .

T h i s n o t i o n o f o p e n p o s si b il it y ca n b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o w h a t H u s s e rlc a l l s p r o b l e m a t i c p o s s i b i l i t y w h e n t h e n a i v e c e r t a i n t y w h i c h o r d i n a r i l ya c c o m p a n i e s p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e g iv es w a y t o d o u b t .

D o u b t a n d n a iv e c e r t a in t y a r e c o m p l e t e l y d i f fe r e n t m o d a l i z a t i o n so f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n w h i c h p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e g i v e n . B u t b e c a u s e o f t h er a d ic a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m t h e p o s s i bi li ti e s t h e y p r e s e n t a r e o f a ne n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d . W e h a v e j u s t s e e n h o w t h e p o s s i b i l it i e s g i v e ni n n a iv e c e r t a i n t y a re " o p e n " , i. e. c o m p l e t e l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e . D o u b t ,h o w e v e r , c h a n g e s t h is s i t u a t i o n s i g n if i ca n t ly . I n e f f e c t , it r e m o v e s t h ei n d e t e r m i n a c y f r o m t h e o p e n p o s si bi li ti es b y i m p o s i n g a s t ru c t u r e u p o nt h e m , u n i f y i n g t h e m a s o p p o s i n g a lt e rn a t iv e s .

N o r m a l p e r c e p t i o n o p e r a t e s in t h e m o d e o f n a iv e c e r t a i n t y u n t i lt h e o p e n p o s s i b i l it y w h i c h is i m a g i n a ti v e ly p r e s e n t i fi e d is d i s a p p o i n t e di n a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . P e r h a p s I g o a r o u n d t h e o b j e c t a n d s e e t h a t t h e


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3 5 3b a c k - s i d e is n o t a s I h a d a n t i c i p a te d . I n th i s c a s e m y a n t i c i p a t i o n - m yi m a g i n a t i v e l y p r e s e n t i f i e d o p e n p o s s i b i l it y - i s c a n c e l l e d , " c r o s s e d -o u t " a s H u s s e r l s ay s , b y th e a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n o f th e b a c k - s id e w h i c hd i f f e rs f r o m m y a n t i c i p a t i o n i n s o m e w a y . I t is o u t o f t h is c a n c e l l a t i o nt h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f n e g a t i o n a r is e s, a c c o r d i n g t o H u s s e rl . T h e o b j e c tis not u n i f o r m l y c o l o r e d a s I h a d a n t i c i p a te d . A n e w p e r c e p t u a l m e a n -i n g s u p e r s e d e s t h e o n e t h a t I h a d a n t i c i p a t e d .

A c c o r d i n g t o H u s s er l, n a iv e c e r t a i n t y a n d n e g a t i o n p r e s e n t t h e m -s elv es as t w o e x t r e m e m o d a l i z a t io n s o f p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e b e t w e e nw h i c h f all s t h e t r a n s it io n a l m o d e o f d o u b t . *3 I n t h e c a s e o f d o u b tp e r c e p t i o n d o e s n o t p r o c e e d w i t h n ai ve c e r t a i n ty b u t n e i t h e r is m ya n t i c i p a t i o n c o m p l e t e l y c a n c e ll e d . P e r c e p t i o n , a s i t w e r e , is c a u g h t b e -t w e e n t h e s e t w o a n d c a n n o t , f o r th e m o m e n t , d e c i d e. H u s s er l - a n dl a t e r S c h u t z 44 - - i l lu s t r a te s w h a t h e m e a n s i n th i s c a s e w i t h t h e e x a m -p le o f a n o b s e r ve r s t an d i n g b e f o r e a d e p a r t m e n t s t o r e w i n d o w . I n s id et h e w i n d o w is a d i s p la y o f a f g u r e . A t f ir st , p e r c e p t i o n p r o c e e d sn o r m a l l y - i .e . i n th e m o d e o f n a i ve c e r t a i n t y - a n d th e o b s e r v e r s e esa h u m a n b e i n g in th e w i n d o w , n o d o u b t a n e m p l o y e e o f t h e s to r e.B u t t h e n a d o u b t a ri se s f o r t h e o b s e r v e r . I s t h is r e a ll y a h u m a n b e i n gi n t h e w i n d o w o r m e r e l y a m a n n e q u i n ? N o r m a l p e r c e p t io n u n d e r g o e sa c h a n g e o f m o d a l i z a t i o n a t t h i s p o i n t , a c c o r d i n g t o H u s s e rl . M y a n ti c i-p a t i o n s n o l o n g e r p r o c e e d w i t h n ai ve c e r ta i n t y . B u t t h e y a r e n o t s i m p l yc a n c e l l e d e i t h e r . R a t h e r , a s H u s se r l s a ys , a n e w c o n t e n t o r i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n (Gehalt) is s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n t h e s e n s e d a t a 4s w h i c h r e m a i ni d e n t i c a l f o r b o t h t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e h u m a n b e i n g a n d t h e p e r c e p -o f t h e m a n n e q u i n . T h e p r o b l e m f o r c o n s c io u s n e ss r e si de s h e r e in th ep r e s e n c e o f t w o c o m p e t i n g i n te r p r e t a ti o n s . O f c o u r se , b o t h t h e p e r c e p -t io n o f t h e h u m a n b e in g a n d t h a t o f th e m a n n e q u i n do n o t c o - e x is ta t t h e s a m e t i m e . O n l y o n e p e r c e p t i o n is g i v en a t a n y i n s t a n t . B u t a sl o n g a s t h e d o u b t is n o t r e so l v ed t h e o n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is m e r e l y" s u r p r e s s e d " b y t h e o t h e r a n d m a y s u r f a ce a g a in a n d su r p re s s i ts o p p o -s it e . N e i t h e r o f t h e s e t w o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i s c a n c e l l e d w h i l e t h e d o u b tp e r si st s . 4~ H o w e v e r , p e r c e p t i o n n o l o n g e r p r o c e e d s w i t h n a i v e c e r t a i n -t y . 47 T h e e g o f o r w h o m t h e d o u b t e x is ts v a c i ll a te s b e t w e e n t h e i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n , h u m a n b e in g o r m a n n e q u i n . I t is a t t r a c t e d t o o n e i n te r -p r e t a t i o n a n d t h e n t h e o t h e r. E v e n t u a l l y o n e o f th e s e w i ll p r ev a ilb e c a u s e i n t h e c o n t i n u e d p r o c es s o f o b s e r v a t io n m o r e " s p e a k s f o r "i t , a s H u s s e r l s a y s , t h a n f o r i ts o p p o s i t e . 48

I n a n y e v e n t , a c o n c e p t o f p o s s i b i l i t y h a s i ts o ri g i n i n t h i s c o n f l i c to f i n c l i n a t i o n s t o b e li e v e, s a y s H u s s e rl , b e c a u s e t h e o b s e r v e r is n o t c e r -t a i n t h a t t h e f ig u r e b e f o r e h i m is a h u m a n b e i n g o r a m a n n e q u i n . 49


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354He is, therefore, confronted with mere possibilities, not certainties(knowledge in the strong sense). But the possibilities presented to theobserver who experiences doubt are quite different in kind from thosepresented to an observer who perceives in the mode of naive certainty.As indicated above, the latter observer anticipates an open (indetermi-nate) range of possibilities, all of which share equal status. This is notthe case for the observer caught in doubt. His possibilities presentthemselves as alternatives. The figure is either a human being or a man-nequin. He cannot, as it were, interpret this figure in any way, as ahorse for instance, because there is nothing presented to him which"speaks for" this interpretat ion in this case. The kind of possibilitiespresented to an observer who experiences doubt are called "question-able" (fragliche) or, more properly, "problematic" possibilities byHusserl because they arise out of a problematic situation. In this casethe possibilities present themselves as conflicting. This conflict (prob-lem), however, places a reciprocal restriction on the possibilities in away which is totally absent in the mode of naive certainty. It unifiesthem as true alternatives.

The concept of the alternative, as can now be seen, can only arisein a situation where naive certainty no longer exists but knowledge- in the form of affirmation or negation - has not yet occu rred. Thealternatives, therefore, appear as possibilities (non-certainties) deter-mined as conflicting interpretations. In other words, a problem occursfor which two or more definite possibilities (of solution) present them-selves. Husserl refers to these conflict ing, definite possibilities as alter-natives.

VThe similarities between Luhmann's presentation of the comparativefunctional method and Husserl's presentation of the concept of prob-lematic possibilities now becomes clear. Both interpret alternatives asdefinite possibilities of solution to a problem. The subject matter,however, is different in each case. Luhmann applies the comparativefunctional method to human actions. Husserl discusses problematicpossibilities in terms of perception. The bridge between these two canbe found, I think, in the writings of Alfred Schutz (1962), especiallyhis essays entitled, "Choosing among Projects of Action" and Re f l e c -t ions on the Prob lem o f Re levance , chapter Two. In each of theseSchutz - in a manner strikingly similar to Luhmann - interpret s


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3 5 5h u m a n a c t i o n i n t e r m s o f c h o i c e o r s e l e c t i o n . " M a n , " s a y s S c h u t z( 1 9 6 2 , p . 8 3 ) , " a c t i n g in t h e s o c ia l w o r l d a m o n g a n d u p o n h i s f el lo w -m e n f in d s th a t t h e p r e c o n s t i t u te d s o ci al w o r ld i m p o s e s u p o n h i m a t a n ym o m e n t se v er a l a l te r n a ti v es a m o n g w h i c h h e h a s t o c h o o s e . A c c o r d i n gt o m o d e r n s o c i o lo g y , t h e a c t o r h a s 't o d e f i n e t h e s i t u a t io n ' . B y d o i n gs o h e t r a n s f o r m s h is s oc i a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f ' o p e n p o s s i b il i ti e s ' ( o f a c t i o nJ .B . ) i n t o a u n i f i e d f i e ld o f ' p r o b l e m a t i c p o s s i b i l it i e s' w i t h i n w h i c hc h o i c e a n d d e c i s i o n - e s p e c i a ll y s o - c a l le d ' r a t io n a l ' c h o i c e a n d d e c i s i o n- - b e c o m e p o s s i b l e ." T h e t r a n s i t io n f r o m o p e n t o p r o b l e m a t i c p o s si b il i-t ie s , w h i c h is s o i m p o r t a n t t o t h e m a k i n g o f a r a t i o n a l d e c i s io n ( ch o i c e ,s e l e c t i o n ) , i s , a s w e h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w , o n e f r o m n a i v e c e r t a i n t yt o d o u b t . " D e f i n i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n " , th e r e f o r e , b e c o m e s a p r o c e s s o fp r o v i d i n g c l e ar c o n t o u r s t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m a t h a n d . I n t h is w a yd e f i n it e n e s s is i m p o s e d u p o n t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g l y i n d e f i n i t e c o m p l e x i -t y o f o u r s oc i al e n v i r o n m e n t a n d r a t io n a l a c t i o n m a d e p o s si b le . A c c o r d -i n g t o S c h u t z (1 9 7 0 , p p . 2 6 - 4 5 ) , t h is p ro c e s s r e q u ir e s sy s t e m s o fr e l e v a n c e s , b o t h topical a n d interpretative. T h e f 't rs t ( t o p i c a l ) s y s t e m o fr e l e v a n c e s g o v e r n s t h o s e a s p e c t s o f c o n s c i o u s l if e w h i c h d i v i d e c o n -s c io u s n es s i n t o t h e m e a n d f i el d . I t c o n si s ts o f m e m o r y a n d w h a t S c h u t zr e fe r s t o as o n e ' s " s t o c k - o f - k n o w l e d g e - a t - h a n d " . I n o u r d e p a r t m e n ts t o r e w i n d o w e x a m p l e t h is s y s t e m o p e r a t e s w h e n o u r a t t e n t i o n isd r a w n t o t h e f i g ur e i n t h e w i n d o w . A s p e c t s o f o u r m e m o r y a n d s to c k -o f - k n o w l e d g e - a t - h a n d si n gl e o u t t h i s f i g u r e a s o f i n t e r e s t t o u s . I t b e -c o m e s o f topical r e l e v a n c e t o u s , a t h e m e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h i s is t h ef i rs t s t e p i n t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e s o ci a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f o p e n p o s s ib i li ti e si n t o a u n i f i e d f i e ld o f p r o b l e m a t i c p o s s i b il it i es . T h e f i g u re ( t h e t h e m e )h a s b e c o m e a p r o b l e m ( o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) f o r c o n s c i o u sn e s s , v iz . w h a ti s th i s f igure?

I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o S c h u t z , e m p l o y s a s y s t e m o f interpreta-tive r e le v a n ce s . I t s u b s u m e s t h e t h e m e ( p r o b l e m ) u n d e r a t ype w h i c his a l r e a d y p a r t o f o n e 's s t o c k - o f - k n o w l e d g e - a t - h a n d . I n o u r e x a m p l e ,t h e f ig u re is s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e t y p e " h u m a n b e i n g " a n d t h e n u n d e rt h e t y p e " m a n n e q u i n " . T h e s e i n t e rp r e t a t io n s b e c o m e w h a t S c h u t z a n dH u s s e r l c a ll p r o b l e m a t i c p o s s ib i l it i e s b e c a u s e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a u n i f i e df ie l d o f c h o i c e . T h e y c o m p r i s e t h e d o m a i n o f p o ss i bl e a l t e rn a t i v e i n te r -p r e t a t io n s o f t h e t h e m e ( p r o b l e m ) o f c o n s c io u s n es s .

T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f p r o b l e m a t i c p o s si b il it ie s , t h e r e f o r e , r e s id e s n o ti n t h e a c t u a l c h o ic e m a d e b e t w e e n o r a m o n g t h e m b u t r a t h e r i n t h ee s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e v e r y p o s s i b il i ty o f c h o i c e i ts e lf . F o r m o d e ms o c i o lo g y , w h i c h i n t e r p r e t s r a t i o n a l a c t i o n a s d e p e n d e n t u p o n a p r o c e sso f c h o i c e , t h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h p o s si b il it ie s w o u l d r e n d e r c h o i c e i m p o s -


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356sible, sl The pro ble mat ic possibilities are, there fore, i ndis pen sab le to aconcep t o f compara tive func t iona l me thod such as Luhma nn ' s becausehis met ho d aims, as we have seen, not at the es tabl ishment of aninvariant relat ion between causes and effects but at the estab l is hmen tof a relat ion of fu nctional equivalence amo ng al ternat ives. I n thissense, then, we can say with Luhmann (1970, p. 52), " . . . that the con-cept ion of a ra t ional i ty based upon comparison would be appropria teto br ing ph eno men olo gy and funct ionali sm closer together . ' 's2

NOTES1. Functional method, as it is used here, refers to a procedure of scientific in-

vestigation first employed by social scientists such as WiUiam Robertson Smithand Emile Durkheim and then by Bronislaw Malinowski and A. Radcliffe-Brown. The term "funct ionalism" is introduced by Malinowski in E n c y c l o -pedia B r i tannica (I 3th ed. 1926).2. Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method inSociology and Anth ropology" in N.J. Demerath and R.A. Peterson, S y s t e m ,Change and Conf l ic t , pp. 379-402. This essay was first published in A m e r i -can Soc io logical Rev iew , (24), 7 57-772, (I 959).3. Indeed, one should say that the establishment of a science of socio logy wasdue to the development of a unified (causal) sociological method.4. There are numerous presentations of what is referred to here as the "un if ied

scientific method". Of present concern, however, is the relation betweenexplanation and prediction within this method. Hempel (1965) presents theorthodox interpretation of the structural identity of the two. This interpreta-tion, however, is, as Hempel himself remarks, by no means universally accept-ed. Some, such as Scheffler, Scriven, Barker and Toulmin question it. Commonto their criticisms, nevertheless, is the problematic status of predict ions . Inother words, as far as the latter are concerned, for various reasons every ex-planation is not necessarily a potential prediction.It is necessary to mention the problematic status of prediction for those whoare otherwise adherents of the "unified scientific method" because Luhmannhimself seems to represent the orthodox interpretation. This, of course, doesnot mean that he is either an advocate or a critic of the "unified scientificmethod". He, rather, intends to show that if the concept of function is sub-ordinated to that of causal relation then (insuperable?) methodological prob-lems arise for funct ional "explanations".

5. "Denn seitdem die Kausalbeziehung einen eindeutigen zeitlichen Richtungs-sinn erhalten hat (den sic weder fuer griechische noch fuer mittelalterlicheDenker besass), koennen Wirkungen irgendwelcher Art das Vorkommen vonUrsachen nicht mehr erklaeren."6. "...die Wirkungen zu einer tragfaehigen Erklaerungsgrundlage ausbauen.'"7. Cf. Malinowski, (1944, p. 169), "This type of functional analysis is easily

exposed to the accusation of tautology and platitude, as well as to the criti-cism that it implies a logical circle, for, obviously, if we define function as the


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3 5 7s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a n e e d , i t is e a s y t o s u s p e c t t h a t t h e n e e d t o b e s a t i s f i e d h a sb e e n i n t r o d u c e d i n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y th e n e e d o f s a t is f y i ng a f u n c t i o n . "

8 . C f . H a r r y C . B r e d e m e i e r ( 1 9 5 5 ) , e s p . p p . 1 7 6 - 1 8 0 .9 . I n b i o l o g y t h e c o n c e p t o f " e q u i l i b r i u m " w a s e x p r e s s e d b y th e c o n c e p t " h o -

m e o s t a s i s " . I n t h is c a s e l i v in g o r g a n i s m s p o s s es s b u i l t 4 n s t r u c t u r e s a n d p r o -c e ss e s w h i c h c o m e i n t o p l a y i n o rd e r , f o r i n s ta n c e , t o m a i n t a i n c o n s t a n tb o d y t e m p e r a t u r e o r h e a l w o u n d s e tc . w h e n s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o r g a n i s m ' se n v i r o n m e n t d i s t u rb s i t.

1 0 . " E i n s o z i a l e s S y s t e m i s t n i c h t , w i e e in O r g a n i s m u s , t y p e n f e s t f i x i e r t . A u se i n e m E s e l k a n n k e i n e S c h l a n g e w e r d e n , s e l b s t w e n n e i n e s o l c h e E n t w i c l d u n gz u m U e b e r l e b e n n o t w e n d i g w a e r e . E i n e S o z i a l o r d n u n g k a n n d a g e g e n t i e f-g r e i f e n d e s t r u k t u r e U e A e n d e r u n g e n e r f a h r e n , o h n e i h r e I d e n t i t a e t u n d i h r e nk o n t i n u i e r l i c h e n B e s t a n d a u f z u g e b e n . "

1 1. L u h m a n n a t t r i b u t e s t h e c o n c e p t t o G o u l d n e r . B u t h e a ls o m e n t i o n s t h a t it iss u b s e q u e n t l y t o b e f o u n d i n P a rs o n s a n d H o m a n s .

1 2 . C f . L u h m a n n ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 3 6 ) , " T h e c l as s ic a l s c h o o l p h i l o s o p h y c o n v e r s e ly h a de x p e c t e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e g e n u in e , u n c h a n ge a b l e ( t he w o r d " u m w a n d e l -b a r e " a p p e a r s a t t h i s p l a c e i n t h e t e x t . I h a v e ta k e n t h i s f o r a m i s p r i n t b e c a u s ei t w o u l d d e s t r o y t h e s e n se o f w h a t L u h m a n n i s s a y in g . I r e a d " u n w a n d e l b a r e "f o r " u m w a n d e l b a r e " ) b e i n g o f a t h i n g s e e m e d t o a p p e a r in q u a l it i e s w h i c hw e r e a l w a y s a n d e v e r y w h e r e t h e s a m e . I t (t h e c l a s s ic a l s c h o o l p h i l o s o p h y ) t o o ks a m e n e s s o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n f o r s ig n s o f t h e t r u e b e in g t h a t e x c l u d e s it s n o n -b e i n g , a n d t h e r e b y a l l o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a n d , i n t h i s s e n s e , i s i t s e l f ( s u b s t a n c e ) . "

" D i e k l a s s is c h e S c h u l p h i l o s o p h i e h a t t e g e r a d e u m g e k e h r t y o n d e r B e t r a c h -t u n g d e s G l e i c h e n A u f s c h l u s s u e b e r d a s e n g e n t l i c h e , u m w a n d e l b a r e ( s i c . ) S e i nd e s S e i e n d e e r w a r t e t . I n i m m e r u n d u e b e r a l l g ie i c he n Q u a l i t a e t e n s c h i e n i h rd a s W e s e n e i n e r S a c h e z u m V o r s c h e i n z u k o m m e n . S i e n a h m G l e i c h h e i t e n ti e rE r s c h e i n u n g a l s Z e i c h e n f u e r d a s w a h r h a f t S e i e n d e , d a s s ei n N i c h t s e i n u n d d a -m i t a l l e a n d e r e n M o e g l i c h k e i t e n a u s s c h li e s s t u n d i n d i e s e m S i n n e e s s e l b s t( S u b s t a n z ) i s t . "

1 3 . R . I n g a r d e n ( 1 9 2 5 , p . 1 8 7 ) , " . . . a l s e i n e n G e g e n s t a n d d e f i n i e r t . .. . t i e r n u r d i eg e m e i n s a m e n E i g e n s c h a f t en a l l e r z u e i n e r K l a s s e g e h o e r e n d e n G e g e n s t a e n d e i ns i ch e n t h a e l t . "

L u h m a n n c i te s I n g a r d e n a s r e fe r r in g t o t h i s s p e c if i c o n t o l o g i c a l p re s u p p o s i -t i o n in t h e a b o v e w o r k .

1 4 . M e n t i o n o f t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e -t w e e n c a u s a l -s c i e n ti f ic a n d t h e c o m p a r a t i v e f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o d s . A c c o r d i n g t ot h is p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , f o r w h i c h t h e p e r m a n e n c e o f a n y c o m p l e x s t r u c t u r e (s y s -t e m ) i s d e t e r m i n e d b y s e v e r a l c o n s t a n t a t t r i b u t e s , a p ri n c i p l e o f e x c l u s i o n p r e -d o m i n a t e s . W h a t i s n o t c o m m o n t o a l l m e m b e r s o f a g r o u p is excluded f r o mi ts e s s e n c e . I f t h e e s s en c e o f a n y c o m p l e x s t r u c t u r e i s w h a t c o n f e r s u n i t y ( p e r -m a n e n c e ) u p o n i t , t h e n t h is c a n o n l y o c c u r t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s o f e x c l u d i n gw h a t d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o i t s e s s e n c e. T h e c a u s a l - s ci e n t if i c f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o dm a k e s t h is p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a c c o r d i n g to L u h m a n n . I t i n t e r p r e t s s y s t e m s a sw h o l e s w h i c h a r e m a i n t a i n e d c a u s a l l y b y se v e r al c o n s t a n t p e r f o r m a n c e s . T h et a s k , t h e n , o f t h i s m e t h o d i s t o d i s c o v e r t h e s e p e r f o r m a n c e s t h r o u g h a p ro c e s so f e x c l u s i o n o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e s t h a t d o n o t c o n t r i b u t e c a u s a l l y t o th e m a i n -t e n a n c e o f t h e s y s t e m . B y a p r o c e s s o f e x c lu s i o n i t b e h e v e s t h a t i t c a n e s t a b -l i s h c a u s a l f u n c t i o n a l l a w s .


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3 5 8T h e c o m p a r a t i v e f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o d p r o c e e d s n o t b y e x c l u s i o n b u t b y i n-

c l u s io n b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e p e r m a n e n c e o f a s y s t e m i n t e r m s o fc o n s t a n t ( i n v a r i a n t) r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c a u se s a n d e f fe c t s . It s ta s k is r a t h e r t od i s c o v er p e r fo r m a n c e s w h i c h a r e e q u i v a l e n t in t h e i r f u n c t i o n o f s o l v i n g p a r -t i c u l a r s y s t e m p r o b l e m s . I n t h i s c a se t h e p e r f o r m a n c e s n e e d h av e n o t h i n g i nc o m m o n e x c e p t , o f c o u r s e , t h e i r f u n c t i o n o f s o l vi n g s y s t e m - p r o b l e m s . T h es i t u a t i o n i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t in t h e c a s e o f t h e c a u s a l - s c i e n t i f i c f u n c t i o n a l m e t h -o d .

1 5 . T h e t w o m a i n c o n s e q u e n c e s o f th i s c h a n g e a re (1 ) th e g o a l o f f u n c t i o n a l m e t h -o d is n o l o n g e r t h e e x p l a n a t i o n a n d p r e d i c t i o n o f s p e c if i c e v e n ts a n d ( 2 ) t h ec o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n i s n o l o n g e r a s p e ci f ic d i f f e re n c e o f t h e c o n c e p t o f c a u s a lr e l a t i o n .

1 6 . L u h m a n n , ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 4 ), " . . . e i n e g e s e tz m a e s s i ge o d e r m e h r o d e r w e n i g e r w a h r -s c h e i n li c h e B e z i e h u n g z w i s c h e n b e s t i m m t e n U r s a c h e n u n d b e s t i m m t e n W i r -k u n g e n . . . , s o n d e r n . . . d i e F es t s te l lu n g en d e r f u n k t i o n a l en A eq u i va l en z m e h re re rm o eg l i ch er U rsa ch en u n t e r d em G es i ch t sp u n k t e i n er p ro b l em a t i s ch en W i r -k u n g . "

17 . Ib id . , p . 1 4 , " . .. z u b e w i r k e n d e W i r k u n g , s o n d e r n e i n r e g u l at i v e s S i n n s c h e m a ,d a s e i n e n V e r g l e i c h s b e r e i c h a e q u i v a l e n t e r L e i s t u n g e n o r g a n i s i e r t .

T h i s is t h e t a s k o f t h e f u n c t i o n a l m e t h o d t o p e r f o r m : t o d i s c o v e r f u n c t i o n a le q u i v a l e n c e s .

1 8 . Cf . ibid. , p . 2 7 , " A l l f u n c t i o n a l i s t i c a n a l y se s a r e u l t i m a t e l y c o n d u c t e d i n r e f e r-e n c e t o p r o b l e m s o f s t a b i l i z a t i o n . "

" A l l e f u n k t i o n a l i s t i s c h e A n a l y s e n w e r d e n l e t z li c h in B e z u g a u f S t a b i l i -s i e r u n g s p r o b l e m e a l s L e i t f a d e n g e f u e h r t . "

p . 3 5 , " B o t h i n th i n k i n g a n d a c t i n g p r o b l e m s o l v in g r e q u i r e s o r i e n t a t i o nt o w a r d s a l t e rn a t i v e s . T h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f t h i n k i n g a r is e s o u t o f a c o m p e t i t i o no f d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l it i e s w h i c h s t r u c t u r e t h e m a s a l t e rn a t i v e s . T h e p r o b l e m i sm e a n i n g f u l i f a c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e a l t e r n a ti v e s m a k e s a s o l u t i o n o f t h e p r o b -l e m p o s s i b l e . "

" P r o b l e m l o e s u n g e r f o r d e r t im D e n k e n u n d H a n d e l n g l e i c h e r m a s s e n O r i en -t i e r u n g a n A l t e r n a t i v e n . D i e P r o b l e m a t i k de s D e n k e n s b e s t e h t a u s e i n e r K o n -k u r r e n z v e r s c h i e d e n e r M o e g l i c h k e i t e n , e in e r K o n k u r r e n z , w e l c h e d i e M o e g l i c h -k e i t e n a l s A l t e r n a t i v e n s t r u k t u r i e r t . D a s P r o b l e m i s t s in n v oU , w e n n e i n V e r -g l e ic h d e r A l t e r n a t i v e n z u r L o e s u n g d e s P r o b l e m s b e f a e h i g t , "

p . 1 3 , " T h u s t h e s e n se o f f u n c t i o n a l i s t a n a l ys i s l ie s i n th e o p e n i n g o f a( l im i t e d ) d o m a i n o f c o m p a r i s o n . "" D e r S i n n f u n k t i o n a l i s t i s c h e r A n a l y s e n l ie g t m i t h i n i n d e r E r o e f f n u n ge i n e s ( b e g r e n z t e n ) V e r g l e i c h s b e r e i c h . "

1 9 . T h e c o n c e p t o f c a u s a l i t y is u n d e r s t o o d h e r e , o f c o u rs e , to c o n t a i n b o t h t h ec o n c e p t o f c a u s e a n d t h e c o n c e p t o f e f f e c t. T h e l a t t e r i s e v e r y b it as m u c h ac a u s a l c a t e g o r y a s th e f o r m e r .

2 0 . L u h m a n n , ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 6 ), " . .. D i e F u n k t i o n i s t n i c h t e i n e S o n d e r a r t d e r K a u s a l -b e z i e h u n g , so n d ern d i e K a u sa l b e z i eh u n g i s t e i n e A n w en d u n g s f a l l f u n k t z ' o n a l e rOrdnung. ' "

A g a i n , a s u n d e r s t o o d h e r e , t h e " c a u s a l r e l a t i o n " i s a n i n v a r ia n t c o n n e c t i o nb e t w e e n a p a r t i c u l a r c a u s e a n d a p a r t i c u l a r e ff e c t . T h e f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n , o nt h e o t h e r h a n d , i s a c o n n e c t i o n o f s e v e r a l c a u s es fr o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a


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35 9particular effect or - and this is equally imp or tan t - a conne cti on of severaleffects from the point of view of a particular cause.

21. "...diese Aussagen besitzen keinen empir ischen Wert, wenn die Aussch altungaller anderen Kausalfaktoren faktisch nicht durchgefuehrt werden kan n."

22. But not - it must be emphasized - inde pende ntly of the concept of causality!The relation of found ation is not abrogated here, only reversed.The functi onal relations are established independe ntly of causal relations

because they hold between several causes or several effects, not between onecause and one effect. If this latter relatio n - the causal rela tion - can in factbe established then it is only as the limit case of comparison (of the functionalmethod).

23. All this, of course, does not mean that causality is rejected as an epistemiccategory or that Luhm ann inten ds to oppose functional to causal research. Hiscritique of functional method has been performed precisely in order to estab-lish it as an inde pende nt method by reversing the basic relation between causalrelations and f unction al ones.24. Cf. Luhm ann, (1970, p. 56), "A f uncti on is the relation of a thing to an ab-stract - and thereby ambiguous - viewpo int, if this viewp oint serves to con-front the thing with other, function ally equivalent possibilities."

"Eine Fun kti on ist die Beziehung eines Seienden auf einen abstrakten - unddamit mehrdeutigen - Gesichtspunkt, wenn dieser Gesichtspunkt dazu dient,das Seiende mit anderen, funkt ional aequlvalenten Moeglichkeiten zu konfron -tieren."

25. "Vergleichsgesichtspunkten koennen rein logisch beliebig gewaehlt werden.Man kann Handlungen unte r dem Gesi chtspunkt ihrer Dauer oder ihres Kalo-rienverbrauchs oder unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Zahl ihrer Zuschauer ver-gleichen, ohne dass die Wahrheit des Vergleichsresultates durch die Wahl desVergleichsgesichtspunktes beeinflusst wuerde."

26. Luhm ann , (1970, p. 37), "...die Klasse der funktionat aequivalenten Alterna-tiven...so dass Erklaerungen bzw. Voraussagen moeglich werd en."

27. Cf. for the d efin itio n of reference as probl em ibid., p. 18, "The reference pointis viewed as (a) problem...""Die Bezugseinheit wird als Problem gesehen..."p. 35, "The advance which the functional method introduces exists...in the

fixing of an a bstract view-point, viz. the "probl em".. ., from which differentpossibilities of action...can be treated as functional ly equivalen t."

"Der Gewinn, den die funk tionale Methode einbringt, besteht,...in derFixierung eines abstrakten Bezugsgesichtpunktes, naemlich des "problems",von dem aus verschiedene Moeglichkeiten des Handelns,...als fun kti ona l aequi-valent behandelt werden koenne n."

For the idea of systems 'plagued' with problems cf. ibid., p. 34, "It (thesystem) is therefore plagued with problems ..."

"Sic wird deshalb yon Problemen (organizational dilemmas) geplagt..."In the con text in which this quote appears the subject of this phrase refers

to "organiz ations" but it is also clear from the co ntext th at organization andsystem in this place are equ ivalent for Luh mann. Cf. P. Blau Dynamics ofBureaucracy and P. Blau & W.R. Scott, Formal Organizations: A ComparativeApproach.


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3 6 0

2 8 . I t s h o u l d b e m e n t i o n e d t h a t L u h m a n n d i s ti n g u i sh e s t w o k in d s o f f u n c t i o n a le q u i v a l e n ce : d i s ju n c t iv e a n d c o n j u n c t i v e . T h e f o r m e r i s t h e k i n d p r e s e n t e d i nt h e t e x t . T h e l a t t e r o c c u r s w h e n , f o r i n s t a n c e , s e v e ra l c a u s e s t o g e t h e r e n t e ri n t o a r e l a t i o n o f e q u i v a l e n c e . I n t h i s c a s e A B C D o r E F G o r H K M a re e q u i v a -l e n t i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o c a u s e P . A s c a n b e s e e n , w h o l e g r o u p s i n s t e a d o f in -d i v i d u a l c a u s e s a r e f u n c t i o n a U y e q u i v a l e n t h e r e .

2 9 . " S e l b s t v e r s t a e n d l i c h " e r k l a e r e n " d i e B e z u g s p r o b l e m e d a r u m a u c h n i c h t d a sf a k fi s ch e V o r k o m m e n b e s t i m m t e r f u n k t i o n a l e r L e i s t un g e n . S i c h a b e n g e r a d ed e n e n t g e g e n g e s e t z t e n S i n n : a u f a n d e r e M o e g l i c h k e i t e n h i n z u w e i s e n . "

3 0 . " D i e G u e l t i g k e i t f u n k t i o n a l i s fi s c h e r A n a l y s e n h a e n g t n i c h t d a v o n a b , o b i mE i n z e l fa l l d as P r o b l e m g e l o e s t w i r d , d i e W i r k u n g e i n t r i t t , d a s S y s t e m f o r t -b e s t e h t . "

3 1 . L u h m a n n , ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 3 8 ) , " . . .e i n S y s t e m m e h r e r e P r o b l e m e l o e s e n m u s s . "3 2 . C f . L u h m a n n , ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 7 ). O n e c a n t h e n a s k in w h a t se n s e d o c a u s e s a n d

e f f ec t s b e c o m e p r o b l e m s . T h e y d o s o a s e v e n ts w h i c h i n s o m e w a y c o n t r i b u t et o t h e i n s t a b i l i t y o f th e s y s t e m b e c a u s e , a c c o r d i n g t o L u h m a n n , a l l s y s t e mp r o b l e m s a r e e s s e n t ia l l y p r o b l e m s o f s t a b i l iz a t i o n . C f. f o o t n o t e 1 8 a b o v e .

3 3 . " . .. d a ss d i e e r l e b t e n P r o b l e m e . . . n i c h t o h n e w e i t e r e s i d e n f is c h s i n d m i t d e nf u n k t i o n a l e n B e z u g s p r o b l e m e . "

3 4 . I t m u s t b e m a d e c le a r h e re t h a t w h a t is m e a n t b y " p e r m a n e n c e o f a s y s t e m "i s i ts s t r u c t u r e a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . S o t h a t w h a t i s k e p t p e r m a n e n t i s t h a tp a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r e .

3 5 . L u h m a n n , ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 9 ) , ". . .s i c h n i c h t a l s B e z u g s g e s i c h t s p u n k t f u e r f u n k t i o -n a l i st i s c h e A n a l y s e n e i g n e t . "

3 6 . C f . i b i d . , p . 1 8 , " A s o c i a l o r d e r (i .e . s y s t e m ) c a n , h o w e v e r , e x p e r i e n c e p r o -f o u n d s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g es w i t h o u t g i v in g u p i ts i d e n t i t y a n d i ts c o n t i n u e de x i s t e n c e . I t c a n c h a n g e f r o m a n a g r a ri a n i n t o a n i n d u s t r ia l s o c i e t y , a n e x -t e n d e d f a m i l y c a n b e c o m e a t r i b e w i t h t ra n s f a m i l i a l p o l i t i c a l o r d e r w i t h o u to n e b e i n g a b l e t o d e c i d e w h e n a n e w s y s t e m e x i s t s . "

" E i n e S o z i a l o r d n u n g k a n n d a g e g e n t i e f g re i f e n d e s t r u k t u r e l l e A e n d e r u n g e ne r f a h r e n , o h n e i h r e I d e n t i t a e t u n d i h r e n k o n t i n u i e r l i c h e n B e s t a n d a u f z u g e b e n .S i c k a n n s i c h a u s e i n e r A g r a r g e s e U s c h a f t i n e i n e I n d u s t r i e g e s e l l s c h a f t v e r -w a n d e l n , a u s e i n e r G r o s s f a m i l ie k a n n e i n S t a t u r e m i t u e b e r f a m i l i a e r e r p o l l -f i s ch e r O r d n u n g w e r d e n , o h n e d a s s e n t s c h e i d b a r w a e r e , w a n n e i n n e u e s S y s t e mv o r l i e g t . "

3 7 . L u h m a n n ( 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 5 ) , " W e l c h e E i n s a t z w e r t e zu e in e r s o l c h e n f u n k t i o n a l e nK l a s se o d e r V a r i a b l e g e h o e r e n , i s t d a g e g en S a c h e e m p i r i s c h e r E r k e n n t n i s u n de r g i b t s i c h k e i n e s w e g s s c h o n a u s d e r F o r m u l i e r u n g d e s B e z u g s g e s i c h t s p u n k t e s . "

3 8 . R o l e - c o n f l i c t s t h e r e f o r e c o n s t i t u t e th e r e f e r e n c e - p r o b l e m ( r e f e r e n c e - p o i n t ) o ff u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s in t h i s c a s e .

3 9 . " . . .e i n P r o b l e m a ls E r k la e r u n g s b a s is u n d a ls t r a g e n d e r G r u n d e i n e r A n a l y s ef u n g i e r e n k a n n . "

4 0 . I c a n s a y " n o n - a c c i d e n t a l " b e c a u s e L u h m a n n r e f e rs t o i t h i m s e l f . C f . ( L u h -m a n n , 1 9 7 0 , p . 4 9 ), f o o t n o t e 1 6 a n d p . 3 5 . " T h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f t h i n k i n ga ri s es o u t o f a c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b il i ti e s w h i c h s t r u c t u r e st h e m a s a l t e r n a t i v e s . "

" D i e P r o b l e m a t i k d es D e n k e n s b e s t e h t au s e in e r K o n k u r r e n z , w e l c h e d ieM o e g l i c h k e i t e n a ls A l t e r n a t i v e n s t r u k t u r i e r t . "


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41. The c ontext of investigation in Erfahrung und Urteil is pre-predicative expe-rience , i.e. the level of consciousness at which objectivities are cons titu ted pas-sively, non- them atic ally , viz. perception. Yet despite the very element ary levelof investig ation, what is said there refers, in Schutz's words, "... to activities ofall kinds..." (Collected Papers I, p. 82), i.e. not just to the level of pre-predica-tive experience. For this reason what follows about open and problematicpossibilities is not meant as a detailed analysis of pre-predicative experiencebut rather as an indicati on of the origin of the concept of open and problema-tic possibility.

42. This is also why Husserl speaks of the naive cert ainty involved in perceptua lexperience. In the case of objects I have never seen before I am naively cer-tain that the back-side will be so and so etc. Experience, however, has shownme that my expectations can and often are disappointed. This is why my cer-tainty is merely naive. I nevertheless perceive objects with this kind of cer-tainty even if my anticipations are deceived.

43. Cf. Husserl (1972 , p. 99), "Do ubt presents a mode of tran sition towards nega-tion...""Der Zweifel steUt einen Uebergangsmodus zur negierenden Aufhebungdar..."

44. The pervasiveness of this analysis of dou bt in Husserl's writings can be demon-strated by its appearance in the works of entirely different periods of hiscareer. Cf. (Husserl, 1968), Investiga tion V, sect ion 27, (Husserl, 1980), sec-tion 103, and finally (Husseri, 1972), section 2l b. Schutz uses the sameexample as (Husserl, 1972) above in his (1962, p. 8). He develops the con-cept muc h more fully in (1970, chapter 2).

45. The theor y of hyletic data which Husserl main tain ed to the end was criti-cized by later phenomenologists, especially those influenced by Gestalt psy-chology. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, "Phenomenology of Thematics and of the PureEgo: Studies of the R elation between Gestalt Psychology and P henom enol ogy"sectio n 16, in (Gurwit sch, 1966). Husserl discusses hyleti c data in (Husserl,1980) section 85.

46. Of course, the alternative need not be limited to two.47. What Husserl means here is that each one of the different interpreta tions car-

ries with it its own anticipations. The observer cannot, therefore, anticipatewith naive cert ainty - as in the case of normal percepti on - in the case ofdou bt because the figure may tur n out to be a man nequ in rather than a hu-man being and the anticipations of the former are of an entirely differentkind than the latter.48. The resolution of the doubt through continue d observation of the figure alsogives rise to the concept of probability, according to Husserl, because throughthe cont inue d process of observation more "speaks for" one possibility thanthe other. One inter preta tion becomes "more likely", i.e. it is proba bly thatthe figure is a human being.

49. Cf. Husserl, (1972, p. 104), "...a concept of proba bilit y has its origin in thisconflict of inc linations to believe..."

"...in diesem Streit yon Glaubensneigungen...hat ein Begriff yon Moeglich-keit seinen Ursprung."50. Schutz also makes use of a third system of motivati onal relevances. But for o ur


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51.

52.

purposes the first two systems are all that are necessary.By systems of relevance Schutz means the structured aspects of consciouslife which make the mind's selective activity possible. Cf. Schutz, (1962, p.13), "...the theory concerning the mind's selective activity is simply the titlefor a set of problems...for the basic phenomenon we suggest calling relevance.Cf. Dewey, (1957, p. 193), "Choice is not the emergence of preference out ofindifference. It is the emergence of unified preference out of competingpreferences."Schutz refers to Dewey often as a source of some of his ideas concerningchoice and rational action."...dass die Konzeption einer auf Vergleich beruhenden Rationalitaet geeignetwaere, Phaenomenologie und Funktionalismus einander naeherzubringen. '"

REFERENCESP. Blau, Dynamics o f Bureaucracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.P. Blau & W.R. Scott, Formal Organizan'ons: A Comparative Approach, San Fran-cisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962.H.C. Bredemeier, "The Methodology of Functionalism" in American SociologicalReview, vol. 20, 1955, pp. 173-80.N.J. Demerath & R.A. Peterson, System, Change and Conflict, New York: FreePress, 1967.J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, New York: Modern Library, 1957.Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th edition, 1926.A. Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Evanston, IU.: North-

western University Press, 1966.C.G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press, 1965.E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968.E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1972.E. Husserl, Ideen I, Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1980.R. Ingarden, "Essentiale Fragen", in Jahrbuch fuer Philosophie und phaenomeno-logische Forschung, vol. 7, 1925, pp. 125-304.N. Luhmann, Soziologische A ufklaerung 1, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970.B. Malinowski, A Scientzfic Theory of Culture and Other Essays, Chapel Hill,N.C.: University of North Carolina Press 1944.A. Schutz, Collected Papers I, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.A. Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1970.

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() John Bednarz - Functional Method and Phenomenology. the Wiew of Niklas Luhmann