12
© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - Aug 1 Certificates: Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved. Allowed copying and public distribution of the complete work only, with author and source citation. Ed Gerck [email protected] Novaware MCG -- http://www.mcg.org.br Certificates are viewed as secure communication channels between two parties in a dialogue. Certification is shown to be mathematically equivalent to distance measurement in a metric space. The model is exemplified with X.509 - Certification Authorities (CA).

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/981

Certificates:Certificates:X.509 and CA

Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved. Allowed copying and public distribution of the complete work only, with author and source

citation.

Ed [email protected].

brNovaware MCG -- http://www.mcg.org.br

Certificates are viewed as secure communication channels between two parties in a dialogue. Certification is shown to be mathematically equivalent to distance measurement in a metric space. The model is exemplified with X.509 - Certification Authorities (CA).

Page 2: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/982

“ On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”

Page 3: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/983

"Much of the public discussion and rhetoric is about encryption -- with little attention focused on what is needed to make its use trustworthy."

“What is less discussed is the need to bind a system of trust to the security systems. This is the only way that security will be truly achieved. What do I mean by this? Security is concerned with locks, fences and guards. Trust is about whether they work.”

US Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet (1998)

Page 4: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/984

•Information (Shannon, 1948):Information (Shannon, 1948):

Information is “that which is transferred from a source to a destination, using a communication channel”.

Information is what you do not expect

•Trust (Gerck, 1998): Trust (Gerck, 1998): (http://www.mcg.org.br/trustdef.htm)(http://www.mcg.org.br/trustdef.htm)

Trust is “that which is essential to a communication channel but which cannot be transferred from a source to a destination using that channel".

Trust is what you know you know you know

Page 5: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/985

• Sense and Reference (Frege, 1910): Sense and Reference (Frege, 1910):

For any referent, sense (Sinn, meaning) and reference (Bedeutung, name) are independent variables:

Reference

Sense

?

?

?

?

?

Page 6: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/986

Certification and Cryptography

Asymmetric cryptography allows for:• two keys: public-key and private-key• Public-key security• private protocols

Certification allows for :• Origin authentication• Data-integrity authentication

A private conversation with a thief ...is not secure just because it is private!

Page 7: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/987

Certification

Certification is expressed by certificates:

(Gerck) A certificate is a secure process for the designation of attributes to an entity, within a process boundary. (http://www.mcg.org.br/cie.htm)

(X.509v3) "user certificate; public key certificate; certificate: The public keys of a user, together with some other information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private key of the certification authority which issued it.". (http://www.mcg.org.br/mirrors.htm)

A certificate is a secure communication channel!

Page 8: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/988

Certificate

• A certificate is a secure communication channel

• Certificates are cryptographically signed by the issuer

• Certificates transport information• Information has no meaning -- it is just

references...even if it is signed!

Is it true that “2 = 2” ?Depends on semantics!In C it is wrong! It should be “2 == 2”

Without meaning communication does not occur!

Page 9: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/989

Certificate

Are certificates trustful because they certify, or certify because they are trustful?

• Stance: objective (the first) versus subjective (the second)

• Risk is borne by the user (i.e., the verifier, the relying party) who is in the subjective stance

• Trust is neither embedded nor infused in the certificate

• Trust is relative to the user's point of view

• ”Trust is in the eyes of the beholder"http://www.mcg.org.br/augustine.txt

Page 10: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/9810

Certification

http://www.mcg.org.br/intrinsic.htm

Name

Key

(Skywalker, K2)

(Skywalker, K1, revoked)

(Bob, K3)

CA

Alice...one also needs:3. CA-invariant

X.509:1. Key-invariant2. Trust-invariant

1

2

Page 11: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/9811

X.509 Certification and CA

1. Key-invariant: Trust the CA and get CA’s certificate

2. Trust-invariant: Use the trusted CA’s key and verify subscriber’s public-key certificate and absence of CRL

...but, one also needs (beyond X.509):3. CA-invariant: challenge subscriber’s private-key confirm subscriber is willing to use it be independent from the CA

After that ... You can eject the booster! Binary relationship can be used for time

indefinite.

http://www.mcg.org.br/certover.pdf -- or, cert.htm

Page 12: © E. Gerck - X.509 and CASegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/98 1 Certificates: X.509 and CA Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved

© E. Gerck - X.509 and CA SegNet III - Brasilia, DF - Brazil - August/9812

Certificates:Certificates:X.509 and CA

Contents Copyright © E. Gerck, 1998. All rights reserved. Allowed copying and public distribution of the complete work only, with author and source

citation.

Ed [email protected].

brNovaware MCG -- http://www.mcg.org.br

Certificates are viewed as secure communication channels between two parties in a dialogue. Certification is shown to be mathematically equivalent to distance measurement in a metric space. The model is exemplified with X.509 - Certification Authorities (CA).