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SUMMETH
SUMMETH – Sustainable Marine Methanol
Hazard Identification Study for the M/S Jupiter Methanol
Conversion Design
Date: 2018-04-10
Authors: Joanne Ellis and Joakim Bomanson
Document Status: Final
Document Number: D4.1b
Supported by the MARTEC II Network
PROJECT PARTNERS
CO-FUNDED BY
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page ii
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page iii
ABSTRACT
This report describes the hazard identification study carried out for the M/S Jupiter road ferry
methanol conversion design. The study identified hazards through two structured hazard
identification meetings and a review of historical accident and incident data for free sailing road ferries.
The hazard identification sessions covered the main areas affected by conversion to methanol
operation, including methanol bunkering, storage, the pump area, and fuel transfer to the engine.
Hazard scenarios identified as part of the work were ranked according to frequency and severity and
all were considered to be in the “low risk” or “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) risk area.
Safeguards and follow-up areas were identified for the ALARP risks.
SUMMETH PROJECT SUMMARY
SUMMETH, the Sustainable Marine Methanol project, is focussed on developing clean methanol
engine and fuel solutions for smaller ships. The project is advancing the development of methanol
engines, fuel system installations, and distribution systems to facilitate the uptake of sustainable
methanol as a fuel for coastal and inland waterway vessels through:
developing, testing and evaluating different methanol combustion concepts for the smaller
engine segment
identifying the total greenhouse gas and emissions reduction potential of sustainable
methanol through market investigations
producing a case design for converting a road ferry to methanol operation
assessing the requirements for transport and distribution of sustainable methanol.
The SUMMETH project consortium consists of SSPA Sweden (project coordinator), ScandiNAOS
(technical coordinator), Lund University, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Scania AB, Marine
Benchmark, Swedish Transport Administration Road Ferries, and the Swedish Maritime Technology
Forum.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The SUMMETH project is supported by the MARTEC II network and co-funded by the Swedish Maritime
Administration, Region Västra Götaland, the Methanol Institute and Oiltanking Finland Oy.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page iv
Document Data
Document Title: Hazard Identification Study for the M/S Jupiter Methanol Conversion Design
WP and/or Task: WP 4
Responsible Author: Joanne Ellis, SSPA
Co-authors: Joakim Bomanson, ScandiNAOS
Date and Version: 20180410, Final
Previous Versions: 20171219, Final Draft 20171106, Draft 00
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... iii
SUMMETH Project Summary ................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. iii
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................ 1
3 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
3.1 Guidelines and Regulations ..................................................................................................... 1
3.2 Risk Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 2
4 Method and Scope .......................................................................................................................... 4
4.1 Hazard Identification Meetings ............................................................................................... 4
4.1.1 24 March 2017 Meeting: ................................................................................................. 4
4.1.2 21 September 2017 Meeting ........................................................................................... 5
5 System Description .......................................................................................................................... 6
5.1 Methanol Conversion Design .................................................................................................. 8
5.2 Methanol properties and characteristics ................................................................................ 9
6 Hazard Identification Discussion ................................................................................................... 11
6.1 Risk Ratings ............................................................................................................................ 11
6.1.1 Frequency Ratings ......................................................................................................... 11
6.1.2 Severity Rating ............................................................................................................... 13
6.2 Risk Ranking ........................................................................................................................... 13
7 Main Findings and Recommendations .......................................................................................... 15
8 References ..................................................................................................................................... 16
Appendix I Hazard Identification Worksheets ....................................................................................... 17
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 1
1 INTRODUCTION
This report describes the hazard identification study done for the M/S Jupiter road ferry methanol
conversion design developed as part of the Sustainable Marine Methanol (SUMMETH) project, Work
Package 4. The methanol conversion design was prepared by project partner ScandiNAOS for the
Swedish Transport Administration Road Ferries vessel M/S Jupiter and is described in detail in report
D4.1 (Bomanson and Ramne, 2018). The general arrangement and vessel specifications served as the
basis for the hazard identification study.
2 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the hazard identification study were to:
• identify relevant and foreseeable hazards associated with the methanol conversion design for
the M/S Jupiter, focussing on the areas of bunkering, fuel tank room (including pumps), and
engine room
• describe cause and effects of hazards where possible
• estimate the frequency and consequence of hazards where possible
• identify any scenarios and hazards that may potentially need more in-depth risk analysis or
risk mitigation measures.
3 BACKGROUND
Methanol is a low flashpoint fuel that has been used in only a few marine applications to date, with
the first being on the RoPax ferry Stena Germanica, which has been operating since 2015. This was
followed by seven chemical tanker new builds that were put into service in 2016. These ships have
large methanol / diesel dual fuel engines and systems that were developed specifically for the vessels.
There are not yet any smaller commercial vessels such as road ferries and inland waterway vessels that
have used methanol as a fuel.
The SUMMETH project has the overall goal of developing methanol engine and fuel solutions for
smaller ships. Part of the project work includes developing and analyzing a methanol conversion design
of a case study vessel, the M/S Jupiter. The safety analysis part of the work included a hazard
identification study, which is described in this report.
3.1 GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS International guidelines and classification society rules are still under development for the use of low-
flashpoint liquid fuels, with methanol one of the main fuels in focus. The International Maritime
Organization’s (IMO) Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) states that fuels should have a minimum
flashpoint of 60⁰ Celsius, and because methanol’s is 12⁰ Celsius, a risk assessment must be carried out
for each methanol installation to demonstrate equivalent fire safety to conventional fuels for marine
use. This provision for allowing use of a lower flashpoint fuel is specified in SOLAS Chapter II-2 Part F
Reg. 17. The International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low-Flashpoint Fuels (IGF
CODE) is under development for methanol and ethanol (which will be covered in “Part A-2”) and this
should facilitate the use of such fuels. The IGF code part A, covering LNG, came into effect in 2017.
Sweden is coordinating the correspondence group that is developing the code further to cover aspects
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 2
such as methanol / ethanol fuel. The most recent meeting of the correspondence group was in
September 2017, where an updated version of the “Draft Technical Provisions for the Safety of Ships
Using Methyl/Ethyl Alcohol as Fuel” was developed and discussed.
Vessels that do not operate in international waters, such as the Swedish Transport Administration’s
road ferries, or smaller vessels, such as pilot boats, may be operating on a national certificate and as
such national regulations apply. For the M/S Jupiter and other Swedish road ferries, the national
regulations “Transportstyrelsens föreskrifter” apply. Regulation “TSFS 2014:1 Transportstyrelsens
föreskrifter och allmänna råd om maskininstallation, elektrisk installation och periodvis obemannat
maskinrum” applies to engine room installations, electrical installations, and periodically unmanned
engine rooms, and is applicable to the design for the methanol conversion for the M/S Jupiter. Chapter
35 of this regulation allows alternative design of engine and electrical installations if an analysis is done
showing equivalent safety to conventional systems. Guidelines for this type of analysis are provided in
MSC.1/Circ 1212, “Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for SOLAS Chapters II-1 and III”.
These guidelines state that identification of hazards and specifying accident scenarios are key to the
alternative design methodology.
3.2 RISK ASSESSMENT Hazard identification and specification of accident scenarios are part of the risk assessment process,
which also includes analysis of the probability and consequences of relevant accident scenarios and
assessment of the risk level to determine whether additional risk control measures need to be
implemented. The main steps in a risk assessment process are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Risk Assessment Process
Risk Presentation
Description of System / Goals / Scope
Hazard Identification
Accident Scenario Development
Evaluation of Risk Level
Implement risk control measures if risk level unacceptable
Scenario Consequences
Scenario Probability
Conclusions and recommendations
Ris
k A
na
lysi
s
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 3
Risk assessment is used in many industries, and there are ISO standards for carrying them out. The
International Maritime Organization has developed guidelines for “Formal Safety Assessment” (FSA),
which is a risk assessment method to be applied as a tool as part of the IMO decision making process.
The first step of the risk assessment process is describing the system and/or problem to be analysed
and setting the boundaries for the study. The hazard identification phase of the study has the purpose
of developing a list of hazards and associated accident scenarios. Identified accident scenarios should
then be assessed in terms of the expected frequency and consequence of the scenarios. A more
detailed risk analysis investigating causes and consequences should then be carried out for the
important scenarios identified during the hazard identification phase. If the risk analysis identifies high
risk areas that need to be addressed, then risk control options should be generated and assessed in
terms of risk reduction effect.
The IMO’s Guidelines for Alternative Design (MSC.1/Circ 1212) state that hazard identification is a
crucial step in developing casualty scenarios for comparing alternative designs. Hazards may be
identified using historical and statistical data, hazard evaluation techniques, expert opinion, and
experience.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 4
4 METHOD AND SCOPE
The hazard identification study carried out for the methanol conversion design for the M/S Jupiter
included the following:
Two hazard identification meetings, held 24 March 2017 and 21 September 2017, carried out
as a structured group review
Review of accident and incident data for road ferries from the Swedish Transport Agency’s
casualty database to identify possible casualties and estimate frequencies.
The hazard identification covered the main areas affected by conversion to methanol operation, as
follows: methanol bunkering, storage, the pump area, and fuel transfer to the engine.
4.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION MEETINGS Details of the two hazard identification meetings were as follows:
4.1.1 24 March 2017 Meeting:
The first hazard identification meeting was held 24 March 2017 and included a presentation of the M/S
Jupiter methanol conversion, an overview of the hazard identification process, and a structured group
review to identify hazards. The participants’ names, titles, and company affiliation are shown in Table
1.
Table 1. List of Participants in the Hazard Identification Meeting held 20170324
Participant Name Company Title
Fredrik Almlöv Swedish Transport Administration Ferry Operations
Technical and Environmental Head
Peter Jansson Peterberg Swedish Transport Administration Ferry Operations
Environmental Coordinator
Joakim Bomanson ScandiNAOS AB Naval Architect
Bengt Ramne ScandiNAOS AB Naval Architect
Nelly Forsman SSPA Sweden AB Risk Analyst
Joanne Ellis SSPA Sweden AB Project manager, risk and environment specialist
Mats Bengtsson Lund Technical University Research engineer, combustion engines
Sam Shamun Lund Technical University Doctoral student, combustion engines
The hazard identification focused on the functions affected by the methanol conversion design. Four
functional areas were used as the basis of the discussion:
Bunkering
Fuel Storage
Pump area
Engine room
The following guide words were used to help brainstorm hazard scenarios: leakage, rupture, corrosion,
fire, mechanical failure, control system failure, human error, impacts, manufacturing defects, and
material selection.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 5
Notes from the hazard identification meetings were recorded in an Excel spreadsheet. It was not
possible to complete the discussion of all nodes during the first meeting so a second meeting was
scheduled.
Prior to the second meeting Joanne Ellis and Joakim Bomanson met on 24 August 2017 and 1
September 2017 to fill in additional information and gaps remaining after the first hazard identification
meeting.
4.1.2 21 September 2017 Meeting
The second hazard identification session was held 21 September 2017 and included both a review of
the hazard identification Excel spreadsheet and an “open brainstorming” discussion regarding the
design and possible incident scenarios. The participants’ names, titles, and company affiliation for this
meeting are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. List of Participants in the Hazard Identification Meeting held 20170921
Participant Name Company Title
Fredrik Almlöv Swedish Transport Administration Ferry Operations
Technical and Environmental Head
Peter Jansson Peterberg Swedish Transport Administration Ferry Operations
Environmental Coordinator
Tim Flink Swedish Transport Administration Ferry Operations
Captain M/S Jupiter, worked on Swedish Transport road ferries since 1994, including all “planet” vessels
Joakim Bomanson ScandiNAOS AB Naval Architect
Joanne Ellis SSPA Sweden AB Project manager, risk and environment specialist
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 6
5 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The Swedish Transport Administration road ferry M/S Jupiter is a free sailing road ferry that was built
in 2007 at the Työvene shipyard in Finland.
Figure 2. The M/S Jupiter (Photo by Andreas Lundqvist).
The vessel operates on a route between Östano and Ljusterö in Stockholm’s archipelago. The route
length is 1100 metres and the crossing time is approximately seven minutes (Trafikverket, 2016). Thus
the sailing time to the nearest land point is at most 4 minutes. The vessel operates year round, even
in ice conditions. The vessel particulars of the M/S Jupiter and the proposed engine and tank details
for the methanol conversion design are shown in the Table 3.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 7
Table 3. M/S Jupiter Vessel Particulars and Machinery and Fuel Capacity for the Existing Vessel and the Methanol Conversion Design
M/S Jupiter Vessel Particulars Main Dimensions Length Overall (LOA) 86 m Breadth 14 m Depth 3.45 m Ramp Length 11 m GT 737 tonnes Design speed 11.6 knots Cargo Passengers 397 Passenger cars 60 Loading capacity 340 tonnes Machinery and Fuel Capacity for the Existing Vessel and the Methanol Conversion Design Existing Methanol Conversion Design Main Engine 4 x Volvo Penta D12D-C, 331
kW, total installed power is 1324 kW
4x Spark ignited methanol engines
Fuel Tank Size 2 x 28 m3 (diesel) (total capacity 56 m3)
1 x 25 m3 (methanol) 1 x 28 m3 (diesel)
Ref: Data on M/S Jupiter from Trafikverket: https://www.trafikverket.se/farjerederiet/om-
farjerederiet/vara-farjor/Vara-farjor/Jupiter/
Fuel Use and Bunkering: The vessel uses approximately one tonne of diesel fuel per day and is bunkered
once every fourteen days. Bunkering is carried out from a tanker truck that parks on the deck when
the vessel has a break in its regular operating schedule and there are no other vehicles or passengers
on board. A similar procedure is expected to occur for methanol bunkering, except that the vessel will
have to be bunkered approximately every eight days. A drip-free coupling would be used for the
methanol bunkering, of the same type that is used for the Stena Germanica.
Classification / Design / Safety training: The Swedish Transport Agency national regulations apply to
the current design and operation of the M/S Jupiter, with the following exception noted for the existing
design regarding insulation between the deck and the engine room:
Engine room fire insulation: There is no A60 fire insulation between the engine room and the
car deck, as is the case for all of the Swedish road ferries with redundant engine rooms (one in
each end of the vessel). This permits heat transfer between the engine room and the car deck
and keeps the deck ice-free under winter conditions.
Training of on-board personnel consists of Basic Safety according to STCW Manila (International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers) and ADR training
according to SRVFS 2006:7 (ADR-S, Regulations for transport of dangerous goods by road) with training
in extinguishing vehicle fires. There is no self-contained breathing apparatus equipment on board and
in the event of an engine room fire on a ferry the arrangement is for land-based firefighters to carry
out the main firefighting activities required. Existing on board firefighting equipment includes two fire
pumps, two water canons (one at each end of the deck), a sprinkler system to protect the
superstructure, and extinguishers with alcohol resistant foam, which were introduced when vehicles
using ethanol fuel became more common on board.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 8
5.1 METHANOL CONVERSION DESIGN The methanol conversion design is based on the available rules and changes have been done
continually in parallel with the risk analysis. This section represents a summary of the design, for more
details see report D4.1 “General Arrangement”.
The main work for conversion is to modify Tank Room 1. The existing Tank Room 1 and Tank Room 3
contain one independent diesel tank each and also serve as the main passage way to the machinery
rooms aft and forward of the tank rooms. Tank Room 2 in the middle contains auxiliary tanks,
switchboard and fire station.
Tank room 1, in the aft, will be divided in two parts with a new watertight and gastight bulkhead along
the centre line. Port side of the bulkhead will define the methanol tank room. The existing fuel tank
will be modified for methanol either with internal coating or installation of a new tank. Connections
on the tank will need to be modified and the tank is also to be equipped with nitrogen inertion and
new tank ventilation.
Figure 3. General overview of Jupiter. Tank room 1 will be converted to a methanol tank and pump room with a new water and gas tight bulkhead along the centre line. Methanol fuel pumps and other equipment on the fuel valve will be located inside the pump room. Individual double walled fuel pipes supply the propulsion engines forward and aft with methanol.
The room will contain individual fuel pumps for each engine, remotely operated fuel shutoff valves
and fuel filters. The methanol tank room is also equipped with independent mechanical ventilation
and methanol vapour detection as well as liquid leak detection. From a fire safety point of view the
pump room is classified as a hazardous area and all electrical equipment is of EX type.
To prevent methanol leaks in other parts of the ferry all fuel pipes outside of the new tank room are
double walled and vapour detectors are placed close to each engine. The fuel system has a working
pressure of about 3 bar.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 9
Methanol vapour detection serves as an important part of the safety system as potential leaks can be
detected early and appropriate safety measures implemented before a dangerous situation can
evolve.
In addition to the vapour detection system fire detection and fire suppression systems are upgraded.
IR-detectors are installed to detect methanol fires in the engine rooms and pump room. For
suppression of fire the gaseous total flooding system is expanded with a section for the pump room.
The capacity is also expanded as the gas concentration for methanol needs to be somewhat higher to
obtain the necessary safety margin compared to diesel.
Bunkering of methanol is done through a new bunker connection above the methanol tank room. The
bunkering connection is a dry disconnect fast coupling.
5.2 METHANOL PROPERTIES AND CHARACTERISTICS Selected characteristics of methanol as compared to conventional marine gas oil fuel are shown in
Table 4.
Table 4. Selected chemical and physical properties of methanol as compared to MGO (data from Ellis and Tanneberger, 2015)
Properties MGO Methanol
Physical State liquid liquid
Boiling Temperature at 1 bar [°C] 175-650 65
Density at 15°C [kg/m3] Max. 900 796 Dynamic Viscosity [cSt] (at 40°C)
3.5
(at 25°C)
0.6
Lower Heating Value [MJ/kg] 43 20
Lubricity WSD [µm] 280-400 1100
Vapour Density air=1 >5 1.1
Flash Point (TCC) [°C] >60 12
Auto Ignition Temperature [°C] 250 - 500 464 Flammability Limits [by % Vol of Mixture] 0.3 -10 6 – 36
Other characteristics for methanol relevant from a hazard perspective include:
burns with a clear flame which is difficult to see in daylight
corrosive, so care should be taken with material selection (stainless steel is a recommended
material for use with methanol (Methanol Institute, 2013), for seals, o-rings, gaskets, etc.,
material compatibility needs to be checked)
toxic to humans by ingestion, inhalation, or contact
in the event of a spill to water it dissolves, is biodegradable and does not bio-accumulate
completely soluble in water, and water/methanol solutions are non-flammable when
methanol concentration is less than 25% in water.
Occupational exposure limit values for methanol and diesel vapours in air are shown in Table 5.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 10
Table 5. Swedish Occupational Exposure Limit Values for methanol and two types of diesel / fuel oil: diesel values are specified as maximum total hydrocarbons in air
Swedish Occupational Exposure Limit Methanol Diesel
Level Limit Value (LVL) – value for exposure for one working day (8 hours)
200 ppm
250 mg/m3
Diesel MK1: 350 mg/m3 Heating oil: 250 mg/m3
Short Term Value (STV) – time weighted average for a 15 minute reference period
250 ppm
350 mg/m3
Reference: Swedish Work Environment Authority, 2005.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 11
6 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION DISCUSSION
A record of the hazards identified during the meetings, comments recorded, and risk ratings is provided
in the Excel worksheets included in Appendix I.
6.1 RISK RATINGS Risk estimation takes into account the likelihood (frequency) and severity of an unwanted event. For
the hazards identified during the hazard identification meeting, both the cause of a hazardous event
occurring and the possible effects (consequences) were identified and described. For a methanol fuel
system evaluation, for example, the hazardous event is the release of methanol, and one example of
cause could be damage to the bunker hose. Possible effects of the release could be fire if there is an
ignition source present. Severity of this could be judged by the maximum amount of fuel that could be
released from the hose before transfer is stopped. The frequency and severity of each identified
hazardous event were estimated using either a review of historical accident data where possible and
judgement of the persons involved in the study.
6.1.1 Frequency Ratings
For some of the hazardous events identified, the cause could be a ship casualty event such as a
collision, grounding, or fire that has an impact on the methanol bunkering, storage, or fuel transfer
system. Data from the Swedish Sea Accident (SOS) database (SOS: “SJöOlyckssytem”) was used to
estimate probability of these ship casualty events that may result in consequences from the methanol
fuel. SOS is a national casualty database that contains information on accidents and incidents involving
Swedish flagged vessels in all waters, and vessels of all flags in Swedish territorial water. Reportable
accidents to this database include events that may have resulted in personal injury or death, ship
damage, or escape of harmful substance (spill). Three categories are used to describe the severity of
the event: serious accident, minor accident, and incident.
Data on accidents and incidents involving Swedish road ferries over the 20-year period from 1997 to
the end of 2016 was obtained from the SOS database to estimate frequency for some of the events.
Data from only the free sailing road ferries was used, as cable ferries were considered to be quite
different with respect to the probability of specific accident categories, such as groundings and engine
room fires. Incidents/accidents occurring while the vessels were at a shipyard for maintenance were
also not included. Only the accidental events in the categories “serious accident” and “minor accident”
were included in the estimation of frequency. Those classified as “incident” were for the most part
“near-misses”, such as close proximity to another vessel when passing, that did not result in any
consequences to humans or to the ship. Minor and serious accidents involving free sailing road ferries
during the 20-year period 19970101 to 20161231 are shown in Figure 4.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 12
Figure 4. Accidents involving free sailing Swedish road ferries during the 20-year period 19970101 to 20161231, categorized according to initiating event, as recorded in the Swedish Sea Accident database
All accidents except one were categorized as minor. The accident categories that were considered
possible base causes of some of the scenarios identified in the hazard identification sessions included
fire/explosion, grounding, and collisions. No serious accidents were reported in these categories.
Further discussion of these main categories were as follows:
Fire / Explosion: 6 minor accidents were recorded in this category. Two of the six involved
smoke development and no firefighting activities were necessary. One was a small fire that
self-extinguished when the engine was stopped. The remaining three were quickly
extinguished by crew. Localized damage was reported for only one of the six accidents.
Grounding: 23 minor accidents occurred with the free-sailing vessels over the twenty-year
period. For 17 of these, there was minor damage to the vessel – primarily to the propeller or
rudder. For the remainder there was no damage noted in the report.
Collision with pleasure boat: Five reported incidents, all of them were minor. Only one resulted
in damage to the road ferry, and it was recorded as minor damage.
Collision with quay, or similar fixed object: 10 incidents were reported, all described as minor,
with minor damage noted for 8 of them, and no damage for the other two.
Collision with other vessel: There were eight reported incidents, all minor, with some minor
damage to the road ferry noted in five cases.
To calculate frequency of the above type of accident events, an annual fleet size of 45 free sailing
ferries was used, for the 20 year period, thus giving 900 ship-years of operation. No major accidents
were recorded in the fire, collision, and grounding scenarios during the 20-year period, so the
frequency for major accidents was estimated as less than 1/900 (approximately 10-3). Minor accidents
were more frequent but were not of sufficient magnitude to initiate a methanol release scenario as
described in the hazard identification spreadsheet (See Appendix I).
The scale used for estimating the frequency index of each scenario recorded in the spreadsheet was
that presented in the International Maritime Organization´s Guidelines for formal safety assessment
(FSA) as shown in Table 6.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Other
Spill
Personal Injuries
Machinery Failure
Water ingress
Collision with other vessel
Collision with quay, bridge, etc.
Collision with pleasure boat
Grounding
Fire/explosion in engine room
Minor Accidents Serious Accidents
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 13
Table 6. Frequency Index for Accident Scenarios (from IMO’s Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment)
6.1.2 Severity Rating
Severity of scenarios was also rated according to the scale presented in the IMO’s Guidelines for Formal
Safety Assessment, as shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Severity Index for Accident Scenarios (from IMO’s Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment)
The IMO’s Guidelines for Alternative design (MSC.1/Circ 1212) state that hazards should be grouped
according to whether they are localized, major, or catastrophic. Localized hazards are considered to
be those where effects are limited to a localized area. Major incidents are considered to be those that
are limited to “a medium effect zone, limited to the boundaries of the ship.” Catastrophic incidents
are those that would have effects extending beyond the ship.
6.2 RISK RANKING To evaluate and rank the overall risk in terms of probability and consequence a risk matrix was used,
as shown in Figure 5.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 14
Figure 5. Risk matrix showing number of scenarios for the case study that were ranked in each category
The frequency and consequence of each of the scenarios identified during the hazard identification
session for the SUMMETH case study were ranked, with results recorded in the Excel spreadsheet in
Appendix I. The numbers shown on Figure 4 correspond to the number of scenarios achieving the
specific ranking – for example 12 scenarios were estimated to be “extremely remote” with minor
consequences. All scenarios were either in the green “low risk” or yellow “as low as reasonably
practicable” zones. Accident scenarios that fall into the “red zone” are considered to have an
unacceptably high risk level and risk reduction measures should be implemented to reduce the risk to
an acceptable level. Scenarios within the yellow zone are tolerable but measures to keep the risk “as
low as reasonable practicable” should be taken. Those within the green zone are considered to be
acceptable.
High Risk
Low Risk
12 3
14 5 6
5 1
Yellow: ”As Low as Reasonably Practicable”(ALARP)
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 15
7 MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The hazard scenarios identified in the workshop and sessions were all ranked to be “low risk” or “as
low as reasonably practicable”. It should be noted that the engine itself was not included in the hazard
identification workshop, but should be covered separately by the engine supplier when engine type
details are available.
Issues highlighted from the hazard identification are as follows:
Ensure that a tank entry procedure is in place for any maintenance, and specify procedures
should be specified for when the ship goes for repairs and maintenance
All who enter the tank / pump room should have basic safety training for methanol
Method for detection of methanol in the annular space of the double-walled pipes should be
specified
Specify procedures for draining possible methanol spills (for example if there is an
accumulation under the methanol tank)
Ensure bunkering procedure and check-list specific to methanol bunkering is developed
Pump area leakage: consider ways to localize any leaks from connections for the four pumps
in this area - perhaps have separate spill trays and detectors to determine which of the four
may be leaking.
Review engine room safety when engine selection has been finalized, considering issues such
as spray guard/vent hood, gas detection.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 16
8 REFERENCES
Bomanson, J. and B. Ramne. 2018. General Arrangement, Class Documentation. SUMMETH Project
Report D4.1.
Ellis, J., and K. Tanneberger. 2015. Study on the use of ethyl and methyl alcohol as alternative fuels in
shipping. Report prepared for the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).
Methanol Institute. 2013. Methanol Safe Handling Manual. Available: www.methanol.org [accessed:
20150815].
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, 2007a. Formal Safety Assessment, Consolidated text of the
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process
(MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392). MSC 83/INF.2. London: IMO.
IMO. MSC.1/Circ 1212, “Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for SOLAS Chapters II-1
and III”.
Swedish Work Environment Authority. 2005. Occupational Exposure Limit Values and Measures
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Exposure Limit Values and Measures against Air Contaminants, together with General
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http://www.av.se/dokument/inenglish/legislations/eng0517.pdf
Trafikverket. 2013. This is STA Road Ferries. Available:
http://www.trafikverket.se/contentassets/8aa0f255593647339b61b34820eedbeb/100527_this_is_t
he_sta_road_ferries_utg2_webb.pdf
Trafikverket. 2014. Säkerhet, kvalitet och miljö. Web page published by the Swedish Transport
Administration Road Ferries. Available:
http://www.trafikverket.se/farjerederiet/farjeleder/Farjeleder-i-
Stockholm213/Adelsoleden/Sakerhet-kvalitet-och-miljo/
Trafikverket, 2016. Tidtabell Vägfärja Ljusteröleden. Trafikverket Beställningsnr. 100153.
SUMMETH M/S Jupiter Conversion Hazard Identification Report version 20180410 Page 17
APPENDIX I HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORKSHEETS
SU
MM
ET
H P
roje
ct H
azI
D D
iscu
ssio
n o
f th
e J
up
ite
r R
oa
d F
err
y D
esi
gn
- C
on
soli
da
ted
ve
rsio
n w
ith
co
mm
en
ts f
rom
se
ssio
ns
20
17
03
24
an
d 2
01
70
92
1,
wit
h a
dd
tio
na
l ra
tin
gs
est
ima
ted
by
J.
Ell
is a
nd
J.
Bo
ma
nso
n
Fre
qu
en
cyS
ev
eri
ty
1.1
.1Le
ak
ing
bu
nk
er
con
ne
ctio
nR
ele
ase
of
me
tha
no
l o
nto
th
e
de
ck d
uri
ng
bu
nk
eri
ng
op
era
tio
n.
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nD
rip
fre
e
cou
pli
ng
be
twe
en
tru
ck a
nd
bu
nk
er
lin
e.
No
pa
sse
ng
ers
are
on
bo
ard
du
rin
g
bu
nk
eri
ng
. E
xclu
sio
n/S
afe
ty Z
on
e t
o b
e
est
ab
lish
ed
aro
un
d t
he
bu
nk
eri
ng
sta
tio
n d
uri
ng
bu
nk
eri
ng
. E
sta
bli
sh
bu
nk
eri
ng
pro
ced
ure
s to
be
fo
llo
we
d.
Pre
pa
re a
sp
eci
fic
bu
nk
eri
ng
pro
ced
ure
.
rem
ote
min
or
1.1
.2h
ose
ru
ptu
re
m
eth
an
ol
rele
ase
fire
if
an
ig
nit
ion
so
urc
e
is p
rese
nt
1.
Flu
sh t
he
sp
ill
are
a w
ith
wa
ter,
usi
ng
a s
pil
l b
arr
ier
tow
ard
s o
the
r a
rea
s o
f th
e
de
ck.
2
. C
off
erd
am
,
spil
l b
erm
, ta
nk
to
co
lle
ct t
he
sp
ill.
Insp
ect
ion
of
the
ho
se b
efo
re
bu
nk
eri
ng
, sa
fety
pro
ced
ure
s fo
r th
e
tan
ke
r tr
uck
P
PE
: sa
fety
gla
sse
s
an
d g
lov
es
wh
en
ha
nd
lin
g m
eth
an
ol.
Sh
ow
er
an
d e
ye
wa
sh a
va
ila
ble
in
ca
se
of
exp
osu
re.
Sa
fety
ro
uti
ne
s a
nd
eq
uip
me
nt
as
req
uir
ed
by
th
e m
ate
ria
l
safe
ty d
ata
sh
ee
t.
De
term
ine
wh
ich
pro
ced
ure
s w
ou
ld b
e a
cce
pta
ble
fro
m t
he
en
vir
on
me
nta
l a
uth
ori
tie
s: e
ith
er
coll
ect
th
e
spil
l o
r fl
ush
th
e a
rea
wit
h w
ate
r a
nd
dir
ect
to
th
e
rece
ivin
g w
ate
r. C
he
ck d
rain
ag
e s
yst
em
s o
n d
eck
, a
nd
wh
eth
er
it i
s p
oss
ible
to
ha
ve
a c
oll
ect
ion
are
a.
rea
son
ab
ly p
rob
ab
le
for
rup
ture
, re
mo
te
to h
av
e b
oth
rup
ture
an
d i
gn
itio
n
sou
rce
, a
s b
un
ke
rin
g
sho
uld
ta
ke
pla
ce
wit
h n
o i
gn
itio
n
sou
rce
sm
ino
r if
no
ig
nit
ion
1.1
.3Im
pro
pre
r co
nn
ect
ion
of
ho
sem
eth
an
ol
rele
ase
fi
re i
f a
n i
gn
itio
n s
ou
rce
is p
rese
nt
As
for
ab
ov
e:
1.1
.2
rem
ote
min
or
1.1
.4ta
nk
er
tru
ck d
riv
es
aw
ay
wit
h
ho
se s
till
co
nn
ect
ed
me
tha
no
l re
lea
sefi
re i
f a
n i
gn
itio
n s
ou
rce
is p
rese
nt
Flu
sh t
he
are
a w
ith
wa
ter,
sp
ill
ba
rrie
r
tow
ard
s th
e d
eck
. 2
. C
off
erd
am
, sp
ill
ba
rrie
r, s
pil
l ta
nk
. In
spe
ctio
n o
f th
e h
ose
pri
or
to b
un
ke
rin
g,
safe
ty r
ou
tin
e f
or
the
ta
nk
er
tru
ck,
wh
ee
l ch
ock
s fo
r th
e
tru
ck.
rem
ote
min
or
1.1
.5C
oll
isio
n
(fe
rry
coll
isio
n)
Ta
nk
er
tru
ck d
am
ag
ed
, h
ose
com
es
loo
se,
me
tha
no
l sp
ill
fire
if
an
ig
nit
ion
so
urc
e
is p
rese
nt
Bu
nk
eri
ng
wh
ile
th
e f
err
y i
s b
ert
he
d a
t
the
qu
ay
.
rem
ote
min
or
1.1
.6A
no
the
r v
eh
icle
co
llid
es
wit
h t
he
tan
ke
r tr
uck
du
rin
g b
un
ke
rin
g.
Ta
nk
er
tru
ck d
am
ag
ed
, h
ose
com
es
loo
se,
me
tha
no
l sp
ill
fire
if
an
ig
nit
ion
so
urc
e
is p
rese
nt
No
oth
er
ve
hic
les
pe
rmit
ted
on
de
ck
du
rin
g b
un
ke
rin
g.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tem
ino
r
Ris
k C
om
po
ne
nt
Ra
tin
g
1.1
Le
ak
ag
e
No
de
1 B
un
ke
rin
g
Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering
CO
MM
EN
TS
S
AF
EG
UA
RD
SP
OT
EN
TIA
L E
FF
EC
TS
/
CO
NS
EQ
UE
NC
ES
HA
ZA
RD
CA
US
E/D
ES
CR
IPT
ION
ITE
M
1.1
.7Le
ak
ag
e o
f v
alv
es
or
pip
e i
n
bu
nk
er
lin
e w
ith
in v
ess
el
Lea
ka
ge
of
me
tha
no
l in
to t
he
ve
sse
l's
tan
k r
oo
m (
ex
cla
sse
d
are
a)
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nT
he
ta
nk
ro
om
ha
s g
as
/ v
ap
ou
r
de
tect
ion
, is
ex-
cla
sse
d.
If m
eth
an
ol
is
de
tect
ed
, th
e a
larm
wo
uld
be
tri
gg
ere
d
an
d b
un
ke
rin
g w
ou
ld b
e s
top
pe
d
(wri
tte
n p
roce
du
re t
o s
top
bu
nk
eri
ng
if
the
ala
rm s
ou
nd
s).
Act
ive
ve
nti
lati
on
of
the
ta
nk
ro
om
. In
spe
ctio
n a
nd
te
stin
g o
f
pip
ing
, a
pp
rop
ria
te m
ate
ria
ls u
sed
.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
te
min
or
giv
en
th
at
de
tect
ion
sy
ste
ms
an
d s
afe
gu
ard
s
sho
uld
pre
ve
nt
ign
itio
n i
f th
ere
is
a
spil
l
1.2
.1B
un
ke
r p
ipe
da
ma
ge
d b
y v
eh
icle
on
ca
r d
eck
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
No
ve
hic
les
on
de
ck d
uri
ng
bu
nk
eri
ng
Wh
en
re
pa
irin
g a
da
ma
ge
d b
un
ke
r p
ipe
, m
ust
em
pty
tan
ks
(sa
me
pro
ced
ure
as
curr
en
tly
ha
pp
en
s fo
r
die
sel)
. C
on
sid
er
ext
ra p
rote
ctio
n f
or
bu
nk
eri
ng
pip
e
on
de
ckre
mo
te
min
or
- li
mit
ed
am
ou
nt
of
fue
l in
pip
e
1.2
.2H
ose
ru
ptu
re
as
ab
ov
e f
or
1.1
.2a
s a
bo
ve
fo
r 1
.1.2
as
ab
ov
e f
or
1.1
.2a
s a
bo
ve
fo
r 1
.1.2
rea
son
ab
ly p
rob
ab
le
for
rup
ture
, re
mo
te
to h
av
e b
oth
rup
ture
an
d i
gn
itio
n
sou
rce
, a
s b
un
ke
rin
g
sho
uld
ta
ke
pla
ce
wit
h n
o i
gn
itio
n
sou
rce
sm
ino
r if
no
ig
nit
ion
1.2
.3O
ve
rpre
ssu
re o
f b
un
ke
r li
ne
No
t p
oss
ible
as
it i
s a
gra
vit
y f
ed
lin
e.
Ext
rem
ely
re
mo
te
1.2
.4B
un
ke
r p
ipe
da
ma
ge
d b
y v
eh
icle
on
ca
r d
eck
(n
ot
du
rin
g b
un
ke
rin
g
be
cau
se v
eh
icle
s w
ill
no
t b
e o
n
de
ck d
uri
ng
th
e b
un
ke
rin
g
pro
ced
ure
)
Lea
k o
f N
2 g
as
(lim
ite
d a
mo
un
t -
on
ly w
ha
t is
exi
stin
g i
n t
he
pip
e)
Sm
all
am
ou
nts
of
N2 w
ill
lea
k t
o o
pe
n a
ir
Pip
e i
ne
rte
d a
fte
r b
un
ke
rin
g,
va
lve
on
pip
e a
t ta
nk
is
clo
sed
wh
en
no
bu
nk
eri
ng
is
in p
rog
ress
. T
he
refo
re o
nly
nit
rog
en
wil
l le
ak
to
th
e o
pe
n a
ir.
Pro
tect
ion
of
the
bu
nk
er
pip
e f
rom
ve
hic
le t
raff
ic.
Re
com
me
nd
th
at
the
bu
nk
er
pip
e i
s p
rote
cte
d f
rom
ve
hic
le t
raff
ic.
Re
aso
na
bly
pro
ba
ble
, a
t le
ast
to
sust
ain
da
ma
ge
to
the
pro
tect
ion
Min
or
1.2
.5B
un
ke
r p
ipe
in
ta
nk
ro
om
da
ma
ge
d
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
lim
ite
d r
ele
ase
of
me
tha
no
l
Pip
e i
s lo
cate
d i
n s
afe
are
a,
hig
h u
p i
n
the
ro
om
, b
un
ke
rin
g p
ipe
en
ters
th
e t
op
of
the
ta
nk
.E
xtre
me
ly r
em
ote
Min
or
1.2
.6S
ide
im
pa
ct c
oll
isio
n o
n b
un
ke
r
con
ne
ctio
n f
rom
an
oth
er
ve
sse
l
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
va
po
ur
N2
wil
l le
ak
ou
t o
f th
e
bu
nk
er
lin
e
Bu
nk
er
lin
e i
s in
ert
ed
aft
er
bu
nk
eri
ng
rem
ote
Min
or
1.3
.1C
orr
osi
on
of
pip
es
an
d
com
po
ne
nts
Me
cha
nic
al
fail
ure
/le
ak
ag
eLi
mit
ed
re
lea
se o
f
me
tha
no
l in
to t
an
k
roo
m.
All
ma
teri
als
use
d i
n c
om
po
ne
nts
to
be
ass
ess
ed
fo
r co
mp
ati
bil
ity
wit
h
me
tha
no
l. S
S3
16
to
be
use
d f
or
all
pip
ing
. T
an
k r
oo
m i
s a
n E
x cl
ass
ed
sp
ace
wit
h g
as
de
tect
ion
an
d v
en
tila
tio
n.
Re
mo
teM
ino
r
1.3
.2E
rosi
on
/co
rro
sio
n a
t ta
nk
fil
lin
g
pip
e
Ero
sio
n o
f ta
nk
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
Fil
lin
g p
ipe
is
go
ing
to
th
e b
ott
om
of
the
tan
k t
o p
rev
en
t to
o m
uch
mo
ve
me
nt
of
the
flu
id,
as
we
ll a
s b
uil
du
p o
f st
ati
c
ele
ctri
city
. F
low
ra
te i
s li
mit
ed
. T
an
k
roo
m s
afe
gu
ard
s a
s in
1.3
.1.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
teM
ino
r
1.3
Co
rro
sio
n/e
rosi
on
1.2
Ru
ptu
re
Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering
1.4
Fir
e/e
xp
losi
on
(E
xte
rna
l so
urc
es)
1.4
.1F
ire
in
en
gin
e r
oo
mH
igh
te
mp
era
ture
s in
th
e t
an
k
roo
m
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nF
ire
pro
tect
ion
. B
ulk
he
ad
be
twe
en
en
gin
e r
oo
m a
nd
me
tha
no
l ta
nk
ro
om
to b
e A
-60
or
ap
pro
pri
ate
to
lim
it
tem
pe
ratu
re r
ise
in
ta
nk
ro
om
.
En
gin
es
are
no
t ru
nn
ing
du
rin
g
bu
nk
eri
ng
- c
on
ne
ctio
n t
o l
an
d
ele
ctri
city
in
ste
ad
.
rem
ote
: n
o f
ire
s
tha
t sp
rea
d d
uri
ng
20
ye
ars
of
op
era
tio
n
sev
ere
(re
sult
s fr
om
the
fir
e i
n g
en
era
l,
no
t m
uch
ad
de
d
da
ma
ge
exp
ect
ed
for
me
tha
no
l a
s
com
pa
red
to
die
sel
fue
l in
th
is c
ase
)
1.4
.3F
ire
on
ca
r d
eck
du
rin
g b
un
ke
rin
g
op
era
tio
ns
Me
tha
no
l in
pip
e c
ou
ld b
e
ov
erh
ea
ted
an
d p
ote
nti
all
y
rup
ture
th
e p
ipe
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nN
o p
ass
en
ge
rs o
n s
hip
du
rin
g
bu
nk
eri
ng
. C
ar
de
ck i
s e
mp
ty,
be
sid
es
bu
nk
eri
ng
tru
ck.
Th
ere
is
a d
eck
wa
sh
syst
em
to
co
ol
the
de
ck.
Re
mo
te:
no
ne
reco
rde
d i
n a
ccid
en
t
da
tab
ase
ov
er
20
ye
ars
sig
nif
ica
nt
1.4
.4Li
gh
tnin
g s
trik
e d
uri
ng
bu
nk
eri
ng
Po
ten
tia
l fi
reF
ire
/exp
losi
on
No
bu
nk
eri
ng
du
rin
g t
hu
nd
ers
torm
s, n
o
op
en
ve
nti
lati
on
to
th
e t
an
k.
Bu
nk
eri
ng
pro
ced
ure
to
sp
eci
fy n
o b
un
ke
rin
g d
uri
ng
ele
ctri
cal
sto
rms.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
te
min
or
- sh
ou
ld b
e
no
me
tha
no
l to
ign
ite
.
1.7
.1C
on
tro
l sy
ste
m f
ali
ure
/ p
ow
er
loss
Loss
of
con
tro
l d
uri
ng
bu
nk
eri
ng
Ta
nk
ov
erf
low
/re
lea
se t
o
en
vir
on
me
nt
Co
ntr
ols
are
ma
nu
al
- M
an
ua
l v
alv
es
on
tru
ck.
No
so
urc
e o
f ig
nit
ion
du
rin
g
bu
nk
eri
ng
, p
roce
du
res.
If
the
re i
s p
ow
er
loss
on
th
e v
ess
el
resu
ltin
g i
n l
oss
of
act
ive
ve
nti
lati
on
th
en
bu
nk
eri
ng
wo
uld
sto
p a
uto
ma
tica
llly
(v
alv
es
wo
uld
clo
se
on
th
e b
un
ke
rin
g l
ine
).
rem
ote
min
or
Bu
nk
eri
ng
of
the
wro
ng
fu
el
into
the
ta
nk
Dif
fere
nt
typ
e o
f co
nn
ect
ion
fo
r th
e
me
tha
no
l ta
nk
- w
ou
ldn
't b
e p
oss
ible
.
Bu
nk
eri
ng
ch
eck
list
an
d p
roce
du
res,
cre
w t
rain
ing
re
ga
rdin
g m
eth
an
ol
ha
nd
lin
g.
2.1
.1M
eth
an
ol
tan
k f
ail
ure
Me
tha
no
l w
ill
fill
th
e t
an
k r
oo
mF
ire
/exp
losi
on
Ta
nk
ro
om
is
a h
aza
rdo
us
are
a (
Ex
cla
ss),
de
tect
ion
of
me
tha
no
l le
ak
s in
air
an
d d
rain
we
lls.
Do
or
to n
on
- h
aza
rdo
us
are
a g
as
tig
ht.
Fix
ed
fir
e f
igh
tin
g s
yst
em
inst
all
ed
. T
an
k c
ert
ific
ati
on
an
d r
eg
ula
r
insp
ect
ion
. T
he
ta
nk
is
a f
ree
sta
nd
ing
un
it a
nd
no
t in
teg
ral.
Re
mo
tesi
gn
ific
an
t
2.1
.2Le
ak
ag
e f
rom
th
e p
ipe
co
nn
ect
ion
(ma
ste
r fu
el
pip
e f
rom
th
e t
an
k t
o
the
fo
ur
pu
mp
s)
M
eth
an
ol
rele
ase
in
to t
he
tan
k/p
um
p r
oo
m
Fir
e i
f th
ere
is
an
ig
nit
ion
sou
rce
. S
hu
t d
ow
n o
f
en
gin
es,
lo
ss o
f p
ow
er
to
the
sh
ip i
f n
o r
ed
un
da
ncy
EX
cla
sse
d e
qu
ipm
en
t, n
on
-sp
ark
ing
too
ls,
shu
t d
ow
n p
roce
du
re.
Ne
ed
to
th
ink
ab
ou
t re
du
nd
an
cy -
po
ssib
ly t
wo
ma
ste
r
fue
l v
alv
es
or
tan
k c
on
ne
ctio
ns
for
red
un
da
ncy
- e
ach
on
e g
oe
s to
tw
o p
um
ps.
Cu
rre
nt
de
sig
n h
as
en
gin
e
roo
ms
in b
oth
en
ds
of
the
ve
sse
l, p
rov
idin
g
red
un
da
ncy
.R
em
ote
Sig
nif
ica
nt
wit
h
red
un
da
nt
en
gin
e
roo
m.
Se
ve
re (
if n
o
red
un
da
ncy
is
in
pla
ce).
2.1
.3Le
ak
ag
e f
rom
th
e p
ipe
co
nn
ect
ion
(ta
nk
to
pu
mp
s:
ind
ivid
ua
l fu
el
pip
es
to e
ach
of
the
fo
ur
pu
mp
s.
Pip
es
ori
gin
ate
fro
m t
he
T-
con
ne
ctio
n t
o t
he
ma
ste
r fu
el
pip
e
Me
tha
no
l re
lea
se i
nto
th
e
tan
k/p
um
p r
oo
m
Fir
e i
f ig
nit
ion
so
urc
e.
Sh
ut
do
wn
of
aff
ect
ed
pu
mp
an
d e
ng
ine
(o
ne
ou
t o
f fo
ur)
.
EX
cla
sse
d e
qu
ipm
en
t, n
on
-sp
ark
ing
too
ls,
shu
t d
ow
n p
roce
du
re.
Ho
w t
o d
ete
rmin
e w
hic
h o
f th
e p
ipe
s a
re l
ea
kin
g?
Th
ink
ab
ou
t a
wa
y o
f lo
cali
sin
g t
he
le
ak
lo
cati
on
- s
uch
as
ind
ivid
ua
l sp
ill
tra
ys
an
d d
ete
cto
rs f
or
ea
ch o
f th
e
fou
r p
ipe
s, a
nd
pu
t sp
ill
de
tect
ors
aro
un
d c
on
ne
cto
rs.
Re
aso
na
bly
pro
ba
ble
Min
or
- lo
ss o
f o
ne
en
gin
e b
ut
the
re i
s
red
un
da
ncy
.
ting systemNode 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering - Node 1 Bunkering
1.8
Hu
ma
n e
rro
r
1.7
Co
ntr
ol
syst
em
No
de
2 :
Sto
rag
e t
an
k a
nd
ve
nti
ng
sy
ste
m /
ta
nk
ro
om
2.1
Le
ak
ag
e (
me
tha
no
l)
2.1
.4N
itro
ge
n g
as
syst
em
sto
ps
fun
ctio
nin
g.
Me
tha
no
l v
ap
ou
rs e
nte
r th
e
ve
nti
ng
sy
ste
m
rele
ase
of
me
tha
no
l fr
om
the
ve
nt
Sa
fety
zo
ne
aro
un
d t
he
ve
nt,
lo
w
pre
ssu
re a
larm
fo
r th
e n
itro
ge
n s
yst
em
,
safe
ty p
roce
du
res
R
em
ote
Min
or
2.1
.5 L
ea
ks
into
spa
ce u
nd
er
tan
k
(bo
tto
m p
lati
ng
)
Me
tha
no
l p
oo
ls i
n s
pa
ce u
nd
er
tan
k (
this
is
on
ly e
xpe
cte
d t
o
ha
pp
en
wit
h a
la
rge
le
ak
).
Va
po
ur
bu
ild
up
un
de
r ta
nk
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
n.
Me
tha
no
l
va
po
ur
cou
ld b
uil
d u
p i
n
spa
ce u
nd
er
tan
k.
Re
qu
ire
sto
p i
n s
erv
ice
to
cle
an
up
.
Va
po
ur
de
tect
ion
sp
eci
fica
lly
lo
cate
d i
n
low
est
are
a,
EX
sa
fe s
pa
ce,
ve
nti
lati
on
,
fire
in
sula
tio
n o
n t
he
bu
lkh
ea
d t
ow
ard
s
the
en
gin
e r
oo
m.
Ne
ed
pro
ced
ure
fo
r sa
fe r
em
ov
al
of
an
y s
pil
l th
at
acc
um
ula
tes.
Re
mo
tesi
gn
ific
an
t
2.1
.6M
eth
an
ol
tan
k f
ract
ure
a
bo
ve
liq
uid
lin
e
N2
in t
an
k r
oo
mIn
suff
icie
nt
bre
ath
ing
atm
osp
he
re i
n t
an
k r
oo
m
tan
k i
nsp
ect
ion
, d
ete
cto
rs i
n t
an
k r
oo
m
(fo
r O
2),
ve
nti
lati
on
Re
com
me
nd
oxy
ge
n s
en
sor
in t
an
k/p
um
p r
oo
m t
o
wa
rn i
f a
tmo
sph
ere
be
com
es
un
-bre
ath
ab
le
Ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tem
ino
r
2.1
.7F
ail
ure
fro
m m
eth
an
ol
bu
nk
er
lin
e w
he
re i
t e
nte
rs i
nto
ta
nk
N2
in t
an
k r
oo
mIn
suff
icie
nt
bre
ath
ing
atm
osp
he
re i
n t
an
k r
oo
m
de
tect
ors
in
ta
nk
ro
om
, v
en
tila
tio
nR
eco
mm
en
d o
xyg
en
se
nso
r in
ta
nk
/pu
mp
ro
om
to
wa
rn i
f a
tmo
sph
ere
be
com
es
un
-bre
ath
ab
le
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tem
ino
r
2.1
.8Le
ak
ag
e o
f N
2 f
rom
N2 s
tora
ge
tan
ks
(sto
red
on
de
ck)
N2 i
n n
itro
ge
n s
tora
ge
ro
om
Insu
ffic
ien
t b
rea
thin
g
atm
osp
he
re i
n s
tora
ge
roo
m (
roo
m i
s o
n d
eck
)
Wa
rnin
g s
ign
s, p
roce
du
re f
or
en
teri
ng
the
ro
om
, co
nfi
ne
d s
pa
ce e
ntr
y
pro
ced
ure
Ch
eck
cu
rre
nt
pro
ced
ure
s a
re f
or
en
teri
ng
th
e r
oo
ms
tod
ay
. T
he
ro
om
s a
re c
urr
en
tly
use
d f
or
ine
rt g
as
so
the
re i
s th
e s
am
e r
isk
fo
r th
e r
oo
ms
tod
ay
. S
imil
ar
risk
red
uct
ion
pro
ced
ure
.e
xtre
me
ly r
em
ote
min
or
2.1
.9Le
ak
ag
e o
f m
eth
an
ol
into
N2
lin
es
-
is t
his
po
ssib
le?
No
t p
oss
ible
be
cau
se t
he
re i
s a
che
ck v
alv
e (
no
re
turn
va
lve
)
2.2
.1C
oll
isio
nT
an
k r
up
ture
, le
ak
ag
eF
ire
/exp
losi
on
De
sig
n w
ith
de
form
ati
on
zo
ne
. T
an
k i
s
ind
ep
en
de
nt.
If
hu
ll i
s ru
ptu
red
th
e
com
pa
rtm
en
t w
ill
fill
wit
h w
ate
r,
dil
uti
ng
th
e m
eth
an
ol.
Co
llis
ion
is
po
ssib
le,
bu
t a
co
llis
ion
of
the
se
ve
rity
th
at
wo
uld
re
sult
in
ta
nk
da
ma
ge
is
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
te,
as
the
ta
nk
is
ind
ep
en
de
nt
wit
hin
th
e h
ull
.
Re
mo
te (
for
a
sev
ere
co
llis
ion
)
min
or
2.2
.2G
rou
nd
ing
Ta
nk
ru
ptu
re,
lea
ka
ge
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nD
esi
gn
wit
h d
efo
rma
tio
n z
on
e.
Ta
nk
is
ind
ep
en
de
nt.
If
hu
ll i
s ru
ptu
red
th
e
com
pa
rtm
en
t w
ill
fill
wit
h w
ate
r,
dil
uti
ng
th
e m
eth
an
ol.
Gro
un
din
g i
s p
oss
ible
, b
ut
a g
rou
nd
ing
of
such
a
sev
eri
ty t
ha
t w
ou
ld r
esu
lt i
n t
an
k d
am
ag
e i
s e
xtre
me
ly
rem
ote
, a
s th
e t
an
k i
s in
de
pe
nd
en
t w
ith
in t
he
hu
ll.
Re
mo
te (
for
a
sev
ere
gro
un
din
g)
min
or
2.3
.1C
orr
osi
on
of
me
tha
no
l ta
nk
.
Me
tha
no
l w
ith
so
me
wa
ter
con
ten
t is
co
rro
siv
e t
o s
tee
l
Lea
ka
ge
Sm
all
re
lea
se o
f
me
tha
no
l.
Th
e m
eth
an
ol
tan
k w
ill
be
sta
inle
ss s
tee
l
an
d c
oa
ted
wit
h a
su
ita
ble
ma
teri
al.
Ta
nk
in
spe
ctio
n p
roce
du
res.
Re
mo
tem
ino
r
2.4
.1E
ng
ine
ro
om
fir
e.
De
ve
lop
me
nt
of
he
at,
fir
e
spre
ad
ing
to
th
e t
an
k/p
um
p r
oo
m
Fir
e i
n t
he
ta
nk
ro
om
. F
ire
fig
hti
ng
sy
ste
m i
n t
he
ta
nk
ro
om
,
incr
ea
se t
he
co
nce
ntr
ati
on
of
ga
s. A
60
insu
lati
on
be
twe
en
th
e e
ng
ine
ro
om
an
d t
an
k r
oo
m.
Re
mo
tese
ve
re
2.4
.2F
ire
on
de
ck
De
ve
lop
me
nt
of
he
at,
fir
e
spre
ad
ing
to
th
e t
an
k/p
um
p r
oo
m
Fir
e i
n t
he
ta
nk
ro
om
. W
ate
r ca
no
ns
on
th
e s
hip
str
uct
ure
,
spri
nk
ers
on
de
ck,
fire
in
sula
tio
n o
r
dre
nch
er
syst
em
No
te t
ha
t in
sula
tio
n b
etw
ee
n t
he
de
ck a
nd
th
e t
an
k
roo
m /
en
gin
e r
oo
m i
s n
ot
A6
0 (
de
cisi
on
re
late
d t
o
ke
ep
ing
th
e c
ar
de
ck "
ice
fre
e",
bu
t ti
me
to
re
ach
la
nd
is l
ess
th
an
7 m
inu
tes.
Re
mo
te
sev
ere
2.4
.3F
ire
in
pu
mp
are
a (
pu
mp
s a
nd
ass
oci
ate
d p
ipin
g)
Pu
mp
bre
ak
s a
nd
ca
use
s fi
re,
fire
aff
ect
s th
e m
eth
an
ol
sto
rag
e
tan
ks
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nF
ire
an
d h
ea
t d
ete
ctio
n s
yst
em
. S
up
ply
va
lve
wil
l cl
ose
. G
as
fire
su
pp
ress
ion
syst
em
. R
em
ote
se
ve
re
Node 2 : Storage tank and venting system - Node 2 : Storage tank and venting system - Node 2 : Storage tank and venting system
2.3
Co
rro
sio
n/e
rosi
on
2.4
Fir
e/e
xp
losi
on
(E
xte
rna
l ca
use
s)
2.2
Ru
ptu
re
2.5
Me
cha
nic
al
fail
ure
Lea
ka
ge
- N
2 i
nto
co
nfi
ne
d s
pa
ce
2.5
.1P
/V v
alv
e j
am
s/fr
ee
zes
du
rin
g
bu
nk
eri
ng
Ta
nk
co
uld
be
ov
er-
pre
ssu
rise
dH
igh
pre
ssu
re a
larm
in
th
e t
an
k.
Pro
ced
ure
s to
sto
p b
un
ke
rin
g b
efo
re
an
y e
ffe
cts.
Re
gu
lar
insp
ect
ion
of
va
lve
.
Insp
ect
th
e v
alv
e r
eg
ula
rly
.
Re
aso
na
bly
pro
ba
ble
min
or
2.6
.1P
ers
on
en
ters
ta
nk
wit
h n
on
-
bre
ath
ab
le a
tmo
sph
ere
fo
r
insp
ect
ion
/ma
inte
na
nce
Ta
nk
co
nta
ins
a h
aza
rdo
us
atm
osp
he
re.
En
try
co
uld
ca
use
asp
hy
xia
tio
n
Asp
hy
xia
tio
nT
an
k w
ill
be
em
pti
ed
be
fore
en
teri
ng
an
d f
ille
d u
p w
ith
wa
ter
to e
va
cua
te
me
tha
no
l v
ap
ou
r a
nd
N2 b
efo
re
en
teri
ng
. C
on
fin
ed
sp
ace
en
try
pro
ced
ure
s to
be
fo
llo
we
d b
efo
re
en
teri
ng
: in
clu
din
g c
he
ckin
g f
or
bre
ath
ab
le a
tmo
sph
ere
be
fore
en
try
,
ve
nti
lati
on
of
spa
ce,
pe
rso
na
l p
rote
ctiv
e
eq
uip
me
nt,
en
try
gu
ard
. T
rain
ing
in
pro
ced
ure
s
Ta
nk
en
try
pro
ced
ure
ne
ed
ed
. D
ev
elo
p p
roce
du
res
for
ma
inte
na
nce
wo
rk,
vis
itin
g a
sh
ipy
ard
, h
ot
wo
rk
pro
ced
ure
s.
Re
mo
teS
ev
ere
3.1
.1 F
rom
fu
el
pu
mp
Lea
ks
fro
m p
um
p e
qu
ipm
en
t
(Pu
mp
, fi
lte
r, e
tc.)
me
tha
no
l v
ap
ou
rsE
xplo
siv
e a
tmo
sph
ere
g
as
de
tect
ion
wit
h E
SD
-fu
nct
ion
- p
ow
er
turn
ed
off
, v
en
tila
tio
n,
fire
in
sula
tio
n
tow
ard
s th
e e
ng
ine
ro
om
, p
um
p p
lace
d
in t
he
me
tha
no
l ta
nk
ro
om
(E
X c
lass
ed
spa
ce).
Ey
e p
rote
ctio
n t
o b
e u
sed
.
Glo
ve
s if
co
nta
cts
wit
h m
eth
an
ol
is
exp
ect
ed
. S
pil
l tr
ay
be
low
pu
mp
to
pre
ve
nt
spre
ad
of
me
tha
no
l.
Ba
sic
tra
inin
g a
bo
ut
me
tha
no
l sa
fety
fo
r a
ll w
ho
en
ter
the
ta
nk
/pu
mp
ro
om
Re
aso
na
bly
pro
ba
ble
Min
or
3.1
.2 F
rom
pre
ssu
re
sid
e (
8 b
ar)
of
pu
mp
an
d c
on
ne
ctio
ns
Lea
ks
fro
m p
ipe
co
nn
ect
ion
s o
n
pre
ssu
re s
ide
of
pu
mp
s
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
into
ta
nk
roo
m (
can
be
sp
ray
)
exp
losi
ve
an
d t
oxi
c
atm
osp
he
re
ga
s d
ete
ctio
n w
ith
ES
D-f
un
ctio
n -
po
we
r
turn
ed
off
, v
en
tila
tio
n,
fire
in
sula
tio
n
tow
ard
s th
e e
ng
ine
ro
om
, p
um
p p
lace
d
in t
he
me
tha
no
l ta
nk
ro
om
(E
X c
lass
ed
spa
ce).
Ey
e p
rote
ctio
n t
o b
e u
sed
.
Glo
ve
s if
co
nta
cts
wit
h m
eth
an
ol
is
exp
ect
ed
. S
pil
l tr
ay
wil
l co
nta
in m
ost
,
bu
t th
ere
co
uld
be
sp
ray
.
Ba
sic
tra
inin
g a
bo
ut
me
tha
no
l sa
fety
fo
r a
ll w
ho
en
ter
the
ta
nk
/pu
mp
ro
om
Re
mo
teM
ino
r
3.1
.3 F
rom
su
ctio
n
sid
e o
f p
um
p
Lea
ks/
dri
ps
fro
m s
uct
ion
sid
e o
f
pu
mp
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
into
ta
nk
roo
m
exp
losi
ve
an
d t
oxi
c
atm
osp
he
re
As
in 3
.1.1
As
in 3
.1.1
Re
mo
teM
ino
r
3.1
.4 F
rom
pip
ing
lea
din
g a
wa
y f
rom
pu
mp
Lea
ks
fro
m p
ipe
le
ad
ing
fro
m
pu
mp
to
en
gin
e r
oo
m b
ulk
he
ad
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
into
ta
nk
roo
m
exp
losi
ve
an
d t
oxi
c
atm
osp
he
re
No
pip
e c
on
ne
ctio
ns
aft
er
the
pu
mp
.
Va
po
ur
de
tect
ion
- E
SD
-fu
nct
ion
-
trig
ge
rin
g p
ow
er
shu
t d
ow
n,
ve
nti
lati
on
, fi
re i
nsu
lati
on
to
wa
rds
the
en
gin
e r
oo
m.
Ey
e p
rote
ctio
n t
o b
e u
sed
.
Glo
ve
s if
co
nta
cts
wit
h m
eth
an
ol
is
exp
ect
ed
.
As
in 3
.1.1
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
teM
ino
r
3.2
.1 R
up
ture
of
fue
l
pu
mp
Fa
ilu
re o
f p
um
p c
asi
ng
Re
lea
se o
f m
eth
an
ol
Fir
e/e
xplo
sio
nE
x-cl
ass
pu
mp
. M
eth
an
ol
con
tain
ed
in
ex-
cla
ss s
pa
ce.
Pu
mp
sh
ou
ld f
ail
in
a s
afe
wa
y i
f d
esi
gn
ed
as
Ex-
cla
ss.
Ne
ed
pro
ced
ure
fo
r sa
fe r
em
ov
al
of
an
y s
pil
l th
at
acc
um
ula
tes.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tesi
gn
ific
an
t
Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest
No
de
3:
Me
tha
no
l p
um
p (
loca
ted
in
ex
-cla
sse
d t
an
k r
oo
m)
plu
s p
ipin
g t
o e
ng
ine
(fu
el
sup
ply
)
3.3
Co
rro
sio
n/e
rosi
on
2.6
Alo
ng
sid
e/m
ain
ten
an
ce
3.1
Le
ak
ag
e
3.2
Ru
ptu
re
3.3
.1 C
orr
osi
on
of
pu
mp
s/p
ipe
s
Inte
rna
l co
rro
sio
nF
ail
ure
/le
ak
ag
esy
ste
m f
ail
ure
Ma
teri
al
spe
cifi
cati
on
, e
nsu
rin
g
com
pa
tib
le m
ate
ria
ls,
insp
ect
ion
an
d
ma
inte
na
nce
pro
gra
m.
Ex-
cla
ss s
pa
ce.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tem
ino
r
3.3
.2 C
orr
osi
on
of
va
lve
Inte
rna
l co
rro
sio
nF
ail
ure
/le
ak
ag
esy
ste
m f
ail
ure
Ma
teri
al
spe
cifi
cati
on
, e
nsu
rin
g
com
pa
tib
le m
ate
ria
ls,
insp
ect
ion
an
d
ma
inte
na
nce
pro
gra
m.
Ex-
cla
ss s
pa
ce.
ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tem
ino
r
3.6
.1M
ech
an
ica
l fa
ilu
re o
f th
e p
um
p
syst
em
.
Loss
of
sup
ply
of
me
tha
no
l to
th
e
en
gin
es
Loss
of
po
we
rF
ou
r p
um
ps
- re
du
nd
an
cy o
f th
e p
um
p
syst
em
.
Ext
rem
ely
re
mo
te
(fo
r a
ll 4
pu
mp
s to
fail
)si
gn
ific
an
t
3.7
.1 C
on
tro
l sy
ste
m
fali
ure
Fa
liu
re i
n s
yst
em
/bla
cko
ut
Co
ntr
ol
syst
em
fa
ils
Fa
ult
s in
th
e s
yst
em
ma
y
de
ve
lop
an
d a
re n
ot
reco
gn
ise
d,
loss
of
pro
pu
lsio
n p
ow
er
Sy
ste
m s
ho
uld
fa
il t
o a
sa
fe s
tate
Re
mo
tesi
gn
ific
an
t
3.8
Hu
ma
n e
rro
r
3.8
.1 P
um
pin
g
ag
ain
st a
clo
sed
va
lve
Va
lve
le
ft c
lose
d a
fte
r
ma
inte
na
nce
Pu
mp
da
ma
ge
M
ain
ten
an
ce p
roce
du
res
Re
mo
tem
ino
r
3.9
Ma
nu
fact
uri
ng
de
fect
s
Insp
ect
ion
an
d c
he
cks
du
rin
g
inst
all
ati
on
3.1
0 M
ate
ria
l
sele
ctio
n
Sp
eci
fica
tio
ns
as
pa
rt o
f d
esi
gn
4.1
Le
ak
ag
e
4.1
.1 L
ea
ka
ge
in
pip
ing
fro
m e
ng
ine
roo
m b
ulk
he
ad
to
en
gin
e
Fa
ilu
re i
n i
nn
er
pip
eLe
ak
ag
e i
nto
th
e a
nn
ula
r sp
ace
Me
tha
no
l w
ou
ld
acc
um
ula
te i
n t
he
an
nu
lar
spa
ce,
dra
in t
o
the
en
gin
e o
r th
e t
an
k
roo
m
Do
ub
le w
all
ed
pip
ing
in
sid
e t
he
en
gin
e
roo
m.
Va
po
ur
de
tect
ion
at
eit
he
r e
nd
of
do
ub
le w
all
ed
pip
es.
Ne
ed
to
sp
eci
fy s
yst
em
to
de
tect
le
ak
ag
e i
nto
th
e
an
nu
lar
spa
ce o
f th
e p
ipin
g.
Po
ssib
ilit
ies
incl
ud
e l
ev
el
de
tect
ion
an
d p
ress
ure
mo
nit
ori
ng
.
Ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tesi
gn
ific
an
t
4.1
.2.
Lea
ka
ge
on
en
gin
e c
on
ne
ctio
n
po
int
Se
al
fail
ure
Lea
ka
ge
of
me
tha
no
l o
nto
th
e
en
gin
e
fire
, e
xplo
siv
e
atm
osp
he
re
Sp
ray
gu
ard
/ve
nth
oo
d,
ga
s d
ete
ctio
n,
fire
su
pp
ress
ion
sy
ste
m i
n t
he
en
gin
e
roo
m
Re
aso
na
bly
pro
ba
bly
sig
nif
ica
nt
4.1
.1.
Lea
ka
ge
fro
m
the
en
gin
e i
nto
th
e
en
gin
e r
oo
m
Fa
ilu
re o
n e
ng
ine
Lea
ka
ge
of
me
tha
no
l o
nto
th
e
en
gin
e
fire
, e
xplo
siv
e
atm
osp
he
re
Fu
el
sup
ply
wil
l st
op
au
tom
ati
call
y i
f a
ga
s a
larm
occ
urs
. S
pra
y g
ua
rd/v
en
t
ho
od
, g
as
de
tect
ion
, fi
re s
up
pre
ssio
n
syst
em
in
th
e e
ng
ine
ro
om
Ne
ed
en
gin
e m
an
ufa
ctu
rer
inp
ut
for
fre
qu
en
cy r
ati
ng
for
me
tha
no
l e
ng
ine
sig
nif
ica
nt
4.2
Ru
ptu
reD
ou
ble
wa
lle
d p
ipe
Ext
rem
ely
re
mo
tem
ino
r
4.3
Co
rro
sio
n/e
rosi
on
Do
ub
le w
all
ed
pip
eE
xtre
me
ly r
em
ote
min
or
4.4
Im
pa
ctN
ot
un
de
r n
orm
al
op
era
tio
ns,
if
ma
jor
ma
inte
na
nce
tak
es
pla
ce t
he
sy
ste
m s
ho
uld
be
dra
ine
d.
4.5
Fir
e/e
xp
losi
on
No
de
4:
En
gin
e r
oo
m n
od
e (
ex
clu
din
g t
he
act
ua
l e
ng
ine
as
this
sh
ou
ld b
e t
he
su
bje
ct o
f ce
rtif
ica
tio
n t
est
ing
)
Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest - Node 3: Methanol pump chest
3.7
Co
ntr
ol
syst
em
3.4
Im
pa
ct (
com
me
nt:
en
clo
sed
sp
ace
wit
h n
o p
oss
ibil
ity
fo
r im
pa
ct f
rom
fa
llin
g o
bje
cts,
etc
.)
3.5
Fir
e/e
xp
losi
on
(se
e a
bo
ve
fo
r fu
el
tan
k)
3.6
Me
cha
nic
al
fail
iure
4.5
.1 E
ng
ine
ro
om
fire
Fro
m o
the
r e
qu
ipm
en
t in
th
e
en
gin
e r
oo
m (
bo
ile
r, e
tc.)
Fir
e s
pre
ad
s to
fu
el
syst
em
Fir
e /
exp
losi
on
Fu
el
sup
ply
to
be
sto
pp
ed
if
the
re i
s a
n
en
gin
e r
oo
m f
ire
ala
rm,
lim
ite
d a
mo
un
t
of
me
tha
no
l in
th
e p
ipe
s. F
ixe
d f
ire
sup
pre
ssio
n s
yst
em
.
No
te t
ha
t st
ati
stic
s a
re f
or
die
sel
en
gin
e s
yst
em
sR
em
ote
Se
ve
re
4.6
Ma
nu
fact
uri
ng
de
fect
s
Insp
ect
ion
an
d c
he
cks
du
rin
g
inst
all
ati
on
4.7
Ma
teri
al
sele
ctio
n
Sp
eci
fica
tio
ns
as
pa
rt o
f d
esi
gn
