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© 2007 Pearson Addison- Wesley. All rights reserved Chapter 11 Diagram Analysis for IPE

© 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved Chapter 11 Diagram Analysis for IPE

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© 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley.All rights reserved

Chapter 11

Diagram Analysis for IPE

11-2Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Commercial Policy as a second-best device

• Trade policy is the second best policy instrument.

• If the distortion comes from the production side, then the production policy itself (production subsidy) would be better.

• If the distortion comes from the consumption side, then the consumption policy itself would be better.

• The tariff can be used to help implement some social objective, but it proves frequently the second to best to some alternative policy instruments.

11-3Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Production Goals

• Suppose free-trade level of production is thought to be low.

• Two different strategies: tariffs on importable; or production subsidy on importable like food.

• Free-trade production is at A and consumption at B.

• If OJ level of food production must be undertaken, a tariff that raises food’s relative price at home to line 2 is sufficient.

• What is consumption behind this tariff wall?

• It should satisfy: (1) the consumption bundle must lie on an indifference curve whose slope reflects relative domestic prices; (2) it must have the same value as production point C at world price, that is point E.

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Figure 11.3 Tariffs vs. Production Subsidies to Achieve a Production Goal

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Production Goals

• The restricted imports are EK, matched at world prices by clothing exports KC.

• Using production subsidy, production point is still at point C.

• World food prices are reflected in line HEC, parallel to line 1.

• Food producers receive the higher (subsidized) price shown by line 2.

• But now home consumers are free to buy at world price, and the best such point for them is H on curve y2.

• Y2 is higher that y1 in the case of tariffs.

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Evidence on U.S. Tariff Structure

• Next table shows the results of a simple test on the levels of protection that prevailed in the 1970s.

• Industries are ranked from the most protected to the least.

• The ranked list was divided into quarters.

• What is effective protection rate?

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Effective Rate of Protection

• The effective rate of protection measures how much protection a tariff or other trade policy provides domestic producers.

– It represents the change in value that an industry adds to the production process when trade policy changes.

– The change in value that an industry provides depends on the change in prices when trade policies change.

– Effective rates of protection often differ from tariff rates because tariffs affect sectors other than the protected sector, a fact which affects the prices and value added for the protected sector.

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Effective Rate of Protection (cont.)

• For example, suppose that an automobile sells on the world market for $8000, and the parts that made it are worth $6000.– The value added of the auto production is

$8000-$6000

• Suppose that a country puts a 25% tariff on imported autos so that domestic auto assembly firms can now charge up to $10000 instead of $8000.

• Now auto assembly will occur if the value added is up to $10000-$6000.

11-9Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Effective Rate of Protection (cont.)

• The effective rate of protection for domestic auto assembly firms is the change in value added:

($4000 - $2000)/$2000 = 100%

• In this case, the effective rate of protection is greater than the tariff rate.

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Table 11.1 Characteristics of Industries in Relation to Levels of Protection Given by U.S. Tariffs

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Does the tariff protect labor-intensive industries?

• The least-protected industries are indeed the least labor intensive.

• However, the most heavily protected industries are not very labor intensive.

• It does not confirm the prediction of the majority of voters that tariffs favor labor-intensive industries.

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Does the tariff protect low-skilled ?

• If the politicians aim in part to redistribute income to those poor, high tariffs should protect industries that employ low-skill and low-wage labor.

• Evidence: Low-wage industries do get the highest protection.

• However, their real income as consumers suffer seriously.

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Does the tariff protect small or big business?

• Theory conflicts.

• The lobbying model suggests that small industries can influence political decision at low cost, thus securing high protection.

• The collective decision suggest that high protection should go to large sellers.

• Evidence suggests that protection favors small establishments.

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Table 11.1 Characteristics of Industries in Relation to Levels of Protection Given by U.S. Tariffs

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Growth, Protection, and Welfare

• If a country devotes newly resources to its exportable sectors, the country’s terms of trade will tend to worsen.

• Immiserizing Growth

• But this is not true if the country is too small to affect world price of its export commodity.

• Why?

• Suppose a small country imposes tariff on its importable (food) like Figure 10.4.

• Such a diversion of resources entails real income losses.

• Tariff in a small country cause dead-weight-loss.

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Figure 3.3 Immiserizing Growth

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Figure 10.4 The Effect of a Tariff on Imports

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Growth, Protection, and Welfare

• As this country grows, the more resources it devotes to the protected import-competing sector, the more its potential real income gains from growth are cut back.

• In the extreme case, growth at home could even result in a loss of welfare.

• Figure 11.4 illustrates these possibilities.

• Line 2 indicates world prices whereas line 1 shows domestic prices behind the tariff wall.

• With a tariff on food imports, line 1 showing domestic prices is flatter than line 2 which shows world prices.

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Growth, Protection, and Welfare

• A’ is the initial consumption point corresponding to production along TT’ at A.

• Now suppose tariff and world prices are unchanged, but the value of produced income at domestic prices rises by 25%.

• Consider difference cases for industries’ expansion.

• Point D: only the exportable sector expands 25%.

• The representative consumption point is at D’ which is the highest.

• Point B: fairly balanced expansion relative to point A.

• The consumption is at B’ which means real income increases.

• Growth has increased real income.

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Figure 11.4 Growth with Protection

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Growth, Protection, and Welfare

• Point C and C’ is for expansion of pure import-competing industrial expansion.

• In the extreme case, if growth has been so biased in favor of importable (food), it would lower the real income.

• Therefore, growth to any of points B, C,D, and E shows a 25% increase in produced income at domestic price.

• But corresponding consumption points B’, C’, D’ and E’ are not equivalent.