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WORLD RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ REFLEXIVITY IN DIALOGUE WITH G8 ‘OTHERS’ ABOUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE//RÉFLEXIVITÉ DES DIRIGEANTS RELIGIEUX DU MONDE DANS LE DIALOGUE AVEC LES G8 ‘AUTRES’ SUR LA GOUVERNANCE MONDIALE Steiner, Sherrie Booth University College (changing June 30, 2014) [email protected] (changing June 30, 2014) 447 Webb Place (changing June 30, 2014) Winnipeg, MB R3B 2P2 Phone: 204-924-4896 (changing June 30, 2014) FAX: 204-942-3856 (changing June 30, 2014) Private email for update: [email protected] Phone: 484-356-6184 (cell)

World Religious Leaders' Reflexivity in Dialogue with 'Others' about Global Governance

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WORLD RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ REFLEXIVITY IN DIALOGUE WITH G8

‘OTHERS’ ABOUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE//RÉFLEXIVITÉ DES DIRIGEANTS

RELIGIEUX DU MONDE DANS LE DIALOGUE AVEC LES G8 ‘AUTRES’ SUR LA

GOUVERNANCE MONDIALE

Steiner, Sherrie

Booth University College (changing June 30, 2014)

[email protected] (changing June 30, 2014)

447 Webb Place (changing June 30, 2014)

Winnipeg, MB R3B 2P2

Phone: 204-924-4896 (changing June 30, 2014)

FAX: 204-942-3856 (changing June 30, 2014)

Private email for update: [email protected]

Phone: 484-356-6184 (cell)

2

Abstract

Globalization is characterized by democratic expectations among the governed even as it occurs

in a context requiring ‘governance without government.’ In the absence of formal political

offices and alternative contenders for those offices, the stability of global democratic governance

requires effective dialogue with critical partners in independent, yet complementary,

relationships for the peaceful ‘play’ of power. The absence of a formal global government

leaves accountability gaps that contribute to patterned vulnerabilities that non-governmental

organizations bridge with the soft power of influence using knowledge to shape the debate

through evolving norms. Effective dialogue must be capable of communicating ethical

opposition to the ‘Other’ if diplomacy is going to negotiate, rather than manufacture, consent.

Reflexivity—the ability to see oneself as object—is a necessary, but not sufficient, skill for

governance as social and political communication. Since 2005, the Summits of World Religious

Leaders have exercised religious soft power in dialogue with each other and with leaders of the

G8/G20 nations. This paper focuses on reflexivity religious leader summits communication and

external, third-party recognition of their participation in global governance. Data is drawn from

G8 summit publications.

La réflexivité – aptitude à se voir comme objet – est une compétence nécessaire, bien qu’insuffisante, à la gouvernance en tant que communication sociale et politique. Les participants aux Sommets des chefs religieux du monde exercent depuis 2005 leur ‘puissance douce’ religieuse dans leur dialogue entre eux et avec les dirigeants des pays du G8/G20. Ce document met l'accent sur la réflexivité dans la communication lors des Sommets des dirigeants religieux de la période 2005-2012. On y fera appel à et des écrits pour illustrer le dialogue réflexif avec ‘l'Autre’, religieux et politique.

Word Count: 6167 – 26 (duplicate contact information) = 5,994

Key Words: international relations, religious soft power, global governance, MDGs, legitimacy

Biographical: Sherrie Steiner is an Associate Research Fellow with the Ridd Institute for

Religion and Global Policy in the Global College at the University of Winnipeg, and an

Associate Professor in Sociology at Booth University College. She served as recorder for

the World Religious Leaders’ Summits in 2010 (Winnipeg, Canada), in 2011 (Bordeaux,

France) and in 2012 (Washington DC, USA). Her research focuses on the co-evolution

of societies and their environments in the context of climate change. She is currently

researching the social construction of cosmopolitan responsibility in relation to the

Summits of World Religious Leaders’ dialogue with the G8 summits.

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Introduction

Global governance is involved in, and put at risk by, a global market that operates as a form of

‘organized irresponsibility’ (Beck, 2002, p. 26). In the absence of a formal global government,

governance accountability gaps contribute to patterned vulnerabilities and unmet democratic

expectations among the governed thereby threatening the stability and legitimacy of the

interdependent global network. Civil society networks strengthen the stability of global

democratic governance to the extent that they represent the “voices of the weak and powerless”

as the “conscience of the world” in dialogue over the “peaceful ‘play’ of power” (Willetts 1996).

The stability of global democratic governance becomes increasingly dependent upon effective

dialogue with civil society partners capable of communicating ethical opposition to perceived

‘others’ so that diplomacy negotiates, rather than manufactures, consent (Herman & Chomsky

1988). In this way, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) use their cultural

capital to help shape the debate over the exercise of power through evolving norms (Nye 2004).

Although civil society is constituted by secular and religious INGOs, the governance role

of religious INGOs has been largely overlooked or, when recognized, largely confined to

situations of post-conflict reconstruction in non-Western societies (e.g., Coward & Smith 2004;

Halafoff 2013; Johnston 2003). Steiner (2013; under review) has critiqued this differential

treatment of secular and religious influence in international relations as a reified imposition of

Cartesian dualisms embedded in Western worldviews similar to other dualisms scholars have

identified as interfering with effective global governance (e.g., Freese 1997; Norgaard 1994;

Yilmaz 2012). Identification of any governance roles being exercised by religious INGOs is

ultimately an empirical question that is best answered by a more nuanced historically embedded

and empirically sensitive investigative approach (Steiner 2013; under review). Scholars have

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begun to explore the complex interplay between religion, social movements and nationalism

paying particular attention to links between religion and populist politics in the developing world

where there is a perceived failure of the secular state to address basic needs (Snyder 2011). The

rise of the multifaith movement is drawing increasing attention (e.g., Ahmed & Forst 2005;

Braybrooke 2007; Eck 2001; Kirkwood 2007; Pratt 2010). As it has become global in scope,

Brodeur (2005) claims it has begun to move from the margins to multiple centers of power.

Halafoff (2013) suggests that multifaith movements may serve as cultural resources for

negotiating ‘cosmopolitan solutions’ to global risks.

This paper contributes to the ‘empirical mapping’ of the governance stream of religious

soft power in international relations by extending the case study of the World Religious Leaders’

Summits as an example of religious soft power influencing the social construction of

cosmopolitan responsibility (Steiner 2011a; Steiner 2011b; Steiner 2013; Steiner under review).

The World Religious Leaders’ Summits is an appropriate case study for exploring linkages

between religious cultural capital and the negotiation of ‘cosmopolitan solutions’ because of the

consistent, persistent and intentional dialogue of high-level religious leaders with the G8 political

leaders on matters relating to government responsibility toward the poor and vulnerable of the

world. This work advances prior work on the Summits through analysis of external third-party

recognition of religious reflexive governance.

The Case Study

The World Religious Leaders’ Summit(s) have met as shadow summits to the G8 meetings

annually since 2005 with the exception of the 2013 Initiative when they created a technologically

mediated statement in lieu of a face-to-face meeting. The Summits were held in the UK (2005),

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Russia (2006), Germany (2007), Japan (2008/two meetings), Italy (2009), Canada (2010), France

(2011) and the United States (2012); the Initiative was hosted by the UK in 2013. Ten

statements have been issued and delivered since 2005. The World Religious Leaders’ Summit(s)

and Initiative have been hosted by a network of religious organizations, the majority of which are

Religious Non-Governmental Organizations (RNGOs) that are global in scope. Because the

leadership for the summits/initiative rotates based upon the country hosting the G8, each summit

has a unique focus and distinctive organizational approach derived from the host country’s

interests, capabilities, and the urgent needs of the world. In 2009, an International Continuance

Committee was formed consisting of representatives of each of the G8 countries that has hosted,

or will host, the summits/initiative. The International Continuance Committee works mostly

between meetings by email and conference call. Despite the organizational fragility of the

summit process, a discernible pattern has emerged whereby the statements are developed by

consensus, statements are written to include attention to extreme poverty, care for the

environment and investment in peace, and statements are variously delivered to political leaders

and media outlets prior to the G8 meetings.

Steiner (under review) has begun to explore the governance role of the religious summits

using reflexivity as the key indicator. Although dialogue with governmental officials is

necessary, it is not a sufficient indicator for ascertaining if there is a governance role for religious

soft power in any particular case study. Fundamentalist communicative action, for example,

works against the democratic process (Habermas 2006, p. 8). Legitimate and constructive

faith-based dialogue in the public sphere must have “the epistemic ability to consider one’s own

faith reflexively from the outside and to relate it to secular views” (Habermas 2006, pp. 9-10).

6

For these reasons, reflexivity has been used as the key indicator for soft power as governance in

this paper.

When operationalizing reflexivity, careful attention has been paid to avoid overly agentic

conceptions that reduce reflexivity to an ahistorical cognitive process, the operationalization of

which would imply a world full of more emancipatory potential than what is practicably possible

within actual embedded histories replete with structural constraints (Beck 1994, p. 177; Farrugia

2013a, p. 2; Steiner under review). Careful attention has also been paid to avoid the

reductionistic tendency to conflate the historical movement toward social individuation with

methodological individualism (Chang & Song 2010), an approach which would unintentionally

imbue the theory with “unsustainable visions of personal sovereignty and political emancipation”

that celebrate a form of middle-class individualism (Adams 2013, p. 226; Farrugia 2013a, p. 2).

Given the transnational scope of this case study, careful attention has also been paid to avoid the

methodological nationalism underpinning many social theories (Sassen 2000, p. 145ff; Beck &

Grande 2010, p. 426ff).

Following Steiner (under review), reflexivity has been operationalized with attention to

the historical development and structural embeddedness of the diverse cosmopolitan coalitions of

actors in specific diverse contexts using the cosmopolitical realpolitik stream within

cosmopolitan social theory (Beck & Grande 2010). The nation state is considered as a variable

associated with multiple paths into second modernity. International relations is understood as

marked by the complex interaction between nations entering from various paths including those

marked by privilege, time compression and the embedded structural constraints of a post-

colonial history (Beck & Grande 2010, p. 416). Reflexivity is understood to emerge out of the

macro context as nationalistic identities give way to transnational recognitions that nation states

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are interdependent and entangled with one another (Randeria 1999). Reflexivity is

operationalized as blurred boundaries (Beck 2002; Beck 2006). Although this is a conceptually

ambiguous way to operationalize reflexivity, for our purposes here, the theoretical gains in

empirical sensitivity to diversity and structural constraints outweigh the costs associated with

inadequate conceptual clarity (Beck & Grande 2010, p. 435; Steiner under review).

According to Beck, the task of those living in cosmopolitan societies is to define and

construct a collectively shared future crisis without adequate forms of institutionalized action in

a context where the norms of cosmopolitan responsibility can no longer be taken for granted

(Beck 2002, p. 27). Reflexivity emerges out of strategies of self-limitation through the

“recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the calculation of one’s

own interests” given a realistic experience of global risks and material interdependencies (Beck

& Grande 2010, p. 437). Reflexivity emerges out of a paradoxical process of compulsive self-

creation in a context of making “decisions, possibly undecidable decisions, certainly not free, but

forced by others and wrested out of oneself under conditions that lead into dilemmas” (Beck

1997: 97). Ideas do not cause social change in this perspective, but ideas may just possibly

influence the unfolding of history through the decisions people must inevitably make. “Whether

a problem has a cosmopolitan solution depends on the normative and institutional framework in

which decisions have to be taken…the basic message of cosmopolitan realpolitik is this: The

future is open. It depends on [the] decisions we make” (Beck & Grande 2010, p. 437).

World religious leaders have been delivering statements to the G8 leaders since 2005

with the intention of influencing the decisions that the G8 leaders must inevitably make.

Religious leaders draw on their cultural capital to counter the market forces of ‘organized

irresponsibility’ with a form of cosmopolitan orientation in an effort to socially construct new

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boundaries for cosmopolitan responsibility that include the interests of the poor and vulnerable

who are impacted by, but excluded from, the G8 decision making process (Steiner under review).

By influencing the normative framework in which G8 decisions have to be taken, religious soft

power is said to influence international relations to the extent that G8 leaders accept moral

responsibility for the poor and vulnerable, taking their interests into account, when making the

decisions which they must inevitably make. To the extent that the political legitimacy of G8

leaders is made vulnerable by governance accountability gaps, it is in the political interests of G8

leaders to take the interests of the vulnerable into account when making decisions. Religious

leaders speak into that decision process with questions of ‘whose interests’ the G8 leaders take

into account on specific decisions at specific historical moments when making these decisions

(Steiner under review). Prior research on the Summit process has empirically illustrated

reflexive governance through content analysis of the communicational sequences of the Summit

statements over the eight year span from 2005-2012. Samples were analyzed according to

meaning units drawn from Beck’s (2002) theory frame (Steiner under review). Further research

is needed to explore whether and how the plurality of perspectives offered by religious leaders

are taken into account by the G8 leaders themselves. This paper moves the research in that

direction by identifying external third-party recognition of religious reflexive governance in a

publication integral to the G8 Summit process.

Data and Methods

The G8 Research Group at The Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto is

the premier research institution studying the G8/G20 Summit process. Since 2009, they have

compiled G8, a glossy publication about 300 pages in length that is published and distributed at

the G8/G20 Summits by Newsdeskmedia. The Munk School’s G8 distribution list includes a

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targeted set of international organizations, diplomatic missions and government officials in

addition to the participants of the G8/G20 Summits. G8 is a summit preparatory document that

regularly features articles from each G8 head of state, editors’ introductions, articles developing

each chosen summit theme, articles on real world conditions (economics, environment, energy,

health, development, etc.), and articles on global governance and the G8 process including, but

not limited to, articles on civil society, compliance reports, and articles on evolving partnerships

with groups such as the G20, B8, BRICS and the United Nations depending upon the current

dynamics at the given historic moment. Using G8 as text, I conducted content analysis of all five

publications from 2009-2013. The vehicle for communication is the G8 publication, the

communicational sequences between communicants are the five G8 texts, and the communicants

are the Munk School and their distribution list.

I disciplined my interpretations of content by drawing the meaning units, specific

characteristics and underlying theoretical assumptions about reflexivity from the literature

review. While there is no single correct meaning or universal application of research findings, I

have made every effort to ensure the transferability of these findings to other settings and groups

by offering a clear and distinct description of the analysis process in order to establish arguments

for the most probable interpretations. According to Beck (2002, p. 19), the pluralisation of

borders and the blurring of boundaries are the most basic indicators of

[insert Table 1 about here]

reflexive modernization (at the macro level). When people are reflexive, dualisms implode and

borders that demarcate categories such as national/international “are no longer predeterminate –

they can be chosen (and interpreted)…redrawn and legitimated anew” (Beck 2002, p. 19). The

10

G8 texts were read through several times to obtain a sense of the whole before dividing the text

into meaning units, condensed meaning units, codes and themes. See Table 1 for an example of

how texts were condensed and coded into a category within a given theme. I

[insert Table 2 about here]

used condensed direct quotes during aggregation to reduce the amount of interpretive bias

introduced in the abstraction process of moving from text, to code creation and theme

categorization. Examples of the aggregation process for a select theme are shown in Table 2.

Findings

Coverage of the religious leader’s summit process has consistently increased over time

(see Table 3). In 2009, the G8 Research Group senior researchers briefly mentioned the summit

process in an article on civil society under the section “Global governance and the growing G8”.

The authors indicated that “leaders from a variety of faith communities discussed the challenges

of health, development and Africa, and issued a joint statement to the G8 leaders” (Hajnal &

Guebert 2009, p. 187).

[insert Table 3 about here]

Recognition changed in 2010, the year Canada hosted the G8 Summit. The publication gave the

religious leader host for that year, Karen Hamilton who was the Chair/Secretary General for

Canada (2010), an entire page which she used to introduce the readership to the religious leader

summit process. From 2011-2013, religious leader hosts have been allotted two pages in the

publication which they have used to keep the readership apprised of the ongoing work of the

religious summits. In each case, editors of the G8 Research Group placed the religious leader

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[insert table 4 about here]

summit article in the last section of G8 which is dedicated to discussion of the global governance

process. The G8 section titles and religious leader article titles for 2010-2013 are listed in Table

4. In 2013, the editor of G8, John Kirton, directly mentioned the work of the faith leaders for the

first time in his introductory editorial about the UK Summit in Lough Erne:

The democratically devoted G8 leaders will be supported by the contribution of their civil

society in a broad and balanced way. A Business Eight summit of corporate leaders has

enlisted private-sector support for the initiatives that G8 governors take, while faith

leaders are showing how human dignity and justice are a compelling call for the

otherwise divided global community. As at previous summits, they will help an astute

British host and his colleagues work together on the economy, development and security

to build a better world. (Kirton 2013, p. 37, emphasis mine)

In each communication sequence contained in the G8, the religious leader’s dialogue process has

been framed in terms of civil society participation in the global governance process.

Content Analysis of Reflexivity in Religious Leader Articles

Religious leaders wrote four articles contained in the 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 issues of G8,

respectively. The illustrative data is theoretically consistent with Beck’s claim that reflexivity

emerges out of embodied dispositions. Religious leaders made frequent reference to practical

knowledge of the world and of a person’s place within it, indicating awareness of social

conditions and specific political promises. Leaders consistently emphasized intelligent

engagement with real world problems in all four articles, acknowledging that different paths into

the global network required different responses. Policy recommendations were often specific,

12

such as recommending that the G8 provide 0.7% of GDP for development assistance (Hamilton

2011, p. 184), and that the G8 follow through on the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (Hamilton

& Heckman 2012, p. 221). All articles consistently emphasized fulfillment of the Millennium

Development Goal promises (Hamilton & Reed 2013, pp. 234-5). Leaders asked for follow up

on past commitments alongside new recommendations that were put forward. In the 2013

statement, leaders recommended

that political leaders first “fulfil existing commitments to spend 0.7 per cent of national

income on aid. Second, launch a G8 convention on tax transparency that commits

signatory countries to preventing individuals and companies from hiding wealth so that it

is untraceable. Third, press for greater financial transparency from governments of

developing countries so that the citizens of these countries can hold their governments to

account for the money they spend.” (as quoted by Hamilton & Reed 2013, p. 234)

Leaders consistently blurred boundaries and accepted, what Beck (2002) refers to as, the logic of

inclusive oppositions. The first dualism to be blurred was the secular/religious barrier associated

with civil society:

To be or not to be an integral part of civil society: that is sometimes both a question

posed by members of faith communities and a lens through which sectors of civil society

view faith communities. It is, however, a question that is disconnected from historical

and theological realities. The faith communities...are not only a part of civil society but

are also grounded in divine imperatives to be so for the sake of the world’s peoples and

indeed for the sake of the globe itself. (Hamilton 2010, p. 308)

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Leaders blurred boundaries between society and the environment as when Hamilton quoted from

the 2010 Canada statement:

“Wealthier countries must come to a more profound understanding of the

interdependence of life and take the courageous steps needed to care for the planet…This

requires innovative leadership in these countries, along with increased collaboration

between rich and poor countries…to support climate change adaptation and mitigation.”

(as quoted by Hamilton 2011, p. 184)

Leaders blurred religious boundaries as they united in a concerted response to the entangled

problems of the modern world with international cooperation between people from different

religions and regions of the world acting on behalf of the common good for a secure and shared

future:

[T]he 2010 summit brought together 80 senior faith leaders and 13 inspiring youth…and

represented well over 800 million of the world’s people from more than 20

countries….The delegates engaged each other with respect, commitment and passion for

the plight of the earth and its most vulnerable, and with the goal of speaking and acting

together for the sake of a future that enables all people to thrive. (Hamilton 2011, p. 184)

Leaders blurred boundaries associated with militaristic defense of the nation state, emphasizing

the importance of human security concerns, calling leaders to nuclear disarmament and working

together to build collaboration and unity for common witness on shared moral concerns:

The faith leaders are aware that military power and economic strength constitute the basis

on which countries are included in the G8 and G20, and that the voices of the other 172

members of the United Nations are thus excluded…they continue to call on all

14

appropriate bodies ‘to halt the arms race, make new and greater investments in supporting

a culture of peace, strengthen the rule of law, stop ethnic cleansing and the suppression of

minorities, build peace through negotiation, mediation, and humanitarian support to

peace processes, including the control and reduction of small arms that every year are the

cause of over 300,000 deaths globally. (Hamilton 2011, p. 185)

Leaders blurred the boundary associated with rapidly changing new technologies and the social

media ‘gap’ between generations:

The UK Interfaith Leaders’ Initiative is acting…in a creative and innovative way when it

called for a global Twitter campaign…to help raise awareness of the G8 religious

leaders’ letter and its central message, namely, that we have a moral responsibility to

deliver on the MDGs and that the right decisions taken at the G8 Summit in June 2013

can accelerate that process…Tweeters of all faith traditions and all demographics,

including youth and students, were actively engaged. (Hamilton & Reed 2013, p. 234)

World religious leaders provide a form of cosmopolitan orientation to a ‘disoriented

cosmopolitanism,’ offering reasons, derived from the major religions of the world, for why G8

leaders should recognize a special moral responsibility towards other people:

Although the form of the faith leaders’ summits has differed from G8 country to G8

country, and while this year’s event might be better called an ‘initiative’ than ‘summit’,

there has been great consistency and persistency in the content…In every faith leaders’

statement since 2005, there has been a very strong emphasis on the Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs), their importance and the need for them to be fulfilled for

15

the sake of a just and sustainable life for the world’s most vulnerable people. (Hamilton

& Reed 2013, p. 234)

Religious leaders offer their reflections as a way of redefining the boundaries for G8 decision

making, challenging the G8 leaders to prioritize the needs of the vulnerable when they make

their inevitable decisions. In these articles, religious leaders draw on the summit statements as a

form of cultural capital used to accomplish the social construction of cosmopolitan

responsibility.

The record of these parallel summits is…a record of consistency and persistency, of

speaking together in commitment and challenge about the issues of today’s world—the

neglect of which causes great suffering to so many; the fulfilment of which would bring

healing and an enhanced life to so many. (Hamilton & Heckman 2012, p. 220)

Informed by religious texts, leaders make consistent reference to current events, shared interests,

mutual concerns and the responsible exercise of power in the decision making process as a way

of negotiating the normative framework in which decisions have to be taken in the hegemonic

‘meta-power games’ of the G8 Summit process.

Discussion

This study advances our understanding of religious soft power through empirical investigation

using data from G8 annuals to describe external, third-party recognition of religious leaders’

reflexive involvement in global governance. Religious leaders access cultural capital to socially

construct norms for cosmopolitan responsibility in an imagined global society that is only

partially realized where common values are lacking in what is a highly interdependent and

violence-prone international system (Beck 2002; Keohane 2004).

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In the absence of a global democratic government, legitimacy is dependent upon INGO

activity that functions as external epistemic actors in a transnational civil society channel of

accountability (Buchanan & Keohane 2006, p. 410). As long as citizens perceive the overall

quality of the social order as legitimate, citizens voluntarily comply even at great cost (Hurd

1999). However, should the social order’s legitimacy become questioned, compliance ceases to

be voluntary and political upheaval can put the entire governing system at risk. When this

happens, the social order faces a legitimation crisis. Understanding processes that strengthen the

complex process of accountability is important for the stability of global governance. Buchanan

and Keohane (2006) suggest several standards for determining which INGOs should be taken

seriously and why. Ideally, they say, external epistemic actors would have content-independent,

non-coercive reasons for their choice to comply (or not comply) with the institution they

assessed. The religious leaders studied here are part of the nascent “third sector” of civil society

that lacks state authority, employs value rather than profit based motivation, and is characterized

by networks of citizens in free association seeking to change the status quo in the interest of an

assumed public good. Even the largest RNGOs are connected to faith networks deeply rooted in

local communities, representing some of the best-organized civil institutions in the world (Berger

2003, p. 16). At more than 800 million strong, the religious networks represented at the summits

are important dialogue partners for global governance--even if the G8 leaders do not recognize

them as such. Whether an institution is legitimate does not depend solely upon its own

characteristics, but also upon the deliberative relationships between the governance institution

and the epistemic actors outside of it.

One of the greatest strengths of the religious leaders’ network—and the strength of their

service to the G8/G20 leadership as dialogue partners—is their shared understanding of the

17

moral vulnerabilities that stem from the accountability gaps of global ‘governance without

government.’ Senior religious leaders have heightened moral sensibilities on behalf of the most

vulnerable people in the global community. But their strengths are related to their greatest areas

of weakness. The other-worldly idealism associated with sacred vocations may not be

sufficiently distinguished from this-worldly judgments of what is practicably possible for

governments to achieve. Religious leaders live in tension between the ideal and the real,

between what exists in ‘the now’ and what is envisioned as possible in the ‘not yet.’ Since all

religions, as religion, require some element of a psychological ‘suspension of disbelief,’ the

religious perspective is vulnerable to unrealistic expectations of what is politically feasible. That

said, the legitimacy of political leaders is often outcome dependent upon services rendered; thus,

politicians are more interested in making decisions that are probable rather than possible. The

dialogue that emerges between those concerned primarily with moral will and those concerned

primarily with political will is a conversation that—if it does not collapse into posturing,

dismissal or condemnation—has the potential to push the language of probability toward

objective possibility. Together, decisions can be made that dare to ask, ‘as we make things work,

what kind of world are we making?’

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