1

WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE TEN YEAR RULE

CHRISTOPHER M. BELL

Between 1919 and 1932, successive British governments instructed the armed services to frame their

policies on the assumption that they would not face a major conflict for a period of ten years. The

‘ten year rule’, as this guideline later became known, was long regarded by scholars as the basis of

Treasury control over British service policies throughout this entire period. This view was corrected

in the mid-1980s by John Ferris, who demonstrated that the significance of the ten year rule had been

exaggerated and misunderstood. Through his examination of British strategic foreign policy during

the years 1919-1926, Ferris revealed the fallacies of the then-orthodox view: the Treasury did not

enjoy virtually unlimited power to cut service estimates during these years; the ten year rule had little

impact on service policies prior to 1924; and it did not begin to take on the characteristics typically

ascribed to it until 1924-1926. The subsequent history of the ten year rule has been less1

controversial. During the years 1925-1932, it operated largely as historians had always thought it2

did: as a means for the Treasury to strengthen its control over defence expenditure.

In the hands of Winston Churchill, chancellor of the exchequer in Stanley Baldwin’s second

Conservative government (1924-1929), the ten year rule became an important weapon in the ongoing

struggle in Whitehall to dominate Britain’s strategic policy-making. Churchill strengthened the

Treasury’s position in 1928 by securing a decision that the rule would apply at any given date until

it was formally cancelled, thereby closing one of the most important loopholes available to the

service departments, and ensuring the rule’s extension beyond the life of the Baldwin government.

The Treasury won many of the battles over defence spending during these years, leaving historians

to explain how Churchill’s actions as chancellor could be reconciled with his record in the 1930s as

an anti-appeaser and vigorous advocate of rearmament. Most attribute Churchill’s changing position

on defence expenditure to a propensity to throw himself wholeheartedly into the pursuit of his

2

departmental objectives. Thus, Churchill attacked the spending proposals of the fighting services

because that is what chancellors of the exchequer are supposed to do. His attacks on the service

departments are treated by most historians as a regrettable side effect of the resolve and drive

Churchill demonstrated during his wartime leadership. But some writers have attempted to use

Churchill’s record at the exchequer to undermine the reputation he built up in later years, claiming

that he actually created many of the deficiencies in Britain’s defences that he decried during the

1930s; that this period demonstrates his inherently poor strategic judgement and recklessness; and

that his influential account of British policies during the 1920s was both self-serving and inaccurate.

The popular view that departmental imperatives alone drove Churchill’s attacks on defence

expenditure rests on two assumptions: that his actions were dictated primarily by financial concerns,

and that he uncritically adopted the Treasury viewpoint on defence issues. But this explanation is at

best an oversimplification. It does not, for example, allow for such anomalies as Churchill’s defence

of the Singapore naval base against Treasury officials, his readiness to reject arms limitation and

court naval competition with the United States, or the consistency of his views on the Japanese threat

between 1924 and 1941. It also leaves little or no room for strategic or political considerations. The3

use of the ten year rule as a means to assault Churchill’s reputation is also problematic. In this case,

the difficulty stems from the propensity of some historians always to place Churchill at the center

of events and, consequently, to treat him as the only member of the decision-making process who

mattered. The revival and extension of the ten year rule are therefore easily depicted as nothing more

than the by-product of Churchill’s fanatical pursuit of economy and disregard of potential risks. But

this perspective exaggerates Churchill’s influence during the 1920s. Churchill’s position as

chancellor of the exchequer and the force of his personality ensured that he often played a leading

role in the formulation of Britain’s strategic policies, but the Treasury could only dominate defence

policy as long as its priorities were endorsed by the cabinet as a whole. The service departments and

the Foreign Office continued to exert a strong influence on the decision-making process, and the

navy in particular retained significant power to thwart the Treasury. Strategic policies were never

simply dictated by Churchill; they emerged out of the dynamic process of competition, negotiation,

and compromise among the various actors involved. Churchill’s motives for reviving and then

extending the ten year rule can only be understood within this context.

3

In the first volume of The World Crisis, published in 1923, Winston Churchill sought to establish

for posterity his reputation as the staunch defender of Britain’s military might in the critical years

leading up to the First World War. Participants in the defence debates of the mid 1920s were soon

struck by Churchill’s seemingly hostile attitude towards the navy when he arrived at the Treasury

the following year. In June 1925, the First Sea Lord, David Beatty declared at a cabinet committee

meeting that “if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were the First Lord of the Admiralty – I know the

Chancellor very well – he would be, I am certain, the last person in this country who would tolerate

any querying to the slightest extent of … the advice that the Admiralty give.” William Bridgeman,4

the First Lord of the Admiralty, complained shortly after leaving office that Churchill “lives entirely

in the present & takes his colour from the particular office he happens to be holding at the time. A

big-navyite at the Admiralty, & the reverse as Chancellor of Exchequer.” This view was not5

confined to Whitehall insiders. In July 1925, a cartoon in Punch entitled “The Two Winstons”

depicted a confrontation over naval spending between Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill and

First Lord Bridgeman. The latter is accompanied by an earlier incarnation of Churchill, whom he

introduces as “the Winston of 1912. He agrees with me in putting the nation’s safety before

economy.” 6

While contemporaries were quick to note Churchill’s apparent inconsistency, there was no

consensus about the long-term impact of his actions. When Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer left the

Admiralty in 1933 to become Commander-in-Chief, China Station, he complained to Admiral Sir

Ernle (later Lord) Chatfield, the new First Sea Lord, that ‘Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the

Exchequer’ had ‘done the Navy hideous harm’ by cutting cruiser construction and having the ‘“10

years No War” rule made a moving one.’ The underlying assumption was that the latter action was7

the more serious, as it had facilitated the larger cuts that followed under the second Labour

government and its successors. Chatfield, who had served as Controller in 1925-1928 during the

Treasury’s assault on naval construction programs, was also inclined to view the ten year rule as the

root cause of the services’ problems during the early 1930s. The drop in British defence expenditure8

in the years after 1929 was not generally attributed to Churchill, however, but to Labour’s

commitment to disarmament and the effects of the Great Depression. Any lingering hostility towards

Churchill within the services largely faded once the former chancellor began his public campaign

for rearmament.

4

Churchill himself was confident during the 1930s that his earlier actions had not caused the

service’s current deficiencies. When members of the government attempted to embarrass him by

recalling his parsimony at the Treasury, Churchill vigorously defended his actions. The ‘ten-years

rule in those days was valuable’, he replied to one critic in 1936. ‘There is nothing, I think, that

anyone who supported that principle in those years after the [Great] War has any reason to regret.’9

In his opinion, Britain’s weaknesses in the 1930s stemmed from the national government’s failure

to react swiftly and decisively when the international situation began to deteriorate in 1931. By 1940,

this view had gained wide acceptance. Churchill’s record at the Treasury was increasingly

overshadowed in the public mind by memories of his campaign for rearmament, opposition to

appeasement, and dynamic wartime leadership. Events confirmed that he had been right about Hitler

all along. The evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk dramatically highlighted the shortcomings in

Britain’s preparations for war, but Churchill, who had been kept out of office after 1931, escaped

censure. “Winston is about the only person who has an absolutely clean sheet”, Lord Halifax noted

in 1940. This view strengthened over time. Churchill emerged in popular memory as the unheeded10

prophet of the 1930s whose inspirational leadership saved the nation from the disastrous path his

predecessors had set it upon. Blame for Britain’s discredited prewar policies fell on Baldwin, Neville

Chamberlain and other prominent members of the Conservative party. 11

There was little interest during the Second World War in searching for scapegoats among the

leaders of the 1920s. Like Churchill, the authors of Guilty Men, the best known and most influential

attack on Britain’s prewar policies, charged that things began to go wrong with the appearance of

the first national government, which took office in August 1931, only a month before Japan’s attack

on Manchuria. The only significant figure at this time to challenge this view was Lord Chatfield,12

the former First Sea Lord and later Minister for Coordination of Defence under Chamberlain.

Chatfield’s memoirs, written during the early years of the war, emphasized the continuities between

the policies of the 1920s and 1930s. The retired admiral denounced the “crushing, soul-destroying

influence” of the ten year rule, which he described as “the dangerous law which laid down for the

guidance of the Services, and all indeed in Whitehall, that it was to be assumed that there would be

no great war for ten years.” He was especially critical of the decision in 1928 to extend the rule

indefinitely. “Protest was unavailing”, he complained. “Gagged and bound hand and foot, they [the

service departments] were handed over to the Treasury Gestapo. Never has there been such a

5

successful attempt to hamstring the security of an Empire.” These charges had no immediate13

impact, however, as the war cabinet denied Chatfield permission to publish the controversial sections

of his memoirs during wartime. Churchill was particularly ill-disposed towards his former14

colleague, whom he dismissed as “a sailor who prolonged his official life after he had left the Navy

by building up credit with the advocates of appeasement.” A volume of memoirs covering15

Chatfield’s early life and seagoing appointments was published with official blessing in 1942, but

his attacks on the ten year rule and criticism of the machinery of government were not made public

until a second volume appeared in 1947.

Churchill addressed the origins of the war and the impact of the ten year rule in The

Gathering Storm, the first volume of his highly influential war memoirs. The Second World War,16

he maintained, was an ‘unnecessary war’: Hitler could have been stopped at an early stage if only

British leaders had acted quickly and decisively when clear threats to peace began to emerge in the

early 1930s. Churchill insisted that he was willing to accept his share of the blame for the policies

as chancellor, but he denied that his actions contributed significantly to Britain’s later problems. An

early draft of his memoirs allowed that there “may be some substance” in claims that the ten year

rule had “lulled the fighting departments into a false sense of security, that Research was neglected,

and only short term views prevailed.” But this concession was excised before publication. Churchill17

also amended his account of the rule’s origin. Early drafts stated that it had been “laid down” by

Churchill during his years at the Treasury. The published version, however, distanced him from the

rule by noting its origins under Lloyd George’s leadership in 1919, and emphasizing that its

subsequent renewals were collectively sanctioned by the cabinet and committee of imperial defence

(CID).

As in the 1930s, Churchill defended himself on the grounds that his position had been

reasonable given the international situation at the time. “Up till the time when I left office in 1929",

he wrote, “I felt so hopeful that the peace of the world would be maintained that I saw no reason to

take any new decision [regarding the ten year rule]; nor in the event was I proved wrong.”

War did not break out till the autumn of 1939. Ten years is a long time in this fugitive world.

The ten-year rule with its day-to-day advance remained in force until 1932 when, on March

23, Mr. MacDonald’s Government rightly decided that its abandonment could be assumed.

6

At this time the Allies possessed the strength, and the right, to prevent any visible or

tangible German rearmament, and Germany must have obeyed a strong united demand from

Britain, France and Italy to bring her actions into conformity with what the Peace Treaties

had prescribed. In reviewing again the history of the eight years from 1930 to 1938, we can

see how much time we had. Up till 1934 at least, German rearmament could have been

prevented without the loss of a single life. It was not time that was lacking. 18

This volume skirted around inconsistencies in Churchill’s positions during the 1930s and

exaggerated his differences with the politicians in office at this time, but this did little to limit its

appeal. His case against the leaders of the 1930s was so persuasive and seemingly authoritative that

few were initially inclined to question it. Even those who defended the national governments did19

not challenge the popular view that Churchill’s prewar record was unblemished. Nevertheless, the

ten year rule constituted a potential chink in Churchill’s formidable armour. Chatfield’s memoirs had

not made an explicit connection between the rule and the former chancellor, but Lord Hankey, the

cabinet secretary throughout most of the interwar period, attempted to do so in 1948 in response to

the first volume of Churchill’s memoirs. Writing to The Times, Hankey maintained that British

rearmament after 1933 had been severely constrained by the “dangerous and demoralizing” impact

of the ten year rule, which had badly damaged not just the fighting services but the arms industry that

supported it. Churchill, in his opinion, could not “escape some responsibility for our misfortunes”,

and he wondered “whether Mr. Churchill would have been any more successful in overcoming the

consequences of his own Ten Years Rule than those whom he pillories.” In a covering letter to The20

Times, Hankey claimed that “Several Service people and ex-Ministers have begged me to write on

the subject.” The “whole official world” knew that Churchill was responsible for the ten year rule,

Hankey asserted, “and the Services – higher ranks at any rate – have never forgiven him”. 21

These criticisms drew an immediate response from Lord Ismay, a retired general and

Churchill’s wartime representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Ismay wrote to The Times22

to point out that Churchill could hardly be held responsible for the actions of governments he did

not belong to. The ten year rule was not binding on any of them, Ismay argued, and could have been

abandoned at any time. In his opinion, blame for Britain’s deficiencies rested with those who waited

over 18 months after the rule’s abandonment to begin planning for rearmament. Britain’s defences

7

may have been run down in 1933, he noted, but the Germans had to “start from scratch”. Hankey was

unwilling to let the matter drop, but his next letter hardly strengthened his case. He conceded that

Churchill was not directly responsible for the retention of the rule after 1929, but was unwilling to

absolve him of blame, claiming that Germany could have been recognized as a potential aggressor

in the 1920s. He also asserted that the ten year rule was not as easy to abandon as Ismay implied

because the MacDonald government, with its commitment to disarmament, could not be expected

to overturn “a financial rule to stop rearmament imposed by a Conservative Government of which

Mr. Churchill, of all men, was Chancellor.” He similarly insisted that rearmament had been

inevitably delayed after the cancellation of the rule by the ongoing disarmament talks at Geneva. But,

while asserting that these governments’ hands were tied in matters relating to rearmament, he

maintained that the rule’s cancellation in 1928 would have created a more favorable situation in

November 1933. 23

Ismay’s final letter to The Times asserted that his former chief should not be blamed because

“those who came after him continued to observe a rule which was no longer in relation to the

conditions which it was drawn up to meet.” He also noted that in 1928 Germany was not considered

a ‘“potential aggressor”in the accepted sense of that phrase’ by the Foreign Office, the Foreign

Secretary, or by Hankey himself. Hankey nevertheless continued to insist that Churchill’s24

perpetuation of the ten year rule had created enormous difficulties for his successors. Cabinet

decisions could always be changed at short notice, he conceded, but a “Treasury rule sponsored by

a powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer ... is always hard and ... sometimes impossible” to change.

One other letter writer supported Hankey. Lord Stanhope, Churchill’s predecessor as First Lord of

the Admiralty in 1938-39, recalled a letter he had received in 1939 from Sir Oswyn Murray, a long-

serving secretary of the admiralty, which asserted that Churchill had “pulled down so much of the

building while in office (as Chancellor of the Exchequer) that he will find it difficult to shore it up

again.” 25

The Times declined to publish an additional letter from Hankey in which he elaborated on

his previous charges and called into question the value of Churchill’s public campaign for more

vigorous rearmament. The result of Churchill’s efforts, he insisted, “was to discredit British

Governments in the thirties, to reduce public confidence in rearmament, to hamper our foreign

policy, to discourage our own people, the Empire, our Allies and friendly neutrals, and to encourage

8

Hitler. How far these tendencies may have been set off by a possible spur to rearmament and public

opinion can be left to posterity.” The following year, Hankey began preparing a more sustained26

indictment of Churchill’s record on defence matters during the interwar period. This was never

completed, but in 1951 Hankey supplied copies of his correspondence with The Times to Viscount

Templewood (Samuel Hoare), one of the leading members of the national governments of the

1930s. Hoare’s memoirs, published in 1954, draw attention to Churchill’s activities as chancellor,27

and suggest that he was “misguided in withdrawing the time limit that had previously restricted the

formula to a single ten years period”. Hoare may have wished to take his criticisms further, but as

a member of Baldwin’s cabinet in 1924-1929, he was clearly conscious of his share in the cabinet’s

collective responsibility for these policies. 28

The public controversy over the ten year rule in The Times letter columns prompted Churchill

to draft a long letter defending his record. He repeated the basic arguments from his memoirs: that29

responsibility for the ten year rule was ultimately a collective one, and that it proved to be a

reasonable estimate. Hankey and Stanhope’s criticisms were attributed to “the uneasy consciences

of some ex-ministers and former high officials”. Hankey, Churchill suggested, was “no doubt”

distressed by his own record during the 1920s, during which he “never formally or informally raised

the slightest protest to the prolongation of the Ten Years’ Rule under a day to day scrutiny.” In

response to Stanhope, Churchill stated that the heaviest cuts to the navy were made after he had left

office. “To pretend”, he concluded, “that my administration of the Exchequer ending ten-and-a-half

years before war, produced irreparable damage to our naval strength, ... only shows the hard straits

to which his Lordship is reduced.”

After having this letter checked by Ismay and Major-General Sir Leslie Hollis, the deputy

military secretary to the cabinet, Churchill decided not to send it, probably deciding, as David

Reynolds suggests, that it would be more dignified to remain silent. In the event, he had little need

to worry: Hankey’s criticisms had little immediate impact on Churchill’s reputation. The

Churchillian critique of appeasement, including the assumption that the path to war began in 1931,

was already well entrenched by this time, and would remain so until the 1960s, when the opening

of the official records revealed the full extent of Churchill’s attacks on the defence services. A new

generation of scholars now began to grapple with the incongruity between Churchill’s stinginess as

chancellor and his reputation as the far-sighted advocate of Britain’s military preparedness. The

9

opinion of J.C.C. Davidson, who had served as the parliamentary and financial secretary to the

admiralty in Baldwin’s second government, proved to be influential. Like Bridgeman, he attributed

Churchill’s attacks on the services to his tendency to “put the whole of his energy into what he

believed to be the right policy of the Department over which he presided. When he was at the

Exchequer he believed that he was the keeper of the public purse and must keep a most severe

control over all spending departments.” This emphasis on departmental concerns was adopted by30

several prominent historians during the late 1960s, including Robert Rhodes James, author of

Churchill: A Study in Failure, and Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Stanley Baldwin’s

biographers. A more elaborate version of this argument was laid out by Vice-Admiral Sir Peter31

Gretton in Former Naval Person. Gretton wrote that:

Explanations of the apparent inconsistency of his policies towards the services in general and

the Navy in particular are difficult to find. We have already seen the pattern. Economy in the

defence departments in 1910 to help the schemes for social security, immediately followed

in 1912 by a large expansion of ship-building. Now we have savage cuts in 1925 to be

followed by demands for rearmament in the 1930s. One explanation must be that Churchill

became absorbed in his task, whatever it was, and fitted himself with mental blinkers which

allowed him to appreciate no one else’s point of view. He then pursued his policies

regardless of opposition and focused every energy on the task to be done. ...

Out of office in 1930, with blinkers discarded, he saw the danger at once and started

to preach rearmament.32

Churchill’s determination to cut the services and extend the ten year rule during the 1920s was thus

rationalized as a “paradox of this remarkable man’s personality”. This explanation quickly gained33

popularity, although others have been suggested. David MacGregor, for example, claims that

Churchill’s inconsistency resulted from the “incorrigible optimism” that marked his “entire career,

and made him so valuable in a crisis – and so dangerous before and after one.” John Charmley, on34

the other hand, plays down the influence of Treasury officials over Churchill, attributing his attacks

on the navy to a combination of “filial piety” (Churchill’s father, Lord Randolph Churchill, had

resigned as chancellor of the exchequer in 1886 over high expenditure on the army and navy) and

10

“political habit”. The orthodox view has also been questioned by Jon Sumida, who suggests that35

Churchill’s position owed more to domestic and international concerns than financial ones.36

While a link was thus reestablished between Churchill as chancellor and Britain’s later

defence problems, most early revisionists went no further than the observation that Churchill must

take a share of the blame, even if a relatively minor one, for Britain’s weakness in the 1930s.

However, some writers have mined Churchill’s tenure at the Treasury for evidence to undermine

what they regard as a grossly-inflated reputation. Churchill has thus been depicted as a hypocrite,

an opportunist, and a reckless adventurer, and his actions as chancellor are sometimes represented

as one of the leading causes of the services’ deficiencies during the 1930s and the early years of the

Second World War. One of the central tenets of this view is the claim, first advanced by Hankey, that

Churchill was to blame not just for the cuts implemented while he was chancellor, but also for those

imposed by his successors. To bolster the argument that Churchill bears a unique responsibility37

for all the ill-effects of the ten year rule, some have claimed that he was also the individual primarily

responsible for its initial adoption in 1919. Other critics see Churchill’s optimism about the38

stability of the international situation and underestimation of the long-term dangers posed by Japan

as evidence that his strategic judgement was seriously flawed throughout his career, particularly with

respect to the Far East. In this manner, a causal relationship is implied between Churchill’s policies39

in the 1920s and Britain’s two great defeats at the beginning of the Pacific war, the loss of the Prince

of Wales and Repulse and the fall of Singapore. 40

Churchill is only one of several individuals to be identified as the instigator of the original ‘ten year

rule’ in August 1919. Stephen Roskill, a frequent critic of Churchill, attributed primary responsibility

to Maurice Hankey; others, including Kenneth McDonald and John Ferris, have emphasised the

central role played by the prime minister, David Lloyd George. 41

Roskill’s case for Hankey rests on a memorandum the cabinet secretary prepared in July 1919

for the guidance of the prime minister. This document argued that postwar economic imperatives42

dictated a reduction of “non-productive” expenditure on the armed services “within the narrowest

limits consistent with national safety.” To achieve this, it proposed that the government furnish the

services with clear policies to guide them in formulating reduced estimates. The navy, in Hankey’s

view, could control expenses by excluding the United States from any new naval ‘standard’ by which

11

it calculated its capital ship requirements. A standard based on the fleets of the next two strongest

naval powers would, he maintained, fulfill Britain’s real security needs while providing adequate

strength to meet the “more remote contingency” of conflict with the United States. Turning to the

other services, Hankey concluded that Britain should concentrate on maintaining order at home and

throughout the empire. In the event that Britain assumed formal obligations to defend France against

a resurgent Germany, he advised that peacetime forces need not be maintained on a Continental

scale. The “machinery should exist for re-creating a great army, he concluded, “although this should

probably consist only of a carefully worked out paper scheme with properly allocated

responsibility.” 43

The ideas outlined in this memorandum were hardly unique to Hankey. As Ferris notes,

similar suggestions had previously been made by Sir Frederick Sykes, the Chief of the Air Staff, and

Sir George Barstow, the chief of the Treasury’s supply services branch. Churchill, as Secretary of44

State for War and Air in the Lloyd George coalition, was naturally involved in efforts to bring

national expenditure under control. He based the air force’s policies on the assumption that there

would be no great war for a period of five or ten years, but continuing military commitments in

Ireland, Europe, and the Middle East made it impossible to place the army and air force estimates

immediately onto a “normal” peacetime footing. He therefore attempted to divert pressure for

economies from the services that were under his authority by highlighting the savings that could be

obtained from the one that was not, the navy. Writing to Lloyd George on 1 May 1919, he insisted

that defence expenditure as a whole would only be brought under control through a large reduction

in the navy estimates. To avoid naval competition with the United States, he suggested that the

Americans might be given surrendered German battleships. “It would be a mark of great confidence

and trust”, he claimed, “and would do more to lay naval competition to rest than anything else.”

Moreover, it would forestall the danger of a qualitative naval challenge from the United States,

which Churchill regarded as more serious than a quantitative one. Britain, he argued, had emerged

from the First World War with sufficient naval strength to forego the construction of expensive new

warships “except of a minor character, for many years to come.”

The dockyards are choked with war vessels and I cannot conceive that any new construction

is required. In the year before the war my new construction vote was over 20 millions, which

at present day prices is considerably over 30 millions. It is from that source alone that in the

12

present circumstances a saving can be made which will enable us to reconcile Imperial

Defence and national economy. 45

Churchill made his views public in June 1919 in an article for The Weekly Dispatch, where he

claimed that even a qualitative challenge from the United States would not require an immediate

British response. “The longer you can delay the building of new ships without letting your margin

fall too low,” he maintained, “the better and more powerful is the ship you can build when the time

comes.”46

Churchill repeated this case in a cabinet memorandum of 1 August, where he insisted that

the reduction of defence expenditure must be borne primarily by the navy, which faced no serious

or immediate threats. Like Hankey, Churchill emphasised the importance of giving the services –

and in particular the navy – a clear policy on which to prepare. To this end, he proposed that the

cabinet should declare, “for the guidance of the fighting services, that they are not to take into

consideration the possibility of another great war occurring in the next five years, and that they are

to consider it only remotely possible in the five years following that.” This, he claimed “would wipe

out a whole series of obligations and anxieties which the military and naval authorities have at

present to reckon with.” Three days later he drove these points home in a letter to the prime47

minister. “The army has definite additions to its responsibilities & the Air Force is a new arm,” he

wrote. “But the Navy must be reduced in accordance with the altered state of the world & of other

maritime powers.”48

The Treasury also dismissed suggestions that the navy must prepare against either an

American or Japanese threat to British interests. The chancellor of the exchequer, Austen

Chamberlain, pressed the cabinet through July 1919 to cut expenditure on the armed services in

general, and infuriated the Admiralty by recommending a sharp reduction in the number of capital

ships maintained in full commission – a proposal that would have left Britain inferior in strength to

the United States. The Admiralty, however, was determined to maintain at least parity with the49

United States. By the end of the month, Lloyd George looked to diplomacy as the best means to50

avert naval competition with the Americans. He enlisted Lord Grey, the former foreign secretary,

for a diplomatic mission to the United States to settle various outstanding issues, including naval

questions. Before accepting this assignment, Grey insisted that the government must exclude the

United States from any future naval standard, as the Liberal government had done before 1914.

13

Lloyd George agreed. The Admiralty does not appear to have been consulted. 51

At the war cabinet meeting of 5 August, Walter Long, the first lord of the admiralty,

complained about the difficulty of effecting economies without clear policy guidance. Following a

suggestion from Churchill, the cabinet agreed that the services should each prepare a memorandum

outlining their expected responsibilities for the following “five or ten years”. Before the52

Admiralty’s reply arrived, Lloyd George moved the question of defence expenditure to a new venue,

the cabinet’s finance committee. This allowed him to obtain preliminary decisions along the lines

he wanted before opening a potentially divisive debate over naval policy in the war cabinet. The

committee’s meeting of 11 August 1919, chaired by Lloyd George, included only three ministers:

Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Milner. This group decided that defence spending must

be reduced to approximate prewar levels, which would mean estimates for all three services totalling

£135 million. The navy was allocated only £60 million, a sharp drop from the £170 million that had

been approved in July. Several principles were suggested to assist the services in meeting this figure:

(1) They should proceed on the assumption that no great war is to be anticipated within

the next ten years, although provision should be made for possible expansion, of

trained units in case of an emergency arising.

(2) The Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry should assume that their principal

responsibility is the provision of sufficient forces to keep order in the United

Kingdom, India, and all British (other than self-governing) territory.

(3) In fulfilling these responsibilities the utmost should be made of air-power and other

mechanical devices in order to save man-power.53

Hankey later claimed that he was instructed not to circulate these minutes beyond members

of the committee and those present at the meeting. The Admiralty, unaware of the finance54

committee’s decision, submitted a survey of its future requirements the following day. This

document was not considered when the cabinet reviewed defence expenditure again on 15 August.

Nor did Lloyd George discuss the question directly with the First Lord, as the finance committee had

recommended. Walter Long later complained that he had not even been given notice that this matter

would be coming up for consideration at this meeting. The war cabinet nevertheless accepted the55

general principles approved four days earlier by the finance committee. The fighting services were

formally instructed to assume “for framing revised Estimates, that the British Empire will not be

14

engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for

this purpose.” The Admiralty was also directed to aim at a maximum figure of £60 million for its

new estimates, and to revert to the naval standard in place before the war – 60% superiority over the

next strongest naval power excluding the United States.56

Churchill can hardly be characterised as the principal instigator of the “ten year rule”. He had

added his voice to those calling for a change in policy, but he was not even invited to the meeting

where the new guidelines were first adopted. The policy approved by the cabinet on 15 August was

framed to achieve Lloyd George’s immediate objectives with respect to strategic policy: meeting his

obligations to Lord Grey, facilitating an agreement with the United States, dramatically reducing

naval expenditure, and providing a clear policy for the guidance of the Admiralty. They also

promised to help the prime minister control the policies of the other two services, although this was

a less pressing matter at the time, as Churchill had already accepted that the army and air force could

frame their policies on the assumption that there would be no major war for a ten year period. But

while the prime minister may have been the driving force behind the adoption of the rule, the

collective nature of the final decision should also be emphasised, as Lloyd George’s goals had strong

support within the cabinet, and not just from Churchill.

The ten year rule of August 1919 had little impact on British service policies prior to

Churchill’s appointment as chancellor of the exchequer in 1924. Despite Treasury opposition, the

cabinet authorised expensive new programmes for the fighting services during the years 1921-23.

The air force obtained approval for a large “home defence air force”, while the navy was authorised

to construct a major new base at Singapore, build up large fuel reserves, and maintain a “one power

standard” relative to the United States Navy. Nor was it clear to policy-makers in Whitehall that57

the principles laid down in 1919 were meant to have an extended shelf-life. The Geddes Committee

on National Expenditure assumed that the ten year rule still applied during its deliberations in 1921-

22, but Hankey advised the War Office in 1923 that the original decision of the finance committee

was only intended to provide guidelines for the revision of the service estimates for 1920-21. The

decision, he maintained, had subsequently been “interpreted rather more widely than was

intended”. 58

Churchill’s efforts to revive the ten year rule began soon after returning to office in

November 1924, when he learned that the Admiralty hoped to increase spending in the upcoming

15

financial year, 1925-26, by nearly £10 million. If these plans were approved, Churchill predicted

naval expenditure could rise as high as £80 million for 1927-28, a sharp increase over the £55.8

million for 1924-25. The new chancellor, eager to make his mark by lowering taxes and stimulating59

trade, objected to these proposals on both economic and political grounds. He warned Baldwin in

December 1924 that increases on the scale demanded by the Admiralty would only “sterilize and

paralyse the whole policy of the Government. There will be nothing for the taxpayer and nothing for

social reform. We shall be a Naval Parliament busily preparing our Navy for some great imminent

shock.” Moreover, excessive naval expenditure would “not only bring the Government into ruin, but

might well affect the safety of the State” by undermining the Conservative party in the next general

election. “If the Socialists win in a tremendous economy wave, they will cut down and blot out all

these Naval preparations.” 60

The Admiralty’s policies were based on a conviction that Japan presented a real threat to the

security of the British Empire; that this threat necessitated both immediate and long-term

preparations; and that Britain must be capable of waging an offensive, and likely protracted, naval

campaign against Japan in its home waters. This translated into Admiralty demands for sufficient61

new construction to maintain a clear margin of superiority over the Japanese navy, the creation of

a large oil fuel reserve, and the completion of a new naval base at Singapore. With capital ship

strength regulated by the Washington naval treaty of 1922, the most expensive warships demanded

by the Admiralty were cruisers. In 1924 the naval staff had set out a ten year construction program

to meet Britain’s needs in this class of ship, which it calculated as 45 for trade defence and 25 for

work with the main fleet. In 1925 Britain possessed only 51 cruisers, with another five being built

as part of the 1924 program authorised by the Labour government. With 32 of these ships due to be

scrapped over the next decade, the Admiralty claimed that an additional 46 cruisers would have to

be built by 1936 to reach its minimum requirements.62

As chancellor, Churchill consistently disputed the underlying justification for the Admiralty’s

most expensive programmes. First, he insisted that war with Japan was not a serious possibility. “I

do not believe there is the slightest chance of it in our lifetime,” he told Baldwin in December 1924.

Second, Churchill denied that Japan was in a position to challenge any truly vital British interests.

“Japan is at the other end of the world,” he insisted. “She cannot menace our vital security in any

way.”

16

The only sufficient cause which could draw us into war with Japan would be if she invaded

Australia. Does anybody imagine she is going to do so? Would she not be mad to do so?

How could she put an army into Australia, over 5,000 miles across the ocean and maintain

it at war with the Australians and the whole British Empire[?] Nothing less than half a

million Japanese would be any good, and these would have to be continually supplied and

maintained. It is an absolute absurdity. Even if America stood inactive Japan would be

ruined. She would never attempt it.

Finally, Churchill challenged the Admiralty’s offensive strategy for a Far Eastern war. It was one

thing to hold Singapore, he maintained, but quite another to inflict a decisive defeat on Japan, as the

Admiralty’s plans envisioned. “We should have to send large armies (how we should raise them I

do not know) to go and attack Japan in her home waters.”

The war would last for years. It would cost Japan very little. It would reduce us to

bankruptcy. All the time it was on we should be at the mercy at home of every unfriendly

power or force hostile to the British Empire. We could never do it. It would never be worth

our while to do it. The only war it would be worth our while to fight with Japan would be to

prevent an invasion of Australia, and that I am certain will never happen in any period, even

the most remote, which we or our children need foresee.

“I am therefore convinced”, he concluded, “that war with Japan is not a possibility which any

reasonable Government need take into account.”63

Churchill appreciated that he could not hope to force large reductions on the navy’s

construction programme without support from the cabinet. On 26 November 1924, he urged his

colleagues to consider “the desirability and practicability of renewing” the decision of August 1919

that the fighting services should assume there would be no great war within the next ten years. A64

few weeks later, he suggested to Baldwin that naval leaders should be “made to recast all their plans

and scales and standards on the basis that no naval war against a first class Navy is likely to take

place in the next twenty years.” In January 1925, Churchill took his case for reduced naval65

expenditure to the CID, where his optimistic views about Japan were supported by the Foreign

Office. Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, advised the committee that “the prospect of war

in the Far East was very remote.” Moreover, even if the “danger of a struggle ever materialises”, he

predicted that the government would have “plenty of warning”. It would therefore be “a great

17

mistake”, he concluded, “to disquiet the Japanese and render them more nervous than they are.”66

The Admiralty contested these views, arguing that Japan did pose a serious threat to British

interests, at least in the long-term; that Britain could not necessarily count on a lengthy warning

period; and that the government must still provide for the defence of British interests in the Far

East. When the navy refused to fall into line, Churchill insisted that the navy estimates for 1925/2667

would have to be settled by the cabinet. His goal was the virtual elimination of the Admiralty’s68

proposed construction program. In a lengthy memorandum of 29 January 1925, the chancellor called

for the cancellation of all new building except a few submarines, which would allow savings of

approximately £1.8 million in the coming financial year, and as much as £8 million in the following

one. The Treasury also believed that freezing personnel levels and adopting later completion dates

for both the Singapore naval base and the accumulation of oil reserves would make it possible to

keep naval expenditure down to £57,650,000, a figure nearly £2 million above the previous year’s

estimates. “No one”, Churchill claimed, “can say this is not an ample supply”.69

Churchill remained hopeful that a bitter struggle with the navy could be avoided. After a

series of “very amicable and friendly” discussions with the first sea lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord

Beatty, Churchill proposed a compromise on 4 February. “It would be a great relief I am sure to you

to know that you could count on a steady £60 millions in future years”, he wrote to Beatty. Churchill

insisted that this figure, which was “more than £4 millions above this year in a period when everyone

was looking for reductions”, was the “absolute limit” on which he could agree. This was a generous70

offer. Churchill was effectively abandoning the idea of restricting naval expenditure on the basis of

cabinet-imposed policy guidelines, which would have allowed the navy considerable freedom to

allocate funds as it saw fit within the total figure available. In return, Churchill would obtain his most

important immediate goal, holding overall naval expenditure to a level the Treasury considered

manageable.

Naval leaders were unwilling to give in, however. They conceded that the current strategic

situation was “in no way comparable to that of 1914”, when Britain faced a hostile Germany across

the North Sea, but they insisted that the challenges facing Britain were now “more difficult and

complex” given that Japan, “owing to her geographical position can deal us a serious blow, by

attacking our trade and outlying portions of the Empire, without having to engage in a Naval battle.”

The difference between the two problems, is, therefore, that whereas our main strategy in the

18

late war began and ended with the correct placing of our battle fleet, a war with Japan would,

certainly, for the first 12 months or more, be a Cruiser war of oceanic proportions as well as

involving the very difficult operation of concentrating the Main Fleet in Far East Waters.71

This line of argument was ineffective, however, as long as ministers accepted that war with Japan

was a remote contingency. The cabinet was impressed with Churchill’s arguments and supported his

plan to maintain the navy estimates at £60 million for several years. However, when Sir William

Bridgeman took the proposal to the Board of Admiralty on 11 February, it was rejected. The Board

was adamant that anything less than £62.5 million in the current year would undermine its long-term

building program. Naval leaders were apparently confident that their construction program could be

defended on the basis of the one-power standard, and expected this to give them leverage in their

battle with the Treasury. Their most effective weapon, however, proved to be the threat of72

resignations. Bridgeman warned Baldwin the same day that the entire Board would step down if the

cabinet did not immediately approve four new cruisers for the 1925 construction program. If this

happened, Bridgeman warned the Prime Minister that “a very large proportion of our party will

sympathise with their attitude”. The Admiralty found little support inside the government, however.73

Lord Cecil was the only minister to vote with Bridgeman at the next day’s cabinet, and he did so,

he claimed, only because the First Lord was “a very old friend” and there was “no danger of his

views being adopted.”74

The Admiralty’s obvious isolation induced Bridgeman to agree to estimates of £60.5 million,

excluding new construction. To placate the Admiralty and avert a crisis, Baldwin referred the cruiser

question to a cabinet committee under Lord Birkenhead, the secretary of state for India and a close

friend of the chancellor. The navy was now compelled to link its cruiser program directly to the75

one-power standard, which not only had formal cabinet approval but had been announced in

parliament, making it difficult for any government to abandon it without facing strong criticism. The

application of the one power standard to cruiser strength was not straightforward, however. Like

previous standards, this one was generally applied only to strength in capital ships, in which class

the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 ensured Britain a 5:3 superiority over Japan. The Admiralty

insisted, however, that cruiser requirements were not directly linked to capital ship strength because

cruisers were required both for work with the fleet and for trade protection. The former requirement

could be measured in relative terms, according to the number and type of cruisers maintained by the

19

enemy, but it argued that the latter must be calculated in absolute terms, based on amount of trade

and the length of the sea lanes requiring protection. The Admiralty claimed that its requirements

were so great, given Britain’s dependence on overseas trade, that no less than 70 cruisers were

required to protect Britain’s interests, and even that figure might be inadequate. The Admiralty

position, therefore, was that its cruiser program was essential for the navy to maintain equality in

fighting strength with Japan in eastern waters. Hence, these programs were essential for the

maintenance of a one power standard relative to Japan. The Admiralty also broadened its definition76

to encompass not only warships but all aspects of the navy’s fighting strength. Thus, the navy

claimed that it must maintain not only a clear margin of naval superiority over Japan after making

allowances for retaining a substantial deterrent force in home waters, but also docking and repair

facilities at Singapore and an ample reserve of oil fuel.

Churchill continued to insist Japan was unlikely to attack British interests and that the cruiser

situation was not urgent. He also undermined the navy’s case by pointing out that the Singapore77

naval base was so far from completion that there was no prospect of basing a large fleet there for at

least another ten or eleven years. “We might as well make a virtue of necessity”, he suggested, and

abandon preparations for a major war in the Far East for the next decade. If this were done, “there

would fall to the ground the whole expense of building and victualling ships, the submarines and

destroyers and depot ships which are required to carry the main British Fleet into Far Eastern

waters.” The Admiralty might then only require 50 cruisers to meets its obligations. The navy was78

unwilling either to exclude the possibility of war with Japan or abandon its interpretation of the one-

power standard, and the CID was compelled to rule on these questions in April 1925. At79

Churchill’s insistence, the committee endorsed a new statement from the Foreign Office that

“aggressive action by Japan for the next ten years is not seriously to be apprehended”. It then agreed

that the Admiralty did not need “to make preparations for placing at Singapore for a decisive battle

in the Pacific a British battle fleet, with cruisers, flotillas, and all ancillary vessels superior in

strength, or at least equal, to the sea-going Navy of Japan.”80

This decision effectively established a new “ten year rule”, but only, it should be noted, to

cover naval preparations for war with Japan before 1935. The committee was not prepared to leave

Britain’s far eastern interests undefended indefinitely, and agreed that the Admiralty should continue

its long-term projects as insurance against a Japanese threat in the more distant future. It therefore

20

approved a new definition of the one-power standard including the provision that arrangements

should be made “from time to time in different parts of the world, according as the international

situation requires, to enable the local naval forces to maintain the situation against vital and

irreparable damage pending the arrival of the main fleet, and to give the main fleet on arrival

sufficient mobility.” The Singapore naval base and the oil fuel program were thus enshrined as an

integral part of the one power standard.81

The limitations of the new rule became clear when the Birkenhead committee resumed its

deliberations. In the absence of an unambiguous cabinet declaration that the ten year rule superceded

the one power standard, Beatty continued to defend the navy’s construction programme on the

grounds that the Admiralty had a duty to maintain the latter, and that Churchill’s proposals could not

be reconciled with it. The government, he maintained, must therefore either renounce the standard,

build the ships the navy demanded, or “tell the Admiralty that they are incapable of doing their job

and get someone else to do it for them.” This argument failed to sway the committee, and its final82

report sided with the Treasury. When the cabinet met on 15 July, only a handful of ministers

supported the navy’s position. But if Churchill expected a complete victory over the Admiralty, he

was mistaken. The ten year rule was only useful to the Treasury if the cabinet was willing to enforce

it. When it became clear that Beatty, Long, and the rest of the board of admiralty were prepared to

resign rather than accept a cancellation of their building programme, Baldwin stepped in and

imposed a settlement that both sides were willing to accept. Four new cruisers were approved for83

the current year, but substantial savings would be achieved by starting work on these ships as late

as possible. Another three cruisers were approved for each of the following three years. This was a

clear setback for both Churchill and the Treasury. Despite the consensus within the cabinet over the

far eastern situation and the establishment of a fresh ten year rule aimed explicitly at naval

preparations for a far eastern war, they failed either to control naval expenditure or eliminate a

shipbuilding program that had been rejected by a major cabinet sub-committee.

If Treasury officials were pleased by the force and skill the new chancellor had deployed

against the Admiralty, they were also likely disappointed over his unwillingness to adopt their

position on all defence issues. P.J. Grigg, Churchill’s principal private secretary at the treasury,

observed in 1925 that his chief was not as “malleable” as either Sir Robert Horne or Philip

Snowden”, two recent chancellors. The most obvious disagreement between Churchill and his84

21

advisors was over the Singapore naval base. Treasury officials shared Churchill’s optimistic views85

about Japan and his doubts about the viability of the Admiralty’s war plans, but they were more

willing to sacrifice British interests in the far east if the cost of defending them seemed prohibitively

high. Officials had therefore opposed the construction of a naval base at Singapore when the idea86

was first raised, and then pressed for its cancellation after the cabinet approved it. Barstow wrote in

1923 that his department had

never attempted to contest the Admiralty view that a naval base at Singapore is necessary if

the Navy is to fight Japan in the Pacific. Our view has been that farseeing statesmanship

might nevertheless decide that alike on grounds of high policy and of finance the naval base

at Singapore ought not to be proceeded with. The Anglo-Japanese alliance has been replaced

by the 4-Power Pact, the Fleets of the Great Naval Powers are being reduced in the

Washington ratio. Might not this gesture of mistrust against a former ally with whom we

have been on friendly terms for so long have been forgone? Must Great Britain which

preaches reduction of armaments and balancing budgets to Europe take the lead in increasing

fortifications at vast expense in Asia?

“Is there”, he concluded, “not a higher statesmanship than the frigid calculations of naval strategy?”87

In February 1924, Barstow proposed that the government could “take the line that Japan for at least

10 years is not a possible belligerent, & defer the Singapore base for at least 5 years; the question

to come up again for consideration in 1929”. 88

Churchill was unwilling to link the survival of the Singapore base to the ten year rule. He had

supported the decision in 1921 to construct the base, and the following year endorsed the navy’s

plans to prepare for a major campaign in the Far East, including “the discreet building up of the

fuelling stations and of the base at Singapore which alone can enable our fleet to offer some

protection to all our interests in the Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand.” While out of89

office in 1924, he spoke out strongly against the Labour government’s cancellation of the project.

At the time, he emphasized Britain’s moral obligation to defend Australia and New Zealand. As90

chancellor (and afterwards), Churchill consistently maintained that these territories were vital British

interests, that they could not be left entirely at Japan's mercy, and that Britain should ultimately be

22

capable of waging at least a defensive war in the region. He therefore remained committed in

principle to the project, although he insisted that it was “a purely defensive measure from the point

of view of the British Empire”. It would be a link “in Britain's inter-Imperial communications, and

one of great guarantees we can give to our Australasian Dominions”, but he warned the navy not to

expect it to serve “as a jumping off ground to attack Japan in her own home waters”. 91

The Admiralty’s determination to use the Singapore base as the cornerstone of an offensive

strategy against Japan continually frustrated Churchill, who complained to the CID in July 1926 that,

“If he had foreseen that the decision to develop a base at Singapore would be used as a gigantic

excuse for building up armaments and that this country would then be invited to pour out money

with a view to conducting war at the other end of the world, he would never have agreed to the

development of this base.” But he never sought to cancel the base itself, as some have claimed.92 93

When Barstow suggested in 1927 that Japan might be persuaded at the upcoming naval conference

to reduce its fleet significantly in return for the termination of the Singapore base, Churchill

immediately dismissed the idea. “I am sure that [such an offer] would be met with a blank refusal”,

he wrote. “The Australasian position wd be considered decisive. We must link the Empire together.

The public declarations are explicit. None more than mine.”94

Churchill and his officials did agree, however, that no opportunity should be lost to

economize on this massive project. When the base came up for discussion at the CID on 5 January

1925, Churchill pushed for the establishment of a new sub-committee, with himself as a member,

to look into the site of the naval base, its defences, and the timetable for completion. The resulting95

committee promptly rejected Churchill’s proposal to relocate the base in order to take advantage of

existing commercial facilities at Singapore’s Keppel Harbour, but its deliberations soon stalled due

to inter-service disagreement over the base’s defences. Churchill and the Treasury sided with the Air

Ministry in the ensuing “guns-vs-planes” debate, believing that an enlarged role for the RAF would

ultimately lead to significant savings. Discussion of Singapore’s defences dragged on until the96

following year, when an offer from the Federated Malay States to contribute £2 million towards the

cost of the base facilitated a compromise. This prompted the Admiralty to begin lobbying for a

decision on the facilities to be provided at Singapore. The Admiralty’s plans division estimated the

cost of a fully equipped base at £11 million, plus an additional £3.25 million for defences. Realising

that this scheme had little chance of obtaining approval in the current climate, the sea lords proposed

23

instead a “truncated scheme” in July 1926, with an estimated cost of £7.75 million excluding

defences. The Admiralty’s modified proposals were approved by the CID in July 1926, with no97

opposition from Churchill being recorded. 98

The Malayan contribution to the Singapore scheme was later augmented by donations from

New Zealand and Hong Kong. The Treasury only turned its attention to the base again in July 1928,

when heavy expenditure was about to begin on the dry dock. With a general election now

approaching, Churchill was again eager for political reasons to reduce the service estimates. He

recommended postponing work on the dry dock for a year in order to effect substantial immediate

reductions. He “stated emphatically”, however, that he had no desire to alter anything other than the

timetable for the “truncated scheme”. To reassure the Admiralty that he remained committed to the

completion of the base, he recommended that the new contract for construction of the dock should

be “definitely settled before the elections took place, so that there could be no danger of the

Singapore scheme being upset by any change in Government.” 99

The Treasury also enjoyed considerable success in slowing down the navy’s accumulation

of oil fuel reserves, another cornerstone of the service’s far eastern war plans. The Admiralty’s goal

of building up reserves equal to one year’s consumption in wartime not only had cabinet approval,

but had been enshrined in the one power standard adopted in 1925. Nevertheless, the chancellor had

little trouble convincing his colleagues to reduce the 330,000 tons of oil fuel the navy requested

annually for its reserve to 100,000 tons for three consecutive year beginning in 1926. The Treasury100

was intent, however, on securing even greater savings from the navy, which could only come by

reducing the new construction program settled by the cabinet in 1925. Churchill’s opportunity to

reopen this issue came in the aftermath of the Geneva naval conference in 1927. Britain entered101

this conference looking for new qualitative restrictions on auxiliary warships not already regulated

by the Washington Treaty, in hopes of easing the nation’s financial burdens. Even the Admiralty was

genuinely interested in securing a deal. Naval leaders appreciated that heavy increases in naval

spending would meet with increasing opposition from the government, and it was clear to many that

if things were bad under Churchill, they would be far worse if Labour returned to power. But,102

when the United States demanded formal parity in all classes of warship, Churchill, the Admiralty,

and most of the cabinet preferred to see the conference break up without an agreement rather than

accept concessions that they felt would undermine British security. Anglo-American relations

24

deteriorated alarmingly following the conference.

On 4 August, before Britain’s delegates had even returned from Geneva, the cabinet assented

to a request from the chancellor for a new inquiry into future naval construction. Treasury officials103

hoped their chief would seek reductions in all classes of ship, but Churchill only wished to reduce

or eliminate the cruisers already authorized for the 1927/28 program and those projected for the

subsequent year. The question was ultimately referred to a new naval programme committee,104

which was chaired, like its predecessor in 1925, by Birkenhead. When this body began its

deliberations in November 1927,Churchill insisted that a reduction in Britain’s cruiser programme

was necessary to reduce tensions with the United States. He buttressed his case with assurances105

that his proposals would not endanger British interests. By 1931, he noted, Britain would possess

more than a 25% superiority over the United States and Japan combined in cruiser strength even if

no new construction were undertaken. Churchill countered the Admiralty’s protests by assuring106

the committee that he was not proposing to cease new cruiser construction altogether. “No one in

their senses would ever suggest that,” he insisted. The only issue was how Britain could replace its

existing fleet “with the least possible cost and burden to the taxpayer.” The choice was not “between

letting the bottom fall out of the British Navy, on the one hand, and building excessive strength, on

the other. The proposal is to arrive at a just rate of building new ships to replace the old ones.”107

Britain, he argued, was far enough ahead of its rivals in cruisers that it could afford to reduce its

program for two years without incurring any risks.

Committee members unanimously backed Churchill. Their final report recommended

dropping two cruisers from the approved program for the current year, and one more in the following

year. Having soundly defeated the navy on the cruiser question, Churchill immediately took aim108

at its 1928 estimates. The Admiralty proposed a figure of £58,330,000 for the coming year, but the

chancellor insisted on no more than £56 million, claiming that the Admiralty had not taken full

account of the favourable international situation, “especially as regards Japan”, or the government’s

decision that no great war “need be anticipated for at least ten years.” Bridgeman denied this109

charge, but there was much truth in it. The Admiralty continued to prepare as best it could for a110

major war with Japan, despite repeated instructions not to do so. The ten year rule was simply

ignored by Admiralty officials, who, when challenged, interpreted it to mean that the navy must

complete its preparations for a far eastern conflict by 1935, when the ten year period laid down in

25

1925 would expire.111

The chancellor’s frustration over Japan’s continuing prominence in the navy’s calculations

was shared by his subordinates. Treasury officials’ minutes on the proposed navy estimates for 1928

showed their exasperation with what they regarded as the navy’s “stubborn unhelpfulness” and

“unstinted lavishness whether on questions of the organisation of dockyards and factories, the

economical use of manpower, or the standard of reserves.” The navy’s attitude was also contrasted112

unfavourably with that of the army. The War Office had requested a cabinet declaration in 1927113

that the ten year rule should be extended to cover a European war, “and that the immediate plans of

the Army should be based upon preparedness for an extra-European war.” The army’s willingness114

to abide by this cabinet decision fuelled the Treasury’s irritation with what it correctly saw as the

Admiralty’s “refusal to acknowledge the government policy of “peace for 10 years”.” According115

to A.C. Waterfield of the Treasury’s supply department, it was “simply perversion of facts” for

Bridgeman to claim that the 1928 estimates conformed to the ten year rule. “The Admiralty”, he

complained, “are not talking the same language as the Government”. 116

The Treasury agreed to navy estimates of £57.3 million for 1928, but Churchill and his

advisers were not pleased with the outcome and determined to bring future naval expenditure under

control by enforcing their interpretation of the ten year rule. Before the 1928 navy estimates had been

submitted to parliament, Churchill informed Bridgeman that he hoped to create a new cabinet

committee to examine the basis of the 1929 estimates. The main point of contention was the117

Admiralty’s claim that the ten year rule of 1925 required it to be ready for a major war by 1935. In

inter-departmental discussions over the 1928 estimates, Chatfield had maintained that the Admiralty

had never been told anything different. Churchill’s view, however, was that “the end of the 10 years

was continually receding.” The Treasury informed the Admiralty in March 1928 that the118

Admiralty’s interpretation was “out of harmony with repeated decisions of His Majesty’s

Government under which the “ten years period” is renewed from year to year, and should now be

regarded as running until 1938 at least.” 119

An exasperated Bridgeman complained to the prime minister that the matter should properly

be considered by the CID rather than an ad hoc committee. Churchill conceded this point, and the120

question was taken up by that body on 5 July 1928. The Admiralty received initial support from121

Arthur Balfour, who cautioned that “nobody could say that from any one moment war was an

26

impossibility for the next ten years, and that we could not rest in a state of unpreparedness on such

an assumption by anybody.” Both the army and navy, in his view, “must be maintained in the highest

pitch of perfection.” Churchill, however, objected to the phrase “highest pitch of perfection”, arguing

that the likelihood of a major war was sufficiently remote that the services did not need to be in the

same “state of instantaneous readiness” as was necessary in the years leading up to the First World

War. Balfour conceded that a “nation which expected to be attacked within a year was in a different

position to one which had no particular anxieties”, and suggested that a “revision of phraseology”

was required.122

Austen Chamberlain proved to be Churchill’s strongest supporter. He warned that the Foreign

Office could not guarantee its prediction about the possibility of war, but nevertheless accepted that

the ten year rule could be a useful tool. “[I]n framing defence policies”, he stated, “a compromise

always had to be adopted”.

The desirability of certain measures as represented by the Service Departments stood on the

one hand, and the need for husbanding our resources in peace so that we might be in a

position to meet the difficulties of war lay on the other. It rested with the Cabinet to decide

where that compromise should be drawn.

Chamberlain did not oppose a renewal of the rule, provided that it was merely a guide for framing

the service estimates. As a safeguard, he suggested that the hypothesis should be reconsidered each

year, and that the fighting services should have the opportunity of raising any concerns about the ten

year period at any time. This opinion was generally shared by the committee.

Bridgeman and Admiral Sir Charles Madden, Beatty’s successor as first sea lord, did not

attempt to defend either the Admiralty’s interpretation of the ten year rule or its assessment of the

Japanese threat. Instead, they fell back on the argument that the rule could not be allowed to interfere

with another cabinet policy guideline, the one-power standard. This prompted a rebuke from

Chamberlain, who declared that the cabinet, rather than the board of admiralty, was ultimately

responsible for determining whether the standard was being jeopardised. A short time later, the

foreign secretary struck the final blow to the Admiralty’s hopes by providing another optimistic

survey of international affairs, which identified the Soviet Union as the only likely threat to British

interests over the next decade. The prime minister supported Chamberlain’s recommendations, and

the committee recommended that “it should be assumed, for the purpose of framing the Estimates

27

of the Fighting Services, that at any given date there will be no major war for ten years.” This

decision was to be reviewed annually by the CID, and could be challenged at any time by any

department or dominion.123

Churchill had every reason to be pleased with this outcome. His interpretation of the ten year

rule obtained official endorsement at the highest level, and in the process was extended to cover all

three services and all potential major conflicts. Treasury officials expected more naval reductions

to follow. Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary, remarked optimistically that “Our margin in

naval strength, the absence of anyone to fight at sea, the Cabinet instruction about no “major” war,

the Kellog Pact, & our financial situation seem to me to provide in the aggregate an overwhelming

argument for a drastic cut in naval expenditure.” For once, all factors seemed to be aligned in the124

Treasury’s favour. Churchill easily achieved his immediate goal, reducing the navy’s 1929 estimates

to nearly £1.5 million below the previous year’s level, but otherwise the new ten year rule did not

dramatically enhance his power over the services. Churchill’s most ambitious efforts to cut expenses

during the final months of the Baldwin government were uniformly unsuccessful. In December 1928

he asked the Cabinet to consider dropping the two cruisers to be laid down late in the 1928/29 fiscal

year as a means to improve Anglo-American relations and to reduce defence expenditure on the eve

of a general election. The Foreign Office was receptive to this idea, but the cabinet supported125

Baldwin's view that such a move might not be well received in the United States. Churchill126

accepted this decision reluctantly, but returned to the attack in February 1929 after learning details

of the new 'pocket battleships' being designed by Germany. These ships, which combined high speed

and endurance with a powerful 11-inch armament, threatened to outclass Britain's existing treaty

cruisers by a wide margin. Churchill again tried to persuade the cabinet to postpone the 1928/29

cruisers “so as to incorporate all the most recent technical improvements.” But Bridgeman protested

strongly that the new German ships had no bearing on the British program, and the cabinet agreed

not to disturb the Admiralty's building plans.127

Labour’s success in the 1929 general election meant that the real beneficiary of the new ten

year rule was the Treasury, which exploited the strengthened rule at every opportunity in its efforts

to control service expenditure. Within weeks of the new government taking power, Treasury officials

were urging the new chancellor to abandon the Singapore naval base and plotting to inflict additional

cuts on the navy, which continued to evade the spirit of the cabinet’s decisions. But Hankey’s128

28

suggestion that the Labour government’s hands were tied by the ten year rule is wrong. MacDonald’s

cabinet could have modified or abandoned the rule whenever it chose to. It had no evident desire to

do so, however. On the contrary, Ramsay MacDonald informed the CID in June 1929 that the new

version of the rule adopted in 1928 was “a change for the better”. It would also be wrong to129

suggest that the ten year rule was entirely responsible for the decline in British strength during the

early 1930s. Defence spending did drop for several consecutive years after Churchill left office, but

this cannot necessarily be attributed to the continuance of the ten year rule. Labour’s commitment

to disarmament and the massive strain placed on British finances by the Great Depression were

probably sufficient in themselves to ensure that the Treasury would enjoy a dominant position in

strategic policy-making during the years 1929-1932. MacDonald’s national government responded

to the deteriorating international situation in 1932 by officially revoking the ten year rule, but even

then it stipulated that this decision must not be taken to justify increases in defence expenditure

owing to the nation’s ongoing economic and financial difficulties. The government did not begin

to reshape the basis of British strategic policy until the establishment of the Defence Requirements

Sub-Committee in November 1933. Churchill’s influence over service policies effectively ended,130

therefore, when he left office in 1929. MacDonald’s governments, like Baldwin’s and Lloyd

George’s, would spend only as much on defence as they wished to, whether the ten year rule existed

or not.

Churchill’s close association with the ten year rule has been used to undermine his reputation as a

staunch supporter of the armed services and a far-sighted prophet who correctly identified the threats

facing Britain while those in power dithered. His record at the Treasury has also been invoked as a

means to balance or overturn the laudatory assessments of Churchill as a strategist by his many

admirers, and also, by depicting them as part of a broader pattern of inconsistency, recklessness and

poor judgement, to bolster the case that Churchill was an inept strategist throughout his long career.

The most severe criticisms of Churchill as chancellor of the exchequer have usually involved the

distortion or misrepresentation of his personal responsibility for the ten year rule and its long-term

effects on Britain’s strategic position. The suggestion that Churchill was responsible for the impact

of the rule after he left office allows critics to burden him with the blame for the deficiencies

accumulated during the period when the deepest cuts were made in Britain’s interwar defence

29

budgets. Similarly, by labelling Churchill as the principal instigator of the original “ten year rule”

in 1919, it becomes possible to blame him for virtually all the problems experienced by the armed

services during the period from 1919 until at least 1932, if not later.

Churchill was undeniably the driving force behind the resurrection and extension of the ten

year rule in 1925-1928, but his objectives were relatively limited and enjoyed a wide measure of

support in the government and, indeed, throughout Whitehall. Moreover, the impact of the rule was

not as great as it is often made out to be. The Treasury had little difficulty controlling expenditure

on both the army and the air force without invoking it, while the Admiralty openly flouted it prior

to 1928. Lloyd George had been able to use the first incarnation of the rule in 1919 to impose

sweeping economies on the Admiralty, but Churchill could not do the same from a subordinate

position, even one as powerful as the chancellorship. Instead, he had to rely on his powers of

persuasion and bureaucratic acumen. He did not resurrect the ten year rule in 1924-1925 in order to

control spending by all three defence departments, but as means to a more limited end: reducing

costly preparations by one service for a specific conflict that he and the government as a whole

regarded as unlikely. Similar guidelines were embraced by the army, but the navy never accepted the

Treasury’s opinions on the likelihood of war with Japan or how to wage such a conflict. As long as

the Admiralty refused to be bound by the spirit of the cabinet’s earlier rulings on this subject, the

Treasury was unable to enforce the priorities established by the government in 1925. The extension

of the ten year rule in July 1928 resulted from Churchill’s need to consolidate his previous

bureaucratic victories, not a desire to achieve new ones. It proved to be a milestone in the lengthy

struggle between the Treasury and the Admiralty over the basis of the naval estimates, but even then

the rule’s limitations were so great that Churchill had little reason to fear leaving it to his successors.

The widespread view that Churchill’s actions as chancellor were fundamentally inconsistent

with his stance prior to the two world wars needs to be qualified. The policies Churchill adopted

during the 1920s arose from balanced assessments of Britain’s strategic requirements, and were

essentially rational responses to major changes in the international environment following the First

World War. To be sure, Churchill made mistakes. His predictions about the likelihood of war in the

far east make for uncomfortable reading today and can only detract from his reputation as a prophet.

His attacks on naval construction programs contributed to the drastic deterioration of the naval

shipbuilding industry during the 1920s, a problem later compounded by the restrictions accepted by

30

the Labour government at the 1930 London Naval Conference. Churchill did not appreciate, either131

at the time or later, the precarious state of this sector of the British economy. But even in these

matters, Churchill’s actions were generally consistent. His optimistic reading of the international

situation did not change as soon as he left the Treasury. “I believe that wars are over for our day”,

he informed the House of Commons in June 1930. And even when he perceived a threat from a132

resurgent Germany, his views on Japan, Singapore and naval strategy remained largely consistent.

Moreover, while Churchill was consistently prone to underestimate the likelihood of an Anglo-

Japanese war, his misgivings about the feasability of the navy’s plans to inflict a decisive defeat on

Japan in its home waters were fully borne out by events during the Second World War.133

There is also little basis for the argument that Churchill was incapable of looking beyond the

narrow needs of the department he headed at any particular moment. As chancellor, Churchill

pursued the Treasury’s objectives with all his characteristic vigour, but he did not hesitate to overrule

his departmental advisers when their views conflicted with his own. For the most part, however, their

goals coincided. Churchill’s determination to reduce government spending stemmed from a mixture

of political, economic and financial considerations. The pursuit of economies at the expense of the

fighting services offered significant political dividends, and appeared justified by the prevailing

assessment of the international situation. And, while all three services could claim to be underfunded

during the life of the Baldwin government, the navy repeatedly bore the brunt of the Treasury’s

attacks because Churchill and his colleagues rejected the strategic rationale for its most expensive

programs. But this does not signify any fundamental hostility towards the armed services in general,

or the navy in particular, during this period of his career. Churchill was a consistent supporter of the

armed services throughout the interwar period. He did not feel compelled to support their every

proposal, but he remained genuinely concerned with their well-being. His actions as chancellor

undoubtedly contributed to Britain’s difficulties during the early 1930s, but the most serious damage

to the armed services was inflicted, as Churchill himself argued, after he left office.

Notes

31

1.John Robert Ferris, ‘Treasury Control, the Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919-1924’ Historical Journal, vol. 30, no. 4 (December 1987), 859-83; idem., Men, Money andDiplomacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), ch. 2. As Ferris notes, the term “tenyear rule” was not commonly used until after it had been formally cancelled. 2.Peter G. Silverman, ‘The Ten Year Rule’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 116(March 1971), 42-5; Ken Booth, ‘The Ten-Year Rule: An Unfinished Debate”, Journal of theRoyal United Services Institute, 116 (September 1971), 58-63; Stephen Roskill, ‘The Ten YearRule: The Historical Facts’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 117 (March 1972),69-71. 3.The consistency of Churchill’s views on the Far East are examined in Christopher M. Bell,“Winston Churchill, Pacific Security, and the Limits of British Power, 1921-41”, Churchill andStrategic Dilemmas before the World Wars, ed. John H. Maurer (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 51-87.4 NP (Naval Programme Committee) (25) 8 mtg, 30 June 1925, CAB (Cabinet Office records)th

27/273, The National Archives (TNA). 5.The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman,1904-1935, ed. Philip Williamson (London: Historians’ Press, 1988), 234. 6.Punch, 29 July 1925. I am grateful to Professor John Maurer for drawing my attention to thisreference. 7.Frederic Dreyer, “Naval Policy & the Sketch Estimates of 1933”, nd, CHT (Chatfield papers,National Maritime Museum) 3/1. 8.Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1947), 10-12.9.Speech of 10 March 1936, House of Commons, Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speechesed. Robert Rhodes James (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), vol. VI, 5699.10.Cited in David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London: Arnold, 2001), 103. 11.This process is nicely outlined in Dutton, Chamberlain, ch. 4; see also Patrick Finney, “TheRomance of Decline: The Historiography of Appeasement and British National Identity”,Electronic Journal of International History, www.history.ac.uk/ejournal/art1.html. 12.‘Cato’ [Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen], Guilty Men (London: Victor Gollancz,1940). 13.Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, 10-11. 14.WM (War Cabinet minutes) 118 (41), 24 November 1941, CAB 65/20. Chatfield did,however, air some of his criticisms in the House of Lords in 1944: “The ten-year rule ... gavepower to the Lords of the Treasury to refuse all demands by the Service Departments whichmight lead to an unpopular Budget. Samson had his locks cut off by Delilah, but Britannia cut offher own. What a tragedy!” Speech by Lord Chatfield, 28 March 1944, Parliamentary Debates,Lords, vol 131 col. 276.15.Churchill minute, 23 November 1941, PREM (Prime Minister’s Office, TNA) 4/6/10. 16.Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (London: Cassell, 1948), vol. 1. 17.CHUR (Churchill papers) 4/76 A, Churchill College Archives Centre.18.Churchill, Second World War, vol. I, 40. 19.Churchill’s postwar reputation and his role in shaping it have been examined in twooutstanding recent works: David Reynolds, In Command of History (London: Allen Lane, 2004)and John Ramsden, Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and his Legend since 1945 (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2003).

32

20.The Times, 2 November 1948, 5. 21.Hankey to the editor, The Times, 31 October 1948, HNKY (Hankey papers) 24/4, ChurchillCollege Archives Centre, Cambridge.22.The Times, 5 November 1948, 5. 23.The Times, 9 November 1948, 5.24.The Times, 11 November 1948, 5.25.The Times, 15 November 1948, 5.26.Hankey, unpublished letter to The Times, 20 November 1948, HNKY 24/4. 27.Hoare to Hankey, 1 and 14 August 1951; Hankey to Hoare, 17 August 1951, HNKY 24/4. 28.Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London: Collins, 1954), 112-13. Hankey alsosupplied copies of his Times correspondence, including the unpublished letter, to James Butler,editor of the military volumes of the British official history of the Second World War. Y.M.Streatfield, “The Ten Year Rule” (unpublished narrative used in the compilation of Gibbs’ GrandStrategy), CAB 101/295. 29.CHUR 2/157; Reynolds, In Command of History, 141-2.30 Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson’s Memoirs andPapers, 1910-37 (London: Macmillan, 1969), 209-10. 31 Robert Rhodes James, “The Politician”, Churchill: Four Faces and the Man (London: BookClub Associates, 1969), 91-2; idem, Churchill: A Study in Failure (1970), 164; Keith Middlemasand John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 326. 32.Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Former Naval Person (London: Cassell, 1968), 244-5. 33.Gretton, Former Naval Person, p. 242; Basil Liddell Hart, “The Military Strategist”,Churchill: Four Faces and the Man; Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (London:Collins, 1977), 77.34.David MacGregor, “Former Naval Cheapskate: Chancellor of the Exchequer WinstonChurchill and the Royal Navy, 1924-29”, Armed Forces and Society, 19, no. 3 (Spring 1993),319-33. 35.John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993), 207. 36.Jon Sumida, “Churchill and British Sea Power, 1908-29”, Winston Churchill: Studies inStatesmanship, ed. R.A.C. Parker (London: Brassey's, 1995), 5-21. 37.E.g. A.J.P. Taylor, “The Statesman”, Churchill: Four Faces and the Man, p. 22; B.J.C.McKercher, “The Limitations of the Politician-Strategist: Winston Churchill and the GermanThreat, 1933-39", Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars, ed. John H. Maurer(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 94. 38.Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), 277; idem,Britain and her Army 1509-1970 (London: Allen Lane, 1970) 411, 415; MacGregor, “FormerNaval Cheapskate”, 319-20; Rhodes James, Churchill, 124, 165. 39.Barnett, Collapse, 275-8; MacGregor, “Former Naval Cheapskate”; Gordon Corrigan, Blood,Sweat and Arrogance and the Myth of Churchill's War (Orion Publishing Co, 2006), 86, 152. 40.Robert O’Neill, “Churchill, Japan, and British Security in the Pacific 1904-1942",Churchill,ed. Robert Blake and William Roger Louis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 288-9.41.J. Kenneth McDonald, “Lloyd George and the Search for a Postwar Naval Policy, 1919”,Lloyd George: Twelve Essays, ed. A.J.P. Taylor (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), 191-222;Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 23-4.

33

42.Roskill, “Ten Year Rule”; idem., Hankey: Man of Secrets (London: Collins, 1972), vol. 2,112.43.Hankey memorandum, “Towards a National Policy”, 17 July 1919, CAB 21/159.44.Ferris, “Treasury Control”, pp. 867-72. 45.Churchill to Lloyd George, 1 May 1919, Winston S. Churchill (cited hereafter as WSC), ed.Martin Gilbert (London: Heinemann, 1977) vol. IV, companion 1, 633-7. 46.Winston Churchill, “Our Armaments After the War”, 29 June 1919, Weekly Dispatch,reprinted in The Collected Essays of Sir Winston Churchill, ed. Michael Wolff (London: Libraryof Imperial History, 1976), vol. I, 218-20. 47.Churchill cabinet memorandum, 1 August 1919, WSC, vol. IV, 2, 782-3.48.Churchill to Lloyd George, 4 August 1919, WSC, vol. IV, 2, 792. 49.McDonald, “Lloyd George”, 196-7, 202-3; GT 7646: Austen Chamberlain memorandum,“Navy Votes”, 8 July 1919, CAB 24/83.50.“Suggested Memorandum for War Cabinet: Naval Policy”, nd, ADM 167/59. 51.McDonald, “Lloyd George”, 205-7; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 7. 52.WC 606A, 5 August 1919, CAB 23/15. 53.Finance Committee 2nd mtg, 11 August 1919, CAB 27/71.54.Hankey to Speed (War Office), 14 December 1923, WO 32/9314. 55.Undated memorandum, “Draft Reply to Cabinet”, August 1919, ADM 167/59. 56.WC 616A, 15 August 1919, CAB 23/15.57.Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy, 24-30.58.Hankey to Speed, 14 December 1923, WO 32/9314.59. Churchill to Baldwin, 15 December 1924, T 161/243/S25613/ANNEX/5. Churchill repeatedthese claims in a memorandum for the cabinet, CP 71 (25): “Navy Estimates”, 7 February 1925,CAB 24/171. 60.Churchill to Baldwin, 15 December 1924, T 161/243/S25613/ANNEX/5.61.Historians have traditionally been critical of British naval plans for war with Japan, and inparticular of the so-called “Singapore strategy”. See, in particular, Ian Hamill, The StrategicIllusion (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981); James Neidpath, The Singapore NavalBase and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1981); Arthur Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), vol.I; Paul Haggie, Britannia At Bay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Malcolm H. Murfett, ‘“Living in the Past”: A Critical Re-examination of the Singapore Naval Strategy, 1918-1941’,War and Society, vol. XI , no. 1 (May 1993) pp. 73-103. For a revisionist view, see Bell, RoyalNavy, Seapower and Strategy, ch. 3 and idem., ‘The “Singapore Strategy” and the Deterrence ofJapan: Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z’, English Historical Review, vol.CXVI, no. 467 (June 2001), pp. 604-34. 62.RS (Committee on Replacement of Fleet Units other than Capital Ships and Singapore) (24)5: memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty, “Ten Year Building Programme”, 9 April1924, CAB 27/236; draft plans division memorandum, “10 Year Building Programme”, 6 March1925, ADM 1/8685/152.63.Churchill to Baldwin, 15 December 1924, T 161/243/S25613/ANNEX/5. These argumentswere reinforced by Sir Warren Fisher, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, who wrote to theprime minister along the same lines the following month: Fisher to Baldwin, 7 January 1925, T161/243/S25613/ANNEX/5.

34

64.Cabinet 64 (24), 26 November 1924, cited in CID 1055-B, “The Basis of Service Estimates:Note by the Secretary”, 23 June 1931, CAB 4/21.65.Churchill to Baldwin, 15 December 1924, T 161/243/S25613/ANNEX/5. 66.CID 193 mtg, 5 January 1925, CAB 2/4.rd

67.CID 193rd mtg, 5 January 1925, CAB 2/4; see also CP 139/25: Admiralty memorandum,“Political Outlook in the Far East”, 5 March 1925, CAB 24/172, and NP (25) 5, CAB 27/273. 68.Churchill to Bridgeman, 23 January 1925, T 161/243/S25613/ANNEX/5.69.CP 39 (25): “Navy Estimates”, CAB 24/171.70.Churchill to Beatty, 4 February 1925, WSC, vol. V, 1, 373-6. 71.Admiralty memorandum, 4 February 1925, ADM 116/2300; CP 67/25: Admiraltymemorandum, “Navy Estimates”, 5 February 1925, CAB 24/171. 72.Board of Admiralty minute 2005, 11 February 1925, ADM 167/71. 73.Bridgeman to Baldwin, 11 February 1925, Modernisation of Conservative Politics, 180. 74.Cecil to Churchill, 12 February 1925, WSC, vol. V, 1, 390; Roskill, Naval Policy, 1, 447-8. 75.Cabinet 8 (25), 12 February 1925, CAB 23/49. The Committee held nine meetings between 2March and 2 July 1925, not 25-30 as claimed by Roskill (Naval Policy, vol. I, 453). Its finalreport, dated 13 July 1925, was circulated to the Cabinet as CP 342 (25), CAB 24/174.76.NP (Naval Programme Committee) (25) 1 mtg, 2 March 1925, CAB 27/273.st

77.NP (25) 2 mtg, 5 March 1925, CAB 27/273.nd

78.NP (25) 2 mtg, 5 March 1925, CAB 27/273.nd

79.See Churchill to Birkenhead, 8 March 1925, WSC, vol. V, 1, 426; CID 198 and 199 mtgs,th th

30 March and 2 April 1925, CAB 2/4.80.CID 199 mtg, 2 April 1925, CAB 2/4.th

81.CID 199 mtg, 2 April 1925, CAB 2/4. This definition of the one-power standard wasth

approved by the cabinet in May. Cabinet 24 (25), CAB 23/50.82.NP (25) 8th mtg, 30 June 1925, CAB 27/273. 83.See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, 336-9; Rhodes James, Memoirs of a Conservative, 213-16; Roskill, 1, 451; Modernisation of Conservative Politics, 182-8. 84.Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, ed. Keith Middlemass (London: Oxford University Press,1969), vol. I, 315; see also P.J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgment (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948),175-77. 85.The history of the Singapore naval base is examined in: Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base; andW. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942 (London:Macmillan, 1979). 86.On the Treasury's strategic views, see Bell, Royal Navy, pp. 13-24; Ferris, Men, Money, andDiplomacy, 4-5, 15-20; G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979); idem., The Treasury and British Public Policy,1906-1959 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); idem., “The Treasury and Defence ofEmpire”, Imperial Defence, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), 71-90. 87.Barstow minute, 1 October 1923, T 161/800/S18917/2. 88.Barstow to Snowden, 26 February 1924, T 161/800/S18917/2. 89.CP 3692, CAB 24/133.90.See for example Winston S. Churchill, “The Case for Singapore”, Sunday Chronicle, 30March 1924, in Collected Essays, vol. I, 256-9; speech of 28 March 1924, The Navy, May 1924,138; Complete Speeches, vol. IV, 3450-1.

35

91.CID 193 mtg, 5 January 1925, CAB 2/4. rd

92.CID 215 mtg, 22 July 1926, CAB 2/4. th

93.Barnett, Collapse, 281; Ian Hamill, “Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924-1929”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (September 1980); idem, Strategic Illusion, 108-10.94.Barstow to Churchill, 25 May 1927 and Churchill minute, 26 May 1927, T 161/295/S34442.95.CID 193 mtg, 5 January 1925, CAB 2/4. rd

96.Churchill began encouraging the Air Ministry to press its claims in December 1924. Churchillto Hoare, 12 December 1924, T 172/1440.97.Egerton minute, 16 April 1926 and Beatty to Bridgeman, 28 April 1926, ADM 116/2416;Enclosure A to Admiralty to CID, 16 July 1926, CID 275-C, “Third Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Singapore”, appendix II, CAB 16/63. 98.CID 215 mtg, 22 July 1926, CAB 2/4. th

99.SP (Singapore Committee) (25) 8 mtg, 10 July 1928, CAB 16/63. th

100.CID 209 mtg, 18 February 1926, CAB 2/4; CP 47 (28): “Naval Programme Committee:th

Report on Naval Oil Fuel Reserve”, 20 February 1928, CAB 24/192; Orest Babij, ‘The RoyalNavy and Inter-war Plans for War against Japan: The problem of Oil Supply’, The InternationalMarine in International Affairs, 1850-1950, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Frank Cass, 2000).101.On British policy and the Geneva naval conference, see in particular Stephen Roskill, NavalPolicy between the Wars (London: Collins, 1968), vol. I, ch. 14; Dick Richardson, The Evolutionof British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), ch. 9; BJCMcKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984), ch. 3. Churchill’s role in bringing about the breakup of theconference is examined in: Tadashi Kuramatsu, ‘Viscount Cecil, Winston Churchill and theGeneva Naval Conference of 1927: si vis pacem para pacem versus si vis pacem para bellum’, inPersonalities, War and Diplomacy: Essays in International History, ed. T. G. Otte andConstantine A. Pagedas (London: Frank Cass, 1997); and Phillips O'Brien, “Churchill and theUS Navy”, Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R.A.C. Parker (London: Brassey's,1995), 22-41.102 Pound to Keyes, 17 June 1927, Keyes Papers, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allenand Unwin for the Navy Records Society, 1980), vol. II, 221. 103.Churchill to Bridgeman, 18 August 1927, T 161/281/S32700/1; WSC, vol. V, I, pp. 1044-5;Cabinet 48(27), 4 August 1927; Cabinet 49 (27), 25 August, 1927, CAB 23/55. 104.R.V.N. Hopkins to Churchill, 14 October 1927; P. J. Grigg memorandum recording adiscussion between Churchill and Bridgeman, 19 October 1927; Churchill to Baldwin, 19October 1927, T 161/281/S32700/1; WSC, vol. V, I, pp. 1062-3.105.NP (27) 1 mtg, 10 November 1927, CAB 27/355.st

106.NP (27) 1 mtg, 10 November 1927, CAB 27/355.st

107.NP (27) 3 mtg, 22 November 1927, CAB 27/355.rd

108.CP 305 (27): “Naval Programme Committee: Report on Cruisers”, 14 December 1927, CAB24/190.109.Churchill to Bridgeman, 16 January 1928, T 161/285/S33101/3. 110.Bridgeman to Churchill, 21 January 1928, T 161/285/S33101/2.111.Undated Admiralty memorandum, “Answers to questions asked by Colwyn Committee,”ADM 116/2282; minute by Fraser (supply department, Treasury), 8 February 1928, T161/285/S33101/2.

36

112.Fraser minute, 29 December 1927, T 161/285/S33101/3; Upcott minute, 17 February 1928,T 161/285/S33101/4. 113.Fraser minute, 17 February 1928, T 161/285/S33101/4. 114.CID 1055-B, “The Basis of Service Estimates: Note by the Secretary”, 23 June 1931, CAB4/21; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 54-5; Cab 45 (27), 28 July 1927, CAB 23/55.115.Waterfield minute, 6 January 1928, T 161/285/S33101/3. 116.Waterfield memorandum, “Navy Estimates 1928”, 27 January 1928, T 161/285/S33101/3;see also Fraser’s minute of 24 January 1928, T 161/285/S33101/3.117.Churchill to Bridgeman, 20 February 1928, T 161/285/S33101/4. 118.Minute by Fraser (Treasury), 8 February 1928, T 161/285/S33101/2. 119.Treasury to Admiralty, 13 March 1928, T 161/285/S33101/4.120.Bridgeman to Baldwin, 19 March 1928, ADM 116/3388. 121.Churchill to Bridgeman, 15 June 1928, ADM 116/3388. 122.CID 236 mtg, 5 July 1928, CAB 2/5. th

123.CID 236 mtg, 5 July 1928, CAB 2/5; Cabinet 39/28, 18 July 1928, CAB 23/58. th

124.Warren Fisher minute, 21 November 1928, T 161/292/S34216.125 CP 394/28, “The Cruiser Programme, 1928-9,” December 1928, CAB 24/199. 126.Cabinet 57(28), 19 December 1928, CAB 23/59.127 Cabinet 5(29), 7 February 1929, CAB 23/59.128. Warren Fisher to Snowden, 14 June 1929, T 161/297/S34610, and various departmentalminutes in this file and in T 161/618/S33420. 129.CID 243 mtg, 27 June 1929, CAB 2/5. rd

130.The classic study is of British grand strategy during this period is Gibbs, Grand Strategy.More recent works on the subject include Peter Bell, Chamberlain, Germany and Japan, 1933-4(London: Macmillan, 1996) and BJC McKercher, “From Disarmament to Rearmament: BritishCivil-Military Relations and Policy-Making, 1933-1934”, Defence Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring2001), pp. 21-48. The DRC and its role in shaping Britain’s strategic foreign policy has recentlybecome controversial. The literature on this subject is summarised in an excellent revisionistarticle, Keith Neilson “The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, British Strategic ForeignPolicy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement”, English Historical Review, vol.cxviii, no. 477 (June 2003), pp. 651-84. Neilson’s interpretation has been contested in B.J.C.McKercher, “Deterrence and the European Balance of Power: The Field Force and British GrandStrategy, 1934-1938”, English Historical Review, vol. cxxiii, no. 500 (February 2008), pp. 98-131.131.John R. Ferris, “‘It is our Business in the Navy to Command the Seas’: The Last Decade ofBritish Maritime Supremacy, 1919-1929”, Far Flung Lines, ed. Keith Neilson, and GregKennedy (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 124-170; G.A.H. Gordon, British Seapower andProcurement Between The Wars (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).132.Speech to the House of Commons, 2 June 1930, Complete Speeches, vol. V, 4814-22. 133.Bell, Royal Navy, pp. 93-8.