Visual securitization: Political cartoons in protracted conflicts

1 PoliticalcartoonsasvisualsecuritizationC.Adamides-ISA2016

Political cartoons as visual securitization in protracted conflicts By: Constantinos Adamides, University of Nicosia∗ ISA 2016 - Atlanta Abstract♣ This paper explores how visual art and in particular political cartoons develops into a routinized and durable mode of visual securitization. This could occur in protracted ethnic conflicts where this form of art supports, and is supported by, the deeply established perceptions of threats and “enemy-others”, and where cartoons are frequently used to remind the audience who or what is a threat, rather than simply highlight a political development. In such environments, political cartooning may acquire its own securitizing ‘voice’ as it can sustain issues and actors into the realm of existential threats ‘autonomously’, without the use of ‘security grammar’ of written or oral speech acts. Thus, the inclusion of these images as part of an immediate inter-textual context is not necessary for a successful securitizing act. The paper uses the protracted Cyprus conflict as a case study, examining political cartoons from the Greek Cypriot press from the 1950’s onward. Key Words: visual securitization, ethnic conflicts, Cyprus conflict, political cartoons

Introduction

This paper explores the impact of political cartoons on the processes of securitization and more

specifically on how cartoons can acquire a voice of their own and ‘speak’ security in ways and

for reasons that differ from mainstream securitizing actors. Even though political cartoons are

frequently used to portray a potential threat on an ad hoc basis, they can have a greater impact on

successful securitization efforts in conditions of protracted conflicts where the perceptions of

threats and enemies are already established, routinized and internalized by elite and public alike.

What is argued in this paper is that the use of political cartoons as a securitizing mechanism *

∗Constantinos Adamides, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Department of European Studies and International Relations, and the Director of the Diplomatic Academy at the University of Nicosia. Contact: [email protected] / www.unic.academia.edu/ConstantinosAdamides ♣The newspapers and/or websites maintain all the copyrights of the political cartoons published in this paper.


deviates from the typical role of ‘speaking security’ as they are not traditionally used for access

to extraordinary measures, but focus instead on reminding audiences about potential threats and

the identity and incentives of the enemy-other. They also help limit the actions of any political

elite that might be willing to deviate from the established conflict and securitization routines. By

extension, in protracted conflict environments, political cartoons used to securitize issues and

actors inevitably become a contributing factor to the intractability of conflicts and the

perpetuation of the status quo. Thus, securitizing acts via political cartoons do not necessarily

aim at engaging in initial (first-time) securitization of a referent object, but rather intent

(primarily) at perpetuating the securitized status quo or enhance the threatening view of a

specific agent or development.

The first section of the paper provides a brief introduction on the theory of securitization,

followed by a brief literature on the under-explored area of securitization through the use of

photographs and images. The next part presents the theoretical argument of the paper and more

specifically how political cartoons may develop a voice of their own, especially in protracted

conflict environments. The last part of the paper provides empirical support using political

cartoons from the Greek Cypriot press over the last six decades.

Securitization

Securitization is about processing a threat through a specific security format; hence ‘a discussion

of security is a discussion of threat’ (Wæver 2011: 472-3, emphasis in original). As Buzan (1997

and Buzan et al. (1998) point out the security focus should be widened and the discussion on

threats should not be limited to a single sector, the military, but should rather be extended to

other sectors as well, namely the political, societal, environmental and economic. This

constructivist and widening approach was not unopposed. On the contrary, traditionalist security

scholars argued that the broadening of the security agenda and the introduction of non-military

issues undermines the field’s ‘intellectual coherence’, while others highlighted the danger of not

being able to differentiate between existential and ordinary risks (Huysmans 1998; 2002).

Wæver and the other so-called Copenhagen School scholars have rejected the criticism that

within the framework of securitization everything could become an issue of security, arguing that


securitization provides a very clear sense ‘of what security is’ (Wæver 1994). Specifically,

within the framework threat-arguments justifying the use of extraordinary measures must i)

establish that there is indeed a threat, ii) that the threat is potentially existential and iii) establish

the relative advantages of security handling as opposed to non-securitized handling (Wæver

2011: 473). Thus, securitization is the process where issues turn into matters of security through

political intervention; these ‘security matters’ are then taken outside the boundaries of normal

politics and the mainstream ‘rules of the game’ and are subsequently treated as special kinds of

politics or beyond politics, therefore potentially justifying actions that fall out of the ordinary

political procedures (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-4).

At the core of securitization lies the idea that security is a speech act; 1 thus, by labeling

something as a security issue, something is done. In other words, ‘the utterance itself is the act’;

‘the word “security” is the act’ (Wæver 1995: 55, emphasis in original). The actual utterance of

the word security, however, is not a necessary prerequisite for a security speech act, as security

and the need for emergency measures (i.e. appeal for urgency) could be connoted or inferred

with the use of other words or terms (Buzan et al. 1998). For an act to be considered successful

the securitizing actor needs to convince a significant audience – one that would grant the actor

the access and legitimacy it requests. There is in other words negotiation between the actors and

the audiences, thus forming an intersubjective process (ibid). Subsequently, securitization

success lies in the production of a ‘security label’ that will be supported or tolerated by an

audience (Wæver 1995: 50) and not necessarily in the presence of a ‘real’ or actual threat.

Similarly, the presence of a ‘real’ threat is not a guarantee for successful securitizing acts. As

Wæver (2011: 472) notes, many real threats do not come with a ‘label’.

Precisely because securitization is based on speech acts, security becomes a self-referential

practice; it is the securitizing agents that define and give meaning to security, meaning that

‘security is what actors make of it’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). Subsequently, security has a

fixed meaning for both the actor as well as the audience, ignoring the intentions of the actors as

well as the context in which the process takes place. Huysmans (2002) warns us of this limitation

pointing out that the theory ignores that security is entrenched in a symbolic and cultural order,

1FormoreonspeechactsseeJ.L.Austin(1967)


which influences actors and audiences alike in the way security is practiced. Similarly, Stritzel

(2007) argues that the Copenhagen School ignores the relational dynamics of social and political

processes that generate meanings for actors and audiences, while Balzacq (2005: 171-72)

explains that the context in which actors operate is just as important as the psycho-cultural

predispositions of the audience.

The second area that was at the epicenter of criticisms was the disproportionate attention given to

the securitization process and actors compared to the role of the audience (Balzacq 2005;

McDonald 2008, Williams 2011). Specifically, there is a gap in the literature regarding the

presence, or rather the absence, of ‘multiple audiences’ (Balzacq 2005; Huysmans 2006; Stritzel

2007; Salter 2008; Roe 2008), as mainstream theory essentially treats the audience as a single

homogeneous actor. However, there are multiple audiences that could extend legitimization to

the securitizing actors’ acts. Roe (2008) suggests that audiences could be split into formal and

informal based on the kind of support they can provide the securitizing actor. Similarly,

Huysmans (2006) separates the audiences into popular and technocratic, while Salter (2008;

2011) splits it further into elite, technocratic, scientific and popular, arguing that success in one

or more setting (e.g. technocratic) does not necessarily mean success in others (e.g. popular).

This problem is not unrelated to the aforementioned criticism as different audiences have diverse

symbolic and cultural orders and they frequently operate in different social contexts. The social

context and historical realities may also lead to the bifurcation of audiences within the same

audience category; individuals adopt different historical and ideological identities meaning that

that within each kind of audience (e.g. public / popular category) one may find different sets of

groups predisposed to different perceptions of threats. Subsequently, even within the same

category securitizing acts may be successful only for some sub-groups, but not for the entire

category.

The insufficient attention to the role of audiences becomes even more important in areas where

securitization is routinized and the objectives of securitizing actors are not necessarily to upgrade

an ‘ordinary’ political issue into one that should be treated as existential threat. The theory treats

the audience as a group of individuals that need convincing for the presence of a threat. The

aforementioned scholars improved the theory by arguing that there is no ‘single’ audience. That


said, they too took for granted that any audience needs to be convinced. However, in some cases,

especially if securitization is routinized and even institutionalized, the audience is already

convinced of the threats and thus the securitization process differs (Adamides, forthcoming). In

these environments the audience(s) expects that the elite and other securitizing actors will

continue to maintain the securitized environment. In these cases the audiences will not

necessarily grant access to additional extraordinary measures to these actors if they continue to

securitize certain referent objects, but may ‘punish’ them in the event they fail to do so (ibid).

Visual securitization

As mentioned the process of securitization is chiefly based on the use of ‘security grammar’ and

speech acts. However, there is a growing literature in security studies and securitization

specifically arguing that images deserve more attention as they can also convey security

meanings to specific audiences (see for instance Williams 2003, McDonald 2008). Hansen’s

seminal work on visual securitization, that is ‘the processes through which images come to have

political implications’ (Hansen 2001: 53), presents a series of challenging arguments on the role

of images in the theory of securitization. Specifically, Hansen (2011) proposes an

intervisual/intertextual model with four components, namely, the visual itself; its immediate

intertextual context; the wider policy discourse; and the constitutions of the image. Furthermore,

she explains how inherent features of visuals, namely immediacy, circulability and ambiguity,

allow for different securitization compared to the exclusively linguistic process (ibid).

Unlike text, visual images have an immediate effect in creating emotional response (Hansen

2011: 55, see also Mirzoeff, 2000: 15). This effect is subject to a number of factors including the

authenticity of the visual and identification of the ‘subject’ portrayed in the visual, albeit, as

Hansen argues, while the presence of the ‘face’ may have a stronger impact, it is not a

prerequisite as long as the ‘body’ is there, as was the case with the Abu Ghraib photos (Hansen

2011: 56) or more recently the images with the execution of Iraqi soldiers by ISIS’ insurgents.

The circulability of the images serves a more practical function in the securitization process,

namely it enhances the speed with which the act and the overall process take place (ibid: 57),

while at the same time it challenges the structure of the process as the securitizing actors need


not be individuals with enhanced social capital – such as political elite – but also individuals who

use social media to reach a large audience (McDonald 2008: 569). Lastly, images may also have

an ambiguity factor, meaning that different audiences may perceive the same images in different

ways, with the diverging perceptions or ‘readings’ of the images being the outcome of different

degrees of familiarity with the issue and context in which the image is used (Hansen 2011: 58,

Mitchell 2005). Similarly, unlike linguistic securitizing acts, the use of images could also lead to

ambiguity in the sense that there is no explicit ‘demand’ or recommendations for specific actions

to counter the threats.

Image theorists2 have pointed out the significance of cognitive perceptions of relations among

groups (Herrmann 1985; Hermann et al. 1999) and more specifically how in the international

system images are ‘comprised of cognitions and beliefs regarding the target nation’s motives,

leadership and primary characteristics’ (Alexander et al. 2005: 28). Visual images are inevitably

a more focused sub-group of this approach, as they too contribute to the development or

perpetuation of perceptions regarding the identity and expected behavior of the ‘other’ as well as

the ‘self’. Audiences ‘read’ images, like words and text, within a historical and sociopolitical

context (Campbell 2004: 62-63). Similarly, some images may even become part of a

community’s visual memory (Brink 2000: 135; Hansen 2011: 55) with a ‘common

understanding’ of the images’ connotations, reducing thus any ambiguity on how to perceive

them. Visual memory does not necessarily revolve solely around threats and ‘enemy-others’ that

may be demonized through the use of images, as it could also focus on the suffering of the ‘self’,

as if for instance cases where the portrayal of the ‘self’ appears as a victim. Indeed, and as

discussed later, in some cases it is a combination of the two that may have the biggest impact on

the audiences.

Ethnic conflicts and routinized securitization

Buzan et al. briefly mention in their work that ‘securitization can be either ad hoc or

institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that

2Thetermimagetheorydoesnotrefertovisualimages,butratherinthebroadersenseoftheword‘image’–thatis,howoneactorviewsotheractorsintheinternationalsystem.


the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized (1998: 27)’. They also acknowledge

that issues that are already defined as security issues may not be dramatized or prioritized (ibid:

28). However, securitization in some cases may not simply evolve beyond an institutionalized

sense of urgency. Under some circumstances the entire process of securitization, including the

choice of referent objects, sources of threats and security grammar, may evolve into something

diachronic, almost permanent, to the extent that it becomes part of the society’s political and

social routines (Adamides, forthcoming). To use a business term, securitization may become a

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), where actors and audiences know exactly what to do and

how to react. There is in other words a form of routinized securitization where the ad hoc part of

the process is almost non-existent; it is as if there are specific, albeit unwritten, rules that actors

and audience alike follow (ibid).

Routinized securitization is more likely to be observed in environments where threats to specific

referent objects and the sources of threats are deeply internalized by the public, the media and

political elite. Prime examples of such environments are conflict areas, especially protracted

conflicts, with well-established perceptions of threats on specific referent objects and of enemy-

others that cause those threats. In such areas the political discourses as well as the media

coverage regarding the development of the conflict and any relevant security risks are frequently

formed and reiterated in a securitization framework that remains relatively unchanged in terms of

process, objectives and agents involved. Thus, while the security grammar maintains the same

structure, the process is different primarily because there is no need for ‘negotiation’ between the

actors and the audiences (ibid). More specifically, what is argued is the significant possibility of

experiencing guaranteed securitization success, as the audiences are already convinced of the

existential threat. More importantly however is the possibility that certain political conflict-

related discourses must follow the established securitization approach even if that means

perpetuating the conflict. Subsequently, the actors’ options of either desecuritizing or not

securitizing certain referent objects or potential sources of threats may be limited. Securitizing

acts are conscious political choices (see for example Williams 2007), which means that there is

the choice to either engage in a securitizing act or not. However, in cases where securitization is

institutionalized in the official discourses and routinized in terms of frequency this political

choice no longer exists and the option of ‘no-securitization’, (i.e. option not to securitize an


issue) may thus not be available to the securitizing actors. In other words, political elite and

media agents may engage in a form of involuntary securitization, as the cost of not securitizing

an issue is particularly high (Adamides, forthcoming). At best, political elite or media agents

who choose to deviate from the established securitizing-supporting discourses may be considered

as ‘soft’ against the enemy and at worst as traitors. Similarly, the audiences may also engage in

involuntary acceptance of a securitizing act or a constant securitization process simply because it

is the norm to accept specific security risks as existential threats from specific sources of threat.

Examples from protracted conflicts, violent or non-violent, such as the Arab-Israeli and the one

in Cyprus respectively, elucidate the aforementioned argument. For instance, for the Greek

Cypriot community - which is the case study of this paper - the source of threat is always Turkey

and any referent object associated to the conflict and Turkey, such as the sovereignty of the

Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the physical security of Greek Cypriots, is automatically (and

perhaps obligatorily) securitized by elite and accepted as a threat by the public.

In such conflict areas the mode and direction of securitization may also deviate from the

mainstream elite-driven top-down path. In cases where the threat is internalized and the expected

policy responses well-established we might observe ‘horizontal securitization’, which, as the

name suggests, takes place on a horizontal level making the process essentially ‘peer

securitization’, challenging thus the mainstream top-down approach (ibid). This mode of

securitization takes place on a micro-level, where the securitizing actors are individuals without

any significant social capital and their aim is not to influence the masses (i.e. the wider

audience), but rather their immediate periphery (peers, family, colleagues, etc.). The actors on a

horizontal level do not necessarily benefit personally and they do not request access to

emergency measures. Their aim is rather to transfer their own security perceptions to their peers,

especially if the latter are contemplating the possibility of deviating from the established

perceptions regarding the threats faced by the community. If these views echo the ones that are

articulated by mainstream actors such as political elite, then the horizontal process influences the

mainstream top-down securitization process by supporting other actors’ positions and acts. Thus,

on a horizontal level, members of audiences that become actors themselves could potentially and

inadvertently become ‘ambassadors’ of the mainstream securitization actors.


Visual securitization within such framework

The study of securitization through speech acts alone is insufficient, not least because a big part

of the political communication is conducted through televisual media and images (Williams

2003). Specifically, the use of images may be particularly important in the dramatization of

issues and thus in the process of securitization. Hansen (2011: 53) builds upon this argument

arguing, however, that images alone cannot be solely responsible for policy responses. The

image’s political constitution is not independent but rather part of the existing written and spoken

discourses (ibid). This paper builds on Hansen’s view, but also argues that visuals, especially in

protracted conflicts, have an additional role to play in the process of securitization, namely to act

as reminders of the existential threats and limit the acceptable (for the audiences) policy

responses. Thus, images may present something or someone as an existential threat without

however requesting major interventions or extraordinary measures to counter that threat; the goal

is to act as reminders that those issues are indeed existential threats and any policy reactions

should keep these realities in mind. Intertextuality in protracted conflicts may subsequently be

different compared to other environments as the images need not be directly related to current

political discourses, as long as they remain part of the overall sociocultural context of the conflict

and the established perceptions of the ‘self’, enemy-others and the threats. Subsequently visuals

may be capable under certain conditions to securitize an issue without the ‘support’ of speech

acts, assuming the visual message is lucid enough for audiences and elite.

Furthermore, the ability of images to act as reminders also serves the purpose of maintaining

pressure on individuals within the audiences and on elite who might have been contemplating the

idea of deviating from the established perceptions vis-à-vis enemies and threats. However, it is

peers rather than mainstream securitizing actors such as elite that exert this pressure. By

reminding who is to be trusted or feared, images influence some members of the audiences on

acceptable and unacceptable policies and in their turn those members are likely to influence their

peers. An indicative example is Cyprus during the period circa 2004 when elite and public alike

were advocating the advantages and disadvantages of the so-called Annan Plan.3 This is a period

3 The Annan Plan (after the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan) was a UN-sponsored settlement plan for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. After several months of negotiations the fifth and final draft of the plan was put on


during which inter-peer and intra-family securitization played a significant role in polarizing

people that turned them into ‘missionaries’ who had to spread the ‘truth’ to their peers.

This paper focuses on only one form of visuals, namely that of political cartoons and more

specifically on cartoons used by the Greek Cypriot press. As Kennedy (2008) notes, cartooning

is a form of critical narration as opposed to photography that focuses more on documenting the

reality. What makes political cartoons interesting for the case of securitization is their ability to

promote feelings, opinions and perceptions, which cannot easily be promoted in a written or

spoken text by other securitizing actors. For instance, arguing that the ‘other’ is brutal while ‘we’

are victims and helpless, or that a foreign state has ulterior motives behind a seemingly positive

act, are opinions that cannot be easily expressed by elite or media without potential political or

financial consequences. Therefore, cartoons have the ability to promote and highlight messages

regarding perceived threats and subsequently invoke feelings in ways that mainstream speech or

written-based securitization cannot; at least not by some actors.

Political cartoons, unlike some photographic images, have an additional advantage, namely that

they are unambiguous. This is primarily due to two factors. The first is that the target audience is

rather narrow (e.g. only the Greek Cypriot community) and has deep knowledge of the

sociopolitical culture and the historical context in which the cartoon is portrayed, thus allowing

the people to receive a clear message from the cartoon, even if they do not follow the every-day

developments in the press. But even if they do not follow every day developments, in protracted

conflicts, there is deep sociocultural and political knowledge, and as such the narrow audience is

almost always very familiar with the ‘actors’ and messages portrayed in the cartoons, thus

eliminating the possibility that different sets of audiences might perceive the same image in more

than one ways. The focus and perceptions regarding the ‘other’ is not only diachronic, but also

extremely unambiguous. As a result, in conflict environments, while political cartoons are

inevitably part of a larger intertextual framework, they can also function independently of the

daily developments, concurrently allowing them to also maintain a meaning on their own without

the need for accompanying text or discourses.

simultaneous referenda on April 24, 2004. The vast majority of Greek Cypriots (76%) who considered the plan problematic and biased rejected the plan, while the Turkish Cypriots (65%) accepted it. Subsequently the Plan was never put in effect.


The second reason that political cartoons send a rather unambiguous message has to do with

familiarity again, albeit specifically to the repetition of the same ‘actors’ in the cartoons. The

‘others’ as well as the ‘self’ remain constant over time allowing thus for the internalization of

any connotations that those images may have. Subsequently, there is no question of

identification; there is no need to have either a body or face in the image. In the Greek Cypriot

case for instance Cyprus is usually portrayed as a young girl, that is inevitably helpless, Turkey

is portrayed as grown man with violent intentions, while other state actors such as the UK and

the US are portrayed as gentlemen-politicians who either explicitly show their Turkish-friendly

views or conceal their true intensions.

Images, especially those depicting death or atrocities, may also be used for purposes of

immediacy, that is, to ‘evoke immediate emotive response[s] that exceed that of the text’ -

(Hansen 2011: 55-6). Similarly, they can have an emotional impact on the viewer (Brink 2000:

138), which is greater than that of oral or written text. Cartoons on the other hand, while they can

do that as well, they do not necessarily aim for immediacy, as they do not necessarily request an

immediate policy change. The impact of a cartoon could revolve around the perpetuation of

perceptions vis-à-vis an issue or an agent in a state of deep and routinized securitization, thus

limiting the political actors’ options – including those of desecuritization – even if the political

developments could allow this possibility. Indeed, political cartoons are frequently used to

securitize any desecuritizing efforts. In other words, any desecuritizing attempts are portrayed as

a threat, meaning that the expected policy response should be to maintain the securitized

environment. Political elite and mainstream securitizing actors cannot easily oppose

desecuritizing efforts, such as bi-communal activities in an ethnic conflict region, or present

them as threats, not least because that would have a political cost for the side they represent - e.g.

the UN could perceive their side as the intransigent one. Political cartoonists on the other hand

do not have such limitations and could easily securitize such attempts or any other similar

developments, aiming not at extraordinary measures, but rather at reminding the public of the

potential dangers, hindering thus the efforts of desecuritization. More importantly, cartoons can

seek their goals more easily and efficiently by portraying the threat of desecuritization in a rather

politically incorrect yet powerful manner.


The case of the Cyprus Conflict

The so-called Cyprus Problem is one of the most contemporary protracted ethnic conflicts. There

is abundant literature on the subject with conflicting views on what has caused it, on who is to be

blamed for its perpetuation and on the structure of the ‘final settlement’. The conflict is viewed

as ethno-national (Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz 2006), with disputes between Greek and

Turkish Cypriots, as an issue of incompatible subject positions (Diez 2002), as the outcome of

regional and superpower interests and interferences (Hitchens 1984), or as a combination of any

of the above. In Cyprus there exists a double minority environment where both Greek and

Turkish Cypriots feel, and could be, considered a minority. The Turkish Cypriots constitute

approximately 20% of island’s population and they are, therefore, a minority in Cyprus.

However, if the two so-called motherlands, Greece and Turkey, are taken into account then

Greek Cypriots are the minority. The close ties and partial dependence of the two communities

with their respective motherlands - especially between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey - coupled

with the historical and frequently violent inter-communal and inter-state relations have rendered

Cyprus vulnerable to external influences (Richmond 2002) and contributed to the development

of a climate of sustainable securitized relations between the two sides.

One of the most challenging areas of contention is that of sovereignty, questioning the degree of

local power distribution and whether sovereignty should be full or constricted, single or divided,

de facto or de jure (Constantinou, 2008). Greek Cypriots, which also enjoy the international

recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, argue for a right for full sovereignty over the entire

island, including the northern part, which, since 1974 is not under the control of the government.

Thus, Greek Cypriots view the problem as one of invasion and occupation as the territorial and

political integrity of the island was violated by force in 1974 with the Turkish invasion

(Stavrinides 1999). Turkish Cypriots on the other hand view the conflict as a domestic problem

of persistent ethnic persecution and subsequently argue for a settlement that would take into

account the realities of the post 1974 period, namely two distinct geographical regions, north and

south of the Green Line (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002). Currently the conflict could be


characterized as a ‘comfortable conflict’ without any violence - with minor exceptions since

1974 - albeit it is also in a state of illiberal peace (Adamides and Constantinou 2012).

The next section focuses on Greek Cypriot perceptions, how they are portrayed through political

cartoons and how the latter contribute to the perpetuation of the deeply securitized environment.

For Greek Cypriots the threat is stemming primarily from Turkey, even though there is

significant distrust towards great powers, especially the UK and the US, as it is usually assumed

that the two are pursing their own and Turkish interests at the expense of Cypriots (Adamides,

2014). The focus on the British is not surprising as Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until

1959 and since the RoC independence in 1960 it maintains two sovereign bases on the island.

Political cartoons as visual securitization within the Greek Cypriot community

The turbulent decades: 1950’s-1970’s

Before the Cypriot 1960 independence Greek Cypriots’ main source of threat were the British

colonial rulers. However, the British threat did not revolve solely around the continuation of the

British rule, but rather from the prospect that the UK would promote the Turkish and Turkish

Cypriot interests at the expense of the Greek Cypriot community. At the time Greek Cypriots

wanted Enosis (union) with Greece, whereas the Turkish Cypriots’ goal was Taksim (division).

The two positions were mutually exclusive and both sides felt that the other’s position

constituted an existential threat

for them. The Greek Cypriots’

view regarding the British

interests was one that

supported the Turkish Cypriot

position and subsequently

would oppose the will of the

Greek Cypriot community for

Enosis, while at the same time it

would help Turkey acquire more Source: Taxydromos 1/10/1955

Figure 1: “Harding and the Turkish training”


control in the island thus posing an existential threat for the former.

Figure 1 depicts the appointed British Governor John Harding sending the British commandos

for training into a Turkish-run school. The sign says: ‘Tutorial School: Wiping out Greeks,

slaughters, prosecutions, vandalisms. Headmaster: A. Menterez [former Turkish Prime

Minister]’. This cartoon highlights the Greek Cypriot threat perceptions of the time, namely that

the British were aligning themselves with Turkey. More importantly it emphasized other

internalized threats namely that the Turks would ‘wipe out, slaughter and persecute Greeks’ (as

the school sign suggests); these are threats that elite and public figures in general cannot easily

express (in written or orally) and more importantly support. During the anticolonial struggle, the

goal of such depictions was not to request immediate or extraordinary measures; they did not

even aim at upgrading an ordinary issue into one that is of utmost security (as that threat was

already internalized). They rather aimed at emphasizing an existing existential threat and act as

reminder to the population that the British and the Turks are part of the same problem for Greek

Cypriots and this specific alliance could be detrimental for the community. In addition, it

underlined the greatest possible existential threat, that of slaughtering and ethnic persecution.

Figure 2 indicates a more – and still valid –

political aspect of the Greek Cypriots fears,

namely that of loss of sovereignty and

permanent secession of the island. In this

cartoon, Harold McMillan, the former British

Prime Minister is splitting Cyprus in two,

saying ‘Don’t act like this, woman. It

is…temporary!’, connoting again that Britain

served Turkey’s interests, namely to

dichotomize the island into Greek and Turkish

parts (taksim). It is also interesting that the

connotation is that UK is depicted as pursuing

these goals all the way from London,

indicating that its presence on the island is not Source: Vima 1/10/1958

Figure 2: MacMillan the peacemaker


a prerequisite, meaning that even in the post-decolonization period the British could still be

perceived as an existential threat by and for Greek Cypriots as they (British) would continue to to

serve their interests through their Turkey-friendly policies. In this cartoon we also see Cyprus

portrayed as a young woman (and in subsequent cartoons as later as a little girl), connoting its

helpless and subject to ‘violation’ by the much stronger enemies, be it Turkey, the UK or the US

– that are always presented as men.

Even after decolonization struggle the Greek Cypriots

maintained the same negative perceptions towards the British

and the Americans. In Figure 3, British Prime Minister Heum

and US President Johnson are ‘helping’ the 18% (Turkish

Cypriot population) to have a ‘heavier’ (not just equal)

presence and power vis-à-vis the 82% Greek Cypriots. It is

worth noting that the 1963-1968 period was particularly

volatile with inter-communal struggles. With the Cypriot

independence in 1960 Enosis was no longer an option.

However, the imposed constitution and the mandatory co-

existence was not workable either, and the by 1963 the first inter-

communal problems emerged. Turkish Cypriots were forced to, or chose to withdraw –

depending on which side of the Green Line one stands – into enclaves arguing that this was the

only way to face the Greek Cypriot threat. Greek Cypriots called this move ‘Turkish mutiny’

arguing that the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the government was the first act towards the

division of the island. As seen in the cartoon above (Fig. 3), Greek Cypriots blamed the external

powers for promoting the Turkish positions and that asked for disproportionate rights for Turkish

Cypriots given the size of their population in the island. It should be noted that political cartoons

over the past five decades still use the 82%-18% scale in different settings to argue that equality

on all fronts – for instance political equality in terms of governance – is rather unnatural.

Figure 3: “Forced equality”

Source: Nea 13/3/1964


The 1970’s was yet another a turbulent decade for Cypriots. In the summer of 1974 there was a

Greek Junta-led coup aiming at overthrowing the elected President of Cyprus, followed by a

Turkish invasion, which led to the de facto division of the island ever since. Once again the same

foreign actors were presented as existential threats, along with the more contemporary ones,

namely the Greek Junta. Figures 4 and 5 refer to the American involvement in the Greek Junta

military coup that led to what Greek Cypriots call ‘the national tragedy’, namely the 1974

Turkish invasion and subsequent division of the island. Figure 4 depicts Kissinger, the former

US Secretary of State along with Demetrios Ioannides, the Greek dictator, and Bülent Ecevit the

former Turkish Prime Minister cooperating to hurt Cyprus. It is interesting to note that the

Turkish Cypriots are not presented as the enemy or threat; instead it is the two motherlands,

Greece and Turkey, along with the US government and the CIA. Figure 5 is once again

Ioannides who is presented as Emperor Nero who facilitated the destruction (burning) of Cyprus,

albeit his actions were manipulated by the CIA – the connotation is that Ioannides was CIA’s

‘toy’. The cartoon has the date July 15, 1974 (the date of the Greek Junta coup) and in the

background there are buildings in capital Nicosia on fire, caused by the Greek Junta military

forces.

Figure 4: CIA, JUNTA & Turkey

Satiriki, 19/7/1975

Figure 5: Ioannides and CIA

Satiriki, 19/7/1975


Similarly, the US was

perceived as the responsible

agent for backing up Turkey

(not just the Junta) in the

subsequent military

intervention in 1974, and for

supporting the latter’s

interests, namely the

dichotomization of the island.

Figures 6 and 7 depict the US,

either in the form of Henry

Kissinger or as the statue of liberty violently splitting up Cyprus.

Fig. 6 is particularly interesting, not only because it shows the

division of Cyprus by the US as per Turkey’s request, but also

because of the knife Kissinger uses, which is not a butcher’s

instrument, but an Ottoman-style knife. The same knife also appears in subsequent cartoons in

the hands of Turkish characters.

What these cartoons in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s demonstrate, is a perpetuation of the same

perceptions regarding the source of threats, but also what was at stake for Greek Cypriots,

namely the division of the island. Clearly these images did not need any accompanying text

given that they were also part of the overall discourse of the period. Thus, this period is a prime

example of intertextuality where text and visuals complement each other. That said, unlike text,

these cartoons present a much more vivid and barbaric image of the agents and of their

involvement. They present an image – for instance that of a violent butcher – that is more likely

to create a lasting impact on the Greek Cypriot public; an impact that, unlike the one generated

only by text, cannot be altered even if the conditions and the discourse changes. Subsequently,

such cartoons contribute to the internalization and long-term securitization of the threats (e.g.

loss of sovereignty) as well as of the agents causing them (e.g. Turkey, US, UK).

Fig. 7 – US butchering Cyprus

Fig. 6 – Kissinger as a butcher


Furthermore, such political cartoons, unlike photographs are not subject to interpretation. The

message is clear: (a) the actors to be blamed are Turkey, the Greek Junta, the US and the UK,

and (b) the goal is to divide the island. Similarly, the message is also clear in terms of how these

goals will be achieved, namely through political influence (figures 1 and 3) or through violence

(figures 2, 4, 5 and 6).

Even before 1974 (as connoted in Fig.1) Turkey

was portrayed as a violent actor. In the post-1974

press however Turkey is almost always portrayed

as a (big) man who either disrespects the European

and international laws or is violent (or even both).

An indicative image is Figure 8, which shows

Turkey (as a man) holding Cyprus (as a little girl)

and a bloody knife, while saying to the EU: “I do

not care about the acquis…can’t you see that I

have my own acquisitions?”. Similarly, in Figures

9 and 10, Turkey is presented as an actor who

solves his problems through violence and not

negotiations.

Specifically,

in Fig. 9 the Turkish actor (again presented with the same

bloody knife) says: “The Armenian problem has been

solved… let’s focus now on the Cyprus problem”, with

clear connotations to the Armenian genocide. The

Armenian genocide is certainly not part of the Cypriot

society’s dominant discourses. However, reference it

could be used opportunistically to perpetuate the negative

image of Turkey in the Greek Cypriot society and to

maintain the threat perceptions regarding the Turkish

methods for a resolution to the Cyprus Problem.

Fig.8–TurkishdisrespectforEUAcquis

Phileleftheros-26-6-2014 Fig.9–TurkeysolutiontotheArmenianproblem


As with the previous figure, Figure 10 also

demonstrates the Greek Cypriot perceptions of

Turkish negotiation views and ways of dealing

with the Problem. Specifically, Cyprus, as a little

girl, holds two olive brunches and asks Turkey to

“take a step to make peace”; Turkey, in a tank

responds “ok… let me start”, connoting of course

that when it does take a step it will crash Cyprus.

The violent Turkish image is also incorporate in

contemporary discourses and more importantly

contemporary threats. Figure 11 (from the Greek

newspaper that is also distributed in Cyprus)

shows the infamous “Jihadi John”, albeit the person is not the Islamic State’s executioner but

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish President; and instead of a hostage dressed in orange, is

Cyprus (also in orange), waiting for its execution.

Phileleftheros-6-8-2015

Fig.10–NegotiatingwithTurkey

TaNea:23-10-2014

Fig.11–Erdoganas“JihadiJohn”


The ‘negotiation decades’: 1977 - today

Following the turbulent 1950’s - 1970’s conflict period is the ongoing negotiations era

commencing with the first high-level meetings between President Makarios and the Turkish

Cypriot leader Denktaş in 1977, followed by the efforts of a series of Greek and Turkish Cypriot

political elite to the present day. Local and international actors have unsuccessfully tried

numerous conflict resolution approaches ranging from close proximity talks, to mediation, to

arbitration. More interestingly is the fact that despite the absence of violence and a significant

(positive) change in the relations between the RoC the two major international actors, the UK

and the US, there is still profound distrust towards them and any attempts on their behalf for

settlement are still being securitized in and by the Greek Cypriot community.

The 1950’s - 1970’s period was a prime example of intertextuality, where political cartoons were

completely imbedded in the political discourses of that time. This was not the case however in

the subsequent decades were the RoC improved its relations with both the UK as well as the US.

Indeed the Greek Cypriot political elite highlight the status of friendly diplomatic relations with

the UK and the US and are asking for their more active involvement4. In terms of visual

securitization, we observe a mismatch between the official political discourses of the governing

parties and the messages conveyed by the political cartoons. As discussed in detail below, the

messages conveyed by the political cartoons have remained unchanged since the previous

decades emphasizing issues of distrust and potential threats, thus maintaining the same

securitized image of enemies and sources of threats. These images are present even in periods

where Anglo-American positions appear to be more in line with the Greek Cypriot views. As

expected, however, when the foreign actors’ positions are incompatible with those of the Greek

Cypriots, the visual threat representations increase substantially, along with the oral and written

positions of local actors.

In the process of securitization, political cartoons have certain advantages relative to other forms

of visuals such as photographs, the most important of which is the fact that they do not need to

4Greek Cypriot are asking for external involvement in the form of pressure towards Turkey so that the latter will make (what Greek Cypriots perceive as) the necessary concessions to reach a viable settlement.


act as ‘witness’ to a specific incident – such as the massacre of Iraqi soldiers by ISIS insurgents –

in order to securitize a referent object or a development. Instead cartoons can securitize an actor,

and subsequently his overall incentives without any reference to a specific event and without

necessarily identifying the actors involved. Thus, political cartoons do not need to ‘report’ or

highlight a specific event, but rather remind the audience that any initiative or action from

specific actors is a potential threat.

Figure 12 depicts the early negotiations efforts with

President Makarios and the Turkish Cypriot

leader Denktash playing chess – essentially

negotiating the settlement of the conflict – and

yet neither one of them is actually in control of

their choices and actions. It is external agents that

determine the available options for Cypriots, as

the Cyprus conflict is, according to this cartoon,

only part of a much bigger ‘game’ with much

bigger and important players than Greek and

Turkish Cypriots. What is particularly interesting

in this form of cartoons is the identification of two actors (Makarios and Denktaş) but not the

other two that are ‘calling the shots’. Yet, there is no

need. In environments where threats are internalized,

an identifiable face or even a body is not a

prerequisite. The message is still clearly portrayed.

Figure 13 is an example of how diachronic and

resilient specific sources of threats can become once

they become part of the routinized securitization

processes. In this specific cartoon Cyprus – that is

the Greek-Cypriot run RoC – is once again portrayed

as a young girl carrying on its back the British who

says: “I respect you…I love you… I appreciate

Fig. 13: Trust the British

Phileleftheros 27/1/2014

Fig. 12: First bi-communal negotiations

Source: Vima 13/2/1977


you… Why don’t you believe I am your friend?” In the background is the Turkish flag on the

mountain in the northern part of Cyprus,5 connoting that the discussion of trust is in relation to

the conflict (and not, for instance, relative to economics, culture, the environment, or any other

issue). This cartoon does not describe any specific event, but rather reminds the audience that the

British cannot be trusted regardless of what they say, and regardless of how much they try to

argue that they maintain friendly or honest positions vis-à-vis the Problem. Once again, Britain is

presented as a man, well-dressed, not ‘savage-looking’ and thus not inherently dangerous. The

emphasis, therefore, is on issues of trust and political danger rather than on actual violence and

brutality (as is the case for instance with the way Turkey is usually presented). This cartoon and

its message would be applicable at any given time since the colonial period.

While the UK and the US are almost always portrayed negatively and ‘actively’ pro-Turkish, the

UN is usually portrayed as neutral, which however ‘passively’ supports the Turkish positions by

ignoring certain realities.

5 In the northern part of the island on the mountain range of Pentadaktylos (Beşparmak Dağları) the Turkish Cypriot authorities painted a gigantic flag of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – TRNC. At night the flag lights up forming both the TRNC and the Turkish flag. What is interesting is that the flag was painted in that position specifically so that it would be visible by Greek Cypriots in the southern parts of Cyprus.

Fig. 14 – UN’s role questioned

Source: www.philenews.com

and at http://pincartoons.com.cy


andathttp://pincartoons.com.cyl

Fig. 15 – UN’s role questioned


Figures 14 and 15 present the argument that the UN either neglects to observe the Turkish side’s

wrongdoings (Fig. 15) or it fails to fulfill one of its roles, namely to reunify the island, and

ignores the developments that are heading towards a permanent division of the island. Once

again, the blame is on foreign actors who are either pursuing their interests at the expense of

Greek Cypriots (cases above) or they fail to defend the Greek Cypriot interests (Figures 14 and

15). Similar to the cartoons above, Figure 16 shows again the UN in relation to the permanent

division of the island, albeit this time the source of the division is the US which applies the

necessary force through the UN which is used as ‘tool’ to divide the island. Noteworthy is the

fact that in these cases the Turkish interests are not directly depicted in the cartoons. However,

Greek Cypriots consider a permanent secession as the overall Turkish goal.

Figure 17 questions the US

trustworthiness. Specifically, this

cartoon connotes that behind the US

interests lie the Turkish ones, even if

the US does not openly accept this.

Figure 18 on the other hand is much

more direct, arguing that the US is

pursuing the Turkish intersts vis-à-

vis the latter’s EU accession at the

expense of Cyprus. As above Turkey

is portrayed as a grown man whereas

Cyprus is depicted as a small helpless

girl and the one that suffers from Turkish and

US interests.

Fig.16–UNandUSroleindividingtheCyprus



The last two figures portray concerns regarding a new issue, namely hydrocarbons in the Cypriot

Exclusive Economic Zone. Specifically, the threat is that Turkey and foreign powers are

interested in exploiting the Cypriot natural resources at the expense of the Cypriots. As

mentioned any new security concerns are securitized using

the same established sources of threat.

What is interesting in this cartoon (Fig. 19) is that there are

no identifiable agents, yet there is a clear and identifiable

threat. The image connotes the presence of foreign agents

(i.e. spies) and military personnel eyeing the Cypriot

natural wealth. Thus any foreign, especially American or

British, interest on this issue or any link between the

natural gas and the resolution of the conflict is portrayed as

suspicious and devious and subsequently as a threat.

Fig. 19. Natural gas and international interest

Source: www.philenews.com 31/3/13

Fig. 17: US’ Turkish hidden interests

Source: www.philenews.com and at http://pincartoons.com.cy

Fig. 18: US Helping Turkey enter the EU


andathttp://pincartoons.com.cy


Figure 20 shows the President of the European

Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker in Cyprus,

holding a picture of a natural gas platform,

while he has his back to the northern part of the

island (with the flag on the mountain clarifying

the orientation). At the same little-Cyprus says:

“Look this way Mr. Juncker”, connoting of

course that the EU’s interest is not the Cyprus

problem and the occupation of the island

(northern part), but rather the potential energy-

related benefits.

Similarly, Figure 21 demonstrates how Greek Cypriots

perceive any negative decisions from the European

Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR is

portrayed as blindfolded by the British, while Turkey

is remains particularly disrespectful towards this

European institution.

When the audience attempts to ‘escape’

As mentioned, cartoons also have the ability to ‘say’

things that elite cannot easily say without significant

cost. Specifically, political cartoonists could and do ‘attack’ members of the society who attempt

to escape from the internalized threat perceptions and the securitized routines. Similarly – albeit

more in line with political elite who oppose the governmental negotiation approaches – cartoons

either securitize the developments per se or the processes used. The referent object in most cases

is the political status of the Republic of Cyprus, but more importantly that of the ‘TRNC’. The

threat portrayed for the RoC is that the latter loses legitimacy, while the ‘TRNC’ is ‘upgraded’

Fig. 20. Junker’s interest in Cyprus



Fig. 21. Blind ECHR


by the international community. Figure 22 shows Cyprus

and in the background is the ‘TRNC’ flag. Below there is a

note that reads “Je suis manni’; “manni” (µαννοί) in Greek

means stupid. This message essentially accuses those

Greek Cypriots who no longer actively oppose the

upgrading of the

‘TRNC’ or who visit

the northern part of the

island. Figure 23

criticizes those who

argue that Cypriots

need to develop a

culture of peace. The left

part of the cartoon reads “Culture of War” and has the

divided island with the text ‘I do not forget’ and on the right

part it says “Culture of Peace”. This form of cartoons focus

on individuals who would like to escape from the internalized positions and repetitive conflict

routines. As the image shows the only way to have a culture of peace is to be ‘blind’ to the

realities and not make any reference to the invasion and occupation. The aim of such cartoons is

to demonstrate how changes in the routines and rejection of the

institutionalized securitization can be a threat to Greek

Cypriots.

The most recent reaction to the developments took place in

early 2016, when for the first time the Turkish Cypriot leader

was invited to the World Economic Forum at Davos, with the

support of the RoC President, Nicos Anastasiades. As

expected those who fear the ‘upgrading’ of the ‘TRNC’

opposed this move. Specifically, they argued that the Turkish

Cypriot side was upgraded, while the Greek Cypriot was

downgraded; thus the RoC and the areas not controlled by the Republic were perceived to be

Fig. 22 Je Suis Manni (“I am Stupid”)


Fig. 23 Culture of peace and war



Fig. 24 Davos - Division


equated. Figure 24 is an example where the cartoon ‘accompanies’ the current securitization

discourses, which argues that such developments will lead to the permanent division of the

island.

Desecuritizing cartoons

Not all political cartoons aim to securitize. Some aim to desecuritize either by supporting

mainstream securitizing actors or by focusing on issues that political elite cannot easily say. The

most frequent goal is to indicate that a settlement to the conflict is not a threat as several

securitizing actors claim. Figure 25 is a response to those who try to securitize the developments

at Davos. Specifically, this cartoon shows three political

elite – and major securitizing actors who focus on the

Cyprus problem – trying to convince the ‘average Cypriot’

that the meetings at Davos are major threat, when in reality

they are not. Figure 26, shows once again a frightening

shadow accompanied by the word ‘ΛΥΣΗ’ [solution], with

reference to Platos’ cave allegory. In this case, the

connotation is that Cypriots do not know anything else

other than the conflict. Here we see one of the political

elite presenting again the solution as a ‘monster’ and the

Cypriot accustomed to this image and unwilling to

explore or even question whether there are other

possibilities.

As seen from the last two figures, Cyprus is not

presented as a victim or as a helpless little girl, but

rather as a man with the connotation that he is neither

strong, nor weak, nor helpless. He does have,

however, a look that is not particularly intelligent; on

the contrary he seems to be very content with the status quo.

The agents that promote the securitized environment rely on audiences that are indeed used to

Politis – 23-1-2016

Fig. 25 Davos – not a real threat

Politis – 25-7-2015

Fig. 26 “solution in “the cave allegory”


the existing conflict-perpetuating and are unwilling to challenge them. What is interesting to note

is that even those cartoonist who do promote a different perspective on the conflict and the

prospects for the solution, do not attempt to desecuritize the traditional securitized threats and

actors mentioned above, as that would not be well-received by the audience. Specifically, they

do not make the claim that Turkey is not a threat, nor do they claim that the UK or the US should

be trusted. Instead, what they try to emphasize is that a solution is not necessarily a threat and

that the public (audiences) is tricked by the securitizing actors who present a potential settlement

as an existential threat.

Conclusion

As demonstrated from the examples presented above, visual images do not follow the

mainstream security grammar of securitization and they do not necessarily request access to

extraordinary measures. However, they do contribute to the continuation of the existing deeply

securitized views and subsequently contribute to the development and enhancement of conflict-

perpetuating routines. They also apply pressure and limit the options of political elite who have

the responsibility to deal with the developments, subsequently acquiring a ‘voice’ of their own.

Political cartoonist, inevitably and perhaps occasionally inadvertently, become securitizing

actors themselves. However, they have different objectives than policy makers that seek access

to measures in order to counter the proposed threat. The impact of their acts is to perpetuate an

already securitized environment and limit the prospects of desecuritization by ‘saying’ things

that mainstream securitization actors cannot. They ‘help’ remind people of what is a threat

subsequently what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior and what policy recommendations

they (public) should accept or reject. Concurrently they apply pressure to the ruling elite who at

best have to simply acknowledge the public’s negative perceptions towards these actors and the

public’s distrust towards any foreign involvement in Cypriot politics, and at worse they have to

actually securitize any foreign involvement to accommodate the public’s fears (even if they do

not wish to do so). On the reverse side, ‘desecuritizing cartoons’ aim for the opposite outcomes,

albeit the cartoonists are much more constrained in terms of what they can attempt to

desecuritize, while it is much more difficult to invoke feelings of trust (instead of fear) in an

conflict environment characterized by deep securitization.


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Visual securitization: Political cartoons in protracted conflicts