Two Conceptions of Technical Malfunction (Theoria)

Two Conceptions of Technical Malfunctiontheo_1092 117..138

by

BJØRN JESPERSEN

Czech Academy of Sciences, TU Ostrava, Czech Republic

MASSIMILIANO CARRARA

University of Padova, Italy

Abstract: The topic of this paper is the notion of technical (as opposed to biological) malfunction.It is shown how to form the property being a malfunctioning F from the property F and the propertymodifier malfunctioning (a mapping taking a property to a property). We present two interpretationsof malfunctioning. Both interpretations agree that a malfunctioning F lacks the dispositional prop-erty of functioning as an F. However, its subsective interpretation entails that malfunctioning Fs areFs, whereas its privative interpretation entails that malfunctioning Fs are not Fs. We chart variousof their respective logical consequences and discuss some of the philosophical implications of bothinterpretations.

Keywords: malfunction, property modification, subsection, privation, philosophy of technology

Introduction

TECHNICAL ARTEFACTS ARE THINGS like hammers, violins, aircraft and micro-chips.1 Though omnipresent in modern life, there is a lamentable gap in thephilosophical literature on technical artefacts: despite the fact that technical mal-function is a key notion in philosophy of technology, it lacks as yet a worked-out,rigorous theory of that notion. The aim of this article is to outline how to fill this gapand make the first steps in that direction.2 It does so by bringing insights culled from

1 We are not going to offer a definition of artefact, hence not of technical artefact either, since theexamples we rely on are paradigmatic examples rather than limiting cases of technical artefacts and so notin need of definition. However, for a definition of artefact, see, for instance, Hilpinen (1993).2 In this article we restrict ourselves to technical malfunction. The artefacts will be familiar ones likeknives, corkscrews and screwdrivers. We do not consider whether our findings may be extrapolated to otherareas, biology in particular. (See Vermaas and Houkes, 2003, for objections to extrapolations from biologyto technology.) However, the notion of malfunction is entrenched both in philosophy of technology andphilosophy of biology, since both designed artefacts and naturally evolving organisms are susceptible tomalfunction. But malfunction is not restricted to hearts and hammers, organs and tools. Systems too maymalfunction. Systems come in all shapes and forms, like infrastructural ones (typically involving telecom-munications, transportation and energy supply), political ones regulating security, economic ones regulat-ing commerce, and a priori systems like mathematical ones for calculating and logical ones for inferring.Thus, a logical system that validates, say, affirming the consequent malfunctions, since it fails to invalidatea fallacy. If an artistic artefact also has a function, then it too may malfunction (for example, by failing toexpress an idea or failing to mobilize the masses). More obviously, items of pop culture have easily

THEORIA, 2011, 77, 117–138doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01092.x

© 2011 Stiftelsen Theoria. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK,and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

philosophy of technology together with techniques stemming from formal seman-tics. The former provides the topic and the two main clusters of theories of functionand malfunction to be discussed here. The latter provides the conceptual frameworkwithin which to broach the topic and systematize the theories of malfunction. Thecontribution that this article makes consists in systematizing the assumptions andconsequences of two sharply delineated conceptions of malfunction. Evidently, anytheory of malfunction presupposes at least one theory of function. Since in thisarticle we zoom in on just one significant difference between two conceptions ofmalfunction, we have organized the theories of function into two correspondingclusters. It turns out that one conception of function sustains both conceptionsof malfunction, while the other sustains but one. The two conceptions of functionwill be equally sharply delineated. We want to emphasize that we are not so muchseeking a taxonomy of existing theories, as a survey of the assumptions andconsequences of two, sharply delineated, opposite views of technical malfunctionand function. The full-fledged formal semantics, providing the logical details, thataccompanies the philosophical findings of this article is set out in a separate study(Jespersen and Carrara, submitted).

The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 1 the two conceptionsof malfunction are introduced. Section 2 outlines the subsective conception ofmalfunction, and section 3 the privative conception. Section 4 compares the twoconceptions. Section 5 discusses multiple-function artefacts. Section 6 sketcheshow the notion of malfunction fits into the wider context of a technical artefact’slife cycle. Finally, section 7 provides a summary.

1. Two Conceptions

The central schematic sentence whose semantics we are going to study is

“ is a malfunctioning ”.a F

“a” denotes an arbitrary technical artefact and “F” denotes a technical-artefactproperty compatible with the modifier denoted by “malfunctioning”. An instance ofthe schema would be, “What I am holding in my hand is a malfunctioning cork-screw”. The primary object of study is the property being a malfunctioning Fformed by applying the modifier malfunctioning (abbreviated “Malf ”) to F in thefollowing manner, “[. . .]” denoting the logical operation of functional application:

identifiable functions – for example, thrillers must thrill their readers, pornography must arouse its viewers,and ambient music must soothe its listeners. Thus, a dull thriller is a malfunctioning thriller.

118 BJØRN JESPERSEN AND MASSIMILIANO CARRARA

© 2011 Stiftelsen Theoria.

Malf F[ ].

Our investigation into the logic of malfunction charts the logical consequences ofarguments whose premise is that a is a malfunctioning F. The consequences dependon the semantics assigned to “Malf”. Different kinds of modifier have differentlogical implications. The two kinds of modifier we are going to study primarily hereare the subsective and privative ones, since we contrast a subsective conception ofMalf with a privative one. In general, these two kinds of modifier have the followingcharacteristic logical behaviour:

Subsective F a

Fa

Privative F a

Fa

[ ][ ] [ ][ ]¬

Thus, on the subsective conception, a malfunctioning F is still an F; on the privativeconception, a malfunctioning F is not an F.

Therefore, the following inference characterizes the subsective reading of Malf:

Malf F a

Fa

[ ][ ]

The following inference characterizes the privative reading:

Malf F a

Fa

[ ][ ]¬

It is crucial that the central sentence be “a is a malfunctioning F” and not, forexample, “This F is a malfunctioning F”. The former phrasing observes neutralitybetween the subsective and the privative conception by not identifying the subjectof predication via the property F.3 The latter phrasing prejudges in favour of thesubsective view: if the predicate “F” truly applies to a malfunctioning F then it isa foregone conclusion that when being a malfunctioning F the artefact in questionis an F.

3 We are not going to deal with (admittedly very interesting) sentences of the general forms, “An F isfunctioning as a G” and “An F is (now) a G”. Instances would be “A church is functioning as a barn” and“A church is (now) a barn”. (Recall what happened to the churches and mosques of Albania after EnverHoxha declared the country atheist in 1967.) What is needed is a mechanism to distinguish between achurch as a building serving a particular function (a Christian shrine) and a church as a function which mayor may not be realized by a building. (The distinction exists in English, which distinguishes between, “I amgoing to the church” and “I am going to church”, the former referring to the building and the latter to thefunction.) One way of capturing the distinction would be by means of the de dicto/de re mechanism, “achurch” occurring de re and “a barn” occurring de dicto (though it falls outside the purview of this articleto supply details). An alternative way would be by means of dot objects, where church, barn, etc., wouldbe dot objects equipped with a complex type (see Asher, 2007; Asher and Pustejowsky, 2005).

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF TECHNICAL MALFUNCTION 119


The two conceptions of malfunction presuppose two different conceptions offunction. (This is not to say that a conception of malfunction may not be com-patible with more than one conception of function. But there are reasons forfavouring one conception over the rest. See below.) Roughly, on the conception offunction matching the subsective view, an artefact is an F if, and only if, it wasdesigned (hence intended) to function as an F, irrespective of its capacity tofunction as one. This view holds that a malfunctioning F retains its proper func-tion as an F, but forfeits its capacity to function as an F. What makes an artefactan F is not its capacity to function as an F, but its origin in a design and manu-facturing process aimed at creating Fs. Call this view “the design view” of tech-nical function. The privative view accommodates two views of technical function.Roughly, according to the amodal variant, an artefact is an F if, and only if, itfunctions as an F; according to the modal variant, an artefact is an F if, and onlyif, it has the capacity to function as an F, regardless of the actual realization ofthis capacity. It is the use (amodal variant) or usability (modal variant) of anartefact as an F that qualifies it as an F. Both are variants of what we call “theuse view” of technical function.4

Thus, the design view requires for an artefact to qualify as a corkscrew that it musthave been designed (and manufactured accordingly) as one. It must have the rightsort of pedigree to be a corkscrew, whereas it is neither necessary nor sufficient to bean artefact that happens to function as a corkscrewing device. However, an artefact’sorigin anchors it to a particular artefact kind that makes the artefact impervious tofailure to function in the way it was designed to. By contrast, the use view requiresthe capacity to function, or the actual functioning, as a corkscrewing device in anartefact for it to qualify as a corkscrew. Its usability, or use, anchors it to a particularartefact kind, but in such a way as to make it vulnerable to failure to function in theway characteristic of the relevant artefact kind.5

4 The design view squares roughly with the etiological, or proper-function, theories of function, and theuse view with the causal-role theories. See, for example, Cummins (1975), Davies (2000), Griffiths (1993),Millikan (1999), McLaughlin (2001), Neander (1991), Preston (1998) and Sloman and Malt (2003). (Thisis not to imply that every existing theory must be either a design theory or a use theory. Thus, for instance,Preston’s is a use-oriented etiological theory. We thank a referee for pointing this out.) Interestingly, whatKripke has to say (in the unpublished 1983 paper, “Functionalism and Automata”) about malfunctioningcomputers would make him an adherent of the design view: “Actual machines can malfunction: throughmelting wires or slipping gears they may give the wrong answer. How is it determined when a malfunctionoccurs? By reference to the program of the machine, as intended by its designer, not simply by referenceto the machine itself . . . [T]he appeal to the designer’s program makes the physical machine superfluous;only the program is really relevant. The machine as physical object is of value only if the intended[mathematical] function can somehow be read off from the physical object alone” (Stabler, 1987, p. 15) (weare indebted to Giuseppe Primiero for the reference to Stabler, 1987).5 We wish to emphasize, however, that we intend to remain neutral on the notion of artefact kind andkindred notions like artefact-kind membership. Our concern here is not what a corkscrew (say) is. Ratherour concern is whether a malfunctioning corkscrew is a corkscrew (regardless of what this or that theory



The relationships between the two notions of malfunction and the two notionsof function are, briefly, the following. The combination of the subsective con-ception of Malf with the design view is restrictive with respect to the property F(it is demanding for an artefact to qualify as an F) and permissive with respectto [Malf F] (no “extra effort” is required of a malfunctioning F to remain an F).The combination of the privative conception of Malf with the use view is per-missive with respect to F (because also what the design view would deem suc-cessful improper use of a as an F makes a an F) and restrictive with respectto [Malf F] (the current incapacity to be used, or usable, as an F disqualifies aas an F).6

The property functioning as an F is indispensable for defining the dual con-ception of function and of malfunction. The exact details of what it means forsomething to function as an F (while perhaps not being an F) need not detain ushere. Our present concern is to carve out a niche for the property in our overallconceptual edifice of malfunction. In Jespersen and Carrara (submitted) weshow what sort of generic logical operations go into forming the property. Forpresent purposes it suffices to consider only the (logically black-boxed) modifierFunc_as_a(n) and the property F. However, the philosophical idea underlyingthe property of functioning as an F would be along the following lines. For eachtechnical-artefact property like being a corkscrew there exists the set of proper-ties defining what the property amounts to, in casu what being a corkscrewamounts to. We are making here the assumption that there is a set of individuallynecessary and jointly sufficient properties that defines the property of being acorkscrew. (This assumption will be substantiated in section 4.) From this set a

of artefacts may require of an artefact to qualify as a corkscrew). The nature of our inquiry is semantic andlogical, not ontological or metaphysical. This is why we explicitly investigate the semantics and logic of thesentence (or rather sentence schema), “a is a malfunctioning F”. That is, given a particular meaningassigned to an instance of “a is a malfunctioning F”, does the truth of that sentence entail the truth of “ais an F”? Our notions of design view and use view are not artefact-kind theories per se; rather they are thetwo notions of (technical) function accompanying the two notions of (technical) malfunction that are themain topic of this article. Thus, we remain neutral on the philosophically rich question of whether thenotion of technical function exhausts the notion of technical artefact. When using the word “artefact kind”in the main text, we have nothing other in mind than artefacts with a particular technical function, wherethe logical type of a technical function is the type of a property. (We thank a referee for urging the need forclarification concerning the relationship between technical function and artefact kind.)6 Our bifurcation between design view and use view is mirrored in Thomasson’s (2003, p. 593)distinction between the intended-function view and the causal/functional capacities view. However, Tho-masson’s objection to the latter via an argument from malfunction is question-begging. She says, “if weattempted to group artifacts together in terms of their actual causal/functional-capacities, broken ordeformed screwdrivers could not be classed as members of their kind” (Thomasson, 2003, p. 594). Whatneeds to be established is exactly that there is such a kind as screwdriver that malfunctioning screwdriversare still members of. In our terminology, a subsective conception of malfunction should not be presupposedwhen arguing for the design view. Rather, the argument must go in the opposite direction: first a theory offunction, then a theory of malfunction.



particular property is extracted; namely, the property laying down what cork-screws are for. Thus, from the set of properties associated with being a cork-screw, assume that the property uncorking_bottles is extracted. The propertyfunctioning as a corkscrew is then the property functioning to uncork bottles,or equally functioning as a bottle-uncorking device.7 The claim that there is aproperty laying down what corkscrews are for is neutral between the design andthe use view. On the design view, the “for-ness” of corkscrews is to uncorkbottles, because they were designed to do so. So this biconditional sums up thedesign view: something is an F if, and only if, it was designed as an F. On theuse view, the “for-ness” of corkscrews is to uncork bottles, because they are, orcan be, used to do that. So this biconditional sums up the two variants of the useview: something is a corkscrew if, and only if, it can be, or is, used for uncorkingbottles. As is seen, the use view does not distinguish between being a corkscrewand being a bottle_uncorking device.

2. The Subsective Conception

On the subsective view malfunction abounds. Look no further than blunt cuttingknives, which fail to cut, or broken corkscrews, which fail to uncork bottles. Stillblunt knives and broken corkscrews are no less knives and corkscrews for that.Just as some corkscrews have wooden handles, so some corkscrews malfunction.Malfunctioning corkscrews are corkscrews, because they were designed as cork-screws. Their incapacity to perform the function they were designed to performis an accidental feature and as such does not affect their status as corkscrews.This view allows that an artefact’s designed function and actual physical struc-ture may be thoroughly divorced. Even when the artefact’s structure cannotsustain the function, the function still remains. And because the designed func-tion as a corkscrew defines an artefact as a corkscrew, the artefact remains acorkscrew, come hell or high water. Its status as corkscrew is anchored solely toits design and not to its structure or the capacities that the structure enables.However, the view needs to dispel the (perceived) oddity of the possibility that a

7 So what about, say, the property being a knife? Knives come in all sorts of kinds: some stab, others cut,still others smear butter and, perhaps, some are finally for decoration (provided we accept that decorativeknives are knives rather than non-knives, just like toy knives are non-knives). To cut a deep and longphilosophical discussion way too short, our tack would be to disambiguate the predicate “is a knife” byspecifying particular kinds of knives. This would probably leave us with predicates like “is a stabbingknife”, “is a dagger”, etc. Each such predicate would denote a property with a what-for property among itsrespective requisites. This is to say that being a knife, unadorned by any further specification, lacks awhat-for property by being too general an artefact property.



particular may co-instantiate the properties of being a corkscrew and failing touncork bottles.

3. The Privative Conception

On the privative view malfunction is a somewhat more elusive notion, since the viewonly tells us, strictly speaking, what a malfunctioning F is not, namely an F.The viewmaintains that something that fails to cut does not qualify as a knife; something thatfails to uncork bottles does not qualify as a corkscrew. A malfunctioning corkscrewis not such a corkscrew that is a malfunctioning uncorking device; it is a non-corkscrew. A mockery is made of the privative view, however, should it be claimedthat it rests content with not differentiating between those non-Fs that are malfunc-tioning Fs and those non-Fs that are not.8 Both kinds of non-F are located in thecomplement of any sets of Fs, but there surely is a significant difference between amalfunctioning corkscrew and a nuclear power plant, say. The general problem withprivation, as we just saw exemplified, is that it tells us what something is not – aforged banknote is not a banknote, a stone lion is not a lion – and not also whatsomething is. The question, then, is how the privative stance is to capture thesignificant difference between nuclear power plants and malfunctioning corkscrews.In particular, there has to be some significant property that corkscrews and malfunc-tioning corkscrews share. What is wanted is a property that will extract the subset ofmalfunctioning Fs from the complement of any given set of Fs.9 We want to putforward the following suggestion for consideration. As soon as a particular thathitherto qualified as a corkscrew fails to function as one it becomes a malfunctioningcorkscrew, hence a non-corkscrew. From the fact that a is a malfunctioning F it canbe inferred that a used to be an F: a currently malfunctioning F has a past as an F. Sowe would suggest introducing the meaning postulate, on behalf of the privativetheory, that something that presently fails to function as an F previously did functionas an F. If this suggestion is taken on board, the privative conception is more

8 Baker (ms., p. 12) asks, “What exactly is the line . . . between having a hammer that is broken, and havingsomething that is not a hammer at all? There is no sharp line”. Well, a hammer that is broken is a hammer,and the line between a hammer and something that is not a hammer at all is that the former is a hammer andthe latter is not; so there is as sharp a line as any. But the question is ill-posed, anyway, since it pre-empts theanswer. The intended question is clear enough, though; namely, what the line is between a malfunctioningF and a non-F. This question is not pressing for Baker’s own theory, however, since she maintains thatmalfunctioning space-shuttles (to use her own example) are space-shuttles. The space-shuttle Columbia wasa malfunctioning space-shuttle that ceased to exist due to malfunction when it burnt up in the Earth’satmosphere. Columbia did not cease being a space-shuttle as soon as it began malfunctioning.9 For a discussion of what positively characterizes, for example, stone lions, which are not lions, andforged banknotes, which are not banknotes, see Coulson and Fauconnier (1999) and Jespersen andPrimiero (2010).



accurately formally rendered in the following way, where Ex is a privative modifieras referred to in a predicate like “is an ex-Stalinist”:

Malf F a Ex F a Fa[ ][ ] → [ ][ ] → ¬ .

The property of being a non-F subsumes the property of being an ex-F, which inturn subsumes the property of being a malfunctioning F. The proposition ¬Fa canbe arrived at either indirectly, via the meaning postulate just given, or directly, via[[Malf F] a] as the premise of an inference. In the remainder of this article we shallassume that the advocate of privative malfunction embraces the suggestion justmade concerning a malfunctioning F’s track record of functioning as an F.

4. Comparison of the Two Conceptions

Interestingly, both the design view and the use view have a historical dimension.The former insists on an artefact’s having been designed to function as an F; thelatter, on an artefact’s track record of functioning as an F.

The privativist holds that the incapacity to function as a corkscrew is an essentialfeature of a malfunctioning corkscrew and as such does affect its status as acorkscrew by depriving it of this status. This view keeps technical function andphysical structure tightly together, while dismissing the notion of proper (i.e.,design-based) function. An artefact’s status as a corkscrew is anchored to itsstructure, and possibly also to its material, which is (are) such as to enable theartefact to function as a corkscrew. However, the view needs to render plausible thebiconditional that a particular is an F if, and only if, it functions/could function asan F. The biconditional would seem to rule out as non-Fs too many objects that wenormally consider Fs, and rule in as Fs too many objects that we normally do notconsider Fs. For instance, if a table (also) functions as a chair (as a platform to siton, say) then that particular qualifies both as a table and a chair, which seems oneproperty too many for a particular to instantiate.

How are these two views to be systematized? What is required is a rigoroustheoretical framework within which to raise, discuss and possibly solve questionsbearing on malfunction. The first observation to make is that nothing malfunctionssimpliciter, as little as anything is either large or small simpliciter. It is only withrespect to a property (be it a particular property or the value of a variable rangingover properties)10 that it is meaningful to say that something is large, small, or

10 This qualification also serves to make sense of the conclusion of this inference (cf. the discussion ofpseudo-detachment), p a variable ranging over properties of individuals:

Small elephant a

p Small p a

[ ][ ]∃ [ ][ ].



malfunctioning. If you claim that a is large, you provoke the question, “A largewhat?” Likewise, if you claim that a is malfunctioning, you provoke the question,“A malfunctioning what?” Your interlocutor wishes to know, and is entitled to betold, what it is that a fails at. What you must do to satisfy your interlocutor is citea property.

What we say in colloquial discourse is, for instance, that a is a large drumkit (i.e., large for a drum kit, or large as far as drum kits go), b is a giant midget,c is a midget giant and d is a malfunctioning amplifier. This goes to showthat “malfunctioning” is syntactically an adjective modifier. Semantically, Mal-functioning is a mapping that takes “old” properties to “new” properties, thesame way Large takes, for instance, the property of being a drum kit to theproperty of being a large drum kit. (To be sure, colloquial English permitsphrases like “This corkscrew malfunctions”; but this phrase is elliptic for “Thiscorkscrew malfunctions as a corkscrew” or “This corkscrew is a malfunctioningcorkscrew”.)

Nonetheless, Jespersen (2010), Duží et al. (2010, pp. 395–405) and Jespersenand Carrara (submitted) show how to imitate the logical effect of detaching themodifier occurring in [Modifier Property] and converting it into a property. Thistransformation is validated by the rule of pseudo-detachment. To get a feel for therule, let Large be the modifier and Large* the property formed from it by pseudo-detachment. Then the following inference is valid:

Large mouse a

Large a mouse a

[ ][ ]∗[ ]∧[ ]

If Malf is the modifier, then the inference is, on the subsective view:

Malf F a

Malf a Fa

[ ][ ]∗[ ]∧[ ]

and, on the privative view:

Malf F a

Malf a Fa

[ ][ ]∗[ ]∧ ¬[ ]

The first conjunct is obtained via pseudo-detachment; the respective second con-juncts follow from the respective conceptions of Malf. The idea informing andjustifying pseudo-detachment is that if a is a large mouse, then a is a largesomething: there is a property with respect to which a is large. All it takes isexistential quantification over properties and the stipulation that Large* be theproperty [Large p], where p is $-bound. Far from being contentious, the pseudo-



detachment of Large* from [Large mouse] turns out to be trivial.11 That ahas the property Malf* simply means that a is a malfunctioning something:$p [[Malf p] a]. Needless to say, the resulting property Malf* is not the same inthe two inferences, since [Malf F] is not the same property, either. Malf* isneeded when, for instance, counting the number of malfunctioning artefacts in ahousehold, as we need then to abstract away from the particular properties modi-fied by Malf.

To amplify the point, when a particular is predicated as being a malfunctioningcorkscrew, the predication does not consist in attributing two properties to theparticular: the property of being a corkscrew and the property of malfunctioning.Only one property is attributed: the property of being a malfunctioning corkscrew.Presenting the difference between the subsective and the privative view explicitly interms of properties (rather than individuals or sets of individuals) and propertymodification places the topic of malfunction squarely within property theory.Properties being intensional entities, the discussion of the two views must, there-fore, be couched within a framework of intensional logic. (Jespersen and Carrara(submitted) puts forward just such a framework of intensional logic within which toreason about the notion of malfunction.)

An additional reason why the topic of malfunction calls for intensional logic isthat two of the three views turn malfunction into a modal notion. According to thesubsective/design view, a is a malfunctioning F if a was designed (hence, ought) tobe able to function as an F, but is incapable of functioning as one. According to theprivative/use view in its modal variant, a is a malfunctioning F if a lacksthe physical capacity to function as an F, but previously did have that capacity. Theproperty of being a malfunctioning F turns out to be a dispositional one on eitherview, in that an artefact that is a malfunctioning F is characterized by lacking acertain disposition or capacity.

a’s incapacity to function as an F comes in two variants on the subsectiveview. The first is this: necessarily, any x malfunctions as an F, because the typeof F is inherently flawed (due to flawed design), so this is type-level malfunction.Any token manufactured according to the flawed design is “born with a handi-cap”. The second is this: contingently, a particular x is a malfunctioning F (for

11 Gamut (1991, §6.3.11) and Geach (1956) disagree. Geach’s argument is, in effect, that pseudo-detachment would license an invalid argument. And indeed, the following argument is invalid: “a is a bigflea, so a is a flea and a is big; b is a small elephant, so b is an elephant and b is small; so a is a big animaland b is a small animal” (Geach, 1956, p. 33). But pseudo-detachment licenses no such argument. Geach’sillegitimate move is to steal the property being an animal into the conclusion, thereby making a and bcommensurate. For sure, both fleas and elephants are animals, but a is big and b is small follow from a’sbeing a flea and b’s being an elephant, so pseudo-detachment only licenses these two conclusions, wherep, q are variables ranging over properties of individuals and p � q: $p [[Big p] a]; $q [[Small q] b]. Anda big p may well be smaller than a small q, depending on the values assigned to p, q.



example, due to wear and tear, flawed manufacturing, or wrongful implementa-tion or maintenance), which is token-level malfunction.12 The privative view doesnot mirror the same two variants, since the view leaves no room for type-levelmalfunction, while it does leave room for token-level malfunction. The reason is,of course, because the view does not cast function in terms of design, but onlyin terms of use or usability. We hold, uncontroversially, that design is invariablya type-level phenomenon.

Note that the modal profile of the necessity and contingency involved is nomo-logical (rather than, say, analytic/conceptual or logical). The laws of nature thathappen to hold sway at the actual world (and any other possible world nomologi-cally indistinguishable from it) are such that material objects with such-and-suchproperties must exhibit such-and-such behaviour. Had the relevant laws been dif-ferent, then it is logically possible that an exemplar that malfunctions in our worldat the token- or type-level would not malfunction.

We define the nominal essence of a property F in terms of the set of propertiesthat are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an individual to exemplifyF. The reason why we introduce the very notion of essence is because the property[Malf F], in its subsective and privative variants, can be given a crisp definition interms of it. Now, the notion of essence may be contentious in the case of naturalkinds such as tiger, lemon and gold. For one thing, even if essences should begranted, it is not obvious whether essences for natural kinds are (to be) discoveredor stipulated.13 In contrast, if a decision is made to develop a notion of essence fortechnical artefacts, then essences are to be stipulated.14 We do not discover what theessence of already existing corkscrews is; we stipulate what corkscrews (past,present, future and merely possible ones) are by laying down what corkscrews arefor. This formulation, in terms of essence as “for-ness”, is neutral between the

12 See Franssen (2008, 2009).13 In a broader context, a fiat lux is reserved for Mother Nature, deities or some other non-human force,while a fiat pecunia is for us humans. We cannot create galaxies or gravity, but we can, and do, createmoney, presidents, kindergartens, railroad networks, beer, and philosophical periodicals. Still, Thomas-son’s (2003, p. 589) picture of “pre-existing and independent conditions”, as attributed to (scientific)realism, seems too coarse: “plausibly . . . it may be a fact that this is a tree without any collectiveacceptance of any principles regarding trees or anything else” (Thomasson, 2003, p. 586). This is anoverstatement, for the very statement of the realist position presupposes the use of concepts like tree. Onlythe most relentless realist is going to insist that empirical reality comes conceptually ready-packaged,neatly compartmentalized into concepts, or conditions, like tree. (Put polemically, Lenin’s reflection theoryis the only existing theory that leaps to mind.) Any other realist will leave room for some measure ofstipulation and legislation when doing conceptual work. And conceptual work cannot do without anycollective acceptance of any principles. For one thing, a scientific community will need to reach anagreement upon which concepts to treat as primitive and which as derived, and how to derive the latter fromwhich other concepts.14 However, for a dissenting voice, see Elder (2004).



design view and the use view. The dispute between the two is instead over whetherfor-ness is to be spelt out in terms of design or use.

Programmatically stated, the design view holds that the essence of the propertyF is what instances of the property are designed to function as. Let the propertyfiring_bullets be the essence of the property being a gun. The design processinstitutes the essential property of a specific artefact kind, making essential prop-erties “historical” in the sense that, for example, firing_bullets was assigned tobeing a gun by the gun designer(s) at the inception, or invention, of the artefactkind. Yet the essence is not subject to change. Firing_bullets defines what any-thing with the property of being a gun is for, because firing bullets is what gunsare for. Not so on the use view. It skips over design and makes do with physicalstructure and material. It is nonetheless still essential that an F functions, orcan function, as an F. It is just that the use view anchors the essence of Fs totheir present use, or usability, as Fs, while the design view anchors it to theirdesign pedigree. It is worth stressing that the use view, despite its pragmatisttinge, will need a relation-in-extension between, say, being a corkscrew anduncorking_bottles. Nominal essentialism (or intensional essentialism, if you like)is based on relations-in-extension among properties, so nominal essentialism (orsomething kindred to it) is indispensable in order to express that a corkscrew isfor uncorking bottles.

5. Multiple-Function Artefacts

We are not assuming that every artefact must be a single-function artefact. Alsomultiple-function artefacts should be included. Hughes (2009, p. 191, n. 12) bringsup the example of a claw hammer, saying that a claw hammer with a broken clawfunctions properly with respect to pounding nails, but not with respect to pryingnails. Hughes is right about this. But what general lessons can be extracted? Assumethat to function as a claw is to pry nails and to function as a hammer is to pound nails.Then there are two options. The first option is this: something is a functioning clawhammer if, and only if, it functions as a claw and it functions as a hammer.The secondoption is this: something is a functioning claw hammer if, and only if, it functions asa claw or it functions as a hammer (or being inclusive disjunction). The first optionentails this: something is a malfunctioning claw hammer if, and only if, it fails tofunction as a claw or it fails to function as a hammer. That is, it is possible thatsomething be a malfunctioning claw hammer and still function as a claw or as ahammer, depending on whether its clawing capacity or its hammering capacity iscompromised. The second option entails this: something is a malfunctioning clawhammer if, and only if, it fails to function as a claw and it fails to function as a



hammer. That is, a malfunctioning claw hammer functions neither as a claw nor as ahammer.15

The difference between the subsective and the privative view of malfunctioncan be schematized in the following manner. The subsective view validates theinference:

Malf Claw Hammer aClaw Hammer a

Hammer a

[ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]

[ ]

The innocuous assumption is that Claw is a subsective modifier, such that a clawhammer is a hammer. That a claw hammer is a claw is in turn inferable via the ruleof pseudo-detachment.

The privative view validates the inference:

Malf Claw Hammer aClaw Hammer a

Claw a Hammer a

[ ][ ][ ]¬ [ ][ ]

¬ ∗[ ]∨ ¬[ ]

That is, a malfunctioning claw hammer is a non-(claw hammer) that now fails tofunction as a claw or as a hammer, or both.

Let us briefly spell out what the design view and the use view would make of amalfunctioning claw hammer. Since we have paired the design view off with thesubsective view, and the use view with the privative view, they adopt the followingrespective stances. On the design view, a malfunctioning claw hammer, whether itcannot claw or cannot hammer (or both), is still a claw hammer, and it does notreduce to a mere hammer or a mere claw (or neither). On the use view, a malfunc-tioning claw hammer whose clawing capacity is gone is still a hammer and nolonger a claw. If its hammering capacity is gone, it is still a claw and no longer ahammer.

So what is the essence of a multiple-function tool? Its essence, we claim, is theunion of the sets of essential properties defining each of its functions. Where beinga claw and being a hammer each comes with a set of essential properties, being aclaw hammer has as its essence the union of these two sets.

In general, both views of function are in agreement that essences of technical-artefact properties such as being a corkscrew are sets of relations between proper-

15 The two respective entailments are instances of De Morgan’s laws: the negation of a disjunction isequivalent to the conjunction of the negations of its disjuncts; the negation of a conjunction is equivalentto the disjunction of the negations of its conjuncts. We are indebted to Marie Duží for discussion ofmalfunctioning bifunctional tools.



ties. So neither view considers it essential of individual token artefacts that they becorkscrews, cars, guns, etc. But the design view entails that an artefact, oncedesigned as an F, cannot shed its essence as an F. This does not exclude that an Fmay be used as a non-F; only this will constitute improper use of the token. The useview entails the possibility of shedding one essence and assuming another. Thissounds odder than it is. Imagine somebody producing a round metal object fromtheir purse. In situation S agent s uses the object to open a beer bottle. Ten minuteslater, in situation S’ agent s’ uses the same physical object to buy a bottle of beer.Relative to S and s, the object functions as a bottle opener and is insofar a bottleopener. Relative to S’ and s’, the object functions as a coin and is insofar a coin. Inthe first case the object is a bottle opener and in virtue of having that property hasthe essential property of being for opening bottles. In the second case the object isa coin and in virtue of having that property has the essential property of being formaking cash payments. The use view allows round metal objects to flit from oneproperty to another, assuming different essences in the process. (If functioning asan n-function device, it will have n essences.) The design view allows round metalobjects to assume exactly one property and thereby exactly one essence. Neitherview entails that round metal objects, nor any other technical artefacts, shouldpossess a real, or inherent, essence as, for example, bottle openers or coins.16

6. A Life-Cycle Schema

Having adumbrated the twin notions of function and malfunction, we now sketchhow the notion of malfunction fits into a larger conceptual schema detailing the lifecycle of an artefact.

First of all, the state of malfunctioning should not be confused with the sourcesof malfunction. It might admittedly seem tempting to differentiate between highlymalfunctioning and slightly malfunctioning artefacts. For, surely, there is a note-worthy difference between something that malfunctions because of a loose bolt andsomething that malfunctions because it is a wreck. But, being a malfunctioning Fis an absolute property and not a scalar one. Something malfunctions, or it does not;and that is it. A malfunctioning F fails to operate in the manner it was designed to(the design view), or a malfunctioning F fails to function, or be capable of func-tioning, as an F. Neither view leaves room for gradation.

What does come in degrees are the technical and other sources of malfunction.There is a spectrum, one of whose two extreme endpoints is a downright wreck,

16 Advocates of artefact kinds as real kinds will disagree. For discussion, see Carrara and Vermaas(2009).



pretty much all of whose components would need to be repaired or replaced. Theartefact hampered by a loose bolt finds itself slightly off-centre, while the otherextreme endpoint is an artefact performing beyond capacity. An example would bea 220-volt adapter being applied to a 330-volt source: the adapter will endure thestress for a while, but is bound to eventually collapse. A biological analogy wouldbe a human heart going at 300 beats per minute: it does what a heart does, but is amalfunctioning heart.17

Being a functioning F is scalar, though, running the gamut from functioningmaximally to functioning minimally. This spectrum is bounded by two cut-off points. One is the point at which an artefact exhausts its full capacityto function as an F, after which the artefact is optimized, or enhanced. Forexample, a vehicle designed to go maximally 280 kilometres per hour may beenhanced so as to go 350 kilometres per hour. The other is the point at which anartefact no longer functions extremely poorly as an F, but ceases to function asan F altogether. Once an F has exceeded this cut-off point, it has acquired theproperty of being a malfunctioning F, whether Malf be construed subsectively orprivatively.

Secondly, engineering practice, on a rational reconstruction, is characterized bya linear process beginning with problem and extending via design (of type),manufacturing (of tokens), implementation and use, malfunction, repair, resumeduse to disposal. The sequential segment ⟨malfunction, repair, resumed use⟩ lendsitself to repetition, as when your frequently malfunctioning Alfa Romeo goes in andout of the repair shop. The dispute between the design and the use view is over howmuch significance to attach to this process when laying down what it means for anartefact to be an F, a functioning F, a malfunctioning F, and functioning as an F.

Schematically, the process is as follows.

(1) Problem. The problem is to design an artefact to carry out a specific task.18

The problem may not afford a solution for any of several reasons. It may bea so-called wicked problem; i.e., inherently incapable of being unambigu-ously stated and lacking clear success criteria. Or the problem may be clearenough, but be unsolvable because any solution would be either logically

17 Thanks to Nicole Vincent and Maarten Franssen for suggesting that an over-performing artefact isalso malfunctioning.18 Says David J. Israel (1993, pp. 13–15), “Imagine you are a designer. You have been commissioned todesign a device that, in a delimited range of environments subject to certain laws, will behave in such a wayas to promote a certain goal or set of goals that someone (perhaps you) has proposed. Your job is to specifythe states of the device and the laws governing their behaviour under various environmental conditions.This specification should be such that you can argue that a device that meets the specification will also besuch that the behaviour it exhibits will tend to promote the stipulated goals.”



inconsistent or conceptually/analytically incoherent or nomologicallyimpossible.19

(2) Design. The design must be a blueprint of the physical structure and thematerials that artefacts should have in order to solve the problem. A designmay be inherently flawed, such that anything correctly produced and cor-rectly used in accordance with it is bound to malfunction.

(3) Production. Artefact tokens are produced, or manufactured, according tothe design. Malfunction may crop up due to, for example, wrong ingredi-ents, poor means of production, or undereducated/misbehaving humanoperators.20

(4) Implementation/use. Artefact tokens are put to use in accordance with theirdirections of use. Malfunction may arise due to users’ poor use or materialfatigue.

(5) Repair. When an artefact is “taken off the road”, the purpose is to turn amalfunctioning F into a functioning F. Poor repair may add new sources ofmalfunction, however.

(6) Disposal. At the end of its life-span, an artefact is disposed of, whether thisbe done in an orderly fashion or the artefact be randomly dumped by thewayside. During disposal, the artefact may sustain malfunction due to poorhandling, only it no longer matters that it does.

It may be instructive to deepen the comparison between the two conceptions offunction by taking a closer look at how they treat the series of properties extendingfrom being a designed F to being a disposed-of F (“des” and “use” abbreviating“the design/use conception of function”).

Designed F a

Fa Fades use

[ ][ ]∨ ¬

, (2′)

On the design view, if F is the property of being some technical artefact, then[[Designed F]wt a] follows from [Fwt a]; for example, every car is a designed car.21

19 Suppose the problem is to design a perpetuum mobile. One could consider this task an impossibleproblem to solve, considering the actual laws of motion and conservation of energy. But attempts to buildsuch artefacts have been made. Baker (ms., p. 4) raises the question, “Should we say that each of themachines malfunctioned?” She argues that we should not, and we agree. An intended perpetuum mobilemay not be one; in fact, none is, so on the design view a non-perpetuum mobile is not a malfunctioningperpetuum mobile, while on the use view it is not one, because it never functioned as one. However, otherlogically possible worlds endowed with relevantly different laws of nature will accommodate perpetuamobilia, in which case malfunctioning perpetua mobilia become an option at those worlds.20 See Simons (2007, §7) for discussion of manufacturing.21 In Jespersen and Carrara (submitted) and Jespersen (2008) the subscript “wt”, which represents worldand time indices, respectively, is explained. What gets predicated of a is an extensionalized property, likeFwt, which is a characteristic function from sets of individuals to truth-values.



The use view disagrees, of course, that this holds for all substituends of F – yourcorkscrew may well not have been designed to function as one. Both views agreewith (2′), though for different reasons. The design view admits that not everydesigned F makes it to the next phase (production), the phase of material realiza-tion, the same way some hoped-for results are borne out and others are not. The useview maintains that, possibly, some designed Fs are not Fs (for failure to functionas Fs) and that, possibly, some Fs are not designed Fs (by, potentially, functioningas Fs). So all that follows is the classical tautology Fa ⁄ ¬Fa, which, of course, isa logically trivial outcome that cannot help differentiate formally between the twoviews (or between either of these two views and any other view). What differenti-ates them are instead their respective reasons for holding that some designed Fs areFs and the rest are not.

Produced F a

Fades

Produced F a

Fa Fause

[ ][ ] [ ][ ]∨ ¬

(3′)

Obviously, the design view maintains that if something was produced to be an F,then it is an F, regardless of its performance as an F. No less obviously, the use viewmaintains that if something was produced to be an F then it is an F if it functions,or could function, as an F, and is not an F, if not. (As with (2′), the conclusion islogically trivial and what is enlightening are the particular reasons for holding thatsome produced Fs are Fs and the rest are not.) Just as the use stance assigns noimportance to an artefact’s design history, so nor does it assign importance to anartefact’s production history. To be sure, the design and production history of anartefact endows it with a particular physical structure and material make-up thattogether sustain various kinds of use, but the use theorist blots out the design andproduction history and focuses on the structure and material these give rise to.

Implemented F a

Fades use

[ ][ ], (4′)

Both sides agree, though again for different reasons. If a is an implemented F, thedesign view understands this to mean that an artefact with the property of being anF is being put to use as an F. The use view understands it to mean that an artefactis being put to use as an F.

Being repaired F a

Fades

Being repaired F a

Fause

_ _[ ][ ] [ ][ ]¬

(5′)

These two inferences are tricky and must remain provisional pending furtherclarification. Basically, the design view holds that an artefact with the property ofbeing an F in repair is an artefact with the property of being an F. What was handed



in for repair was an F; what is picked up after repair is an F; so it is to be expectedthat while being repaired the object remains an F. But there is a problem. Thechallenge is what to make of a disassembled watch, say; for is a disassembled watcha watch?22 By “is a disassembled watch” we mean a watch that has been 100%“exploded”; i.e., taken apart into its smallest designed parts, its engineered atoms,if you like. The problem for the design theorist is not that a dismantled watch cannotdo what watches do (telling time, say), for nobody expects a dismantled watch to doso, but that there seems to be no physical individual around to bear the propertybeing a watch. The design theorist claims that a disassembled watch used to be awatch, but will not consider the scattered parts of a watch a watch. So there is therisk of (5’) being an argument with a false conclusion. On the other hand, if theglove compartment of a car is what is being repaired then surely the car remains inexistence throughout the process of being repaired. The validity of (5′) cannotdepend on how “invasive the surgery” is. But its soundness can. In particular, itseems that the threshold for whether (5′) is sound is determined by whether theprocess of repairing a given F involves taking the artefact thoroughly apart. Ifdisassembled, there is no longer a bearer available for being an F, in which case thepremise is not true. Furthermore, on both the subsective and the privative view ofmalfunction, there is no longer a bearer available for being a malfunctioning F; soa dismantled watch is incapable of malfunctioning.23

The use view holds that when something that used to function as an F is beingrepaired, it is not functioning, or capable of functioning, as an F, hence it is not anF. However, if the glove compartment of a car is what is being repaired then it isstill conceivable that the car should function. Tentatively, one might consideradopting the more careful strategy of classifying the modifier Being_repaired asintensional (a.k.a. modal) for both des and use (because intensional modifiers onlyvalidate the conclusion Fa ⁄ ¬Fa; see Jespersen and Carrara (submitted) andJespersen and Primiero (2010) for discussion of intensional modifiers). We areleaving the matter at that.

Disposed of F a

Fades use

_,

[ ][ ]¬

(6′)

22 Jubien (2009, p. 16) states, without argument, “We do not believe that a bicycle goes out of existencewhen taken apart, only to pop back into existence upon reassembly. Instead we say the bicycle isdisassembled.” Jubien pictures a disassembled bicycle as being a bicycle that is, perhaps temporarily, whathe calls a scattered object. This is debatable, though: first, because (as mentioned in the main text) it is farfrom obvious what is the bearer of the property of being a disassembled bike; second, because a disas-sembled bike lacks any of the physical structure that seems to define in part what a bike is in the first place.Contra Jubien, one could equally well maintain that a disassembled bike is similar to, for example, afinished meal: what once was a meal no longer is one.23 For further discussion, see Wiggins (2001, p. 87) and Tichý (2004).



While the jury is still out on (5′), both the design and the use theorist will not thinktwice about denying that a disposed-of F is an F. A disposed-of F shares the samefate as a disassembled F, with the possible exception that a disassembled F may bereassembled and so possibly regain its status as an F, while a burnt or otherwisedestroyed and disintegrated F cannot (in the light of the actual laws of nature).

7. Function and Malfunction: Summary

Bearing in mind that des and use, subs and priv are pure views, devoid of softedges, it follows that since there are two conceptions of malfunction and twoconceptions of function, four combinations are mathematically possible. But one ofthem is logically impossible, because inconsistent. With des and use as above, and“priv” for the privative view of Malf and “subs” for the subsective view of Malf, thecombinations individually amount to the following.

[1] des + subs. An artefact a was designed as an F, which is why a remains an F,even when a is a malfunctioning F. Its malfunction may have two sources. Itsdesign as an F is flawed, such that every artefact manufactured accordinglyis a malfunctioning F. The principle we are appealing to is that type-levelmalfunction entails token-level malfunction. Or a’s F-design is impeccable,only it so happens that the token a is a malfunctioning F (due to wear andtear, etc.).

[2] des + priv. An artefact a was designed as an F, but is not an F, because nomalfunctioning F is an F. It is left open whether a was ever a functioning F.(The sources of malfunction are as above.)

[3] use + subs. This combination is logically impossible. If a is a malfunctioning Fthen a is an F; and if a is a malfunctioning F then a fails to function as anF and is, therefore, not an F. So, if a is a malfunctioning F then a both is, andis not, an F.

[4] use + priv. An artefact a is a malfunctioning F, hence a was previously an F andno longer is one. That a was previously an F also follows from a previouslyfunctioning as an F. (In [3], [4] the only source of malfunction is at the tokenlevel.)

As is seen, the privative conception of Malf is both compatible with the design viewand the use view. This two-way compatibility goes to show that the privative viewof Malf does not logically presuppose the use view of function at the expense of thedesign view. A noteworthy philosophical difference, however, between combiningprivative Malf with the design view or the use view is that on the latter design is notsufficient to preserve a’s status as an F. According to this combination, a designedF that fails to function as an F is a malfunctioning F and, therefore, not an F. But



it is far from clear why it would be philosophically rewarding to go with [2]. For asfar as Malf goes, the notion of design is rendered idle. This explains why [1], [4] arethe two combinations we have been concentrating on in this article.

8. Conclusion

In this study we have distinguished between two conceptions of technical malfunc-tion, couched in terms of whether the property modifier Malfunctioning is subsec-tive or privative, and spelt out the respective notion of technical function thatmust or ought to go together with it (dubbed “the design view” and “the use view”,respectively). The upshot of our study is that the subsective conception of malfunc-tion is restrictive with respect to F and permissive with respect to [Malf F], whereasthe privative conception of malfunction is restrictive with respect to [Malf F] andpermissive with respect to F. The notion of design is required to prevent an F failingto function as an F from ceasing to be an F. The notion of use is required to enablean F failing to function as an F to cease being an F.

As we pointed out in section 4, since properties are intensional entities, andmodifiers are operations on such entities, the discussion of the two conceptions oftechnical malfunction must be couched within a framework of intensional logic.Thus, an important general methodological lesson that may be extracted from thisstudy is that at least certain compartments of analytic philosophy of technology willget off the ground and can hope to make progress only if logical techniques,including those stemming from intensional logic, are invoked.

Acknowledgements

The authors are indebted to Marie Duží, Maarten Franssen, Peter Kroes, PavelMaterna, Nicole Vincent, as well as three anonymous referees for Theoria forvaluable comments. The research reported herein was supported by NGI (NextGeneration Infrastructure) and carried out during a one-month research stay byBjørn Jespersen at Seminario di Logica e Filosofia Analitica, Università degli Studidi Padova in April–May 2008 while affiliated with Section of Philosophy, DelftUniversity of Technology. The research was also pursued within the projects GACR401/10/0792: Temporal Aspects of Knowledge and Information, and Sulla catego-rizzazione degli artefatti: semantica e cognizione (Progetto di ricerca di ateneo –Bando 2008), University of Padua. Versions of this article were read by BjørnJespersen at Department of Informatics, Technical University of Ostrava, 30 April



2005; Department of Logic, Charles University, Prague, 2 May 2005; and Depart-ment of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 28 April 2007.

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Two Conceptions of Technical Malfunction (Theoria)