Turkish-Russian Relations in the Shadow Of the Syrian Crisis

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Fatih Özbay, “Turkish-Russian Relations in the Shadow of the Syrian Crisis”, Journal of Caspian Affairs, Vol. I, No. 1, (Spring 2015), pp. 73 - 91

TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS

* Assoc. Prof. Fatih ÖZBAY

Abstract

Turkish-Russian relations have been developing rapidly since 1992. This trend, which was particularly notable in the economic sphere in the 1990s, ex-panded into the political arena in the 2000s. The development of bilateral rela-tions accelerated with the emergence of Erdogan and Putin on the political scene. The two countries are cooperating in multiple fields, although they have serious differences of opinion on certain issues. Syria has been the most important source of disagreement; the two countries have entirely conflicting opinions on how to deal with the Syrian crisis. Nevertheless, they have managed to keep this dissent out of their overall bilateral relations. The Turkish-Russian relationship in the shadow of the Syrian crisis can be regarded as a leading example of a rational and pragmatic bilateral partnership.

Key Words: Russia, Turkey, Syria, Middle East, Putin, Erdogan, pragmatism

* Assoc. Prof., Istanbul Technical University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

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Recent Turkish-Russian Relations in the Shadow of the Syrian Crisis

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Introduction

Following the Cold War, Turkish-Russian relations deepened significantly during the early 1990s; however, this progress was mainly based on economic and commercial issues rather than political cooperation. While the economic as-pect of Turkish-Russian relations advanced considerably, the same progress could not be achieved on the political front. In the 2000s, both countries embarked on a quest to strengthen bilateral relations and build trust based on lessons learned from the recent past. Considering the general framework of the relationship, it can be observed that the scope of relations has expanded; political dialogue has increased; social relations have improved, and in general sense, mutual trust has been strengthened. Mutual relations were reshaped on the basis of the lessons learned from the competition-based relationship of 1990s and the opportunities of 2000s.

Today, the regional and global foreign policies of the two countries and their interest perceptions have become the driving forces behind the multi-dimensional relationship, from trade to economy, from politics to culture. Successful channels for political dialogue have been established. In both countries, the determination of individual policy makers has definitely played a key role in developing relations. Turkish-Russian relations gained significant momentum with Putin’s rise to power in 2000 and the AK Party government under Erdoğan in 2002. The diversity and depth of the bilateral relationship are noteworthy, along with the new approach based on diversification of relations and cooperation in the areas of tourism, econ-omy, energy and regional security. However, despite this positive picture, there have been some disagreements between the two countries. The Syrian crisis is one of the most important issues within this context.

Since March 2011, the international community has followed the events in Syria with bated breath. To date, tens of thousands of people died in the clashes. Opposition to the Syrian regime began to grow as the international press broad-cast images of civilians being targeted by Syrian Army military operations, and of conflicts between the opposition and military forces. In addition to the chaos and human tragedy, the international community is concerned about the risk that conflicts may spill over the Syrian borders, dragging the entire Middle East into a multilateral war. Although the Assad regime in Syria has to a large extent lost its legitimacy as a result of its brutal and merciless attitude over the past four years, it has managed to survive with the support of Russia, China, and Iran. Despite the differences between the approaches of the two nations towards the Syrian conflict,

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Turkey and Russia have been largely successful in maintaining good relations by minimizing the negative impacts of their differences.

Turkey-Syria Relations

Turkey – Syria relations have always involved ups and downs. Turkey shares its longest land border with Syria, nearly 1000 kilometres. While the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating, Turkey was going through its own national liberation struggle. In these years, Syria was under a French mandate. Turkey announced its sovereignty in the international arena with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924, while Syria remained under the French mandate until gaining independence in 1946. The first disruption in Turkey-Syria relations was Hatay’s declaration of independence from the French rule under the supervision of the League of Nations in 1938, and then its integration into Turkey one year later. The Syrian administration did not hesitate to show its displeasure by mapping Hatay as part of its territory. New tensions emerged with the division of the Euphrates River, which starts in Turkey and flows into Syrian territories, and the Southeast Anatolia Project of the 1980s. Another source tension between the two states was the Syrian government’s host-ing of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the terrorist organisation Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). For years, Öcalan could travel comfortably through the Syrian-con-trolled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, where PKK militants attended terrorist training camps. The PKK was able to hold congresses in Syria. In 1998, Turkish pressure to remove the PKK leader from Syria together with troop deployment to the Syr-ian border forced Damascus to expel Ocalan. After Ocalan left Syria, the Adana Protocol was signed on October 20, 1998, following which Turkey-Syria relations entered into a rapid recovery process.

Improvement in relations continued when then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended the funeral of Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad in 2000. Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam subsequently visited Ankara. Bashar al-Assad came to power in July 2000 after his father, and the Justice and Development Par-ty (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002; these leadership changes accelerated high-level mutual visits. Farouk Sharaa, then-Syrian Foreign Minister, came to Turkey in 2003 for the first high-level visit between the two countries. On March 1, 2003 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey rejected the resolution on the US’s use of Turkish territory for the invasion of Iraq. The Syrian President visit-ed Turkey for the first time in the history of independent Syria; Syrian President Bashar Assad paid an official visit to Turkey in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister at the time, responded to this visit by making an official

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visit to Syria in December 2004. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer held official talks in Syria on April 13-14, 2005. High-level visits between the two countries contin-ued. In parallel with the development of political relations, joint projects in numer-ous areas such as trade, culture, tourism, security, customs, transportation, agricul-ture were implemented. In January 2007, the Turkey-Syria Free Trade Agreement entered in force. In 2008, Turkey became a mediator between Syria and Israel, but failed to resolve the conflict. During this period, relations between Turkey and Syria were so good that the Erdogan and Assad families took a holiday together in Turkey. At the military level, the two armies held joint military exercises for three days in border regions on April 27, 2009. Turkey’s new President Abdullah Gül, replacing Sezer, paid an official visit to Damascus on May 15-16, 2009. In this environment, the two countries began to hold joint cabinet meetings and revoked longstanding visa requirements for their citizens. However, this rapprochement was halted by the “Arab Spring” revolution in Syria in 2010.

In the first days of the uprising in Syria, Turkey repeatedly called upon the Syr-ian regime to enact reforms. For this purpose, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu on April 6, 2011 and the MIT’s Undersecretary Hakan Fidan (as “spe-cial envoy”) went to Damascus on April 28, 2011. Ahmet Davutoğlu made a final appeal for reforms to the Assad administration on May 7, 2011. In August, he went to Damascus for the last time and had a six and a half hour meeting with Assad. However, despite these efforts, the Syrian government did not make any policy changes, and relations were broken off. Turkey-Syria relations began to decline rapidly in both political and economic terms. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria were forced to take refuge in Turkey. Opponents of the Assad regime opened an office in İstanbul; Free Syrian Army, the armed oppo-sition group, was deployed in Hatay on the Syrian border of Turkey. The Turkish Embassy in Damascus was closed in March 2012, marking the official end of diplomatic relations.

Russia-Syria Relations

The history of official relations between Russia and Syria dates back to the So-viet Union (USSR). During the Cold War, the USSR’s policy on Syria was devel-oped on the basis of mutual hostility towards the US. The USSR established diplo-matic relations with Syria in 1944, when the country had just become independent but remained under occupation. Syria became the USSR’s most important partner in the region since the 1950s. The number of civil and military Soviet profession-als in the country increased rapidly. The Syrian army was equipped with Soviet weapons. On October 8, 1980, the Soviet Union-Syria Friendship and Coopera-tion Treaty were signed.1 In the second half of the 1980s, relations between two 1. Bülent Karabulut, “Karadeniz’den Ortadoğu’ya Uzanan Bir Dış Politika: Geçmişten Günümü-ze Suriye-Rusya İlişkileri”, Journal of the Black Sea Studies, Issue 15, Fall 2007, pp. 67-88.

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countries began to cool, as the interest of the USSR in the Middle East declined. In 1985, Hafez Assad demanded increased military aid from the USSR during his visit to Moscow; in response, Syria was rebuked about its Palestine Liberation Organization and Iraq policies. Assad was reminded that Syria was not the only ally of the USSR in the Middle East.2 In this period, the number of Soviet military advisers in Syria began to decline. By 897, the Soviet Union had withdrawn all of its military advisers from Syria. This freeze in relations lasted until Hafez Assad’s death in 2000.

Relations between Syria and Russia began to gradually warm when Vladimir Putin and then Bashar Assad came to power in the early 2000s. Firstly, Russia opened discussions around the cancellation of Soviet era debts held by Arab coun-tries. During Bashar Assad’s visit to Moscow in January 2005, the cancellation of 73% of Syria’s debts in exchange for new arms deals accelerated the development of bilateral relations, especially in the area of energy. Bashar Assad paid his second visit to Moscow in December 2006. Assad’s third visit to Moscow took place on August 20-21, 2008, immediately after Russia’s intervention in Georgia. During the visit, Assad stated that Western countries were trying to isolate Russia, and that Syria fully supported the Russian intervention in South Ossetia and Abkha-zia. Assad stated that, “Russia’s military operation is response to Georgian prov-ocation.”3 Another important development in relations was the visit by Russian President Dimitri Medvedev to Syria in May 2010. When Arab Uprisings reached Syria in March 2011, Russia developed a policy of full support of Assad. Finding a diplomatic solution to the problem and preventing external military intervention became Russia’s main goals; accordingly Moscow vetoed nearly all the UN Secu-rity Council Resolutions against Syria. Against this backdrop, Russia sent vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating its support not only for Syria, but also its opposition to any development that threatened its interests in the region.

This extraordinary and consistent effort by Russia to support Syrian regime is remarkable. Russia has been in favour of resolving the problem without the use of force. At the beginning of the Uprisings, Russia expected patience from the in-ternational community in regard to reforms by the Damascus government. Russia made the first call for the establishment of dialogue between the Syrian govern-ment and the opposition. Russia made efforts to mediate between the parties, and on numerous occasions accused the West of acting unilaterally and politicising the issue. According to Moscow, the West wants to overthrow the regime by giving support to the opposition to establish a democratic government, and focusing on

2. Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, “Rusya’nın Ortadoğu’ya Dönüşü”. Ortadoğu Yıllığı 2009, Ed. Kemal İnat, Muhittin Ataman, Cenap Çakmak. Küre Publishing, İstanbul, February 2011, pp. 427-451.3. Esad: Rusya provokasyona cevap verdi. Hürriyet, 21.08.2008.

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the crimes of the government, but ignoring what the opposition has done. Most im-portantly, according to Moscow, if Assad is to be forced out, it should be through the free will of the Syrian regime rather than an external intervention. International organisations such as the UN, NATO, the Arab League and the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) had to try to establish dialogue between the government and the opposition. Any sanctions against Syria would aggravate the problem in-stead of solving it.

There are many reasons behind Russia’s determination to stand behind Syria today at all costs. To understand Russia’s policies in Syrian crisis, we must first of all address the special relationship between Russia and Syria. Relations between the two countries are not only economic, but also politically and strategically im-portant. Syria is relatively independent from the West. There is a strong tradition of bilateral relations. For Russia, Syria represents access to the Mediterranean. As long as Russia does not develop and increase political and economic relations with the rest of the Middle East, the Kremlin will not give up its special relation-ship with Syria, its only ally in the region. Among the Arab countries, Syria is the country providing the most political support to Russia. From this perspective, Russia’s relations with Syria are different from its relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.4

In analysing Russia’s approach to the Syria crisis, even the factors of historical good relations, arms trading, the strategic Port of Tartous and economic interests are not sufficient to explain this loyalty. Dimitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Institute in Moscow, says that Moscow’s support for the Assad regime cannot be explained by the solidarity of authoritarian regimes or Russia’s need to protect its economic interests alone. According to Trenin, behind this support lies the recent experience in Libya, doubts about the Syrian opposition, and scepticism of US policy are all key factors.5

Syrian Crisis and Turkish-Russian Relations

After the start of the crisis in Syria, Turkey-Russia relations entered into the shadow of the ongoing conflict. Firstly, both countries tried to understand and make sense of the other’s policies. On February 8, 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a phone call with President Dimitri Medvedev and discussed the Syrian crisis. The parties shared opinions on the crisis.6 During this period,

4. Andrey Kreyts. Siriya: Glavnıy rossiyskiy kozır na Bilizhnem Vostoke. IFRI Tsenter Rossiya/NNG, Noyabr 2010, pp. 4-6.5. Dmitri Trenin. “Russia’s Line in the Sand on Syria. Why Moscow Wants to Halt the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2012. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137078/dmitri-trenin/russias-line-in-the-sand-on-syria? (Accessed on 08.02.2015)6. http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hronika306.html

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relations were strained by the plan to locate NATO Patriot missiles on the Turk-ish-Syrian border, in response Ankara’s security concerns. The activation of one part of the US’ Cold War missile shield at the Malatya-Kürecik radar base target-ing Russia worried Moscow. Russia opposed the activation of missile radar system from January 1, 2012, on the basis that it disrupted the existing balance of power between Russia and NATO.7 The Russian government has repeatedly raised the missile shield in international fora, declaring that it will take precautions against the NATO missile shield system. Russian Prime Minister Putin promised to in-crease military spending and modernization, declaring that an “asymmetric and effective response should be given to the missile shield project” when he returned to the presidency.8

Then-President Abdullah Gul, along with then-Prime Minister R.T. Erdogan telephoned Putin to congratulate him on his victory in the presidential elections in March 2012. On the other hand, the Syrian issue continued to cause problems for bilateral relations. Russia’s vetoes in the UN Security Council were a source of concern for Turkey. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov spoke to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on the phone on 9 April, and reported that Turkey gave a guarantee not to take any unilateral action in Syria.9 Prime Minister Recep Tayy-ip Erdogan held a meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on a visit to South Korea together with a delegation including Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu to join the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on 19 April. The two leaders exchanged views on international issues and the Syrian crisis. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on April 20, 2012 in Brussels, where he travelled for the meeting of NATO-Russia Foreign Ministers.

Relations between the two countries were indeed developing positively, even “if the Syrian crisis was not”. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reported on re-lations between Turkey and the Russian Federation at a meeting in a restaurant in Akcaabat with businessmen on June 9, 2012; he stated that “Turkish-Russian rela-tions are experiencing a golden age. We have removed visa requirements. Russia has been the first partner of Turkey in some years while the second one in other years in foreign trade. We are making great investments.”10 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan held bilateral talks with Russian President Putin at the 7th G20 Summit held in Los Cabos on June 18-19, 2012 under Mexico’s presidency. At the beginning of the meeting Putin made a statement: “Thank God, there is not

7. “Rusya, Türkiye’de aktif hale gelen radardan endişeli”. Zaman, 18.01.2012.8. “Füze kalkanına asimetrik yanıt veririz,” Hürriyet, 21.02.2012.9. “Rusya: Türkiye, Suriye’de tek taraflı girişimde bulunmayacak”, CHA, 10.04.2012.10. “Türkiye ile Rusya ilişkileri altın çağını yaşıyor”. DHA, 09.06.2012. http://www.dha.com.tr/turkiye-ile-rusya-iliskileri-altin-cagini-yasiyor_324478.html (Accessed on 08.02.2015)

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a single problem between us. We are carefully approaching to the problems that may arise and solving rapidly. Our relations are continuing to be energetic and progressive. Our cooperation will always develop in the future.” The Prime Min-ister said that they assessed bilateral and regional issues at the meeting. The main agenda of the meeting was the recent developments in Syria. Erdogan tried to gain Russia’s support by providing information about the killing of innocent people by the Syrian government.11

The first serious tension in the relations between the two countries arose in mid-2012, after a Turkish fighter jet was shot down by Syria in the international waters on June 22, 2012. In the debates on how and by whom the fighter jet was shot down, there were claims that a missile was fired from Syria’s Tartous Port by Russian technicians in order to send a message to Turkey.12 These claims were re-futed by Russia, right after Turkey explained it was not considering this possibili-ty. Ömer Çelik, AK Party Deputy Chairman, helped ease tensions between the two countries through a statement that “The involvement of Russia in the incident is not considered. It is not logical for Russia to engage in such a crazy thing, there is no possibility of Russian involvement to such a conflict with any Russian military elements.”13 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that Moscow had shared all the information it had about the Turkish military aircraft.14 Such statements prevented the problem from becoming a crisis. However, Prime Min-ister Erdogan reacted to the statement made by the Russian Foreign Ministry that “Syria’s shooting down of the Turkish jet should not be seen as a planned prov-ocation or action”15 with the words “I do not know what Mr. Lavrov’s statement is based on. His negotiation yesterday with our foreign minister was different.16

In this atmosphere, Prime Minister Erdogan made a one-day visit to Moscow on July 18, 2012. In the Turkish media, some interpreted this visit as a strategic move.17 In bilateral negotiations lasting longer than expected, comments that Er-dogan and Putin put many issues including Syria crisis on the agenda were made. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu responded to questions from journalists with this statement: “As Mr. Prime Minister emphasied yesterday, the negotiations we held in Russia were extremely fruitful. Political will was demonstrated in a way to make further progress in our bilateral relations which have gained momentum gradually in recent years. Regional and international issues were discussed in a

11. “Erdoğan ile buluşan Putin: Şükürler olsun aramızda tek bir sorun yok”. http://www.rtib.com/tr/haberler/506-erdogan-putin-dostluk-bulusmasi.html (Accessed on 08.02.2015)12. “Uçağın düşürülmesinde Rus parmağı,” Habertürk, 02.07.2012.13. “Rusya’nın bu çılgınlığı yapmasının mantığı yok,” Milliyet, 27.06.2012.14. “Ankara’ya verileri ilettik”, Hürriyet, 17.07.2012.15. “Rusya’dan düşen Türk uçağı ile ilgili açıklama: Provokasyon değil”, Bugün, 26.09.2012.16. “Erdoğan’dan Rusya’ya jet yanıt”, Vatan, 29.06.2012.17. Bülent Erandaç. “Erdoğan›ın stratejik Moskova hamlesi”, Takvim, 12.07.2012.

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very friendly manner. Turkey-Russia relations - both in bilateral context and in re-lated regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East - have been open to mutual consultation.”18 This situation strengthened the view that de-spite the Syrian crisis, the two countries were committed to maintaining bilateral relations in isolation from the crisis and as planned.

In 2012, the major crisis faced by the two countries occurred when Syrian Airbus A-320 type passenger aircraft, taking off from Moscow’s Vnukova Air-port, was forced to land at Ankara Esenboga Airport by Turkish authorities on October 10, 2012, due to suspicions that it carried weapons.19 According to Article 35 of Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, a state has the right to interfere if they have a strong suspicion that an aircraft is using its airspace to transport “war material, weapons or vehicles”. Transportation of military supplies is only permissible if the country gives consent for the use of its airspace. The forced landing took the front page in the Russian press and gave rise to passion-ate debate. Even some of Russia’s leading Turkologists talked about “going to war” following this development.20 Turkey’s use of “very careful” language in the descriptions of the investigation of the aircraft prevented the deepening of the crisis. When Turkey announced that it had discovered gun parts in the aircraft’s cargo, Russia responded that the cargo was non-military. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that the development would not damage Russia-Turkey relations21, but that Moscow was waiting for an explanation from Turkey relating to the non-presence of weapons and ammunition in the Syrian aircraft.22 Prime Minister Erdogan responded with a statement to journalists at Esenboga Airport just before his visit to Azerbaijan: “Russia wants information from us. You do not need to request information from us, ask this information to the related bureau which will give information to you.”23

There were rumours that the postponement of Putin’s scheduled visit to Turkey (October 14-15, 2012) was in response to the forced landing. While the discus-sions on the new date of the visit were going on in the press, Russia declared that the visit would take place on December 3-4, 2012. Nevertheless, there was much media speculation that Putin would postpone his visit indefinitely, if the weap-

18. “Görüş ayrılıkları olsa da Rusya ile iletişim içindeyiz”. 20.07.2012. http://haberrus.com/politics/2012/07/20/gorus-ayriliklari-olsa-da-rusya-ile-iletisim-icindeyiz.html19. “Suriye uçağı Ankara’ya indirildi”, Sabah, 11.10.2012. 20. “Suriye uçağı ile ilgili hadise Rus basınının ön sayfalarında”. Rusya’nın Sesi Radyosu, 12.10.2012.http://turkish.ruvr.ru/2012_10_12/Suriye-ucagi-rus-basini/ (Accessed on 08.02.2015)21. “Lavrov’dan çok önemli mesaj”, Sabah, 15.10.2012.22. “Rusya, Türkiye’den açıklama bekliyor” Vatan, 23.10.2012.23. “Erdoğan’dan Rusya’ya uçak cevabı: Gönderen kurumundan bilgi al”. Haberrus, 16.10.2012. http://haberrus.com/politics/2012/10/16/erdogandan-rusya-ucak-cevabi-git-gonderen-kurumundan-bilgi-al.html

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ons were not returned.24 Despite all these negative developments, Putin’s visit to Turkey took place on December 3, 2012. During the visit, 11 cooperation agree-ments were signed between the companies, institutions and ministries of the two countries. Mutually affirming positive remarks were made by both countries, and the various agreements signed demonstrated that bilateral relations were strong enough to withstand the recent disruption and would continue to grow. Both coun-tries exerted maximum efforts to protect the relationship from the impact of the Syrian crisis, despite all the attendant difficulties. In a sense, Putin’s visit gave the two governments an opportunity to rebuild trust between. In particular, Putin’s remark that “We are not lawyers for the Syrian regime” during the visit was re-markable.25

At the same time as these improvements, debates on the problematic aspects of bilateral relations were ongoing. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Moscow was not opposed to the Patriot missiles on the Syrian border, and they did not want to interfere with Ankara’s right to self-defense. Russian Pres-ident Vladimir Putin, holding official talks in Turkey on December 3, said the missiles would increase tensions in the region, and emphasised that the Syrian regime lacked the capacity to attack to Turkey. Putin, stating that he was not the lawyer of Syrian leader Bashar Assad, did not want to give a guarantee regarding any possible attacks.26

Russia and Turkey passed a kind of Syrian test in 2012. Despite their different views on Syria, they prioritised the gains arising from the increasing economic and trade relations. The reactions of the two countries to the forced landing of the Syr-ian passenger aircraft is a clear example of this. The installation of Patriot missiles to Turkish soil and the issue of the radar base did not mean that Moscow-Ankara relations were damaged. However troublesome such issues were, the two coun-tries immediately signed more than 10 agreements to deepen relations, indicating a mutual mastery of crisis management. The remarkable aspect of the relations is that the parties are consciously highlighting the cooperation areas while nego-tiating problematic areas behind closed doors. Although they have had different opinions about what is happening in Syria, the fact that the two countries avoided a serious crisis in bilateral relations revealed the strength of the relationship. If the two countries succeeded in solving this crisis with common policies, this situation would have increased mutual trust between Ankara and Moscow more than ever. This success could have a constructive effect on other problematic areas and raise the relations to a “strategic” level. But they could not manage to do so.

24. “Rusya ister de Türkiye iade etmezse Putin gelmeyecek”, Taraf, 26.10.2012.25. “Putin: Suriye rejiminin avukatı değiliz”, Milliyet, 03.12.2012.26. “Rusya’dan Patriot açıklaması: Lavrov: Türkiye’nin meşru müdafaa hakkına saygı duyuyoruz”, Habertürk, 05.12.2012.

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The Syrian issue continued to test diplomatic relations in 2013. The parties were able to move on from the last two years without any lasting damage by giv-ing priority to economic and trade relations. High level official visits between the two countries continued in 2013. In this sense, the first official negotiation took place between Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mihail Bagdanov on January 9, 2013 in Mos-cow. The main subject of the negotiations between Sinirlioglu and Bagdanov was the developments in Syria, as expected, giving rise to a decision to continue the dialogue on the issues in the Middle East.

However, indications of the first negative development in relations emerged in the early days of 2013. Patriot air defense systems, sent by the Netherlands and Germany at Turkey’s demand, reached to Turkey in January 2013. The missiles were deployed in the scope of the NATO mission pursuant to the Syrian civil war and the conflicts on the Turkish border,. Although the missiles are for defense, the deployment of patriot missiles in Turkey caused concern in Russia.

In November 2012, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukase-vic declared that “Turkey’s increasing military actions on the Syrian border is a threatening signal. We have another suggestion to our Turkish counterparts. They use their own impact potentials on Syrian opposition to start the internal dialogue in Syria as a matter of urgency.27 In fact, Anatoliy Kornukov, the former Air Forc-es Commander of Russia, said that the Patriots deployed in the south of Turkey were aim at the partners of Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) rather than the possi-ble threats from Syria. Kornukov stated that “This action, in the final analysis, was made against CIS, CSTO and before everything Russia.”28

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Istanbul on April 17, 2013 and met with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The ministers held a meeting at Cıragan Palace in the framework of the 3rd Meeting of Strategic Planning Group (lower body of High Level Cooperation Council). In the meeting, bilateral rela-tions and international issues such as Syrian crisis, the Cyprus problem and the Middle East peace process were discussed. In this meeting Lavrov stated that of-fering Syrian President Bashar Assad’s resignation as a precondition would be wrong. According to Lavrov, all conflict parties fighting should lay down arms.29 The different approaches to the Syrian crisis were once again confirmed.

27. “Rusya, Türkiye’nin sınıra Patriot füzeleri yerleştirilmesinden endişeli”, Zaman, 22.11.2012.28. Raketnıe kompleksi “Patriot” v Turtsii napravlenı protiv Rossii, sşitayet eks-glavkom VVS Kornukov. http://interfax.az/view/56386529. “Lavrov: Suriye’de herkes silah bıraksın”, Radikal, 18.04.2013.

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Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reported the details of the meeting to CNN Turk broadcast. Davutoglu’s statements indicated the disagreement between Tur-key and Russia on Syria. Davutoglu stated that the talks had been highly detailed, and that countries do not need to agree one hundred per cent on any issue, empha-sising that the important thing was a commitment to work together to find solu-tions without cutting channels for dialogue. Davutoglu talked about the difference in the underlying approaches of each country: “Russia does not consider it right to prompt the UN Security Council on the Syrian issue because of the Libya ex-perience. They think they were misdirected in Libya. It is undoubtedly a separate negotiation issue in P5. It is not an issue directly related to us. We think that the UN system needs to take action immediately and urgently to stop the human trag-edy. This is a difference of opinion.”30

But there were still points of agreement between the two countries. Both coun-tries were in consensus on Syria’ strategic importance, protection of its territorial integrity, and the need to focus on the will of the people. Turkey was insistent on the establishment of a transitional government and the transfer of all executive power to this government, arguing that Bashar Assad needed to withdraw com-pletely from the office and transfer his authority to this transitional government. Russia intentionally avoided making Assad an issue of discussion.

Aside from ongoing bilateral negotiations, the main topic of phone discussions held between the senior officials in the first half of 2013 was the Syrian crisis. Despite the differences of opinion, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had a tele-phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on June 26, 2013. Once again, the parties predominantly spoke about Syria and shared mutual evaluations. According to information from diplomatic sources, the conversation was held at the request of Lavrov.31 Immediately after, on June 27, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan evaluated bilateral relations and the situation in Syria via phone.

At this point, the Syrian crisis is the top item of the agenda in bilateral or multilateral high-level negotiations. Davutoglu stated that he discussed the Syrian issue when he met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Bandar Seri Begavan, the capital of Brunei, at the 46th Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Asso-ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Davutoglu, saying he had shared his concerns with Lavrov, stated, “So far the UN has been unable to find a formula to produce any solution to the tragedy in Syria, due to the special position of Russia and China in the UN Security Council. In a sense, the differences of opinion be-30. http://turkish.ruvr.ru/2013_04_19/Rusya-ile-gorush-ayriligi-var-diyalog-suruyor/31. Anadolu Ajansı, 26.06.2013.

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tween the UN Security Council’s five permanent members have blocked the UN. In our dialogue with the Chinese Foreign Minister, as a neighbouring country, I expressed our concerns about the effects of Russia and China’s vetoes on the world economy.”32

Although both countries have made extraordinary efforts to protect bilateral relations from being damaged by the Syrian crisis, this difference of perspective has affected relations in various ways. It was claimed that two kilogrammes of the chemical weapon sarin were found in a suspect’s house in an operation against Al-Qaeda militants in Adana. Russia stated that it expects an explanation from Turkey after the statement of Adana Police Department in this regard.33 This re-sponse came on July 3, 2013; Aydin Sezgin, Turkey’s Ambassador to Russia, at a press conference organised by the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in Moscow, announced that the materials captured in the operation organized by the police in Turkey for Syria militants were not chemical weapons. Sezgin said, “the material was antifreeze. In this regard, we informed our Russian counterparts.”34 On Au-gust 5, 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin held another phone call. In the official statements made about the phone call, it was reported that steps to be taken in regard to Syria and Egypt were discussed.

In late August 2013, the world was shocked by the appalling massacre of 1300 people, including women and children, in the chemical weapon attack by Assad forces in the East Guta region of Damascus. The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the allegations about the use of chemical weapon in Syria should immediate-ly be examined, and that if the allegations were true, the international commu-nity should stand against this unacceptable violence constituting crimes against humanity. The chemical weapon attack became a new issue of dispute between Turkey and Russia. Russia insisted that the attack could have been perpetrated by opposition rather than regime forces.

As the international community responded to the chemical attack, the possi-bility of military intervention in Syria was seriously considered for the first time. US President Barack Obama blamed Syrian President Bashar Assad for the attack. According to Obama, the regime had crossed a red line by attacking its own people with chemical weapons. However, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin made an unexpected suggestion aimed at preventing military intervention in Syria and to gain a diplomatic advantage over the US.35 Russia saved the Assad regime 32.“Davutoğlu: Hizbullah’ın Suriye’deki varlığı açık bir yabancı müdahale”, Hürriyet, 01.07.2013.33. “Rusya, Türkiye’den sarin gazı açıklaması bekliyor”, Zaman, 31.05.2013.34. “Büyükelçi Sezgin: Suriyelilerden ele geçirilen kimyasal silah değil”, CHA, 03.07.2013.35. “Suriye krizi: Rusya kimyasal silah planını ABD’ye iletti”, BBC Türkçe, 11.09.2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/09/130911_rusya_kimyasal_onerisi (Accessed on 08.02.2015)

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by offering to receive all the chemical weapons and to destroy them as an alterna-tive to military intervention. The US and Russia agreed to this solution.

This was seen by the international community as a diplomatic success for Rus-sia, which had from the outset opposed any military operation in Syria. But this also significantly weakened Turkey’s hand in the Syrian crisis. Russia’s clever manoeuvres and Putin’s skilful diplomacy put Russia in a strong position. Turkey could not demand anything from Russia in the context of Syria, and this weakened Turkey’s stance against Russia. Perhaps the two countries could have agreed that at least Assad would not participate in the next elections, marking a new era with-out his leadership. However, after these developments, Turkey’s hopes about ma-jor change in Syria were significantly diminished. Moscow held the cards, while Turkey had lost its political clout in regard to Syria.

Prime Minister Erdogan held a bilateral meeting with Russian President Putin during the G-20 Summit in St Petersburg on September 5, 2013. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu came together with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov the following day. The focus of the meetings was the crisis in Syria. However, despite all these phone calls and face-to-face meetings, the policies of the two countries on Syria were still at odds. Turkey, with all its might, was arguing for a military solu-tion to the crisis, the human dimension of which had already exceeded all tolerable limits. But Prime Minister Erdogan, on his return to Turkey from Argentina visit at Esenboga Airport reported that Russia was not convinced of the advisability of a military intervention in Syria.36

In Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, the first Russian-Turkish Social Forum meeting was held on November 20, 2013. Turkish and Russian Foreign Ministry officials met in Moscow and discussed the Syrian crisis before Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Russia on November 22, 2013. In Moscow, For-eign Ministry Secretary Feridun Sinirlioglu once again discussed the Syrian crisis with Mihail Bogdanov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and President Vladi-mir Putin’s Special Representative for the Middle East. Despite the intense po-litical dialogue, neither country shifted its position. Recep Tayyip Erdogan came together with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg for the meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council, functioning as joint Council of Ministers between Turkey and Russia. At the joint press conference after this visit, Putin stated that he did not see any reason for relations with Turkey to deteriorate. On the contrary, common ground was being sought.37 While Putin stating that the real

36. Akşam, 08.09.2013.37. “Şangay’a Alın AB’den kurtarın”, Yeni Şafak, 23.11.2013. http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/politika/sangaya-alin-abden-kurtarin-585183

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danger in Syria was the extremist groups, Erdogan said the regime bore the main responsibility for the death toll.38

In 2014, the Syrian issue remained top on the agenda. In the last week of May, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu visited Moscow and undertook extensive consultations with Russian Deputy Foreign Ministers Grigoriy Karasin, Mihail Bogdanov, and Aleksey Meşkov. Sinirlioglu discussed the Syrian and Ukraine crises with his Russian counterparts.39 On May 30, Erdo-gan spoke with Putin by phone about the crisis in Ukraine and Syria. The leaders of Turkey and Russia said the crisis could be resolved only through political di-alogue.40 In October 2014, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that Turkey would only participate in the ground op-eration in Syria on the condition that Syrian President Bashar Assad was removed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reacted to this statement by saying, “We deeply condemn such statements.”41

Putin’s official visit to Ankara on December 1, 2014, along with ten ministers, drew the attention of the international community. Although Putin was formally in Turkey for the meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council, he was welcomed with the protocol usually reserved for top-level state visits at the request of Turkey. This visit was important for Moscow, which was at this point almost overwhelmed by the economic sanctions declared by the US and the EU after the annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis, alongside the sudden drop in oil prices and deval-uation of the rouble, the national currency. In terms of Turkey, the situation was not much different. This visit was also important for Ankara, which had for several years been struggling to gain expected support from its Western allies, especially in regard to some regional issues.

Putin and Erdogan, almost showing off to the West, reaffirmed confidence in the Russia-Turkey relationship during this visit. However, during the visit, it was ob-served that the difference of opinion about Syria remained completely unchanged. For example, at the joint press conference in response to Putin’s comment that “Assad has major support in the elections in Syria,” Erdoğan said, “Those who made military coups had always received high rate of votes. There is an effort to legitimize Assad.” by drawing attention to the anti-democratic conditions of the elections in Syria.42 İbrahim Kalın, Foreign Policy Advisor to President Erdogan, 38. “Rusya zirvesinde Suriye damgası: Putin ve Erdoğan canlı yayında tartıştı”, Radikal, 22.11.2013.39. Moskova-Ankara hattında haraketlilik. http://tr.sputniknews.com/rsfmradio.com/2014_05_23/Moskova-Ankara-hattinda-haraketlilik/ (Accessed on 08.02.2015)40. Erdoğan ve Putin, Ukrayna’yı konuştu, Sputniknews, http://tr.sputniknews.com/rsfmradio.com/2014_05_30/putin-ve-erdogan-ukraynayi-konustu/ (Accessed on 08.02.2015)41. Rusya: Türkiye’nin Esad şartını esefle karşılıyoruz, Hürriyet, 09.10.2014.42. Erdoğan’dan Putin’e Esed düzeltmesi, http://www.haber7.com/dis-politika/haber/1236438-erdo-gandan-putine-esed-duzeltmesi (Accessed on 08.02.2015)

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summarised Turkey’s position on this issue: “As for Russia’s attitude toward the Syrian crisis, there was no surprise. Although Putin said they do not support any person or group in Syria, he is opposed to Assad’s ouster on the grounds that Syria would be dragged into bigger chaos. Turkey’s position on this issue is clear: Assad is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands people and the damage causing disastrous consequences for the whole region. Russia’s proposal brings the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition (Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army) to the negotiation table is not realistic given Damascus’s previous abuse of such initiatives.” 43

Conclusion

It is clear that the two countries have different approaches to the Syrian crisis. Turkey wants a government without Assad and is negotiating with the opposition. Russia opposes a regime change in Syria, and argues that military intervention or a transition period without Assad will be damaging for the country. Turkey anticipates stricter policies against the Assad regime following the UN decision, drawing international attention to the conflict, the refugee crisis and the civilian casualties. As for Russia, it opposes any kind of intervention in Syria and shows its support for Assad government at every turn. This fundamental difference of opinion is based on the different foreign policy goals of the two countries. Syria is an indispensable ally for Russia in the Middle East. For Turkey, Syria is important because it is both a crucial component of Turkey’s Middle East policy, as well as a close neighbour with historical, cultural, and commercial ties with Turkey. How-ever, it is no longer possible for Turkey to establish normal relations with Syria under Assad’s rule. In the final analysis, both countries want to end the bloodshed, and establish stability, peace and security in Syria. Although they have the same views on the need for a transitional period, they have different opinions on the best way to achieve this. In conclusion, we can say that despite Turkey’s expectation that the Assad regime would fall in the near future, it has survived more than three years, benefiting from the support of Russia. Assad has further strengthened his position in comparison to the first year of the war; this could be evaluated as a success for Russia and failure by Ankara.

Turkish-Russian relations have been severely tested over the last few years. It is notable that despite their different opinions on Syria, Turkey and Russia have prioritised economic and commercial relations. Although they have been unable to find any solutions to some of their problems, both countries have sought align-ment on many regional or global issues in recent years; at least they made an effort to appear so. When viewed from outside, this situation seems to be a conscious

43. İbrahim Kalın. “Putin’in Ziyareti ve Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri”, Sabah, 04.12.2014.

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choice agreed upon by both sides. Although the two countries have been following very different paths on the Syrian crisis, they have focused on protecting bilateral relations. This would indicate that that the “crisis management” level in relations has been successfully achieved. However, the Syrian crisis indicates they have not yet reached the “crisis resolution” level. Despite all these developments, signifi-cant experience has been accumulated, and relations have been institutionalised in many respects. There has always been the potential for a conflict of interests, as the Syrian crisis has produced. However, the experience gained in the last few years - indeed the most difficult years of the bilateral relationship since 1992 - re-veals that there is great potential for cooperation and strategic crisis management of bilateral disagreement.

Despite their disagreements over Syria, Moscow and Ankara can negotiate on this issue, exchange views and even criticise one another. This is an indicator of how far the relationship has strengthened. Therefore, they will not risk this golden age, experienced for the first time in 500 years. They will continue to be rational and pragmatic, which offers the best prospects for the relationship.

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Documents

Turkish-Russian Relations in the Shadow Of the Syrian Crisis