Trade Union Renewal in Chile - Research Explorer

Trade Union Renewal in Chile: A case study analysis and

comparison of the challenges and prospects facing company-level

trade unions in the food manufacturing and beverage sector

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2019

DAINA BELLIDO DE LUNA MAYEA

ALLIANCE MANCHESTER BUSINESS SCHOOL

2

List of Content

List of Content ............................................................................................................. 2

List of Tables................................................................................................................ 5

List of Figures .............................................................................................................. 7

List of abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 8

Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 9

Declaration ................................................................................................................. 10

Copyright Statement .................................................................................................. 11

Dedicatory .................................................................................................................. 12

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 14

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 14

1.2. Background to the thesis ................................................................................. 16

1.3. Outline of the thesis ......................................................................................... 19

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review ............................................................................ 23

Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: The Context and Challenges of Change

and De-Collectivisation ............................................................................................ 23

2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 23

2.2. The field of industrial relations ................................................................... 23

2.3. The crisis of employment and its effects on organised labour .................... 32

2.4. The emergence of de-collectivisation strategies.......................................... 35

2.5. Chapter discussion ....................................................................................... 41

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................... 43

The question of trade union revitalisation: developments, challenges and the

issue of context. ......................................................................................................... 43

3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 43

3.2. Background, definitions and dimensions of Trade Union Revitalisation ... 44

3.3. Trade union renewal strategies .................................................................... 48

3.4. Chapter Discussion ...................................................................................... 65

3

CHAPTER 4: Chile’s Industrial Relations Context ............................................. 69

4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 69

4.2. The Context of Chilean Politics and Economy ........................................... 71

4.3. Employment and Labour Standards ............................................................ 89

4.4. The use of regulation to undermine collective rights through ‘by-passing’

strategies ................................................................................................................. 95

4.5. Chapter discussion ..................................................................................... 101

CHAPTER 5: Methodology and Research .......................................................... 103

5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 103

5.2. Epistemological position of the research. .................................................. 103

5.3. Case Study Research Strategy ................................................................... 107

5.4. Data Collection Methods: Interviews and Observations ........................... 111

5.5. Fieldwork phases ....................................................................................... 115

5.6. Post-fieldwork activities ............................................................................ 118

5.7. Ethical considerations ................................................................................ 119

5.8. Research Organisations and Participants................................................... 120

5.9. Additional interviewed informants ............................................................ 126

5.10. Data Analysis ............................................................................................ 127

5.11. Thematic Analysis Development .............................................................. 128

5.12. Challenges and research’s limitations ....................................................... 130

CHAPTER 6: Organisational Context, Actors and Relations .......................... 133

6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 133

6.2. Corporate strategy and structure ................................................................ 134

6.3. Participation mechanisms, union democracy and representation structur. 139

6.4. Management approach to industrial relations. .......................................... 151

6.5. Chapter Discussion .................................................................................... 155

CHAPTER 7: De-collectivising strategies directed towards trade unions and

labour relations: The use of the state and regulatory ambivalence within the

workplace ................................................................................................................ 157

7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 157

4

7.2. De-collectivising strategies ....................................................................... 158

7.3. Chapter discussion ..................................................................................... 184

CHAPTER 8: Trade union responses and questions of revitalisation. ............. 188

8.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 188

8.2. Trade union ‘revitalisation’ strategies ........................................................... 189

8.3. Chapter Discussion ........................................................................................ 230

CHAPTER 9: Discussion and Conclusions .......................................................... 234

9.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 234

9.2. Summary of research chapters................................................................... 236

9.3. Summary of the research questions and findings ...................................... 243

9.4. Summary of the central research findings ................................................. 249

9.5. Implications of the research....................................................................... 252

References ............................................................................................................... 254

Appendices .............................................................................................................. 284

Appendix 1: The process of Collective Bargaining leading to Industrial Action284

Appendix 2: Discussion of anti-union practices predominant in the Chilean

literature ................................................................................................................ 285

Appendix 3: Summary of union democracy in Chile. .......................................... 288

Appendix 4: Individual Labour Standards ........................................................... 292

Appendix 5: Interview schedules ......................................................................... 295

Appendix 6: Summary table of interviews conducted during the three fieldwork

visits. ..................................................................................................................... 306

Appendix 7: Rationale for the lack of qualitative software analysis ................... 309

Appendix 8: Reflexivity ...................................................................................... 311

Total Word Count: 88.414 words including in-text citations and excluding

References and Appendices

5

List of Tables

Table 1: Summary of industrial relations perspectives .............................................. 25

Table 2: Crisis of Organised Labour .......................................................................... 33

Table 3: Union Strategies and Contents ..................................................................... 49

Table 4: Summary of the most relevant Chilean Presidents since the Presidential

Republic. .................................................................................................................... 74

Table 5: Summary of 1979 Labour Plan’s main features. ......................................... 75

Table 6: Summary of Chile’s key topics for labour reforms ..................................... 86

Table 7: Summary of the legislation used to undermine trade union representation. 99

Table 8: Comparison of Collective Contracts vs. Collective Convenios ................. 101

Table 9: Company A’s diversity composition ......................................................... 121

Table 10: Company A’s trade union composition ................................................... 121

Table 11: Company B’s parent company workforce diversity composition............ 123

Table 12: Company B’s trade union composition in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of

fieldwork. ................................................................................................................. 123

Table 13: Company C’s workforce diversity composition ...................................... 125

Table 14: Company C’s trade union composition.................................................... 126

Table 15: Summary of themes for thematic analysis ............................................... 129

Table 16: Summary of general aspects of corporate strategy in the case studies .... 138

Table 17: Summary of Trade Unions in Case Study A ............................................ 142

Table 18: Summary of Trade Unions in Case Study B ............................................ 146

Table 19: Summary of Trade Unions in Case Study C ............................................ 149

Table 20: Summary of Participation Mechanisms and Representation Structure .... 150

Table 21: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in Case Study A ....................... 164

Table 22: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in Case Study B ....................... 175

Table 23: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in Case Study C. ...................... 182

Table 24: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in the three case studies. .......... 184

Table 25: Summary of specific trade union responses for renewal ......................... 193

Table 26: Summary of Case Study A trade union strategies for revitalisation ........ 202

Table 27: Summary of Case study B’s trade union specific responses to employer’s

de-collectivism. ........................................................................................................ 208

6

Table 28: General trade union renewal strategies in Case Study B implemented by

the ‘Largest Trade Union’. ....................................................................................... 216

Table 29: Specific responses from Union One and Union Two to de-collectivising220

Table 30: Summary of general trade union renewal strategies in Case Study C ..... 229

7

List of Figures

Figure 1: Frameworks for the analysis of industrial relations systems. ..................... 31

Figure 2: Outputs from de-collectivist strategies. ...................................................... 37

Figure 3: Examples of outputs of de-collectivist strategies. ...................................... 40

Figure 4: Dimensions of trade union revitalisation .................................................... 46

Figure 5: Trade union renewal framework................................................................. 47

Figure 6: Dimensions and strategies for trade union renewal .................................... 48

Figure 7: Reality according to critical realism ......................................................... 105

Figure 8: Visual representation of Company A’s trade unions ................................ 121

Figure 9: Visual representation of Company B’s trade union composition. ............ 124

Figure 10: Visual representation of Company C’s trade union composition. .......... 126

file:///F:/PHD/4th%20year%20Submission%20Pending/First%20Draft%20-%20Empirical/Latest%20Draft%20July%202019/Final%20Draft%20September%208th%202019.doc%23_Toc19286624

file:///F:/PHD/4th%20year%20Submission%20Pending/First%20Draft%20-%20Empirical/Latest%20Draft%20July%202019/Final%20Draft%20September%208th%202019.doc%23_Toc19286626

8

List of abbreviations

ANEF: National Association of Public Workers (Asociacion Nacional de Empleados

Fiscales)

CAT: Autonomous Central of Workers (Central Autonoma de Trabajadores)

CPC: Confederation of Production and Commerce (Confederacion de Produccion y

Comercio)

CTCH: Confederation of Chilean Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de

Chile)

CUT: Central of Union Workers (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores)

DT: Labour Inspectorate (Direccion del Trabajo)

ENCLA: Labour Survey (Encuesta Laboral)

EU: European Union

FOCH: Chilean Worker’s Federation (Federacion Obrera de Chile)

HR: Human Resource

HRM: Human Resource Management

INE: National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística)

IR: Industrial Relations

MNC: Multinational

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

UK: United Kingdom

ULF: Union Learning Fund

UMF: Union Modernisation Fund

US: United States

UNT: National Union of Workers (Union Nacional de Trabajadores)

9

Abstract

Trade Union Renewal in Chile: A case study analysis and comparison of the

challenges and prospects facing company-level trade unions in the food

manufacturing and beverage sector

The thesis evaluates the revitalisation strategies developed by a range of company-

trade unions embedded in three company case studies in the food-manufacturing

industry in Chile. Most of the literature on revitalisation has been developed in the

European and North American context, yet there does not seem to be a systematic

body of literature documenting trade union renewal in the Latin American context.

This thesis focuses on the Chilean context, as this can be an interesting country in

which to evaluate the revitalisation efforts of trade unions at the company level

mostly due to its tradition of trade unionism and a neo-liberal market economy. After

the state implementation of extensive neo-liberal policies and union-weakening

practices during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s, Chilean industrial relations has

the potential to be an interesting case for researching revitalisation and the role of the

institutional context. Therefore, the aim of the thesis is to understand how Chilean

trade unions are coping with and responding to such challenges, while also

understanding the role played by the Chilean political and economic context in such

a process of renewal. The thesis attempts to understand how trade union strategies

vary and why within such a context. Using comparative case study research, the

findings suggest that although there are some similarities in the renewal strategies

pursued by Chilean trade unions (such as labour-management partnership, member

servicing and legal mobilisation) trade union revitalisation is a process that needs to

be understood in what appears to be a fragmented context. The fragmentation of the

labour movement, increasing levels of state intervention in the weakening of unions

and an extensive isolation from other labour-related bodies are emphasised as the

primary challenges facing Chilean trade unions in their path to renewal. Hence,

within such national and workplace-level contexts, Chilean trade unions seemed to

be engaging in a range of renewal activities, albeit constrained by the country’s

institutions, regulations and employer practices. This research contributes to the

international debate on trade union revitalisation and the importance of a range of

de-collectivising strategies in framing such changes.

The University of Manchester

Daina Bellido de Luna, PhD Researcher, 2019

10

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an

application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other

institute of learning.

11

Copyright Statement

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this

thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and

s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such

Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, and whether in hard or

electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright,

Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it

or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the

University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such

copies made.

iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other

intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of

copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables

(“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned

by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property

and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the

prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property

and/or Reproductions.

iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication

and commercialization of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual

Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in

the University IP Policy (see

http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=24420), in any

relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library,

The University Library’s regulations (see

http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/), and in The

University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

12

Dedicatory

To my mom and dad, whom withstood the challenges and risks of migration to give

my brother and me the opportunities they never had.

13

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge my supervisors Professor Miguel Martinez-Lucio and

Dr. Stephen Mustchin for their constant help in completing the thesis. Miguel, who

was always there to read and comment every document and draft I sent him, his

patience and commitment towards teaching will always inspire me. Stephen, who

always had words of encouragement towards my work and offered his constructive

feedback throughout the process.

To my mom and dad for their unconditional support in this crazy journey their

daughter embarked upon. Thank you for going above and beyond to offer me all the

opportunities you never had. Los amo mucho.

To my husband, who left his rising career and everything behind to accompany me

in this process and grow alongside me, for making me laugh every day and wiping

my tears away whenever I felt everything was too much to handle. I would not have

been able to stay this sane for this long without you. Te amo por siempre y para

siempre.

To my friends who shared my ups and downs, especially Macarena and Cristian,

who were there every step of the way.

I would also like to acknowledge CONICYT for sponsoring my PhD (and previously

my Master’s degree). For their amazing scholarship programme and their

commitment to developing science and technology in Chile. Without the help

provided, I would have never been able to study abroad.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my Chile, for welcoming me and my family

and allowing me to take advantage of all the opportunities offered, without ever

making me feel like an outsider. I will always be eager to return to you. Viva Chile!

14

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

One of the key issues in the literature on trade unionism is to understand how unions

manage the social and economic challenges caused by neo-liberalism. In this regard,

the most evident of the challenges have been union membership decline and the

erosion of collective bargaining structures (Turner, 2004; 2005; Murray, 2017; Ibsen

and Tapia, 2017). As a response to these challenges, trade unions have been

engaging in a range of activities labelled by the academic literature as trade union

renewal and/or revitalisation (concepts used interchangeably). Union renewal or

revitalisation refers to the processes of change engaged in by trade unions to bring

new life to the labour movement while rebuilding organisational and institutional

strength (Murray, 2017; Kumar and Schenk, 2006). A growing body of literature has

been developed to understand and determine the type of actions trade unions are

taking in endeavouring to revitalise, in that way being able to increase their presence

and power in the workplace. More recently, Turner (2004) called for research that

could potentially specify the pros and cons of renewal strategies to aid policy

recommendations for governments.

Despite the many studies that have followed this call for research, to date

there has been limited studies regarding the shape of this process in Latin American

countries, as the majority of the research seems to be focused around European and

North American countries (e.g., Frege and Kelly, 2003; 2004; Phelan, 2007; Munck,

2011; Murray, 2017). Although there are studies on the labour movements in Central

(Anner, 2007; 2011) and South American countries such as Argentina (Senen et al.,

2010; Serdar, 2012; Marshall and Perelman, 2008) and Brazil (Anner and Candia,

2013; Cardoso, 2002; Cook, 2002; Frangi and Memoli, 2014), there does not seem to

be a systematic body of literature covering revitalisation efforts in the South

American region. Incidentally, Murray (2017) indicated that although union

revitalisation research has predominantly focused on English-speaking liberal market

economies, these contexts have experienced marked declines in union density,

having to contend with a hostile employer and indifferent public policy. However,

this thesis will argue that Latin American countries also have the potential to inform

the revitalisation debate, not only because they have also suffered steep declines in

15

union membership and dealt with hostile employers, but because their different

historical and political contexts and institutions can inform the process of labour

renewal and bring new light onto the factors shaping labour revitalisation.

One Latin American country with a history relevant to the topic of trade

unionism is Chile. During the 1980s, the country experienced an authoritarian

regime that implemented strong neo-liberal policies primarily marked by the

development of markets and businesses (Bronstein, 2010; Barrett, 2001). There was

liberalization of trade and foreign investment, privatization of state-owned

enterprises and an interest in the containment of state interventions (Riesco, 2009;

Leiva, 2013; Cook and Bazler, 2013). After the 1990s and with the country’s

transition into democracy, four labour reforms were undertaken as an attempt to

modernise the employment relationship and restore some of the power taken from

trade unions (Frank, 2002; Rojas-Mino, 2007). Although some labour reforms

modified critical rights cut during the military regime (e.g., freedom of association,

right to strike, dismissal immunity for trade union leaders), some scholars believe

that resistance to state regulation as well as an overall anti-union bias has persisted

amongst employers (Bank, 2017; Palacios-Valladares, 2010; Riesco, 2009; Narbona,

2014; Feres, 2008). These issues may have constrained the types of actions Chilean

unions can deploy to face their challenges. As a result, the Chilean context,

considered now an advanced case of liberal market capitalism, has the potential to

inform the revitalisation debate and offer good insights into the discussion of labour

revitalisation.

Therefore, this thesis has reviewed the path to renewal of a range of Chilean

trade unions based in three companies in the food-manufacturing sector, where two

of the case study companies had two trade unions each and one case study had one

trade union. It was important for this research to document such processes in a sector

that had similarities with other industries in the Chilean economy but that were not

far removed from the country’s reality. Typically researched sectors in the Chilean

labour literature are the mining and banking industries, which despite being the most

unionised sectors in the country, have characteristics that may not represent the

reality of the majority of workers in Chile (Frank, 2009, 1994; Palacios-Valladares,

2010b). Therefore, the less researched food-manufacturing sector was selected to

conduct the research for this thesis, as it appeared to be a sector with important

industrial relations. Consequently, this research is also an attempt to fill the empirical

16

gap for labour-related studies in a less researched sector. Food manufacturing is a

growing sector in Chile with over 15 billion USD in revenues in 2018 and with over

850.000 workers in 2019 (INE, 2019). These features make this industry an

important sector in the country’s economy, not only because of its revenues but

because it provides employment for a large portion of the country’s workers. The

sector also has some curious labour relations characteristics that will be considered

later in the thesis.

1.2. Background to the thesis

The main purpose of this research was to understand how Chilean trade unions were

coping with and responding to the national and workplace-level challenges faced.

Therefore, the researcher explored and reviewed the activities conducted by a range

of company-level trade unions within three companies in the food-manufacturing

sector in their efforts to achieve renewal. In so doing, the thesis discussed the

challenges and obstacles faced by these trade unions at the national and workplace

level. Using comparative case study research, the researcher argued that the

revitalisation strategies implemented by these trade unions were shaped by the

external and broader economic and political context, organisationally and at the

micro level, by certain workplace features, such as the approach to industrial

relations taken by the respective employers. Despite such constrains, the researched

trade unions showed some level of choice in the range of strategies implemented to

revitalise their movement. The theoretical framework primarily used to assess the

strategies for revitalisation was that developed by Frege and Kelly (2004). These

authors described six strategies for trade union revitalization: organising trade unions

through recruitment and mobilisation, organizational restructuring, coalition building

with other social movements, social or labour-management partnership, political

action and transnational cooperation. Two additional dimensions for trade union

renewal were added to the theoretical framework given their recent predominance in

the labour revitalization literature. These two additional dimensions were skill

formation, perceived as the mapping of skills required to be developed by trade

union members and their leaders in order to achieve renewal (Martinez-Lucio et al,

2007; Findlay and Warhurst, 2011), and social media implementation to organise,

communicate with and mobilise workers (Martinez-Lucio, 2003; Martinez-Lucio and

17

Walker, 2005). These strategies were used as a template to understand and evaluate

the developments in trade union renewal in the case studies.

Frege and Kelly’s (2003; 2004) framework argued that trade unions have, to

some extent, a choice in regards to which of the aforementioned renewal strategies

they implement to advance presence and power in the workplace. Despite

acknowledging the relatively wide choices trade unions have, Frege and Kelly (2003;

2004) believe that the structure of the union, the institutional context, the unions’

framing process, the nature of employer opposition and the unions’ identity can

influence the selected strategy. Although this framework has been developed for

industrialised countries, this thesis has applied it to the Chilean context, analysing

how these variables influence the process of revitalisation in Chilean trade unions.

The findings indicated that even though these trade unions were taking steps towards

renewing, their efforts encountered several difficulties. At the national level, the

general uncertainty, disconnection from labour-related organisations and an

ambivalent relationship with the state seemed to be the most critical challenges.

Similarly, at the workplace level, a fragmented space for trade union representation

and management-related challenges influenced the unions’ capabilities for renewal.

Such issues will be introduced next.

Since Chilean trade unions are embedded in a neo-liberal context, they have

faced serious structural limitations that have challenged them. There was a

disconnection between the reviewed trade unions and sectoral and national-level

organisations that isolated them and prevented them from learning from each other.

The lack of affiliation of some unions or the symbolic affiliation that one trade union

had to one confederation may have also hindered the potential for organising firm-

level trade unions for revitalisation. Such isolation is often explained in the literature

by the strong de-politicisation that the Chilean labour movement suffered under

Pinochet’s authoritarian regime during the 1970s (Duran, 2013; Ugarte, 2008; Feres,

2008; Bronstein, 2010). In this regard, due to the centrality of neo-liberal practices

implemented during Pinochet’s government in the labour movement today, the thesis

highlights the importance of the institutional context and the path dependency

approach in the process of trade union renewal. According to path dependency

theory, early events in a process have substantial effects on later events (Crouch and

Ferrell, 2004). Applied to this research, path dependency meant that the functioning

of today’s Chilean institutions, such as collective bargaining and the employment

18

relationship, were largely shaped by past events (Peters, 2009; Kay, 2005), in this

case, the military dictatorship that weakened the country’s industrial relations.

Therefore, the potential responses that trade unions could implement to revitalize

were therefore influenced by neo-liberal labour legislation that allowed for

fragmentation, decentralisation and de-collectivization to be implemented in the

workplace. This meant that trade unions had to be constantly dealing with union-

weakening practices, having limited time and resources to engage with processes of

revitalization.

Likewise, most of the difficulties faced by firm-level unions in the case

studies were anchored at management level where, despite the efforts towards

cooperation and dialogue, employers consistently tried to limit union power.

Amongst other, the most commonly used anti-union practices were the use of multi-

rut, the extension of collectively bargained benefits, the use of minimum services

regulation and a special form of collective agreement that does not allow workers to

strike. These activities were combined and recombined with other union-substitution

practices such as direct participation mechanisms and open-door policies, initiating

significant levels of de-collectivisation. Arguably, these union-weakening activities

tend to be more frequent in the Chilean context because the employers seem to be

forced by law to bargain with all the workplace trade unions, not being able to de-

recognise trade unions (Bank, 2017; Palacios-Valladares, 2010). As a result, the

Chilean context can be more prolific in the development of de-collectivising

practices (Baltera and Munoz, 2017). Together with reviewing the revitalisation

efforts of the workplace trade unions, the thesis was also able to outline the most

common de-collectivising practices used by employers as provided by the Chilean

legislation.

After contextualising the research, this thesis’ research questions are presented

next:

a) How are Chilean trade unions coping with the labour crisis and their declining

role, and what are the strategies and innovative practices in terms of trade union

renewal and revitalization in Chile?

b) What role does the Chilean political and economic context play in this process

of renewal?

19

c) How do such trade union strategies relate to those being discussed

internationally, and in what ways do they vary, and why?

The methodology used to address these research questions was based on case

study comparison to understand the different processes undertaken by different

company-level trade unions in their path to renewal. Overall, the interview analysis

suggested that the company-based Chilean trade unions in the case studies were

attempting to engage with the topic of renewal by implementing a weaker form of

labour-management partnership, a strong service role and a mobilising legal strategy.

However, the process was not as smooth and as innovative as expected and the trade

unions were facing internal and external limitations.

1.3. Outline of the thesis

The thesis will begin with a literature review divided into two chapters. This

differentiation was made to better contextualise the research topic. The first chapter

(Chapter 2 Literature Review: The field of industrial relations) will address the

general field of industrial relations, providing key definitions, reviewing existing

theoretical approaches and frameworks for the study of labour relations, discussing

the transformation of labour relations and providing relevant examples of industrial

relations systems. The second chapter of the literature review (Chapter 3 Literature

Review: The question of trade union revitalisation: developments, challenges and

the issue of context) discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the process of trade

union revitalisation as well as the challenges faced by worldwide trade unions. A

general background containing key debates in the international literature covering

trade union renewal is presented, moving then to address definitions and dimensions

of the process of trade union renewal. This section primarily focuses on the model of

trade union revitalisation developed by Frege and Kelly (2003; 2004) outlining six

strategies through which trade unions in industrialised countries implement

revitalisation. As this model was developed a few years ago, trade unions have since

developed additional strategies to revitalise, hence the literature review also includes

two activities that were not included in Frege and Kelly’s (2004) model, such as

focus on skill formation of trade union leaders and members and the use of social

media to organise, communicate and mobilise. As this thesis reviews the theoretical

framework provided by Frege and Kelly (2004), it will also be argued that the

20

research on trade unionism suffers from a Euro- and North American centrism and

an overemphasis on the role of strategic choice in trade unions.

The next chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4: Chile’s industrial relations

context) reviews the Chilean system of industrial relations as well as the country’s

political and economic background. This chapter presents the required

contextualisation to further understand Chilean employment relations as well as the

framing process of the trade unions’ renewal choices. The chapter begins with an

overview of the country’s relevant history, revisiting the different political periods,

governments and the four attempted labour reforms after the transitional period to

democracy. Likewise, a description of the collective bargaining process and a

discussion of how regulation is used to undermine workers’ rights is also included.

This chapter argues that the features of the Chilean political and economic context

play a key role in shaping and constraining the way trade unions cope with and

respond to their challenges and how they engage in the process of renewal.

Once the literature review of the thesis has been reviewed, the research

methodology chapter (Chapter 5: Research Methodology) is presented to explain

the research design implemented in the thesis. Together with a discussion of the

methodological framework and epistemological underpinnings of the research, this

chapter describes the research strategy, data collection methods (interviews and

observations) and data analysis techniques (thematic analysis). A detailed description

of the participant organisations and the interviewed informants was included,

emphasising the research’s ethical considerations as well as the challenges and

limitations encountered when conducting fieldwork. Such issues focused on the

difficulties of gaining access to the case study organisations in a highly de-

centralised and fragmented context.

The research findings have been organised into three empirical chapters. The

first empirical chapter (Chapter 6: Organisational context and actors) compared

and contrasted the workplace governance and the representation structure across the

three case studies. This chapter argued that the corporate and local features of a

workplace need to be considered when analysing the process of the company-level

trade union revitalisation activities, as they tend to frame the responses implemented

by the unions. Since industrial relations are becoming more decentralised and

increasingly anchored at company level, it is important to inform the trade union

renewal debate by considering the individual workplace features and characteristics

21

of the company-level representation structure. The chapter showed that, despite

having direct and indirect participation mechanisms with a strong representation

structure and a pluralist view of industrial relations, these employers engaged in

union-weakening practices. Such an approach to the employment relationship meant

the trade unions had to be extremely resourceful in countering the weakening

strategies imposed by managers.

In order to understand the importance of such de-collectivising strategies, the

second empirical chapter (Chapter 7: De-collectivising strategies directed towards

trade unions and labour relations: Challenges and issues) described the set of

practices common to the three case studies used by the managers to avoid or weaken

the workplace trade unions. This chapter argued that, especially in contexts where

bargaining was conducted at firm level, the range of de-collectivising strategies

appeared to shape and limit the individual trade union responses to revitalisation.

Understanding these practices will also help researchers to recognise the complex

relationship trade unions and employers have in the Chilean context and the role the

state and national regulations play in the employment relationship. Overall, this

chapter showed the way employers use (and abuse) the existing labour regulations to

weaken the company-level trade unions and the constant resources trade unions need

to deploy to respond to such practices.

The third empirical chapter (Chapter 8: Trade union responses and

questions of revitalisation) explored the strategies implemented by the trade unions

in the case studies to respond to the political and economic challenges of their

workplace and national contexts. The chapter firstly addressed the specific

‘defensive’ responses trade unions were implementing to counter the employers’ de-

collectivising strategies and, secondly, identified their general ‘proactive’ strategies

to revitalise the labour movement: it tries to therefore look across such different

types of responses and relations. This division was only made for conceptual

purposes, as these activities overlapped with each other. Towards the end of this

chapter, the researcher identified the revitalisation dimensions used by the trade

unions. Three general strategies for revitalisation were the most salient: a weaker

form of labour-management partnership, strong service unionism and the use of the

legal strategy to advance the power of trade unions in their workplace. These

strategies were to some extent determined by particular managerial strategies in the

trade unions’ workplaces and by the Chilean political and economic context.

22

The final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 9: Discussions and Conclusions)

outlined the key themes that emerged from the research findings. Three conclusions

were emphasised. One was the systematic applicability of the renewal framework

and how it was useful as a template to assess labour revitalisation. The second

important finding was the importance of context in the discussion of trade union

revitalisation, not just workplace context but also the national political, economic

and institutional context. The third finding highlighted the role of the state in the

process of renewal by arguing that, as seen in the cases, the state’s dysfunctional

relationship with labour can influence the unions’ power and revitalisation strategies.

Overall, this thesis aimed to contest the assumption that trade unions can choose

strategically their renewal practices, as this ‘choice’ can be constrained by contextual

characteristics, the state’s role and the employers’ practices. Despite such

assumptions, the thesis showed the level of agency some trade unions had in the

implementation of revitalisation strategies. However, the degree and context of

fragmentation seemed to be so extensive that it may have prevented unions from

strategically coordinating and learning from each other’s experiences. There were

also issues around terminology, where the academic terms provided for revitalisation

strategies may not have the same meaning in the field. Similarly, the language of

revitalisation does not appear to translate well into Spanish due to its Anglo-Saxon

roots. These issues will be further analysed and presented in the following chapters,

thus explaining how these five Chilean trade unions responded to the challenges they

encountered and engaged with revitalisation.

23

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: The Context and Challenges

of Change and De-Collectivisation

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature pertinent to the

present research on the topics of industrial relations and trade union renewal. This

first chapter of the literature review addresses the general field of industrial relations

(IR) by providing key definitions, reviewing existing theoretical approaches and

frameworks for the study of labour relations and discussing the transformation of

labour relations. At the end of the chapter, there is a discussion section where the

topics addressed herein are summarised. Since the main topic of this research was

trade union renewal and this is a process embedded in a country’s system of labour

relations, the topic of industrial relations will be first addressed in this chapter. The

concepts of work and employment, and their transformation, will also be discussed,

following the analysis of fragmented labour markets, weaker relationships between

trade unions and the state, the demise of long-term stable employment and the

erosion of structures of participation presented by Frege and Kelly, 2013 and Stuart

et al., 2011. These transformations have prompted the call for action on the part of

organised labour, hence the importance of understanding the way in which workers

come together to respond to these challenges (Frege and Kelly, 2003; 2004; Behrens

et al., 2004).

2.2. The field of industrial relations

This first section of the literature review will begin with a description of the existing

theoretical approaches in industrial relations in order to gain historical perspective on

the topic. It also covers definitions of the IR field, its objectives and transformations

over the years, and concludes with a brief description of the IR system of three

industrialised countries to illustrate how institutions function and shape the practices

of trade unions.

The term Industrial Relations can be traced back to the 1920s in North

America and Britain (Edwards, 2009) and refers to the study of the institutions of job

regulation, addressing and analysing the relationships and interactions that take place

24

in the employment relationship (Salamon, 2000). As a long-standing field of study,

IR’s scholars have developed many approaches and perspectives to explain the aims

and concerns of this field. These approaches will be described next.

2.2.1. Perspectives on the field of Industrial Relations

The academic field of IR has been mainly perceived through three perspectives:

unitarist, pluralist and critical. These ideologies or frames of reference can be

defined as packages of values and assumptions that the parties to the employment

relationship have (Budd and Bhave, 2008). Each of these frames of references can be

used to analyse different topics within the field of IR. These three perspectives

influence a researcher’s values and assumptions regarding the employment

relationship, hence their importance (Budd and Zagelmeyer, 2010; Provis, 1996). A

brief description of these perspectives is presented next and a summary is provided

in table 1.

The unitarist perspective views companies as a harmonious place where

workers and managers share common interests and values (Ackers and Wilkinson,

2003). Fox (1974) argues that this perspective is rooted in the old master-servant

perspective where the master demands obedience from his servants and considers

them subordinates without opinions. The unitarist approach has accumulated several

critiques. Heery (2016) mostly highlights the gaps in this perspective in terms of the

lack of interest in collective rights and the fact that it assumes employers and

workers share the same goals (e.g., the company's productivity and performance).

Likewise, Provis (1996) argues that this assumption of shared values is problematic

since employers may attempt to manage an employee’s principles as a way of

control. Similarly, Heery (2016) comments on how this perspective places limited

emphasis on labour institutions.

Precisely these criticisms are reconciled by the pluralist perspective, which

views organisations as composed of individuals with their own interests and

objectives (Salamon, 2000). Pluralism recognises the difference of interests in

employment and suggests that a way of channelling and institutionalising these is

through trade unions and collective bargaining (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2003).

Different positions can reach common ground through the use of dialogue, rules,

regulations and mechanisms of representation such as trade unions and their

negotiation processes (Martinez-Lucio, 2014; Blain and Gennard, 1970). Trade

25

unions are the organisations through which employees can give voice to their claims

and opinions. According to Budd (2004), the goal is to be able to balance efficiency,

equity and being heard. The pluralist perspective has been criticised for its lack of

focus on the generation of conflict in order to concentrate only on its resolution.

Another important critique made is that Fox (1974) assumes that, during collective

bargaining, all parties negotiate in a context of balance of power, which is not always

the case. The concept of power is thus at the centre of the critical perspective, the

third approach to the study of IR.

Table 1: Summary of industrial relations perspectives

Perspective Content Criticism

Unitary

• The company is a harmonious place

where there is no conflict. • Workers and managers share common

interests, objectives and values.

• Assumes employers and workers

share the same interests. • Downplays the role of conflict in the

employment relationship. • Limited acknowledgement of the

value of labour institutions

Pluralist

• Organisations are composed of

individuals, each with their own interests

and objectives. • Due to the difference in interests, labour

institutions such as trade unions and

collective bargaining are a way of

channelling conflict. • Rules and regulations are fundamental

because they frame minimum labour

standards.

• Lack of focus on the generation of

conflict, being only concerned with

its resolution. • Downplays the concept of power in

the employment relationship

Critical

• The interests of workers and employers

are essentially opposed and cannot be

reconciled. • Conflict in the employment relationship is

essential to society and is ongoing. • Workers have a subordinate position in

the employment relationship. • Regulation is insufficient as it is

perceived as another mechanism by

which stronger groups perpetuate

dominance over the subordinated

• Over-stresses exploitative and

degraded conditions of work. • Pessimistic conception of

employment relations wherein

employers will never improve the

employment conditions. • Limited importance granted to

change and reforming the

employment relationship

Source: Own Illustration

The final perspective is the critical framework based primarily on the

assumption that the interests of workers and employers are essentially opposed

(Kelly, 1998). This perspective emphasises constant criticism of the actions of

employers and the consequences thereof for workers. Unlike the pluralist

perspective, by which conflict between employers and employees can be reconciled,

the critical position believes that conflict between capital and labour is an essential

part of society and can never be overcome (see for a discussion Budd and Bhave,

2008). Workers have a subordinate position in the employment relationship, which

26

consequently means that their collective definitions of interests are always subject to

challenge by employers (Kelly, 1998). Regulation is downplayed, as it is perceived

as another tool used by stronger groups to perpetuate dominance over the

subordinated. The only process that can bring major improvements in employment

relations is mobilisation of workers and other oppressed social groups (Kelly, 1998).

Critiques made against this perspective refer to its over-emphasis on

exploitative and degrading conditions of work. According to Heery, (2016) the

tendency in this perspective is to perceive the worst-case scenario and make

generalisations from there. In addition, this perspective tends to have a pessimistic

conception of employment relations in which employers will never improve

employment conditions, collective bargaining would not achieve a more balanced

approach and legislation cannot improve employment conditions (Heery, 2016). The

author also comments on the diminished importance this perspective places on

reforming the employment relationship. Academics with a critical perspective

believe reforms could not suppress the imbalance of power between capital and

labour. A summary of these perspectives and their criticisms is seen in table 1.

This thesis follows a pluralist frame of reference due to the importance

granted to the implementation of regulation. This research acknowledges the

opportunity to reconcile the interests of employers and workers. The space in which

these interests can be reconciled involves the implementation of legislation and

policy reforms and the role of institutions such as trade unions and collective

bargaining. The role of the state, through regulation and programmes, can develop

frameworks for management practices (see Martinez-Lucio, 2014; Martinez-Lucio

and Stuart, 2009 for a discussion of the state from a critical perspective). Political

projects such as the development of social dialogue programmes and trade union

education may also be developed to counteract the growing power of employers and

to try to restore some balance in the direction of trade unions (Martinez-Lucio and

Stuart, 2004).

Distinctive approaches to studying the field of industrial relations were

available, which allowed a comparative perspective. Of importance to this research

were the approaches of institutionalism, path dependency and varieties of capitalism.

These different perspectives will be explained next and can be visualised in figure 1.

Firstly, institutional theory provides an understanding of how and why industrial

relations systems vary across different countries (Peters, 2005). According to the

27

institutionalist approach, a country’s characteristics are largely influenced by its

institutions and political history (Hall and Taylor, 1996), emphasising the powerful

role of institutions, individual decision-making procedures, and the importance of

rules and regulation (Bulmer, 1993; Lowndes, 2010).

There seems to be agreement in the literature on two broader types of

institutionalism, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. The focus of the ‘old’ institutional approach

was upon formal rules and organisations, upon official structures of government and

the central role of law in governing (Lowndes, 2010; Peters, 2009; Hall and Taylor,

1996). Structures were of predominant importance as they determined political

behaviour, leaving limited space for individuals to affect them. Comparisons across

contexts yield knowledge of the effects of such variations (Peters, 2005). One of the

key characteristics of the ‘old’ institutionalism was the pronounced role of historical

developments that framed the socio-economic and cultural present. The ‘old’

approach was criticised for being too reductionist and simplistic, assuming the

superiority of certain forms of government institutions for achieving good

governments (Lowndes, 2010). Hence, the ‘new’ institutional approach included an

individualistic component emphasising the behaviour of individuals as key to the

role of institutions. For the ‘new’ institutional approach, “institutions are the

accumulation of individual choices based on utility-maximizing preferences”

(Lowndes, 2010, p.63).

Hall and Taylor (1996) commented on the notion that the ‘new’

institutionalism was not a unified body of thought and there were at least three

different analytical approaches: historical, rational choice and sociological

institutionalism. Historical institutionalism assigned importance to formal political

institutions, understanding that the institutional organisation of the polity or political

economy is the main factor structuring collective behaviour. Historical

institutionalists look closely at the state because it is not a neutral actor but rather a

“complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group

conflict” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.938). The notion of stability was central, for once

policies are adopted and organisations are created, those structures will persist until

some major disruptive event happens.

Rational choice institutionalism is the second strain of ‘new’ institutionalism

identified by Hall and Taylor (1996), arguing that individuals behave instrumentally

within institutions to maximise their own personal interests. Institutions influence the

28

behaviour of individuals by affecting the context in which individuals pursue their

preferences while providing information about the incentives attached to different

courses of action (Lowndes, 2010). Finally, sociological institutionalism

concentrates on the way in which institutions create meaning for individuals

(Lowndes, 2010) as some institutions tend to be culturally specific (Hall and Taylor,

1996). This form of institutional approach seeks explanations for why organisations

have specific institutional forms, procedures or symbols, being interested in

explaining the similarities in organisational forms across countries regardless of the

differences that local organisations display across sectors.

Linked to the notion of change within institutionalism is the concept of path

dependency. Path dependency is the second approach reviewed in the thesis to

suggest that the functioning of present day institutions is, to a large extent, shaped by

past events and that these in turn heavily frame the strategic choices open to people

and organizations as they respond to new developments (Teague, 2009; Pierson,

2000; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Kay, 2005). There are different versions of path

dependency; stronger versions argue that institutions are deeply rooted in a country’s

history, providing the origins of established patterns of behaviour which hinder any

type of radical change (Teague, 2009). In this case, change is perceived as a major

force that is abrupt and discontinuous (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Milder versions of

path dependency, however, shy away from the determinism with which stronger

versions perceive institutions and, while emphasising the importance of the past,

allow for some form of change in the institutions (Crouch and Ferrell, 2004). In this

latter version of path dependency, great importance is given to actors, as they shape

and reshape the institutional landscape in which they live (Teague, 2009).

Trade union revitalisation, which is discussed later, could therefore be seen to

follow the institutional approach and the notion that, because each country’s politics,

economy and institutions differ, the systems of IR will also vary and thus shape the

nature of renewal. Regardless of these constraints and contexts, trade unions can

develop a level of agency in the implementation and development of revitalisation

strategies. This variation has emphasised the need for a comparative approach that

facilitates understanding of the specific nature of contextual differences. A

comparative approach to the study of IR refers to the systematic cross-analysis of

phenomena displaying both similarities and differences (Hyman, 2001b; 2007). As

many of the contributors to this approach have suggested, a comparative analysis

29

might deepen the existing knowledge of employment systems across countries, along

with the ability to derive lessons and identify best practices (Hyman, 2001; 2001b;

Bamber, Lansbury, Wailes, and Wright 2016). IR systems do not necessarily develop

in a similar way across different countries (Frege and Kelly, 2013), mainly because

industrial relations systems experience the effects of their historical, political, legal,

economic and social contexts (Duran-Palma, Wilkinson and Korczynski, 2005). A

comparative perspective is thus relevant to assessing national economies.

Thirdly, there is Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice,

2001), which has been widely used to compare systems of industrial relations. This

approach focuses on the primacy of the market and national institutions, arguing that

firms and financial markets are predominant in comparison to the state and organized

labour. Hall and Soskice (2001) developed this approach as a new framework to

understand the institutional similarities and differences among the developed

economies. Institutions are seen as helping firms to solve general coordination

problems in five spheres: industrial relations, vocational training, corporate

governance, inter-firm relations and the workforce in relation to employers and the

state. This approach understands that different types of capitalism give rise to

distinctive industrial relations systems (Heery, 2008). Liberal market economies are

more deregulated and flexible, having weaker unions, less centralised bargaining and

less employment protection (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Firms rely more heavily on

market relations to resolve coordination problems and managers often have unilateral

control over the firm with the freedom to hire and fire and firms are not obliged to

establish representative bodies for employees. In contrast, coordinated market

economies conceive of unions as an essential part of businesses’ strategies, therefore

employers and the state have an interest in strengthening them (Hall and Soskice,

2001). The corporate governance of coordinated market economies provides

companies with access to finance that is not dependent on publicly available finance-

related data; top managers rarely have the capacity for unilateral action – instead,

they must secure agreement for major decisions from supervisory boards, which

include employee representatives and major shareholders. Recently, Amable (2003)

has expanded on Hall and Soskice’s Types of Capitalism Theory, presenting five

more types: the market-based model, similar to liberal market economies, the Asian

model, the social-democratic model, the Continental European model and the

30

Mediterranean model. Except for the market-based model, all the other models are

geographically based.

Contrasting with the VoC view is the theory of convergence. Due to

increased international competition and the role of multinational corporations, the

economic systems of countries have been showing increased similarity, resulting in

what authors call the convergence of national patterns (Bamber et al., 2016). The

main argument of convergence theory is that previously diverse political economies

are all converging on a single model of liberal market economy (Streeck and Thelen,

2005). Despite debate over economies converging towards the liberal market,

research suggests that rather than converging, national patterns of employment

relations are increasingly diverging (Frege and Kelly, 2013). Hall and Thelen (2009)

recognise the criticisms made against the varieties of capitalism approach for

neglecting issues of institutional change. These authors outline an alternative

approach within varieties of capitalism, suggesting that the persistence of institutions

depends on their welfare effects and on the benefits they provide to social and

political coalitions. They also include Kelly’s (1998) concept of mobilisation,

explaining that through continuous processes of mobilisation, social actors test the

limits of existing institutions. Reforms and re-interpretation of laws and regulations

are the result of such mobilisation processes.

The conceptual framework developed by Locke and Thelen (1995) builds

upon the difficulties of using the comparative approach to study the different systems

of different countries in political terms. It is a framework that can be used as a

complement or simply as another way of undertaking traditional institutionalist

comparisons. These authors explain that such an attempt to describe two systems

provides only a partial picture of the dramatic changes in the world of work. This

thesis is built on the notion that various international trends are not translated

automatically into the same issues in all national economies but are, rather, mediated

by national institutional arrangements and refracted into divergent struggles over

particular national practices. Conventional institutional comparisons miss two

important points: the meaning that different actors give to the same term and the

distinct patterns of economic development, as well as the role of political

mobilisation and working-class formation, in every country. Taking a different tack,

the authors offer the term of contextualized comparisons, which places precisely

these differences at the centre of the analysis, forming the interpretation that

31

nationally distinctive institutional configurations mediate in different ways the effect

of common international pressures. The risk of simply comparing practices across

countries without attending to differences leads to the development of oversimplified

and misleading conclusions. Contrarily, the contextualized approach provides new

perspectives and a deeper understanding of cases, explaining the distinctive features

of particular systems (Locke and Thelen, 1995).

Figure 1: Frameworks for the analysis of industrial relations systems.

Source: Own illustration

2.2.2. The Transformation of Industrial Relations: the changing context of

regulation and rights

The world economy and the field of IR have suffered a series of complex

transformations due to recent events taking place. The need to understand the context

in which these transformations are taking place is of relevance because institutions of

regulation, the state and economic factors can be subject to increasing pressure for

change.

32

These changes originated from the promotion of neo-liberal policies that privileged

the mechanisms of markets and the promotion of labour flexibility (Stuart et al.,

2011; Greenwood and Stuart, 2002). Recent years have witnessed a decline in

employment in manufacturing and an increase in the service sector. Other

unanticipated changes occurring in the 1970s and 1980s were large scale

unemployment, more self-employed workers, a fall in the size of unions and a

significant growth of non-regular employment (e.g., part-time work, freelance,

subcontracting and fixed term contracts) (Brown, 1992).

The essential features of the new world of work are now labour market

flexibility, employment insecurity, a decline in the regulatory role of the state in

economic and social terms, intensified capital mobility, introduction of new

technology and diversity in the composition of the workforce (Jackson, Kuruvilla,

and Frege, 2013; Bernaciak, Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2014; Martinez-

Lucio, 2007; Martinez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004). Trade unions are steadily

losing membership and power (Frege and Kelly, 2013; Bernaciak et al, 2014). A

greater number of actors in the employment relation have opposing interests

(Jackson et al., 2013; Stuart et al., 2011). Internal structures of workers’

representation have been eroded (Frege and Kelly, 2013) and a decreased capacity

for mobilising workers and related institutions can be seen (Kelly, 1998). In this

scenario, the state is often forced to follow the dictates of the market, implementing

regulations that are market-oriented, liberalising labour laws and weakening trade

union influence to make economies more competitive (Phelan, 2009; Martinez Lucio

and MacKenzie, 2004). The new configuration of work has therefore brought about a

crisis in organised labour, whose characteristics will be further detailed in the next

section.

2.3. The crisis of employment and its effects on organised labour

In light of recent events taking place in international markets, academics have

stressed the need for stronger organised labour (Frege and Kelly, 2013). Trade

unions are at the heart of this much needed change, with the critical task of fighting

to protect past gains, endure the hostile environments in which they are embedded

and resist decline (Baccaro et al., 2003). There is a shift away from the more

organised bargaining-based view to a more individualised view of the workplace

(Bacon and Storey, 2000; Greenwood and Stuart, 2002). However, the crisis of

33

labour, particularly in Europe, can exhibit different forms. Martinez Lucio (2006)

offered a summary of the dimensions of change that are affecting labour in Europe.

This is useful for categorising the crisis of organised labour and provides a deeper

understanding of the definitions of the labour crisis. The author distinguishes six

dimensions over which trade unions are experiencing change: workplace,

management and labour utilisation, social context of work, state and regulation, the

global dimension and the communication sphere. The dimensions are summarised in

table 2 and further explained below.

Table 2: Crisis of Organised Labour

Dimensions of Activism Crisis of O rganised Labour

WorkplaceDecentralisation in the firm and the workplace through teams, cost

centres and outsourcing.

Management and labour

utilisation

New forms of labour utilisation through the quality and consumer

paradigm

Social context of work Fragmentation and individualisation of the workforce

State and regulation Changing state roles and its decentralisation

The global dimension Globalisation: the new international dynamic and the gaps in labour

in the face of Multinational Corporations (MNCs)

The communication sphereNew forms of communication and the decline of public space and

collectivism

Labour Crisis in Europe and North America

Source: Martinez-Lucio (2006)

The first dimension is at the level of the workplace in terms of a greater

tendency towards decentralisation. Several aspects of decision-making have moved

away from the industry level to local businesses. This, paired with outsourcing of the

labour force and work, is creating difficulties in the organisational power and reach

of trade unions. The second dimension refers to management and labour utilisation,

whereby a new form of labour utilisation through the quality and consumer paradigm

is born. Managers are linking worker interests and pay to customer satisfaction,

which translates into a move away from collectivism towards individualism. This

means that managers are encouraging workers to become more focused on the

company’s agenda while loosening their grip on their own interests. The third

dimension is the social context of work, which has changed so as to result in more

fragmentation and individualisation of the workforce. Trade unions are experiencing

the problem of representing only portions of the workforce, unable to reach wider

constituencies. The fourth dimension involves changing state role and regulations

34

where, arguably, the state has been withdrawing from its role of welfare provider and

trade union collective rights protector; all state institutions are experiencing a shift

towards a market-oriented agenda, albeit in various different ways. As a result, trade

unions can no longer trust that their interests will be safeguarded by the state. The

fifth dimension covers globalisation, meaning that new global developments can

undermine national regulatory systems. Finally, the sixth dimension of trade union

change refers to communication: as information and the media are much more

diverse and focussed through a more individualised set of communications and

activities, the trade union message is now confined to meetings and traditional

publications, undermining its relevancy.

The crisis of organised labour has also reached Latin America and, according

to Zapata (2004), has been influenced by a transition from models of accumulation

of goods to a model of trans-nationalization of internal markets. According to this

author, since the 1980s there has been a profound economic and social

transformation affecting the Latin American countries witnessing trade liberalisation,

privatisation of state-owned enterprises and ongoing deregulation of employment

relations. These transformations have enhanced the crisis of labour, thus weakening

the power of trade unions in the collective bargaining process (Zapata, 1992; 2000).

Arguably, Zapata (2004b) explains that the opening of internal markets to

international trade redefined the way trade unions and workers were organising. In

his view, the deregulation of labour institutions reduced the scope for trade union

activities. This was particularly the case in Chile, were after 1973 there was a

significant break in the ability of trade unions to intervene in matters of employment

and to bargain collectively (Campero, 2001; Campero and Cortazar, 1986). The

reduced role of trade union federations and confederations in collective bargaining

on wages and living conditions also limited the topics negotiable and often weakened

the provisions intended to protect workers. Paired with this, there has been a change

in the shape of the workforce. An intensification of migration processes, increasing

feminisation of the labour force, and increase of the service sector, part-time and

precarious jobs (Zapata, 2004; Brown, 1992) has also contributed to an increase in

non-standard workers. Other issues that have influenced Latin American trade

unions can be unemployment and informal labour markets, which have diminished

the trade unions’ capacity to recruit more members, which may have impacted on the

size of trade unions (Campero and Cortazar, 1986). Another issue affecting the trade

35

unions ability to grow in size has been the tendency of companies towards

subcontracting workers.

Therefore, the characteristics of the labour crisis experienced in Latin

America can be somewhat similar to those of countries in Europe: declining

unionisation rates, shrinking average size of unions, wage increases below

productivity gains, low-wage and low-status jobs as well as the individualisation of

working relations. Particularly in Chile, this crisis has been deepened by practices

implemented by employers to further weaken labour. Such practices will be detailed

below.

2.4. The emergence of de-collectivisation strategies.

In trying to increase or merely defend their power in the workplace, one of the major

obstacles unions face is resistance from employers. Employers implement strategies

that aim to consolidate their interests, exclude employee mobilisation and undermine

trade union organisation (Van den-Broek and Dundon, 2010). These strategies have

been called de-collectivising practices, referring to a group of activities aimed at

reducing the influence of unions in the workplace (Peetz, 2002). De-collectivising

strategies can take different forms depending on the employer and the context and is

of relevance to this thesis due to the nature of firm based relations in Chile.

The first attempt at developing a framework for union weakening practices

was developed by Roy in 1980, where the author determined three common practices

implemented by employers when trying to diminish trade union power. The first

tactic described was ‘fear stuff’, where employers would conduct threats against

workers, spreading rumours of plant closures, risk of unemployment and lay-offs of

workers. The second tactic was named ‘sweet stuff’, where employers would promise

promotions and other opportunities if trade unions remained excluded from the

workplace. The third tactic was called ‘evil stuff’, where employers’ anti-union

animosity was more evident, with strong attacks on trade unionism and actively

campaigning against them, e.g. linking trade unions to corruption and violence.

In addition to this categorisation, two theoretical frameworks were developed

to analyse trade union-weakening practices. The first discussed in this section is the

framework by Gall and McKay (2001), who frame trade union weakening practices

as either aiming to replace the trade union or suppress it. This model is useful for this

research as it is simpler in providing a first categorisation of trade union weakening

36

practices. The model explained by Gall and McKay (2001) has two distinct

practices: union suppression and union substitution. The approach whereby

employers substitute a trade union is when employers try to supplant the union’s role

with HR practices that attempt to portray unions as unnecessary. Employers would

try to resolve grievances, establishing independent and non-union related

mechanisms and giving the impression of some form of employee voice (Gall and

McKay, 2001). Among the most used tactics to implement this strategy are the

sudden resolution of long-standing grievances (without resorting to trade unions),

general improvements regarding pay and working conditions and an increasing

emphasis on individualization. Other practices include the ‘door’s always open’

policy, establishing consultative or representative forums where staff issues and

grievances can be dealt with.

On the other hand, there are companies that suppress unions through an array

of resistance practices. These include control, intimidation and creating an

atmosphere of fear in the workplace. Dismissals, redundancies or the threat thereof

are the tools through which employers implement fear. Other approaches can be

harassment of union activists or monitoring their work. The goal is to prevent union

officers from dealing with members’ concerns, organising meetings and recruiting

members (Gall and McKay, 2001). Companies may go so far as hiring anti-union

consultancy companies, holding meetings to show workers how the company’s

profits are negatively affected by unions, telephoning worker’s families to tell them

about what would happen if a union is established or even restructuring the company

by splitting it up into units. Although this is a very useful model to understand the

strategies of union avoidance by employers, Dundon et al., (2010) warned about the

problematic use of such dichotomies since employers’ actions tend to be more

uneven and contradictory is presented with these two categories.

A model for trade union weakening practices that is more comprehensive in

its analysis is that of Peetz (2002). This author developed a framework to understand

the different patterns of managerial initiatives that promote an individualistic

approach to industrial relations. The first step of the model is to distinguish between

the inputs and outputs of the de-collectivist management strategy. The inputs are the

actions that provide information for the management decision-making process: the

use of anti-union management consultants, teams of lawyers and changes in

37

corporate management. The outputs are the actions taken by an employer who

attempts to de-collectivize an organization.

The model differentiates between the real dimension of the output and the

symbolic dimension of the output. The real dimension of the action is the physical

manifestation of the action; it can either be information, or something to do with

relations between the employers, employees and unions or an employment practice

(something that concerns the conditions of work). The symbolic dimension of the

output is the meaning attached to the action and conveyed to a specific audience.

This message can either be inclusivist, exclusivist or both. This is the third step of

the model. Figure 2 shows the model from Peetz (2002) with the different outputs

from de-collectivist strategies.

Figure 2: Outputs from de-collectivist strategies.

Rea

l D

imen

sio

n Employment Practices

Relational Informational

Exclusivist Dual Inclusivist and

Exclusivist Inclusivist

Symbolic Dimension Source: Peetz (2002)

An inclusivist message is one that tells employees they are an integral part of

the organization. Inclusivist actions are implemented to increase employee

commitment to the organization. By contrast, an exclusivist message indicates that a

particular employee or a particular behaviour of a particular union is not welcome in

the organization. Exclusivist messages have the purpose of further distancing

employees and unions who do not share the same values of the company from the

organization. Some messages can simultaneously include exclusivist and inclusivist

meanings. Not all de-collectivist strategies will contain each of these features, nor

will all of them be successful. A simpler approach will be to implement activities

with an exclusivist message, while a sophisticated approach will use a more

inclusivist message with some forms of human resource management technique (e.g.

performance related pay, appraisal systems and participation mechanisms, among

others).

Regarding the model’s real dimension, employment practices will be the first

action to be considered. Exclusivist employment practices may be redundancies

whereby the employer wishes to create a sense of vulnerability for employees and

38

thus render them more willing to accept changes to their employment conditions. In

contrast to this crude practice, Peetz (2002) discusses the inclusivist employment

activities used by employers to increase the commitment of workers to the

organization. According to this author, general inclusivist practices can include

enhanced standardization of other terms and conditions of employment through the

use of terms such as staff employment. Peetz (2002) also describes dual inclusivist

and exclusivist employment practices. Within these activities can be found the

offering of individual contracts or similar instruments. Another dual employment

practice relates to recruitment and selection. Through these processes, the de-

collectivist employer can identify who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’. An employee may be

selected based on their willingness to sign an individual contract; selection can also

be based on an employee’s attitudes rather than on their technical skills: employees

that get selected are those who are most likely aligned to company’s values and

principles

In addition, Peetz (2002) describes the use of relational methods as another

dimension of his model that deals with the interactional features of the employment

relationship. Exclusivist relational measures concern interactions with unions, where

management overtly takes measures against unions and employees that identify with

unions. The most common form is to restrict or refuse the union entry to the

workplace as well as the threat or the actual removal of payroll deductions. Other

forms include: placing of barriers to union activists and delegates; the reduction of

union’ access to the company’s resources or facilities; threats of lock-out; placing

limitations on a unionised workforce that is pushing for collective agreements;

taking legal action against the union; an explicit exhortation to change the way in

which the trade union has been working; and/or police handling workers in the

picket lines. Another strategy may be the refusal of the employer to meaningfully

negotiate (delayed response to the union, negotiating in an aggressive or superficial

way). In this category, the more coercive process of blacklisting can be included. As

defined by Adams (1981), blacklisting is “the distribution of the names of workers

suspected to be union organizers and the subsequent refusal of employers to hire

people on the list” (p.3). Mustchin’s (2014) research in the British construction

industry documented the existence and use of the blacklisting practice whereby

construction employers resisted the power of trade unions in a sector characterised

by the vulnerability of workers. The practices listed above are argued by Peetz

39

(2002) to be pursued by employers with the aim of sending an exclusivist message

that the union is inefficient and/or has no credibility.

Inclusivist relational methods aim at emphasizing the integration of particular

employees within the organization. These measures are mostly directed at

employees. Activities may be to establish alternative, non-union consultation,

participation, communication or grievance resolution mechanisms. They are a way of

promoting the company’s own form of employee involvement. Another form of

inclusivist relational methods can be the use of social and recreational events and the

fact that if employees actively participate in these, it helps to get them recognised

among their peers.

Finally, dual inclusivist and exclusivist relational methods aim at reinforcing

beliefs that in order to be part of the company, employees have to keep unions out. In

order to reinforce a certain belief, managers may tend to use supervisors. The goal is

to further emphasise that if employees want to be part of the company, they need to

sign individual contracts. The way in which this may be conducted is through one-

on-one meetings, giving awards, prizes and movie tickets. Figure 3 presents a

summary of all the strategies mentioned around the three actions contemplated in the

real dimension.

The third action in terms of the real dimension is informational methods. For

this action, the importance is around the provision of information. This point is

critical to employers if they wish to convey messages regarding being part of the

company. Similar to the other actions, this one has inclusivist, exclusivist and dual

methods. Inclusivist informational methods are when the company transmits its

messages through induction and training. Exclusivist methods of information exist

when the company is openly against trade unions and so engages in practices such as

threatening to replace workers who decline to do what the company is asking them to

do, threats of redundancies and threats about the consequences of joining a union.

There can also be informational methods of a dual kind where both inclusivist and

exclusivist messages co-exist. This may be reflected in company practices where

management chooses to use certain language to convey their message (e.g. when

they call workers associates). Employers can also use more explicit propaganda with

monthly magazines, campaigns, letters and newsletter sent to workers with the

specific message that they want to come across. Crude strategies may be to look for

40

something in the workers’ personal records to try and find a weakness that they

could use to discredit union activists.

Despite how useful these frameworks can be, Dundon (2002) explains how

cautious a researcher needs to be when using typologies as the reality may be more

complex and uneven that the categories present. The space of de-collectivisation is

very broad and the relevance is that we cannot engage with any debate on union

presence, change and renewal without an awareness of this. Within the context of

Chile and the arguments presented in this thesis, the issue of de-collectivisation is

complex and extensive – framing issues of renewal and change within the labour

movement – so such a set of debates are important as a compass to guide the

analysis.

Figure 3: Examples of outputs of de-collectivist strategies.

Source: Peetz (2002)

41

2.5. Chapter discussion

The purpose of this chapter was to revisit the debates and the existing literature on

the topic of industrial relations. As this research is an attempt to conceptualise trade

union renewal responses in a Latin American context, understanding the field of

industrial relations was essential. The chapter has reviewed key definitions as well as

the different perspectives used to study the field of IR, which include the unitarist,

pluralist and critical approaches. These perspectives summarised the different

approaches that can be taken when discussing and analysing IR. Thus, reviewing

them was key as they underpinned any discussion regarding labour relations. This

research was framed around the pluralist perspective because of the view that forms

of regulation can balance power structures in the employment relationship.

Following the review of these perspectives, institutional theory was briefly

developed as a way to account for the relevance of institutions in the analysis of IR.

Within institutionalism, path dependency theory was highlighted due to its

suggestion that existing institutions were shaped by past events (Teague, 2009). This

was central to the present research as the thesis noted that a country’s institutions and

historical context framed the choices open to trade unions, curtailing some activities

while promoting others. One of the key characteristics of institutionalism was its

belief in comparisons to yield knowledge from variations, therefore the comparative

approach with which the study of industrial relations has been developing was

emphasised as the most appropriate way to analyse various systems of IR. However,

the concept of contextualised comparisons (Locke and Thelen, 1995) highlighted the

importance of differences in national institutional configurations.

The section then moved to describe the changes that industrial relations have

been experiencing in the last decades, highlighting the fragmentation of labour, the

demise of long-term stable employment, weaker relationships between trade unions,

employers and the state and the erosion of collective structures of interest

participation. These issues were described as challenges faced by trade unions and

were further developed when reviewing trade union-weakening practices as the

embodiment of the challenges faced by organised labour. Authors call for a stronger

or a rebuilt form of organised labour to confront such issues and the importance of

research in specifying the alternative strategies and policy recommendations for

unions (Frege and Kelly, 2004; Baltera and Dussert, 2010). Labour revitalisation

studies was the banner under which the body of literature concerned with identifying

42

the strategies to broaden the perspective and reverse the decline of labour was

framed (Frege and Kelly, 2004).

The factors described in this first literature review chapter are of great

importance for the research as they contextualise the relevance of institutions as well

as the country’s history, politics and economy in the trade union renewal discussion.

Likewise, identifying the author’s frame of reference as pluralist was also central to

further understand the emphasis placed on regulation to reconcile the interests of

workers and employers.

The next chapter addresses the nature of the trade union revitalisation debate

and the strategies used by trade unions to achieve some type of renewal of the labour

movement. The chapter will describe the general background for trade union

responses to the challenges posed by employers, the state and features of the

employment relationship.

43

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

The question of trade union revitalisation: developments, challenges

and the issue of context.

3.1. Introduction

This section reviews the concepts and debates around the specific topic of trade

union renewal, having outlined contextual factors and related debates in the previous

section. This is central to establishing the background of the present research and

establishing the drivers of trade union responses. It begins with key definitions

pertaining to trade union renewal, emphasising practices and activities documented

in the literature to explain the revitalisation phenomenon in different contexts. The

chapter focuses on eight activities for trade union renewal developed in the literature

so as to include a more comprehensive framework for the analysis of trade union

practices. Six of these practices are those outlined by Frege and Kelly (2004) in their

varieties of unionism review, added to which are two additional ones recently

developed and added by the author in the light of new technologies and concerns

with training. These practices will be reviewed in this chapter.

The impact of globalisation and the widespread propagation of neo-liberalism

have threatened organised labour (Frege and Kelly, 2004). Much change has been

brought about, mostly characterised by economic restructuring, relentless pursuit of

labour flexibility, declines in union membership, the increasingly limited

effectiveness of collective bargaining, weakening of membership engagement,

difficulty in connecting with new constituencies and the emergence of less

institutionalized forms of collective action (Levesque and Murray, 2006; Murray,

2017; Blyton et al., 2008). General discontent with the notion of trade unionism

prevails, where authors argue for the existence of a weaker identification with the

traditional values of trade unionism (Levesque, Murray and Le Qubravoeux, 2005).

Due to these issues, research on trade union renewal is vital for the capacity of trade

unions to respond to the challenges (Levesque and Murray, 2010; Murray, 2017).

Such research is instrumental in promoting workplace, societal and political change,

with the potential for offering substantial breakthroughs in relation to a renewed

union project (Turner, 2004; Levesque et al., 2005).

44

However, the research on trade unionism suffers from two marked issues: a

Euro- and North American centrism and an overemphasis on an uncritical view of

strategic choice. For the first challenge, Levesque and Murray (2006) and Murray

(2017) comment on how a substantial portion, albeit not the entire body, of academic

research dealing with trade union renewal has been developed in the Anglo-Saxon

countries. These authors explain such limited coverage as due to these countries

exhibiting marked declines in union density as well as mostly representing liberal

market economies. However, Latin American contexts share these features, so they

have the potential to inform the debate on trade union renewal. Thus, this research

represents an effort to extend this debate to the issues and relative absence of trade

union renewal research in developing economies while providing an insight into the

activities of Chilean trade unions and their institutional and socio-economic context.

The second issue of renewal studies is the tendency to believe that trade unions have

a choice in the selection of the strategy implemented for renewal (Frege and Kelly,

2003; 2004). As it will be argued, in contexts where the labour movement is weaker,

this choice is heavily constrained by a country’s institutions and political-economic

history. This research represents an attempt to reconcile these three issues around

trade union renewal studies.

The present chapter is organised as follows. A general background to the

literature on trade union renewal is presented first, moving then to describing the

theoretical frameworks available to study the process of trade union renewal.

Likewise, the section contains a detailed description of the eight dimensions of trade

union renewal documented in the literature, to end with the presentation of country

case studies that includes Anglo-Saxon and Latin American contexts.

3.2. Background, definitions and dimensions of Trade Union Revitalisation

Union renewal or revitalisation relates to the processes of change to modify and

inject a new strength into the labour movement and to rebuild institutional efficiency

and influence (Murray, 2017; Bernaciak and Kahancova, 2017). Renewal has also

been defined as the search for new methods aimed at securing union growth (Wills,

2001). Despite decades of research (Murray, 2017), the concern for this topic

remains ongoing (Balasubramanian and Sarkar, 2015; Behrens et al., 2004;

Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). These definitions tend to conceive renewal as

based at the national level, which sometimes downplays the importance that

45

individual trade unions have in the process of revitalisation (Serrano, 2014).

Serrano’s (2014) definition incorporates that individual element, which will be

central in addressing this research’s findings. In her view, union renewal is a

“gradual, continuing and purposive process of maintaining, re-establishing,

rebuilding and reconfiguring the institutional and organisational sources of union

power and strength in a changing environment” (p.220). This definition suggests

union actors are constantly experimenting with different activities conducive to

renewal while also accepting the importance of the institutional dimension in the

process.

There are four dimensions along which trade unions have been seen to

implement activities to renew themselves, namely the membership, economic,

political and institutional dimensions (Behrens et al, 2004). These dimensions are

represented in Figure 4. The membership dimension consists of three factors:

membership numbers, membership density and changes in the composition of union

membership. All these factors can be measured to determine any possible variation.

The assumption behind this dimension is that the more members a trade union has,

the greater the resources at its disposal (i.e., money and people) that can be

mobilised to achieve a determined outcome. Such factors can be good indicators of

the trade unions’ legitimacy, representativeness and bargaining power.

The economic dimension includes features such as bargaining power, ability

to achieve wage and benefit improvements and the impact of labour on the

distribution of wealth (Behrens et al, 2004). Union revitalisation in this category

implies the use of methods to increase economic advantage. Unions may seek to

boost their economic influence by developing techniques outside of their bargaining

power, such as redefining their role in the workplace. Union revitalisation along the

political dimension means that unions improve their effectiveness to influence the

policy-making process (Behrens et al, 2004). This dimension refers to unions

interacting with key actors in the government and in national or local political

elections, being involved in policymaking and in the implementation of legislation.

This dimension assumes that unions can gain power through securing victory for a

political party with which they are allied and/or promoting legislation in

concordance with their objectives.

Finally, the institutional dimension relates to the trade unions’ organisational

structures and governance, as well as their internal dynamics (Behrens et al, 2004).

46

This dimension refers to the trade unions’ capacity to adjust to new contexts and

introduce something new to the union. Some examples of the institutional dimension

might be the introduction of new bargaining approaches and/or new ideas around

organising or being political.

Source: Adapted from Behrens et al., 2004

Building upon the conceptual framework of their theory on union

revitalisation, Frege and Kelly (2003) developed a model aiming to explaining cross-

country variation in union renewal strategies. This model argued that circumstances

external to the trade union as well as internal circumstances shape and explain the

national trade unions’ strategic choice of activity to implement to revitalise a

country’s labour movement. External circumstances of the trade union are

institutional differences in the context of IR, social and economic trends and

employer and state strategies. Internal circumstances are the trade union’s internal

structure and its framing processes, defined as the perceptions that its leaders have

regarding change. Regardless of the constraining features of these variables, they are

argued to not be determinant. Neither of these factors alone will be able to account

for the chosen strategy for renewal. As argued by Frege and Kelly (2004), ‘unions,

as organisations, have some leeway in deciding whether they want to focus their

efforts and resources on gaining political or economic power or both, whether

pursuing internal organisational or leadership changes is vital to their renewal

efforts, and how crucial is the membership dimension’ (p.31). The authors refer to

the concept of strategic choice in reference to the decision unions have to take in

choosing the renewal strategy to implement, where union leaders can, within the

Figure 4: Dimensions of trade union revitalisation

47

constraints of their national contexts and organisations, decide on the most promising

dimension for renewal and therefore the activities they identify as leading to

revitalisation. Frege and Kelly’s (2003) framework for trade union renewal is

presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Trade union renewal framework

Source: Own illustration based on Frege and Kelly (2003)

According to the trade union renewal dimensions, revitalisation strategies can

include elements of bargaining power, political power, membership density and trade

union openness to internal reform (Behrens et al, 2004). More specifically, Frege and

Kelly (2004) present the diverse patterns of trade union renewal of Western

European and US trade unions grouped into six areas. These areas are (1) organising;

(2) organisational restructuring; (3) coalition building with non-labour related

groups; (4) labour-management partnership; (5) political-action; and (6) international

networks with labour-related organisations. As this research intended to take a

comprehensive approach to the study of trade union renewal, two additional

dimensions were added in the analysis. Skill formation and social media platforms

are the seventh and eight areas, respectively, for trade union renewal to be addressed

in this research. As these strategies are at the core of this research, section 3.3

explains in detail each one of them.

Each of the trade union renewal strategies is linked to the four dimensions for

renewal in this approach. The organising strategy relates to the membership

dimension, labour-management partnership relates to the economic dimension,

forming coalitions with political parties relates to the political dimension and the

48

internal and external restructuring of trade unions, as well as coalition-building and

international links, all refer to the institutional dimension. This relationship between

dimensions and strategies can be visualised as shown in figure 6. It is important to

highlight that any union activity has multiple dimensions and can, therefore, overlap

with some aspects of the membership, economic, political and institutional

dimensions.

Source: Adapted from Behrens et al., 2004; Frege and Kelly, 2004.

In summary, the concept of trade union renewal refers to the efforts made by

unions to inject vitality and purpose into their movement. Trade unions can base

their activities along four dimensions that frame the revitalisation strategies. These

depend on the combination of variables such as institutions, state, employer

strategies, union structures and identities that account for a specific trade union

choice. These variables on their own fail to explain the trade unions’ decisions as to

the strategy used to revitalise. The central strategy that unions will adopt in their

renewal efforts tends to be consistent with their internal values (i.e. identities) and

their external environment (e.g. economic, institutional context).

3.3. Trade union renewal strategies

This section describes in detail the areas for trade union renewal. The focus is on the

six dimensions outlined by Frege and Kelly (2004) and the two additional strategies

of skill formation and the use of social media platforms (and/or e-communications)

developed in the literature. Along with providing definitions, research accounting for

each type of strategy is also provided as a way of illustrating the shape these

activities take in real-life contexts. Likewise, the discussion will highlight how some

dimensions for renewal are more prevalent in some contexts and not in others. As

Bernaciak and Kahancova (2017) explain, trade union organisations based in

Figure 6: Dimensions and strategies for trade union renewal

49

countries with established institutional traditions can heavily rely on social dialogue

and collective bargaining to make their voices heard. As argued by these authors,

having such strong institutional support, trade unions may be less eager to recruit

new members and form coalitions with different groups than unions in liberal market

economies. In these contexts, the survival of trade unions directly depends on the

presence of a strong membership base and the trade union’s ability to liaise with

other civil organisations (Baccaro et al., 2003). Therefore, as this section emphasises,

the context in which each strategy for trade union renewal tends to be more

predominant also deepens the understanding of each strategy for renewal. Table 3

provides a summary of the trade union renewal strategies.

Table 3: Union Strategies and Contents

Strategy Definition Key Features

Organising Recruit new members

into the trade union

- Quantity of resources devoted to the organising strategy.

- Type of activity chosen by unions to organise.

- Method chosen by unions to organise.

Restructuring Trade unions' structural

change

- Forms: external structure and internal structure (targeted

at union governance or administration).

- Factors driving change: environmental pressures and a

clear mission/vision statement.

- Motivations: aggressive, defensive, transformative.

Coalition

Building

Form coalitions with

non-labour related

groups

- Objectives: Financial and physical support, access to new

groups, expertise, legitimacy, mobilisation.

- Relationship with partners: vanguard, common-cause and

integrative coalitions.

- Degree of integration into policymaking: coalition of

influence or coalition of protest.

Partnership

Formally structured,

ongoing relations of

cooperation between

unions and employers

- Level: national, regional, sectoral or company level.

- Topics: social policy goals, collective bargaining or

topics beyond employers and unions.

Political Action Ally with political

parties

- Forms: elections, legislation and implementation.

- Outcomes: Positive and negative.

International

Links

Network with

international labour-

related organisations

- Objectives: Expansion of national movements or of

practices, institutions and patterns.

- Forms: union collaboration; European integration; social

engagement; joint working; mutual learning and sharing

and embracing other struggles.

Skill Formation

Skill development,

training and learning of

trade union leaders and

workers

- Aims: Developing the skill set of trade union members

and/or of trade union activists.

Social Media

Platforms / e-

communications

Use of electronic

communications to

organise and/or

communicate with trade

union members.

- Uses: to communicate, to organise, to include non-

standard workers, for transnational reach.


50

3.3.1. Organising

Trade union organising is directed at union membership recovery (Frege and Kelly,

2004) which, simply put, can mean recruiting new union members (Murray, 2017).

Heery and Adler (2004) prefer to define organising as “the promotion of activism

and the creation of collective organisation in the workplace” (p. 52). This strategy

can strengthen workplace representation by securing recognition and political

lobbying. This in turn might increase the unions’ mobilising capacity and thus their

economic bargaining power (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2011; Frege and Kelly, 2004;

Kelly, 1998). Other authors emphasise shifting the power of organising to the

membership, thus the agency for success is in a continually expanding base of people

(McAlevey, 2016).

The organising strategy has three components: resource allocation, targets

and methods used. Resource allocation refers to the commitment a union has with its

strategy of organising. This can be measured by the number of written organising

policies and plans, by the dedication of an organising function such as committees

and staff whose main focus is organising or by the proportion of union finance that is

allocated to the organising activity (Heery and Adler, 2004). The targeting of the

organising activity is the second component and refers to the activity or tactic chosen

to organise. Unions can opt to consolidate membership through internal organising

or by using expansion techniques targeting new members. They can also commit to

field enlargement targeting to recruit women, younger workers and ethnic minorities

(Heery and Adler, 2004). Methods used are the third component and relate to the

different techniques unions use to achieve organising. The methodology refers to the

degree of diffusion or concentration of the activity: if recruitment is diffused,

members joining the union will be ongoing and conducted through routine activities.

Contrarily, if recruitment is concentrated, their joining the union will be through

planned and dedicated campaigns with a specific time frame (Heery and Adler,

2004). The method for organising will also include the distinction between

organising employers (gaining recognition and then approaching employees) or

employees (building membership first and then approaching employers).

Fletcher and Hurd (2001) comment on three ingredients that, in their opinion,

are central to effecting union transformation in the organising strategy. These are:

having adequate resources to support the new members without compromising

existing effectiveness to represent members; strategic planning to address technical

51

issues that may appear along the way; and member education and mobilisation to

prepare for organisational change. Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1998) established a

separate but rather similar set of practices common to most organising approaches:

recruiting and training union organisers; organising in the community through

various community and religious networks; and identifying key activists within

workplaces to be organised and training them in union-related skills. The training

aspect of this strategy is key since trade unionists lacking the skills needed to

organise their membership can constitute an obstacle to the implementation of this

strategy (Murray, 2017).

The organising approach seems to be more prevalent in liberal market

economies, where having a larger membership directly translates into more power

given the weakening of labour institutions (Bernaciak and Kahancova, 2017; Frege

and Kelly, 2004; Heery and Adler, 2004). A country’s institutional structure can

present incentives to trade unions that can hinder or promote organising activities.

Such institutions refer to the bargaining structure of a country (centralised or

decentralised), union recognition approach and worker participation structures. As

Baccaro et al. (2003) comment, the irony is that when a country has a strong

institutional position, this can reduce the incentives to organise which may be

essential for trade unions to sustain their long-term influence.

In the UK, Fairbrother (2009), Gall (2009), McIlroy (2008), Heery and Adler

(2004), Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2000) and Wills and Simms (2004) explained the

country’s reliance on organising responses where national trade unions have made an

increased investment in these types of activities. Research shows that in the UK, the

characteristics of organisers, the nature of the organising task and the systems put in

place to manage such activity are central to the success of the organising strategy

(Heery and Simms, 2008). Likewise, trade unions from the US have strongly relied

on the organising strategy to build their membership. They went as far as creating

the “Organising Institute” and other specialist organising departments (Heery and

Adler, 2004; Hurd et al., 2003), whose main focus was expansion aiming at

broadening job territories and reaching non-standard workers. The main unions offer

institutional support and network mobilisation for local unions to organise and build

coalitions (Hurd et al., 2003). As these two countries represent liberal market

economies and are tending towards the decentralisation of industrial relations, given

that the source of union influence comes directly from their membership, the primary

52

emphasis is on their organising strategy. In contrast, in countries such as Germany

where trade unionism is strongly supported by the state and more established

regulatory institutions, union influence is not necessarily determined by size of

membership, so there are reduced incentives to organise. Due to this, only a few

German unions have, until recently, managed to go beyond traditional advertising

and public relations campaigns to recruit members (Heery and Adler, 2004; Behrens

et al., 2003). A summary of these factors is presented in table 3.

3.3.2. Restructuring

This strategy refers to a trade union’s structural change with reference to its external

or internal organisational form. External re-organisation is usually evident when a

trade union merges with another trade union, thus altering its external form. Internal

re-organisation can take the form of a trade union modifying its governance or the

way in which it administers itself (Behrens et al, 2004).

This strategy can influence the strength of the union, mainly because it is

exerting change to produce a re-organisation or re-engineering of some of its

organisational features. However, Behrens et al. (2004) and Murray (2017) advise on

the limits that this strategy has for automatically leading to trade union renewal. In

order for trade unions to progress through this route, they need to map the factors

that influence the success of the activity and their motivations for implementing such

changes. Factors that drive change in a trade union tend to be environmental

pressures and having a clearly articulated conception of the trade union’s future.

When a trade union has a sufficient level of environmental pressure to alter the way

it is organised, any resistance to change can be eliminated. Likewise, when unions

are driven by a clear conception of their future (e.g., mission or vision statements),

this provides a basis for change. These factors are also intertwined with trade unions’

motivation to change. Three motivations can lie beneath any restructuring processes:

aggressive motivation to consolidate and strengthen the political control of union

leaders; defensive motivation as a reaction to issues and aiming at stabilising the

union; and transformative motivation aiming to engage all union members to address

new strategic priorities. A summary of these factors is presented in table 3.

Trade union restructuring through mergers has been commonplace in the

literature on renewal of industrialised countries (Murray, 2017; Waddington, 1988;

2005; 2006; Michelson, 2000; Waddington and Hoffman, 2000; Gennard, 2008;

53

Chaison, 2018). This is because most unions – generally speaking - have experienced

a sharp decline in membership; thus, engaging in mergers can mean an automatic

increase in membership size as well as increased financial outcomes. This strategy

has been predominant in the UK (Waddington, 1988; 2005; 2006) and in Germany,

where restructuring through mergers has been driven solely by the desire to

compensate for membership loss and budgetary crises (Behrens et al., 2003;

Waddington 2005; 2006). However, such drivers are said to be limited in generating

renewal. Serrano (2014) states that unless mergers are participative and driven by

values, growing the size of trade unions does not necessarily translate into more

influence. In addition, Murray (2017) and Waddington (2006) mentioned that

because restructuring requires high levels of coordination and organisational

efficiency, trade union efforts might be strained in the process due to the added

complexity of the increased heterogeneity of membership. Ultimately, the literature

suggests that only transformative restructuring with its embedded strategic view can

lead to union renewal.

3.3.3. Coalition Building

This strategy refers to the option unions have to form alliances with other non-

labour-related social movements to acquire resources that help them to achieve their

desired goals (Frege and Kelly, 2003; Frege, Heery and Turner, 2004). The

assumption is that trade unions need to access the resources controlled by their

coalition partners. This strategy can refer to intermittent or continuous joint activities

with partners that go beyond job regulation in the hope of generating social and

political change (Frege et al., 2004).

Unions that engage in this type of alliance tend to pursue different objectives.

They can aim for five things: financial and physical support, access to new networks

of communications, using the expertise of the coalition partners, securing greater

legitimacy (i.e., by proxy with their partner) or facilitating mobilisation (Frege and

Kelly, 2004). Coalitions may also have different durations, identities, goals, methods

and degrees of success as well as different relationships with their partners. This

leads to three types of coalitions: vanguard, common cause and integrative

coalitions. The first is when the interest of the union dominates and partners accept a

subordinate role, the second is when partners and unions have separate but

associated interests and they enter the alliance to advance their respective interests.

54

In addition, the last is when unions give priority to the interests of their partners and

accept their partner’s objectives as their own. Another differentiation can be found

regarding the degree of integration into policymaking, having coalitions of influence

and coalitions of protest (Frege and Kelly, 2004). While the first seeks to achieve its

objectives by influencing the government through insider organizations, the latter

seeks to mobilize institutions to exert pressure on governments. A summary of these

factors is presented in table 3.

The research suggests that coalition building tends to be a context-specific

strategy possessing a wide range of characteristics (Hurd et al., 2003; Frege and

Kelly, 2003; Wills, 2001; Wills and Sims, 2004; Black, 2005). Coalition building is

more salient in the US, UK and Germany. In the US, Black (2005) and Fine (2005;

2000) argued that trade unions have recently focused on the gains that forming

alliances with other social movements can bring to the more isolated unions based in

liberal market economies. Of importance in the US has been the focus on modest

sized community-based organisations of low-wage and migrant workers (Munck,

2011) which has been successful in raising wages and improving working conditions

(Fine, 2005). Likewise, Wills and Sims (2004) comment that coalition building with

non-labour groups has been one of the most widely implemented strategies by

British unions despite the literature’s tendency to focus on organising and social

partnership as the main strategies of UK unions. Wills (2004) argues that British

unions are rebuilding connections with the local community to increase their

influence and strength, but such a strategy in still incipient.

In Germany, coalition building has been a longstanding strategy by which

trade unions access resources (Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers, 2009). Such coalitions

have been more geared towards building awareness of topics around environmental

issues, racism, globalisation and unemployment (Behrens et al., 2003). Yet, the

extent to which these topics are developed depends on the union’s size and the

importance of the issue. Larger unions are more likely to have special departments

responsible for these topics, although coalitions tend to be more sporadic and short

term (Behrens et al., 2003). Despite the centrality of this strategy in some national

labour movements, forming coalitions does not necessarily translate into renewal.

This is mainly because trade unions are being pushed into forming coalitions due to

their experienced weakness (Frege et al., 2004) and not due to a long-term

established strategic plan.

55

3.3.4. Labour-Management Partnership

Several authors have ventured a definition of this strategy as it is one of the most

prevalent in the literature. This chapter will use the definition by Fichter and Greer

(2004) provided in their varieties of unionism book, where social partnership is

defined as “formally structured, ongoing relations of cooperation between unions

and employers, whether at the national, regional or sectoral level, between unions

and employers associations or within enterprises between worker and management

representatives” (p.71). Further clarification of exactly what constitutes a social

partnership strategy was made by Martinez-Lucio and Stuart (2004; 2002a; 2002b)

indicating that partnership with employers is only a tool for union revitalisation

when is institutionally embedded and integrated into a union strategy to counter or

prevent attacks from governments and employers. Usually, social partnership means

the development of mutual gains between employers and trade unions and a policy

agenda covering a wide range of topics (e.g., collective bargaining, working

conditions, social policy goals) (Fichter and Greer, 2004; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart,

2004): a summary of these factors is presented in table 3. In addition, Oxenbridge

and Brown (2002) discussed how union influence tends to be higher when there is an

informal type of partnership that is also backed by higher levels of workplace

unionisation, concluding that, perhaps, formal social partnerships are not providing

the expected gains for labour.

There is debate in the literature on the success of this strategy for trade union

renewal. For some authors, social partnership is favourable to unions because with

such cooperation, unions can regain the initiative and rebuild their institutional

presence in society (Ackers and Payne, 1998). Similarly, for Terry (2003),

partnership offers unions the opportunity to restore legitimacy and reinforce their

organisational foundations. However, the mutual gains approach has been widely

criticised in the literature in view of its skew towards the management side (Guest

and Peccei, 2001; Kelly, 1998; 2004; Heery, 2002; 2005; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart,

2004; Dobbins and Dundon, 2017). As this strategy means engaging in cooperation

with employers, this may be risky as it could potentially de-mobilise trade unions

and disseminate amongst workers the managers’ ideology (Kelly, 1998). Moreover,

such a cooperative relationship with employers can move trade unions away from an

adversarial and/or independent culture of industrial relations in exchange for

commitments on a range of employment issues (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005).

56

The research conducted on this strategy seems to agree with the latter interpretations,

where engaging in social partnerships with employers does not necessarily result in

net gains for workers (Kelly, 1998).

The labour-management partnership strategy has been the main activity

pursued by British trade unions (Badigannavar, and Kelly, 2011; Martinez-Lucio and

Stuart, 2004; Bacon and Storey, 2000; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Kelly, 2004;

McIlroy, 2008). It was of such importance that the main confederation of British

trade unions (TUC) and the 1997 Labour Government in Britain created different

funds and institutions to promote it. The TUC went as far as outlining the conditions

that any partnership approach needed to have in order for it to be considered a formal

social partnership. Amongst these conditions were shared commitment to the

business goals of the organisation, clear recognition of differences of interest and

priorities between the parties, flexibility of employment not being at the expense of

employees’ security; and well-informed consultation (Brown, 2000). The role of

Britain’s main confederation in the implementation of this strategy has been strongly

criticised by McIlroy (2008), stating that the role played by the TUC was to

compensate unions for their failure as a guarantor of workers and not to bring about

real gains for workers.

3.3.5. Political Action

This strategy refers to the influence trade unions may exert at many different levels

of government with the aim of influencing the policy-making process (Hamann and

Kelly, 2004; Baccaro et al., 2003). Arguably, trade unions engage in political action

as they can draw from political parties the support they need (Hamann, 2012;

Hamann 2018; Connolly and Darlington, 2012). The literature distinguishes several

forms of political action, of which the most common are to support political actors in

elections, to press for legislation that affects them or their members, to ensure

legislation is effectively implemented and voter mobilisation (Hamann and Kelly,

2004; Hamann 2018). Due to the different political and institutional contexts in

different countries, political action can take several forms. A summary of these

factors is presented in table 3.

The research suggests that when institutional channels for labour-friendly

policies tend to be weak, trade unions have a tendency to focus on building

coalitions with other social movements (Upchurch et al., 2009; Upchurch, Croucher,

57

and Flynn, 2012; Upchurch and Mathers, 2012) and with political parties (Baccaro et

al., 2003; Connolly and Darlington, 2012). As a result, the labour movements in

most industrialised countries have shown a tendency to rely on political engagement

to revitalise (Baccaro et al., 2003; Hamann 2018).

Political action in Britain has sometimes involved mobilisation of workers

through strike action, combined with left-wing ideological opposition to both

employers and government, which has paved the way to advancing workers’

interests and to revitalizing union organization (Connolly and Darlington, 2012)

although trade unions also have formal relations with the Labour Party and follow

more institutionalised forms of influence. Hamann (2018) agrees but reflects on the

fact that British unions have been experiencing weaker ties with the government and

yet are still able to successfully lobby for legal changes. In the same vein, trade

unions in the US have engaged in increased electoral activity and lobbying, with a

strong emphasis on membership mobilisation, but this has not prevented unions from

losing membership and bargaining power (Hurd et al., 2003; Dörre, Holst, and

Nachtwey, 2009; Hickey, Kuruvilla and Lakhani, 2010). Similarly, German unions

have had a modest degree of political action, in particular lobbying for legislation,

which might explain the limited recovery in union membership and erosion of

bargaining coverage (Behrens et al., 2003; Behrens et al., 2009; Hamann 2018),

although the German context remains robust compared to the UK and the USA due

to the legal regulatory context.

In general, the more positive or negative results of political action as a trade

union renewal strategy seems to be difficult to predict. This is mostly because any

change in a political coalition can also be based on other factors such as

unemployment, the behaviour of employers and the government’s ideology

(Hamann, 2012; Hamann and Kelly, 2004). Moreover, unions might be successful in

obtaining immediate outcomes, but that does not necessarily translate into favourable

policies that would strengthen the union movement (Hamann 2018).

3.3.6. International Links

With the increased internationalisation of economies and cross-border arrangements,

especially for European countries, establishing international links can also be a

relevant strategy to aim at renewal (Fairbrother, 2009). This strategy is best

understood as a set of transnational relationships of and between union organisations

58

rather than as the outcome of the revitalisation strategy of any one labour movement

(Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004). This strategy not only involves national labour

movements extending their national structures into the international arena but also

involves the extension of specific practices, institutions and patterns of national

influence into international contexts (Levesque and Murray, 2010; Martinez-Lucio,

2010; Pulignano, 2010). A summary of these factors is presented in table 3.

Globalisation has challenged unions more than ever to become transnational

and to resort to a variety of new organisational activities (Martinez-Lucio, 2010) to

the point where transnational networking is becoming more systematic (Lillie and

Martinez-Lucio, 2004). Such international networking can take different forms:

union collaboration within transnational corporations and sectors (Martinez-Lucio

and Weston, 1992), consultation within Europe-based transnational corporations

(Pulignano, 2010), new forms of social engagement as a way of making regulatory

bodies aware of the growing inequities in societies (Lillie and Martinez-Lucio, 2004)

and mutual learning and sharing from unions (Martinez-Lucio and Weston, 2000).

Overall, transnational agreements can strengthen the trade unions’ influence in a

context otherwise characterised at having limited union rights (Mustchin and

Martinez-Lucio, 2017).

This strategy has been more salient in the UK and in Germany. British unions

have engaged in international networking, especially through European Works

Councils, and although such cooperation has been relatively extensive, tangible

outcomes of that relationship cannot be determined (Heery et al., 2003). Similarly,

when discussing links between British trade unions and their international

counterparts, the evidence is scarce. There have been several meetings but none has

resulted in formal arrangements. Similarly, international solidarity in the US focuses

on collective bargaining and company-based regulation (Lillie and Martinez-Lucio,

2004). The problem is that for both UK and US trade unions, transnational

cooperation is limited and can also be a source of conflict and competition

(Martinez-Lucio, 2010; Stewart and Smith, 2010; Lillie and Martinez-Lucio, 2004).

Contrastingly, German unions have been active in attempting cross-border

agreements with the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; however, there is no

sign of imminent European-level collective bargaining and wage agreements

(Behrens et al., 2003). What follows next are two additional elements to this six-

dimensional model presented by Frege and Kelly (2004).

59

In addition to these six strategies for renewal, skill formation and social

media platforms were included in this research given their recent predominance in

the labour revitalization literature (e.g., Mustchin, 2012 on learning and Bryson et

al., 2010 on social media). Both strategies are described below.

3.3.7. Skill Formation, Training and Learning

Skill formation has been deemed central to the process of trade union renewal for

several years by this stage. The main idea is that the process of renewal and of

modernisation can be supported and encouraged through training and skill formation

of workers and of trade union activists (Fairbrother, 2009; Martinez-Lucio and

Mustchin, 2013; Mustchin, 2012; Findlay and Warhurst, 2011; Wallis, Stuart and

Greenwood, 2005; Findlay and McKinlay, 2003). Research shows that union-led

learning can contribute to revitalisation because it enhances the relationship trade

unions leaders have with their existing and potential new members and increases

activism within the union (Findlay and Warhurst, 2011).

Union involvement in skill formation leading to renewal has two facets. The

first focuses on the notion of concentrating on the development of the workers’

skillsets, ensuring they can rapidly adapt to the labour market’s changing conditions

(Stroud, 2012; Heyes, 2007). The second notion focuses on how trade union leaders

develop their own skills to better assist members (Warhurst, Findlay and Thompson,

2006) and bargain with employers from a stronger position (Stroud, 2012) in terms

of knowledge and capability. The research suggests that skill formation aids in

organising and coalition building because it attracts more diverse constituents such

as non-standard workers (Mustchin, 2012), thereby enhancing recruitment. Training

also helps in the implementation of community-based union learning centres, e.g. to

help migrant workers and minority ethnic groups to face the social and economic

exclusion that they tend to suffer (Martinez-Lucio and Perrett, 2009). Likewise,

training of union leaders supports renewal because activists are more adequately

trained to represent workers and to engage in mobilising campaigns (Heyes and

Rainbird, 2011). Overall, the research has supported the idea that learning and skill

formation can contribute to the improvement of industrial relations (Warhurst et al.,

2006). A summary of these factors is presented in table 3.

There are differences between countries as to how the involvement of trade

unions in training provision happens. In liberal market economies, training

60

arrangements are mainly driven by management although they may be subject to

collective bargaining, where trade unions may have limited capacity. Contrastingly,

in coordinated market economies, unions tend to participate more in the provision of

training as they work together with the employer to ensure the development of

training activities (Stroud, 2012). Nevertheless, the debate on union learning leading

to renewal has been more prominent in the UK, where the state has implemented

Union Learning Funds (ULF) whereby, through the work of union learning

representatives, trade unions are involved in accessing funds and establishing

learning centres to conduct training for their members (Heyes and Rainbird, 2011).

The involvement of trade unions and the ULF was premised on cooperation between

these two actors, which prompted debate (Mustchin, 2012). On the one hand,

McIlroy (2008) believes that revitalisation through these types of activities is limited

given that the learning provided through such cooperation with the state would

potentially hinder the necessary progressive thinking required for trade union

renewal. In the same vein, Ewing (2005) argues that these funds mean subordinating

the unions’ interests and objectives to those of the state. On the other hand, Heyes

and Rainbird (2011) and Rainbird and Stuart (2011) argue that although funded by

the state, these funds produce the space needed for trade unions to choose the

training they want to provide for their members. The evidence also shows a clear

link between learning and union organising at the workplace level, which by

extension can prompt revitalisation (Warhurst et al., 2006). Specifically, when

unions engage in skill formation, this can enhance positive attitudes towards unions

and facilitate the recruitment of new members.

3.3.8. Social Media Platforms

The use of social media to organise workers, communicate with them and mobilise

them to action has been recently developed in the literature of union renewal (Bryson

et al., 2010). By using the new information technology available, trade unions can

implement creative modes of communication that help them to communicate their

agendas beyond any existing boundaries (Levesque and Murray, 2010). Several

authors have engaged in research regarding the use of social media by trade unions.

According to Panagiotopoulos and Barnett (2015) social media strategies

implemented by unions are mostly driven by expectations of modernisation and

pressures from their members. Kerr and Waddington (2014) explain that nowadays,

61

trade unions are using information technology in a wide array of activities that

includes assistance in negotiations, as an internal administrative tool, in organising

campaigns and to communicate with members and with international labour-related

groups. Bryson et al., (2010) explain that social media platforms can be an important

instrument to acquire high rates of membership, especially at a moment in time

where membership-based institutions are falling. These authors believe trade unions

should learn how to market their benefits by using techniques from contemporary

membership-based institutions such as Facebook. Downplaying the role that social

media platforms can have for organising and communicating is Zittrain (2008), who

believes that these platforms are simply another tool that trade unions can use to

organise and do not translate into any renewal capability.

Recent research supports the notion of Bryson et al., (2010) that the use of

social media enhances organisation of workers (Frangi and Zhang, 2018; Anduiza,

Cristancho and Sabucedo, 2014; Greene, Hogan and Grieco, 2003; Martinez-Lucio,

2003; Greene and Kirton, 2003). Greene et al., (2003) argue that Internet and

electronic forms of communications can facilitate information and resource

dissemination, thus enhancing organising. Likewise, by using these platforms, trade

unions can become more inclusive of workers who might be under-represented

(Greene and Kirton, 2003; Thornthwaite, Balnave and Barnes, 2018). The argument

for this is that since activism often requires the presence of people during meetings,

and these are held at times and in spaces that may be in conflict with caring

responsibilities, organising through social media can help to boost the participation

of workers who have caring responsibilities and/or atypical job arrangements. In

addition, unions enhancing communication through these platforms can potentially

open up training opportunities to a wider group of members (Greene et al, 2003) and

enhance transnational labour solidarity (Geelan and Hodder, 2017). Barnes, Balnave,

Thornthwaite and Manning (2019) agree, mentioning that social media can

reconfigure dramatically the way employees express their voice, which can

contribute to the regeneration of unions.

The research supports these claims, with several articles demonstrating the

utility of social media in enhancing communication of trade union members

(Panagiotopoulos, 2012; Panagiotopoulos and Barnett, 2015; Geelan and Hodder,

2017). However, this is not to say that electronic communications are completely

replacing the way trade unions engage with their members, rather, it shows that

62

electronic forms of communication can and do co-exist with traditional forms of

communication and organising. Furthermore, a recent survey conducted by

Thornthwaite et al., (2018) supports the combination of these communications but

grants predominance to traditional forms. This survey indicates that more traditional

communication channels (e.g. face‐to‐face contact and email) are still the preferred

means of communication between trade union members.

Despite the positive outcomes of implementing social media platforms to

enhance the work of unions, it is important to understand that this does not

necessarily mean that any trade union implementing social media to improve

organising will succeed. As illustrated by Martinez-Lucio (2003) the use of social

media may be dependent upon union identity, union democracy and a range of

organisational and social contingencies. Panagiotopoulos (2012) makes another

contribution relating to the use of social media by indicating that Internet skills and

experience are two of the main characteristics of members who would likely support

information sharing and networking activities through electronic communications

systems. Moreover, Panagiotopoulos and Barnett (2015) mention that the use of

different channels for communication (including social media) is based on

organisational variables such as the size of their membership base and participation

in communities that promote the use of social media. A summary of these factors is

presented in table 3. This strategy has been more salient in the Spanish context,

where trade unions have made wide use of social media platforms (e.g. Facebook

and Twitter) to organise protests and mobilise (see Anduiza et al., 2014 and

Martinez-Lucio, 2003 for general discussion).

As was initially argued, the literature on trade union revitalisation has been

mostly developed in the European and North-American context. As this thesis

represents an attempt to move away from such contexts, the next paragraphs will be

focused on framing the labour revitalisation research in the Latin American context

by describing the general trends adopted by the labour movement in countries in the

Southern Cone region, namely Argentina and Brazil. The analysis will show that

when research moves away from developed countries, the labour movement’s

choices tend to shift.

In Argentina, the most widely described renewal strategies have been

organising, coalition building and political action. The Argentinian trade unions are

known in the region for their mobilising capabilities and contestation, which may

63

have translated into enhanced organising and campaigning for increased employment

regulation (Atzeni and Ghigliani, 2009). Likewise, political action has been strongly

developed since the governments of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner enhanced the

establishment of collective agreements and social dialogue (Cato and Ventrici, 2011;

Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). Likewise, the political action strategy was also

clearly developed by the labour movements in Brazil, where the Worker’s Party

participated in the government’s election in 2003, which gave momentum and a new

source of political power to the Brazilian trade union movement (Ramalho, 2009;

Munck, 2011). This strategy may have shifted due to the recent political scenario

that Brazil has gone through, with the impeachment of the Worker’s Party president

Dilma Rousseff and the new election of right-wing President, Jair Bolsonaro.

Despite the development of the political action strategy that once flourished in

Brazil, other activities for renewal such as organising, restructuring or coalition

building were not so clear in the literature. These two country examples from the

Latin American region illustrate the importance of political, economic and historical

institutions in shaping and understanding the activities implemented by organised

labour in terms of renewal.

3.3.9. Other theories of trade union renewal: the question of servicing,

bureaucracy and the state

Despite the majority of research on trade union renewal centring round an

understanding of the importance of Frege and Kelly’s (2004) theoretical framework,

there are other theories to assess the process of trade union renewal. These studies,

although relevant, have not been conducted in the same systematic manner as Frege

and Kelly’s work. Serrano (2014), Wever (1998) and Boxall and Haynes (1997)

present alternative frameworks to analyse renewal. Boxall and Haynes (1997)

researched unions’ strategies and effectiveness in a neo-liberal environment (e.g.,

New Zealand). Renewal strategies can then be described in terms of two dimensions

that intersect with each other: union-worker relations and union-employer relations.

As a result, they identified four broad patterns of strategy: classic unionism, paper

tiger unionism, consultancy unionism and partnership unionism. Classic unionism

refers to servicing worker relations plus a solid organising strategy and a robust

adversarial relationship with employers with no incorporation of unions; paper tiger

unionism refers to only servicing worker relations and a formalistic and adversarial

64

relationship with employers; partnership unionism refers to a servicing worker

relationship accompanied by a solid organising strategy and where the relationship

with employers is credible, along with extensive cooperation practices; and finally,

consultancy unionism refers to a mostly servicing and limited organising strategy for

worker relations paired with a routine adversarial relationship with some cooperative

practices (Boxall and Haynes, 1997). These authors conclude that when patterns of

union-worker relationships are based on servicing, this is detrimental to the unions,

making them vulnerable. In turn, when patterns of union-worker interactions

complement servicing with other forms of organising, trade unions are more secure

in their role and chances of survival. This is a point that is central to aspects of the

findings of the present thesis.

Serrano’s (2014) framework distinguishes two approaches to the logic of

union renewal, namely, accommodation and transformation. The logic of

accommodation is embedded in and constrained by the external environment of a

trade union. Therefore, short-term solutions to problems confronting unions are

sought within existing economic and social frameworks, often involving ‘fire-

fighting’ activities. This implies that unions with an accommodation logic tend to

defend the existing institutional sources of union influence and power (e.g.,

centralised bargaining, works councils or political party linkages). They do not

challenge or seek alternative forms to enhance their influence. The transformation

logic seeks to challenge existing institutional regimes and the dominant political

economy. This logic seeks to address the roots of the crisis of trade unionism.

Serrano (2014) explains that these two logics can coexist, and that unions are able to

alternate between them.

Wever (1998) describes two basic union revitalization strategies and, in her

study, adds a third strategy. The first strategy, most common in the USA, is for

workers to add value to the product or service, thus making their activity less

dispensable and raising wages by increasing productivity and quality. The second

strategy, most common in Europe, involves adjustments to the institutions of

employment relations to allow for greater flexibility within the framework of

industry-wide bargaining. Both strategies are the result of employers being critical of

the traditional processes of collective bargaining and their outcomes. There is a third

strategy whereby unions attempt to organise workers outside the field of industrial

relations and represent interests that go beyond but can also include the traditional

65

topics of bargaining; it refers to organising and representing new members and new

interests. Although dated, Wever’s (1998) analysis of enlarging the field of action of

trade unions can be considered an antecedent of Frege and Kelly’s (2004) organising

strategy. Wever’s (1998) theory is also similar to that of Bernaciak et al., (2014) who

argued that trade unions should concentrate on new members’ interests (e.g. women,

the young, migrants and precarious workers) if they wanted to revitalise their

movement.

The state can also facilitate the process of renewal by fostering programmes

that seek to improve the unions’ capabilities (Mustchin, 2012; Stuart et al., 2011;

Rainbird and Stuart, 2011; Pulignano, 2010). This is the case with the UK’s Trade

Union Modernisation Fund (UMF) that financed projects aiming at improving the

capacity and relevance of trade unions in relation to their employers and to the

changing workforce. There are authors who believe these projects are positive for

trade unions as they were aimed at promoting labour-management partnerships,

workplace change and increased learning for trade unions and their constituents

(Stuart et al., 2011). Other authors have expressed disapproval of these funds by

questioning the genuine reasons of the state for providing those funds (Ewing, 2005)

and for the alignment in interests that they could generate between trade unions and

the state (McIlroy, 2008).

Transnational bodies can also aid trade union renewal. Pulignano (2010)

researched transcending national regulation in regards to trade union renewal,

concentrating on the direct influence of EU institutions within the policy-making

process for the progress of European economic and political integration. She

concluded that the emergence of social dialogue initiatives and capability building

through EU funding have elicited the creation of new forms of networking between

social partners and the development of frameworks of learning, knowledge and

skills. However, in these studies the state is seen to have an agenda to propagate a

more partnership and servicing model of renewal; so, we need to be alert to these

issues in any study.

3.4. Chapter Discussion

This section has described the theoretical framework of trade union renewal, as well

as the strategies outlined in the literature that can led to revitalisation of the labour

movement. Due to its comprehensiveness, Frege and Kelly’s (2004) framework has

66

been widely used in the literature to address trade union renewal. In this framework,

the strategies of organising, restructuring, coalition building, political action, social

partnership and international links were outlined as the main activities through which

national unions can achieve revitalisation. Recently, skill formation and the

implementation of social media platforms were included in the literature as

additional strategies for renewal and, thus, were added in this thesis to the

framework. All these strategies were embedded in four dimensions, namely the

membership, economic, political and institutional dimensions.

The section has also discussed how each strategy for renewal can be more

salient in one context than in others as the patterns of union revitalisation tended to

be dependent on a country’s institutional arrangements, political frameworks and

general orientation towards a capitalist economy. This closely linked with the

discussion regarding which factors influence the choice of renewal strategy. Frege

and Kelly’s (2004) framework highlighted the trade union’s external and internal

factors that, according to its variations, can shape the options chosen by trade unions

to revitalise. Hence, different contexts may be associated with different types of

union problems and crises. As a result, in liberal market economies (e.g., the UK and

US), where legitimacy of unions depends on labours’ strength, trade unions may

choose to focus on activities that would bring more constituents into their

organisation, such as the organising strategy. Opposite to this were the coordinated

market economies (e.g., Germany and the Netherlands) where longstanding

institutions account for the strength of the trade unions, therefore trade unions can

rely on the institutional framework to engage members, meaning they have tended to

focus instead on alternative activities to bring about renewal, although this has been

changing (Connolly et al., 2017).

Another topic of interest in the discussion of renewal has been the success of

these strategies in restoring the unions’ influence. The discussion seemed to

highlight the conclusion that there was no one best practice to effect revitalisation of

labour movements, but rather, a combination of strategies was what tended to work

best (Frege and Kelly, 2004). This links to the question of how to measure the

success of renewal. Some authors commented on enlarged union density and

increased activism as outcomes of renewal (Gall and Fiorito, 2007; Heery and Adler,

2004; Kelly, 1998), while others indicated that such measures were too narrow to

determine the success of trade union renewal (Hickey et al., 2010).

67

Whilst significant for the thesis, Frege and Kelly’s (2004) framework argued

that a union’s actions may at times be constrained by institutional, political and

economic factors, although they tend to emphasize that trade unions may have some

leeway for making a choice regarding which type of strategy to implement. Although

the thesis points out that trade union officials and activists can have some choices in

the type of strategy they use for the purpose of revitalization, the results of the thesis

showed that a selection of such strategies remains considerably constrained by

contextual variables such as a country’s institutional context, economic and political

traditions, and management practices.

Overall, the two separate literature reviews on the topic of industrial relations

and the process of trade union renewal have helped us to understand the issue of

context and strategy. The first literature review concentrated on reviewing central

topics of industrial relations. The three perspectives for the study of IR were

outlined, considering the unitarist, pluralist and critical perspectives. Of particular

importance for this research was institutional theory, a framework born in the field of

political science and which emphasises the importance of history in the development

of a country’s political and economic institutions. The most widely used

methodology within institutional theory is comparative research, a technique

commonly used to achieve cross-national comparisons between different countries’

institutions. Comparative research has produced evidence of the reasons behind the

variation of systems of IR and the labour movement in different locations. As

Hyman (2001) argued, comparing systems has practical and theoretical importance,

but it has difficulties due to the tendency to generalise. Locke and Thelen’s (1995)

argument also tended to criticise the comparative approach, as they explained that

comparing systems of IR only provided a snapshot of the situation. Instead, they

believed in the importance of making contextualised comparisons to emphasise the

differences that make a context unique.

The first literature review ended with a review of the transformation that IR

and the employment relationship have suffered due to globalisation, capital mobility

and internationalisation of production. These changes have challenged the labour

movement, which is starting to show the strains of dealing with an ongoing crisis of

organised labour. Diminished trade union membership and bargaining power have

been the most cited outcomes of this crisis, and with them, the predominance of the

68

weakening practices implemented by the employer; these were also discussed at

length.

The second literature review focused on presenting the responses that

organised labour has implemented to face the challenges posed by neo-liberalism

and globalisation through aspects of the union revitalisation debate. As a result of

widespread neo-liberalism, unions have been forced to resort to a range of activities

and search for the most appropriate activities that will help them to achieve renewal.

After having contextualised the topic of trade union renewal in the

international literature, the next chapter will introduce the Chilean context, where

this research took place. The aim is to outline this country’s salient features to

understand the functioning of the revitalisation process in such a context.

69

CHAPTER 4: Chile’s Industrial Relations Context

4.1. Introduction

This chapter reviews Chile’s industrial relations system as well as the country’s

political and economic background. Such contextualisation is needed to further

understand employment relations as well as the framing process of trade union

renewal choices. The chapter begins with an overview of the country’s relevant

history and then revisits the different political periods, governments and main labour

reforms. The second section addresses individual and collective labour rights,

together with a description of the collective bargaining process and a discussion of

how regulation is used to undermine workers’ rights. The third and final section

argues that the features of the Chilean political and economic context shape the way

trade unions respond to their challenges and how they engage in the process of

renewal. The chapter is detailed because of the need to understand the nuances and

contradictions of the Chilean system of regulation and representation within

industrial relations: especially in the light of ongoing attempts to stereotype and

typecast the country as being either neo-liberal without significant forms of labour

rights, or as radical and labour oriented as a system due to its history and past

configurations politically. We need to respectively understand the general trends and

directions of the country but also the way political interruptions create contradictions

and ongoing tensions between the attempt to establish worker rights and the general

direction of economy policy, for example.

As Chile is part of Latin America, a brief description of the region will be

offered first. Latin America has been integrated into the global economy for several

decades by this stage and has been increasing its competitiveness and modernisation

(Calderon and Castells, 2014; Ebenau, 2012). Likewise, the economic changes that

the world has witnessed in the past decades and that have influenced the institutions

of collective bargaining, employment protection and trade unions (Thelen, 2009;

Hall and Thelen, 2009; Pierson, 2000) have also reached the Chilean context

(Gamonal, 2011; Palacios-Valladares, 2010). As a politically stable country, Chile

has strong links with all relevant labour-related international bodies. The country

also ratified both ILO’s conventions related to freedom of association (No. 87) and

70

to the right to organise and to conduct collective bargaining (No.98) during the year

1999 (Cross and Balckburn, 2016; Frias, 2008).

As a liberal market economy (Ebenau, 2012), Chile’s institutions and

employment relations have a tendency towards a more marketized capitalism, often

aiming towards deregulation, especially in regards to labour legislation (Ugarte,

2008; Marzi, 2017; Duran, 2013; Duran and Kremerman, 2015). Paired with this, the

country has a significant income inequality, marked primarily by a strong power

imbalance between employers and workers (Contreras, 2003; Duran, 2013; Soto and

Torche, 2004; Rodriguez and Rios, 2009). Against this backdrop, workers’

organisations tend to be perceived by employers as problematic and un-cooperative

towards the companies’ objectives and, in general, Chilean employers are not

sympathetic to the presence of trade unions in their workplaces (Baltera and Munoz,

2017; Henriquez, 2014). The latest National Labour Survey (Direccion del Trabajo,

2014) shows considerable levels of anti-union practices, with nearly half of the

surveyed companies indicating a negative attitude towards trade unions and the right

to freedom of association. In addition, the academic literature often portrays the

Chilean state as a static actor in the system of industrial relations, not showing much

real intervention (Gamonal, 2011; Barrett, 2001; Cook, 1998; Doniez, 2012). After

several efforts at regulating and reforming the employment relationship, much

criticism is made in the literature about the ambivalence of the Chilean state’s

legislation regarding the employment relationship (Bronstein, 2010; Frank, 2002;

Haagh, 2002; Cook, 1998; Lopez, 2007; Ulloa, 2003).

The neo-liberal basis of Chilean employment regulations directly derives

from the 1979 Labour Plan that was developed and implemented during Augusto

Pinochet’s government (Ugarte, 2008, Gamonal, 2011, Barrett, 2001, Rodriguez and

Rios, 2009, Duran, 2013). At first, Pinochet implemented a repressive system where

signs of collective action were prohibited (Undurraga, 2012; Campero and Cortazar,

1986; Riesco, 2009; Cross and Blackburn, 2016). After growing opposition,

Pinochet freed up some of the control mechanisms over political parties and

collective rights, allowing for a relatively more open yet still constrained industrial

relations system (Frank, 2000; 2009, Barrett, 2001). However, the country’s

legislation, and in particular labour regulation, remained neo-liberal at its core

(Ffrench-Davis, 2010; Bronstein, 2010). Experts have emphasised the neo-liberal

basis of the 1979 Labour Plan based on its encouragement of market deregulation,

71

limitation of worker’s collective rights and overall introduction of flexibility in the

employment relationship (Vejar 2012, Duran-Palma et al., 2005).

Research conducted in the country shows a general discontent with

Pinochet’s labour legislation (Haagh, 2002; Gamonal, 2011; Duran, 2013; Duran and

Kremerman, 2015). Since 1979, four major labour reforms have been developed

aiming to modernise the employment relationship by, supposedly, restoring the

balance of power between workers and employers (Vejar, 2014; Rodriguez and Rios,

2009). However, these labour reforms have been widely criticised by academics,

practitioners and the general public due to their limited transformation of Pinochet’s

Labour Plan (Duran, 2013; Frank, 2002; Ugarte, 2008). Despite the introduction of

significant changes to both individual and collective rights, the employment

relationship remains imbalanced, biased towards the employer’s side, showing the

strains of the neo-liberal context.

4.2. The Context of Chilean Politics and Economy

With the integration of Chile into the international economy, several problems

emerged at political, economic and social levels. This section identifies these issues

as well as the country’s political and economic characteristics. This is important

since, as explained by Teague (2009), a country’s political and economic contexts

have a tendency to shape its institutions, a topic that is relevant for this research. The

main political periods will be described, as well as the labour reforms attempted and

the social dialogue initiatives implemented.

4.2.1. Political and economic background

Chile’s economy after its independence from Spain during the 1820s was heavily

based on mining and agriculture. Chile’s economy continued to grow and the War of

the Pacific (also called the Salt-Pepper War) exploded due to the region’s desire to

dominate the nitrate industry (Bulnes, 1920; Villalobos, 2004; Sater, 2007; Drake,

2003). After the war ended and the nitrate activity was incorporated to the country’s

economy, the Chilean labour movement started to develop (Plaza and Carrasco,

2013; Grez, 2007; Remmer, 1980). During this period, the first laws to favour

workers were implemented, such as Sunday rest and workplace safety (Frias, 1989;

2008). The labour movement gained considerable momentum. Plaza and Carrasco

(2013) argue that trade unionism in Chile was fully developed during the period of

72

the world’s increasing demand for nitrates exported by Chile; evidence of this is the

fact that in 1909 the first Chilean union centre was formed, named ‘Federation of

Chilean Workers’ (Gran Federacion Obrera de Chile, FOCH in Spanish). This

confederation would pave the way for other national federations to come into being

later on (in 1936, the Confederation of Workers (CTCH) and in 1953, the Central

Union of Workers (CUT)).

Arturo Alessandri Palma became the country’s president in 1920 (in office

until 1924 and then again from 1934 to 1938), being primarily concerned with social

laws favouring the working class. Under his and Carlos Ibanez del Campo’s first

terms of office (1927-1931) the first official laws regarding labour rights in terms of

social security, health and safety, conflict resolution, trade unionism and collective

bargaining were passed (Frias, 2008). This served as the first Labour Code in the

country and, indeed, of the Latin American region, combining a mixture of control

and state intervention over trade unionism (Frias, 2008). This Labour Code, with

some minor modifications, would rule the country’s labour relations until 1973. For

a summary of the country’s presidents and political parties since the beginning of the

Republic, see table 4.

The country began to regain its economic stability as the 1930s approached,

and continued to be ruled by a succession of labour-friendly governments such as

those of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1942), Juan Antonio Ríos (1942-1945), Gabriel

González Videla (1946-1952) and the second term of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo

(1952-1958). During the 1960s, the Popular Unity coalition was created by the

Radical, Communist and Socialist parties as a coalition of left and centre-left parties.

Their goal was to strengthen democracy and the economic development of the

country (Frias, 2008). Popular Unity dedicated significant efforts to the country’s

industrialisation and increasing urbanisation. The importance of the Popular Unity

regarding trade unionism is that, for the first time, the labour movement was present

in the political sphere. According to Frias (2008) this relationship between trade

unionism and political parties would be characterised by subordination and lack of

autonomy on the trade union side (Frias, 2008; Salinero, 2004; 2006).

Internal conflicts within the Popular Unity front became more obvious when

the Socialist and Communist Parties found themselves opposed over what should be

the country’s future policies. After several successful populist governments, Jorge

Alessandri (1958-1964), the son of former President Arturo Alessandri, came to

73

power using a managerial approach to government (Kornbluh, 2003). His

government was oriented towards a more market-based capitalist approach, focused

on cutting public expenditure, controlling inflation, signing free trade treaties with

other Latin American countries and implementing tax reforms. With the increased

implementation of these policies, the country became politically divided between

those represented by a new presidential candidate, Salvador Allende and others who

supported Eduardo Frei Montalva. These two candidates would face elections in a

scenario where political awareness and mobilisation were growing.

According to Correa and Subercaseaux, (1996) the United States’ influence

in Latin America in the midst of the Cold War made the humanist policies of

Eduardo Frei Montalva more feasible to implement in the country as they also

represented an interesting alternative to that of capitalism and socialism. Eduardo

Frei Montalva (1964-1970) won the 1964 elections and ruled the country with a

focus on building cooperatives and new social organisations such as neighbourhood

associations and youth centres aiming to improve the living conditions of

marginalised sectors. Changes made at the social level were implemented mostly by

communities, and therefore, more strength was given to collectivism, cooperation

and trade unionism. Frei Montalva’s more ‘humanistic’ and liberal government

agenda tended to clash with the more socialist policies of Salvador Allende, who

once again planned to run for the 1970 presidential elections as the Popular Unity

candidate and then won, heavily backed by the Socialist and Communist parties, but

opposed by the United States (Cross and Blackburn, 2016; Campero, 1979).

Under Allende, Chile nationalised the mining industry, accelerated land

redistribution and increased workers’ wages. These policies would earn him the

disapproval of the United States’ president, Richard Nixon, who was said to boycott

Allende’s government by denying any possible loans (Correa and Subercaseaux,

1996). The country’s economy plummeted shortly after, with a major budget deficit

and uncontrollable inflation that brought about a growing black market. That

scenario could have led to the coup d’etat implemented by Augusto Pinochet in

1973. Pinochet’s regime would build its actions around a plan of actively countering

most of Allende’s socialist policies while liberalising the country’s economy.

74

Table 4: Summary of the most relevant Chilean Presidents since the

Presidential Republic.

Historical

Period/

Orientation

President Year in

office Political Party Coalition

Popular Unity

governments

Arturo Alessandri Palma 1920-1924 Liberal No Coalition

Carlos Ibáñez del Campo 1927-1931 Independent No Coalition

Arturo Alessandri Palma 1932-1938 Liberal - Popular No Coalition

Pedro Aguirre Cerda 1938-1941 Radical Popular Front

Juan Antonio Ríos 1942-1945 Radical No Coalition

Carlos Ibáñez del Campo 1952-1958 Independent

Feminist Party, Labour-

Agrarian Party, Socialist

Party

Centre-right Jorge Alessandri

Rodríguez 1958-1964 Independent

Liberal Party and

Conservative Party

Centre-left Eduardo Frei Montalva 1964-1970 Christian

Democrat No Coalition

Popular Unity

government Salvador Allende 1970-1973 Socialist Popular Unity

Military

Dictatorship -

Liberal

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte 1973-1990 Liberal Military Government

Transition

Period – Centre

left

Patricio Aylwin 1990-1994 Christian

Democrat

Coalition of Parties for

Democracy

Eduardo Frei Ruiz Tagle 1994-2000 Christian

Democrat


Democracy

Centre-left Ricardo Lagos Escobar 2000-2006 Party for

Democracy


Democracy

Centre-left Michelle Bachelet 2006-2010 Socialist Coalition of Parties for

Democracy

Centre-right Sebastián Pinera 2010-2014 National

Renewal Coalition for Change

Centre-left Michelle Bachelet 2014-2018 Socialist New Majority

Centre-right Sebastián Pinera 2018-In

Office Independent Chile Vamos


The 1973 military government meant a severe division for the country, not

only in political and economic terms, but also in social and labour-related matters

(Silva, 1995, Bronstein, 2010, Gamonal, 2011, Haagh, 2002). The country

underwent a substantial transformation of its productive structure (Calderon and

Castells, 2014). Over the six years that followed the military coup, employment

relations suffered a change. Unions and confederations were banned from public life,

while the government actively intervened in the few surviving unions, controlling

and confiscating their assets. Some trade union leaders were exiled, imprisoned or

even executed (Cross and Blackburn, 2016; Drake, 2003). This strong repression

lasted until 1980, when Pinochet nuanced his approach to the country’s labour

relations due to growing international pressures. In 1979, José Piñera, Pinochet’s

75

Labour Minister, developed and implemented the Labour Plan, destined to replace

the country’s old labour code dating back to 1931. This new Labour Code was to be

decisive in terms of implementing more neo-liberal labour legislation (Gamonal,

2011; Silva, 1995, Fundacion Sol, 2014; Vejar, 2012; Haagh, 2002).

The Labour Plan’s aim was for labour relations to be regulated by market

forces (Narbona, 2014). As Clark (2015) explains it, the Labour Plan “restricted

collective bargaining to the plant level, limited strike activity and coordination while

instituting a host of measures to discourage unionization and the reconstitution of

ties between organized labour and party politics” (p. 208). The main changes

implemented by the Labour Code are presented in table 5, in regards to collective

bargaining, they anchored it to the company level (Law Decree 2.758 Art.4), limiting

the matters that could be negotiated to merely bargaining over wages and working

conditions (Art. 6 and 7).

Table 5: Summary of 1979 Labour Plan’s main features.

Union Organization

• Enterprise-level union organisation.

• Voluntary union membership.

• Multiple unions operating in the same workplace • National and sectoral federations prohibited.

• No unions allowed in the first year of a business’s existence.

• No organising rights in the public sector.

• No organising rights for workers employed in the agricultural sector or in the newly privatised pensions

and health systems. • Minimum number of workers to form a union.

• Reduction of legal protection for union leaders.

• Financing of unions must come exclusively as ‘voluntary contributions’ from affiliated workers.

Collective Bargaining

• Enterprise-level collective bargaining.

• Collective bargaining forbidden in the first year of a business’s existence.

• Numerous topics excluded from bargaining including ‘all matters that may restrict or limit the

employer’s exclusive right to organise, lead, and manage the firm, and those external to the firm’.

Collective bargaining restricted to wages.

• Elimination of the floor for negotiating wages that guaranteed wages could not be negotiated downward. • Unions were not the exclusive bargaining representatives of workers. Groups of two or more workers

could form ‘bargaining groups’ which were allowed to bargain and sign ‘collective convenios’. • Collective contracts were not the exclusive outcome of collective bargaining. Collective ‘convenios’

could be signed by unions and bargaining groups in a non-regulated process of collective bargaining that

did not allow for the right to strike

Right to Strike

• Strikes can only take place during the collective bargaining process.

• Strikes limited to a maximum of 60 days, after which workers would be automatically dismissed

without compensation (‘voluntary resignation’).

• Striking workers entitled to individually dissociate themselves from the strike and to negotiate

individually after 30 days from the commencement of the strike.

• Employers’ lockout and strikers’ replacement permitted.

• The President of the Republic could deem a strike illegal if it imposed a threat to national security, the

economy, and/or the well-being of the population.

76

The Labour Plan also limited the organising abilities of trade unions, which

could be organised only at company level without any national or sectoral federation

allowed (Law Decree 2.756). Negotiating groups were able to be established in

parallel to trade unions (Art. 22). Workers who were not affiliated to any trade union

could come together into these bargaining groups to exclusively bargain their own

working conditions and benefits with the employer (Montero et al., 2000). Likewise,

the Plan also allowed for multiple and competing trade unions to be established in a

same workplace (Art. 10 and 11). In terms of strikes, the Labour Plan limited the

number of days a worker could be on strike to 60 days, after which the worker was

considered dismissed (Art. 62) and allowed for the replacement of striking workers

(Art. 58). Overall, the Labour Plan restricted collective bargaining and the organising

abilities of trade unions, brought strikes under the market and kept the state from

interfering in trade union activities (Narbona, 2014; Didier and Luna, 2017; Duran

and Kremerman, 2015; Campero and Cortazar, 1986).

Pinochet gave employers ample discretion in the interpretation and

application of the labour law. According to Calderon and Castells (2014), Chile’s

model of development under Pinochet was characterised as authoritarian based on

privatising larger sectors of the economy and limiting public expenditure.

Specifically, his policies mostly aimed at fiscal discipline, cutting public

expenditure, tax reform, trade liberalization, enhancing foreign direct investment,

privatization of national organisations and deregulation of the market (Williamson,

2004; Martinez, Garmendia and Soto, 2012; Riesco, 2009). The adoption of these

policies had a critical role in the configuration of Chilean employment relations and

the economic system (Duran, 2013; Frank, 2000).

In 1983 a gradual reorganisation of political parties emerged. This was

allowed by Pinochet’s adoption of a more nuanced approach to the country’s

politics. Such reinstatement of political parties focused on a plebiscite said to have

been conducted in 1988. That plebiscite would decide on the continuation or not of

Pinochet in power (Silva, 1995; Gamonal, 2011). As a result, the parties that

constituted Pinochet’s opposition were grouped into the Coalition of Parties

(Coalición por el NO in Spanish). After winning the 1988 plebiscite, the Coalition of

Parties was established as a formal political coalition giving, birth to the Coalition of

Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) (Silva, 1995;

Gamonal, 2011). This coalition attained the presidency and stayed in office during

77

four successive governments over the next 20 years (Silva, 1995; Palacios-

Valladares, 2010).

The period from 1990 onwards confronted the complex task of reorganising

and strengthening all institutions disrupted previously (Silva, 1995; Aravena and

Nunez, 2011). Four successive centre-left governments came to office, under the

Coalition of Parties for Democracy: that of Patricio-Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo

Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), Ricardo-Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle-Bachelet

(2006-2010). These governments were greeted by the public with great enthusiasm

and high expectations, hoping that they could reduce the country’s inequality and

restore some form of fairness in labour relations (Barret, 2001; Frank, 2002; Vejar,

2012). The CUT, an institution that was completely dismantled during the

dictatorship and reunited to support the 1988 plebiscite, was especially hoping for

more participation at the national level and in the formulation and control of public

policy (Frias, 2008). Yet, these governments requested moderation in the labour

movements’ demands in order to transition smoothly into democracy (Haagh, 2002;

Frias, 2008; Vejar, 2012). Ultimately, such a moderated approach will influence the

way the economy and industrial relations were conducted. The next section details

the attempts made by the transition governments, in terms of labour legislation, to

restore some of the power taken from workers and trade unions during Pinochet’s

regime.

4.2.2. The Nature of Post-Pinochet policies: Social dialogue initiatives and

labour reforms

This section discusses the different attempts made by Chilean governments during

the transition to democracy to modify Pinochet’s policies and to restore some form

of balance in the employment relationship. Since March 1990, several amendments

to the Chilean labour law have been made. The most significant modifications were

contained in four labour reforms implemented by the subsequent centre-left

governments that ruled the country. Most modifications were made to the workers’

individual rights, which sparked discontent from the overall labour movement

represented by the CUT as they were expecting radical changes to collective rights in

addition (Duran, 2013; Feres and Infante, 2007; Frias, 2008; Gamonal, 2011). The

four implemented labour reforms were balanced between mild changes aiming

towards flexibility (such as the labour reforms of 1991, 1995 and 2001) and direct

78

undermining of collective rights (such as the labour reform of 2015). The description

of the labour reforms is framed within the political periods that came after Pinochet’s

regime. A characterisation of that political and economic context is also presented to

facilitate understanding of the constraints the labour movement experienced in this

period. Such constraints are argued to have shaped the trade unions’ identity and

their consequent responses.

4.2.2.1. Patricio-Aylwin (1990-1994): the re-opening of the industrial relations

space

Patricio-Aylwin (1990-1994) was the first democratically elected president in the

transitional period. Aylwin belonged to the Christian Democratic political party that

was part of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy, which formed in 1988 to oppose

Pinochet’s regime. This coalition reached office with the difficult task of

transitioning the country from the military dictatorship into democracy. In Chile, the

Christian Democratic Party had a centrist democratic position and generally formed

coalitions with the centre-left (Candia and Schaffeld, 2017; Ffrench-Davis and

Stallings, 2001). This party’s policies have been linked to re-distributionist demands

embodied by the Agrarian Reform (which re-distributed the land to its workers),

nationalisation of copper and human rights defence.

Patricio-Aylwin’s government would enhance social coalitions and legal

reforms, and extended tripartite national-level decision-making (Campero, 2000;

Candia and Schaffeld, 2017; Feres, 2008; Ffrench-Davis and Stallings, 2001). The

most emblematic examples of this cooperation were the ‘Framework Agreements’

(Acuerdos Marco in Spanish) on tripartite dialogue signed in 1990. This was the first

ever social dialogue initiative in the country’s history, reuniting employers

represented by the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC), workers

represented by the CUT, and the state. These framework agreements consisted in a

series of socio-economic tripartite agreements that established fundamental

guarantees for a post-Pinochet market economy with a commitment to fostering

dialogue in the country’s decision making (Narbona, 2014; Mizala, and Romaguera,

2001; Van-Klaveren, 2011). There were four framework agreements, the first one in

April of 1990, the second one in April 1991, the third one in April 1992 and the

fourth one in May 1993. All the agreements discussed national minimum wage, re-

adjustments of pensions and sectoral agreements with public and port workers

79

(Narbona, 2014). One of the end goals of these agreements was ensuring dialogue

and that irreconcilable sectors, such as employers and labour, would come together

and jointly discuss changes in legislation. As Cerda and Valenzuela (2012) explain,

these framework agreements were part of a strategic design of growth policies that

favoured ‘stability’ and ‘social peace’, integration into world markets, formation of

human capital and promotion of private investment. The parties had conciliatory

attitudes to foster the process of sustained development, which demanded basic

consensus regarding the economic and political system. Arguably, such consensus

was the only way to face uncertainty in the transition process (Feres, 2008; Campero,

2000; Cerda and Valenzuela, 2012; Candia and Schaffeld, 2017).

In terms of labour regulation, Patricio-Aylwin’s administration was central in

the (relative) revitalisation of trade unionism (Vejar, 2012; Feres, 2008; Diaz-

Corvalan, 1993; Crocco, 2013). He initiated several political dialogues with

parliamentarians to pass four bills regarding employment contracts, job stability,

labour organisations at national level, labour unions and collective bargaining.

During Aylwin’s government, and in the period lasting from 1990 to 1993, several

changes to the labour regulations were made. These changes discussed the process

for labour contract termination (Law 19.010 of 1990), the functioning of national-

level confederations (Law 19.049 of 1991), the autonomy of trade unions and anti-

union practices (Law 19.250 of 1993) and individual rights at work (Law 19.250 of

1993) (Feres, 2008; Candia and Schaffeld, 2017; Rojas-Mino, 2007). Patricio-

Aylwin was also interested in approving a labour reform that was mainly

concentrated on the less controversial side of collective rights (Feres, 2008). Topics

regarding the public worker’s right to organise, mandatory payment of the union fee

in case of obtaining collectively bargained benefits, improvements in immunity from

dismissal for workers and the right to form federations were all included in the

reform.

Despite the progress made, this administration’s labour reform had as its

primary role preserving Chile’s political stability while restoring the power and

legitimacy of unions albeit in a constrained manner (Haagh, 2002; Candia and

Schaffeld, 2017; Feres, 2008). Thus, modifications to the labour law were not as

extensive as the public expected. The labour movement, represented by the CUT,

argued that the Labour Plan was illegitimate as it was implemented during the

dictatorship, thus they were calling for more radical modifications (Cordova, 2005;

80

Narbona, 2014; Cortazar, 1993; 1995). The CUT also faced, during this period, a

redefinition process in their role in the regulation of the employment relationship

(Frias, 2008). The main modifications of this labour reform are presented in table 7.

4.2.2.2. Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000): stabilisation and the constraining

of industrial relations development

The passivity of Chilean governments in terms of labour reforms remained during

Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s government, who came to power in 1994 and remained

until 2000. He was a Christian Democrat who governed with the challenge of further

strengthening the country’s economic performance (Calderon and Castells, 2014).

This government also wanted to go further in terms of labour legislation as

democracy grew stronger. The promise was to ‘modernise and strengthen trade

unionism and labour relations’ (Narbona, 2014, p.25), yet they encountered a divided

country. On one hand, left wing parties were pushing for deeper changes to the

labour legislation and more legitimacy for trade unions. On the other hand, right

wing voices, as well as the employers’ association, wanted to end any possibility of

more labour-related modifications (Gamonal, 2011; Trafilaf and Montero, 2001;

Crocco, 2013; Campero, 2007).

Against this backdrop, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle introduced a bill in 1995 that

aimed to transform labour legislation in hopes of being seen to move away from

Pinochet’s Labour Plan. This labour reform bill specifically focused on

implementing sectoral collective bargaining, trade unions’ access to the company's

financial information, prohibition of replacing striking workers and simplifying the

collective bargaining process (Narbona, 2014; Cordova, 2005; Candia and Schaffeld,

2014; French-Davis and Stallings, 2001). Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s bill pursued a more

protective labour market attempting to limit employers’ powers (Frank, 2002;

Candia and Schaffeld, 2014). Despite his efforts, his bill initiative did not prosper in

the Senate, where it faced strong resistance from right-wing parties and business

organisations (Cordova, 2005). This time, the employer’s association (CPC) was less

willing to enter dialogue with the CUT and with the state (Narbona, 2014). As

analysed by Silva (2002), extensive lobbying undertaken by the CPC contributed to

the government’s limited attention to key labour demands.

As a way to salvage the situation and to appease the labour movements’

discontent, the country ratified the ’97 and ’98 ILO conventions in 1999 (Cordova,

81

2005). Contrary to some authors’ argument that Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s government had

limited modifications to the labour legislation (Narbona, 2014; Candia and

Schaffeld, 2014; Gamonal, 2011), Campero (2007) nonetheless argues that important

advancements were implemented in regards to labour relations. In 1997, the Training

and Employment Department was modernised by allocating more resources to its

operations. The Labour Directorate’s quality was enhanced to give better inspection

capability and less tardy resolutions. Social security was improved by allowing more

competitiveness in the pension funds and the possibility to invest in foreign markets.

Table 6 presents a summary of the employment reforms during Frei’s administration.

During Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s administration (1994-2000) tripartite

agreements, like those of the previous administration, were not achieved despite

efforts. According to Gamonal (2011), as democracy consolidated, the tripartite

social dialogue process lost its purpose of discussing proposed legislation. This was

evident since the start of the government: in 1994 Frei Riz Tagle’ administration

called for dialogue between the CUT and the employer’s association (CPC) to

discuss national minimum wages and pension adjustments, however, the commission

was unable to reach any agreement. Nevertheless, one important outcome of this

commission was the creation of the National Productive Development Forum (in

1994) which was a permanent, multi-party panel with presidential advisory

functions. The panel comprised representatives from the government, the CUT, the

CPC, and other labour and employer representatives appointed by the president.

Renowned members of the political, social and academic communities were also

invited to participate. The forum’s results included the creation of a national Centre

for Productivity and Quality; proposals for an unemployment protection system; and

progress, at the tripartite level, on equal labour opportunities for women (Candia and

Schaffeld, 2014; Narbona, 2014). The then Minister of Economy later recognised

that dialogue was mostly hindered by insufficient technical support in matters of

work and due to scarce representation of the small and medium enterprise sector

(Candia and Schaffeld, 2014).

Ultimately, neither of the labour reforms attempted in these two governments

actually delivered their promise of strengthening trade unionism and labour relations

(Frank, 2008; Candia and Schaffeld, 2014; Candia and Schaffeld, 2017; Feres,

2008). As explained by Silva (2002), the relatively harmonious business-state

relations under the first two coalition governments with their mild reforms would

82

end with the election of a new President, also from the centre-left Coalition of

Parties for Democracy, Ricardo Lagos.

4.2.2.3. Ricardo-Lagos (2000-2006): developing social dialogue but sustaining

the continuing constraints on labour

The administration of socialist Ricardo-Lagos (2000-2006) was one of the most

important periods for the labour movement. Lagos was the founder of the Party for

Democracy (PPD in Spanish) that was part of the Coalition of Parties for

Democracy. Since the Party for Democracy was formed from the Socialist, Radical

and Popular Front parties, it was difficult to clearly determine its political ideology

(Ffrench-Davis and Stallings, 2001), but it is considered to be a social democratic

political party (Etchepare, 2006). Lagos founded a new party to overcome the legal

obstacles facing the existing parties that were contesting the 1988 plebiscite. As

mentioned by Silva (2002), Angell and Pollack (2000) and Barrett (2001), Lagos

represented the farthest left within the Coalition, which explains the change in

business-state relations. Nevertheless, Lagos’ government was still committed to

maintaining the country’s economic stability by preserving a liberal market (Angell

and Pollack, 2000). Under Lagos, the government was expected to “renew efforts to

abolish the authoritarian enclaves embedded in the Constitution of 1980, to reopen

the human rights debate, and to reform the dictatorship's labour code” (Silva, 2002,

p. 347). Moreover, after Lagos was elected in 2000, he promised the organised

labour movement that reforming labour legislation was a priority for him (Frank,

2002).

After many criticisms made against Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s government, newly

elected President Ricardo-Lagos’ (2000-2004) first initiative was the creation of the

Social Dialogue Council, in where representatives from employers and union

organisations were invited to participate and offer their advice on social and

economic matters (Cerda and Valenzuela, 2012). The addressed issues were labour

reforms, unemployment insurance, women in the labour market and

institutionalisation of dialogue. One of the council’s most noteworthy

accomplishments was the creation of the National Women’s Ministry. The ministry

promoted various issues, including childcare for working women, access to training,

promotion of entrepreneurship and protection from sexual harassment in the

workplace. The council dissolved in August 2001 when slow economic growth and

83

rising unemployment led to a rupture in labour relations, leaving institutionalization

of social dialogue in Chile incomplete (Cerda and Valenzuela, 2012).

Lagos came to office in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. Such adverse

economic conditions diminished Lagos’ administration’s power and popularity after

it had, for the first part, focused on the provision of employment (Frias, 2008;

Cordova, 2005). In the year 2000, several law decrees tried to improve the state of

labour relations with activities such as sponsoring higher education for civil servants

and financing training activities for trade unions and confederations (Frias, 2008).

There was also the inclusion of a new law (No. 19.666) that regulated the process of

externalisation of workers, wage improvements for teachers (Law No. 19715) and

the banning of child labour (Frias, 2008).

Lagos announced a labour reform bill at the beginning of 2001 which

immediately sparked opposition from the CPC, who began campaigning against it.

Different to his predecessors’ reform, Ricardo Lagos’ labour reform was more

focused on collective rights, directly aiming to strengthen trade unions and improve

collective bargaining capability (Silva, 2002; Cordova, 2005). Amongst the most

important topics of the reform were sectoral collective bargaining and the prohibition

of replacing striking workers. Together with these themes, mandatory union

membership, dues from non-union employees who benefited from union contracts

and job security were also included (Cordova, 2005; Silva, 2002; Frias, 2008). Lagos

brought together trade union leaders and employers, asking them to engage in direct

negotiations to finalise the labour reform. As employer resistance continued, Lagos

was forced to drop fundamental aspects of the reform such as sectoral collective

bargaining and the replacement of striking workers. A summary of Ricardo Lagos’

labour reform is presented in table 6.

Eventually, the labour reform was approved in September of 2001 without

two of its pillars: the prohibition on replacing striking workers and inter-company

bargaining something which as the reader will see is a key feature of the latter case

studies. Despite this, the passing of the reform marked a new state in the context of

labour relations, opening new prospects for the labour movement, improving

worker’s working conditions, focusing on both the country’s growth and

development and also bringing important benefits to both employers and workers

(Cordova, 2005). The CUT, however, had an ambivalent reaction to the approved

labour reform. On one hand, they appreciated the commitment to engaging in labour

84

reforms, but on the other hand acknowledged they that the content of the new

legislation did not completely satisfy their expectations nor represent their

aspirations (Frias, 2008). With the discontent of both the CPC and the CUT in

relation to labour regulation, Michelle Bachelet was voted into power.

4.2.2.4. Michelle-Bachelet’s governments (First period 2006-2010 and second

period 2014-2018): the embedding of constraints of labour influence amidst

limited reforms

After Ricardo-Lagos, socialist Michelle-Bachelet (2006-2010) became President.

She was perceived by the public as a symbol of political, economic and social

change (Fernandez and Vera, 2012). This being the fourth centre-left government

since the restoration of democracy in 1990, long-desired social justice goals were

stronger than ever. However, her administration was going to be the last of the 20-

year dominance of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy. The popular discontent

grew as workers argued they gave Coalition governments the requested time and

political space to implement their agenda while accepting restrictive working

conditions and wages imposed by the ruling economic model (Calderon and Castells

2014; Fernandez and Vera, 2012). Similar to her predecessors, Bachelet opted for

conciliation without challenging the main basis of the political consensus. Cook and

Bazler (2013) and Cook (1998) explain that both Lagos and Bachelet expanded the

social safety net, improving conditions for workers in both formal and informal

employment and for those in previously excluded sectors, such as women and

youths. Yet their policies primarily targeted individual workers, neglecting the

workers’ collective interests.

During Bachelet’s first administration (2004-2008), various advisory councils

were created, aiming at pension reform, work and equity and protection of

employment during the economic crisis (Weeks and Borzutzky, 2012). The councils

were responsible for developing political and technical proposals to be presented to

the president. Even though these proposals were not binding, they guided various

processes of decision-making. Additionally, a tripartite ‘decent work’ national

agreement was signed in November 2008. The government, the CUT, the CPC, the

business community and the ILO’s sub-regional office for Latin America’s southern

cone ratified their commitment to deepen tripartite exchange and social dialogue.

Employers were expected to increase productivity, avoiding termination costs while

85

workers would improve their skills and abilities, leading to overall improvement in

wages and employability.

In terms of labour, the CUT under the Bachelet regime was far weaker that in

her predecessors’ governments (Barria, Araya and Drouillas, 2012). The government

perceived the CUT as the worker’s representative both for negotiating the minimum

wage and for reaching agreements in important labour conflicts. Barria et al., (2012)

suggested that despite Bachelet’s rhetoric of creating a participative government with

opportunities for the CUT to be involved in policy making, her reliance on advisory

commissions “effectively excluded the CUT from the policy-making arena” (p.15).

In 2009 the CUT organised a national work stoppage protesting against businesses

taking advantage of the conditions created by the economic crisis of 2008 to fire

workers and violate labour rights (Barria et al., 2012). Unprecedented in her

government, the Bachelet administration called the CUT and the CPC to resume

dialogue and to agree on keeping unemployment from rising. The measures adopted

included providing public and private subsidies for training workers and avoiding

layoffs. However, this was only an isolated agreement as the CUT remained

excluded from any national debate over labour policy (Barria et al., 2012). Overall,

the CUT has played a major role for organised labour but their activities have been

clearer at the national level and not in terms of coordinating trade unions or having

an outreach role which perhaps has been more constrained.

According to Barria et al., (2012) discussions regarding labour relations

during Bachelet’s administration centred on building the trade unions’ negotiating

power. Yet, limited by the far-reaching protests, it was only in her second period in

office (2004-2018) that she presented a new labour reform. This reform was greatly

anticipated as it promised to even the balance of power among workers, trade unions

and employers while completely modifying the 1979 Labour Plan. However, after

several disagreements in Congress, the reform was passed with only mild

adjustments to collective rights. Collective bargaining remained at firm level and no

change was implemented to the excessively regulating procedures for reaching a

collective agreement (Fundacion Sol, 2014). The most important modifications are

presented in table 6.

86

Table 6: Summary of Chile’s key topics for labour reforms

President Content of the Reforms

Patricio

Aylwin (1990-

1994)

1991 Labour

Reform

Social dialogue initiatives and Labour Reforms

• Individual rights

- Improved protection for daily rest for workers in retail, hospitality and transport.

- Improved maternity leave rights as well as work-life balance arrangements.

- Modified the clauses for termination of contracts requiring employers to justify dismissals

but included the ‘firm needs’ clause which granted employers great discretion in job

termination.

- Increased from 5 to 11 years the maximum severance pay received by a dismissed worker.

• Collective rights

- Implemented the right to form confederations

- Established the right to dismissal immunity when forming a trade union.

- Implemented the indefinite strike, abolishing the previous 60 days limit.

- Created mandatory payment of 75% the union fee when workers receive the benefits

bargained by the union (extension of benefits) - Determination of deadlines and procedures for collective contracts and collective

convenios.

- Recognised public workers’ right to form associations.

Eduardo Frei

Ruiz-Tagle

(1994-2000)

1995 Labour

Reform

Stabilisation and the constraining of industrial relations development

• Individual rights

- Improved and modernised the Department for Training and Employment giving it more

resources to regulate and promote better training and employment

- Added to the protection of workers by modernising the Labour Directorate (Dirección del

Trabajo).


- Removed the right that the companies had to request the dissolution of the union in certain

cases.

Ricardo Lagos

(2000-2006)

2001 Labour

Reform

Developing social dialogue but sustaining continuing constraints on labour

• Individual Rights

- Reduced the working week from 48 to 45 hours.

- Established mandatory Sunday rest for all workers.

- Increased the regulations for working overtime

- Increased fines when companies have offences related to employment and social security.

- Increased fines when unfair dismissal is proved.

-Established the employer's obligation to pay the costs of food, accommodation and

transport of agricultural workers.


- Established an increase in the cost of replacing striking workers (USD$ 150 per replaced

worker). - Established stricter requirements for collective bargaining upon negotiating groups

- Established the right for unions or negotiating groups to ask for official financial

information of the company to prepare the draft of the collective agreement.

- Established immunity when implementing a trade union.

- Granted the Department of Labour the possibility to record anti-union practices and

publish the list of offenders. - Granted dismissal immunity to all workers involved in collective bargaining.

Michelle

Bachelet (2nd

period in

office, 2014-

2018) 2015

Labour

Reform

The embedding of constraints of labour influence amidst limited reforms


- Eliminated the unilateral decision of extending the benefits secured during collective

bargaining to non-unionised workers.

- Eliminated the possibility of replacing striking workers.

- Regulated the right to information of trade unions when engaging in collective bargaining

with the company.

- Guaranteed women presence in the leading positions of trade unions. - Enlarged the matters that are allowed to be bargained collectively to include arrangement

in the working week for work-life balance and child-care, equality in the workplace, training

agreements and assistance in the productive retraining of workers when needed. - Established minimum conditions for negotiation (negotiations can only offer improved

benefits, not less).

- Granted the right to organize and bargain collectively to fixed-term and job-specific

workers but without the right to strike.


87

While the coalition administrations demonstrated their interest in promoting

social dialogue, their efforts did not bear fruit. Labour reforms after 1990 fell short

of restoring power to the labour movement (Palacios-Valladares, 2010; Silva, 2002;

Haagh, 2002; Cook, 2002). The limited ability of trade unions to recruit and mobilise

workers facilitated the deepening of employers’ influence in the workplace.

Likewise, Palacios-Valladares (2010), Haagh (2002) and Cook (2002) indicate that

the lack of significant change brought about by the labour reforms was a reflection of

the labour movements’ persistent political weakness during the democratic

transition. Arguably, this will be increased by the incoming centre-right government

led by business-owner Sebastian Pinera.

4.2.2.5. Sebastian-Pinera governments (First period 2010-2014; Second period

2018-present): the hegemony of neo-liberalism as a regulatory framework

Sebastian-Pinera won the presidency in January 2010 and became the first centre-

right candidate to achieve a presidential election since Jorge Alessandri Palma in

1958 (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Pinera was part of the conservative National

Renewal party that was a member of the Coalition for Change (Coalicion por el

Cambio in Spanish), a centre-right political coalition formed by the ‘National

Renewal’ (RN in Spanish) party and the ‘Independent Democratic Union’ (UDI in

Spanish). He was a businessman, owner and director of several companies related to

the airline and stock market industries. According to Undurraga (2012), the

strengthening of the neo-liberal model during the Coalition governments (from 1990

to 2010) paved the way for a businessman such as Pinera to be elected president. His

election would also bring an alternation of power after four consecutive governments

of the centre-left, which formally consolidated Chilean democracy (Toro and Luna,

2011; Briones and Dockendorf, 2015). In economic terms, Pinera’s administration

preserved the same agreements that had been put in place during the previous

governments. Table 6 does not include Pinera’s topic for labour as he did not engage,

in any of his time in office, with labour reforms.

The prospects for labour when Pinera took office were not auspicious as he

dealt with economic stagnation and he himself was a company owner. As expressed

by Luna and Mardones (2010) early signs from this government were not promising

for labour as Pinera’s policies tended to focused more on boosting economic growth

and labour-market flexibility. Figueroa-Clark (2010) agrees by indicating that Pinera

88

pushed for traditional neo-liberal measures that increased labour flexibility and the

weakening of trade unions and strikes. Likewise, Leiva (2013) argues that with

Pinera in office, a renewed capitalist offensive against the working class was

implemented with a promise to tackle “weak economic growth rates and declining

labour productivity with increased labour flexibility” (p.103.). Although Pinera

promised to maintain the successful social-policy initiatives of the Coalition era, his

government was marked by great austerity since he had to face the country’s re-

building process after the 2010 February earthquake. Arguably, this budgetary

constraint distorted the policy agenda, forcing issues such as inequality and

educational reform to the side and giving priority to the country’s re-construction

(Luna and Mardones, 2010).

Despite such dim prospects, the outcomes of Pinera’s government were not

as negative as predicted. Unemployment decreased, the country’s growth spiked and

he created a new Ministry of Social Development with the main goal of eradicating

poverty in the country. With regards to labour, and as expected by the previously

cited academics, there was limited progress on individual or collective labour rights.

The lack of interest shown by the government on these matters, budgetary

constraints and the persistent weakness of the Chilean labour movement (represented

by the CUT) determined the restricted development of labour-related matters during

both of Pinera’s administrations.

This section has contained a brief description of the Chilean governments

since the transition of the country to democracy. The emphasis has been placed on

the change in legislation related to labour rights that these administrations

implemented while in office. As explained, the most significant modifications were

made to individual rights, leaving collective rights virtually untouched since

Pinochet’s Labour Plan of 1979. This section has also explained the role of the

largest national confederation, the CUT, in the process of the reorganisation of the

country during the transitional period. Employer’s associations and the role taken by

the state during reforms have also been discussed. These issues are relevant to

understanding the constraints and shape of the labour movement and thus shed light

on their renewal responses. The following section describes in more detail the

country’s labour standards.

89

4.3. Employment and Labour Standards

This section discusses the overall character of the Chilean employment relationship

as well as the country’s general labour standards. The section begins with a general

background of the features of the employment relationship and overall organisational

culture in Chile and moves to then describe more specifically individual and

collective labour standards. The role of the largest national confederation and the

employers’ associations is also addressed as they will prove to be central in the

understanding of trade union revitalisation responses. The section ends with a

description of four legal provisions contained in the Labour Code that are used by

employers to limit and in some cases even undermine the power of the labour

movement and how the Chilean state has allowed for the misuse of such provisions.

This section enables further understanding of the field of industrial relations, the role

of the state in the employment relation through the provisions of law and the context

in which the process of trade union renewal operates.

The Chilean system of industrial relations places great emphasis on

individual agreements over the terms and conditions of work. In contractual terms,

individual contracts are the basis of the employment relationship and collective

agreements, if any, act as a supplement to that initial contract (Ensignia, 2016;

Lopez, 2002). Consequently, several aspects of the employment relationship, such as

appraisal systems, payment schemes and communications, tend to focus on the

individual rather than the collective (Rodriguez, 2010). Chile’s national minimum

monthly wage as of March 2019 was approximately US $440 with a weekly working

time of 45 hours, and a maximum working day of 10 hours, with at least half an hour

break for lunch (Otero et al., 2013; Ensignia, 2016). For a more detailed review of

Chile’s individual labour standards, see Appendix 4.

Chile is a highly decentralised (Feres and Infante, 2007; Palacios-Valladares,

2010) system where collective bargaining is circumscribed to the company level and

trade unions are not the exclusive bargaining bodies in the workplace (Palacios-

Valladares, 2010b, Feres, 2008, Duran, 2013). The topics that can be bargained for

are limited and the process of collective bargaining is highly rigid, requiring strict

observation of deadlines in order to avoid tacit acceptance of the employer’s final

offer in the process (Palacios-Valladares, 2010).

Regarding organisational culture, recent studies have suggested that

organisational culture in Chile is characterised by the existence of high levels of

90

work intensification and a focus on organisational efficiency but with low levels of

worker autonomy and empowerment (Rodriguez and Gomez, 2009, Rodriguez,

2010; Perez-Arrau et al., 2012; Arrau and Medina, 2014). As loyalty and compliance

are the main expected values in workers, the employment relationship tends to be

authoritarian and legalistic in nature (Cook, 2002; Narbona, 2014). Managers tend to

have an authoritarian leadership style that can often be disguised as paternalistic

protection (Rodriguez and Stewart, 2017). The tendency of Chilean employment

relations is portrayed often as that of the ‘Hacienda’ where the landowner provided

workers with protection and housing in exchange for their labour, loyalty and

compliance (Rodriguez and Gomez, 2009). Worker control and monitoring tend to

be the underlying principles of the employment relationship.

Another important feature of the employment relationship is the strong focus

on legislation, which plays a critical role in the regulation of employment (Frias,

2008; Trafilaf and Montero, 2001; Narbona, 2014). There is debate in the literature

that while the principles of Chilean legislation are employment stability and worker

protection (Otero et al, 2013; Gamonal, 2011), others have criticised the flexibility

provided for the employer’s advantage (Gaudichaud, 2003; Vejar, 2012). Gamonal

(2011) explains that, on one hand, the legislation reinforces the protection of

individual workers, modifying some flexibility issues, yet on the other hand,

collective rights have been left untouched, which casts a shadow over the state’s

commitment to the labour movement. Individual and collective labour standards will

be described next as this will help the reader to understand the context in which the

employment relationship is embedded.

4.3.1. Collective Labour Standards

This subsection discusses the collective legislation present in the Chilean context as

well as the characteristics of the collective bargaining process. The trade union

affiliation rate in Chile as of January 2018 is 20.6% (INE, 2018) while almost 9% of

Chilean companies have trade unions (ENCLA, 2014). Of the firms that have trade

unions, only 16.9% have actually bargained collectively in the last five years. The

explanation for this is that there are trade unions established in some workplaces that

do not actively engage in collective bargaining with their employers (ENCLA,

2014). Out of the working population, only 8.6% of workers are covered by a

collective agreement (ENCLA, 2014). These numbers show a fragmented context for

91

trade unionism with limited organising capabilities. Due to space limitations, the

visualisation of the collective bargaining process (see Appendix 1) and the union

democracy system (see Appendix 3) were organised in the Appendices section of

this thesis.

4.3.1.1. Collective Bargaining Process

Regarding the process of collective bargaining, one of its characteristics is the firm-

level nature of the process without the option to bargain at sectoral or national level

(Baez, 2015; Vejar, 2012; Feres and Infante, 2007; Frias, 2008). Collective

bargaining is defined by the Chilean Labour Code as the process through which one

employer relates to one or more trade unions or to workers joined solely for the

purpose of bargaining (negotiating groups), to establish common working conditions

and wages for a certain period of time (Baez, 2015). Inter-company collective

bargaining is voluntary, which means it only comes about if employers are willing to

bargain with inter-company trade unions (Palacios-Valladares, 2010). This means

that an employer can refuse to bargain with unions in relation to conditions applying

in workplaces additional to their own. Contrastingly, employers have the obligation

to answer to the demands of all of their workplace’s trade unions and negotiate in

accordance with the legally established procedure (Feres and Infante, 2007). The

Chilean Labour Code allows for several trade unions and negotiating groups to

function within a single workplace. These different worker’s organisations can and

actually do bargain over the same topics and issues (Baez, 2015; Feres and Infante,

2007). As a result, several unions may be simultaneously negotiating collective

agreements within each company. Trade unions can form federations and

confederations, but the role of these organisations is highly restricted (Ugarte, 2008;

Feres and Infante, 2007; Frias, 2008). Federations and confederations are not entitled

to perform collective bargaining on the behalf of the trade unions that are affiliated

to them (since company trade unions are the only ones that can collectively bargain

with employers). Their main role is behind the scenes in supporting the trade unions

that are affiliated to them; although they assist in the process of collective bargaining

and in any labour-related topic or disputes, the negotiations are in the name of the

individual unions and can have no sectoral application (Duran, 2013). Appendix 1

shows the process of collective bargaining leading to industrial action.

92

4.3.1.2. Trade unions, Federations and Confederations

Central to the topic of collective rights is the role played in the employment

relationship by the largest Chilean confederation, the Central Unitaria de

Trabajadores (CUT). Many of the characteristics of today’s Chilean labour

movement are rooted in the role played by this confederation leading up to the

present (Vejar, 2012). A long history of internal conflicts, a slow process of ideology

reconfiguration and a de-composition and re-composition process have strongly

affected Chile’s main federations and, as result, the overall labour movement (Vejar,

2012; Leiva, 2013).

The first federation of workers in Chile was created in 1909 under the name

of Federacion Obrera de Chile (FOCH in Spanish) (Gaudichaud, 2003). The second

federation in the country was the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCH)

created in 1936. Both of these organisations faced internal political conflicts in

regards to their leadership (Gaudichaud, 2003; Cross and Blackburn, 2016). These

confederations dissolved due to these political differences and later regrouped in

1953 under the name of Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) and included

members from the Christian Democratic, Socialist and Communist parties. Plaza and

Carrasco (2013) indicate that since the beginnings of the CUT and towards 1956,

there were internal forces within the organisation that led to its politicization. The

CUT started to be more actively involved in the state’s activities, especially during

Frei-Montalva’s (1964-1970) launch of the Agrarian reform (in 1964) that continued

in Salvador-Allende’s administration (1970-1973). The Agrarian reform is

considered a milestone for the labour movement since it gave land ownership, and

therefore power, to the workers. The CUT’s political activities were reinforced when

this institution strongly backed Salvador-Allende’s presidential election bid during

1970. In Allende’s government, several CUT leaders came to be state ministers

(Vejar, 2010; Frank, 2002; Leiva, 2013). This golden age for the Chilean labour

movement lasted until 1973 when the military coup seized power and all trade

unionism activity was banned.

Since that de-composition period, Leiva (2013) explained that the Chilean

labour movement has been unable to recover its strength due to its declining

organisational and negotiating capabilities. Arrieta (2003) has a similar viewpoint,

arguing that at the beginning of the first Chilean democratic government, the CUT

understood the importance of strengthening democratic institutions and was more

93

consensual in its approach, as is common in some transitional processes (see

Hamann and Martinez-Lucio, 2003; 2007; Hamann, 1998). However, over time, the

CUT was unable to strengthen the Chilean labor movement, primarily due to internal

conflicts, an inability to renew itself ideologically and limited organising and

coordinating capabilities. These issues translated into a fragmentation of the labour

movement while jeopardizing the CUT’s legitimacy (Leiva, 2013; Vejar, 2012,

Frias, 2008).

Aside from the CUT, Chile has two other national-level confederations: the

Central Autonoma de Trabajadores (CAT) and Union Nacional de Trabajadores

(UNT) (Salinero et al., 2006; Vejar, 2012; Duran, 2013). These organisations have

enterprise unions, inter-company unions and federations affiliated to them from the

private sector. Public workers cannot form trade unions or federations and can only

adhere to the National Association of Fiscal Employees (Asociación Nacional de

Empleados Fiscales, ANEF). According to Duran (2013), in 2012, only 28.3% of the

existing company unions in Chile were affiliated to the CUT, while 1.7% were

affiliated to the CAT and 0.8% to the UNT. Hence, the majority of unions in Chile

(approximately 70%) are independent of national-level confederations, mostly based

as company-level unions. This low affiliation rate is reinforced by the decentralised

industrial relations system whereby the only relevant organisation to perform

collective bargaining is the firm-level trade union (Feres and Infante, 2007).

Campero (2001) summarises the CUT focus since the transition to democracy

as twofold, one directed towards national level and another one towards the company

level. At national level, Campero (2001) explains that the CUT aimed for social

cohesion and cooperation with the transitional governments and the employers

generating tripartite agreements that served to stabilise the country. Similarly, the

CUT attempted to institutionalise labour and social security by pressing for labour

reforms that would modify the industrial relations set forth in the military

government. At company level, the CUT developed strategic arrangements with

some industry sectors that had high economic and social value, such as mining. The

purpose of the agreement was to establish a ‘kind of compromise by the company

and the workers' organization to ensure the economic performance of the company

and a satisfactory level of labour relations’ (Campero, 2001, p.24). In the same vein,

there were agreements on productivity levels where trade unions would agree to

include in their collective agreements policies to increase productivity, also

94

considering the benefits for workers when they achieved the goals. Finally, Campero

(2001) comments that the CUT was involved in reaching agreements with companies

in terms of vocational education and training where companies would establish

bipartite committees (formed by trade unions and the employer) to draw the

company’s annual training plan.

Despite the participation of the CUT in the aforementioned activities, Leiva

(2013) explains that the CUT has been unable to systematically organise and

represent the needs of the labour force that is experiencing increasing flexible

employment arrangements. Even after four consecutive centre-left governments that

somewhat favoured the labour movement, the CUT remained weak, disconnected

and uncoordinated in its strategic planning (Luna and Mardones, 2010). In the same

vein, Vejar (2012) explains that the CUT has had difficulties in politically

positioning itself and rebuilding labour rights after Pinochet’s regime. It failed to

organise private-sector workers in full employment and also failed to reach the

casualised workers who constitute a large portion of the labour force throughout the

country’s industries (Vejar, 2012; Winn, 2004; Schurman, 2001). According to

Gaudichaud (2003) the CUT now exerts moral pressure on unions, not because of its

authority but because the prestige it once had. Frias (1989) explains that given the

previously mentioned issues, the national labour movement will have problems in

finding its identity, which will lead to a further weakening of the labour movement.

Overall, the CUT is said to have limited influence over trade union structures,

responses and activities (Vejar, 2012; Arrieta, 2003; Feres and Infante, 2007; Feres,

2008).

4.3.1.3. Employers’ associations

Another relevant actor in the country’s industrial relations system is the employer.

Vejar (2012) as well as Feres and Infante (2007) have mentioned that, opposite to

what happens with the fragmented labour movement, Chilean employers are highly

organised and politically cohesive. Chilean employers are affiliated to one exclusive

confederation that gathers all the main federations from the country’s different

industries. Created in 1935 and going by the name of “Confederacion de Produccion

y Comercio” (The Confederation of Production and Commerce), CPC for its Spanish

name, this confederation is composed of the National Society of Agriculture

(Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura), the National Chamber of Commerce, Services

95

and Tourism (Camara Nacional del Comercio, Servicios y Turismo), the National

Society of Mining (Sociedad Nacional de Minería), the Industrial Development

Society (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril), the Chilean Chamber of Construction

(Cámara Chilena de la Construcción) and the Banks’ Association (Asociación de

Bancos). The CPC’s main objective is to promote the conditions that allow the

creation and maintenance of business initiatives and the existence of an institutional

framework that encourages competition and growth (CPC, 2015). According to its

stated principles, their goal is to achieve sustainable economic, social and

environmental development.

The CPC is the highest representative body of the Chilean private sector

employer class and for that reason is the CUT and the government’s counterpart in

all labour-related discussions. It is continuously presenting initiatives to the

government and participating in joint committees that work in different ministries

and public services (CPC, 2015). Finally, this employer association is affiliated to

the International Labour Organization, representing the Chilean business community

while also participating in the organisation of the OECD’s business community. To

further understand the role of the legislation in the process of trade union renewal, it

is also important to outline the additional legislation that was not included in any of

the subsections above, as will now be presented.

4.4. The use of regulation to undermine collective rights through ‘by-passing’

strategies

This section describes the uses that Chilean employers are giving to regulations

contained not only in the Labour Code but in other bodies of regulations (such as

taxation law) additionally to undermine the rights of workers and of the labour

movement as a whole. This discussion is relevant for the process of trade union

renewal since such strategies can undermine the power of trade unions, thus directly

influencing the range of options available for them as they seek to renew. In addition

to the legislation discussed in this section, Appendix 2 contains a summary of the

union-avoidant and anti-union practices developed in the Chilean literature, which

also serves to contextualise the system of industrial relations. This section will

discuss the legislation on negotiation of minimum services between the company’s

trade union and management during disputes, extension of collectively bargained

benefits to other non-union workers, the interesting concept of multi-rut, non-

96

unionised negotiating groups and the special type of collective agreement of the

convenio. A brief description of these regulations will be made to then analyse how,

specifically, employers use this legislation to counter employees’ rights and the

overall labour movement, a summary of which is presented in Table 8.

The first regulation discussed in this section is that of minimum services

provision. Directly affecting the worker’s right to strike is the newly introduced

legislation regarding minimum services. This regulation was first incorporated in the

2015 Labour Reform, indicating that during strikes and to preserve the company’s

infrastructure and the functioning of critical services, trade unions must allow

workers who are striking, to perform their usual job-specific activities for the

company (Simonet and Gonzalez, 2015). After the 2015 Labour Reform came into

effect, all trade unions in the country and their employers had to engage in

negotiations to determine the range of activities and/or services that were essential to

the company, thus constituting the ‘minimum services’. Minimum services can be

functions, tasks, processes, services or areas within a company that, according to the

company’s size and characteristics, must be attended to during the progress of a

strike (Direccion del Trabajo, 2018). These services are necessary to protect the

company’s infrastructure and assets as well as to prevent accidents and guarantee the

provision of services and basic needs to the Chilean population (Direccion del

Trabajo, 2018). The agreement on minimum services also needs to contain a list of

all the job positions needed to operate these essential services (Simonet and

Gonzalez, 2015). In cases where it is difficult for trade unions and employers to

reach agreement on what constitutes the minimum services and how many workers

should be made available to operate such essential services, the Labour Inspection is

called to intervene and mediate an agreement. The provision of minimum services

must be in place before the beginning of a collective bargaining process.

The main criticism made against this regulation is that it restricts the

worker’s right to strike (Simonet and Gonzalez, 2015). This is because when a trade

union is striking, the workers who perform their roles in the job positions classed

under essential services have to surrender their right to strike and continue working

for the company as if they were not on strike (Simonet and Gonzalez, 2015). After

the implementation of the minimum services provision, the main problems

experienced by trade unions appeared to be twofold. The first problem was that

employers mostly tried to ensure the company’s full operation during strikes by

97

negotiating more services than the trade union deemed essential for the company’s

operations. This will be illustrated with an example. In the negotiations for minimum

services in a Chilean bank, the trade union revealed that the bank’s managers argued

that the opening of 118 branches (during a strike) was an essential service of the

bank and that at least 5 workers per branch needed to be working to ensure the

continuity of the bank’s operations (Marusic, 2018). Presumably, if the bank’s trade

union were to go on strike, the bank’s operations would not be affected as managers

ensured the opening of 118 branches, thus the workers’ strike would serve no

purpose. Before the minimum services provision, employers had to make their own

arrangements to deal with any distortion in their company’s operations caused by

strikes. In this case, legislation was introduced to ensure the continuity of a

company’s operation, thus curtailing the workers’ right to strike.

A further problem encountered by trade unions when negotiating minimum

services was that employers tried to bargain for more job positions to be made

available to them in case of strikes than were actually needed. Using the same

previously cited example, the bank requested that 1,173 workers (all affiliated to

trade unions), representing 16% of their payroll, continued working as normal in

case of strikes (Marusic, 2018). The bank’s trade unions filed a complaint to the

Labour Inspection claiming the employer was deliberately requesting more

‘essential’ workers than strictly needed, taking advantage of this provision.

Ultimately, as a consequence of enlarging the services considered minimum or

essential, any eventual strike may not disrupt the company’s operational continuity,

hence hindering the strike’s objectives.

The second regulation discussed in this section is the option that employers

have to extend to non-unionised workers the benefits they bargained with their

trade unions. This clause was first introduced in Pinochet’s 1979 Labour Plan to

standardise working conditions for all employees in the same workplace (Henriquez,

2014). The way in which this operates is now explained. After a collective

agreement has been signed by the parties, the employer can determine the degree and

extent of the extension of collectively bargained benefits. The only requirement is

that workers who receive the extended benefits have is to pay a mandatory 75% of

the trade union fee to the trade union that secured the benefits. As argued by

Henriquez (2014) and Baltera and Munoz (2017), the problem with this legal

mechanism is that by granting opportunities to employers to extend benefits that

98

were secured by trade unions, this legislation can further deepen the power distance

between workers and employers, as well as depicting trade unions as unnecessary.

When managers extend the benefits to non-unionised workers, they do so without

actually reinforcing the idea that those benefits were accomplished by the union in

the process of collective bargaining. Therefore, workers may not be aware that the

increase in payment and enhancement of working conditions they are receiving are

the direct consequence of a collective bargaining process conducted by the

workplace’s trade unions. The extension of benefits does not actually strengthen the

unions’ influence in the workplace because workers do not perceive the importance

that trade unions have. For a summary of this legislation and its challenges to labour,

see table 7.

The third legislation discussed as being used to undermine the trade union

power is the use of multi-rut. This legal mechanism was established in 1978 as part

of the Tax Code and then transferred to the Labour Code in 1987 (during Augusto

Pinochet’s dictatorship). Multi-rut is the option that companies have to artificially

divide themselves into different companies even if owned by the same person or

overall employer. In practical and legal terms, these companies are independent

businesses, each with its own regulations and workers (Direccion del Trabajo, 2014).

The consequences for workers when a company uses multi-rut to dilute its labour

obligations can be innumerable. Biondi (2015) indicates that this practice has served

to abuse and hide the real and effective working relationship between workers and

employers. The company tries to differentiate itself with different taxation identities

despite operating in the same physical location, having the same owner, being under

one administration and performing one activity. Consequently, this practice

facilitates segmentation of the labour movement, simulating the existence of multiple

entities and further fragmenting the labour movement (Biondi, 2015). The most

extreme case is seen in the retail sector, where one single company has formed over

150 different companies (Biondi, 2015). Multi-rut directly hinders the rights to

collective bargaining and freedom of association. Freedom of association is affected

because the use of multi-rut forces workers to organise and form trade unions for

each one of the single ‘companies’. Similarly, it affects collective bargaining

because more often than not, these smaller companies do not have the minimum

quorum of workers required to establish a trade union, hence workers cannot bargain

99

collectively through the proper union. For a summary of this legislation and its

challenges to labour, see table 7.

Table 7: Summary of the legislation used to undermine trade union

representation.

Law Content Challenge to labour

Minimum

Services

Created in 2015.

Law No. 20.940

In the event of a strike, the

trade union needs to allow

their members that perform

essential services, to work for

the company and abdicate to

their right to strike.

Limits the workers' right to strike.

Employers try bargaining for more

services than are strictly essential.

Employers try bargaining for more

job positions than are strictly essential

Extension of

benefits

Created in the

1979 as part of

the Labour Plan.

Reviewed and

updated in 2015.

Part of the law

No. 20.940

Employers can extend to non-

union workers the benefits

agreed with the company's

trade unions

Depicts trade unions as unnecessary

since non-unionised workers can

access and obtain the benefits that

were exclusively bargained with the

trade unions.

Multi-rut

Created in the

1978 as part of

the Tax Code.

Reviewed and

updated in 2014

as part of the

Labour Code No.

20.760

A company can artificially

divide itself into different

companies.

Hinders freedom of association as

workers cannot form one union

amongst all the companies owned by

the same conglomerate. Increases

fragmentation of the labour

movement by dividing the number of

trade unions that can be implemented

in a company.

Negotiating or

bargaining

groups

Created in the

1979 as part of

the Labour Plan.

Reviewed and

updated in 2015.

Part of the law

No. 20.940

Non-unionised groups of

workers can come together

and bargain with their

employer without the need to

form a trade union. The

topics of the bargaining can

be similar to those of the

workplace's trade unions

Depicts trade unions as unnecessary

by allowing workers to form their

own negotiating groups without

having the trade union status. Hinders

trade union affiliation as workers may

not perceive it useful. Inserts

competition in the workplace between

trade unions and non-unionised

negotiating groups.

Collective

Convenios

Created in the

1979 as part of

the Labour Plan.

Updated in 1991

Law No. 19.069

A special type of collective

contract that does not include

the right to strike but allows

workers to bargain with the

company for improvements

in wages and working

conditions

Does not provide the right to strike to

workers.


Multi-rut does not only affect trade unions and collective bargaining but also

contributes to deepening labour precariousness (Fundacion Sol, 2014). As an

example of this, if companies are divided and employers claim economic losses, they

can refuse severance pay to workers. All this can happen while the company is

collecting revenues in a different company owned by the same employer. Also, given

this far-reaching fragmentation, workers can often struggle to secure the minimum

100

quorum to create a trade union (Biondi, 2015). In addition, multi-rut allows company

to have endless fixed-term contracts with workers without extending them to open-

ended as required by law. The employer simply hires the same worker through one

company, and then when that contract expires, hires the same worker in a different

company, and so on. The same happens with annual leave, given that the employee

has changed employer continuously, the worker has not completed the required

period to be entitled to annual leave.

A fourth piece of legislation described in this section is that involving

negotiating groups and convenios. According to the existing Labour Code, there are

two types of collective bargaining in Chile: regulated collective bargaining

(‘negociación reglada’) and non-regulated collective bargaining (‘negociación no

reglada’) (Baez, 2015; Duran, 2013). Regulated collective bargaining considers the

negotiation between trade unions and/or groups of workers with strict regulations

such as predetermined deadlines, durations of the agreements, dismissal immunity

for workers and the right to strike. This form of negotiation finishes by subscribing

to a collective contract or collective agreement. Opposite to this is the non-regulated

collective bargaining, which refers to a negotiation between groups of workers and

the employer that does not follow any predetermined regulations (Gallardo, 2019).

There are no deadlines, no specification of the agreement’s duration, no dismissal

immunity for workers involved and, most importantly, this agreement does not

consider the right workers have to strike. Contrary to the collective agreement, this

form of negotiation brings about what is called a collective convenio. Consequently,

at any time and without restrictions of any kind, workers in any company can get

together without forming a trade union and begin direct negotiations with their

employer (Gallardo, 2019; Montero et al., 2000). This type of negotiation produces

bargaining groups (grupos negociadores in Spanish) who can then agree with their

employer common working conditions and wages for a determined period. This

collective convenio is equally binding on both parties but with the aforementioned

limitations (Montero et al., 2000). For a summary of this legislation and its

challenges to labour, see table 8. Field experts’ evaluations indicate that collective

convenios can lead to precarious employment since workers are giving up their most

important collective right, which is the option to strike (Montero et al., 2000; Duran

and Kremerman, 2015). The next table summarises the key differences between

collective convenios and collective contracts.

101

Table 8: Comparison of Collective Contracts vs. Collective Convenios

Topic of Comparison Collective Contracts Collective Convenios

Norms and Regulations • Follows strict norms and regulations. • Does not follow strict norms and

regulations.

Compliance • Subject to Labour Inspection for

compliance with deadlines and

procedures.

• Does not have major labour

inspections.

Type of Negotiation • Indirect negotiation (employer

bargains with trade union leaders).

• Direct negotiation (employer

bargains directly with workers).

Dismissal Immunity • Considers dismissal immunity for

trade unions and workers during

collective bargaining.

• Does not consider dismissal

immunity for negotiating groups

and workers.

Right to Strike • Considers the right to strike. • Does not consider the right to

strike.

Communication • Must be communicated to the

Labour Inspection.

• Must be communicated to the

Labour Inspection.

Duration • From 2 to 4 years. • From 2 to 4 years.


As described in this section, the system of industrial relations that this

regulation has created is one that, while not ensuring the protection of the workers’

rights, allows the bypassing of managers with the subsequent threat to social

dialogue and collective bargaining. Chilean employers have shown their ability in

taking advantage of the loopholes provided by these laws and by the labour reforms

to equip themselves with a range of tactics directly aiming to diminish the power of

trade unions in the workplace. This has been the case so far with the laws described

in this sub-section, that of multi-rut, extension of collectively bargained benefits,

minimum services provision and negotiating groups with their alternative form of

collective agreements (the convenios).


This chapter presented a summary of the Chilean industrial relations system. The

Chilean system of labour relations seems to be of a special type. In terms of

organisations, the system is quite similar to that of other countries and can be

visualised as a pyramid, where there are company trade unions, which can form

federations, federations that can group to form larger federations and, at the top of

the pyramid, there are national-level federations that are called ‘centrales’. However,

in matters of collective bargaining is where the system differs from other countries

as this pyramid becomes inverted and the most important organisation to conduct the

process of bargaining is the company trade union, leaving federations and

confederations with virtually no power or role in the process. In the Chilean system,

these organisations have more of a support role for trade unions during the process of

collective bargaining and during strikes. As Ugarte (2018) explained, there are some

102

confederations that have understood their political role and tend to be more

organised, such as those in the copper and banking confederations, but these are

exceptional cases.

Likewise, as the Chilean system tends towards decentralisation, trade unions

are not the only bargaining body that can be implemented in workplaces to negotiate

wages and working conditions with the employer. Non-unionised negotiating or

bargaining groups are groups of workers who can come together at any point in time

and negotiate with the employer their wages and working conditions. The main

difference between trade unions and these bargaining groups is the possibility of

exerting their right to strike, which the latter group does not have.

Ugarte (2018), Marzi (2017) and Palacios-Valladares (2010b) argue that the

weakness of the labour movement can be traced to the deficiencies provided by the

Labour Code in terms of union organisation and the role granted to federations and

confederations. The Labour Code remains rooted in Pinochet’s neo-liberal Labour

Plan and the goal of reforming this legislation remains elusive (Frank, 2002).

Virtually, all labour reforms and social dialogue initiatives implemented in the

country after the transition to democracy were restrained by the capitalist economy

that pursued flexibility in the labour market. Both the existing labour regulation and

Chile as a whole tends toward flexibility and loosening minimum standards, often

emphasising de-regulation (Clauwaert and Schoman, 2012).

As the labour movement remains weakened and fragmented, the national-

level confederations face a legitimacy crisis, mostly because they have been unable

to build on their capabilities and ensure a predominant role. This, paired with the

state’s ambiguity in the provision of legislation and the politically organised

employers’ association, has put a strain on workplace trade unions who are

struggling to remain relevant. Chilean trade unions are faced with the problem of

diminished power as well as limited political influence. Likewise, the economic and

political contextualisation offered in this chapter is key to understanding the framing

process of trade union renewal choices. It is in this context that we need to discuss

the details and practices of industrial relations – and the response of trade unions in

the workplace.

103

CHAPTER 5: Methodology and Research

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological framework and epistemological

underpinnings of the present research. The importance of such a discussion is

emphasised by Denzin and Lincoln (2018), who argued that the way researchers

approach the reality determines the way they interpret their observations and

findings. This chapter is first, an attempt to reflect the way this researcher

approached the world and second, a way of describing how the research was

conducted. The first section will address the discussion of paradigms, specifying the

philosophical underpinnings of the study. Then, the chapter describes the

methodology used, outlining the research strategy, data collection methods and data

analysis techniques. The chapter also contains a detailed description of the

participant organisations and the interviewed informants. Emphasis is also placed on

the research’s ethical considerations as well as the challenges and limitations

encountered when conducting fieldwork.

5.2. Epistemological position of the research.

A paradigm is a set of basic beliefs that describe an individual’s assumptions about

the nature of the world, their place in the world, and the range of possible

relationships between the world and its component parts (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

These basic beliefs respond to three fundamental questions, the ontological, the

epistemological and the methodological. Such beliefs are logically interconnected in

such a way that the answer provided to the ontological question determines the

research’s epistemological and methodological answers. Ontology refers to

theorising about the nature of reality (Bell, Bryman and Harley, 2018). Epistemology

refers to determining the nature of knowledge, and methodology concerns the way

the researcher investigates what can be known in the world.

There are different research paradigms in social science research, of which

the most common are positivism, post-positivism and constructivism. Positivists and

post- positivists believe that a single reality exists, that it can be measured and

known (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2016; Blumberg,

Cooper and Schindler, 2005). Typically, researchers with this view tend to rely on

104

experimental, quasi-experimental and survey approaches (Denzin and Lincoln,

2018). Meanwhile, constructivists assume that there are multiple realities in the

world and that is possible for the knower to co-create understanding of a

phenomenon (Bell et al, 2018). Individuals with this philosophical stance tend to rely

more on qualitative methodological techniques.

This research follows a critical realism paradigm, albeit with some caution

and in a broader manner. Critical realism is a scientific philosophy (Brown,

Fleetwood and Roberts, 2002) that has been proposed as an alternative to positivism

and interpretivism, amalgamating elements of the two paradigms to provide new

approaches to developing knowledge (Wynn and Williams, 2012). Critical realism

“seeks to unite the objectivist ontology of natural and social realities with the

socially constructed and fallible character of scientific knowledge” (Schwandt and

Gates, 2018, p.345). Critical realism assumes the existence of an observable reality

(Price and Martin, 2018), acknowledging the subjective knowledge of social actors

in a given situation (Danermark, Ekstrom, and Jakobsen, 2005; Wynn and Williams,

2012). As expressed by Bhaskar (2013), things exist and act independently of our

descriptions, but we can only know them under particular subjective descriptions.

Independent structures constrain and enable authors to pursue certain actions in a

particular setting (Wynn and Williams, 2012). Therefore, an aim of this research is to

be alert to the structures of representation such as the nature of work and trade

unions, the role of the state in the workplace, the nature of management and broader

historical factors that shape the nature of Chilean industrial relations.

For critical realists, reality is hierarchically stratified into layers, domains or

strata: the Real domain refers to the greater level that contains the two other strata,

the Actual and the Empirical (Mingers, 2015; Wynn and Williams, 2012). The real

domain contains all the mechanisms, relations and experiences which are

independent from events but are capable of producing them; the empirical domain

are the experienced events; and the actual domain refers to what really happens but

is not necessarily experienced (Bashkar, 2013). Figure 7 visually presents reality

according to critical realism.

There are natural structures, mechanisms, tendencies and powers that exist,

independent of the researcher who is trying to uncover them (Brown, 2014).

Knowledge and perceptions have historical, social and cultural structures that differ

between people and influence their experiences. Therefore, to build the knowledge

105

of a stratum, the mechanisms that are beneath that layer of reality need to be

thoroughly examined (McAvoy and Butler, 2018). In social sciences, examining the

mechanisms that underpin a phenomenon may be virtually impossible, since the

structures that originate the event may be concealed. Moreover, there are

mechanisms in the social and business worlds that exist independent of the

researchers’ investigation (McAvoy and Butler, 2018) and that interact in complex

ways and specific times. This research is an attempt at building knowledge of a

social event while having in mind how problematic this can be from a critical realist

perspective.

Figure 7: Reality according to critical realism

Source: adapted from Mingers (2004)

Despite critical realism having a growing presence in the field of business

research, for some, this approach offers limited guidance for applied research and

general methodologies (McAvoy and Butler, 2018; Wynn and Williams, 2012;

Brown, 2014). This philosophy can accommodate a wide-range of methodologies,

yet Wynn and Williams (2012) argue that case study research is the best-suited

methodology for critical realist studies because it provides the possibility of

describing a certain phenomenon, its structures and mechanisms, in the real-life

scenario and context. Critical realist philosophy will be used in this study to research

the process and practice of trade union renewal. Inherent to this research is the

understanding that a country’s economy, politics and institutions can shape a trade

union’s renewal responses congruent with path dependency theory. One of the aims

of this research is to describe the different contextual factors and deeper structures

106

that shape the nature of Chilean industrial relations and how this develops in specific

contexts and at specific moments in time. As critical realism seeks to describe reality

based on the analysis of the experiences observed and interpreted by the participants,

this research attempts to describe trade union renewal reality in the Chilean context

through the examination of the case study informants’ experiences and

interpretations. The resulting description also addresses those elements of reality

(i.e., workplace governance, labour legislation and the state), that exist in order for

the events and experiences under examination to occur. The goal of critical realism is

to explain the mechanisms that generate a certain event more than the ability to

predict future events. Therefore, the aim of this research will not be the prediction of

trade union renewal, but only to understand the process of trade union renewal and

the challenges faced by these dynamics, thus explaining the lived reality of trade

unions in their context. Critical realism is cautious in its admission that a researcher

will rarely be able to identify a complete set of precedents that cause a specific

phenomenon. Similar caution is taken in this research, as an attempt to explain the

process of trade union renewal in the Chilean context will be made using the

informants’ experiences and understandings.

Other paradigms were not considered in the light of their primary

assumptions. A positivist paradigm would likely have neglected the alternative views

and interpretations to the issues studied here, while ignoring the country’s political,

historical and economic context. Similarly, constructivism would have emphasised a

co-constructed reality between the researcher and the informants, ignoring the

existing independent workplace reality that influences the studied phenomenon. As

expressed by Brown (2014), employment relations scholars must go beyond both

extreme positivism and extreme constructivism. Heeding that call, critical realism is

used an alternative paradigm in this research albeit in a general way.

As mentioned above, case study research is one of the strategies used to

conduct critical realist research (Easton, 2010; Wynn and Williams, 2012; Archer,

1998; Danermark et al., 2005). Case study research was identified as the best way to

explore the interaction of structures, events, actions and contexts to describe and

explain the process of trade union renewal. Three aspects of case study research are

of particular importance for critical realism: the need to specify the research

questions, explain the case selection rationale and discuss the significance of

generalisability. Research questions that satisfy critical realism are expressed in the

107

form of ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions which are associated with explanatory case study

research (Wynn and Williams, 2012; Yin, 2003). This research’s questions tend to

follow that format and are presented next:

a) How are Chilean trade unions coping with the labour crisis and their declining

role and what are the strategies and innovative practices in terms of trade union

renewal and revitalisation in Chile?

b) What role does the Chilean political and economic context play in this process

of renewal?

c) How do such trade union strategies relate to those being discussed

internationally, and in what ways do they vary, and why?

The two other features of critical realism’s case study methodology deal with

explaining case study selection and further elaboration of generalisation. The

selection of the cases should comply with the research questions and the explanatory

nature of critical realism. Likewise, critical realism’s concern with generalisation

refers to being cautious at generalising findings from a sample to the population

(Wynn and Williams, 2012). These two features will be further explained when

discussing in detail the research strategy.

To explain the process of trade union renewal in the Chilean context, the

framework provided by Frege and Kelly (2004) has been used and further developed.

This served both as theoretical guidance and as a tool facilitating data analysis.

Adopting a critical realist approach would allow the researcher to examine the trade

union process from different perspectives and offer interpretations as well as

possible explanations. Frege and Kelly’s (2004) framework was the most

comprehensive model available to study the process of trade union renewal. The

authors developed their framework by looking at five large industrialised countries:

the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States.

5.3. Case Study Research Strategy

The research strategy used in this study was case study research. Case studies are

the preferred strategy when the focus of the research is placed in the real-life context

(Yin, 2003). More specifically, Easton (2010) defines case studies as a “research

method that involves investigating one or a small number of social entities or

108

situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data and

developing a holistic description through an iterative research process” (p. 119).

Case studies are an intensive study of single or multiple units (Gerring, 2006)

producing rich, empirical descriptions (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bhattacherjee,

2012; Bechhofer and Paterson, 2012). Being able to study the process of trade union

revitalisation in its real-life context (i.e., different workplaces) facilitates retaining

the meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 2003). It is mostly through

case study research that the micro levels and the complex relations happening in the

workplace can be studied. Additionally, a case study approach was implemented

because of the need to get closer to the firm level and its context to evaluate the

reality of trade union renewal and challenges on the ground; hence the importance of

case study methodology to understand the lived reality and challenges facing trade

unions. Likewise, having case studies depicting the reality of Chilean industrial

relations is not commonly found in the literature, hence the need to fill that gap.

Case studies can be used for different purposes. One of the most important

applications is to explain the presumed causal links of a phenomenon that are too

complex for surveys or experimental strategies to grasp. This aligns with critical

realist philosophy’s aim of providing explanations for phenomena as a way of

understanding reality (Easton, 2010; Järvensivu and Törnroos, 2010; Bhattacherjee,

2012), and looking at the various factors and structures that influence choices and

change. Case study research can also be used to describe an intervention and the

context in which it has occurred, to illustrate certain topics or to explore those

situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear outcomes

(Schwandt and Gates, 2018). In this research, the case studies developed served the

purpose of exploring, describing and possibly explaining the process of trade union

renewal in the Chilean context.

Case studies can include single or multiple cases (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt,

1989). The single case strategy is used in three instances: when the selected case

represents a critical case in testing propositions, when it is a representative case

where the phenomenon occurs or when it is a unique case that demonstrates the

researched variables (Yin, 2003). In contrast, multiple cases can be used when the

researched topic is too complex or involves too many actors (Yin, 2003). Using

single or multiple cases have their respective advantages and disadvantages, yet the

most prominent advantage when comparing these two approaches is that, arguably,

109

the evidence obtained from multiple cases is considered more robust. This may

sound appealing at first but presents the problem of requiring extensive resources

and time to conduct (Gerring, 2006; Yin, 2003). This research uses multiple cases to

compare not only the outcomes of the trade union renewal process but also the

configuration of the different variables that shape that process. Since trade union

renewal is indeed a very complex process influenced by diverse variables,

incorporating different cases was a way of ensuring a comprehensive understanding

of the Chilean trade union revitalisation process. Likewise, case study research was

the most suitable research strategy based on its ability to provide understanding of

the workplace context given the argument that employment relations practices tend

to be shaped by local factors.

The rationale for case study selection is discussed next. Using multiple cases

for comparison usually implies selecting cases with similar specific characteristics, a

process that should be guided by the theoretical framework (Schwandt and Gates,

2018). The three cases were selected on the basis of industry and company size.

Firstly, the choice of industry will be addressed. The sector chosen to conduct this

research was food manufacturing due to its tradition of employment relations. The

assumption was that researching renewal in a sector with a longstanding tradition of

industrial relations increased the possibility of finding some form of activity around

renewal and more advanced or modernised industrial relations compared to taking a

different sector. Additionally, the researcher aimed purposely to stay away from the

overly researched industries in Chile, which are mining and banking, as these sectors

do not fully represent the reality of the national labour context. For instance, both

these sectors have a tendency to enjoy higher than average trade union affiliation

rates, which could - potentially - translate into more powerful unions and have

specific trade union traditions.

The size of the company was also relevant in selecting the cases. Larger

companies tend to have more sophisticated systems of industrial relations, hence

their potential to have some form of trade union renewal. Since there were only a

handful of larger food manufacturing companies in Chile, the decision as to which

companies to research was rather straightforward. The three resulting cases were

unionised companies, with trade union membership higher than the national average

and with some form of social dialogue happening between management and unions.

110

These companies are explained in more detail in the participants section of this

chapter.

Access to these case studies was gained through the researcher’s personal

network. Issues of national fragmentation prevented the researcher from gaining

access through the national-level confederation as many local trade unions might not

be affiliated to national confederations. Most Chilean trade unions may in fact not be

connected to national-level confederations. Statistics show that only 23% of trade

unions belong to one of the three existing national-level confederations (Duran,

2013; Duran and Kremerman, 2015). Hence, the Chilean labour context in itself

presented the first difficulty when trying to access the organisations. Access for the

first case study was established as the researcher previously worked in that company.

The gatekeepers were the company's HR managers. From there, the researcher

contrived her way into the two other companies using friends and family’s

connections in food manufacturing companies. Interviews were scheduled either via

e-mail or directly by calling the informants over the phone.

Since access for the two other cases was granted in a rather informal way (i.e.,

not through management), several issues emerged. Being able to build trust with

trade unions and HR managers was one of the most difficult tasks. Discussing such

sensitive topics as the employment relationship and trade union strategies

represented a problem when conducting the interviews as the researcher was

focusing on their reactions. There was the possibility that if trade unions knew the

researcher was also interviewing HR managers, they could have refrained from

offering relevant information. Likewise, if HR managers knew the researcher was

simultaneously meeting the trade unions, perhaps the trust to share any strategic

information could have been lost. Arguably, these issues were further emphasised in

the Chilean context where, traditionally, capital and labour tend to be ideologically

opposed. Another apparent problem was the multi-union presence. Since there were

several trade unions in the same workplace that often competed with each other,

problems of trust could have emerged. All the interviewed trade unions had some

form of conflict with their fellow unions, so seeing as the researcher was

interviewing them, this could have initially easily led to loss in confidence and

refusal to share critical information for the research. However, no conflict of this

nature happened during the fieldwork.

111

5.4. Data Collection Methods: Interviews and Observations

The data collection methods used in this research were interviews and observations.

The main goal was to gain a deep understanding of the topic of the research (Rubin

and Rubin 2011). Interviews are one of the most common ways of producing

knowledge in the social sciences (Brinkman, 2018). Interviews are a highly efficient

way to gather rich, empirical data (Denzin and Lincoln, 2018) giving access to

people’s subjective experiences and allowing researchers to explore an individual’s

views, experiences and beliefs on specific matters (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2005;

Gill, Stewart, Treasure and Chadwick, 2008). The research interview is essentially a

purposeful conversation between two or more people while carefully listening to the

answers in order to explore these further (Saunders et al., 2016).

There are different types of interviews, namely structured, semi-structured

and unstructured (Saunders et al, 2016; Brinkman, 2018). Each has its own

advantages and disadvantages when considering the research questions. This study

used semi-structured interviews, all conducted face-to-face. The advantages of

both semi-structured and face-to-face interviews are their capacity to enable

interpersonal contact, providing context sensitivity as well as conversational

flexibility (Brinkman, 2007; Saunders et al., 2016). The goal pursued by

implementing semi-structured interviews was to allow interviewees to raise

questions and concerns in their own words and from their own perspectives

(Brinkman, 2018). The following sub-sections describe in detail the interview

schedule used in this research, the fieldwork phases and the research’s ethical

considerations.

5.4.1. Interview Schedule

To prepare the questions of the semi-structured interviews, the researcher had a list

of themes regarding the analysis of the process of the trade union renewal debate.

Drawing from the literature review conducted in the first stage of the research and

the research questions, the themes and questions of the interview were developed.

Interview questions were designed to cover the theoretical framework’s dimensions.

Frege and Kelly’s (2004) framework was operationalised by turning the trade union

renewal dimensions into the basis for questions. The interview schedule contained

additional questions regarding the trade unions’ particular activities in the pursuit of

legitimacy and power in their workplaces as well as other forms of activity. These

112

questions prompted answers regarding the unions’ local practices that were not

related to the previously mentioned dimensions of the revitalisation framework. The

interview schedule also covered a range of background factors, with questions about

national-level challenges and practices. By including all types of questions, the

objective was to yield as much information as possible about the phenomenon under

study.

Each semi-structured interview mainly consisted of open-ended questions to

allow the respondent to provide as much detail as possible regarding their

experience. The same list of questions and themes was followed accordingly with

each informant. However, the researcher omitted some questions in particular

interviews (i.e., when the informant had already discussed the topic in a previous

answer), varied the order of questions to adjust to the flow of the conversation and

asked additional questions to further explore the topic being discussed. According to

Saunders et al., (2016), these are all possibilities within semi-structured interviews.

Overall, the approach taken for interviewing was rather flexible, encouraging the

interviewees to talk at length around the subject of trade union renewal and Chilean

industrial relations.

There were different sets of questions corresponding to the informants’

positions, one for trade union leaders at company level, one for national-level trade

union leaders, one for HR managers, one for line managers, one for company owners

and one for field experts (for the full brief of interview questions, see Appendix 5),

however, the questions followed a series of common topics. The interview questions

were carefully developed by the researcher in conjunction with her supervisors

before going into the field. The supervisors’ review was considered critical in this

process as they have considerable experience in conducting interviews and

researching similar topics. Interview questions were also reviewed with field experts

to determine their suitability. Follow-up questions were added to explore the

particular themes, concepts, ideas and unexpected thoughts provided by the

interviewees (Wahyuni, 2012). Probes were primarily used to clarify some

discussion points by asking for more details or examples relating to what had been

said during the interview. When conducting the interviews, the researcher remained

alert to the way the informants framed and explained their answers.

The interview schedule contained an introductory section where the

researcher presented the study’s objective to the informant. The informant would

113

then state their position and any relevant contact information. This section also

covered the informed consent process whereby the respondent agreed to be

interviewed while the researcher stressed the respondent’s ability to stop the

interview at any point. Confidentiality and anonymity were emphasised throughout

the interview process. The second section of the interview schedule contained more

general questions about the research’s main topic, prompting answers about broader

challenges in Chilean trade unionism and the industrial relations’ system. Then, the

interview schedule asked the informant about the specific trade union renewal

practices implemented or sought to be implemented in their workplaces. These were

the core questions that addressed in full the topic of the research. The questions

surrounding strategies for trade union renewal were difficult for the informants to

answer, mainly because they did not always understand what the terms

‘revitalisation’ or ‘renewal’ meant and did not tend to generate their responses in

terms of broader strategic developments or possibilities. Likewise, they did not refer

to any of the activities they were undertaking as revitalisation strategies. Therefore,

this portion of the interview was not as straightforward as expected. After the first

couple of interviews, it became obvious there was confusion as to what trade union

renewal meant, so the decision was made to alter the first questions to ‘what

activities do you implement to have more power in the bargaining table and be

considered relevant in the process of collective bargaining?’ and ‘what kinds of

strategies are you developing?’. These forms of question would prompt more

answers than the original ones. Existing institutional support and the union’s

relationship with the employer and the state were also questions included in the

interview schedule. The interview would then conclude with general questions about

the respondent’s opinion of the national labour movement and its comparison to the

local, firm-based labour movement.

The length of the interviews varied from 45 minutes to 1 hour and 45

minutes in some cases. Once interviews ended, the researcher thanked participants

for their time. Respondents were also given the opportunity to ask any questions

about the research, comment about it, or add any information that was not discussed

during the interview. Additionally, the researcher would ask for the chance to remain

in contact for further clarification of queries. All interviews and sessions were

recorded using a voice recorder and with the specific authorisation of the informant.

Interviews were usually conducted in the informants’ places of work and/or their

114

own offices. As the information shared was rather sensitive, privacy for conducting

the interviews was strongly emphasised. Staging the interviews in a place known

only to the interviewer and being secure was also about making them feel

comfortable when sharing their experiences. Different dates and times were allocated

to each respondent according to their availability and convenience. When the

researcher first contacted the informants, the research’s objectives and the use of the

information provided was always stated. No monetary compensation was offered to

any informant in exchange for their participation in the research.

Interviews with trade union leaders, HR managers, workers, labour-related

NGOs, sectoral and national level confederations were conducted, as well as

interviews specific to the food manufacturing sector. The interviews that were not

directly embedded in the case studies were useful in grounding the research in the

Chilean context and determining the spread of the practices from trade unions and

managers, not only regarding revitalisation but also about employment relations. A

summary of all the interviewed informants can be seen in Appendix 6.

5.4.2. Observations

Primary data can also be collected using observations (Saunders et al., 2016).

Conducting observations was useful to gain insight of the trade unions’ interactions

both between their leaders and with the HR managers. In these observations, the

researcher took notes that were then analysed, together with the interviews, in the

data analysis phase. The observational information was useful in providing empirical

data for the development of some themes. These types of observations allowed

gathering ‘live’ data from ‘live’ situations and represented 10 hours of work.

The researcher was also able to obtain a first-hand account of the way experts

discuss topics related to trade unionism. The researcher attended three sessions of a

government-funded trade union school as well as five talks about the past, present

and future of Chilean trade unionism developed by the Remembrance Museum in

Santiago. Both activities can reflect the level of commitment the Chilean government

has to educating the population, and the trade union leaders, on these topics. The

trade union school observations, as well as the museum’ talks, were voice recorded

and analysed with the interviews in the data analysis phase. These observations

represented a total of 21 hours of work and were labelled as expert and national-level

information.

115

5.5. Fieldwork phases

Data collection was carried out in three separate phases. As the researcher was doing

her PhD in the United Kingdom, she travelled to Chile to collect all the data. The

entirety of the fieldwork was conducted between October 2016 and September 2018.

All visits were purposely spaced out, each serving a specific purpose within the

research as outlined below. The final visit was scheduled at a later point to allow for

feedback from informants. The objective of that last visit was to present the main

findings and possibly gain feedback from the interviewees. A total of 69 interviews

were conducted over the three fieldwork stages. The work undertaken in each of the

stages presents the periods and interviews taking place, where phase 1 refers to the

first period of fieldwork of October-November 2016, phase 2 refers to the second

fieldwork trip of May-June 2017 and phase 3 reflects the last visit on September

2018.

5.5.1. First Fieldwork Visit

The first fieldwork visit took place during October and November of 2016. This

visit’s goal was rather exploratory, to gather any existing information regarding trade

union development and renewal activities. The researcher met with several trade

union leaders from different sectors to gain a more general feel for the challenges

and issues facing trade unions and how they were responding. Also, during this visit,

field experts were interviewed in order to obtain a solid informational background of

the existing trade union debates.

During this first stage, 35 interviews were conducted, of which 20 interviews

were with trade union leaders from different industries, 7 interviews with HR and

line managers, 6 interviews with field experts such as labour lawyers, labour NGO’s

and health and safety officers and 2 interviews with workers from one of the

companies. During this visit, the researcher also attended three sessions in one of the

government’s trade union schools as an observer. These trade union schools were

hosted by the Sociology department at University of Chile, in Santiago. The Labour

Directorate (a department dependant on the Ministry of Labour) offers specific

funding for the development of Trade Union Schools. This programme is destined to

support the continuous, permanent and systematic improvement of the training of

union leaders in the exercise of their roles as social actors. The programme

understands that having union leaders with a solid formation is an asset that

116

contributes to the quality of labour relations and is a contribution towards the

development of a labour culture based on understanding and social dialogue. There

are three types of funding available in this programme: one for new trade union

leaders, one for continuous training and a third one for women who are trade union

leaders. In 2017 there were 27 projects allocated to the new trade union leader’s

programme totalling USD$818.000, 20 projects for the continuous training

programme with USD$ 611.000 and 15 programmes costing a little over

USD$254.000 for the woman trade union leader programme.

The information regarding the outcomes of these projects was not made

available to the public and when interviewed, the head of these programme

mentioned they only receive a final report of the activities undertaking but do not

make any further evaluations. These trade union school funds and social dialogue

initiatives are part of the government’s plan to ‘modernise’ the employment

relationship. In the three sessions attended, the topics discussed were health and

safety at work, social security for workers and social dialogue in the Chilean context.

Another set of observations took place when visiting one of the companies, which

would then become Case Study A. On this occasion, the researcher observed two

meetings between the trade union leaders and one meeting between the trade union

leaders and the HR manager. Additionally, since all interviews were conducted in the

trade union offices located in one of the company’s production plants, the researcher

also took notes about the activities happening during these visits.

Once this fieldwork phase ended, interviews were transcribed by the

researcher and an initial report was generated containing the main information. The

process after every fieldwork phase is described in more detail in subsection 4.4.

After analysing the data from the interviews and meeting with the supervisory team,

a decision regarding the number of case studies was made. In order to consider

which of the interviews would become part of a case study, each conducted

interview was analysed to determine its potential to inform the research. Having

access to the organisations was also considered, to determine the interview’s

possibility of becoming a case study. Once these issues were discussed, a number of

three case studies were decided upon to develop to inform the research. The decision

was made to focus on food manufacturing due to its increasing significance as an

employment provider (Royle, 2004) and the limited research the sector has seen in

the Chilean context. A second visit to the field was planned to collect more

117

information about the sector and possibly to address in detail three companies as

case studies. Before going back to the field for a second time, the interview questions

were developed further to fit the case study format.

5.5.2. Second Fieldwork Visit

The second visit was from May to June of 2017. Although the focus at this point in

time was primarily on developing the case studies, additional interviews that were

not part of the case studies were also conducted. A total of 30 interviews were

conducted. 10 interviews with trade union leaders from the selected case study

companies, 3 interviews with HR and line managers and 5 interviews with workers

from the specific case studies selected. Background interviews were made with

sectoral and national confederations (3 interviews), labour lawyers who were active

academics (2 interviews), labour-related NGO’s (one interview) and one government

official who was the director of the national social dialogue program. Coincidentally,

during May and June of 2017, Chile’s Remembrance Museum was hosting five talks

reviewing Chilean unionism. These talks aimed to discuss with national experts the

past, present and future of Chilean trade unionism. The researcher attended all five

sessions as an observer. Each session would discuss a specific topic: women and

trade unions, the Labour Plan and labour reforms, industrial support networks and

the power of workers, the past and present challenges of Chilean trade unionism and

the impact of the Agrarian reform on Chile’s institutional context.

Once the second visit ended, the interviews conducted and sessions attended

were transcribed and collated with interviews from the first fieldwork phase. This is

where the research’s main analysis of the data gathered took place, studying all

interviews, determining existing gaps and looking at the information’s coherence.

The process of data analysis is described in detail in a separate section.

5.5.3. Third Fieldwork Visit

A third visit was made in September of 2018 and aimed to present the research’s

preliminary results to trade union leaders; thus, it was scheduled to be shorter than

the earlier visits. To present the results from previous stages, the researcher

requested a meeting with the trade unions from each of the case studies. Due to time

constraints and the informant’s availability, only two interviews were conducted

during this phase, one with the main trade union in Case A and the other with the

118

leader of Union Two from Case study C. The main themes of the analysis were

presented while the researcher requested their comments on the results. Overall, they

agreed with the main findings and challenges faced. This was also an opportunity for

them to let the researcher know of any possible outcomes or progress their activities

might have had since they last met. For instance, in the first case study, the trade

union leaders were able to explain the failure of the bargaining group supported by

the company to compete with them. Likewise, the trade union leaders in Case Study

C commented on the failure of the merger process that they were discussing during

the researcher’s first visit. Although having iterative visits was more time and

resource-consuming, it had the advantage of providing continuity to the story told by

the interviewees.

5.6. Post-fieldwork activities.

This subsection addresses the process after each part of the fieldwork regarding data

preparation and transcription. The majority of the data collected during the three

fieldwork phases was text-based, so it needed to be managed for analysis (Wahyuni,

2012). The trade union school sessions, the talks at the museum and the interviews

were all recorded with a phone ‘voice recorder’ application. Given the information’s

sensitive nature, right after the interviews, the researcher transferred the audio file

into a safe file on her password-protected computer and immediately deleted the

audio file from the phone. After a couple of interviews were conducted, the

researcher listened to the recordings to determine any audio problems. When the

researcher returned from every phase of fieldwork, she would make a list of all the

interviews conducted, categorising and labelling the information based on its

relevancy for the research. Only after that did the transcription process begin.

The researcher transcribed all the interviews herself to ensure all

information was adequately typed and as a way of reviewing and studying the

interviews in a systematic manner. The transcription was verbatim and also included

non-verbal details such as laughter and tone of voice. Both these were considered

when analysing and interpreting the data. Even though transcribing was highly time-

consuming, it was helpful when analysing the interviews. The researcher could

easily remember whether an interviewee had addressed a certain topic or not, or the

location of a comment in the interviews’ transcripts. The length of the transcriptions

119

varied according to the length of the audio recordings but was roughly in the range

of 10 to 35 pages long.

All interviews were conducted in Spanish and only the most useful passages

and quotes were translated into English. As one of the research’s supervisors was

fluent in Spanish, he reviewed some of the interviews to determine accuracy of the

information and content. The interviews contained many Chilean linguistic styles

and phrases that were difficult to translate directly into English. These portions were

double-checked for translation with colleagues who spoke both Spanish (and

understand the Chilean linguistic style) and English. However, the exact meaning

and intention of some quotes may have been lost in translation.

When the transcription process was finished, the interviews were revised

once more with consideration of anonymity and confidentiality. All information that

could possibly identify either the researcher or the case study organisations was

deleted. The data was then encoded (e.g., Company A, trade union leader 2, phase

3). This identifiable information was intended to be used for data analysis purposes

only, to enable a comparison of the findings between case studies.

5.7. Ethical considerations

This section addresses the research’s ethical considerations. Prior to fieldwork,

several measures were taken to ensure the study complied with ethical

considerations. This research adhered to the ethical standards for conducting a PhD

at The University of Manchester. After the Alliance Manchester Business School’s

ethics process was completed, permission was granted to conduct the fieldwork.

Anonymity of the participants, confidentiality of the information shared and

informed consent were some of the most important ethical issues considered when

performing the research. The researcher ensured, before the start of the interviews,

that all information was explained along with the informant’s freedom to stop the

interview at any point in time and withdraw from the study without having to give

any reason. Additionally, the researcher provided her business card, with all her

contact information as well as institutional affiliations, so that participants would be

assured of the study’s legitimacy.

The consent form was provided by the researcher and signed by the

respondents before each interview started. All interview content was kept

confidential and only discussed between the researcher and the supervisory team.

120

Data was stored according to the Data Protection Act and the University’s

requirements for data protection. After the study ends, the data will be kept for a

period of one year before being destroyed. To ensure anonymity, research reports,

presentations and documents used anonymised quotations. In addition, all

information that would make it possible to identify either the individual participants

or the case study organisations was deleted or encoded.

5.8. Research Organisations and Participants

This section presents a general description of the companies where the case studies

were developed. To facilitate understanding, companies will be referred to as A, B

and C.

5.8.1. Company A

Company A is a Chilean owned multinational company that started as a family

enterprise. The organisation directly employs around 3,100 workers, 63% of which

are manufacturing workers. In addition to this workforce, the company also uses

subcontracted workers who are employed by a different company that provides

services to Company A. Regarding workforce composition, Company A has a

proportion of 70% men and 30% women. In terms of worker’s nationality, 70% are

Chilean nationals and 30% are foreigners. Regarding age of the workers, 74% are

aged between 30 and 60 years old. A summary of this information is presented in

table 9 and 10.

At present, there are six trade unions in Company A. The largest trade union

has 421 members, the second largest trade union has 120 members and gathers

members from the retailing portion of the company, the third trade union has 87

members and operates in a production plant that is not located in the country’s

capital, the fourth trade union has 20 members, the fifth trade union has 15 members

and the sixth trade union has 32 members. The fourth, fifth and sixth unions are

located in the regions where the company has its grape fields and are considered agro

trade unions (hence their name in the summary table). A summary of this

information is presented in table BB, and for representation of trade union size, see

figure 8. These numbers represent a 22.2% trade union affiliation rate with an

approximate bargaining coverage of 70% due to the company’s extension of benefits

to non-unionised workers. The bargaining coverage is calculated according to the

121

workers who, despite not being part of the union, receive the benefits the trade union

has bargained with the company. Hence, the 70% bargaining coverage is composed

of the 22.2% of unionised workers who receive the benefits bargained by their union,

plus an additional estimate of 48% of non-unionised workers who receive the

extension of these benefits.

Table 9: Company A’s diversity composition

Company A diversity composition

Managers Workers

Gender Male 73 2265

Female 12 826

Nationality Chilean 64 2240

Non-Chileans 21 851

Age

Less than 30 years old 0 593

Between 30 and 40 years old 22 1217


More than 61 years old 8 139

Tenure

Less than 3 years 9 859

3 to 6 years 11 697

7 to 9 years 8 473

More than 9 years 57 1062


Table 10: Company A’s trade union composition

Company A trade union composition

Main Trade Union 421

Retailing Trade union 120

Regional Production Plant Trade Union 87

Agro trade union 1 (in region 6) 20



Total unionised workers 695


Figure 8: Visual representation of Company A’s trade unions

The proportions in this visual representation are in relation to the percentage of

workers who are unionised.

122


In this case study a total of 15 interviews were conducted over three

different time periods. Seven interviews with trade union leaders, three interviews

with HR managers, two interviews with health and safety specialists, one interview

with a line manager in charge of supervising the operations department and two

interviews with workers. Interviewees were aged between 30 and 45 years old and

only three informants, two workers and one HR manager, were women. Appendix 6

presents a summary of all the participants interviewed in this case study.

5.8.2. Company B

This company is a Chilean-owned multinational, part of the largest food-

manufacturing conglomerate in Latin America. Company B operates as part of a

parent company that differentiates its production sites (and therefore each of the

companies) in terms of its produced goods. This differentiation not only allows for

different structures and divisions within the organisation but also for multiple trade

unions to set up in each company. Companies under the parent company are

autonomous and completely independent from one another. In terms of

workforce composition, Company B’s parent company employs more than 10,500

workers. This research, however, was conducted in one of this parent company’s

production companies, which employs a little over 1,200, with a proportion of 60%

women and 40% men working in the production plant. This information was

provided by the trade unions in approximate numbers since Company B’s parent

123

company only detailed general data regarding workforce composition and did not

specify the information for each of its companies and/ production plants. A summary

of this information is presented in table 11.

Table 11: Company B’s parent company workforce diversity composition

Company B's workforce diversity composition

Total

Gender Male 6388

Female 4581

Nationality Chilean 7297

Non-Chileans 3672

Age

Less than 30 years old 4066

Between 30 and 40 years old 2911

Between 41 and 60 years old 3672

More than 61 years old 320

Tenure

Less than 3 years 5453

3 to 6 years 2093

7 to 9 years 929

More than 9 years 2494


The description that follows concerns the workplace in which Company B

is operating. The company has three trade unions, representing a 50% affiliation rate,

and a similar percentage for bargaining coverage. However, trade union membership

strongly fluctuated during the fieldwork. At the time of the first visit to the company,

the largest trade union had almost 580 employees affiliated, the second trade union,

which will be referred to as the ‘marginalised’ trade union, had around 120 workers

affiliated and the third trade union, which will be named the ‘gummy bear’ trade

union due to the product manufactured by its members, had 80 workers affiliated. By

the second visit, these numbers had shifted due to several issues that will be further

explain in upcoming chapters: the largest trade union had over 500 employees

affiliated, the second trade union was barely holding to 20 members and the third

union had a little over 55 members. A summary of Company B’s trade union

composition is presented in table 12 below. Also, a visual representation of trade

union composition is included in figure 9.

Table 12: Company B’s trade union composition in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of

fieldwork.

Company B trade union composition

124

Phase 1 Phase 2

Largest Trade Union 580 500

Marginalised Trade union 120 20

Gummy bear trade union 80 55

Total 780 575


Figure 9: Visual representation of Company B’s trade union composition.




In this case study a total of 11 interviews were conducted, eight with the trade union

leaders, one with the line manager and two with workers. Interviewees were aged

between 35 and 55 years old, with only two women interviewed. The company's HR

manager was not interviewed due to his reluctance to participate in the research. The

line manager, who was the gatekeeper of this case study, mentioned being afraid of

asking for an interview on the researcher’s behalf to discuss the trade unions and the

employment relationship, because of the possibility of the HR manager’s negative

reaction. The line manager thus provided the researcher with the HR manager’s

contact information to directly contact him. After several emails sent where the

researcher explained the purpose of the research and the types of questions that were

going to be asked, no answer was received. Eventually, this would prove to be an

125

indicator of the challenges presented by this case study. Appendix 6 presents a

summary of all the participants interviewed in this case study.

5.8.3. Company C

Company C was initially a Chilean-owned multinational but was recently bought by

a foreign conglomerate (in 2011). They specialised in dairy products and based their

strategy on being a mass consumer brand. This company had a little over 1,100

workers with a distribution of 85% male workers and only 15% female workers. A

summary of this information is presented next:

Table 13: Company C’s workforce diversity composition

Company C's workforce diversity composition

Managers &

Directors Workers

Gender Male 16 1043

Female 3 182

Nationality Chilean 16 1185

Non-Chileans 3 40

Age

Less than 30 years old 0 196



More than 61 years old 0 63

Tenure

Less than 3 years 4 377

3 to 6 years 0 246

6 to 9 years 7 120

More than 9 years 8 482


In terms of worker’ representation, Company C had two trade unions which,

combined together, represented a 75% membership rate with a similar percentage of

bargaining coverage. ‘Union One’ was the oldest union with 350 members while

‘Union Two’ was the largest with 560 members. This company represented the

highest trade union affiliation rate of the three cases studied here. A summary of this

information is presented in Table 14 with a visual representation in figure 10.

126

Table 14: Company C’s trade union composition

Company C's trade union composition

Union One 350

Union Two 560


Figure 10: Visual representation of Company C’s trade union composition.




Thirteen interviews in total were conducted in this Company, eight with the

leaders from the two trade unions, two interviews with line managers and two

interviews with workers. HR managers were not interviewed in this case study as

they did not reply to the researcher’s emails where she explained the research and the

importance of their participation. All this case study’s informants were men and aged

between 35 and 50 years old. Appendix 6 presents a summary of all the participants

interviewed in this case study.

5.9. Additional interviewed informants

Additional informants were interviewed as a way of gathering background

information on the topic being researched. These informants were categorised as

national-level informants, expert informants and supplementary case study

127

informants. National-level informants referred to those interviewees with a

perspective on the national challenges of Chilean trade unionism and the industrial

relations system. These informants may have worked at sectoral confederations or

national-level confederations, or even been involved in national social dialogue

programmes. The sessions attended at the Remembrance Museum were labelled as

national-level sessions given the scope of the discussed topics. As a result, twelve

interviews were categorised as national-level, all with a strong diversity focus,

involving 7 women and 5 men. The category of expert participants was formed by

eight interviewees who, as the label indicates, were experts in their own field. This

category contains labour lawyers, academics, trade unionism- and social dialogue-

specialised NGOs as well as social security experts. Finally, fourteen interviews

were labelled as supplementary case studies since their role was to supplement the

information gathered from the three main case studies. These interviews were all

conducted with either trade union leaders or HR managers from different companies

in a wide variety of industries (e.g., pharmacy, airlines, logistics, education,

telecommunications, IT and hospitality). Such interviews were useful in grounding

the research in the Chilean context and determining the spread of practices from

trade unions and managers, regarding not only trade union revitalisation but also

employment relations. A summary of the additional interviewed informants is

presented in Appendix 6.

5.10. Data Analysis

The technique used in this research to analyse the interviews was thematic analysis.

Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns

(themes) within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Braun, Clarke and Terry, 2014;

Saunders et al, 2016). It is considered a flexible approach not tied to any particular

theory or research paradigm, only specifying analytical procedures for coding and

theme development (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Braun et al, 2014; Saunders et al,

2016). Braun and Clarke (2006) identify six phases that guide thematic analysis:

familiarising oneself with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes,

reviewing themes, defining and naming themes and producing the report.

When using thematic analysis, the researcher should understand the

ontological and epistemological basis of their study, the specific theories guiding the

analysis and its deductive or inductive nature, and determine whether coding

128

includes semantic or latent meaning (Braun et al., 2014). In this research, critical

realism was used, allowing for different participants’ experiences to inform the

research. Thematic analysis was guided by the theoretical frameworks presented in

the literature review. With these theoretical frameworks, the researcher identified

patterns and themes from the interviews, selecting which were of interest to

answering the research questions. The data analysis was a deductive process, starting

from the theory and then moving on to the collected data. The level of analysis at

which the thematic analysis was developed was the semantic level, where the

meaning of the information given by the informants was taken as explicit. Latent

information was not included in the main analysis even though it was considered

useful when analysing some portions of the interviews, where the tone of voice with

which comments were made determined the actual meaning of the message.

After presenting the research’s design, data collection methods and data

analysis procedures, it was critical to comment on the research’s validity. One way

in which researchers can ensure validity of their qualitative research is through

reflexivity (Creswell and Miller, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2018; Denzin, 2008).

Due to space limitations, this thesis’s reflexivity discussion was moved to Appendix

8.

5.11. Thematic Analysis Development

As Braun and Clarke (2006) indicate, the first step upon completion of all the

interviews is familiarisation with the data. Since the researcher conducted and

transcribed all the study’s interviews, she became familiar with the data at an earlier

stage. After transcribing, the researcher continued reading and studying all the

interviews to determine the importance of their content and to highlight possible

recurrent themes. The researcher also presented a table summarising the key findings

from the interviews to her supervisory team. The researcher had an active role in

identifying patterns and themes, selecting which were of interest and reporting them

in the analysis. The initial stage of coding was facilitated by the deductive process in

which the information was analysed. As suggested by Yin (2003), when theory is

used to formulate the research questions, these theoretical propositions can also be

used to help with the analysis of the information. The theoretical framework helped

organise and direct the data analysis (Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2003).

129

The initial coding began after all interviews were transcribed. The first

round of coding was done by scrolling through the interviews and identifying

patterns. While reading the interviews, the researcher highlighted the sections of the

text where comments were made about each of the dimensions of renewal. The

researcher also remained alert for general themes developing from the interview

questions. Taking this approach facilitated the analysis of local trade union

revitalisation practices. This coding process was then enlarged to consider all other

relevant themes, discussion points and patterns.

Table 15: Summary of themes for thematic analysis

Main Themes Sub-themes

1 Strategies for trade union renewal

1 Organising

2 Restructuring

3 Coalition Building

4 Social Partnership

5 Political Action

6 International Links

7 Training

8 Social Media Platforms

9 Other strategies for renewal (e.g. servicing)

2 Management approach to trade

unions

10 General Positive

11 General Negative

12 Ambiguity

13 Union Suppression

14 Union Substitution

15 Inclusivist

16 Exclusivist

3 Aspects of Employment Relations

17 Willingness to Collective Bargaining

18 Worker desired values

19 Participation mechanisms

20 Management ideology

4 Representation Structure

21 Membership Composition

22 Trade union roles

23 Relationship between trade unions

5 Challenges 24 National-level challenges

25 Workplace-level challenges


The third stage of the thematic analysis process involved a much deeper

analysis of the interviews, searching for themes and recognising relationships

amongst the codes to relate the information to the research questions. A theme is a

130

broad category that incorporates several codes that can be related to one another,

indicating an idea that is important to the research question (Saunders et al., 2016).

Searching for themes implies condensing the raw data firstly by coding them and

secondly by grouping the coded data into analytic categories (Braun et al., 2014;

Saunders et al., 2016). The theme search involved judging the data and determining

how the codes fitted together. At first, this research had over 10 main themes and 50

sub-themes. Once these themes were developed, the researcher searched for the

codes in the interviews and grouped them together. While she was going through the

interviews, she made several modifications to the themes. New themes that were not

developed previously but were considered important to answering the research

questions were added to the analysis. After refining and testing the themes, the final

themes numbered five with 25 sub-themes. Table 15 shows a summary of the themes

and sub-themes for the interview analysis.

Interim reports and transcript summaries were developed while and after the

themes were identified to ensure their appropriateness. Interim discussion with the

supervisory team also helped in analysing the information. During this process,

relevant extracts from the interviews were identified. These extracts were examined

for adequacy vis à vis the themes by the researcher and the supervisory team. The

final stage of the process was to select the extracts that best represented each sub-

theme. The chosen extracts were illustrative of the analysis conducted with the aim

of answering the research questions. The themes helped analyse the data and develop

the story around the research topic and questions.

Due to space limitation, the discussion on the rationale for the lack of

qualitative software used to analyse the information from the interviews was moved

to Appendix 7.

5.12. Challenges and research’s limitations

This section describes the study’s limitations as considered by the researcher.

Regarding the process of data collection, the most relevant challenges were

threefold: the fragmentation of industrial relations, intra-trade union rivalry and

union weakening practices; these issues, although relevant findings, presented

important methodological challenges. The extent of the industrial relations

fragmentation and decentralisation was so evident that it permeated the feasibility of

accessing trade unions through the national-level confederation. As explained, access

131

had to be secured via personal networking and ‘snowballing’ from initial contacts.

Intra-union rivalry in some of the workplaces was also of relevance during data

collection. Since the relevant Chilean legislation allows for multiple unions to co-

exist in the same workplace, in each case study there were at least two unions with

which the researcher was conducting interviews. These interviews sometimes were

back-to-back, hence trade union leaders knew that the researcher was simultaneously

talking to both unions. As a consequence of this, they could have possibly felt

uncomfortable about sharing information with the researcher about their internal

practices or strategic planning. In B and C’s case studies, trade unions were indeed

depicted as rivals against each other, so having someone conducting interviews with

both organisations may have been problematic.

Another important challenge was the clear presence of some trade union-

weakening practices, even in companies that had social dialogue with their trade

unions. These practices often made it difficult to access HR managers: some of them

were unwilling to be interviewed by the researcher. Overall, building trust either

with trade unions or with HR and line managers was very difficult as the researcher

was initially presented as a complete stranger to them and, on the spot, they had to

disclose sensitive information about their future strategies.

Furthermore, each case study had its own sensitive topics that further

complicated the interviews. Case study A had had a history of quite violent strikes

that made it problematic to discuss any topic surrounding that critical event. Case

study B had one trade union being targeted by the employer for termination and was

‘falling apart’ during the fieldwork process. In this case, it became very difficult to

observe and research that trade union. Case Study C witnessed a problem between

the two trade unions because of a failed merger process right in the middle of the

fieldwork, thus interviewing trade union leaders was problematic since they were

going through their conflict while the researcher conducted the interviews.

A limitation in terms of data analysis was the somewhat predetermined

theoretical framework that may have constrained the questions asked and the way

information was coded and analysed (Saunders et al., 2016). Using the dimensions

from theoretical frameworks could have limited the interpretation of the data,

particularly when determining the trade union responses surrounding renewal. To

overcome this possible limitation, attention was placed on seeking all relevant data

that could potentially inform the research questions.

132

There was also an important issue around terminology which has become

one of the supplementary findings of the thesis itself. The specific language of

renewal and revitalisation does not often translate well into Spanish. Even though

words can be directly translated to Spanish as they exist in that language’s repertoire,

the exact meaning attributed to the concept varies from context to context. The same

happened with the names given to renewal strategies, which tended to not mean the

same across contexts. Therefore, research into these topics in different contexts tends

to be much more complex and challenging. The argument for avoiding direct

translation of concepts between contexts has been developed by Locke and Thelen

(1995) in their request for contextualised comparisons. As mentioned by these

authors, the dominant matched-comparison approach tends to assume that same

practices and terms have the same meaning across various national settings. In

reality, same labour practices may have completely different meanings in diverse

contexts, although they may be named the same. Something particularly along these

lines happened in this study with the notion of political action, which tends to be

more partisan in Chile. This practice, although widespread in European and North

American contexts, was extremely limited in the Chilean context as trade unions

associated political action with specific political parties. The analysis showed that

due to Chile’s political parties’ identities and historical contingencies, political

action was a strategy from which trade unions shied away, contrary to what some

studies have argued as being stereotypical of Chilean trade unions. The researcher

therefore had to remain open-minded to be able to capture the trade union responses

due to the different ways in which they expressed their activities and challenges.

133

CHAPTER 6: Organisational Context, Actors and Relations

6.1. Introduction

This chapter is the first of three empirical chapters and describes the workplace

governance and the representation structure of the three case studies that are included

in this research. As the effects of contextual factors on the development and nature

of trade union renewal strategies is highlighted in the theoretical framework of

revitalisation, these features are emphasised here. This chapter argues that the

corporate and local features of a workplace need to be considered when analysing

the process of trade union revitalisation as they can frame the responses implemented

by the unions. Since industrial relations are becoming more decentralised and

increasingly anchored at company level, it is important to inform the trade union

renewal debate by considering the workplace features and characteristics of the

company-level representation structure that may influence the process of

revitalisation.

The linkages between corporate strategy and industrial relations have been of

interest for decades. The assumption was that an organisation’s corporate strategy

can inform the employment practices implemented by that organisation (Grugulis,

2017; Noe, Hollenbeck, Gerhart, and Wright, 2017; Bird and Beechler, 1995; Purcell

and Sisson, 1983; Holbeche 2009). As a result, aligning both business and

employment strategies to achieve high organisational performance seems to be of

great importance for companies (Holbeche, 2012). However, companies can

sometimes place business outcomes and operations ahead of employee relations.

This thesis used Ahlstrand and Purcell’s (1988) model to outline the links

between corporate strategy and industrial relations. Whilst dated, this model is used

because it makes it possible to understand the connection between a company’s

decisions regarding its strategic direction and the approach taken towards workers,

which is of relevance for this thesis. In their model, these authors distinguished three

corporate strategy levels: first-, second- and third-order. First-order corporate

strategy concerns the company’s mission and goals; second-order business strategy

deals with the company’s structures and internal control mechanisms; and third-order

business strategy relates to the decisions made regarding production and employee

relations. Decisions taken at these three levels can shape the nature and practices of

134

the company, mainly because first-order corporate strategies flow downwards into

second- and third-order decisions. These three strategies also help frame the

configuration of industrial relations in each company.

By analysing the three levels of strategies of the three companies that are

included in this research, the present chapter has attempted to outline the workplace

features that tend to influence the responses that trade unions implement for

revitalisation. This chapter begins by describing the general business strategy and

structure of the three cases. Then, the companies’ representation structure will be

addressed, and finally, the management approach to industrial relations will also be

highlighted. The chapter ends with a summary of the key topics developed and a

discussion of the potential role played by some of these features in the union renewal

process. Throughout the chapters, the terms ‘case study’ and ‘company’ will be used

interchangeably without this implying a change in the meaning of the topic being

addressed.

6.2. Corporate strategy and structure

This section describes the corporate strategy of the three cases studies of this

research. This will make it easier to understand the context in which these company-

level trade unions were found. A corporate or business strategy can be

conceptualised as a “set of decisions about the direction of a firm” (Bird and

Beechler, 1995, p.25). Companies tend to their preferred strategy, considering

evaluations made as to their strengths and weaknesses, and also within sets of

constraints. Since the ‘choice’ made can thus influence the way a trade union

responds to the challenges faced, the corporate features of the case study companies

will be determined next.

6.2.1. Corporate strategy of Case Study A: when different values coexist.

Company A was one of the most successful organisations in the Chilean food-

manufacturing industry, with an annual revenue of USD$ 983 million in 2018. The

principles on which Company A focused – in theory – were customer satisfaction,

employee engagement, employee safety and compliance with the code of ethics.

They wished to be leaders in the food and drinks industry while promoting the

sector’s development. The Code of Ethics and Conduct reflected the principles and

values that guided Company A. This code provided guidelines for the behaviour of

135

all its employees. Billboards promoting the company’s values and principles could

be found in the premises of Company A. Additionally, ongoing training was

provided by the human resources department to employees, aiming to secure

understanding of and compliance with the code of conduct. As commented on the

interviews with HR managers, roughly once a year Company A provides training on

the specifics of the code of conduct for all workers.

The second-order business strategy for Company A can be described as

highly hierarchical since the company was composed of semi-autonomous divisions

based on geographical locations. As a family-owned holding, Company A grew

rapidly into a multinational firm, leading to several administrative and control

mechanisms which were highly bureaucratic. Company A divided itself into smaller

companies that specialised in each portion of the business. Consequently, production

plants represented one company and the retail department constituted another

company while the vineyards were technically another company. As will be

explained at a later point, Chilean companies tend to use this compartmentalization

mainly for financial and taxation purposes, but they can also use it to fragment the

workplace.

The third-order business strategy of Company A reflects an integrated HR

function, with formal procedures and structures to manage employees, although daily

interactions with workers could be highly dependent on each line manager’s style.

The head office in Company A outlined the HR practices in reference to recruitment

and selection, training and development, health and safety and, finally, compensation

and benefits. Each production plant then had its own HR department in charge of

implementing these practices at the different sites. All HR processes (e.g.,

recruitment, training and health and safety) operate independently from one another,

yet there was constant communication between the line managers of each HR

function to maintain alignment.

In general, the HR function was considered to be an important part of the

company’s operations, evidenced by the HR Senior Manager being part of the

company’s executive committee. This may be indicative of the interest Company A

had in issues pertaining to industrial relations. However, as it will be clearer in later

chapters, Company A’s values and principles tended to be rather ambiguous. Table

16 shows a summary of Company A’s features in comparison to Case Studies B and

C.

136

6.2.2. Corporate strategy in Case Study B: a company without worker values.

Company B was one company within a larger Chilean food manufacturing holding,

which in 2018 made USD$ 1.145 million in annual revenues. Company B focused

on consumers and branding, aiming to be the most renowned mass consumer brand

in the country. They had a code of conduct addressing respect for workers, the

provision of job-specific training, opposition to workplace harassment, interest in

work-life balance, emphasis on workers’ safety and non-discrimination policies. The

right of freedom of association was also mentioned in the code of conduct, as well as

the importance of engaging in collective bargaining within the limits of the law.

Company B’s second-order strategy showed a relatively hierarchical

divisional structure. This company was different from the other two case studies in

that it belonged to a parent company that differentiated its sites in terms of the

products manufactured. For example, there was a company (located at a specific

production site) dedicated to the production of water, another dedicated to producing

chocolate and cookies and yet another dedicated to manufacturing pasta. All these

companies acted independently from one another. Such differentiation has facilitated

the proliferation of trade unions both within and between the different sites.

Finally, company B’s third-order strategy also resembled – to some extent -

the previously mentioned Hacienda system, whereby there was a general sense of

the company perceived as the ‘protector’ of workers. The HR function was less

developed here, compared to the other case studies, since their main role was

providing compensation and other economic incentives to employees, while

measuring productivity and performance. Workers were expected, rhetorically at

least, to align their behaviours with the company’s guidelines, with a strong

emphasis on loyalty and compliance. Strategic planning was also less developed in

terms of how to manage workers and was more akin to a reactive and even fire-

fighting activity. Arguably, this company's HR department served a more stand-

alone function with limited influence over product, market or strategic decisions.

Drawing on Rodriguez and Gomez’s (2009) key elements of Chilean HRM, there

was high work pressure exerted on workers to meet the daily production programme

as well as a sustained focus on organisational efficiency. These features were

evidenced in the constant concern of line managers with reducing production waste

and meeting deadlines. Worker autonomy and empowerment were limited since

workers tended to be heavily supervised by line managers who precisely indicated

137

the ways in which production should be conducted. In return, employees were

expected to show exceptional loyalty, dedication, compliance and professionalism

towards the company.

Another feature of Company B’s third-order strategy was the marked

difference in the way management dealt with the existing trade unions. With the

largest trade union, collective bargaining was conducted relatively smoothly (e.g.

agreements were reached without major conflict between the employer and the trade

unions, and no strikes were conducted by this trade union), with several agreements

reached. In contrast, the relationship with the second trade union showed clear signs

of tension, with management strongly opposing the demands and issues presented by

this trade union. Moreover, the interviewees in this case study commented on the

fact that there were several ongoing legal disputes over matters of employment

between this union and management. As a result, management attempted to construct

a workplace culture where being a member of the first union was somewhat safer

than being a member of the second union. Table 16 shows a summary of this

Company’s features as regards first-, second- and third-order strategies.

6.2.3. Corporate strategy in Case Study C: the Multinational with family values

Company C was a multinational which had revenues of USD$459 million in the year

2018. This company was bought in 2002 by a non-Chilean multinational corporation,

therefore this was the only case study in this research with foreign ownership.

Company C’s values were different as compared to those of Companies A and B in

that, in addition to consumer focus, it signalled the importance of products for

families and communities. Their mission was to be the largest family food provider,

and they were a well known brand in the country, with several products leading their

food category. The importance of the company in the food industry had influenced

its mission and vision statements as it wished to be a mass consumer brand in Chile.

Their main values included customer and community collaboration, a focus on

products and high financial performance. The fact that the company declared its

interest in families and communities as stakeholders can be taken as a sign of a

higher quality employer in the industry. Additionally, Company C acknowledged the

relevance that shareholders and employees have to its operations, being the only

company in the case studies to include this in its corporate values.

138

Regarding second-order corporate strategy, the company compartmentalised

its different areas in a significant manner. Similar to Companies A and B, Company

C had various internal divisions such as operations, finance, marketing and HR.

Likewise, this company had different production sites in the south of the country, but

its main production plant was in the capital, Santiago.

The third-order strategy for Company C was highly sophisticated. The

fieldwork showed Company C had an engaged relationship with trade unions and

great respect and consideration for workers. This was in evidence through two

features. The first was that the HR function was centralised while having a separate

‘Employee Relations’ department that dealt with the collective bargaining process.

The second feature was the company’s apparent commitment to minimum labour

standards as they signed an international agreement on trade union rights and

freedom to conduct collective bargaining. In addition, these agreements highlighted

the importance of consultation and information with workers and their

representatives. In general, this company was perceived by the researcher as more

worker- and union-friendly than Companies A and B. Table 16 shows a summary of

these features.

Table 16: Summary of general aspects of corporate strategy within the case

studies

Corporate Strategy

First-Order Second-Order Third-Order

Case A Focus on:

• Customer satisfaction.

• Employee engagement

• Employee safety,

• Compliance with code of

conduct and ethics.

• Highly structured.

• Hierarchical.

• Bureaucratic.

• Strong control mechanisms.

• Some work pressure

exerted by managers.

• High organizational

efficiency without

HRM.

• Working on having

some worker

autonomy. Case B Focus on:


• Consumer branding.

• Divisional structure.

• Significantly hierarchical.

• Internal division marked by

product specialisation.

• Considerable work

pressure exerted by

managers.


efficiency without

HRM.

• Virtually non-existence

of worker autonomy. Case C Focus on:


• Product quality.

• Family-oriented products • Collaboration with

surrounding communities.

• Important

compartmentalization.

• Hierarchical.

• Non-Chilean MNC from a

social economy background

• Less work pressure

exerted by managers.


efficiency without

HRM.

• Some worker

autonomy.

139

In terms of employee relations, the three case studies showed a firm-level-

based unionism and, consequently, a decentralised collective bargaining process.

Each company had different ways of approaching trade unions and workers,

although later chapters will point to the nuances and challenges of these

relationships. In the three companies, the HR function was relevant and had an

important position in the corporate office, albeit with some differences. However, the

HR departments in Companies A and C showed a more predominant role in their

participation in the firms’ technical decisions. Equally relevant in a company’s HR

function was the way in which it promoted worker participation. Since this feature

was part of the corporate strategy and relevant in the process of trade union renewal,

the details of each case study’s participation mechanisms will be addressed below.

6.3. Participation mechanisms, union democracy and representation structure

This section describes the companies’ participation mechanisms and representation

structure (e.g., trade union structure, trade union composition, trade union identity

and membership density). Such practices were reviewed in this research as they may

play a significant role in explaining the trade unions’ revitalisation strategies. This

section also manages to outline the nature of fragmentation and complexity within

the cases in terms of worker representation as this is one of the key factors

determining the challenges unions face in relation to conducting industrial relations

matters and developing renewal strategies. The section will start by addressing the

theoretical underpinnings of the participation mechanisms and union democracy,

proceeding to then describe in detail the configuration of these topics for each case

study

Workplace participation is a concept that refers to the notion that workers

should have a say in matters of work that concern them. According to Dundon, et al

(2017) workers need a voice to express their concerns and employers should provide

that space. Employee participation and involvement can have different degrees, be at

several levels and take different forms (Wilkinson, Gollan, Marchington, and Lewin,

2010; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington, 2006).

Participation can be about managers informing people of changes, consulting

employees or allowing workers to make the decisions. Participation can take place at

different levels such as within teams and at department or company level. The topics

of participation can range from trivial concerns up to strategic decisions.

140

Additionally, participation can have a direct or indirect form. Direct participation

mechanisms are when workers communicate directly with the employer to express

their concerns. Direct participation can take the form of face-to-face or written

communications between managers and workers (Dundon, Wilkinson, Marchington,

and Ackers, 2004; Wilkinson et al, 2010). Indirect participation mechanisms are

when employees voice their concerns to management through representatives they

have previously elected (Wilkinson et al, 2010). Indirect participation centres on the

role that trade unions play in discussions between managers and the workforce and

can take the form of joint consultation or collective bargaining (Budd, Gollan, and

Wilkinson, 2010). The benefits put forward in the literature of enhancing

participation in the workplace are that workers can become more aware of the

business situation and improve their labour productivity and job satisfaction

(Wilkinson et al., 2010; Dundon et al., 2017). The different degrees, levels and forms

of the case studies’ participation mechanisms will be addressed in the following

subsection.

6.3.1. Case Study A’s participation mechanisms and representative structure.

Case Study A was characterised by having both indirect and direct forms of

employee participation. Direct participation was used to consult on employees’

satisfaction and engagement while indirect participation was established to bargain

over wages and working conditions. The indirect form of worker involvement was

more widespread and dependent on the case study’s trade union. The main trade

union was in charge of representing workers and communicating with the company.

However, there were another five trade unions in this company; these were located in

the company’s sites outside the capital. The main, dominant trade union in Case

Study A was called “Sindicato Unificado de la Empresa A” which can be translated

as “Unified Trade Union of Company A”.

This trade union was formed after the merger of three smaller unions located

in the company’s largest production plant. That merger took place in 2006 after the

leaders of the three existing unions came together and agreed the unification process.

The process was facilitated by these unions’ similar features (e.g., similar benefits

and agreements with the employer, autonomy from national federations and

confederations, independence from managers and sharing the same values and

goals). The merger was first discussed amongst the leaders and then voted upon by

141

the members, whereupon the unification process won in the ballot. The entire

process took almost a year to be completed and, as a result, the three trade unions

formed one larger union. All the leaders of the three unions remained in the leading

positions after the merger.1 The position each of the five leaders had in the present

union were President of the trade union, Secretary, Treasurer and two ‘Directors’2.

All trade union leaders from Company A worked in the production and

logistics area in the larger production plant. However, each trade union leader

worked in a different area or department. One trade union leader worked in the pallet

removal area, another one worked in the filling area (which is the most critical area

in the entire wine production process), two worked in the packaging area (in

different plants) and the last trade union leader was a supervisor in a particular area

dealing with the packaging of special edition wines. As employees of Company A,

these leaders had to work their shifts and fulfil the required working time while

having only a limited number of hours per week allocated to union-related activities.

Moreover, these five trade unionists performed all the activities related to the union

and its members. They did not have branches or committees that helped them in

managing the trade union; this is solely done by the five trade union leaders, who

were at the forefront of every activity developed. The reason for this is that the

Chilean legislation attributed to them alone the right to manage issues related to the

union. This is not rare in the Chilean trade union movement: as remarked by Bank

(2017), most Chilean unions have limited resources to build their power, act against

the offensives of their employer and ensure success. As the author mentioned, unlike

most international trade unions, which can have paid staff, offices or organising and

education departments, independent trade unions, as in these case studies, are not

well resourced. Overall, the better-equipped Chilean trade unions may have the

money to pay for a part-time labour lawyer, release time for the president of the

union and a small office to conduct their operations, but these remain relatively

limited.

The trade unions in Company A were all company-based trade unions. The

largest trade union in the company had 421 members, another trade union in the

1 The rationale for this is that the legislation allows five leaders when the trade union has over 250

members. Four of this trade union’s leaders remain in their positions at the time of writing.

2 These are the positions directly translated from Spanish and exist according to what the labour code

establishes.

142

Company’s retail department had 120 members, one trade union in another

production site near the capital had 87 members and the other three trade unions,

located in different regions, had 20, 15 and 32 members respectively. Of these trade

unions, none were affiliated to federations, confederations or any national-level

institutions. Table 17 shows a summary of the existing trade unions in Company A.

This case study focused on the achievements of and analysed the largest trade union,

which contains the majority of the union members in Company A. This being said,

the case study also mentioned the importance of other, smaller unions in the merger

process.

Table 17: Summary of Trade Unions in Case Study A

Trade

Union 1

"Main trade

union"

Trade

union 2

Trade

Union 3

Trade

Union 4

Trade

Union 5 Trade union 6

Location Capital

Capital

(Retail

centre)

Region Region Region Region

Members 421 120 87 20 15 32

Total

workers 750 256 150 32 46 62

Areas

Operations,

logistic,

maintenance

and

warehouse

Sales staff,

warehouse

operators.

Operations,

logistics,

maintenance

and

warehouse

Agricultural

fields

Agricultural

fields

Agricultural

fields

Total

workers 2536


The trade union affiliation rate in the company was close to 20%, with a

predominance of male membership with 351 male members and 70 women. The

majority of unionised workers were employed in the areas of production and

logistics, in which they were front line workers on the shop floor. In addition, there

were only a few unionised supervisors. In 2017, the members’ wages ranged from

USD $530 (which was the minimum wage that a worker in the Operations

Department could be paid) to USD $1200 (which was the wage of one of the

supervisors).

The internal structure of the trade union was specified by the relevant

national regulations. Consistent with membership characteristics, the constituents of

this trade union were from an older cohort and enjoyed several years of seniority

within the firm. Yet, there was also a significant number of younger workers.

Ninety-six members were aged over 45 years old while 46 members were aged

143

between 18 and 20. Only three members of the trade union were migrant workers.

Since each union had its own agreement, the existing collective agreement covered

all unionised workers. In addition, the company could extend some of the bargained

benefits to non-unionised workers3. Union members were not divided by

occupational group as they all belonged to the same union irrespective of their

positions in the company.

There were two main key roles performed by this union, the first one related

to conducting the process of collective bargaining and ensuring the company’s

compliance with the agreements. Trade unionists not only performed collective

bargaining but also spent a reasonable amount of time monitoring the company’s

compliance with collective agreements. This was mostly because, despite having a

legally binding collective agreement, the company often skirted the limits of what

sufficed to comply with each clause. An example of this happened with a production

bonus the company had to pay to the workers in the Operations Department. The

company miscalculated the production bonus contained in the collective contract and

paid the workers less than the agreement stated (Company A, HR Manager1). The

trade unions became aware of this issue and met with the production plant HR

manager to make the proper formal claim. In this case, the successful reviews and

claims of the trade union induced the company to comply with what was stated in the

agreement regarding the production bonus. The trade union leaders of Company A

were of the view that their employer would take advantage of any loopholes in the

collective agreement.

In the process of collective bargaining, the largest trade union in Company A

had a significant strike during the year 2013 which culminated in a complete shift in

the way employment relations were being developed. The negotiations for the new

collective agreement were halted due to disagreement on the pay increase of the

workers. Presented with the employer’s final offer, the workers voted for a strike that

lasted 45 days. This strike was characterised by HR managers and trade unions as

unprecedented as it completely changed the way in which the company’s executives

approached workers and trade unions. After the strike, the company’s strategy

changed from confrontation to cooperation with the trade unions. Ongoing meetings

3 This changed in the new Labour Reform. Now companies are obliged to ask for the trade union’s approval to

extend to other workers any benefits that were collectively bargained.

144

took place and the company regularly listened to the trade union’s requests. As will

be seen in the analysis, this strike was key in enhancing the trade union’s legitimacy

in the workplace.

This in turn related to an additional activity that trade union leaders

performed, which was to report to the Labour Inspectorate and/or to the HR

department any violations of the agreements coming out of collective bargaining.

Prior to the trade union reporting a breach in the collective agreement, there might be

negotiations taking place between them and the company. Yet, it might happen that

these negotiations reached an impasse and the trade union would then proceed to the

Labour Inspectorate to claim a breach of the collective contract. This technique has

been documented in the literature by Crocco (2017), who mentioned that involving

the Labour Inspectorate in the employment relationship has become commonplace

for Chilean trade unions as the most important way trade unions have of securing

compliance.

The second role of this trade union was servicing its members. According to

the collective agreement, it was the duty of unionists to help members and promote

mutual cooperation. Hence, their goal was to remain close to their members and

open to any questions they might have. This particular role reflected on one of the

trade union’s main objectives, which was to administer the benefits that were

exclusive to their members as contained in the collective agreement. This role has

become critical in retaining employees in union membership given how problematic

it is to increase membership numbers. The servicing role has been the route through

which this union has been able to recruit new members, secure legitimacy and more

bargaining power (Heery and Kelly, 1994). As an example, trade unionists in

Company A noted that workers needed support to access housing, so they included a

specific clause in the collective agreement regarding the support of the trade union in

conjunction with the employer to help workers access subsidies to enable them each

to buy a house. Another example of servicing in this trade union was the inclusion of

medical benefits and access to a leisure centre. All of these benefits were exclusive

to union members and negotiated with the company by trade unionists in light of the

workers’ needs.

The other form of worker participation in Case Study A was through direct

mechanisms of information and consultation. Direct forms of communication were

established through surveys and meetings between managers and workers. This latter

145

mechanism was more evident in the aftermath of the 2013 strike, at which time the

company established weekly breakfast meetings between workers, supervisors and

the respective department manager. The goal of these meetings was to have a direct

channel of communication between management and workers and listen to their

concerns with the hope of generating a prompt solution to any existing problem.

These meetings ended approximately two months after the strike was over,

illustrating the reactive and instrumental nature of such participation mechanisms.

The two forms of employee participation co-existed simultaneously in Company A

without any apparent tension.

6.3.2. Case Study B’s participation mechanisms and representative structure.

Company B seemed to have given predominance to indirect participation, since

direct forms of participation were not observed during fieldwork. Three company-

based trade unions were in charge of representing the employees’ demands in the

workplace. The main trade union, which was the main subject of this case study,

dated back to 1925, and was considered one of the oldest company-based trade

unions in Chile. The current leaders of this trade union were elected in 2007. The

official name of the trade union was “Sindicato Industrial Company B” which can be

translated as “Company B’s Industrial Union”. This was an independent company-

level union, not affiliated to any federation, confederation or other national-level

institution. The trade union had not merged with any other trade union despite

varying in size over the years.

The positions of the five leaders within the union were President of the Trade

Union, Secretary, Treasurer and two ‘Directors’. In terms of the positions held in the

company by these leaders, all were production operatives and worked in the

production area. Similar to Case Study A, all trade union leaders used their union

leave to conduct the tasks related to their union and they did not have branches or

any special committees to aid them in administering the trade union. These five trade

unionists were the only workers allowed by law to represent workers and to deal

with all issues related to the collective agreement and the union.

All three trade unions were independent from each other, meaning they all

engaged separately in collective bargaining. These trade unions suffered important

changes in their membership rates over the years. The second trade union was

initially the largest but, after engaging in industrial conflict with Company B, its

146

membership decreased and it is was, at the time of the interviews, the second union

in the workplace in terms of size. The details of this membership fluctuation will be

further explained as it concerned the present research’s findings.

The membership composition of the three trade unions in Case Study B is

described next and summarised in table 18. To simplify the presentation of these

trade unions, the largest trade union will be referred to as ‘Largest Trade Union’, the

second trade union in size will be referred to as the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ and

the third trade union in terms of size will be referred to as the ‘Third Trade Union’.

The numbers of workers affiliated to the trade unions shifted between the two phases

of fieldwork, such that during phase 1, there were 780 members affiliated to these

trade unions (580 members in the ‘largest trade union’, 120 members in the

‘marginalised trade union’ and 80 members in the ‘third trade union’). This

represented a 52% affiliation rate. During the second phase of the fieldwork, there

were 575 workers affiliated to the unions, 500 members in the ‘largest trade union’,

20 members in the ‘marginalised trade union’ and 55 members in the ‘third trade

union’, which represented a 50% affiliation rate. The trade unions showed a

predominance of women in their membership, consistent with the workplace

composition, as nearly 60% of the union members were women.

The majority of union members were employed in the production area. Most

members were front line workers and there were no unionised supervisors. The age

distribution of members varied; while there were older workers affiliated to the trade

union with seniority, there were also younger workers who had been in the company

for only a couple of years. There were also only a few migrant workers affiliated to

the trade union. Similar to Case Study A, the existing collective agreements covered

all unionised workers. The ‘Largest Trade Union’, the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’

and the ‘Third Trade Union’ had their own separate collective agreements that

covered their particular members. Additionally, the company could extend the

bargained benefits to non-unionised workers, a process that needed to be agreed with

the respective trade union.

Table 18: Summary of Trade Unions in Case Study B

Trade union 1

‘Largest Trade

Union’

Trade union 2

‘Marginalised Trade

Union’

Trade union 3

‘Third Trade Union’

Location Workplace, V Region Workplace,

V Region

Workplace,

V Region

147

Members

• 580 members during

phase 1 of fieldwork











Total

employees

• 1.500 employees during phase 1 of fieldwork.

• 1.150 employees during phase 2 of fieldwork

Areas Operations and

logistics

Operations and

logistics

Operations and

logistics


The trade unions performed two key roles. The first was to conduct collective

bargaining while regularly ensuring the employer’s compliance with the agreements.

Despite agreements being contained in the collective contract, there could often be

issues that required the trade union leaders’ constant supervision. The second role

performed by the unions was providing services to the members, which was

significant for them. Chilean trade union leaders may have a tendency to believe that

such servicing is their primary role, and workers expect the union to provide

different services for them. This case study showed strong competition amongst the

different unions regarding who offered the best benefits. This competition was

accentuated by the potential it had for recruiting workers. The trade unions

mentioned that this service role was what brought them legitimacy amongst workers

and with the employer.

6.3.3. Case Study C’s participation mechanisms and representative structure.

Participation in Case Study C was conducted through indirect and direct

mechanisms. Direct forms of participation were surveys and team briefings between

managers and workers. These meetings were based more on communicating certain

information to workers than on allowing upward information flow. Similar to Case

Study A, the direct form of voice was geared more towards job satisfaction and

worker engagement. Differently, indirect participation took place exclusively

through trade unions. This case study had two trade unions whose names were

“Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores No. UNO de Company C” and “Sindicato

Nacional de Trabajadores No. DOS de Company C”. In English, this can be

translated as “National Trade Union of Workers No. ONE from Company C” and

“National Trade Union of Workers No. TWO from Company C”. These two trade

unions were independent from each other and were company-based. Only one of

them, the one referred to as ‘Union Two’, was affiliated to the national

confederation, the CUT. In order to best describe this case study, the trade unions

148

will be identified as ‘Union One’ and ‘Union Two’. The Presidents of ‘Union One’

and ‘Union Two’ had been in their positions for six and ten years respectively.

Union One had been the same trade union since its founding while Union Two had

experienced several mergers. The internal structure of each trade union was similar

to the other case studies, where each trade union’s positions were a President, a

Treasurer, a Secretary and two ‘Directors’.

One specific feature of these trade unions that differentiated them from the

other two cases studies is these unionists’ exclusive dedication to performing union

duties. They did not perform a specific job in the company as they were full-time

trade union leaders. This feature was very significant as, unlike other trade unions,

leaders in Company C were able to focus solely on developing union activities. As

the legislation stated, these ten unionists were the only ones responsible for

conducting all union-related activities, collective bargaining and member

representation. They did not have branches or any special committees that assisted

them in administering the trade union.

Company C’s largest trade union was ‘Union Two’ with 561 members while

‘Union One’ had 352 members. Table 19 presents a summary of this information.

This represented a 46.1% and 28.7% affiliation rate respectively. There was no

division of occupational groups in these trade unions, hence any worker, irrespective

of their job title or position, could join either of the two unions. The combined

membership of these trade unions represented a 74% affiliation rate, which was the

highest of the three cases studies. In terms of membership composition, there were

more men than women affiliated to the trade unions; 37 women were affiliated to

‘Union One’ and 59 women were affiliated to ‘Union Two’. Unionists in this case

study were particularly proud that all production supervisors were affiliated to the

trade union, while their affiliation was somewhat rare in the other two cases. There

was an equal number of young and older members and no significant presence of

migrant workers. As a way of incorporating all their members’ concerns when

engaging in collective bargaining, the trade unions implemented working committees

amongst the members of the unions with the aim of collecting as much information

from workers as possible. Trade unionists in this case mentioned the importance of

this process as they believed it was the best way to represent workers.

149

Table 19: Summary of Trade Unions in Case Study C

Union One Union Two

Location Workplace Workplace

Members 352 561

Total

Employees 1.225

Areas

Operations, logistics,

sales, warehouse,

maintenance

Operations, logistics,

sales, warehouse,

maintenance


Moving now to describe the main roles of these trade unions, there were two

activities emphasised, which were collective bargaining and services for members.

While collective bargaining was a central role for ‘Union Two’, ‘Union One’

believed servicing members was its main task. This servicing role was highly

sophisticated and essentially meant using the union fees to cover some of the

workers’ medical expenses and the purchase of schoolbooks for the members’

children. ‘Union One’ had a form of health insurance that would cover some medical

expenses that members and their families would incur in case of sickness. This was

based on a ‘top-up’ system whereby expenses not covered by the employees’ health

insurance could be covered by the trade unions’ ‘top-up’ medical insurance. The

system also included coverage for some medications and medical exams for the

union member and their family. The Treasurer of ‘Union One’ was particularly

proud of this health insurance system as he believed that the most important thing for

workers was health and education. The trade union also implemented a library within

Company C, which contained schoolbooks for the workers’ children. The workers

could borrow the books when they needed them and, in the event that a book was not

available in the library, the trade union could buy the book and keep it in the library

for future workers. Both of these services showed the extent of the service role that

trade unions can come to have, whereby the overall objective of the trade union is to

administer these benefits. This was an important feature of the firm-based industrial

relations processes of Chile around which inter-union competition emerged,

therefore the analysis will return to this later. There was no mention by this union’s

leaders of the importance of conducting collective bargaining in the workplace even

though such activities existed. In contrast, ‘Union Two’ emphasised its role in

collective bargaining and the preparation undertaken in advance. Its leaders believed

150

collective bargaining was the only way to secure better wages for the members.

Servicing members was a very important function but understood to be secondary to

the union’s role. The next table contains a summary of the participation mechanisms

and representation structure discussed in this chapter.

Table 20: Summary of Participation Mechanisms and Representation Structure

Case Unions in the

workplace

Participation

Mechanisms

Affiliation

rate

Membership

composition

Case A

6 trade unions in

the entire

company, 1 trade

union in the

researched

workplace.

Direct and

Indirect 20%

• 421 members.

• Predominantly male

membership.

• Junior and senior

workers equally

distributed. • Small presence of

migrant workers.

Case B 3 Mostly Indirect 50%

• 600 members.

• Predominantly female

membership


workers equally

distributed. • Growing presence of

migrant workers.

Case C 2 Direct and

Indirect 74%

• 352 members in

Union One; 561

members in Union

Two.

• Predominantly male

membership.


workers equally

distributed in both

unions. • Limited presence of

migrant workers in

both unions.


This section has illustrated how each case study had its own trade union

structure, membership composition and representative strategy (see summary in table

20). In line with what was seen in the literature, these companies’ industrial relations

were based on company-level unions, with the existence of multiple, independent

unions in each workplace. Affiliation rates to the trade unions were higher than the

national average in the three companies, but most significant in Case Study C, where

the rate exceeded 74%. The cases also showed these employers’ tendency to

combine different forms of participation mechanisms. Broadly speaking, direct and

indirect participation forms co-existed, with limited tension arising from this. Having

151

said this, tensions were more obvious in Case Study C where ‘Union Two’ voiced

concern with Company C’s direct communication with workers, as will be further

explained in Chapter 7. The union believed Company C was directly engaging with

employees with broader and unclear business information to weaken the unions’

position. Finally, trade union roles in the three cases were primarily oriented towards

collective bargaining and servicing, with Case Study C showing the extent of this

role.

Embedded in the companies’ features was the approach managers took

towards workers and trade unions. This approach was also essential to understanding

the efforts of company-based trade unions to revitalise. Therefore, the next section

focuses on identifying the general approach managers took towards workers and

trade unions in each of the case studies.

6.4. Management approach to industrial relations.

This section describes the cases studies’ management approaches to industrial

relations. By describing this approach, the overall managers’ perceptions and

interactions with the workers’ representatives will be illustrated. Understanding this

is critical as in company-based industrial relations, the approach managers take

towards worker representatives can influence the responses of the trade unions

aiming towards revitalisation (Purcell, 1987). The discussion will start by identifying

the nature of the relationship between management and trade unions, moving to then

describe the general style managers had in the employment relationship. Finally, the

section ends by discussing the implications that such approaches have for trade union

renewal.

6.4.1. Management style in Case Study A.

In general terms, Company A could be characterised as a pluralist employer, mostly

due to its apparent collaboration with trade unions. There seemed to be a tacit

understanding that unions and workers can represent opposite viewpoints to that of

the company, and although this had not always been the case, managers and trade

unions had a formal and stable relationship. Differences between the trade unions

and the employers were channelled through dialogue.

There were, however, several features of Company A that might question the

pluralist philosophy of the firm. The first is that input from workers into decision-

152

making processes did not seem to be meaningful, as Company A could inform

workers about decisions without actually consulting them. The second feature was

that affiliation to a trade union, although allowed, was not really encouraged. Some

interviewed workers believed that joining a trade union could potentially have

negative consequences. In addition, middle managers tended to be trained to

consider themselves part of the company's administrative committee, so they were

not frequently permitted to join trade unions. In this particular case study,

supervisors, line managers and managers were not unionised, nor did they belong to

employees’ associations. This impacted the trade union affiliation rates as, out of the

three case studies, this was the one with the lowest membership rates. Another

interesting feature regarding the management approach to trade unions was

Company A’s 2013 industrial conflict in 2013 that not only meant disruption of the

company’s production but also acted as the basis for a shift in the employer’s

orientation to industrial relations. After this conflict, Company A understood that the

way to stability both in production and in working relations came with a trade-off,

since they had to engage in consistent dialogue with workers and trade unions.

Following that episode, the company engaged in collective bargaining more

willingly and established a cooperative relationship with trade unions. Overall,

having this fairly minimalist pluralist approach to workplace industrial relations may

have been instrumental for Company A in achieving its objectives without

significantly investing in terms of worker voice and trade unions, as later chapters

will illustrate.

6.4.2. Management style in Case Study B.

Company B’s management style tended to be pluralist on paper, but the reality in the

workplace might challenge this assumption. On the one hand, this employer was

constantly trying to undermine trade unions by depicting them as unnecessary. On

the other hand, this company engaged in collective bargaining with the three

company trade unions, which arguably they had to do exclusively to comply with

Chilean legislation. Out of the three case studies, this was the one that evidenced the

most union opposition, which was mostly supported by this company’s alleged

tendency to engage in mass dismissals of workers after strikes. Such hostility

towards strike action became more noteworthy when the interviews revealed that the

‘Largest Trade Union’ renounced to their right to strike (by signing a specific

153

collective agreement called ‘convenio’) in order to have a less antagonistic

relationship with their employer.

Another peculiarity of this case study was that management differentiated its

approach when engaging with the trade unions. With the ‘Largest Trade Union’,

managers legitimised their role and bargained over wages and working conditions.

As perceived by line managers, this relationship may have been the easiest to

maintain and develop along the non-confrontational lines the company sought, as

this trade union could be considered a business-friendly union. In contrast, with the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’, management restricted all communication channels

strictly to those deriving from collective bargaining. Company B did not have any

type of relationship with this trade union and significantly opposed it. As a result,

unionists in the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ opted for a more confrontational

approach, having ongoing legal disputes over matters of the employment

relationship.

Overall, even though Company B recognised unions and engaged in

collective bargaining (both signs of a pluralist approach to industrial relations), they

showed a tendency to marginalise the role of unions by taking a dismissive approach

towards them. Since Chilean legislation holds that – in theory- companies need to

recognise all trade unions and bargain with all of them, the employer has found other

ways to challenge the legitimacy of trade unions. Some of these practices, although

prohibited by law, have actually become more frequent and sophisticated to the point

where trade unions are challenged daily. The second empirical chapter of this

research will analyse in more detail the use employers make of the gaps and

ambiguities in the labour legislation, which is central to understanding the process of

trade union renewal in the Chilean context.

6.4.3. Management style in Case Study C.

In comparison to the previous two case studies, Company C may have had the most

pluralistic approach to IR. This company had two trade unions in the same

workplace, whose combined membership represented a 74% affiliation rate. This

company was owned by a non-Chilean international conglomerate, which had a

tradition of positive industrial relations. As a result, Company C’s parent company

had clearly stressed the importance of a collaborative relationship between trade

unions and managers, emphasising a zero-conflict policy. Moreover, this

154

multinational had signed an International Framework Agreement to promote trade

union rights and minimum labour standards, which may account for its apparently

better IR practices.

This company’s approach to trade unions contrasted with that of most

Chilean-owned companies where employers tended to be more cautious and wary of

trade unions. Despite general guidelines coming from the non-Chilean head office,

local managers in the Chilean subsidiary had a tendency to adapt the company’s

employment policies to the Chilean context, where an underlying discomfort with

trade unions can be noticeable. Such local adaptations became more apparent when

‘Union One’ and ‘Union Two’ began to discuss a possible merger. According to

leaders in ‘Union Two’, the management reached out to the leaders of ‘Union One’

to prevent the merger from happening. ‘Union Two’ felt that the company and their

fellow trade union leaders from ‘Union One’ had breached the cooperative

relationship and the merger agreement and had betrayed their trust. As a result, the

merger was cancelled and the fragmentation of the workplace between the two

unions remained.

The foreign ownership may also explain why this was the only case study

with a specifically separate employment relations department. The Employment

Relations department and the HR department were two separate areas, where the first

directly dealt with trade unions and all matters related to the process of collective

bargaining, collective agreements and compliance from all parties, while the second

dealt with wages and compensation. Similarly, Company C was the only company

with fully dedicated trade union leaders working in the company’s premises and not

required to perform work duties. Instead, their exclusive role was to focus on union-

related tasks. This implied that leaders had a more visible presence in the workplace

and were more on-call for workers than the trade union leaders in the other cases.

As a result, this company’s approach to trade unions was identified as more

cooperative than the other two cases. Middle managers were less antagonistic to

trade unions and their approach was more pragmatic as they worked alongside each

other to operate smoothly. There were, however, some issues regarding the nature of

the employment relationship that will be further explained in the next chapter.

155


This chapter began by describing the organisational context in which the three case

studies took place. Describing the organisational context, identifying the business

strategy of each company along with participation mechanisms, union structures,

characteristics of the representation structure and the general approach management

took to industrial relations will be essential in analysing the responses of these

company trade unions to renewal.

In general, the cases illustrated positive industrial relations where these

individual trade unions engaged in collective bargaining with their employer. The

business strategies of the companies seemed to emphasise the development of

workers, which concurs with the higher quality employers that these companies tend

to be. Likewise, there were several participation mechanisms for workers to voice

their concerns, and a well-developed representation structure. However, when

closely analysing the workplace context, there were some issues surrounding the

interaction of trade unions and employers, which challenged the positive pluralist

nature of their industrial relations.

Neither of the participation mechanisms implemented provided workers with

a significant voice, as direct participation was mostly used to survey the workers’

opinions regarding job satisfaction with no action plans developed, a process that

was highly dependent on managerial control. Similarly, some trade union rights (e.g.,

the right to strike) were hindered by employers and there was limited consultation on

broader matters of the employment relationship. In addition, the representative

structure, although sophisticated, seemed to be skewed towards a managerial

business unionism.

What appeared to be weaker forms of partnership and a strong service

approach were emphasised in the three cases as the main activities. Particularly, the

service role was a central function in Chile’s company-based unionism, where trade

unions tended to engage in collective bargaining for wage increases and shy away

from broader political and social goals (Heery and Kelly, 1994; Crouch, 2017). The

extent to which the servicing role has been organised in Chile can be observed in

Case Study C, where the trade union went as far as creating a ‘top-up’ health

insurance system to reimburse medical expenses for their members using the

members’ union fees. This system helped to boost membership as it translated into

more members affiliating to the trade unions. The problem lay in the fact that, if

156

unions concentrated mostly on securing local wage increases within each company,

the gains they could achieve for the general working population might be limited

(Murray, 2017; Crouch, 2017). Arguably, the servicing role of Chilean trade unions

has been fundamental to increasing membership and, therefore, to influencing

employers in the workplace and forcing them to bargain. However, this approach can

have limited results in improving the conditions of the labour movement as a whole.

This discussion is relevant because having a tradition of servicing unionism, as

seems to be part of the Chilean union identity, can influence the nature of collective

relations and impose possible limits on revitalisation.

In theory, the cases demonstrated the employers’ acceptance of and

collaboration with unions, but the analysis revealed a different story. Conflict was

evident in the three cases where, for instance, the trade union in Case A had an

unprecedented 45-day strike in 2013 that completely altered industrial relations

within the company. Similarly, the unions in Case B witnessed the dismissal of

several union members after they engaged in a strike in 2008. Finally, the unions in

Case C experienced the cancellation of a pre-agreed merger due to the employer’s

interference in the process. Conflict was also apparent in some of the de-

collectivising strategies implemented by these employers, which will be analysed in

detail in the next chapter. The presence of conflict in these workplaces seemed to be

aligned with national statistics, where surveyed trade union leaders declared that, at

least in 45% of Chilean companies, employers had a negative attitude towards

worker organisations (Direccion del Trabajo, 2014).

In general, these cases can be taken as examples of positive industrial

relations in that there is some kind of weak orientation towards partnership, yet there

appear to be some tensions and issues pointing towards a deliberate strategy to

reduce the influence of unions in the workplace. The next chapter describes in more

detail the practices implemented by employers tending to limit and constrain union

power. This will be useful in understanding the challenges unions face and the way

in which management further restricts the reach of trade unions, thus influencing the

nature of the renewal process.

157

CHAPTER 7: De-collectivising strategies directed towards

trade unions and labour relations: The use of the state and

regulatory ambivalence within the workplace

7.1. Introduction

This document follows the previous chapter where the contextual circumstances of

the case studies’ trade unions were outlined. That first empirical chapter covered

workplace governance, participation mechanisms and representation structure,

identifying the formal dimensions of bargaining and the general state of employment

relations. Although the case studies showed a tendency towards pluralist values

within management strategies, there were several challenges with which the

workplace trade unions had to contend. Therefore, this second empirical chapter will

look at the challenges in the employment relationship by describing a set of practices

common to the three case studies: activities to avoid or weaken the workplace trade

unions. This chapter therefore argues that, especially in a context where bargaining

was conducted at firm level, de-collectivising strategies might have influenced and

framed the individual trade union responses to revitalisation (and the lack of them,

let alone their nature). Understanding these practices will also make it easier to

recognise the complex relationship trade unions and employers have in the Chilean

context and the role the state and national regulations play in the employment

relationship.

This chapter will provide a detailed description of the union-weakening

practices implemented by employers in the three case studies, showing that, despite

having apparently positive industrial relations, they implemented some forms of

union-weakening practices. These forms varied in level from more sophisticated

(i.e., covert) to more blatant (i.e., overt) practices and were sometimes implemented

in conjunction with one another. The structure of this chapter is as follows: the first

section presents the theoretical frameworks through which the union-weakening

practices are addressed. The second section describes specific union-avoidance

strategies developed by the three Chilean companies, and the third section contains a

discussion of the implications of these practices for the process of trade union

renewal.

158

7.2. De-collectivising strategies

Although the literature review in Chapter 2 introduced key aspects of de-

collectivising strategies earlier, this section broadly presents the theoretical

frameworks used to assess the union-weakening practices implemented by

employers in their workplaces, drawing together the patterns and methods by which

employers implement them. Two theoretical frameworks were mainly used to

analyse such practices, the first developed by Gall and McKay (2001) and the second

developed by Peetz (2002). While Gall and McKay’s (2001) framework was

broader, Peetz (2002) offered a more comprehensive model to assess union-

weakening practices. Gall and McKay’s model (2001) identified two union-

weakening strategies: suppression and substitution. The approach whereby

employers substitute a trade union was used when managers tried to supplant the

union role via HR practices that attempted to portray unions as unnecessary.

Alternatively, companies could also suppress unions through an array of resistance

practices that included control, intimidation and creating an atmosphere of fear in the

workplace (e.g., dismissals, redundancies or simply the threat thereof). Peetz’ (2002)

model, explained in more detail in Chapter 2, presented two dimensions to analyse

de-collectivisation: the real and the symbolic. Each dimension had three actions that

intersected with one another. The actions in the real dimension were employment

practices and informational and relational measures, while the actions in the

symbolic dimension were inclusivist, exclusivist and dual inclusivist/exclusivist.

Each of the concepts’ intersections generated a specific category of de-collectivising

strategy.

The work detailed in this chapter applied both conceptual frameworks to the

union-weakening practices seen in the three case studies. The section is therefore

divided into three subsections, accounting for each case study’ union-avoidant

practices. These cases will show the different forms used by the employers to

weaken the unions and will exemplify the legislation’s ambiguity and the array of

practices that Chilean employers can implement.

7.2.1. Case Study A: The irony of inclusivist strategies.

This subsection covers the de-collectivising activities used by Company A as an

employer. The different forms of de-collectivising strategies and the general

approach taken by managers towards unions in Company A will be explained in this

159

section. In general, the employer seemed to legitimise the union role given its

apparent collaboration with the unions (e.g. continuous meetings and open dialogue).

This employer also appeared to willingly engage in collective bargaining by

establishing direct negotiations with unions and providing the necessary information

for the process to operate smoothly. However, a closer analysis determined that the

employer was engaging in several union-weakening practices.

Company A seemed to be implementing both suppression and substitution

tactics to limit the influence of trade unions. Some of these practices tended to be

context-specific because they were anchored in the Chilean labour legislation. In

order to substitute the union role, the company was engaging in two practices: direct

communications with the workers and extending the collectively bargained benefits

to non-unionised workers. Likewise, to suppress the union role, Company A was

using multi-rut and negotiating groups as a way of further fragmenting the

workplace.

The first substitution strategy analysed in this document was in the form of

direct communication with the workers. This was determined to be a substitution

strategy because through direct communications the company was promoting its own

employee involvement mechanisms without considering the union’s participation

(Dundon, 2002; Peetz, 2002). In this case, Company A used its own employee

participation and communication mechanisms to discuss workers’ perceptions

regarding matters of employment. This was done by Company A through one-to-one

meetings with supervisors and/or direct managers and through the use of surveys to

measure job satisfaction and employee commitment. During the interviews the HR

manager commented that after the 2013 strike, the company’s owner requested that

the HR department implement daily breakfast sessions to smooth communications

between workers and managers and to have a direct channel to listen to the workers’

concerns. Since the trade unions were not included in these sessions, it could be

argued that these weekly breakfasts amongst managers, supervisors and workers

aimed to directly reach workers without third parties involved, thus constituting a

substitution strategy (Gall and McKay, 2001; Wilkinson et al., 2010). These

breakfasts took place every day over the course of two months. As commented by

the HR manager (Company A, HR manager 1 and HR manager 2), each day a

different department within the company, as well as different workers, would meet

with their manager and an HR representative to discuss any matter. The owner of the

160

company requested transcripts of these sessions and the diligence of the HR

department to solve any issues raised in the meetings.

Another way of substituting the role of trade unions was Company A’s ‘open

door’ policy. This policy assumed that at any given point in time, and if workers

experienced any problems, they could directly approach senior managers and HR

managers to obtain a ‘faster’ and less bureaucratic response. Evidence of this policy

occurred during fieldwork observations when a worker experienced a problem with a

specific bonus and he directly approached the HR manager to discuss the issue. The

worker was unionised but decided to speak directly with the HR manager, instead of

going to the trade union leaders. When asked, the worker mentioned he considered

this a faster way to solve the issue than going through the trade unions (Company A,

Worker 2). According to Peetz (2002) the establishment of internal grievance

mechanisms that exclude the role of unions can also constitute a de-collectivising

strategy since it weakens the role of the union. Likewise, the open-door policy might

restrict collective channels of expression of conflict, thus emphasising the individual

aspects of the employment relationship (Kirk, 2018; D’Cruz and Noronha, 2011).

Using Peetz’ (2002) typology, this practice would categorise the employer as

inclusivist, whereby they tried to create a culture with a set of values that excluded

unionism and, in that way, indirectly prevented the unions in the workplace from

growing and gaining more power.

Similarly, Company A can be perceived as seeking to increase employee

commitment through the use of particular forms of HRM practices (e.g., training, job

satisfaction surveys, direct open-door communication policies) which tended to be a

way of minimising the influence of the trade unions (Gall and McKay, 2001; Peetz,

2002; Van den-Broeck and Dundon, 2010). As commented by Van den-Broeck

(1997) “by creating a corporate culture based on commitment to the firm,

management effectively excluded and created substitutes for trade union activities

within the firm” (p.334).

Company A also depicted the union role as unnecessary by using information

methods, specifically when transmitting its desired message through the process of

induction and training (Van den-Broeck, 1997). This form of inclusivist measure was

considered critical to conveying the company’s organisational culture and aligning

employees. In an interview with one worker, the implementation of this strategy

became clear:

161

“That time we went to the HR retreat, do you remember? It was an entire day of

them teaching us how the company was a super good company, asking us about how

we thought the HR department could improve, all those team-work activities and

games with the corporate values. All the bosses presenting their teams, what a stupid

thing! Those mugs they gave us at the end with our picture and the HR slogan ‘A

human team’. What a joke, a total joke! The next week they fired at least five people

from their super human team” (Company A, Worker 14).

This activity mentioned by the worker can be understood as a way of

eliminating, through training, so-called problematic values. Another example was the

training conducted on the company’s code of conduct when it first launched. All

workers were required to participate in the training, with attendance monitored by

internal auditors. D’Cruz and Noronha (2011) have commented on these types of

practices where managers can engage in the training and re-training of workers as a

way to emphasise the employer’s concerns for employee well-being, thus

highlighting the importance of individualism in the employment relationship.

Likewise, Van den-Broeck (1997) researched how these high-commitment practices

of training and induction can be used by some employers to exclude or substitute

workplace trade unionism.

Finally, the strategy of extending the collectively bargained benefits to non-

union workers was also identified in this case study as substituting the union role.

This strategy was contained in the legislation and was first introduced in the 1979

Labour Plan (i.e., during Pinochet’s government) to standardise working conditions

for all employees in the same workplace (Henriquez, 2014). Academics argued,

however, that by granting opportunities to employers to extend benefits, this

legislation could further deepen the power distance between workers and employers

(Henriquez, 2014; Duran, 2013; Duran and Kremerman, 2015; Baltera and Munoz,

2017). As expressed by trade union leaders:

“The extension of collective benefits is annoying at first, you get angry at it, but then

we know it is impossible to fight back, because if you go to the labour inspectorate

4 The coding used to present the quotes from the interviews of the thesis comes from the table in

Appendix 6 where all the thesis’ informants are presented.

162

and make a claim, the law allows it. I mean, the only requirement the law indicates

is that workers who have benefited from the extension [of the benefits]5 pay 75% of

the union fee. As long as they pay that, all complaints are useless [meaning the

courts do not rule that this is an anti-union practice]. But we get angry because we

were the ones that did all the hard work negotiating with the company, even going

on strike to achieve those benefits. When we were out there striking, we needed

everyone on the picket line and those workers who now have our benefits were

comfortably seated while we were fighting” (Company A, Union A, Trade union

leader 1).

This is an existing Chilean workplace tradition that has become normalised.

As it can be common for employers to extend collectively agreed benefits, trade

unions can often struggle to counter this practice (Henriquez, 2014). As an HR

manager in Company A commented, the extension of benefits can be more pressing

for trade unions as extending the benefits to non-union workers can generate more

income for the trade unions. This is because all non-unionised workers who receive

the benefits bargained by the trade union must pay 75% of the union fee to the

company’s trade union. Consequently, some practitioners may argue that the

extension of benefits can actually strengthen the unions’ influence in the workplace

because workers understand the advantages of being part of the union. However, the

message sent by employers is that trade unions are unnecessary since unaffiliated

workers receive the same benefits, even more so with the advantage of not taking the

risks associated with industrial conflict. As commented by Gall and McKay (2001),

this is an employer activity seeking to provide positive benefits for non-union

workers and to reduce their propensity to unionise. Likewise, it could also be a

potentially insidious practice as it may force those who do not want to be union

members, to pay the union fee regardless, which can deliberately lead to resentment

and division. Instead of creating an atmosphere of fear and implementing more

obvious de-collectivising strategies, this Chilean employer favoured rather indirect

strategies to conceal their union-weakening objectives.

Suppression strategies were also identified in this case and they tended to be

more context-specific because they arose from the use of the Chilean labour

5 Comments placed in brackets within quotes from the thesis’ interviews correspond to clarifications

added by the researcher and are not part of the comments made by the cited informant.

163

legislation. Two union-weakening practices were determined in this case study,

namely multi-rut and negotiating groups. As this employer divided the company into

smaller companies, the use of multi-rut was common. This mechanism that the

Chilean legislation first established with the aim of facilitating fiscal planning is now

used by employers to dilute their labour obligations. As previously explained, the

way employers take advantage of having virtually different companies is that they

can atomise workplace unions (Biondi, 2015). Therefore, this employer might be

relying on multi-rut to fragment the labour force of the whole company. As

commented by the trade union:

“We were thinking about suing the company because of [the use of] multi-rut, that

way we could incorporate people from Company Ab6 [another company within the

Holding owned by the multinational], from Company Ac [another company within

the Holding owned by the multinational] and from all the subsidiaries that are

owned by the company. But Company Ab’s trade union went ahead and they sued the

company first. If one union of the conglomerate sues the company, it is not necessary

that other unions submit a separate case. A multi-rut [in the event that we win]

allows for our people to join their union or that the people from other unions in the

company may join our union. Doors open everywhere. It means that we lift the gates

so that people can be where they want to be. But the tool named multi-rut needs to be

understood as unification (…) it is the only way we can have muscle (Company, A,

Union A, Trade Union Leader 1).

Another strategy used by this employer to limit union power was by

implementing negotiating groups. These groups were not trade unions in themselves

but rather groups of workers who came together to negotiate common working

conditions with the company (Baltera and Munoz, 2017; Ugarte, 2018). The use of

these groups by Company A is visible in the next quote:

“[the negotiating group] was set up by the company with all the former trade union

affiliates and leaders. All together it was 99 people in that group. The company

6 This coding is used for anonymity purposes and indicates a Company that is part of the holding to

which Company A belongs to, but is a different Company.

164

picked them up in a bus so that they could attend a meeting. The company gave them

the same benefits as ours but for 4 years and gave them 50.000 pesos as an end-of-

conflict bonus (…) the only thing workers are saving is [not] paying the 75% of the

union fee” (Company A, Union A, trade union leader 2).

According to Aravena (2006), bargaining groups are a sign of trade union

weakness since such groups replace the role of trade unions in the workplace.

Likewise, the real ability of the workers engaged in these bargaining groups to

negotiate wages and working conditions with the employer can be questioned as it

does not safeguard employment security and stability of the workers in the way that

the trade unions do (Baltera and Munoz, 2017; Direccion del Trabajo, 2014). The

legislation on bargaining groups (which was reviewed in 2015 and 2018) determined

that trade unions should not be the only institutions allowed to collectively bargain

within the company because there may be workers who wish to collectively bargain

with their employer but refuse to join a trade union (Aravena (2006). Thus, Chilean

labour legislation supported competition between these two bargaining bodies within

a single workplace. Table 21 summarises all the de-collectivising strategies

implemented by Company A.

Table 21: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in Case Study A

Suppression strategies Substitution strategies

• Multi-rut

• Bargaining groups of non-unionised

workers.

• Own participation and communication

mechanisms such as weekly breakfasts

with workers immediately after the

strike and ‘open-door’ policy.

• Extension of collectively bargained

benefits to non-union members.

• Implementation of values of high

commitment towards the company

through training and induction. Source: Own Illustration

In summary, although this employer appeared to legitimise the role of unions,

it was simultaneously attempting to de-collectivise the workplace by implementing

several trade union substitution and suppression strategies. Both strategies were

common in this case study, showing a rather indirect approach towards weakening

the unions. The de-collectivising strategies took the form of direct communications

with workers (i.e., weekly breakfasts, open-door policies), the company’s own

employee involvement mechanisms (i.e., job satisfaction and employee commitment

surveys), and in-house (i.e., local) practices such as multi-rut, negotiating groups and

165

extension of collectively bargained benefits. By installing these strategies that serve

as an alternative to trade unions, the employer can limit trade union power and,

therefore, the responses of the unions to achieve renewal.

7.2.2. Case Study B: De-collectivising strategies at their finest.

This subsection describes Company B’s practices towards unions. This case study

showed a multi-union approach where managers implemented different strategies to

approach each of the workplace trade unions. With the ‘Largest Trade Union’, the

employer was more collaborative and open to dialogue, while with the ‘Marginalised

Trade Union’ and the ‘Third Trade Union’ the employer tended to be more distant

and limited its interactions strictly to those arising from the formalities of the

collective bargaining process. Given this distinct relationship, the analysis of this

case study will be more focused on the first and the second trade unions, the ‘Largest

Trade Union’ and the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ respectively.

In order to understand this company’s use of de-collectivising strategies, it is

important to first address the relationship of management with the trade unions. The

general approach taken by Company B towards the ‘Largest Trade Union’ was more

collaborative, which was perceived by these trade union leaders as a friendly

relationship:

“(…) We say hello to each other, we shake hands. We talk about football, about the

league’s teams, the championship (…). The relationship with him [the manager] is

not a work-based relationship, because we do not talk about work. When I talk to

XXX [the owner of the company], I talk about football. He tells me anecdotes, he

talks to me about his football team and I talk to him about mine and that´s it”

(Company B, Union A, Trade union leader 1).

By establishing this friendly relationship, this employer might have been

fostering some sort of ‘engaging’ practice with the trade union in the hope of

diminishing conflict. The assumption may have been that if they were perceived as

friends, then the trade union would most likely refuse to engage in any conflict. This

technique has been identified by Cullinane and Dundon (2014) as characteristic of

unitarist employers, who perceive workplace conflict as unnecessary, irrational and

deviant. These authors determined that when employers have a unitarist perspective,

166

trade unions can be perceived as often lacking legitimacy, while collective

bargaining is considered an objectionable and time-consuming activity. Further

evidence on this relationship’s unitarist nature can be seen in the next quote:

“Nowadays, the perception [that workers have of the company] is materialistic, not

paternalistic. We have a traditional perception, where the company provides

protection, where the people are committed to the company (…) There is an effort, a

dedication, a lesson to be learned and a care for the company. So that means that

there is also reciprocation from the company to the worker because nowadays it is

difficult to find a job where workers have been there for as many years as we have”.


Following the comments made by this trade union leader, there seemed to be

the perception that the company was giving them the opportunity to work and have a

stable job, therefore they identified themselves with the achievements of the

company. As commented by Badigannavar and Kelly (2011), such identification

with the company’s goals can be one of the risks of aligning the trade union’s agenda

with the company’s objectives, as it can jeopardise the more proactive renewal

efforts of the unions. Despite this close relationship, the trade union leaders remained

aware of the unilateral power held by the employer. They believed that an error in

the way they performed their jobs could potentially result in dismissals:

“Above all, we are workers. To be a trade union leader is an add-on position,

because I entered this company as a worker. We supported and are supporting the

idea of making things right, if you made a mistake, you have to correct it and make

things right (…). That is why some people have been in the company for many years,

because they make things right, you know that if you don’t make things right, you are

fired” (Company B, Union A, Trade union leader 2).

This rather close relationship between management and the ‘Largest Trade

Union’ sharply contrasted with the relationship established between the managers

and the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’, which suffered from increasing tensions:

167

“[about the trade union leader of the marginalised union] the owner does not want to

see us at all, he can´t stand us. So, what does that tells you? That the owner knows

everything, nobody is safe. If I see the owner [of the company] and the owner sees

me, the owner goes in the opposite direction and he doesn´t say hello, he doesn´t

speak to me the way he does with the other union” (Company B, Union B, Trade

union leader 1).

Now the general relationship between Company B and the trade unions has

been determined, the next paragraphs show the union weakening strategies this

company was implementing against its trade unions. Company B used both

suppression and substitution tactics to interact with unions. One substitution strategy

used by this employer was communicating to workers the unnecessary role played by

unions because of the company’s positive working conditions. As Dundon et al.,

(2010) mentioned, by using the substitution approach, the employer can be

displacing demands for collective representation through paternalistic policies. This

employer implemented such practices to the point where trade union leaders in the

‘Largest Trade Union’ also believed that Company B could be considered one of the

better employers in the industry, as one of them explained:

“There are realities that are extremely, extremely different! For instance, there are

some companies where workers don´t have a place to eat, they are forced to pay for

their uniform - dramatic situations! Some companies have difficulty in paying

overtime, even the monthly wages! Companies use unethical and abusive strategies

such us not paying the last working day of the month, they pay on the fifth day. Our

reality is extremely different, for example we as trade union leaders, we go to

meetings outside the company and see it. The other day we went to the labour

inspectorate to discuss the labour law reform and other leaders started to make their

claims and we looked at each other thinking: ‘does that even happen?’” (Company

B, Union A, Trade union leader 1).

Company B engaged in several suppression activities to exclude trade unions

from the workplace. Some of these activities were implemented through the use of

legislation and took the form of local practices (i.e. collective convenios and

minimum services procedures). The rest of the suppression activities implemented

168

were similar to those explained in the international literature, such as dismissal of

specific workers after strikes, replacement of striking workers and threats against

unionised workers. The details of these strategies will be explained next.

The collective convenio, instead of a collective agreement, is used by

Company B as a suppression strategy. Convenios are non-regulated bargaining

contracts and do not acknowledge the right of workers to strike: they can be signed

by trade unions and non-unionised workers at any time (Baltera and Munoz, 2017).

The ‘Largest Trade Union’ agreed to sign a collective convenio with the company

instead of a collective agreement because they perceived this was a better way of

bargaining with Company B. They mentioned preferring this form of collective

contract because in the light of so doing, they were not bound by the deadlines and

procedures of regulated collective bargaining. In their perception, they could begin

the bargaining process at any point in time, even before the convenio expired, which

was positive for them as they could, for instance, take advantage of the company’s

positive economic periods. As they commented:

“We basically thought that if the company has a full tank of gas, we can go faster.

We usually bargain in August/July so, why not negotiate right away? That could

make the process of collective bargaining less traumatic and stressful for both sides.

We were seven months – well before - the negotiation deadline. The company said

we could do it, but they told us to keep it quiet, that we should negotiate in private

without other people knowing, and we totally agreed. Why? because if we involve

other people, the negotiation could have been at risk. People start talking, the

rumours spread and if something happens, everyone blames the negotiation”


One of the major problems with this type of collective contract was that trade

unions could not exert their right to strike, and thus may be subject to the manager’s

prerogatives when engaging in collective bargaining. This practice can be considered

a trade union suppression strategy because the employer is trying to annul or limit

the union’s ability to strike and to openly engage in industrial conflict. Throughout

the interviews it became rather clear that these trade union leaders did not consider

the negative consequences of engaging in non-regulated bargaining; on the contrary,

they only highlighted the benefits. They did not seem to understand the limits this

169

type of agreement imposed on their organisation, as they did not comment on this

particular issue. Additionally, by securing this type of contract, the employer could –

as in this case - create an organisational culture in which strikes were perceived as

negative. This re-emerged throughout the interviews with comments signalling the

employer’s animosity towards strikes:

“Trade union leader 2: I have been seeing different experiences throughout the

years. In 1985, there was a strike in the Santiago plant, in the cookies division. This

is a strong company, with a tough approach to strikes, so if 500 people go on strike

it is not a big concern for them (…)

Interviewer: so, that means that strikes do not work with this company; it is not an

effective form of protest?

Trade union leader 2: Exactly, it is no pressure for them, if they want to break you,

they can (...). After the strike ended, fifteen days after the strike started, members of

the striking trade union went back to work. It was then that the trade unions leaders

were questioned, who do they think they [the trade union leaders] are taking us on

strike? Of course, the people started getting angry, they didn´t know about the

setbacks of the strike. That time during the strike was hard, controversies began, and

a lot of drama happened, because people started getting sick, they needed the

pharmacy and they didn´t have any money to buy their medications. There were

countless problems. So, after a while, the dismissal immunity ended, and they [the

company] started firing an important number of people from that union. That trade

union was completely destabilized to the point that the leaders of that union had to

leave”. (Company B, Union A, Trade union leader 2).

The fact that Company B jeopardised the employment security of workers

after they engaged in strikes resulted in the limited number of occasions when

industrial action was used in this case study. In the history of the company, there

have been only two strikes (in 1998 and 2005), both of which ended with dismissals

of the workers who mobilised during them. As commented by the ‘Largest Trade

Union’, this company not only threatened workers, but actually converted the threats

into dismissals, destabilising the trade unions that went on strike on those two

occasions. The way in which Company B engaged in these dismissals also became

clear from the interviews with a line manager from Company B, who stated that

170

immediately after the strike, the HR department requested that they dismiss certain

workers. This manager (Company B, LM1) also mentioned his inability to question

the dismissals as it was made obvious to him that each worker had been identified as

a troublemaker because of his/her participation in the strike.

Another in-house suppression strategy used by this employer was the

implementation of minimum services to destabilise the potential strikes of the

unions. As mentioned in the literature review, minimum services were part of the

fourth and most recent (2015) state labour reform. The law established that, during

strikes and with the aim of preserving the company´s infrastructure and key services,

trade unions must allow workers who are striking to conduct essential activities (i.e.

their usual job) for the company (Simonet and Gonzalez, 2015). The definition of

what is essential is therefore problematic for trade unions. The legislation on

minimum services directly hindered strikes because some workers were forced to

refuse their right to strike and work for the company while their fellow trade union

members were striking (Simonet and Gonzalez, 2015). The hindrance process was

further analysed in the literature review chapter, showing a case were a Chilean

bank’s trade union fiercely opposed the minimum services their employer wanted to

agree because they considered that the bank was requesting far more workers than

necessary (Marusic, 2018). In the bank’s case, the employer was requesting more

workers than strictly necessary to continue its normal operations during a potential

strike. In contrast with that episode where trade unions from the bank opposed the

agreement and reached out to the Labour Inspectorate and the Supreme Court to

mediate with the employer, Company B’s ‘Largest Trade Union’ did not experience

any difficulties when negotiating the minimum services, although their fellow

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ leaders did:

“We now have to come to an agreement about minimum services because of the

labour reform. The company was only asking for the boiler operator and the health

and safety guy, plus someone who could operate the green point in order to avoid

rubbish accumulation. So, it is unreasonable to refuse that. I am not going to argue

with them over the boiler operator. They need him because if we go on strike, we

need to keep pumping steam to the lines in order to prevent the chocolate production

from stopping, because then we could lose our jobs. XXX [the trade union leader

from the marginalised union] did not want to sign that agreement. He said: “I don´t

171

like the idea”. But he is screwed, because they are going to take it to the labour

inspections’ committee and the committee is going to say, “he is mad”. He is going

to have to say yes, no matter what. It would be a totally different scenario if the

company says: We need 20 operators! They are crazy, that means the plant would be

normally working” (Company B, Union A, Trade union leader 1).

This quote reveals two issues. First is the acquiescent manner in which the

largest trade union negotiated the minimum services, which contrasts with the more

strident approach other Chilean trade unions took (Simonet and Gonzalez, 2015;

Marusic, 2018). Second, the comments can also be an indication of this trade union’s

realisation that if they did not provide workers to conduct the minimum tasks

required, there could be potential job terminations. Contrastingly, the quote shows

how the trade union leader from the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ opposed and

disagreed with the requested minimum services because he considered that they

could hinder the right to strike.

The final suppression strategy described for this case study was the

replacement of workers during a strike. Similar to the minimum services approach,

the replacement of striking workers was allowed by the Chilean legislation and has

become somewhat normalised in the employment relationship. This normalisation

was clear in that the ‘Largest Trade Union’ did not perceive the replacement of

striking workers as a strategy to weaken industrial conflict. Such limited

understanding of the problems with replacing striking workers has weakened the

strike action of the other trade unions, as seen in the following quote:

“Interviewer: did you replace the workers from the other union when they were on

strike? Trade union leader 3: Yes, it’s just that their strike went unnoticed, they were

like 500 members. The buses with people would come in normally, the machines

were operative” (Company B, Union A, Trade union leader 3).

“In 1990 there was a strike in the cookies plant, the company took people from here

to work there, it was a different system, even different legislation. So, from that year

until 2010, there weren’t any strikes in this company” (Company B, Union A, Trade

union leader 2).

172

“I lived the strike from the outside, I wasn´t a trade union leader or anything, just a

simple worker. But I saw it from my co-workers who were outside, we were working.

We had to wear a logo in our ID which indicated that we weren´t on strike, we had a

logo that identified us so that we could enter the company’s facilities” (Company B,


The replacement of striking workers has been the subject of a growing debate

in the Chilean context since its origins in the 1979 Labour Plan (Mizala and

Romaguera, 2001; Aravena and Nunez, 2011). The four labour reforms conducted so

far (i.e., 1991, 1995, 2001, 2015) have attempted to modify this clause but have

failed to do so due to strong opposition in the Senate and from employers’

associations. Aravena and Nunez (2011) argued that the replacement of striking

workers limited the efficacy of any strike as employers could replace unionised

workers who were on strike with either internal or external workers. The

implementation of this strategy was taken as evidence of the developed way in which

this employer replaced workers. Thus, the employer has built up a sort of system to

be able to work and differentiate between striking and non-striking workers whereby

identification cards were given to workers to wear when entering the company’s

premises during strikes.

Another very obvious union suppression strategy was the dismissal of

workers who went on strike. Over the course of two years, the employer dismissed

all workers that participated in the strike and/or remained affiliated to the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’. The management of Company B had singled out for

termination those workers who participated in the strike and who were members of

the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’. Employers implementing such practices wished to

create a climate of vulnerability, thus making employees more willing to accept the

company’s terms and conditions of employment (Peetz, 2002; Gall and Dundon,

2013; Dundon, 2002). Likewise, by dismissing trade union members, the company

might also be eliminating union sympathisers, thus discouraging unionisation (Gall

and McKay, 2001; Peetz, 2002; Cullinane and Dundon, 2014). The ‘Largest Trade

Union’ commented on the process of dismissal after the strike suffered by their

members and the members of the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’. The quote is rather

long, but clear, so it is included in full:

173

“Interviewer: How was the loss of members in the other union [the marginalised

one]? You told me that the company was firing union members and now there are

only 20 members left.

Trade Union Leader 1: At the beginning, when they came back [from the strike]

there was an important percentage, I don´t remember how many, but many people

switched from their union (…) The thing is that a major percentage of workers

resigned from that union and joined ours. There are a good number of people in our

union who were from that union and they resigned [from the union]. And also, there

was an important number of workers who were fired one by one, because they were

on strike, that is the only reason.

Interviewer: What legal clause did the company use to fire them?

Trade Union Leader 1: article 161, they can still use it and with that clause the

company does not have to explain the reasons why they fire someone, and if you go

and make a formal complaint, they only pay 20% more compensation and that is it

(...) I think that is what happened. The company said, there is a fund of 1,500 million

to fire them all [to pay compensation].

Interviewer: Do you think that that was a specific company strategy, to dismiss only

the members of that union?

Trade Union Leader 1: They also dismissed some of our members, but much less, it

was like a 4-1 ratio, so that it wasn't too obvious.

Trade Union Leader 2: Although it is true they went on strike, they dismissed people

who didn't know, deep down they were not bad people, nor bad workers, but because

they were all part of the union, they had to pay, so they had to leave. They were

excellent workers, good people, but unfortunately that is the process. It happened a

lot: hey, do you want to switch union because this company has been giving you this

and it is giving you the opportunity to continue with them, and the opportunity was

to switch to any of the other two unions so that workers were not getting tainted in

the other union. And some people changed, and they are still with us (…)”

(Company B, Union A).

The above quote evidenced the blatant attitude of the employer in Company

B in dismissing the workers who participated in the strike. This is a cause for

concern given that it happened in a renowned company in the country, a larger

174

employer who had pluralist values, participated in collective bargaining and engaged

with trade unions.

Other overt union-suppression mechanisms aimed directly to exclude trade

unions from the workplace were the employer’s threats of implementing a lockout,

calling the police to ‘control’ the workers gathered in the picket lines, placing

barriers in the workplace against union activists, refusing to meaningfully negotiate

or delaying responses to trade union requests (Peetz, 2002). Interestingly enough,

trade unionists in Case Study B accounted for the use of all these practices when

interviewed. Company B involved the police during the strikes of 1998 and 2005.

Trade unionists in the ‘Largest Trade Union’ mentioned that even though strikes

were rare in Company B, they had always tended to involve the police standing close

and monitoring the picket lines. This activity can be taken as a sign of repression of

the workers’ right to strike (Peetz, 2002; Van den-Broeck and Dundon, 2010).

Likewise, Company B refused to meaningfully negotiate with the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ and deployed delaying tactics:

“In the last negotiation, we had to use a clause where everything [the collective

agreement] is frozen and can be extended for another 18 months. We were

negotiating and because they [the employer] kept cancelling our meetings, we did

not reach an agreement and we had to use that clause” (Company B, Union B,

Trade union leader 1).

The quote reveals that in the latest collective bargaining process, the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ did not reach an agreement with the company, forcing

them to postpone the deadline of the collective agreement for another 18 months.

The trade union leader mentioned being forced to do this because the employer

delayed the meetings where it would have been possible to conduct the collective

bargaining process. Postponing the deadline of the collective agreement is usually

the last resort trade unions use, when they realise there will not be an agreement with

the company in the stipulated period that they have to conduct negotiations (Ugarte,

2018).

In summary, this company used both suppression and substitution strategies

in conjunction to avoid unionisation, although emphasis was placed on a ‘divide and

rule’ strategy. Following the evidence provided in this subsection, it may be clear

175

that this employer selected a particular set of de-collectivising strategies to

implement with each union. With the ‘Largest Trade Union’ the employer tended to

be more collaborative, thus engaging in milder union-weakening practices. In return,

this union had fewer confrontations with the employer, even perceiving their

relationship as friendly. Possibly, Company B was taking advantage of this

relationship to promulgate the anti-strike notion particular to the unitarist

management ideology (Cullinane and Dundon, 2014). In contrast to this was the

relationship Company B established with the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’, where

there was fractured dialogue, with limited discussions and negotiations. The

employer and this union were less predisposed towards collaboration. The

relationship further deteriorated when this union decided to strike in 2005. After this

event, the management decided to overpower the union by dismissing most of its

membership. Table 22 shows a summary of the de-collectivising strategies

implemented by Company B.

Table 22: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in Case Study B


• Having a convenio with largest trade

union.

• Implementation of minimum services

• Dismissal of trade union members

who went on strike.

• Police intervention in the picket lines.

• Refusal to meaningfully negotiate and

tactics delaying negotiations

• Substitute union role via the message

sent that unions are unnecessary

given the company’s good working

conditions.


Overall, the majority of union-weakening practices implemented by this

employer were those that excluded trade unions from the workplace. Most union-

avoidance strategies were based on threats of job instability should workers not

belonged to the ‘right’ trade union. In comparative terms, this company stood out

from the other two cases as the most anti-union employer, evidencing union-

weakening practices at several levels of the analysis. There were dismissals of union

members due to their involvement in strikes, picket lines intimated by police,

delaying tactics in negotiations and a general organisational culture of zero-tolerance

for strikes. The particularity of this case study resides in the variation observed in the

de-collectivising practices between management and the different workplace unions.

176

7.2.3. Case Study C: Local practices overshadowing the headquarters’

This subsection describes the de-collectivising strategies implemented by Company

C against its two trade unions. The discussion identifies the forms of de-

collectivising strategies in this particular case and the general approach taken by

managers towards unions. To begin the discussion, a general characterisation of

Company C’s relationship with its trade unions will be presented, moving to then

describe in detail the strategies implemented by the employers to weaken the trade

unions. Two features central to this case study were the foreign ownership of this

company and the high trade union membership affiliation, amounting to 75%.

Broadly speaking, the employment relationship in Company C can be conceptualised

as positive in outward appearance since throughout the interviews and during

fieldwork observations, the interactions between management and trade unions

seemed to be optimistic. However, and similar to the previous case studies, when

analysed closely, the employer implemented several union-weakening practices.

Although union-weakening practices were more nuanced in this case, the presence of

these de-collectivising strategies throughout the three companies may suggest a

pattern within the sector.

Similar to Case Study B, this company had multiple unions on one

production site, and overall, a collaborative approach to them. Nonetheless, the

largest trade union of the company, ‘Union 2’, outlined the presence of some signs of

tension:

“At present, the management that is now in office is very approachable; you can

raise issues with them in a very straight way, looking face to face. When there are

serious problems that cannot be solved, we directly bring a case against them

[through the labour inspectorate]. We have a good relationship with the company,

but that doesn’t mean that if workers face a problem, we would not act against the

company. When they [the company] can’t give as a solution, we file our case”

(Company C, Union 27, Trade union leader 1).

7 To avoid confusion when presenting the quotes from the trade unions in Company C, the coding

reflects the trade unions’ name (e.g., Union One and Union Two).

177

‘Union One’ was the smaller trade union of Company C and could be

conceptualised as a business-friendly union due to the alignment of its perceptions

with those of the managers. In contrast, ‘Union Two’ was the largest trade union in

Company C and had a more confrontational approach when interacting with the

employer. Only ‘Union Two’ was affiliated to the national-level confederation in the

country, the CUT. This feature will also be significant in the analysis of de-

collectivising strategies outlined below.

The actual relationship between trade unions and managers became clearer

when the leader of ‘Union Two’ was explaining the aftermath of a failed merger

attempted with ‘Union One’ where he placed most of the blame on the other union

and not on managers:

“The bad thing is that with the company we have had a good working relationship

and we thought it was terrible that they tried to scam us. We can expect something

like this from Union 1 because they have always been sneaky like that, all the time!

And I am not the one saying it, it’s history and the workers that say it, any worker

can tell you. And so, it happened, the desired union unification could not happen”


Interestingly, the quote expressed more discontent with the actions of

Company C than with the actions of ‘Union One’ in the cancellation of the merger.

The leader of ‘Union Two’ explained that he was more surprised at the participation

of Company C in the cancellation of the merger than at the actions of ‘Union One’,

this being because he perceived that the interests of ‘Union One’ were more aligned

with that of the company’s. This evidence also supported the argument that despite

the guidelines of Company C’s parent company about having a pluralist workplace,

local managers favoured a divided labour movement.

In appearance, local managers have tried to follow the head office’s

instructions by preventing industrial conflicts and cooperating with trade unions. In

addition to ongoing meetings and expedited communication channels with the

unions, Company C seemed to openly engage in collective bargaining with the

unions. The company provided extensive forms of information to trade unions, so

that they could be well-prepared to engage in collective bargaining, as commented

by the union leaders:

178

‘Union Two’ Trade union leader: “We obviously, as leaders, ask the company for the

financial statements, the economic things, how are the company’s profits

Interviewer: And they have no problems?

‘Union Two’ Trade union leader: There is no problem, well now with the new labour

reform it is an obligation, but before that, there was no obligation for the company

to give any information. We ask for all the financial information and the company

provides it” (Company C, Union 2, Trade Union Leader 1).

Likewise, sharing the necessary information for collective bargaining may be

a sign of Company C’s attempted pluralist frame of reference. In April 2002,

Company C’s parent company signed an important international framework

agreement on international trade union rights and minimum labour standards. The

agreement committed the company to respect international labour standards such as

freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, the right to strike, the right

to have worker representatives, the prohibition of child labour and the right to

consultation and information (IUF, 2002). In addition, the agreement established the

company's obligations towards the unions in case of business changes with adverse

employment consequences. In these circumstances, the company must provide the

affected unions with accurate information on the nature and potential consequences

of the changes and consult with the unions on measures to minimise the

consequences for employees. The trade union of Company C’s parent company had

actively worked with and supported unions inside the company's foreign

subsidiaries, creating a fund for international coordination and solidarity work.

Such agreements were important because they could provide a bridge

between national contexts in developed economies that are the countries of origin of

MNCs and subsidiaries’ contexts in emerging economies (Bourque, Hennebert,

Lévesque and Murray, 2018; Lévesque, Hennebert, Murray and Bourque, 2018).

Therefore, in contexts where trade union rights are limited, these agreements might

strengthen local trade union power. Nonetheless, in this case study, the presence of

such an agreement seemed to be less apparent upon close analysis of the practices of

Company C. There was an underlying desire among local managers to limit the

power of the unions, which was manifested in the desire to keep the unions

fragmented into two separate organisations.

179

The trade union leader in ‘Union Two’ explained the desire to merge with

‘Union One’ and in that way strengthen the influence of the unions in the workplace.

He mentioned having discussed the merger extensively and was eagerly waiting for

the ballot to decide the outcome. However, two days prior to the vote, the leaders in

‘Union One’ cancelled the merger after, allegedly, meeting with high-level

executives of Company C. Arguably, it was in the interest of Company C that the

two unions remained separate and suppressed their role in the workplace. It is the

researcher’s hypothesis that, since Company C had an unusually high unionisation

rate, this could potentially challenge Company C’s operations in case of strikes.

Therefore, if both unions went on strike, Company C might risk paralysis of its entire

operations, so by keeping the trade unions’ fragmented into two separate

organisations, the company made sure they had enough workers to keep the

company operational in the event that one of the trade unions went on strike. Hence,

one of the main outcomes of this suppression activity – even within this formally

pluralist and negotiated context – was the emergence of a ‘dividing’ strategy,

whereby if strikes took place, one union could have workers replacing the roles of

the other union’s striking workers. As will be argued in this section, Company C

appeared to be trying to use such fragmentation within the trade union community to

its advantage. The following quotes from each trade union’s leaders reflected this

relationship, through the different perspectives seen below:

“Look, what happens in this company is very important because there are two

unions but there should only be one. So, there is a union that is pro-business and

there is another union that is not pro-business. In this case, the union next door is

pro-business, it has always been pro-business. So, they always negotiated after us

and we left them the negotiation ready to be implemented. You know that there

cannot be much differentiation between what each worker earns, regardless of their

union affiliation. Hence, if the company offers something to us, and we accept, they

have to offer the same thing to the union next door, because if not it would be

considered an anti-union practice. It has been easier for them, we carry the weight

of all the negotiation. They then sign and that is it. This has been their past

behaviour, I do not know how it will be from now on, but they have always been a

yellow union, a business union, a union where the union leaders are looked after,

180

economically looked after by the company, I mean. So, having said that, what more

can they ask for (...)?” (Company C, Union 2, Trade union leader 1).

“Union One, Trade Union Leader 2: We, as a trade union in the last negotiation, had

to lead [the negotiation], we achieved 91% more than our colleagues [refers to the

other union], a month and a half after they negotiated, under the same term and

conditions –

Interviewer: and why do you think your union achieves more things?

Union One, Trade Union Leader 2: I think we have more expertise in handling the

new things.

Interviewer: And what has given you this expertise? The passing of the years?

Union One, Trade Union Leader 2: Yes, and apart from that, I am a professional you

see; I studied accounting for 5 years and that is in our favour” (Company C, Union

1, Trade Union Leader 2).

The quotes above showed that both trade union leaders from the two different

unions stated that they led the negotiations of the collective bargaining process. This

in itself may be considered as evidence of the dividing nature with which the

employer engages with the unions, making them believe each of them leads the

collective bargaining negotiations.

The most interesting suppression strategy became evident when bargaining

for minimum services. During this negotiation, Company C tried to establish a larger

number of services considered essential to continuing the operation of the company

in case of a potential strike. The next quote from a leader in ‘Union Two’ is

indicative of how the company tried to manipulate the legislation:

“Now the unions have to negotiate the minimum services to have an emergency

[support] team. So, we already did that negotiation. And in that negotiation the two

unions have to agree, because that negotiation is once and for all, it cannot be

changed later. At first, we told them, zero minimum services! Zero. Yes, because they

are minimum services. Managers here believe we are stupid; they think that we are

imbeciles because they asked for stupid things as minimum services. They asked for

1000 people to continue operating the plant (...) So, we told the company, it had to

be zero minimum services. Later, when we negotiated with the company and amongst

181

the 5 leaders, we were shouting at each other because if you ask me, I say it is zero

and I can give you the reasons. For me the strike is a legal right that all workers

have. Then the company said no. We almost got into a fight with them. Then we

reached an agreement (...) Then the company said: you have to put 5 workers here, 5

workers there because we supply milk for the population [according to the company,

supplying milk for the Chilean population was a critical task that enabled them to

have a bigger emergency team]. And I said, no, there are other companies that can

do that (…) But still, we made a compromise and we accepted it, we accepted that

they removed the 250 thousand litres of milk leaving two machines in two shifts that

made the daily milk production. Because the cows give milk every day [laughing]!”


This trade union leader was reflecting on the fact that the employer tried to

take advantage of this regulation and request more workers than those who were

truly essential. By doing this, the company would remain operational in the run up to

a strike without the strike causing any major disruptions. Likewise, the problems

encountered by this union during the negotiation of the minimum services were

evident in the comments, where the trade union leader commented that the

agreement was reached but with high levels of confrontation. This trade union leader

also reflected on how this minimum services legislation undermined the right to

strike that workers have, a right that has been ratified, ironically, by the international

agreement signed by Company C’s parent company. As has been discussed, the

minimum services clause can be considered a union-suppression strategy because it

tries to suppress unionisation through the limitation of strikes. Moreover, the way in

which the company tried to take advantage of the clause by including more workers

in the agreement can be considered a resistance tactic typical of union suppression

mechanisms (Dundon, 2002; Gall and Dundon, 2013; Gall and McKay, 2001).

Overall, Company C tended to be an employer that included trade unions in

its deliberations and discussions to some extent, depicting trade unions as relevant.

However, Company C’s union-weakening practices tended to be more nuanced as

they tried to build direct communication channels with workers. In so doing,

Company C could reinforce the idea that direct employee voice lessens the

importance of indirect participation (Marchington, 2007). An example of this can be

taken from the interviews, where the ‘Union Two’ leader mentioned a recent project

182

where managers directly provided workers with information regarding the

company’s finances. The project’s name was ‘Connection’:

“The company has been doing the ‘Connection’ for about 8 months now,

'Connection', they call it, with the workers. Before making a presentation to the

workers, because they make a financial presentation and the workers do not

understand anything, the company makes a presentation to all workers, shows them

the financial reality of the company” (Company C, Union 2, Trade union leader 1).

The name of this process of direct downward information sharing should not

be taken lightly. Arguably, there is a purposeful yet subtle use of language whereby

Company C might be letting workers know of its efforts to consider their opinions

regarding the production process, and there was evidence of this being expanded as a

strategy. This use of language also supported the use of more inclusivist

informational measures where the company tried to communicate a sense of

cooperation and create a collaborative corporate culture through which workers

might then consider trade unions to be unnecessary (see the following for discussions

on such strategies generally - Peetz, 2002; Van den-Broeck and Dundon, 2010; Gall

and Dundon, 2013; Dundon, 2002). The trade union leader in ‘Union Two’ was

against such information-sharing processes as he believed they generated various

issues among workers. Sharing raw financial information with workers was, in his

opinion, a way of confusing workers to prevent them from questioning the company.

As Beale and Mustchin (2014) explained, these direct forms of communication

practices were often met with suspicion on the part of the unions as they were

perceived as an attempt to bypass the unions. Despite these concerns, the trade union

eventually accepted they could not prevent this strategy from being implemented.

The next table therefore summarises the most relevant union-weakening practices

implemented by this employer.

Table 23: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in Case Study C.


• Implementation of minimum

services.

• Acting against the merger of the trade

unions.

• Attempt to substitute the union role

through the implementation of the

'Connection' project where management

directly communicates with workers. Source: Own Illustration

183

In summary, this case may have appeared to show a pluralist employer that

legitimised workplace trade unions and attempted to work collaboratively with them.

However, Company C managed to implement several forms of union-weakening

practices despite being owned by a foreign multinational with several international

collective agreements. As mentioned before, despite the efforts at collaboration with

unions made by Company C’s parent company, this case remained embedded in the

Chilean context where unions’ rights tend to be rather limited. Despite the presence

of transnational collective agreements that could potentially enhance trade union

influence in the workplace, mostly through improved networking among worker

representatives (Mustchin and Martinez-Lucio, 2017), Company C was able to

implement several union suppression and substitution practices.

As the quotes have made clear, this employer’s discourse with the trade

unions was more collaborative. Company C emphasised a relationship of all staff

being part of one unified workforce, working ‘arm-in-arm’ for the achievement of

the company’s goals. Yet, the de-collectivising ideology present in the local

managers’ administration could have influenced the union-weakening practices

established in this case. Despite all the messages regarding how satisfied the

company was with working closely together with both unions, there were still

elements of uncertainty and union vulnerability in which the employer had the power

to dismiss workers and destabilise the trade unions should it wish to. In so doing,

Company C was masking anti-union values in more subtle ways.

Additionally, Company C may have opted to play the trade unions against

each other to position itself as the most powerful actor in the process of collective

bargaining. Neither of the trade unions spoke of the company in negative terms, yet

they referred to each other in rather negative ways, often being unaware of the game-

playing of management. During the analysis of the interviews, it became clear that

this company was fuelling the fragmentation of its unions into two separate

organisations while at the same time using this to its advantage. This was clear when

the company acted against the potential merger of the two workplace trade unions.

For a comparison on the three cases’ union-weakening practices, the reader can refer

to table 24.

Attempting an explanation as to why some cases have different forms of de-

collectivising strategies goes beyond this chapter’s objectives. However, in

comparative terms, several comments can be made at this point. One of the features

184

particular to this case study was its foreign ownership. According to the interview

analysis, such a difference could have directly influenced the union-weakening

practices implemented by Company C.

Table 24: Summary of de-collectivising strategies in the three case studies.

Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C

Suppression

strategy

• Multi-rut

• Bargaining group

• Own participation and

communication

mechanisms such as weekly

breakfasts with workers

immediately after the strike

• Having a convenio with

largest trade union.

• Implementation of minimum

services

• Dismissal of trade union

members who went on strike

• Police intervention in the

picket lines.

• Refusal to meaningfully

negotiate

• Tactics to delay negotiations

• Minimum services.

• Acting against the merger

of the trade unions.

Substitution

strategy

• Extension of collectively

bargained benefits to non-

union members.

• Substitute union role via the

message that unions are

unnecessary given the

company’s good working

conditions. • Extension of collectively

bargained benefits to non-

union members.

• Attempt to substitute the

union role through the

implementation of the

'Connection' project where

management directly

communicates with

workers


Arguably, Company C’s parent company, a non-Chilean multinational,

established the basis for general HR practices and communicated this to its

subsidiaries, in this case, Company C. However, local managers implemented these

practices while aligning them to the Chilean employer ideology and to the national

legislation, which resulted in engagement in union-weakening practices. Therefore,

running alongside the formal strategies of engagement communicated by the parent

company were the local union-weakening practices of Company C. Arguably, the

difference in ownership may account for the level of sophistication of some union-

avoidance practices possess in this case study. The high unionisation rate of

Company C could also serve to explain why this employer tended to use subtler de-

collectivising strategies as a way to limit conflict in a highly unionised workplace:

thus, this employer may have opted to covertly exclude the role of trade unions in

mobilising workers.


This chapter has described the approaches three Chilean employers took in their

interactions with workplace unions in order to restrain and limit their influence. To

185

that end, the models of Gall and McKay (2001) and Peetz (2002) were used as a

compass to guide the analysis and the characterization of union-avoidance strategies.

Although Dundon (2002) advised on the limitations of typologies, both models

proved to be useful in helping to categorise and analyse these employers’ practices.

Chile has presented an interesting neo-liberal context for understanding the

complex dynamics of union-management relations. It is regarded as a successful

economic context, yet, as with other contexts, Chilean employment relations have

been fragmenting and becoming much more individualistic. Many aspects of the

employment relationship, including contracts, appraisals, rewards and

communications, have been conducted to individualise the context and minimise the

role of unions (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Rodriguez, 2010). Chilean employers have

become subtle – or ‘craftier’ - in applying de-collectivising strategies in their

workplaces and as a result, more sophisticated techniques to exclude trade unions’

influence in the workplaces have arisen. Such sophisticated (i.e. indirect) strategies

can also help understanding of why Chilean workers may find unionisation less

attractive, hence limiting the prospects that the unions’ organising strategy may have

in the revitalisation debate. These union-avoidance strategies can also explain the

smaller size and more fragmented nature of Chilean unions (Baltera and Munoz,

2017).

While comparing management approaches to trade unions in Case Studies A,

B and C, several conclusions may be drawn. The most significant of these is that the

three case studies emphasised different practices in their attempts to de-collectivise

the workplace. While Case Studies A and C focused on the subtle use of ‘inclusivist’

measures, Company B was more blatant in its approach to weakening trade unions.

This difference may be anchored in the way trade unions interact with the employer,

the company’s objectives, the institutional context of each company and even

management preferences. Likewise, high levels of unionisation and foreign

ownership appeared to serve as a buffer against the use of more aggressive anti-

union practices. When comparing the different union-weakening practices, the

companies distinctively emphasised certain activities, which illustrates the more

complex and uneven nature of employer approaches to resisting unions, as suggested

by Dundon (2002).

These cases showed the different forms that de-collectivising strategies could

take in the Chilean context, particularly in the food and drinks industry, of which the

186

most common were those embedded in the legislation. This chapter has not only

described somewhat authoritarian strategies involving the dismissal of workers, but

also commented on indirect strategies such as the implementation of employee

participation and internal grievance mechanisms. Chilean employers have

contributed to the array of de-collectivising strategies, developing their own brand of

local practices: these practices are the use of multi-rut, the extension of collectively

bargained benefits to non-union members, the systematic replacement of striking

workers, the use of collective convenios over contractually binding collective

agreements, the creation of bargaining groups and the use of minimum services

procedures. The ability that employers have to use these practices shows how the

regulatory context is, indeed, supportive of various union-weakening strategies. The

state has allowed aspects of the regulations to be used to weaken social dialogue and

fragment the workplace. Moreover, these practices became even more problematic

when trade unions became accustomed to their ongoing use, as appeared to be the

case in some instances.

Arguably, this relationship has become more problematic because the

relevant legislation insists, at the same time, that Chilean employers bargain with all

unions that establish themselves in their company (i.e., provided that they have the

‘quorum’ needed and are acknowledged by the Labour Inspectorate). This is a

particular aspect of the Chilean legislation whereby trade unions that have the

quorum needed are automatically in a position to bargain with their employer. The

result can be a rather problematic relationship, where employers feel they are being

‘forced’ to engage in collective bargaining and therefore offer minimum conditions

to trade unions and workers. Likewise, in this scenario, trade unions need to

constantly monitor the compliance of the company with the agreements reached.

Arguably, the fact that Chilean employers engage in collective bargaining does not

necessarily mean that they have a pluralist ideology and are consistently

collaborative with unions. The respect and compliance of an employer with the

collective agreement can be dependent on the pressure exerted by the union on the

employer (Baltera and Munoz, 2017).

The utility of typologies in the description of de-collectivising strategies can

also be addressed at this point. Although the taxonomy helped with characterising

employers’ practices, the categories should be treated with caution (Dundon, 2002).

The employers’ behaviour, especially in a matter as sensitive as de-collectivism, may

187

be multifaceted. In real-life scenarios, certain practices may not neatly fit into one or

another category. In the three analysed cases, employers used de-collectivising

strategies in conjunction, overlapping with one another, which shows the complexity

that can be found when describing and analysing de-collectivising strategies

(Cooper, Ellem, Briggs and Van der-Broek, 2009). Adding to this complexity is the

fact that the focus of Chilean industrial relations is firm-based, and as a result, a

plethora of de-collectivising strategies may be identified depending on the

company’s features - as there are fewer forms of sector-level or multi-employer

bargaining or coordination.

The analysis conducted also showed a problem with the terminology used in

the de-collectivising models. The ‘suppression’ term, used to indicate employer

willingness to eliminate unionisation in a more aggressive way, may not be

comparable to the actual ‘suppression’ episodes that the labour movement

experienced in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. The frameworks utilised in the

analysis utilised the term ‘suppression’ in a slightly less aggressive way than that

which the Latin American context has experienced. The original terminology derives

from an Anglo-Saxon set of debates which have not witnessed real suppression.

Consequently, although the term ‘suppression’ is valid to refer to such practices,

there should be an awareness of the context in which the term is used.

Overall, the understanding of these union-weakening practices is relevant due

to their influence on the process of trade union renewal and how they shape it. On

one hand, they tend to explain the daily efforts company-based unions must make to

deal with employers, thus curtailing their ability to focus on renewal. On the other

hand, they illustrate the importance of the industrial relations legacy, which in this

case is marked by high levels of diminished union rights, that interferes with the

process of trade union renewal.

188

CHAPTER 8: Trade union responses and questions of

revitalisation.

8.1. Introduction

This chapter follows on from the previous chapters that have already described

workplace governance and management strategies relating to three case studies in

the food manufacturing sector. This chapter will focus on the revitalisation strategies

that the trade unions in the three case studies implemented to build their power in the

workplace. The chapter thus has three aims: the first is to describe the strategies

implemented by the trade unions in these three companies to respond to the

challenges of their workplace and the political and economic national contexts, the

second is to determine how specific trade union strategies can be contrasted with

particular managerial strategies (i.e. revitalisation responses vis-à-vis management

strategies and the internal environment) and the third aim is to understand the role

that the Chilean political and economic context plays in such processes of renewal.

At the end of the chapter, the reader will have a clearer idea of how the Chilean

context has informed the general debate on trade union renewal and labour

modernisation.

Union revitalisation strategies refer to a range of initiatives that allow trade

unions to achieve greater power resources along four dimensions: membership,

economic, political and institutional (Behrens et al., 2004). Most of the examined

work that has described the process of trade union renewal has supported or engaged

with Frege and Kelly’s (2004) six strategies for trade union revitalisation (i.e.,

organising, trade union restructuring, coalition building, social partnership, political

action and international links). To ensure that a broader set of trade union strategies

were covered in this thesis, two additional dimensions for trade union renewal were

added, given their predominance in the literature supporting labour revitalisation:

skill formation (Martinez-Lucio, 2007) and social media implementation (Martinez-

Lucio, 2003; Martinez-Lucio and Walker, 2005). All these strategies were outlined

in Chapter 3.

Despite how well developed these strategies are at the international level,

when analysing the Chilean labour movement, it became obvious that the efforts of

these individual trade unions to revitalise were, to a great extent, shaped by their

189

employers’ union-weakening practices. Therefore, given the importance of

understanding such responses, and so as not to subsume all the strategies into a

general framework, the analysis of trade union renewal responses will account for

general (i.e. Frege and Kelly’s renewal dimensions) and specific (i.e., de-

collectivising strategies from employers) approaches. This chapter begins by

outlining the specific, local trade union responses to management attempts to weaken

them collectively, before going on to discuss more general and expansive

revitalisation strategies.

The chapter is divided into three sections, one for each case study, with each

section accounting for both specific trade union responses to management attempts

to weaken their role and the more general ‘proactive’ strategies related to a more

engaged and systematic attempt at renewal. This division was made following the

argument that trade union responses needed to be broken down and studied across

the more general dimensions from the international literature whilst analysing the

local dimensions of the practices and their specific contexts and immediate

challenges. As a result, each subsection details the specific activities the case studies’

trade unions were developing to tackle the particular de-collectivising and

weakening activities implemented by their employers. As explained before, these

activities tended to be context-specific as they were, in part, dependent on the

country’s legislation and regulatory traditions. To do so, each de-collectivising

strategy established by the employer will be presented vis-à-vis the counter-strategy

implemented by the trade union. Contrastingly, each subsection also discusses the

rather general and internationally informed trade union renewal strategies that these

case studies’ trade unions have been engaging with as an attempt to revitalise their

labour movement. In this latter portion of each subsection, Frege and Kelly’s (2004)

dimensions for renewal plus two additional dimensions are presented, explaining in

detail the efforts that these individual trade unions were developing to yield power in

the workplace. By so doing, the similarities and contradictions between the

dimensions should become clearer. The chapter argues that we need to therefore be

wary of the differences between more reactive and more proactive union responses.

8.2. Trade union ‘revitalisation’ strategies

This section describes both the specific trade unions’ responses to management’s

union-weakening practices and the more general revitalisation activities. The first set

190

of responses will be referred to as the specific strategies to counter union avoidance

while the second set of responses will be referred to as the general activities for trade

union renewal. Given the nature of Chile’s firm-level bargaining, responses to union

weakening within each workplace have a tendency to be more specific to the

workplace context and rarely coordinated within a broader tapestry of strategies,

hence the need to emphasise the efforts of these trade unions. Each activity

implemented by the trade unions seemed to be a direct response to the specific

practices that management implemented in a particular workplace. Despite obvious

workplace diversity, similarities across trade union responses can be observed, and it

is one of this thesis’ objectives to try to draw them out. This chapter thus argues that

the responses trade unions implement to face their challenges are not only

constrained by managers’ de-collectivising strategies but also by the existing

regulatory framework, which is drawn upon in the course of such strategies.

8.2.1. Case Study A: From legal mobilisation to labour-management

partnership.

This section firstly presents the specific responses implemented by the largest trade

union in Company A to counter the employer’s weakening practices and, secondly,

focuses on the general dimensions of trade union renewal. As sketched out in

previous chapters, Company A has a rather ambiguous relationship with its

workplace trade unions. Even though, in theory, management has recognised and

legitimised unions, Company A has implemented several union-weakening practices

(e.g., the support of negotiating groups, implementation of multi-rut, extension of

collectively agreed benefits and direct participation mechanisms).

8.2.1.1. Case Study A specific trade union responses to the employer’s union-

weakening practices

The most readily evident trade union-weakening practice in this case was that of

multi-rut. Due to Company A’s highly compartmentalized structure, the use of multi-

rut was perhaps an advantageous choice to further fragment the unions. As

previously mentioned, by using multi-rut, the employer divided the company into

smaller independent organisations, thus constraining the workers’ association rights.

Since the state is aware that companies often use multi-rut to prevent trade unions

from organising, it has granted workers and trade unions the ability to audit their

191

workplaces and detect their employers’ malpractice. The process by which trade

unions actively denounce employer’s labour malpractices to the Labour Inspectorate

has received the name in the literature of ‘legal mobilisation’ (Crocco, 2017). This

response to the employers’ union weakening activities has been documented as one

of the most sustained and widespread tactics among Chilean trade unions since the

1990s, as has been noted earlier (Crocco, 2017). This technique has served to contest

the power of Chilean employers in a context of often antagonistic labour legislation.

In terms of tangible outcomes, legal mobilisation has brought about countervailing

resources for the trade unions. The use of legal mobilisation can be seen in Case

Study A, where the trade unions made a formal claim to the Labour Inspectorate

arguing Company A’s misuse of multi-rut:

“We understand that the way to acquire power, power to bargain, power to get more

things is to have more members: it is the only thing that gives us more power. We

were thinking about suing with regards to multi-rut. Through that we are able to

incorporate people from other sites, from all the subsidiaries that are part of the

company. But the union in XXX [another site] did it first. A multi-rut lawsuit allows

our people to go there or for the people from there to join here. It aims to eliminate

the barriers so that people join whichever union they want. The multi-rut tool has to

be understood as a means of unification, allowing all workers to be in one place, it's

the only way to have muscle” (Company A, Union A, Trade Union leader 1).

As these trade union leaders explained, their only chance at challenging

multi-rut was through the mediation of the Labour Inspectorate, meaning that

structures at the level of the state provided some opportunities for extending

membership and coordination. The Labour Inspectorate has the ability to force a

company to eliminate any existing barriers to unionisation resulting from the abuse

of multi-rut. This process is rather straightforward, for once the trade unions agree

on denouncing the company, they can visit any Labour Inspectorate office in the city

and file their claim. This body then has the obligation to investigate all the claims

made, and upon analysing the information gathered during its investigation, can rule

accordingly. For the specific case of multi-rut, the Chilean state has issued an

ordinance for all Labour Inspectorate offices to rule in favour of the trade unions

when multi-rut is proved to be in use by the employers to dilute their labour

192

obligations (Ruiz-Tagle and Sehnbrush, 2015; Cano and Flores, 2014). Without this

body’s intervention, Chilean trade unions would be limited in their attempt to

challenge their company for implementing this particular weakening practice.

In this particular case study, legal mobilisation has helped the trade union to

organise workers who otherwise would have been unable to join, and it has also

positioned the trade union as a powerful actor at the bargaining table. Kirk (2018)

agrees with this argument, indicating that collective claims made by trade unions can

also be indicative of mobilisation as this process has become an alternative to strikes.

Knowing that trade unions can make formal claims to legal bodies can be a powerful

enough threat to put a stop to an employer’s malpractice. Trade unionists in this case

study commented how the company, perhaps fearing formal complaints, was more

open to listening to their claims and implementing the corresponding solutions.

In contrast to multi-rut, bargaining groups and the extension of collectively

bargained benefits were additional union-avoidance mechanisms, but permitted by

Chilean labour law. Under the assumption that all workers must be similar to one

another and that they all should have freedom of association, companies can extend

the same benefits to all workers (Henriquez, 2014). The problem is that both of these

mechanisms allow for employers to hinder workplace unionisation. As explained in

the previous chapter, Company A supported the implementation of a bargaining

group (i.e., a group of non-unionised workers who come together to bargain

collectively with the company) that was competing with the existing trade union.

Company A’s trade unionists understood the need to organise the non-affiliated

workers to become part of the trade union and therefore contested the bargaining

group’s strength. The organising efforts were based on campaigning for new workers

to join the trade union instead of the bargaining group, using the argument of the

union fee. When a worker belongs to a trade union in Chile, they must pay the union

fee. However, if the worker is not affiliated to the union but receives the benefits

bargained by the union, they must pay 75% of the union fee to the company’s union.

In this case study, most workers were already paying 75% of the union fee without

belonging to the union, since they were all workers to whom the company previously

extended the bargained benefits. Consequently, the trade union leaders mentioned

that their main argument for recruiting members was explaining the benefits of

paying the remaining 25% of the union fee and become affiliated to the union. In so

doing, workers could have the benefits of belonging to the trade union along with

193

greater employment security (Feres and Infante, 2007; Murray, 2017). However, this

could also mean unions had to clearly differentiate their ‘value added’ to workers

through activities such as the provision of services. This notion of servicing will be

further discussed. In order to organise and specifically poach members that were

initially attracted to the bargaining group, these trade unionists implemented Q&A

sessions in different production plants, handed out flyers to workers in distant

production plants and conducted various visits to the company’s different sites.

These activities seemed to have had positive results because a year after the first

round of interviews with these trade unionists, the bargaining group had been

destabilised. Trade unionists mentioned that workers realised the lower force of the

bargaining group compared to the trade union:

“Today there are people coming from the bargaining group and joining the union.

Because now we have the pharmacy benefit, the Christmas boxes, the Independence

Day celebration boxes, worker's day gift and all other small things that make the

difference compared to the bargaining group. Because they [the bargaining group]

have nothing, they don’t offer anything. In addition, the company fired one of the

workers who started the bargaining group and they were left almost adrift”

(Company A, Union A, Trade Union Leaders 1 and 2).

This quote showed how effective certain aspects of the trade union’s

responses can be. Despite the success of this response, the fact that this trade union

needed a direct threat to mobilise and recruit members can shed light on the nature of

Chilean IR and how time-consuming workplace fragmentation can be for trade

unionists. A summary of the specific responses this trade union implemented to

counter management strategies is seen in Table 25.

Table 25: Summary specific trade union responses for renewal in Case Study A

Specific de-collectivising

strategy Trade Union response

Multi-rut

• Legal mobilization: the trade union has resorted to filing claims and directly

suing the company before the labour inspectorate, arguing that the company is

using multi-rut purposefully to hinder trade union affiliation. • Organising: on a lower level, the trade union is organising with other trade

union leaders and members to fight multi-rut.

Bargaining groups • Organising: the trade union has responded to the BG by campaigning with

non-unionised workers as to how it may be the better choice to join the trade

union instead of the BG. Source: Own Illustration

194

8.2.1.2. Case Study A general trade union responses for revitalisation

As for general trade union revitalisation practices, Case Study A’s most developed

activities were targeted at their relationship with the employer and the union’s

internal structure. The trade union was actively pursuing a re-organisation of its

internal structure through the process of merger whilst at the same time attempting

an informal labour-management partnership. This latter strategy was classified as

‘informal’ since there was no actual agreement signed that recognised the

partnership. In a less developed manner, the trade union was aiming to increase its

membership through the broader organising-type strategy (although organising is not

a term that is used in Chile in the same way as in the USA or the UK, for example).

However, as will be discussed further below, such a strategy was not the core of the

trade union’s strategic plan for renewal. Contrary to these much more settled

activities, other activities for renewal, such as coalition building, training for trade

union members and/or workers and implementation of social media had limited

scope. Arguably, this may be due to the trade unions’ preferences and context

characteristics that tended to constrain the further development of more sophisticated

trade union renewal strategies. Finally, one of the least developed strategies for

renewal was political action. Such a lack of development sharply contrasted with this

strategy’s development in various other national contexts, where political action has

been one of the most prominent activities undertaken by the unions (e.g., Hamann

and Kelly, 2004; Baccaro et al., 2003; Hamann, 2012; Ibsen and Tapia, 2017). The

reasons explaining this phenomenon will be further addressed in this section.

Following this, all these general trade union renewal strategies will be analysed in

light of the case study’s characteristics.

Union activity around structural adjustment was observed in Case Study A.

This readjustment was mainly an external restructuring specifically aiming at a

merger process with the other, rather smaller trade unions of the company. Since this

was a multi-union company, the largest trade union understood the need for altered

arrangements with its fellow unions in the hope of more power at the bargaining

table. This trade union was pursuing a direct increase in membership after the

merger. After the 2013 strike, this trade union had been growing stronger and

embracing new objectives, either from an increasing membership or because of its

renewed position at the bargaining table. From their perspective, becoming one

single union through a merger process was perceived as the way to reach the new set

195

of goals. When interviewed, trade union leaders clearly articulated their goals for the

upcoming years and explained the steps that needed to be taken to achieve them. As

explained by the trade union:

“We understand that the only way to have power, bargaining power, power to obtain

more things is to have more members, that is the only thing that gives us power (…)

We decided to look for ourselves inside the same company, to look for more trade

unions and called on them to integrate with us” (Company A, Union A, Trade Union

Leader 1).

The merger process was being implemented through an active campaign.

Monthly meetings were held with other unions’ leaders, discussing the advantages

and disadvantages of the merger with workers and trade union leaders while also

explaining to their constituents the advantages and disadvantages of a merger.

However, similar to what the literature has documented on restructuring processes

(Waddington 2005; 2006; Gennard, 2008; Chaison, 2018), the trade union

encountered strong internal resistance as other trade union leaders were concerned

with losing their leader status and the benefits associated with this.

“There is this fear that we can see, a fear of the leaders of losing the dismissal

immunity [the immunity representatives have]. Even though we proposed a strategy

for them to continue enjoying those privileges, looking for mechanisms that would

allow them to make use of union leaves to be able to leave and do everything, they

didn´t even want to negotiate with the dismissal immunity issue” (Company A,


“The main problem is that the leaders do not want to lose their immunity. They also

mentioned that they were not going to have anyone to guide them, or a quicker

response because we were going to be here in Santiago [and they were going to be in

the south of the country]. They knew that we were going to be spending most of our

time in Santiago” (Company A, Union A, Trade Union Leader 2)

Trade unionists leading the process were determined to make the merger

happen and neutralise the challenges. Understanding that other leaders were

196

comfortable in their positions and did not want to discuss with their constituents the

merger’s possibilities, they challenged them by visiting the ‘problematic’ sites and

speaking directly to union members; the objective was to educate them about the

importance of becoming one trade union. In terms of outcomes, this strategy did not

have the expected results, as the union’s primary motivation was to increase

membership. Although the union managed to merge with smaller unions and held

continuous discussions with other unions, the process of merger did not

automatically translate into any significant or net membership growth. The literature

on restructuring indicated that for a merger process to be effective it needed to have

a transformational motivation behind it, meaning that the changes should not aim to

protect the interest of members and leaders, but to engage a broader constituency of

workers in the process (Behrens et al., 2004; Murray, 2017). There must also be a

desire to increase the union’s strategic effectiveness to make revitalisation happen.

Unfortunately, such strategic conceptualisation of the process of merger was not

identified in this case study’s main union.

The second most developed general revitalisation strategy in Case Study A

was the issue of a labour-management partnership. The company and the larger

union had mostly had an adversarial relationship in the past, so after the historical

strike in 2013 the more cooperative relationship began evolving steadily into some

sort of labour-management partnership. Interviewed HR managers and trade

unionists agreed that the strike was the turning point for the way in which

employment relationships were managed. Immediately after the strike, a new senior

HR manager was appointed, who was said to be more inclined towards open

dialogue with the trade unions. Interviewed trade unionists agreed that one of the key

things that started the organisation’s cultural shift towards consistent dialogue was

the new HR manager.

Despite the efforts made by the new head HR manager in bringing together

unions and managers, there was an underlying distrust perceived by the trade union

leaders, leading them to question the new HR manager’s real motivations for

engaging in a collaborative relationship. The literature on labour-management

partnership indicated that employers may, in certain circumstances, engage in a

collaborative relationship with the intention of further limiting trade union power by

compromising their ability to mobilise, a power that in this case increased after the

strike in 2013 (Danford, Richardson and Upchurch, 2002; Badigannavar and Kelly

197

2003). As a result, the real motivations behind the company’s partnership agreement

remained unclear. Additionally, all labour-related gains secured through partnership

were overshadowed by management support of a non-union bargaining group, which

also contributed to the ambiguity of the informal partnership. Ultimately, the

partnership agreement was not formalised and management still engaged in labour

fragmentation, irrespective of its supposedly ‘positive’ relationship with the union.

The notion of such a labour-management partnership strategy leading to some form

of renewal must then be evaluated with caution.

Another general response that this trade union was developing in order to

renew was organising. As explained in the literature, structural changes of the trade

union can directly impact on the membership dimension of the renewal process

(Behrens et al., 2004). Since mergers are often justified by the aim of acquisition of

members, which can directly translate into more power, organising members can be

an obvious trade union response. The case study analysis showed that, after the

historical 2013 strike, it was important for the trade union to increase membership

through the affiliation of new members. Therefore, an informal recruitment

campaign was sustained, targeting new members from all production plants. This

recruitment process was determined to be ‘informal’ since it did not have any pre-

determined objectives and outcomes. The process was more about educating workers

regarding the basic advantages of belonging to a trade union. These activities

required time and monetary investment, which the trade unions did not have. Trade

unionists paid visits to the production plants with the highest levels of non-union

membership. They would directly talk to prospective members and would stand

outside the workplace’s canteen. They also hosted drop-in sessions to clarify any

queries. Most importantly, they were also relying on their members to recruit in the

places they could not reach:

“We had people in our union that belonged to a union there in XXX [another

production site], and they have given us propaganda. Because among workers they

talk and ask members: hey, why do you have that box [the Christmas box], who sent

it to you? The Santiago union. And the word starts to spread” (Company A, Union

A, Trade Union Leader 2).

198

Evaluating this strategy’s outcomes, there were several issues that may have

prevented it from being successful in achieving trade union renewal. There were no

clear objectives established prior to implementation. There was limited organising of

non-standard workers and national contextual limitations were disregarded.

Although this trade union understood the need to reach all kinds of non-unionised

workers, they did not have any specific target for organising specific groups of

workers, e.g. young workers, women or migrant workers. Such a lack of diversity

may account for the less specialised organising function that this trade union had.

Further, in a context of overall union avoidance, Chilean workers seemed to be

concerned about becoming trade union members because of the potential

repercussions this might entail. Therefore, the organising strategy’s outcomes can be

limited in its path to labour revitalisation as it was not planned or systematically

reflected upon as a strategic initiative.

In contrast to previous renewal strategies, activities such as coalition

building, skill formation and social media platforms were amongst the less

developed responses. Forming coalitions with non-labour-related groups was limited

in this case study. Although this trade union formed a coalition with non-labour

groups for a specific purpose, such coalition was limited to yield support from

neighbours and firefighters during the 2013 strike. The basic goal of the coalition

was to yield material support to help sustain a 45-day-long strike in 2013. The

relationship with their community allies lasted as long as the strike happened, since

the union needed the moral and material support these community groups offered.

Hence, these relationships were mainly circumstantial and instrumental to that

specific goal. No continuous activity between this trade union and the community

was established beyond the interaction they might have from living in the same

municipality. In this case, coalition building can be viewed as a secondary union

renewal activity used to support an industrial conflict but not to create longer term

interactions, as the next quote shows:

“(…) with the neighbours and the firefighters, even with the police, they helped us a

lot when we were on strike, they saved us a lot, they brought us food, they gave us

money, they brought us clothes, they helped us with coats so that we wouldn’t get

wet with the rain, and the police even let us make a fire to warm us during the cold

199

nights in winter. They were fundamental, imagine if we were out there fighting alone

for 45 days” (Company A, Union A, Trade Union Leader 2).

A coalition based on the surrounding community can assist with renewal to

the labour movement. As explained in the literature, unions should act together with

other progressive social forces and new social movements in order to achieve some

form of revitalisation (Heery and Adler, 2004; Frege et al., 2003). In this case, the

trade union showed a lack of perception of the opportunity to become or be part of a

social movement that could make progress beyond the immediate employment

relationship. The community-oriented strategies were therefore episodic and not

developed in any strategic or reflective manner. Chile’s decentralised industrial

relations system, plus the relative (and ironic) de-politicisation of significant parts of

the labour movement, can help explain the challenges trade unions face in relation to

these initiatives. As commented by Hurd et al., (2003) this strategy tends to be

context-specific, therefore it is possible that the Chilean context does not have the

characteristics necessary to foster trade union renewal through systematic coalition

building, in this sector at least.

Another general renewal strategy with a moderate level of development was

training or skill development, for trade union leaders and/or for workers. At the time

of the interviews, these trade unionists were regularly attending training sessions on

labour laws as a way of understanding the requirements of the new labour reform

(approved in 2015). These training sessions were part of a trade union school funded

by the government and offered to all trade unionists who wanted to know more about

the changes in the collective labour law. When specifically asked about attending

training, this union mentioned not being able to participate frequently, as they

needed to use their union leave time to attend the training. The company did not

provide extra time off work to attend these training sessions. Regarding training

provided for workers, unionists did not consider it a priority. Focusing on gaining

improvements in working conditions and wages was their primary role. This lack of

reflection about workers’ skill development activities can be highly criticised as it is

through training that workers develop a more critical conscience, thus increasing the

potential ability to challenging the employer (Martinez-Lucio and Mustchin, 2013).

Therefore, this activity as a trade union revitalisation strategy did not offer results.

Neither were trade union leaders systematically participating in training, nor were

200

workers being systematically trained as members and company workers: it simply

was not a strategic priority.

Another strategy that was less developed was the implementation of digital

platforms through social media. Through these platforms, trade unions can organise

and better communicate with members as well as undertaking transnational

networking (Bryson et al., 2010). However, social media was being used by these

trade unionists less as an instrument for organising and more for basic information

sharing. Formal communications were reserved for the monthly general assemblies

between trade unions and members. Through the official Facebook page of this trade

union, the leaders would post updates of any meetings held with the company’s

managers and regarding whichever activity they needed to inform the members

about. Using social platforms was a way of minimally supporting their daily

interactions with members. Therefore, the use of social media or e-communications

was not central to organising or networking as it was mostly used to share basic

information amongst trade union members. In this regard, this strategy was

implemented by the trade union as another mechanism through which to

communicate with members, without in itself being a renewal strategy.

The limited used of this strategy may be explained by the nature of firm-level

bargaining, where this trade union’s objectives and activities tended to be confined

to their members (especially core ones). Therefore, there was a limited experience

with sectoral and national communication – and even within the workplace – such

that trade unions could use social media to get their message across (Barnes et al.,

2019) but appear contained by their institutional relations. There was also the

possibility that this trade union’s membership preferred more traditional face-to-face

interaction, as Thornthwaite et al.’s (2018) study indicated was the case for some

unions. As a result, the potential for engagement through social media strategies was

rather limited.

Finally, two general strategies for renewal were very limited in this case

study. These revitalisation strategies were political action and international links.

The political action strategy was one of the least implemented activities across the

cases. In this case study, the trade union understood the possibilities and benefits of

joining a political party, yet the leaders were reluctant to do so. Therefore, these

trade union leaders in their role as trade union leaders were distant from political

parties and from what they perceived as serving at times as the embodiment of

201

political parties in the labour movement, the CUT. In this context, trade unionists

mentioned being concerned with losing their autonomy whilst engaging with

political parties. In their view, political parties may attempt to align the union’s

objectives with their own, thus disregarding the union’s goals. Additionally, they

believed that becoming associated with a political body might increase distrust

amongst the union’s members:

“[we do not belong to a federation] because of everything that is happening, if you

google CUT and see the debacle that is inside, the internal fights, the inflated voting

lists, elections that are fraudulent (...) the first thing that potential new members ask

is if we belong to the CUT? But not as a positive thing, it was more like: if you are in

the CUT we won’t join your union” (Company A, Union A, Trade Union Leader 1).

Such perceptions can be explained as, among other things, due to the

legitimacy crisis Chilean political parties and national-level confederations seem to

be experiencing (Duran, 2013; Narbona, 2014). Additionally, the fact that these local

and company-level trade unions chose to distance themselves from political parties

and the political agenda may also be explained by the de-politicisation that large

parts of the Chilean labour movement has suffered since 1973. Such relative de-

politicisation has resulted in a strong workplace-level focus and less involvement in

national-level discussions.

The same unwillingness to resort to political parties was found for

transnational cooperation in this case study. Establishing international

relationships with other labour-related bodies to support each other was not

considered as a strategy by this trade union. Even though leaders of this trade union

were aware that international bodies could support them in the process of collective

bargaining and in implementing renewal (Fairbrother, 2009), they have not fallen in

with transnational institutions in a systematic manner. One possible explanation for

this limited development may be the isolation that this trade union had from

national-level institutions in themselves, which prevented its leaders from

understanding the advantages and disadvantages of engaging in transnational

cooperation. The trade union in this case study made it clear in the interviews that

engaging with other labour-related institutions might affect its autonomy, hence the

reluctance to do so. Perhaps there was a latent fear of being undermined by inter-

202

union rivalry and competition, and thus they refused to engage in international

solidarity. Lillie and Martinez-Lucio (2004) commented on the fact that strategies

and structures for mobilizing solidarity seemed to be dependent on favourable

circumstances, one of them being strong inter-union networks and informal relations

of a political nature, which seemed to be limited in this case study. The summary of

this trade union’s general strategies for renewal can be seen in Table 26.

Table 26: Summary of trade union strategies for revitalisation in Case Study A

Dimensions for renewal Level of

development

Specific activities

Restructuring High

• Pursuing a merger process with smaller trade unions

within different sites of the company.

• Resistance from other trade union leaders.

Labour-Management

Partnership ‘High’

• Attempting to establish a cooperative relationship with

senior management and HR services after a critical

incident. • Partnership may be being bypassed by the management

through the support of a competing bargaining group

and a more fragmented industrial relations context.

Organising Medium

• Campaigning on different sites of the company to

recruit more members. • Using Q&A and drop-in sessions where interested

workers can talk to them and clear up any existing

queries.

Coalition Building Low

• Joint relationship with neighbours and firefighters of

the community established during the strike to gain

support and access their resources. • Linked mainly to short-term disputes and not long term

coalition building.

Training Low

• Trade union leaders attended training sessions.

• Skill development of workers is not clearly embedded

in an overall learning agenda.

Social Media Low

• Limited use of social media platforms to organise or

communicate with members.

• Facebook account used to answer day-to-day

questions, yet not regarded as an official

communication channel.

Political Action Underdeveloped

• Refusal to join political parties or any other political

body (such as federations, confederations and national-

level institutions) because of concern of losing

autonomy.

International Links Underdeveloped

• Aware of the help international bodies can provide but

fear losing autonomy.

• Firm-based unions do not have relevant resources to

develop this strategy and are not connected through

other national labour institutions due to the nature of

their local structures.

Source: Modified research template from Frege and Kelly (2004)

203

This case study is quite an insular case, with a focus on a limited form of

partnership, constrained organisational restructuring and the use of the

regulatory/legal side of the renewal process. However, it was not quite the strategic

or innovative case that could be expected for a large trade union embedded in such

high-level company. Despite the perceived disconnection from broader political and

social struggles, this trade union managed to implement several practices directed

towards trade union revitalisation. There was awareness of their role as workers’

representatives and the fights they must continuously undertake in order to counter

the employer’s offences. Despite the evidence suggesting that this trade union did

not show strong militancy and mobilisation, they were engaging in a wide range of

activities, albeit at the workplace level. This union’s concerns within the limits of the

workplace may be questionable but can be the result of the strong de-politicisation

suffered by trade unions at the national level and the manner in which the day-to-day

practice of industrial relations has been developed. These responses and activities,

although at micro-level, show the beginnings of a renewal process.

Additionally, the case study showed increasing workplace-level challenges.

The main challenge had to do with the ambiguity in the labour-management

relationship. Trade unions were encouraged to trust managers but were blatantly

bypassed at key times by them. Overall, neither managers nor trade unions trusted

each other to any significant extent. Management used several strategies to weaken

trade unions while inviting them to negotiate through ongoing dialogue. There were

also national-level issues influencing this trade union’s path to revitalisation.

Isolation from other social movements and the spreading legitimacy crisis of large-

scale national actors were the most highlighted points. Nevertheless, the high-profile

responses implemented by this trade union can be seen as promising for

revitalisation in that there appeared to be an openness to this.

8.2.2. Case Study B: The passive and constraining trade union response.

This portion of the chapter details the renewal responses of the two main trade

unions in Company B. The first part of the section will discuss the trade unions’

specific responses to their employer’s union weakening strategies and then move on

to a discussion of the general revitalising strategies based on Frege and Kelly’s

(2004) framework. Previous chapters showed Company B’s different union-

weakening techniques for each of the workplace trade unions. With the ‘Largest

204

Trade Union’, the employer used rather subtle practices (i.e., collective convenios,

advantageous implementation of minimum services legislation and extending the

collectively bargained benefits to non-unionised workers). However, with the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’, the analysis showed more overt union-weakening

practices (i.e., dismissal of members who participated in strikes, replacement of

striking workers, police intervention in the strikes and management refusal to

meaningfully negotiate). As a result of such differentiated practices, each trade union

responded with its own set of counter-strategies. These distinct responses are

presented next. The analysis will mostly concentrate on the activities of the ‘Largest

Trade Union’ as that was the most representative trade union in this case study.

Although the activities of the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ seemed to be the most

innovative compared to the ‘Largest Trade Union’, this organisation was strongly

destabilised throughout the fieldwork, limiting the researcher’s ability to understand

more of their renewal process. In this respect, trade union fragmentation was an

important feature of this case.

8.2.2.1. Case Study B specific trade union responses to the employer’s union-

weakening practices

In facing the majority of workplace challenges, an informal labour-management

partnership was the most effective strategy for the ‘Largest Trade Union. Trade

unionists in this particular organisation explained how the company’s perception of

strikes was extremely negative, quoting several incidents where the company made

clear its discontent with strikes. The company’s unwillingness to allow strikes has

meant the trade union leadership having to defer their right to strike. They have done

so by engaging in a special form of collective agreement, the collective convenio.

The importance of this form of contract in the case study is the trade union’s

powerlessness to question it. In addition to the aforementioned issues surrounding

this type of agreement, the collective convenio was negotiated behind closed doors,

concealing its disadvantages from workers. The workers voted for this agreement

solely based on the advantages presented to them by their trade union leaders, whose

seemed to be interested in perpetuating a cooperative relationship with management.

Seeing as Company B implemented rather aggressive anti-union practices, the

largest trade union opted for a collaborative approach with the company. Emerging

from this relationship was the idea that these trade union leaders were the company’s

205

partners in a rather friendly manner. Management were relatively devious in

allowing this trade union to believe that they were not only legitimate partners but

also ‘friends’, as explained earlier. As a result, trade union leaders did not overtly

confront the employer with demands asking for better wages and working conditions

in a robust fashion. Rather, they proposed ideas to the employers on how to make the

company more profitable, something that in their view would indirectly bring an

increase in wages. Interestingly, the next quote originated when they were

interviewed and asked about their strategies to gain more strength and bargaining

power:

“Interviewer: let's focus on the strategies you use to have strength and negotiate

better ...

Trade union leader: we have a strategy, I´ll tell you (...) we asked the general

manager, we put it this way, we said look: we want to work, we want to do this, let's

consider it for one year, based on 2016. In 2016 there were an X amount of

chocolate produced with a Z amount of waste. We want to lower that waste amount,

in terms of percentages, let's lower it say by 10 points” (Company B, Union A,

Trade Union Leader 2).

This type of contract can illustrate the nature of industrial relations in Chile

as trade unions feel the need to legitimate their presence through engaging at the

micro-level with questions of efficiencies. Something similar happened when

negotiating with the employer around another of the legislation’s union-weakening

practices. The trade union favourably agreed the level of minimum services with the

employer during its negotiations in 2018. According to the trade unionists, the

employer was proposing a reasonable minimum services agreement, so they could

not refuse. They mentioned to have been in their interest that the company remained

operational during strikes as this was the way they made a living. Throughout the

interviews, this trade union failed to perceive these practices as weakening their

autonomy and legitimacy, never mind they being possibly anti-union. As explained

before, they felt they were the employer’s business partner; hence, going against the

company’s goal was unreasonable.

Contrary to these responses and limited in extent were the activities

implemented by the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’. They opted for what the Chilean

206

literature calls legal mobilisation (Crocco, 2017). They believed legal mobilisation

was their best way to counteract the overt anti-union practices that the employer was

using against them. The second trade union understands this strategy to be more

efficient than any other that they might implement.

“(…) he [the Marginalised trade union leader] takes the company to court for

anything! That’s it! The guy went and sued the company on behalf of the workers (...)

sue the company for all the problems that workers may have. One of the people

involved in a past conflict spoke directly with him, and he goes and sues. He does

everything to judicialize the conflicts, all of them! he will not talk to the company, he

goes directly to sue” (Company B, Union A, Trade Union Leader 2).

Given this type of strategy and the comments made by this union’s leaders,

the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ seemed to be more progressive than the ‘Largest

Trade Union’ because they tended to be less dependent on management, more

worker-oriented and more inclined to innovation in their responses. This trade union

was also linked to specific left-wing movements and specific political parties, which

had possibly contributed to more confrontations with the employer. Moreover, trade

unionists of the ‘Largest Trade Union’ believed that workers supported the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ because of how progressive the ideas of this leader

were:

“at that time, no one said ‘this union achieved this’ and ‘that union achieved that

other thing’. No, that was not said, it was more like there was no distinction between

what our union and his [trade union] achieved. Until some time ago we said: ‘no!’

Because the people believed he [the Marginalized trade union leader] fought and was

the one who got things for them” (Company B, Union A, Trade Union Leader 2).

“(…) And he [the leader of the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’] started talking about

what he had achieved [benefits for workers] and people believed that, so we said:

no, from now on we're going to be quiet with everything we propose” (Company B,


As can be seen from this last quote, there were also some tensions emerging

from the differences in the ways in which the two trade unions responded to the

207

workplace challenges. Instead of wanting to collaborate with each other, they

marked a clear distance between them. The process through which they became

distant from one another may be important to understanding the significant levels of

intra-union rivalry present in this case, so the full comment is outlined next:

“(…) we had a very close relationship with XXX [the leader of the marginalized

union], very cool at the beginning, we got together here, we met in different places,

once a month. And suddenly he started showing his true colours. He started talking

about the confederation, the federation, and we looked at each other (…) He said he

wanted to be the President of all the unions. So we said: it was a pleasure to have

shared all this time with you, we learned a lot, we hope that you too have learned a

lot from us, we have learned a lot from you, but our relationship, as it is right now,

ends here. We are autonomous, we were born autonomous, and we are going to die

autonomous. No one makes decisions for us. So, it was a pleasure and we left. And

we left. From that moment, there was a separation of both action and thought, a

radical split. Because we follow our line, which is a line of conversation, of

agreements around a table, the agreements are respected, not signed and then

erased. Strategies are used but always face-to-face. And that's where the work with

the people began, he started working with the people. He began to show the people

that there was a way to achieve better things, but it was a totally anti-diplomatic

way, an alternative path, which came to collide with the company” (Company B,


These comments were also interesting in that they explicitly showed the

differences in the approach each trade union took with the employer. Where the first

trade union mentioned having a mora collaborative style with the company, the

second trade union chose to be confrontational to accomplish more things. Arguably,

such confrontational approaches may be the main reason for the employer’s anti-

union practices, or vice-versa. Table 27 presents a summary of the specific trade

union responses vis-à-vis management’s de-collectivising practices. In this case,

there were two different responses to the union-weakening strategies mentioned in

Chapter 7, and perhaps a greater space for agency. What emerged was the proactive

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ being increasingly constrained by the behaviour of the

208

other trade union and the problem of fragmentation and difference within the system

of industrial relations.

Table 27: Summary of trade union specific responses to employer’s de-

collectivism in Case Study B.

Specific de-

collectivising

strategy Largest Trade Union’ responses

Marginalised Trade Union’s

responses

Collective Convenio

• Informal labour-management

partnership: they abdicate to their right to

strike in order to have a more

collaborative relationship with the

company.

• Not applicable

Minimum Services

• Through labour-management

partnership the trade union favourably

agreed to the minimum services proposed

by the company without engaging in

confrontations or further discussions.

• Legal mobilisation: the trade union

has resorted to filing claims before the

labour inspectorate for what they

consider the company’s misuse of the

legislation.

Extension of benefits • Normalisation of such practices: did

not organise against it.

• Legal mobilisation: claims before

the labour inspectorate for any benefits

the employer extends to non-union

members without consultation. Source: Own Illustration

8.2.2.2. Case Study B general trade union responses for revitalisation

The next part of the section reviews general trade union revitalisation strategies,

concentrating on the efforts of the ‘Largest Trade Union’ as the most representative

trade union of this workplace. In contrast to what happened in other countries where

trade unions, embedded in contexts of intensified market competition, mainly used

mobilisation and organising as the strategies to lead renewal (Bernaciak and

Kahancova, 2017; Frege and Kelly, 2004; Heery and Adler, 2004; Wills and Simms,

2004), this trade union gravitated more towards traditional revitalisation practices

such as labour-management partnership and, to a lesser extent, the strategy of

servicing members. The two strategies were implemented with different objectives,

yet they showed a resemblance in their limited innovation. Likewise, all other

general strategies for trade union renewal seemed limited in this case study. As will

be argued, such limitations may have been due to the firm-based nature of the union,

disconnected from any sectoral or national-level unions. Thus, regardless of the

differences in the responses to the union weakening strategies, the overall

revitalisation orientations seemed similarly weak by comparison.

Throughout the interviews, it was rather clear that the ‘Largest Trade Union’

mostly wanted to be at peace, hence they were highly invested in further developing

209

an informal labour-management partnership, even if this meant sacrificing their

right to strike (by signing the collective convenio). They had chosen to develop this

approach, seeing how utilising confrontation had had negative consequences in the

past (i.e., the company dismissed most striking workers). Not only was the

relationship more collaborative, but the trade union also made extensive concessions

to the employer regarding job security. The main concession was the right to strike,

which they alienated by signing the collective convenio. These trade unionists

mentioned their satisfaction with the benefits offered by the company given the poor

characteristics, as they perceived it, of the food-manufacturing industry. In general,

the trade union believed that without job security and the possibility of legal

mobilisation, an informal labour-management partnership was the best possible

option for them. Since this employer had, at key points, shown disregard for

workers’ rights and a confrontational relationship with trade unions that opposed it,

this trade union might have considered an informal partnership to be the best renewal

strategy:

“(…) So that's why I tell you, that the company for us is our partner, in that we are

working with the company (...) we are in that process. (...) so that they understand,

that the company also understands that we do not look at them as the employer, or

we do not want this company to be paternalistic, we have to be part of the business,

with all of them. Maybe in Europe they work like this and unions are part of the

business. Trust is fundamental. You see, we are doing things well then” (Company

B, Union A, Trade Union Leader 2).

There were other general strategies for revitalisation reviewed in this case

study. After going through the interviews and the thematic analysis, it appeared as

though the ‘Largest trade union’ may have been using its servicing role as a strategy

to become more powerful in the workplace. In this case, that increased power would

come from increasing its membership. When asked about their day-to-day activities,

the trade unionists referenced some form of servicing. They related that their main

concerns were the provision of services (i.e., workers’ retirement plans, workers’

transportation to and from the production plant and monetary bonuses), therefore the

servicing role was the predominant activity from which this trade union drew its

power as it enlarged and maintained its membership. The problem with this role was

210

that it had the potential to transform union’ members into consumers, with trade

union leaders constantly tracking and responding to their members’ service needs

(Heery and Kelly, 1994). Chilean academics have also commented that the way by

which trade unions in Chile seem to be earning and building their legitimacy is

through the servicing role (Crocco, 2017; Narbona, 2014; Palacios-Valladares,

2010). Therefore, the effectiveness of servicing members in order to recruit more

members is a renewal strategy that may be limited in its scope. In this case, the trade

unions focused on the quality of the service provided and not on the membership

numbers, as the next quote illustrates:

“We think that the number does not mean anything in terms of strength. We think

that strength is made by quality. In the sense that (...) We are not looking for

members. They come and tell us: hey, what do you offer me? They come

recommended by a friend who told them: Go to that union because they are good

and can guide you more. But we do not campaign” (Company B, Union A, Trade

Union Leader 2).

This quote thus supports the argument that this trade union had a limited

approach to organising, although the trade unions would not use this term to address

the activity of campaigning for new members. There were no organising targets, no

organising methods and hardly any resources allocated to serve the purpose of

organising. Arguably, this lack of strategic planning with regards to recruitment may

be observed because of this trade union’s predominance in the workplace, where

they were recognised by workers and the employer as the main trade union.

Likewise, focusing on organising non-standard workers (i.e., young, migrant or

women workers) was not a target for this trade union, yet the ‘Largest Trade union’

was the only organisation from the case studies to emphasise the affiliation of

women to the union. They have been targeting this specific group and have even

elected a woman to one of their leading positions.

Coalition building was another general trade union renewal strategy that

received scant attention in this case study. Possibly a sign of coalition with non-

labour groups could be illustrated with one specific episode where trade unionists

collaborated with the community surrounding their offices. This collaboration took

place because of a large-scale fire that happened in the city. The trade union’s offices

211

were near the fire and so they sheltered families who had lost their homes. This

collaboration essentially only took place at the time of the fire and never resumed.

No other forms of collaborations with non-labour groups were detected in this case

study, hence the less developed strategy label. Consequently, the social dimension of

trade unionism was not integral to the ‘Largest Trade Union’.

Another less developed renewal strategy was training and the use of skills

development as a form of labour revitalisation. This trade union had limited impact

on the provision of training for workers as they did not influence Company B’s

decisions over workers’ skill training and development. Despite leading a rather

large trade union with the majority of workers affiliated, these leaders did not

consider workers’ skill development to be a priority, either for general or on-the-job

skills. Arguably, this could be attributed to the company’s overall limited provision

of training to workers, whereby trade union leaders could also fail to understand the

training possibilities that could be offered to workers within the company. Therefore,

the notion of training as some form of space to connect with workers and their needs

was in effect non-existent.

However, these trade union leaders attended training themselves to develop

their own skills. This was particularly evident at the time of the fieldwork, when a

new labour reform (approved in 2015 and came into effect in 2017) had been

approved and all of them had attended training on the new regulations’ requirements.

These trade union leaders also mentioned having attended additional training on

labour relations, accounting and negotiations. According to the literature, the

attendance of union leaders at training supported renewal because they could become

more adequately prepared to represent workers and to engage in mobilising

campaigns (Heyes and Rainbird, 2011). Even though trade union leaders attending

training might be considered positive for revitalisation, it was also evident that the

skills development agenda of their constituents seemed fragmented and less relevant

to them. As a result, training workers was a strategy left underdeveloped, which may

have constituted a lost opportunity given what recent studies have mentioned about

training’s contribution to revitalisation (Findlay and Warhurst, 2011; Warhurst et al.,

2006). Martinez-Lucio and Mustchin (2013) and Rainbird and Stuart (2011) agree

with this statement as they indicate that the training agenda and the union

involvement therein should be a major issue in trade union activity.

212

The analysis of social media platform implementation to organise and

mobilise workers was also limited in the case study as a strategy for renewal. This

trade union did not implement such platforms to organise, but rather chose to use

social media for basic communications with the members. Additionally, senior trade

union leaders commented on their preference for a more traditional approach to

communicating with their members through face-to-face interactions, according with

a study conducted by Thornthwaite et al. (2018). The use of this strategy in this case

study was limited and not used more actively to organise members or to

communicate with sectoral, national and transnational labour movements as the

literature explained (see Anduiza et al, 2014; Bryson et al, 2010). Bryson et al.

(2010) argued about the potential that social media platforms had for acquiring high

rates of membership at a moment in time when membership-based institutions

seemed to be falling. These authors believed that trade unions should learn how to

market their benefits using techniques from contemporary membership-based

institutions such as Facebook. However, as indicated before, this trade union opted

for a more traditional, hierarchical approach when using social media. This may be

explained by the overall lack of innovation that this trade union exhibited during the

interviews and the perception that social media was simply a one-way

communication channel.

Having a trade union with limited innovation capabilities also meant that they

did not considered restructuring as a likely strategy for revitalisation. Furthermore,

trade union leaders of the ‘Largest Trade Union’ admitted that any structural change,

either internal or external, would not only be undesirable but would also be

detrimental to them because of the potential for conflict. They strongly opposed

being influenced by other trade unions’ leaders, for they wished to remain

independent:

“the other union wanted to use us and that was when we cut off (...) as J [the other

trade union leader] said and made an allusion about it when we sat down and the

conversations we had, then I looked at J and said: we go the other way. I'm not like

that and my colleagues are not like that, and our ideals are not like that. And one

day I told J, you know what? I do not like this guy; we are in another place where it

is not convenient for us to walk alongside him (…)” (Company B, Union A, Trade

Union Leader 1).

213

This comment showed another possible explanation for this trade union’s

refusal to engage in restructuring. As they were the union enjoying the company’s

good will, they believed that merging with other unions could result in losing the

company’s preference. In addition, given that the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ was

considered to have a ‘bad’ reputation, exploring the benefits of unified labour force

within the workplace seemed to be less attractive for the ‘Largest Trade Union’.

Finally, the last two general trade union revitalisation strategies that were

found to be underdeveloped in this case were political action and international

solidarity. This, again, may be an unsurprising result given Chile’s firm-level

industrial relations. For both these strategies, the trade union leaders in the ‘Largest

Trade Union’ mentioned not being willing to endure the consequent loss of

independence and autonomy that relating to political parties and international bodies

might cause. Regarding their association with political parties, they mentioned not

being comfortable with engaging with any political ideology, be that right- or left-

wing:

“…obviously the union is political, everything we do is political, but politics for us

does not have to be managed by other entities, by other thinking minds, politics has

to be managed by ourselves, that’s it. I have to be direct with our members, we have

to manage our politics, we have to decide what to do or not to do. We cannot let

other people who are not in our position run our organization” (Company B, Union

A, Trade Union Leader 2).

The same negative answer was provided when asked if they belonged to a

federation or confederation:

“Why don’t we join a federation? Because it is politics. Look, I do not know if you

looked at the drawings [on the walls of the office] that we have here, those drawings

say something, you are in a trade union. This says that here in this house, and in our

way of thinking, our way of acting and our guidance is not political, neither blue,

green, red, nor yellow. Everyone has their thoughts, I have my thoughts, he has his

thoughts, maybe they don’t match, but we do agree on something: what do we want

for our group? What do we want to achieve for our group? What is the pathway for

our group? Where do we want to take them? We do not want to take them to the left,

214

or to the right or to the centre, no, we want to take them to a path of well-being”

(Company B, Union A, Trade Union Leader 2).

As expressed by the trade union leaders in the ‘Largest Trade Union’,

belonging to a political party and/or a federation and confederation could potentially

hinder their autonomy in the union’s decision-making process:

“(…) you have to follow certain parameters that are, parameters or decisions that

are made in those meetings, or in those thinking heads, do you understand me? You

also have to contribute to certain situations from other places, from other

companies, and other companies have to support you” (Company B, Union A, Trade

Union Leader 2).

Likewise, international networking with labour organisations was not

considered necessary according to these trade unionists, as according to their

statements, they accomplished their goals through respectful dialogue with their

employer:

“we have no contact [with international bodies], nothing like that, nothing, nothing.

Because the truth is that it is not necessary, we have managed to reach a safe port in

most situations and in those situations where we haven’t reach agreement, we have

been able to adapt to that situation. But it has not been necessary to be interwoven

into an external entity, be it from anywhere, national or international” (Company B,


These last two strategies marked the biggest differences with their fellow

workplace trade union. While the ‘Largest Trade Union’ constantly tried to stay

away from any political action and international solidarity, the ‘Marginalised Trade

Union’ resorted to both strategies to reverse the decline in membership and to regain

power:

“He [the other trade union leader] must be managed by a political party, this is

typical. He always held meetings at the headquarters or in the house of a senator

who is a Christian Democrat (...) Those from the political party are the ones who

215

advise him to go and sue the company for everything” (Company B, Union A, Trade

Union Leader 2).

Something similar was said about the involvement of the ‘Marginalised trade

union’ with international bodies:

"The other union that went on strike, which I told you, they have gone to the ILO,

everywhere. They take videos, photos, interviews, everything. They go to the Senate,

they talk to the senators. They are close to a deputy with the last name González (...).

Every time they have problems, he shows up” (Company B, Union A, Trade union

leader 2).

Analysing these comments, it may be clearer that the ‘Marginalised Trade

Union’ was in fact more progressive in its strategies for renewal than the ‘Largest

Trade Union’. Its leadership were willing to implement any activity, even if that

meant challenging the employer, to regain power in the workplace. As the literature

shows, such progressive strategies can be the result of contexts where employer’s

hostility is more apparent, such as liberal market economies (Lillie and Martinez-

Lucio, 2004, p.165). However, in the Chilean context, these strategies may tend to

limit trade union power because, historically, when Chilean trade unions engaged in

open confrontation with employers (e.g. denouncing them to the Labour Inspectorate

and/or striking), management tended to respond aggressively with anti-union

practices. In this case study, it might be possible that precisely because the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ was resorting to such confrontational activities, the

employer implemented the most aggressive anti-union practices seen in the three

cases, dismissing all workers who participated in strikes. It was also reasonable to

believe that because of the employer’s aggressive tactics, the ‘Marginalised Trade

Union’ implemented the most confrontational responses. This case study thus

presented a somewhat fragile form of renewal, despite the undetermined success of

these strategies. Clearly, the ‘Marginalised Trade Union’ had a proactive agenda but

it was constrained by both the ‘Largest Trade Union’ and the legal context in its

ability to expand and create a more significant counterpoint. This smaller trade union

was an interesting case for the process of renewal; however, the ‘Marginalised Trade

Union’ was also subject to the constraints of the Chilean industrial relations system

216

that allowed for the employer in Company B to continuously and significantly

weaken this trade union. Table 28 shows a summary of the general trade union

strategies implemented by the ‘Largest Trade Union’.

Table 28: General trade union renewal strategies in Case Study B implemented

by the ‘Largest Trade Union’.

Level of

Development Dimensions for renewal Specific activities

High

· Labour-Management Partnership

· Informal partnership with managers as a

response to the employer's de-collectivising

activities

· Servicing

· Servicing as main role to counterbalance

management culture of hostility towards

progressive unions.

Low

· Organising · Recruiting new members was accessory to

servicing members

· Coalition Building · Perceived as unnecessary

· Training

· Limited participation in provision of

workers’ training. Trade union leaders engaged

in training to develop their skills.

· Social Media

· Social media platforms and e-

communication tools only for basic

communication with members.

Underdeveloped

· Restructuring Perceived as undesirable because of possible loss

of autonomy.

· Political Action

· Refusal to join political parties or any

other political bodies (such as federations,

confederations and national-level institutions)

because of concern of losing autonomy as an

organisation.

· International Links

· Aware of the help international bodies can

provide but have not joined any international

institutions likewise because of fear of losing

autonomy and of isolation from other

organisations. Source: Own Illustration

As seen in this case study, the central activities for renewal established by

the ‘Largest Trade Union’ were labour-management partnership and servicing

members. Both strategies, although successful in bringing some form of partnership

to the employment relationship as well as increasing membership numbers, were

perhaps incomplete in their labour renewal success. On the one hand, the ‘Largest

Trade Union’ was not systematic in questioning and challenging the employer, yet it

was a legitimate actor in the collective bargaining process. On the other hand, the

‘Marginalised Trade Union’ was the centre of employer opposition and worker

mobilisation, yielding some curious results, but represented, to a lesser extent, the

worker’s interests – proportionally it was 25 times smaller (Largest Trade Union had

217

500 members and Marginalised Trade Union had 20 members at the time of the

fieldwork). How successful each of these unions were in achieving renewal remains

debatable.

Although this case study showed some forms of revitalisation, the level of

complexity of such strategies was evident, while the workplace had multiple unions

and a differentiated employer approach. As a result, this case study’s relevance came

from the different types of impact that the employer’s approach may have had on

trade union responses. Similarly, despite the existence of an informal labour-

management partnership that resulted in what appeared to be a positive bargaining

relationship, it was a rather weak partnership since it mostly benefited management.

This illustrated how labour-management partnership can be used to further diminish

trade union power, resulting in workforce demobilisation. By engaging in a

relationship of partnership in the way that it has, this employer may actually be

limiting the trade unions’ efficacy in achieving renewal, and also creating significant

divisions within the workforce while marginalising other voices.

8.2.3. Case Study C: Progressive possibilities and the question of inter-union

competition

This subsection describes both the specific and the general responses to the questions

of renewal of the two trade unions in Company C, ‘Union One’ and ‘Union Two’.

This section will start by outlining the specific trade union responses to weakening

management strategies, moving to then discuss the general revitalisation strategies

developed by these trade unions along Frege and Kelly’s (2004) dimensions. Such

specific responses were limited mostly because the relationship between Company C

and its trade unions was apparently cooperative. The peculiarity of this case study

was that, despite having two trade unions in the same workplace, the relationship

between management and the trade unions seemed less conflictual than in the

previous two case studies. Moreover, this case study had two additional features that

may be significant for union renewal: a high trade union membership rate and

foreign ownership of the company.

218

8.2.3.1. Case Study C specific trade union responses to the employer’s union-

weakening practices

As the interviews unfolded, it was clear that ‘Union Two’s’ leader believed the

collaborative relationship that Company C had with the unions was rather

instrumental for the company, as it was possible that Company C was utilising their

relationship to attain its business objectives and not to build a partnership

relationship with the trade unions, as seen next:

“We prefer to have a good relationship with them to get more benefits, that’s it, I do

not want to go hand in hand with managers. I'm interested in managers

understanding that we have issues where we can agree or disagree. If we are

thinking about the sustainability of the business, I am interested in seeing that this

company sells, to make good products, to have quality” (Company C, Union 2,

Trade Union Leader 1).

Such an instrumental conception of their role contrasted with the notion

presented by ‘Union One’. The leaders in ‘Union One’ believed they were the

company’s partners, and they shared their interest in the positive performance of the

business. However, despite this relationship’s positive features, tensions between the

employer and the trade unions were visible during the fieldwork observations. As

explained in detail in the previous chapter, Company C implemented several union-

weakening practices. The most visible episode of tension between the trade unions

and the company emerged when the trade unions were negotiating a possible merger.

According to the explanation offered by the leader in ‘Union Two’, Company C

opposed the merger and influenced ‘Union One’ to back away from the agreement

that had initially been reached between the trade unions. ‘Union Two’ responded by

directly confronting the employer, asking for their reasons for opposing the merger.

Arguably, Company C could have opposed this merger to restrict the power the trade

unions would have had if they merged and gained a combined membership of 75%

of the workforce. This episode illustrated the risks this employer was willing to take

to keep the company´s unions fragmented and divided, even in a context where they

formally tried to harness some type of – albeit weak – partnership.

Likewise, the episode showed the nuanced differences in the relationship

management established with each trade union. These differences were more

219

noticeable when analysing the informal labour-management partnership this

company had with both unions. In general, Company C had a pluralist perspective

which cascaded into its relationship with the unions, thus legitimising their role.

Despite this, Company C showed more affinity to ‘Union One’ than to ‘Union Two’.

In a rather subtle way, ‘Union One’ and Company C had a more sustained dialogue,

where their members enjoyed greater job security8 - although this form of

partnership should be approached with caution as it did not entirely translate into

systematic mutual gains.

The clearest union-weakening practice that Company C used was taking

advantage of the legislation on minimum services. During the negotiations on the

essential services in 2017, the management attempted to negotiate with the trade

unions for additional services, claiming they were of national importance. Using

their apparent collaborative relationship, the employer and the trade union leaders

engaged in a series of conversations where they respectfully defended their positions

as to the minimum services. Although ‘Union Two’s’ leader described these sessions

as being mostly confrontational, the solution to the issues was reached through

dialogue. This way of reaching agreement when facing difficulties was preferred by

both unions and favoured over other possible strategies:

“We are not a union that sues the company a lot. Generally, out of one hundred

problems, we go to the Labour Inspectorate with one or almost none. All other issues

we try to resolve here with the company´s labour relations department, we try to

pass all our problems to [the] labour relations [department] and with them we get

feedback and reach a good understanding. When we do not reach a good

understanding, we obviously have the freedom to be able to go and stand before the

Labour Inspectorate and sue the company where we think it is appropriate. But I

believe that whenever we have needed them, they [the Labour Inspectorate] have

given us support” (Company C, Union 2, Trade Union Leader 1).

Even though the two trade unions and Company C did not refer to their

collaborative relationship as a partnership per se, the characteristics they offered

8 In a recent episode (September 2018), Company C dismissed 200 workers due to economic

downturn, the majority of whom were from Union Two.

220

when describing it were those of an informal labour-management partnership. This

was a strategy used to specifically address certain union-weakening practices, and as

a general renewal activity that would allow these trade unions to have some

influence during the bargaining process. Table 29 summarises the specific trade

union responses reviewed in this case study.

Table 29: Summary of specific responses from Union One and Union Two to de-

collectivising in Case Study C

Specific de-

collectivising strategy ‘Union One’ responses ‘Union Two’ responses

Minimum Services

• Through the use of the informal but

stable labour-management partnership,

‘Union One’ favourably agreed to the

minimum services proposed by the

company in relation to the strike

possibilities.

• Through the use of the informal

but stable labour-management

partnership, ‘Union Two’ confronted

the company for taking advantage of

this strategy and hindering the

effectiveness of possible strikes. Source: Own Illustration

8.2.3.2. Case Study C general trade union responses to revitalisation

Now that the specific responses of the unions to the company’s de-collectivising

practices have been discussed, the general responses to renewal are presented next.

Despite labour-management partnership being the most used strategy to reach

agreement with the company, these trade unions used other strategies to address the

more general question of renewal addressed by Frege and Kelly’s (2004)

dimensions. External restructuring, servicing members and international solidarity

were the clearest responses to the contextual challenges these workplace unions

implemented. Even though the majority of these responses may be considered

limited from an innovation point of view, they secured some positive gains for the

unions, as membership was enhanced and industrial conflict was less frequent

(although the latter is a matter of opinion).

Besides the informal labour-management partnership that went across the

efforts of these trade unions to renew, restructuring was the second most

emphasised revitalisation strategy in the case study. During the first wave of

interviews, the two trade unions were engaging in conversations to implement a

merger. They also mentioned having discussed this external restructuring with the

federation of which ‘Union Two’ was part:

221

“(…) we went to a meeting, with the federation, Union One and Union Two, we held

meetings, we held 3 meetings, among the trade union leaders to reach an agreement,

so that we could say to each other’s faces anything we wanted, and clarify why the

merger process was not happening in this company. So, we went (...), the thing is

that we agreed to unify our demands and criteria to [proceed with] the unification of

the unions (…)” (Company C, Union 2, Trade union leader 1).

The trade union leader from ‘Union Two’ explained that the aim behind the

merger was to empower workers and become one single, unified structure vis-à-vis

the employer.

“Having one single union means that the worker is more empowered, the worker has

a clear defense against many things that the company could do (...) not only to

defend him/her. So the company knows that the unions are the ones that strengthen

the company, and the union is the workers, they are well organized” (Company C,

Union 2, Trade union leader 1).

Despite what the leader of ‘Union Two’ mentioned, one of the leaders in

‘Union One’ had his reservations and was hesitant about engaging in the union

merger from the start:

“Interviewer: do you think it's good to merge?

Company C, Union One, Trade union leader 2: personally, if we are not going to

have a positive leader, no. Now that there are two unions, it generates competition.

By generating competition, the only beneficiaries are the workers. Why? Because

they will get more and better benefits. When there is a single organization, those

who empower themselves with power are the leaders and not the members. Why?

Because the member has no options. Then, the member will come with a problem

and the leader will say no, simply no, it will be a negative response. And if you like

it, so be it, and if you don’t like it, then the doors are always open (…)” (Company

C, Union 1, Trade union leader 2).

In the view of ‘Union One’, the primary reason for opposing the merger

related to the servicing role they provided for workers. The quote highlighted the

222

trade union leader’s perception of the unions’ main role as service providers,

whereby, as mentioned by Heery and Kelly (1994), members have to be attracted

and serviced on the basis of market logic. This marked servicing style of ‘Union

One’ proved to be crucial for the process of trade union development, especially

because the Line Managers attributed to the success of this servicing role the high

unionisation levels seen in the case.

As ‘Union One’ and ‘Union Two’ seemed to have disagreed with the merger

since the beginning of the meetings, it was not surprising to see that, in the second

wave of interviews (conducted 6 months after the first interviews), the merger had

failed. The trade union leader of ‘Union Two’ explained what happened in his

opinion:

“(…) The thing is that on Monday I called the company, this I will say with much

responsibility, the company called Union One or Union One called the company, the

issue is that the leaders there, especially the President of that union, went to the

headquarters. It was really strange, strange that a President of a union goes to the

company’s head offices because if there is a union meeting, we all know because it’s

always done the same day (…) So, the thing is that, as a result of that meeting,

Union One held an assembly and made the declaration that the merger was not

going to proceed. Two days before the voting took place. Then we asked ourselves:

what happened here? Well after all we could have done, we speculated a lot, but we

had to check the facts. So, we called the company, the managers and there we

grabbed them. Seriously. Imagine the worst that could happen. So, we told them that

they were... look, we are not against the administration of the company because it is

illegal, but they played us, Union One and the company sold themselves for

money”(Company C, Union 2, Trade Union Leader 1).

These comments were not only about attributing the fault of the failed merger

to the leaders of the other trade union, but also about signalling the impact of the

employer’s participation and role in the process. As the trade union leader in ‘Union

Two’ continued:

“I can only imagine how the conversation went... The company [told the union], or

the union told the company. I imagine that the union went and told the company:

223

‘Hey, do you want two unions, or do you want one?’ And the company must have

said: ‘no, I want two.’ To have governing role they (...) then the [union] would have

said: ‘good, but that has a price.’ So, we are clear. After that we squeezed the

managers, they had to tell the truth. And it was like that. We, look, we are not going

to criticize the company because the company play its games and has their

strategies. The bad thing is that with the company we have had a good working

relationship, and the fact that they did this was abhorrent for us. From Union One

we can expect it because they have always been like that. And so it happened, we

could not merge. And the company was left ‘perfect’” (Company C, Union 2, Trade

Union Leader 1).

Directly linked to the failure of this strategy was the third most salient

strategy, which was developed in the form of servicing. In interviews, ‘Union One’

was the worker organisation that continuously stated the importance of such a role in

the company:

“…our union, what this union has you will not find it anywhere. These

organizations, since these organizations are non-profit, the idea is to give benefits -

benefits and job stability. We have a medical service that even companies do not

have, which we reimburse 100% of [many] medical consultations, 100% of

pharmacy expenses, 80% medical exams and dental support, 80% with an annual

cap (...) the main thing is health, then comes the issue of education. We have here a

library with all the required textbooks, we give textbooks to read to children in

school and high-school, and based on that they do their homework, practice for any

major test and exams. If we do not have a book available in the library, the worker

can buy it and we reimburse it. Once the child finishes reading it, that book enters

the library (…) (Company C, Union 1, Trade union leader 2)

This trade union leader took pride in the services they provided to members,

arguing that their benefits were unmatched by any other organisation. Similarly, the

leader of ‘Union Two’ also described their own benefits package of services such as

loans, pharmacy and medical reimbursements. In some sense, servicing seemed to be

of a competitive nature and slightly more dynamic as the trade unions were battling

for more members. These comments showed the importance these trade unions and

224

their members attached to servicing, which also served the purpose of recruiting and

retaining employees in union membership. As a strategy, servicing appeared to be

working since line managers and supervisors attributed the company’s high

unionisation rate to this strategy. Therefore, if revitalisation was measured by the

membership rate, in this case study servicing should be considered successful.

The final most developed general trade union renewal strategy in this case

study was international solidarity. Specifically, trade union leaders in ‘Union Two’

mentioned having ongoing information exchange with the unions of their parent

company located in the home country of the multinational. Several encounters

between them have also taken place to coordinate future action plans and secure

international solidarity when needed. ‘Union Two’s’ leaders had also attended

training in the head-office’s country, provided by Company C’s parent company. As

‘Union Two’ explained, they established communications with their fellow unions

abroad when negotiations in the subsidiary were halted. ‘Union Two’ perceived a

change in the company´s willingness to negotiate when they threatened managers

with direct communication with the foreign headquarters. Transnational networking

has been regarded in the literature as a way to extend specific trade union responses

across international contexts (Levesque and Murray, 2010) and for more general

mutual learning and sharing (Martinez-Lucio and Weston, 1992), which were two of

the reasons argued by ‘Union Two’.

“It is a strategy that we have. When we see that the process of collective bargaining

is trapped, we go to Company C’s parent company and we threaten them through

their [main] union. The union of theirs is not like the union here. It is more powerful

there. Then there is a connection, we have a connection with the union president of

Company C (...). So, we do all that … so that somehow, they know our problems

here, why we are not experiencing good collective bargaining or what [are] the

points that we are trapped on” (Company C, Union 2, Trade Union Leader 1).

This trade union also developed cooperative international networking with a

Global Union - specifically with the International Union of Food (IUF), which is an

international federation of trade unions representing workers employed in the food

manufacturing industry. Even though these links may have seemed segmented and

constrained, the relationship established by this trade union with international bodies

225

focused mainly on international communication and co-ordination regarding

different aspects of trade union activity. From a more positive perspective, such

activities represented a form of potential and symbolic mobilisation against the

employer in that such relations were used partly to threaten the employer and to

pressurise them.

The general renewal strategies that were less developed in this case study

were organising, political action and training. Both trade unions had a limited

approach to organising new members. They relied on members recruiting their own

colleagues and used the union’s reputation to increase membership. As expressed by

the leader of ‘Union Two’:

“We do not go knocking doors, we are not looking for members. Here in this

company there are two unions, what interests us is that the members see and become

familiarized with the unions, so that they inform themselves which is the one that

suits them (...) then after that condition the worker has to be able to choose where

they want to be, so they decide. But we do not go around finding members (…)”


In contrast to this view is the perception of the leader in ‘Union One’, who

indicated that recruiting was directly linked to the servicing role and specifically to

the benefits offered by each trade union:

“We constantly work to the mission of guiding the worker, especially the young, new

one, who comes out of school, enters the workplace and does not know about the

unions, you give him a talk about it. Obviously, the decision [to join the union] is

always personal, the decision is made by the worker. But the benefits that the worker

has in a union are very good compared to the benefits that a worker has without

being part of a union” (Company C, Union 1, Trade union leader 2).

The data analysis showed only a restricted view on organising, seeing as

there were no organising targets discussed or established, no organising methods

mapped and no resource allocation for this task. However, it may be somewhat

reasonable to expect such a limited approach to organising given the high

membership rates associated with these unions. Despite this, there was no specific

226

interest in extending unionisation to minority groups. Additionally, both unions

failed to mention any future plans to focus on migrants, women or young workers,

who, although limited in numbers, were an important part of the workforce. The only

trade union that mentioned doing something related to this was ‘Union Two’ as they

had included a woman in one of the union’s leading positions. Yet, this inclusion

should not be taken as evidence of organising or a more proactive trade unionism,

but rather as the fulfilment of the new labour reform’s (2015) requirement of at least

one woman among the trade union’s leading positions. As explained next:

“Apart from the fact that now at the collective bargaining table there has to be a

woman. Of course, because now the law determines it this way, with the new labor

reform that Chile has, the woman is a very important entity, so she has to be at the

negotiating table (...). We already have one, the most warrior-like out of all the

women. So, there are some points that we want to innovate on (…)” (Company C,

Union 2, Trade union leader 1).

Another tentative explanation for the unions’ lack of interest in organising

non-standard workers resides in the labour law. The Chilean Labour Code only

allows for full-time employees with indefinite contracts to become unionised.

Similarly, if the company has part-time employees, these workers are most likely

linked to the subcontracted dimensions of the firm, and hence not able to affiliate to

the company’s union. Consequently, the reader might perceive the trade union

leaders’ interest in organising non-union members as narrow, yet the law only allows

trade unions to organise full-time workers (Art. 212 from the Labour Code)

Political action was also a less developed trade union renewal strategy for

the unions in Company C. ‘Union Two’, to a greater extent than ‘Union One’, had an

understanding of engaging with political bodies linked to labour, which in the

Chilean case, can be epitomised by the CUT:

“We have always belonged to the CUT, always. Because the CUT is the most

important entity that we have as workers, and we belonged to the CUT (...) Now

look, we participate in all the marches that there are in Chile, and we do not have to

go to march, if strictly speaking, we are, we are an island in Chile, we do not have

the problems that all the other workers here in Chile have. But we are still

227

supportive, and we must participate because we are all the working class (…)”


This comment also revealed this trade union’s reservations about affiliating

to a political party. Contrary to the perspective on Chilean culture and politics, the

current neo-liberal context and recent historical experience – broadly speaking - has

managed to fragment and de-politicise some key aspects of the labour movement. As

indicated by Frank (2009), some parts of Chilean society may have an overall

discontent with the political class, particularly those that have reached the

government. Along with a general legitimacy crisis, political parties and national-

level confederations have lost their appeal amongst trade unions. This perspective

and this thesis’ findings contrasted with the view of some Chilean academics that

highlighted the political orientation of trade unions (Duran-Palma and Lopez, 2008).

However, the analysis of the interviews and of the literature indicated that after the

ongoing de-politicisation of the labour movement that removed social movement

values from the unions’ identity, it was troublesome for unions to become allies of

political parties. In this case, the link to the CUT of one of the two unions was fairly

limited and symbolic as far as this thesis’ author could tell.

The last less developed trade union renewal practice in this case study was

training or skill formation. Concerns about training the workforce were something

that both unions mentioned in relation to collaborating with the company, yet they

explained that workers’ skill development was not their primary concern but rather

the company’s priority. In general, workers’ skills development may be something

for which unions advocated but, ultimately, remained at the employers’ discretion.

Despite not leading training initiatives, they mentioned attending courses and

developing their own skills through self-study.

“We are permanently attending training, they invite us to several courses. We are

super-limited for time, so it is our own decision to determine if we need any support

or knowledge. For example, now that next year the new labour reform starts, we

have to prepare ourselves, we have to negotiate in July and we are going to

negotiate with the new labor reform. We have to be knowledgeable on all the issues

of the new reform (Company C, Union 2, Trade union leader 1).

228

By analysing these statements, it may become clear to the reader that these

trade unions were not actively focusing on their workers’ learning agenda or skills

development, despite the state’s efforts to change this through the implementation of

Bipartite Training Committees and the trade union school. These efforts may suggest

the significant role of the state in shaping opportunities within the workplace for

unions. Martinez-Lucio and Mustchin (2013) have mentioned how learning can be a

major vehicle for political development - and also lead to increased activism within

the union (Findlay and Warhurst, 2011; Wood and Moore, 2007). Skill formation

can also help in recruitment because trade union leaders can develop their own skills

to better assist members (Warhurst et al. 2006) which can potentially attract more

diverse constituents such as non-standard workers (Mustchin, 2012).

Finally, the underdeveloped dimensions of trade union revitalisation in this

case were coalition building and social media. For both of these strategies, both

trade unions failed to mention or reference what they were doing when prompted

through the interviews. There was no activity being implemented with community

groups or any other non-labour-related bodies, even when ‘Union Two’ commented

on its links with the CUT. The reason for this, as they indicated, was that they were

placed in an isolated location, away from any community. An interesting comment

was made in the interviews when trade unionists were prompted about engaging with

other interest groups. They commented that their primary concerns were the issues

within the company and that establishing any relationship outside these boundaries

was irrelevant to them.

Finally, the use of social media platforms was also limited in this trade

union. With regard to using these digital platforms as a way to acquire membership

as Bryson et al. (2010) explained, this trade union had not developed recruitment or

membership engagement through social media. A possible explanation may be that

because the trade unions had high levels of union membership, the use of social

media to recruit workers may have been perceived as unnecessary. In terms of

deploying this strategy to enhance transnational cooperation (Geelan and Hodder,

2017), these trade unions did not seem to believe transnational communication with

other labour-related bodies could help them in renewal. Despite this, the trade unions

had Twitter and Facebook accounts that were mostly used to engage in basic

communications with members; they were not strategically using social media or

other electronic communications to enhance organising of workers as some authors

229

have argued (see Greene et al., 2003 on the proactive use of modern communication

technologies and various types of social media). The fieldwork showed the strong

institutionalisation and communication mechanisms this trade union has with its

members, which can explain why this strategy was less developed. Table 30 presents

a summary of the unions’ strategies for revitalisation based on Frege and Kelly’s

(2004) framework.

Table 30: Summary of general trade union renewal strategies in Case Study C

Level of

development Dimensions for renewal Specific Activities

High

• Labour-Management

Partnership

• Informal labour-management partnership with

both unions

• Servicing

• Both ‘Union One’ and ‘Union Two’ have

servicing as their main role, with the implementation

of sophisticated services (e.g. top-up health

insurance, school books)

• Restructuring

• Attempted an external restructuring in the form

of a merger, which failed due to the employer's

intervention

• International Links

• Most developed in ‘Union Two’:

transnational cooperation with the IUF and with the

union in their parent company in New Zealand.

Low

• Organising • Recruiting new members was limited.

• Political Action

• Not joining political parties or any other political

body because of concerns of losing autonomy as an

organisation.

• Training

• Skill formation of workers is not developed.

Trade union leaders from both unions attend training

sessions to develop their skills

Underdeveloped

• Coalition Building • Forming coalitions with non-labour-related

groups

• Social Media

• Limited use of social media platforms to organise

members. More of a tool for basic communication

with members. Source: Own Illustration

In general, Case Study C was characterised by more sophisticated trade union

renewal strategies than the other case studies presented. Both workplace unions had

implemented strategies that led them to enjoy a consistent and more engaged

position at the bargaining table. They had developed a strong but informal labour-

management partnership with the employer, engaging in a more cooperative

relationship. This rather unusually strong labour-management relationship for the

Chilean context might be explained by this company’s foreign ownership. Despite

the fact that this multinational corporation had developed guidelines for the

implementation of HR policies in the Chilean subsidiary, Company C nevertheless

deviated from such guidelines to implement an instrumental relationship with the

230

unions. Thus, the two trade unions in this case study responded to their employer by

implementing different strategies and practices.

International links with their foreign union counterparts, as well as servicing

members were also highly developed strategies. ‘Union Two’ seemed more aware of

the politics of production and therefore was more progressive in the responses

implemented to counter the managers’ strategies. This trade union may have

envisioned the utility that links and connections to international bodies could bring,

thus challenging traditional forms of hierarchy (Lillie and Martinez-Lucio, 2004).

‘Union One’, on the contrary, prioritised the servicing role as a way of maintaining

its enlarged membership, and hence its powerbase within the workplace.

Nevertheless, the case was marked by ongoing fragmentation and tensions between

the trade unions, which were exploited by management.


This discussion section addresses the findings of the three case studies regarding

trade union revitalisation practices. Comparing the three cases helped the researcher

to adventure tentative explanations as to why trade unions responded to workplace

and national challenges the way they did. They illustrated the current state of trade

union renewal practices in the food manufacturing industry. Although the thesis

showed that renewal activities were shaped by features of the national and local

context in which they were embedded, there were some signs of trade union agency

in the selection, development and implementation of strategies to revitalise. The

limited choices demonstrated by trade union leaders, however, highlighted the

importance of considering revitalisation practices within their overarching contexts

and not in isolation.

One of the most important contextual factors that shaped the trade unions’

renewal responses was the national context provided by the role of the state through

labour legislation and enforcement agencies. The Chilean legislation seemed to be

highly ambivalent on questions of workers’ rights: on the one hand, there was a

series of rights offered to workers, but, on the other hand, there was a range of gaps

and counter-procedures offered to employers to contest union power. This context

led on various occasions to constant surveillance and control of the employer’s

practices by trade unions. Whenever trade unions identified a violation in labour law,

they could legally mobilise by making a formal claim to the Labour Inspectorate.

231

Arguably, this was the main resource trade unions had at their disposal to correct the

inherent power imbalance in the employment relationship. Crocco (2017) has

commented on the success of this strategy, yet the problem lies in the time spent by

trade unions engaging in such legally oriented practice that required constant

surveillance and formal claims. All in all, the audit capabilities granted by the state

to the trade unions may be considered positive, but they underpin a form of

paternalistic approach to the employment relationship.

The case studies evidenced three predominant trade union renewal practices.

Labour-management partnership and servicing were central (albeit uneven in

some cases), and when these were challenged, or mobilisation from the trade unions

was required, this was developed through legal mobilisation (Crocco, 2017). There

seemed to be a curious reliance on partnership of a limited nature whereby the

employment relationship may have seemed amicable for as long as there were no

problems. Additionally, the way to accentuate bargaining power further has been

through servicing trade union members. Chilean trade unions have realised they can

only recruit and retain members primarily by offering benefits to workers and

rationalising their affiliation. However, the sustainability of these strategies over

time remains questionable. Nevertheless, when issues do emerge, the trade unions

then resort to the mediating role of the state and the legal dimension of union action.

Assessing the trade unions revitalisation responses using Frege and Kelly’s

(2004) framework proved to be useful for better describing, categorising and

analysing the pertinent practices. Despite this framework having been developed in

European and North American contexts, it showed its applicability in the Latin

American context, not only for the revitalisation practices outlined, but for the

overall framework provided. Much can also be said about the use of typologies and

how limited they can be when analysing information. The chapter has argued that

Frege and Kelly’s (2003; 2004) framework was applicable as a means to

comprehend the different levels of union action in the Latin American context,

specifically that of Chile.

However, although Frege and Kelly’s (2004) framework was significantly

helpful in explaining the nature of revitalisation activities, it presented challenges

when analysing the data. As illustrated in the analysis, the case study unions often

did not extensively engage in the revitalisation practices indicated by the framework,

nor did they have the same level of organisational development. Additionally, their

232

own response strategies were essentially marked by the political and economic

context. As a result, the way in which each trade union approached ‘revitalisation’

was complex and uneven at times. Likewise, each trade union discussed in the

chapter was restrained in its choices by the institutional context, the system of

workplace governance, the nature of management ideology and the form of the state.

Therefore, contextual variables have an undeniable influence on the strategies

implemented by the trade unions.

A final point to be made related to the markedly fragmented nature of

industrial relations in terms of union structure, which was exacerbated by the role of

the state and employer strategies, thus creating a limit on how some of the more

proactive strategies could be developed. As will be shown, trade unions in Chile

were constrained by their political and economic contexts and institutions, and

therefore their discretion in selecting revitalisation practices was limited. In this

sense, the activities they engaged in were the result of external circumstances, such

as particular economic or institutional contexts, workplace governance, management

ideologies and the role of the state. Nevertheless, there appeared to be signs of a

disruptive set of strategies and actions that in the future may challenge this

fragmented industrial relations culture.

Throughout the three case studies, some forms of organisation within the

trade unions to respond to their challenges could be observed. although in quite

interesting and discreet ways. The trade unions, thus, implemented a wide array of

revitalisation practices although they were focused on particular types. Most of them

were drawn from successful past experience while others were established for the

first time in the hopes of securing more gains. Be that as it may, each of the

implemented trade union practices served a specific purpose. A point worth

emphasising was that none of the interviewed trade unions named the implemented

activities as revitalisation or renewal practices per se, and there did not seem to exist

any apparent local language related to understanding or enacting strategic change of

one form or another. There was no overarching template for trade union leaders to

attach their reflections to and this could be a sign of their disconnection from the

confederations and the fragmented nature of industrial relations. Much was due to

the defensive and reactive side of unions bearing the pressures of de-collectivising

strategies emerging from management that also constrained the organisational reach

and strategic renewal of the unions: the role of inter- union competition as an

233

expression of the fragmentation of the Chilean industrial relations was also relevant

although in the third case this had some curiously positive outcomes.

As these case studies took place in a context of intensified market

competition, decentralisation and deep fragmentation, it was difficult to imagine that

trade unions would rely on single successful strategies for revitalisation. Trade union

leaders often seemed unprepared for the task of renewal and implemented activities

while generally lacking clear long-term objectives. However, they intuitively

committed to the renewal activities, hoping they would lead to sufficient gains for

the workers. Some of the smaller trade unions did attempt to connect nationally and

internationally but, when these results existed, they were minor partners and

constrained within the workplace.

234

CHAPTER 9: Discussion and Conclusions

9.1. Introduction

This chapter addresses the main themes around the research findings, while also

outlines the implications that the results of this thesis may have for debates relating

to the process of trade union revitalisation and its associated issues. This chapter is

divided into three main parts: the first summarises the research findings, the second

discusses the findings in relation to the research questions and the third addresses the

broader insights the thesis provides.

The primary objective of this thesis was to determine the ways in which

Chilean trade unions have been coping with and responding to the challenges posed

by the country’s neo-liberal policies. Consequently, the primary goal was to identify

the practices implemented by Chilean trade unions to revitalise. This task was

undertaken using a theoretical framework developed mostly for European and North

American labour movements that, although premised on specific institutional

contexts, proved to be useful, as a template, in assessing labour’s revitalisation in a

Latin American context. This framework, developed by Frege and Kelly (2004),

identified six strategies for revitalisation: organising mostly through the recruitment

and mobilisation of union members, organisational restructuring through internal

and/or external changes, coalition-building with non-labour-related social

movements, partnership with employers, political action engaging with political

parties and transnational cooperation with international labour movements. Two

additional revitalisation activities were added to these strategies due to their recent

development: skill formation of trade union leaders and of members to enhance their

abilities for renewal (Rainbird and Stuart, 2011; Mustchin and Martinez-Lucio,

2007; Findlay and Warhurst, 2011) and the use of social media platforms to

organise, communicate with and mobilise members (Bryson et al., 2010).

According to the revitalisation framework used, trade unions have, to some

extent, a choice with regards to which of the aforementioned renewal strategies they

implement to advance their presence in the workplace. Despite acknowledging the

relatively wide choices trade unions have, Frege and Kelly (2003; 2004) argue that

the structure of the union, the institutional context, the union’s framing process, the

nature of employer opposition and the union’s identity can influence the selected

235

strategy. Hence, for example, based on this, Frege and Kelly (2004) observed that in

more institutionally secure countries (such as Germany and Sweden) the strategies of

organising, coalition-building and transnational cooperation appeared to be less

developed. However, in countries with rather strong neo-liberal legislation (such as

the US and UK), trade unions seemed to engage more in organising-type strategies

and coalition-building as well as other radical strategies such as political action and

international alliances and relations (Ibsen and Tapia, 2017; Heery and Adler, 2004).

Within this framework, Behrens et al. (2004) indicated that the outcomes of the

revitalisation strategies could be framed in terms of four dimensions: membership

increase, economic power in relation to employer, political influence and enhanced

internal governance.

Using comparative case study research across three Chilean companies, the

thesis engaged with the strategic choice argument as the findings showed, firstly,

how trade unions in Chile were highly constrained by their institutional context as

well as by the organisational characteristics of their workplaces, leading to a

restricted set of choices in relation to questions of renewal. Secondly, the high

degree of fragmentation and decentralisation that the Chilean labour movement faced

under Pinochet’s government challenged the extent of cooperation between and

within trade unions, hence they effectively have fewer options in relation to the

adoption of the activities necessary for revitalisation. Thirdly, the importance of

context when analysing the process of trade union renewal was central, as well as the

nuances in the language and terminology required, are key to understanding the

choices available to trade unions and those they eventually make. In this regard, the

relevance of path dependency and institutions in the process of trade union renewal

was found to be central. Thus, the thesis showed that Chile’s economic and political

institutions influenced, in a curious manner, the responses implemented by the trade

unions.

Data for this thesis were collected using a comparative case study approach

because it was important to illustrate the similarities and differences between

different trade unions in the same industry. However, the main aim of the thesis was

to highlight the common trends and practices within Chilean labour relations and

union strategies. The following sections will help to illustrate how these and other

important conclusions of the present thesis were developed, beginning with a

236

summary of each of the chapters and going through the research questions, to end

with an overview of themes from the thesis’ findings.

9.2. Summary of research chapters

As seen in the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3) the field of industrial relations

has viewed trade unions and collective bargaining as critical for worker

representation and balancing the power in the employment relationship (Tapia, Ibsen

and Kochan, 2015). Despite this relevancy, trade unions have suffered a steep

decline and collective bargaining has been eroded, mostly due to the wide spread of

neo-liberal policies across the world (Turner, 2004; Stuart, Martínez-Lucio and

Robinson, 2011; Frege and Kelly, 2003; 2004; 2013) although this is not uniform in

its occurrence. Research on trade unionism suggested the need to understand how

workers and their organisations seem to be responding to these increasing challenges

to remain valid actors in the employment relationship (Behrens et al., 2004). The

process by which trade unions engage in this process is called revitalisation (Murray,

2017; Kumar and Schenk, 2006).

In the study of trade union renewal, two theoretical positions can be outlined.

Generally speaking, radical scholars believe that the power of trade unions can be

restored mostly through mobilisation and activism (Kelly, 1998; 2004; Hyman,

2001; 2001b) while pluralists scholars believe that partnership and institutional

reform can help renew the labour movement (Ackers, 2002; Ibsen and Tapia, 2017).

As this research took a somewhat pluralist approach, institutional dimensions were

determined to be central in the process of trade union revitalisation. Due to this, the

concepts of path dependency and institutionalism were reviewed in order to

understand how present-day institutions can shape the ways in which people and

organisations respond to new developments and challenges (Teague, 2009; Kay,

2005). Path dependency was used in this thesis to explain the process of

revitalisation, arguing that a country’s institutions (in this case, Chile’s) shape and

even constrain the way in which a group of social actors (in this case, the trade

unions) act in any given context (Kay, 2005). Specifically, the political, economic

and social institutions of a country can inform the choices that trade unions make

regarding the strategies used to revitalise (Peters, 2009).

Given the predominance of context in this research, Chapter 4 described in

depth Chile’s industrial relations system, a system mostly decentralised with

237

collective bargaining conducted at the firm level (Palacios-Valladares, 2010;

Carmona, 2015; Bronstein, 2010). While company-level trade unions in Chile were

responsible for conducting collective negotiations with employers (Marzi, 2017;

Ugarte, 2018), sectoral bargaining remained limited. Federations and confederations

can support trade unions during the process of collective bargaining and participate

in national projects of relative importance to the labour movement (Vejar, 2012;

Dusaillant, 2008). Similar to other countries, Chile has witnessed a significant

decline in union density, going from 34% in 1971 to 14% in 2017 (Dusaillant, 2008;

Crocco, 2017). Academics directly attributed this decline to the hostile dictatorship

that imposed strong neo-liberal policies in its legislation and a high degree of

fragmentation in the workplace as well as authoritarian policies for trade union and

its activists (Feres and Infante, 2007; Ugarte, 2018; Duran, 2013; Narbona, 2014).

This distinctive feature of Chile’s political history was pivotal in explaining some of

the renewal practices developed by the researched company-level trade unions.

Exacerbating the problems of decentralisation were the significant levels of

union avoidance and weakening practices that were seen in Chilean workplaces

(Baltera and Munoz, 2017; Henriquez, 2014). Such approaches to trade unions can

be considered legacies of earlier union-state relationships that curtailed the actions of

the labour movement, introducing major weaknesses. Chilean employers have

developed high-level union-weakening practices to further limit the power of trade

unions in the workplace. As seen in the literature and in the thesis’ results, these

practices varied across companies from subtle union substitution activities to more

blatant union suppression strategies (Baltera and Munoz, 2017).

While these features may suggest a pattern of sustained union decline in

Chile, a closer and more detailed analysis illustrated a more complex reality in terms

of the causes. The ambivalence of the state in employment matters, the continuous

union-weakening practices, the isolation of firm-level trade unions and an overall

fragmentation of labour made revitalisation a difficult goal to achieve since

coordination and organisation can be extremely challenging in such a context.

However, despite major fragmentation and de-collectivisation imposed by

employers, some firm-level trade unions in Chile continued to respond to such

challenges, although they have done so in isolation from sector-level organisations

that have also seen their role curtailed by strong neo-liberal-inspired labour

legislation (Salinero, 2006; Trafilaf and Montero, 2001; Clark, 2015).

238

Against this backdrop, the link between trade unions and

federations/confederations tended to be rather symbolic, a fact which was especially

evident in the food-manufacturing sector where this thesis was developed, as there

was limited affiliation from company-level unions to federations. More specifically,

when discussing trade union revitalisation, there seemed to be some, albeit limited,

strategic revitalisation efforts originating from the affiliation of company-trade

unions to federations and confederations.

After describing the thesis’ methodological approach in Chapter 5, the

thesis’ findings were reported in three empirical chapters commencing with Chapter

6. This chapter introduced the reader to the case studies showing the companies’

characteristics, identifying their workplace governance and the representation

structure found there. What was argued in that chapter was the fact that these factors

were considered essential features in understanding the process of renewal and the

strategies implemented by the trade unions (Frege and Kelly, 2003; 2004; Ibsen and

Tapia, 2017, Murray, 2017). As seen in Chapter 6, the three companies were, on

paper, highly structured, exhibiting important levels of both direct and indirect

participation. Participation mechanisms in the workplace were regarded as important

because they can improve organisational outcomes and enhance organisational

democracy (Budd et al., 2010). Consequently, when organisations implement direct

and/or indirect participation mechanisms as part of high-commitment and high-

performance work systems, one could speculate on the positive industrial relations

that the workplace may have. In addition to direct forms of employee participation,

the companies also believed – rhetorically at least - in some form of cooperation with

worker organisation, engaging in indirect participation mechanisms through trade

unions. This seemed to be of relevance in the workplaces as trade union membership

in the three companies was higher than the national average (which showed an

affiliation rate of 16% as of December 2018). Similarly, collective bargaining was

continuously developed and the overall working conditions were in the main

relatively positive.

The three case studies had a multi-union approach, characteristic of the

Chilean context. Although a normalised practice, such co-existence can increase the

level of tension in the employment relationship and within the workplace as the

employer can interact differently with each of the trade unions (Bank, 2017; Barrett,

2001; Doniez, 2012). Likewise, as commented by Bacon and Storey (2000), in this

239

multi-union approach of IR, union organisations are left with the responsibility of

conducting collective bargaining with the potential dangers of inter-union rivalry and

its effect on the employment relationship, which in Chile is particularly a problem,

due to this horizontal and vertical forms of fragmentation. As seen in the case

studies, the managers took advantage of the multi-union presence in the company

and used that fragmentation to advance their own agenda. Additionally, one of the

cases showed a stark difference in the way the employer approached each trade

union, which indicated the somewhat ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘segmenting’ pluralist

approach to industrial relations of some of the case study companies. While

providing a degree of ‘voice’ for workers and apparently legitimising trade unions,

the employers were engaging in a combination of union-weakening practices.

Since the approach taken by employers to trade unions was understood as

central to explaining the constraints placed on the trade unions’ revitalisation

practices, the second empirical chapter, Chapter 7, closely examined the firm-level

relationship and management strategies. Chapter 7 focused on the informal strategies

employers used to avoid or weaken trade unions in the workplace and maintain a

fragmented workplace. At first, these employers seemed to legitimise the union role

and the collective bargaining process, but a closer analysis determined that they

were, indeed, undermining trade unions.

The interview analysis and the comments listed in Chapter 7 showed that

such management practices limited trade union power. In the first case study, the

company was primarily trying to substitute the union role by implementing direct

participation mechanisms and fragmenting the workplace through the use of multi-

rut. In the second case study, the company was using a dual approach towards trade

unions: while utilising milder versions of union substitution strategies such as the

implementation of collective convenios and minimum services with the ‘Largest

Trade Union’, with the ‘Marginalised trade union’ the employer implemented more

blatant union suppression strategies such as the dismissal of workers who

participated in strikes. In the third and last case study, the employer tended to

implement indirect union substitution strategies such as direct communication with

workers and the use of minimum services legislation to curtail union power. The de-

collectivising practices were described using two theoretical models, those of Gall

and McKay (2001) and Peetz (2002). These frameworks helped to describe the

different mechanisms implemented by managers to weaken and avoid trade unions.

240

As remarked by these authors, employers can use a de-collectivising strategy alone

or in combination with other approaches, which can range from quite simplistic

methods (such as direct participation mechanisms) to cruder methods (such as the

dismissal of striking workers).

The analysis of the interviews showed that while the three employers seemed

to establish a rather positive and cooperative relationship with the company-level

trade unions, they still engaged in some form of trade union-weakening practice.

Moreover, these employers were adept at applying de-collectivising strategies in

their workplaces using strategically specific aspects of the labour legislation. As a

result, running parallel to the cooperative employment relationship were these trade

union-weakening strategies, partly linked to the legislative framework and

accentuating trade union fragmentation. Similar to the views that Peetz (2002)

expressed in his study of Australian de-collectivising strategies, the Chilean state has

created - or has allowed to be created - a favourable environment for de-

collectivising practices through the legislative framework. The implication of this for

the present thesis was that the outlined practices constrained the way in which these

trade unions responded to the revitalisation process. The trade unions had to invest

high-level resources in dealing with a plethora of weakening practices in addition to

their engagement with revitalisation activities. Therefore, the time and resources

devoted to building a coherent and proactive revitalisation strategy were limited.

Once the factors that influenced revitalisation where established in Chapters

6 and 7, the third and last empirical chapter, Chapter 8, described the renewal

practices implemented by the trade unions researched. Before addressing the

strategies implemented by these trade unions along the renewal dimensions stated in

the literature review, it was important to understand their activities in regards to the

de-collectivising strategies established by managers. This was mainly because much

of the Chilean trade union revitalization activities concerned coping with these

contradictory employer strategies in the first place, which conditioned the industrial

relations spaces. Therefore, Chapter 8 commenced by looking at the specific

‘defensive’ responses that trade unions implemented to challenge their employers’

de-collectivising strategies, moving then to look at the broader - more ‘proactive’ -

revitalisation strategies implemented along the dimensions previously stated. With

such a constrained approach, it was important to understand that when discussing

Chilean union revitalization, there needed to be a consideration of the limited and

241

uneven experiences of partnership, the limited engagement employers had with trade

unions - albeit within a ‘pluralist’ approach - and the countervailing mobilizing

employers’ strategies. Thus, Chapter 8 also illustrated how national institutions and

workplace relationships shaped the revitalisation strategies implemented. As a result,

the chapter emphasised the importance of considering the context when discussing

revitalisation.

In regards to revitalisation strategies, Chapter 8 showed that, in addition to

the constrained (and often symbolic) labour-management partnership, the trade

unions in the three case studies tended to privilege servicing and legal mobilisation

as revitalization strategies. The trade unions and the three companies engaged in

some form of labour-management ‘partnership’, since arguably, these employers

may have preferred to deal with the cooperative rather than the confrontational

unions. Such labour-management partnership was understood by using the existing

academic literature on the topic framed in British literatures, as mentioned in the

literature review section of the thesis. However, the partnership relationship

described in these workplaces differs from the concept of social partnership

illustrated in that literature and mostly describes a relationship of cooperation

between the employer and the workers’ representatives with limited mutual gains

(although it may also be questionable if the UK context saw major mutual gains

through the use of social partnership which is not as strong as the German or Nordic

models).

Moreover, using Kelly’s (2004) characterisation, these labour-management

agreements could be characterised as employer-dominated agreements because the

balance of power tended to be most favourable to the employer, with an agenda

primarily reflecting their interests. In the same vein, Bacon and Storey (2000)

commented that some managers try to use partnership agreements with limited

commitment to cooperation and joint governance of the workplace. Illustrated in the

thesis’ case studies, this weaker type of partnership meant that employers could

select the company-level union that would benefit the most from the cooperation

agreement (as seen most clearly in Case Study B where there was a ‘Marginalised

Trade Union’ in comparison to the ‘Largest trade Union’), thus developing a

distinctive relationship for each trade union. Furthermore, as this type of partnership

may reinforce the search for common interests, mostly around the employers’

242

objectives, it can thereby weaken the trade unions and their more proactive

revitalisation agendas.

In addition to this constrained partnership, trade unions implemented a

servicing strategy, possibly as a way to increase membership. In contrast with the

trends in Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal countries where trade unions have opted for

organising as the strategy to recruit new members (Murray, 2017; Ibsen and Tapia,

2017; Heery and Adler, 2004), these Chilean trade unions relied more explicitly on

servicing members to recruit and maintain their membership. The research showed a

significant culture developed around servicing members, whereby unions engaged in

a servicing logic with their members, actively providing specific benefits for them.

The extent of servicing was so significant in some cases that trade unions were

competing with each other for members in terms of who provided the best services.

The servicing role appeared to have a paternalistic nature, trying to obtain more

members through offering different types of services. The fact that there were

different agreements and services that trade unions offered drew attention to a

somewhat business aspect of trade unionism as explained by Heery and Kelly

(1994), but in this context it was fairly constrained, fragmented and based on inter-

union competition.

Lastly, the third strategy used by the case studies’ trade unions to revitalise

was legal mobilisation. Trade unions in the case studies used the law to act against

employers and increase their power in the workplace. As mentioned by the social

movement scholarship, legal action can be used to raise awareness of labour rights

amongst trade union members and achieve set goals (Crocco, 2017). Kirk (2018)

developed a similar argument, indicating that collective claims brought by trade

unions in Labour Courts can also be indicative of mobilisation as this process has

become an alternative to strikes. In this regard, the law does not only exist as a set of

guidelines and reference points, but as a framework and space to attain goals. Crocco

(2017) argues that, albeit inconstantly, the Chilean state through the Labour

Inspectorate has been a crucial ally of the Chilean labour movement since the

restoration of democracy. However, other scholars (Duran, 2013; Ugarte, 2018)

believed that the Chilean state has hindered trade unionism since the country’s return

to democracy. As argued in this thesis, the Chilean state has shown a rather

dysfunctional relationship with labour because, although ensuring workers’ rights

and job security provisions, it also allows for the use of union-weakening legislation

243

in the workplace. In this sense, the Chilean state may be indirectly shaping the

efforts and space for worker mobilization and of renewal through its contradictory

roles as managers may or may not utilise the body of legislation.

In sum, these three revitalisation activities were premised on fragmentation

of the workplace and limited union power. Ongoing union weakening practices, a de-

collectivist legislative framework, inter-trade union competition and the

decentralisation of the employment relationship meant that the majority of renewal

practices implemented by the case studies’ trade unions were constrained. This led to

a type of employment relationship in the three case studies which was nonetheless

conditioned and constrained by the employers’ counter-strategies and the country’s

legislative framework. Such issues shaped the trade union responses to revitalisation

and may have limited the content of collective bargaining.

9.3. Summary of the research questions and findings

Drawing from the empirical chapters, the second section of this discussion chapter

addresses the findings of the thesis vis à vis the research questions. Regarding the

first research question on the main ways in which Chilean trade unions were coping

with and responding to the labour crisis and their declining role, this was mostly

through the implementation of three marked strategies: a rather constrained form of

labour-management partnership, a high-degree of servicing and a type of

mobilisation that involved engaging in legal procedures against company-specific

issues and problems. The first of these three salient strategies was the concept of

labour-management partnership, which appeared to be a weaker form of partnership

in these three national cases (see Fichter and Greer, 2004; Martinez-Lucio and

Stuart, 2004; Kelly, 2004). The cooperative relationship established between the

companies and the trade unions was not formally structured or labelled as a

partnership agreement and was more a type of relationship based on the limited trust

that employers and trade unions had in each other to maintain dialogue. Due to this,

the relationship was described as a form of labour-management partnership and not

as a form of ‘social partnership’, as, for instance, there was limited implementation

of mutual gains. According to the interviewees, the cooperative relationship tended

to be mostly instrumental for employers, allowing them to achieve their business

goals and to reduce potential workplace conflict. This type of partnership has been

referred to in the literature as employer-dominated, where the interest of employers

244

dominate those of the union (Kelly, 2004). Similarly, a weakened model of

Oxenbridge and Brown’s (2002) informal partnership concept was also apparent in

relation to the type of relationship that these case studies represented, due to reliance

on informal and somewhat limited transparency in the relations between some trade

union leaders and key managers. In the majority of the cases, collective bargaining

was being conducted through highly informal partnership relationships, which

seemed to be positive for those trade union leaders involved, as they believed they

could secure more gains through cooperation and ongoing dialogue. However,

because these types of partnerships were mostly instrumental for companies,

tensions emerged between the employer and the trade union leaders. These tensions

related to the fragmentation of the workplace, where the employer privileged the

proliferation of multiple unions at company level (as evidenced in Case studies A

and C); benefitting the union that was perceived to be most compliant with the

company’s objectives (as shown in Case study B) at the expense of others;

implementing direct communication mechanisms to replace the union role (clearer in

Case Studies A and C); and the establishment of union-suppression strategies such as

the use of multi-rut and collective convenios (throughout the cases).

The second trade union response against the challenges was the notion of

servicing and individualised welfare that was greatly embedded in the cases. The

service function was emphasised by the majority of the case studies’ trade unions as a

way of gathering legitimacy and gaining more members. The saliency of this strategy

in the Chilean context may not be surprising; as commented by Ewing (2005) and

Heery and Kelly (1994), there has been an emergence of service unionism worldwide

with a managerial focus where trade union members are perceived as passive

consumers whose needs should be fulfilled by trade unions. In the three case studies,

the unions commented on the importance of providing sufficient services and benefits

to the workers as a way of retaining their membership and as a means to recruit new

members. The level of service unionism was strongly emphasised in Case Study C,

where one of the trade unions had developed a ‘top-up’ health insurance system

which could only be accessed through the trade union. Arguably, the main problem of

having a trade union with a predominant service role is that it may dilute the

representative and regulatory functions of the trade unions, which are central in

promoting fairness and social justice (Ewing, 2005).

245

The third most salient response implemented by the trade unions was labelled

‘legal mobilization’, a term introduced by the social movement literature to denote a

form of legal action taken by trade unions against companies. In the case of Chilean

trade unions, Crocco (2017) used the term to describe one strategy where trade unions

take legal action against firms, denouncing the infringement of the law in Labour

Courts or at the Labour Inspectorate’s offices with the deliberate purpose of

strengthening their position in the workplace. According to Crocco (2017), legal

mobilization has been one of the most sustained and widespread tactics amongst trade

unions since the 1990s, as it contests the power of employers in ways that other

tactics have failed to do. This was the case for the trade unions in the reviewed case

studies, where the trade unions engaged in some form of legal mobilisation against

their companies. More specifically, in Case Study A the trade union was mobilising

against the company’s use of multi-rut; in Case Study B, the ‘Marginalised Trade

Union’ resorted to legal mobilisation as a way to force the employer to bargain with

them; and similarly in Case Study C, the trade unions commented on the importance

of legal mobilisation whenever dialogue reached an impasse and collective

bargaining was being halted. As a result, legal mobilisation has been the way in

which trade unions have acquired some type of collective control and the political

resources they need for collective action against their employers (Kelly, 1998). Kirk

(2018) indicated that because there were changing patterns of dispute, such collective

action can be an alternative act of opposition and expression against employers and

governments, especially because collective processes such as strikes and union

membership have declined.

In sum, these trade unions mostly engaged with one (labour-management

partnership) of the eight revitalisation dimensions described in the international

literature while developing two rather context-specific renewal activities (servicing

and legal mobilisation). However, despite the fact that the implemented strategies do

not show much innovation (as they appear to rely on a traditional industrial relations

approach), the trade unions in the cases were in fact engaging in some forms of

revitalisation. Reinventing the repertoires of collective action and attempting to

innovate was in fact difficult due to the level of fragmentation that unions

experienced; the lack of affiliation (or in some cases a symbolic affiliation) to

weaker confederations that could potentially organise firm-level trade unions

towards revitalisation; and the limited vertical and horizontal interaction within

246

unions that could bolster cooperation and learning. Hence, more progressive renewal

strategies such as coalition-building, political action and transnational cooperation

were limited.

Fragmentation of the labour movement was mostly emphasised by the

counter-strategies of employers who engaged in several de-collectivising strategies

in order to debilitate the workplace trade unions. As shown in the empirical chapters,

these weakening strategies proved to be sophisticated (i.e., indirect) and successful in

weakening trade unions. The fragmentation of labour increased due to the

ambivalence shown by the state that, while implementing labour reforms to restore

labour rights, was simultaneously enhancing business-friendly legislation.

Linked to this was another obstacle to revitalisation that may have emerged

due to the organisational isolation with which Chilean trade unions performed their

role. With some exceptions and for different reasons, company-based trade unions

had limited interaction with other trade unions, federations or labour-related bodies.

Hence, the degree of fragmentation was extensive, making it difficult for trade

unions to strategically coordinate themselves so as to learn more about each other

and coordinate their individual renewal efforts.

Another barrier to revitalisation was the affiliation issue which developed

around the absence of the CUT as a leading national-level body to organise

revitalisation. Broadly speaking, the CUT did not seem to systematically or generally

coordinate the revitalization efforts of the individual unions affiliated to it, which

proved to be a problem for labour renewal. The trade unions were widely

disconnected and, even when affiliated to the CUT, had limited regulating

capabilities. As remarked above, the strong servicing orientation may have limited

the collective mobilisation of the trade unions against their employer through

traditional mechanisms. Too weak to mobilise workers, affiliation to the national-

level confederation may not necessarily be translated automatically into

revitalisation. Therefore, the individual unions at the plant level in Chile were the

ones implementing renewal. Yet, on their own, trade unions may not be strong

enough to reverse the decline and to revitalise.

Therefore, these cases exhibit differences from the trends seen in Anglo-

Saxon countries where trade unions seemed to be converging on similar strategies of

organising as a way to recruit new members (Murray, 2017; Ibsen and Tapia, 2017)

albeit with varying outcomes. In this thesis, the servicing strategy was used instead

247

of organising to increase and maintain membership. Similarly, these cases did not

see extensive developments in relation to international union bodies that tried to

build external coalitions with other social movements and engage in political action.

These trade unions commented on their reluctance to interact with other labour-

related groups due to the fear of losing their autonomy and having to adopt the

agenda of other organisations.

The second research question regarding the role of the political and

economic context in the process of renewal generated the most interesting findings.

As discussed in the thesis’ chapters, these renewal strategies were heavily influenced

by the political and economic context of Chile. The neo-liberal policies implemented

in the country as well as the political legacy of Pinochet hindered unionisation and

the process of renewal. Although there were some elements of protection for worker

rights and some ‘democratic’ institutions in place, a significant ambivalence in the

legislative framework was also evident, which influenced the revitalization practices

implemented by the trade unions. In line with path dependency theory, the

functioning of Chilean institutions at present such as collective bargaining and the

employment relationship were largely shaped by past events (Peters, 2009; Kay,

2005), in this case, the military dictatorship that weakened the country’s industrial

relations. As assumed by path dependency, early events in a process have substantial

effects on later events (Crouch and Ferrell, 2004), therefore Chile’s political and

economic history may have indirectly constrained the actions of individuals (in this

case, the trade unions) in the process of labour renewal. Early developments on the

Chilean political scene after Pinochet were decisive in determining the trade unions’

strength and power to implement revitalisation. The potential responses that trade

unions could implement to revitalize were therefore influenced by neo-liberal labour

legislation that allowed for fragmentation, decentralisation and de-collectivization to

be implemented in the workplace. This meant that trade unions had to constantly

deal with union-weakening practices, having limited time and resources to engage

with processes of revitalization. Although innovation existed, sharing experiences

and coordinating cross-firm activities was extremely difficult and sometimes even

undesirable for some of the trade unionists; this may have been a reflection of the

experience of de-politicization and the erosion of social movement values within

trade unions that were inherited from the experience of the Pinochet government. As

248

a result, union revitalization in Chile cannot be understood in isolation from the

political context and from the primacy of company-level industrial relations.

Linked to the previous point is the notion that, despite Chile’s highly political

reputation, the trade unions in the case studies tended to exhibit a fairly apolitical

tradition. Possibly, this was partly due to the nature of the country’s neo-liberal

economy and the ‘de-politicisation’ process implemented by Pinochet through his

legislative framework as stated above. With the exception of certain sectors, the

food-manufacturing sector was perhaps not as political as was anticipated in terms of

the identity of its labour organisations, at least in the three case studies analysed in

this research. The trade union leaders in the interviewed organisations were overall

quite hesitant to participate in any form of political activity or act with any political

party because, as they commented, they were anxious that engaging in such

relationships meant their loss of autonomy. Furthermore, these trade unions believed

that perhaps interacting with political parties might have directly implied the

adoption of that party’s agenda and a limitation on the pursuit of their own

objectives.

Finally, the third research question, concerning how the Chilean experience

of trade union renewal strategies can relate to those discussed internationally and

how the Chilean case can inform the international debate around renewal and

change: there were similarities and disparities when comparing the renewal practices

of these case studies to those discussed internationally. The main differences were

around the more progressive strategies of political action, coalition building and

transnational cooperation. Internationally, in some of the more common examples,

the political action strategy was one of the most implemented activities in terms of

links to social movements and broader social campaigns, yet in the Chilean context,

it was one of the least developed: international awareness on the ground was fairly

restricted compared to some multinational cases in the UK, for example (Mustchin

and Martinez Lucio, 2017). Similarly, the convergence towards organising

experienced by Anglo-Saxon countries (Ibsen and Tapia, 2017; Murray, 2017)

cannot be seen in these Chilean cases since the trade unions used servicing as a core

strategy to engage new constituents. Such differences may have responded to the

economic and political context of the country, which can be linked to the previous

point on the legacy of neo-liberal values and a de-politicisation of the labour

movement in many sectors marked by the military government of Pinochet, as stated.

249

The analysis carried out in this thesis showed that there was also an important

issue around the terminology of revitalization and how it ‘travels’ (or not). The

specific language of renewal and revitalization does not translate well into Spanish.

Even though words can be directly translated to Spanish, as they exist in that

language’s repertoire, the exact meaning attributed to the concept varies from context

to context. The same happened with the titles given to renewal strategies, which

tended to not mean the same across contexts. The language of renewal is useful as a

template for analysis, but one cannot assume that trade unions understand it, not only

because of translation issues, but because trade union leaders do not express

themselves in these terms, it being a very Anglo-Saxon concept. Therefore, research

into these topics in different contexts has a tendency to be much more complex.

The argument for avoiding direct translation of concepts between contexts

has been developed by Locke and Thelan (1995) in their request for contextualized

comparisons. As mentioned by these authors, the dominant matched comparison

approach tends to assume that same practices and terms have the same meaning

across various national settings. In reality, some strategies may be labelled the same

but have completely different meanings in diverse contexts. For example, in this

study the notion of political action tends to be more partisan in Chile. This practice,

although widespread in European and North American contexts, was extremely

limited in the Chilean context as trade unions associated political action with formal

and specific political parties. The analysis showed that due to the identities of Chilean

political parties and to historical contingencies, political action was a strategy from

which trade unions shied away, contrary to what some studies have argued as being

stereotypical of Chilean trade unions. The researcher therefore had to remain open-

minded in order to be able to capture the trade union responses due to the different

ways in which they described their activities and challenges. Hence, the thesis

provides a broad set of insights into the relevance of cases such as Chile’s for the

study of trade union revitalisation.

9.4. Summary of the central research findings

Having summarised the chapters and the research questions, the next section

addresses the main themes and findings of the thesis. In terms of renewal strategies,

there were three salient revitalisation strategies implemented by the trade unions: a

type of labour-management partnership, strong servicing and a form of collective

250

action under the banner of legal mobilization. These strategies had their own

characteristics and were heavily influenced by the country’s political and economic

context. As a result, revitalisation in the Chilean labour movement is a process that

needs to be understood in relation to its context. Political and economic contexts, as

well as employer strategies, can shape and contour the strategies implemented by

trade unions, although they can have some discretion, albeit limited, in the strategies

they implement to revitalise. Such direct influence has meant that certain sectors,

such as food-manufacturing, have limited politicization, which might be different

from the type of more political dimensions that other academics (Duran-Palma and

Lopez, 2009) have emphasized for Chile’s labour movement. This steady de-

politicization – in the researcher’s view - has meant that trade union renewal was

constrained, existing without the presence of a clearly identified strategic choice

where unions were able to and supported in deciding what strategies to implement.

Linked to this argument was the question of strategy. As remarked in Chapter

2, the revitalisation framework assumed that trade unions may have different choices

in selecting the way by which they could revitalise their movement (Frege and Kelly,

2003; 2004; Ibsen and Tapia, 2017). However, there were contexts, such as that

described in this thesis, that showed higher levels of path dependency where political

legacies and economic institutions curtailed the opportunities for trade unions to

choose the activities through which they seek renewal. The strong legacy of political

history (Crouch and Ferrell, 2004) can be decisive in determining the ways in which

Chilean trade unions could cope with and respond to the challenges faced in the

employment relationship. Therefore, there cannot be an assumption that there were

clear and strategically selected choices implemented by company-level trade unions

with regards to renewal.

Not only can the nature of labour legislation be an obstacle for trade unions

in achieving revitalisation, but there also seemed to be a limited level of horizontal

inter-union learning: trade unions in Chile seemed to not be learning from each other

or from their federations and confederations. The degree of fragmentation was so

extensive that it was difficult to strategically coordinate trade unions and for them to

learn from each other, thus affecting revitalisation. In addition, having to constantly

engage in defensive strategies against their employer meant appreciating that much of

a trade union’s resources were used in coping with and responding to the employer’s

union-avoidance practices; these defensive and reactive strategies did not tend to lead

251

to an overarching re-imagining of the trade union and its revitalisation. The quantity

of resources that were consumed by these reactive types of activity appeared to be so

extensive that some trade unions may be left with limited revitalisation capabilities.

Another set of themes was developed around the state and was further

emphasised as a general finding. Firstly, it was important to highlight that one cannot

make assumptions about unions being more politicized by virtue of the political

context and changes, since as a consequence of the legacy of Pinochet, there may be

more willingness to mobilize against the state and the employers, but also more

anxiety and even fear to do so because of the potential consequences. Therefore, there

seemed to be an apolitical trade union movement as well in the less traditional sectors

of the Chilean economy. As seen in the three cases, there was a disconnection from

sectoral and national-level discussions. In addition to this, there was the absence of

very proactive support from the state beyond some limited government funds

available for training and social dialogue that aimed to develop trade unionism.

Despite the absence of a more supportive state, although this could be contended, the

process of revitalization was being influenced by the implementation of de-

collectivising strategies.

This thesis has found that revitalization as a template for understanding

unions is nevertheless useful. Such a template, taken mostly from Frege and Kelly

(2004), was very useful because it identified certain key and relevant elements such

as the use – albeit limited in nature - of labour-management partnership and emphasis

on servicing. Frege and Kelly’s (2003; 2004) trade union renewal framework proved

to be useful in better describing, categorizing and analyzing the practices of these

trade unions. The thesis also showed the positive uses of the debates of other aspects

of trade union renewal, specifically that of Murray (2017) who discussed the

modernization of union strategy, the re-engineering of organizing techniques and the

renewal of collective action repertoires. Therefore, they were, for all their Anglo-

centric nature, important templates and starting points.

However, there were some difficulties when applying the theoretical

frameworks and following the debates, mostly because it was important to understand

the role played by context to a larger extent. These comments also reflected the Euro-

centric perspective of the debate and the over-reliance on the strategic choice

approach. There is a need to understand revitalization within path dependency

structures. Therefore, to understand revitalization in Chile, there needs to be an

252

understanding of the nature of the firm, the micro-level tensions at this level and the

fragmented and complex nature of industrial relations. Consequently, trade union

renewal models need to be much more sensitive to the institutional context and to

path dependency. A balance between the templates of ‘best practice’ – if we can use

that term – within organizing narratives and studies, on one hand, and the role of

context on the other is therefore advisable as, indeed, the studies outlined above have

indicated.

9.5. Implications of the research

This research makes three contributions. Firstly, it offers empirical evidence to the

renewal debate, especially in Latin American countries. Secondly, this research

contributes to the de-collectivisation literature by reviewing the practices

implemented in the Chilean context to date. Such practices not only fragment the

trade unions but they also influence the revitalisation responses of the workers’

organisations. In addition to the influence on renewal that de-collectivising activities

may have, the emergence of these strategies as a coherent model of union-weakening

practices can have policy implications for Chile and other countries; this thesis has

outlined the most common activities Chilean employers are implementing to deal

with trade unions to date. In this regard, the role of the state is important as it is

central to the environment where union-weakening practices tend to be

commonplace: it is not just one factor in assessing trade union renewal. Thirdly, this

research contributes to policymaking in relation to governments understanding the

way trade unions can contribute to the economy and society through being more

proactive - and not constrained by de-collectivising strategies. This could be done by

developing and supporting trade union renewal capabilities and leadership.

The limitations in conducting the research were threefold: the fragmentation

of industrial relations, intra-trade union rivalry and union-weakening practices. The

extent of industrial relations fragmentation and decentralisation was so evident that it

permeated the feasibility of accessing trade unions through the national-level

confederations. Intra-union rivalry in some of the workplaces was also of relevance

during data collection. The last of these challenges was the clear presence of some

trade union-weakening practices, even in companies that had social dialogue with

their trade unions. These practices often made it difficult to access HR managers:

some of them were unwilling to be interviewed by the researcher. Overall, building

253

trust either with trade unions or with HR and line managers was very difficult as the

researcher was initially presented as a complete stranger to them and they had to

disclose sensitive information about their future strategies. However, it is the

researcher’s opinion that the extent of the research data was sufficient, and the

number of interviews was sufficiently extensive, although no project can be truly

comprehensive.

For future research, it would be important to expand the findings of this

thesis to other sectors in the Chilean economy. It is important to understand how

other trade unions engage with the process of renewal, determining the innovative

strategies that they may be implementing to counter and respond to the challenges. It

would also be of importance for policy-making circles to be able to identify the

revitalisation strategies that the company-level unions are utilising and, in that way,

to support the trade unions’ ability to engage with renewal more broadly and

imaginatively.

254

References

Ackers, P. (2002). Reframing employment relations: the case for neo-

pluralism. Industrial Relations Journal, 33(1), 2-19.

Ackers, P., & Payne, J. (1998). British trade unions and social partnership: rhetoric,

reality and strategy. International Journal of Human Resource

Management, 9(3), 529-550.

Ackers, P., & Wilkinson, A. (2003). Understanding work and employment:

Industrial relations in transition. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Adams, R. (1981). A theory of employer attitudes and behaviour towards trade

unions in Western Europe and North America. Retrieved from

https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/5501/1/fulltext.pdf

Ahlstrand, B. & Purcell, J. (1988). Employee relations strategy in the multi-

divisional company. Personnel Review, 17(3), 3-11.

Amable, B. (2003). The diversity of modern capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Anduiza, E., Cristancho, C. & Sabucedo, J. (2014). Mobilization through online

social networks: the political protest of the indignados in Spain. Information,

Communication and Society, 17(6): 750-764.

Angell, A., & Pollack, B. (2000). The Chilean presidential elections of 1999–2000

and democratic consolidation. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 19(3),

357-378.

Anner, M. (2007). Forging new labor activism in global commodity chains in Latin

America. International Labor and Working-Class History, 72(1), 18-41.

Anner, M. (2011). The impact of international outsourcing on unionization and

wages: Evidence from the apparel export sector in Central America. ILR

Review, 64(2), 305-322.

Anner, M. & Candia, J. (2013). Brazil. In Frege, C., & Kelly, J. (2013). Comparative

employment relations in the global economy. London. Routledge.

Aravena, A. (2006). Trabajo, relaciones laborales y sindicalismo en Chile:

reflexiones para el debate. Retrieved from

http://www.iisg.nl/labouragain/documents/aravena.pdf.

255

Aravena, A. & Núñez, D. (2011). Los gobiernos de la Concertación y el sindicalismo

en Chile. Revista Trabajo, 5(8), 113-133.

Archer, M. (1998). Introduction: realism in the social sciences. In Archer, M.S.,

Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, T. & Norrie, A. (1998). Critical Realism:

Essential Readings. Routledge, London, pp. 189-205.

Arrau, G. P. & Medina, F. M. (2014). Human resource management in small and

medium-sized vineyards in Chile. Ciencia e investigación agraria: revista

latinoamericana de ciencias de la agricultura, 41(2), 141-151.

Arrieta, A. (2003). Mercado de trabajo: organización y representación sindical.

Oficina internacional del trabajo. Santiago de Chile.

Atzeni, M. & Ghigliani, P. (2009). The Resilience of Traditional Trade Union

Practices in the Revitalization of the Argentine Labour Movement. In Phelan,

C. (2009). Trade Union Revitalization: Trends and Prospects in 34 countries.

Bern: Peter Lang.

Baccaro, L., Hamann, K., & Turner, L. (2003). The politics of labour movement

revitalization: The need for a revitalized perspective. European Journal of

Industrial Relations, 9(1), 119-133.

Bacon, N. & Storey, J. (1993). Individualization of the employment relationship and

the implications for trade unions. Employee Relations, 15(1), 5-17.

Bacon, N. & Storey, J. (2000). New employee relations strategies in Britain: towards

individualism or partnership?. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38(3),

407-427.

Badigannavar, V. & Kelly, J. (2011). Partnership and organizing: An empirical

assessment of two contrasting approaches to union revitalization in the UK.

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 32(1), 5-27.

Baez, V. (2015). La Negociación Colectiva en Chile. Retrieved from

http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---

actrav/documents/publication/wcms_230682.pdf.

Balasubramanian, G. & Sarkar, S. (2015). Union revitalisation: A review and a

research agenda. Employment Relations Record, 15 (2), 20-42.

Baltera, P., & Dussert, J. P. (2010). Liderazgos sindicales emergentes. El caso de los

trabajadores subcontratados de la salmonicultura, minería del cobre y

forestales. Cuadernos de Investigación, 37.

256

Baltera, P. & Munoz, P. (2017). Prácticas antisindicales: una dinámica

interaccional descolectivizadora. Cuaderno de Investigacion No. 61, Direccion

del Trabajo.

Bamber, G., Lansbury, R., Wailes, N. & Wright, C. (2016). International and

comparative employment relations: National regulation, global changes.

London: Sage Publications.

Bank, C. (2017). Building power from below: Chilean workers take on Walmart.

Cornell University Press.

Barnes, A., Balnave, N., Thornthwaite, L., & Manning, B. (2019). Social Media:

Union Communication and Member Voice. In Holland, P., Teicher, J. &

Donaghey, J. (2019). Employee Voice at Work . Springer, Singapore.

Barrett, P. (2001). Labour policy, labour–business relations and the transition to

democracy in Chile. Journal of Latin American Studies, 33(03), pp.561-597.

Barria, D., Araya, E. & Drouillas, O. (2012). Removed from the Bargaining Table:

The CUT during the Bachelet Administration. Latin American

Perspectives, 39(4), 85-101.

Beale, D. & Mustchin, S. (2014). The bitter recent history of employee involvement

at Royal Mail: An aggressive management agenda versus resilient workplace

unionism. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 35(2), 289-308.

Bechhofer, F. & Paterson, L. (2012). Principles of research design in the social

sciences. Routledge, London.

Behrens, M., Fichter, M., & Frege, C. M. (2003). Unions in Germany: Regaining the

initiative? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9(1), 25-42.

Behrens, M., Fichter, M., & Frege, C. M. (2009). Trade Union Revitalisation in

Germany. In Phelan, C. (2009). Trade Union Revitalization: Trends and

Prospects in 34 countries. Bern: Peter Lang.

Behrens, M., Hamann, K. & Hurd, R. (2004). Conceptualizing Labour Union

Revitalization. In Frege, C., & Kelly, J. (2004). Varieties of unionism:

comparative strategies for union renewal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bell, E., Bryman, A., & Harley, B. (2018). Business research methods. Oxford

university press.

Bernaciak, M., Gumbrell-McCormick, R. & Hyman, R. (2014). European trade

unionism: from crisis to renewal?. Brussels: ETUI.

257

Bernaciak, M. & Kahancova, M. (2017). Innovative union practices in Central-

Eastern Europe. ETUI: Brussels.

Bhaskar, R. (2013). A realist theory of science. London, Routledge.

Bhattacherjee, A. (2012). Social science research: Principles, methods, and

practices. Retrieved from

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.go

ogle.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1002&context=oa_textbooks

Biondi, A. (2015). Europa y América Latina y Caribe: Un frente común para

construir las Estrategias en materia de Derechos de los Trabajadores.

Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---

actrav/documents/publication/wcms_230682.pdf.

Bird, A. & Beechler, S. (1995). Links between business strategy and human resource

management strategy in US-based Japanese subsidiaries: An empirical

investigation. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(1), 23-46.

Black, S. (2005). Community unionism: A strategy for organizing in the new

economy. New Labor Forum, 14 (3), 24-32.

Blain, A. & Gennard, J. (1970). Industrial relations theory: a critical review. British

Journal of Industrial Relations, 8(3), 389-407.

Blumberg, B., Cooper, D. & Schindler, P. (2005). Business research methods.

McGraw Hill, London.

Blyton, P., Heery, E., Bacon, N. & Fiorito, J. (2008). The SAGE handbook of

industrial relations. London: Sage.

Bourque, R., Hennebert, M. A., Lévesque, C. & Murray, G. (2018). Do international

union alliances contribute to the effectiveness of international framework

agreements? A comparative study of Telefonica and Portugal

Telecom. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 0(00), 1-23.

Boxall, P., & Haynes, P. (1997). Strategy and trade union effectiveness in a neo-

liberal environment. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 35(4), 567-591.

Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology.

Qualitative research in psychology, 3(2), 77-101.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative

research in psychology, 3(2), 77-101.

258

Braun, V., Clarke, V. & Terry, G. (2014). Thematic analysis. In Rohleder, P. &

Lyons, A. (2014). Qualitative Research in clinical and health psychology.

Palgrave MacMillan.

Brinkmann, S. (2007). Could Interviews Be Epistemic?: An Alternative to

Qualitative Opinion Polling. Qualitative Inquiry, 13(8), 1116–1138.

Brinkmann, S. (2018) The Interview. In Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (2018). The Sage

handbook of qualitative research. Sage Publications, New York.

Brinkmann, S. & Kvale, S. (2005) Confronting the ethics of qualitative research.

Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 18 (2), p. 157-181.

Briones, S. & Dockendorff, A. (2015). Continuidad y cambio en la política exterior

chilena en el gobierno de Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014). Estudios

internacionales, 47(180), 115-138.

Bronfenbrenner, K. & Juravich, T. (1998) It takes more than house calls: Organizing

to win with a comprehensive union-building strategy. In Bronfenbrenner, K.,

Sheldon, F., Hurd, R., Oswald, R. & Seeber, R. (1998). Organizing to Win:

New Research on Union Strategies. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

Bronstein, A. (2010). Labour Law in Latin America: Some Recent (and not so

Recent) Trends. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and


Brown, A. (2014). Critical realism in social research: approach with caution. Work,

employment and society, 28(1), 112-123.

Brown, A., Fleetwood, S. & Roberts, J. (2002). Critical Realism and Marxism.

London: Routledge.

Brown, R. (1992). Understanding industrial organizations: Theoretical perspectives

in industrial sociology. London: Routledge.

Brown, W. (2000). Putting partnership into practice in Britain. British Journal of


Bryson, A., Gomez, R., & Willman, P. (2010). Online social networking and trade

union membership: what the Facebook phenomenon truly means for labor

organizers. Labor History, 51(1), 41-53.

Budd, J. (2004). Employment with a human face: Balancing efficiency, equity, and

voice. Cornell University Press.

259

Budd, J. & Bhave, D. (2008). Values, ideologies and frames of reference in

industrial relations. In Blyton, P., Heery, E., Bacon, N. & Fiorito, J. (2008).

The SAGE handbook of industrial relations. London: Sage Publications.

Budd, J., Gollan, P. & Wilkinson, A. (2010). New approaches to employee voice and

participation in organizations. Human Relations, 63(3), 303-310.

Budd, J. & Zagelmeyer, S. (2010). Public policy and employee participation. In

Wilkinson, A., Gollan, M., Marchington, M. & Lewin, D. (2010). The Oxford

handbook of participation in organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bulmer, S. (1993). The governance of the European Union: a new institutionalist

approach. Journal of public policy, 13(04), 351-380.

Bulnes, G. (1920). Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879. Santiago, Chile:

Imprenta Universitaria.

Calderon, F. & Castells, M. (2014) Development, democracy and social change in

Chile. In Castells, M., & Himanen, P. (2014). Reconceptualizing development

in the global information age. Oxford University Press.

Camargo, R. (2012). Dealing with income inequality during the Bachelet

administration: A critical analysis of the discourse of Chilean political

elites. Latin American Perspectives, 39(4), 19-33.

Campero, G. (1979). Las nuevas condiciones en las relaciones del trabajo y la acción

política en Chile. Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 481-493.

Campero, G. (2000). Respuestas del sindicalismo ante la mundialización: el caso de

Chile. Documentos de Trabajo No. 113.Instituto Internacional De Estudios

Laborales.

Campero, G. (2001). Trade union responses to globalization: Chile. Documentos de

Trabajo No, 126.Instituto Internacional De Estudios Laborales.

Campero, G. (2007). La Economía política de las relaciones laborales 1990-2006.

Serie Estudios Socio-económicos No, 37. Corporación de estudios para

Latinoamérica.

Campero, G., & Cortázar, R. (1986). Lógicas de acción sindical en Chile. Revista

mexicana de sociología, 283-315.

Candia, J. & Schaffeld, F. (2014). Política Laboral del Gobierno de Eduardo Frei RT

y su Impacto en el Sindicalismo Chileno. Políticas Públicas, 7(2).

Candia, J. & Schaffeld, F. (2017). Política laboral del gobierno de Patricio Aylwin y

su impacto en el sindicalismo chileno. Trabajo y sociedad: Indagaciones sobre

260

el empleo, la cultura y las prácticas políticas en sociedades segmentadas, (29),

249-263.

Cano, A. & Flores, C. (2014). La problemática del Multirut en el retail y su

incidencia en la accion sindical y el dialogo social. Unpublished work.

Retrieved from http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/116554/de-

cano_a.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Cardoso, A. (2002). Neoliberalism, Unions, and Socio-Economic Insecurity in

Brazil. Labour, Capital and Society, 35 (2), 282-316.

Carmona, F. (2015). Relaciones Laborales en Chile. Importancia, efectos y

proyecciones. Democracia, 130.

Cato, J. & Ventrici, P. (2011). Labor Union Renewal in Argentina: Democratic

Revitalization from the Base. Latin American Perspectives, 38 (6) 38-51.

Cerda, C. & Valenzuela, H. (2012). Can Social Dialogue Be a Social Coordination

Mechanism? Social Dialogue Policies in Chile between 1990 and 2010.

Politics & Policy, 40(5), 904-929.

Chaison, G. (2018). Union mergers in hard times: the view from five countries.

Cornell International lndustrial and Labour Relations Report No. 31.

Clark, T. (2015). Class Transformations in Chile’s Capitalist Revolution. Socialist

Register, 51, 199-215.

Clauwaert, S. & Schömann, I. (2012). The crisis and national labour law reforms: a

mapping exercise. European Labour Law Journal, 3(1), 54-69.

Connolly, H., & Darlington, R. (2012). Radical political unionism in France and

Britain: A comparative study of SUD-Rail and the RMT. European Journal of


Connolly, H., Marino, S., & Martinez Lucio, M. (2017). ‘Justice for Janitors’ goes

Dutch: the limits and possibilities of unions’ adoption of organizing in a

context of regulated social partnership. Work, employment and society, 31(2),

319-335.

Contreras, D. (2003). Poverty and inequality in a rapid growth economy: Chile 1990-

96. Journal of Development Studies, 39(3), 181-200.

Cook, M. (1998). Toward Flexible Industrial Relations? Neo‐Liberalism,

Democracy, and Labor Reform in Latin America. Industrial Relations: A

Journal of Economy and Society, 37(3), 311-336.

261

Cook, M. L. (2002). Labor reform and dual transitions in Brazil and the Southern

Cone. Latin American Politics and Society, 44(1), 1-34.

Cook, M. & Bazler, J. (2013). Bringing unions back in: Labour and left governments

in Latin America. Retrieved from

http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/166/

Cooper, R., Ellem, B., Briggs, C. & Van Den Broek, D. (2009). Anti-unionism,

employer strategy, and the Australian state, 1996–2005. Labor Studies

Journal, 34(3), 339-362.

Córdova, L (2005). Relaciones laborales y el proceso de reformas laborales.

Unpublished work. Retrieved from

http://www.tesis.uchile.cl/tesis/uchile/2005/cordova_l/sources/cordova_l.pdf

Correa, R. & Subercaseaux, E. (1996). Ergo Sum. Santiago de Chile: Editorial

Planeta.

Cortázar, R. (1993). Política Laboral en el Chile Democrático: avances y desafíos

en los noventa. Santiago de Chile: DOLMEN.

Cortázar, R. (1995). Una política laboral para una nueva realidad. In Pizarro, C. y

Raczynski, J. (1995). Políticas económicas y sociales en el Chile democrático.

pp. 129-140. Santiago de Chile: CIEPLAN.

Cox, A., Zagelmeyer, S. & Marchington, M. (2006). Embedding employee

involvement and participation at work. Human Resource Management Journal,

16(3), 250-267.

CPC. (2015). Informe Annual. Retrieved from http://www.cpc.cl/wp-

content/uploads/2016/09/MARCO-ETICA-OK-B.pdf

Creswell, J. & Miller, D. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. Theory

into practice, 39(3), 124-130.

Crocco, F. (2013). Oportunidades y peligros del pluralismo sindical en el Chile post-

transición. Retrieved from https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/65608

Crocco, F. (2017). Coping with Neoliberalism through Legal Mobilization: The

Chilean Labor Movement’s New Tactics and Allies. In Donoso, S. & Von

Bülow, M. (2017). Social Movements in Chile. Organization, Trajectories, and

Political Consequences. Nueva York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cross, C. & Blackburn, D. (2016). Trade unions of the World. The international

centre for trade unions rights.

262

Crouch, C. (2017). Membership density and trade union power. Transfer: European

Review of Labour and Research, 23(1), 47-61.

Crouch, C., & Farrell, H. (2004). Breaking the path of institutional development?

Alternatives to the new determinism. Rationality and society, 16(1), 5-43.

Cullinane, N. & Dundon, T. (2014). Unitarism and employer resistance to trade

unionism. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 25(18),

2573-2590.

D’Art, D. & Turner, T. (2003). Union recognition in Ireland: one step forward or two

steps back?. Industrial Relations Journal, 34(3), 226-240.

Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M. & Jakobsen, L. (2005). Explaining society: An

introduction to critical realism in the social sciences. Routledge.

Danford, A., Richardson, M., & Upchurch, M. (2002). ‘New unionism’, organising

and partnership: a comparative analysis of union renewal strategies in the

public sector. Capital & Class, 26(1), 1-27.

D'Cruz, P., & Noronha, E. (2011). The limits to workplace friendship: Managerialist

HRM and bystander behaviour in the context of workplace bullying. Employee

Relations, 33(3), 269-288.

Denzin, N. (2008). Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials. Sage

Publications.

Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (2018). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Sage

Publications, New York.

Diaz-Corvalan, E. (1993). Nuevo sindicalismo. Viejos problemas. La concertación

en Chile. Nueva sociedad, 124, 114-121.

Didier, N. & Luna, J. (2017). Where Are We? Chilean Labor Culture since Hofstede.

Revista Colombiana de Psicología, 26(2), 295-311.

Dirección del Trabajo. (2014). Encuesta Laboral Nacional 2014. Retrieved from

https://www.dt.gob.cl/portal/1629/articles-108317_recurso_1.pdf

Dirección del Trabajo. (2014). Las Claves para entender el MultiRut. Retrieved from

http://www.gob.cl/2014/07/04/las-claves-para-entender-el-multirut/.

Dirección del Trabajo. (2016). Prácticas Antisindicales o Desleales. Retrieved from

www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-89187_recurso_1.doc

Dirección del Trabajo. (2018). Servicios Mínimos. Retrieved from

https://www.dt.gob.cl/portal/1626/w3-propertyvalue-169177.html

263

Dobbins, T. & Dundon, T. (2017). The chimera of sustainable labour–management

partnership. British Journal of Management, 28(3), 519-u533.

Doniez, V. (2012). El modelo laboral chileno: la deuda pendiente. Retrieved from

http://www.fundacionsol.cl/wp-

content/uploads/2013/12/El_modelo_laboral_chileno_la_deuda_pendiente.pdf

Dörre, K., Holst, H. & Nachtwey, O. (2009). Organising-A strategic option for trade

union renewal?. International Journal of Action Research, 5(1), 33-67.

Drake, P. (2003). El Movimiento Obrero en Chile: de la Unidad Popular a la

Concertación. Ciencia Política, 23(2).

Drake, P. & Jaksic (1995). The Struggle for Democracy in Chile. University of

Nebraska Press: Lincoln.

Dundon, T. (2002). Employer opposition and union avoidance in the UK. Industrial

Relations Journal, 33(3), 234-245.

Dundon, T., Cullinane, N. & Harney, B. (2006). The ideology of union busting.

International Union Rights Journal, 13 (2): 5-6.

Dundon, T., Cullinane, N. & Wilkinson, A. (2017). A very short, fairly interesting

and reasonably cheap book about employment relations. SAGE.

Dundon, T., Harney, B. & Cullinane, N. (2010). De-collectivism and managerial

ideology: towards an understanding of trade union opposition. International

Journal of Management Concepts and Philosophy, 4(3-4), 267-281.

Dundon, T., Wilkinson, A., Marchington, M. & Ackers, P. (2004). The meanings

and purpose of employee voice. The International Journal of Human Resource

Management, 15(6), 1149-1170.

Duran, G. (2013). Panorama Sindical y de la Negociación Colectiva en el Chile de

los US$22.655. Retrieved from

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278669347_Panorama_Sindical_y_d

e_la_Negociacion_Colectiva_en_el_Chile_de_los_US22655.

Duran, G. & Kremerman, M. (2015). Sindicatos y Negociación Colectiva. Panorama

Estadístico Nacional y Evidencia Comparada. Retrieved from

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278675287_Sindicatos_y_Negociaci

on_Colectiva_Panorama_Estadistico_Nacional_y_Evidencia_Comparada.

Durán-Palma, F., & López, D. (2009). Contract labour mobilisation in Chile's copper

mining and forestry sectors. Employee Relations, 31(3), 245-263.

264

Durán-Palma, F., Wilkinson, A. & Korczynski, M. (2005). Labour reform in a neo-

liberal ‘protected’ democracy: Chile 1990–2001. The International Journal of

Human Resource Management, 16(1), 65-89.

Easton, G. (2010). Critical realism in case study research. Industrial marketing

management, 39(1), 118-128.

Ebenau, M. (2012). Varieties of capitalism or dependency? A critique of the VoC

approach for Latin America. Competition & Change, 16(3), 206-223.

Edwards, P. (2009). Industrial relations: theory and practice. John Wiley & Sons.

Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of

management review, 14(4), 532-550.

ENCLA. (2014). Encuesta Laboral Informe de Resultados Octava Encuesta Laboral

2014. Retrieved from https://www.dt.gob.cl/portal/1629/articles-

108317_recurso_1.pdf

Ensignia, J. (2016). Mitos y Realidades del Mercado Laboral Chileno. Retrieved in

March 2019 from

http://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/1212/mitosyrealidades

_laboral.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Etchemendy, S. & Collier, R. (2007). Down but not out: Union resurgence and

segmented neocorporatism in Argentina (2003–2007). Politics & Society,

35(3), 363-401.

Etchepare, J. (2006). Surgimiento y evolución de los partidos políticos en Chile,

1857-2003. Universidad Catholica de la Santisima Concepción. Chile

Ewing, K. (2005) The function of trade unions. Industrial Law Journal, 34 (1), 1–22.

Fairbrother, P. (2009). Trade Union Revitalisation: Trends and Prospects in the

United Kingdom. In Phelan, C. (2009). Trade Union Revitalization: Trends and

Prospects in 34 Countries. Bern: Peter Lang.

Feres, M. (2006). El Trabajo y las Relaciones Laborales en los programas de la

Concertación 1990 – 2006. Análisis de los contenidos programáticos.

Fundación Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Chile

Feres, M. (2008). Gobiernos Progresistas y Movimiento Sindical, La Experiencia

chilena. Colección Análisis y Propuesta Fundación Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Feres, M. & Infante, R. (2007). La negociación colectiva del futuro de Chile.

Colección Ideas, 8(79).

265

Fernandez, A. & Vera, M. (2012). The Bachelet Presidency and the end of Chile’s

Concertacion era. Latin American Perspectives, 39(4), 5-18.

Ffrench-Davis, R. (2010). Latin America: the structural fiscal balance policy in

Chile: a move toward counter-cyclical macroeconomics. Journal of

Globalization and Development, 1(1).

Ffrench-Davis, R. & Stallings, B. (2001). Reformas, crecimiento y políticas sociales

en Chile desde 1973. Lom Ediciones.

Fichter, M. & Greer, I. (2004). Analysing Social Partnership: A Tool of Union

Revitalization? In Frege, C. & Kelly, J. (2004). Varieties of unionism:


Figueroa-Clark, V. (2010, April). Prospects for Chile under the Piñera

administration. Retrieved from

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83139/1/Prospects%20for%20Chile%20under%20the%

20Pi%C3%B1era%20administration%20_%20International%20Affairs%20at

%20LSE.pdf.

Findlay, P. & McKinlay, A. (2003). Surveillance, electronic communications

technologies and regulation. Industrial Relations Journal, 34(4), 305-318.

Findlay, P. & Warhurst, C. (2011). Union learning funds and trade union

revitalization: a new tool in the toolkit?. British Journal of Industrial

Relations, 49, s115-s134.

Fine, J. (2000). Community unionism in Baltimore and Stamford: Beyond the

politics of particularism. WorkingUSA, 4(3), 59-85.

Fine, J. (2005). Community unions and the revival of the American labor movement.

Politics & Society, 33(1), 153-199.

Finlay, L. (2002). “Outing” the researcher: The provenance, process, and practice of

reflexivity. Qualitative health research, 12(4), 531-545.

Fiorito, J. (2004). Union renewal and the organizing model in the United Kingdom.

Labor Studies Journal, 29(2), 21-53.

Fletcher, Jr. B. & Hurd, R. (2001). Overcoming obstacles to transformation:

Challenges on the way to a new unionism. In Turner, L., Katz, H. & Hurd, R.

(2001). Rekindling the movement: Labor’s quest for relevance in the twenty-

first century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/312/

Fox, A. (1974). Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations. London: Faber.

266

Frangi, L. & Zhang, T. (2018). Gaining back Influence through Social Media?

Analyzing Twitter network to Predict Trade Union Influence in North America.

Paper presented at the 18th International Labour and Employment Relations

Association World Congress.

Frangi, L., & Memoli, V. (2014). Confidence in Brazilian Unions A Longitudinal

Analysis. Latin American Perspectives, 41(5), 42-58.

Frank, V. (1994). Acuerdos y Conflictos: ¿signos contradictorios de nuevas

relaciones laborales en la transición chilena a ala democracia?. Estudios

Sociológicos, 12 (36).

Frank, V. (2000). El Movimiento Sindical en la Nueva Democracia Chilena.

Perspectivas de los Dirigentes Sindicales de Base: ¿Hechos o Ficción?.

Universum, 15, 73-100.

Frank, V. (2002). The elusive goal in democratic Chile: Reforming the Pinochet

labor legislation. Latin American Politics and Society, 44(1), 35-68.

Frank, V. (2009). The difficult road for trade unionism in Chile. In Phelan, C.

(2009). Trade Union Revitalization: Trends and Prospects in 34 Countries.

Bern: Peter Lang.

Frege, C. (2008). The History of Industrial Relations as a Field of Study. In Blyton,

P., Heery, E., Bacon, N., & Fiorito, J. (2008). The SAGE handbook of

industrial relations. London: Sage.

Frege, C., Heery, E. & Turner, L. (2004). The New Solidatrity? Trade Union

Coalition-Building in Five Countries. In Frege, C., & Kelly, J. (2004).

Varieties of unionism: comparative strategies for union renewal. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Frege, C. & Kelly, J. (2003). Union revitalization strategies in comparative

perspective. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9(1), 7-24.

Frege, C. & Kelly, J. (2004). Varieties of unionism: comparative strategies for union

renewal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frege, C. & Kelly, J. (2013). Comparative employment relations in the global

economy. London. Routledge.

Frías, P. (1989). El movimiento sindical chileno en la lucha por la democracia.

Programa de Economía del Trabajo, Chile.

267

Frías, P. (2008). Los desafíos del sindicalismo en los inicios del siglo XXI. Retrieved

from

http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/coediciones/20100610104715/frias.pdf

Fundación Sol (2014). 7 dudas que despierta el Proyecto del gobierno para regular

el multi-rut. Retrieved from http://www.fundacionsol.cl/2014/04/7-dudas-que-

despierta-el-proyecto-del-gobierno-para-regular-el-multirut/.

Gall, G. (2001). Management Control Approaches and Union Recognition in

Britain. In Work Employment and Society Conference, University of

Nottingham, September.

Gall, G. (2009). Union revitalisation in advanced economies: Assessing the

contribution of union organising. Springer.

Gall, G. & Dundon, T. (2013). Global Anti-Unionism. Palgrave, Macmillan.

Gall, G., & Fiorito, J. (2012). Union commitment and activism in Britain and the

United States: Searching for synthesis and synergy for renewal. British Journal

of Industrial Relations, 50(2), 189-213.

Gall, G. & McKay, S. (2001). Union recognition in Britain: the dawn of a new

era?. Unpublished paper, University of Stirling.

Gallardo, P. (2019). Corte Suprema valida a grupos negociadores para celebrar

instrumentos colectivos. In press. Retrieved from

https://www.latercera.com/pulso/noticia/corte-suprema-valida-grupos-

negociadores-celebrar-instrumentos-colectivos/468620/.

Gamonal, S. (2011). Chilean Labour Law 1990–2010: Twenty Years of Both

Flexibility and Protection. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law

and Industrial Relations, 27(1), 85-94.

Gaudichaud, F. (2003). La Central Única de Trabajadores, las luchas obreras y los

Cordones Industriales en el período de la Unidad Popular en Chile (1970-

1973). Análisis crítico y perspectiva. Rebelión, Santiago.

Geelan, T. & Hodder, A. (2017). Enhancing transnational labour solidarity: the

unfulfilled promise of the Internet and social media. Industrial Relations

Journal, 48(4), 345-364.

Gennard, J. (2008). A new emerging trend? Cross border trade union mergers.

Employee Relations, 31(1), 5-8.

Gerring, J. (2006). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge

university press.

268

Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E. & Chadwick, B. (2008). Methods of data collection

in qualitative research: interviews and focus groups. British dental journal,

204(6), 291.

Greene, A., Hogan, J., & Grieco, M. (2003). E-Collectivism: Emergent

Opportunities for Renewal. E-Business: Key Applications, Processes and

Technologies, 845-851.

Greene, A. & Kirton, G. (2003). Possibilities for remote participation in trade

unions: mobilising women activists. Industrial Relations Journal, 34(4), 319-

333.

Grez, S. (2007). Transición en las formas de lucha: Motines peatonales y huelgas

obreras en Chile (1891-1907). Cyber Humanitatis, (41).

Greenwood, I. & Stuart, M. (2002). Restructuring, Partnership and the Learning

Agenda: A Review. For full text: http://www. leeds. ac. uk/learning-in-

partnership/files/english/publication3. pdf.

Grugulis, I. (2017). A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book

about Human Resource Management. SAGE.

Guba, E. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Sage

Publications, New York.

Guest, D. & Peccei, R. (2001). Partnership at work: mutuality and the balance of

advantage. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 39(2), 207-236.

Haagh, L. (2002). The emperor’s new clothes: labor reform and social

democratization in Chile. Studies in Comparative International Development,

37(1), 86-115.

Hall, P. & Soskice, D., (2001). Varieties of capitalism. The Institutional Foundations

of Comparative Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hall, P. & Taylor, R. (1996). Political science and the three new

institutionalisms. Political studies, 44(5), 936-957.

Hall, P. & Thelen, K. (2009). Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. Socio-

economic review, 7(1), 7-34.

Hamann, K. (1998). Spanish unions: institutional legacy and responsiveness to

economic and industrial change. ILR Review, 51(3), 424-444.

Hamann, K. (2012). The politics of industrial relations: Labor unions in Spain.

Routledge.

269

Hamann, K. (2018). Union Revitalization through Political Action? Evidence from

Five Countries. Retrieved from file://nask.man.ac.uk/home$/Downloads/1281-

1762-1-PB%20(2).pdf

Hamann, K. & Kelly, J. (2004). Unions as Political Actors: A Recipe for

Revitalization? In Frege, C., & Kelly, J. (2004). Varieties of unionism:


Hamann, K. & Martinez-Lucio, M. (2003). Strategies of union revitalization in

Spain: negotiating change and fragmentation. European Journal of Industrial

Relations, 9(1), 61-78.

Hamann, K. & Martinez Lucio, M. (2007). Trade Union Revitalisation in Spain. In

Phelan, C. (2007). Trade Union Revitalization: Trends and Prospects in 34

Countries. Bern: Peter Lang.

Heery, E. (2002). Partnership versus organising: alternative futures for British trade

unionism. Industrial relations journal, 33(1), 20-35.

Heery, E. (2005). Sources of change in trade unions. Work, Employment & Society,

19(1), 91-106.

Heery, E. (2008). System and Change in Industrial Relations Analysis. In Blyton, P.,

Heery, E., Bacon, N., & Fiorito, J. (2008). The SAGE handbook of industrial

relations. London: Sage.

Heery, E. (2016). Framing work: unitary, pluralist, and critical perspectives in the

twenty-first century. Oxford University Press.

Heery, E. & Adler, L. (2004). Organizing the Unorganized. In Frege, C., & Kelly, J.

(2004). Varieties of unionism: comparative strategies for union renewal.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heery, E. & Kelly, J. (1994). Professional, participative and managerial unionism: an

interpretation of change in trade unions. Work, Employment and Society, 8(1),

1-22.

Heery, E., Kelly, J. & Waddington, J. (2003). Union revitalization in Britain.

European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9(1), 79-97.

Heery, E. & Simms, M. (2008). Constraints on union organising in the United

Kingdom. Industrial Relations Journal, 39(1), 24-42.

Henriquez, H. (2014). La extensión de beneficios: una práctica que afirma el

desequilibrio en las relaciones laborales. Cuaderno de Investigación No. 54.

Dirección del Trabajo

270

Heyes, J. (2007). Training, social dialogue and collective bargaining in Western

Europe. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 28(2), 239-258.

Heyes, J. & Rainbird, H. (2011). Mobilising resources for union learning: a strategy

for revitalisation?. Industrial Relations Journal, 42(6), 565-579.

Hickey, R., Kuruvilla, S. & Lakhani, T. (2010). No panacea for success: Member

activism, organizing and union renewal. British Journal of Industrial

Relations, 48(1), 53-83.

Holbeche, L. (2009). Aligning human resources and business strategy. Routledge.

Holbeche, L. (2012). The high performance organization. Routledge.

Huber, E., Pribble, J., & Stephens, J. D. (2010). The Chilean left in power. Leftist

governments in Latin America: Successes and shortcomings, 77-97.

Hurd, R., Milkman, R. & Turner, L. (2003). Reviving the American labour

movement: Institutions and mobilization. European Journal of Industrial

Relations, 9(1), 99-117.

Hyman, R. (2001). Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market,

Class and Society. London: Sage

Hyman, R. (2001b). Trade union research and cross-national comparison. European


Hyman, R. (2007). How can trade unions act strategically? European Review of

Labour and Research, 13(2), 193-210.

Ibsen, C. & Tapia, M. (2017). Trade union revitalisation: Where are we now? Where

to next?. Journal of Industrial Relations, 59(2), 170-191.

INE (2018). Boletin Estadistico Empleo Trimestral. Retrieved from

https://www.ine.cl/docs/default-

source/boletines/empleo/2019/espanol/bolet%C3%ADn-empleo-nacional-

trimestre-m%C3%B3vil-mayo-julio-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=5d675fd2_6

IUF (2002). IUF and New Zealand Dairy Workers' Union Sign International Union

Rights Agreement with Fonterra. Retrieved from http://www.iuf.org/cgi-

bin/dbman/db.cgi?db=default&uid=default&ID=271&view_records=1&ww=1

&en=1

Jackson, G., Kuruvilla, S. & Frege, C. (2013). Across boundaries: The global

challenges facing workers and employment research. British Journal of


271

Järvensivu, T. & Törnroos, J. (2010). Case study research with moderate

constructionism: Conceptualization and practical illustration. Industrial

marketing management, 39(1), 100-108.

Kay, A. (2005). A critique of the use of path dependency in policy studies. Public

administration, 83(3), 553-571.

Kelly, J. (1998). Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization. Collectivism and

Long Waves. London: Routhledge.

Kelly, J. (2004). Social partnership agreements in Britain: labor cooperation and

compliance. Industrial relations: a journal of economy and society, 43(1), 267-

292.

Kelly, J. (2013). The United Kingdom. In Frege, C., & Kelly, J. (2013). Comparative

employment relations in the global economy. London. Routledge.

Kerr, A. & Waddington, J. (2014). E‐Communications: An Aspect of Union

Renewal or Merely Doing Things Electronically?. British Journal of Industrial

Relations, 52(4), 658-681.

Kirk, E. (2018). The (re) organisation of conflict at work: Mobilisation, counter-

mobilisation and the displacement of grievance expressions. Economic and

Industrial Democracy, 39(4), 639-660.

Kornbluh, P. (2003). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and

Accountablity. The New Press.

Kumar, P., & Schenk, C. (2006). Union renewal and organizational change: A

review of the literature. Paths to union renewal: Canadian experiences, 29-60.

Leiva, F. (2013). Chile’s Labor Movement, 1990–2012: Ensnared in the Past and

Absent from the Struggles to Democratize Society?. Retrieved from

https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/31479406/Leiva-Labor-

Lasa2013.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=

1554138821&Signature=gM%2FbRTShTaQHEsXyaLgVukacaFo%3D&respo

nse-content-

disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DChiles_Labor_Movement_1990-

2012.pdf

Lévesque, C., Hennebert, M., Murray, G. & Bourque, R. (2018). Corporate social

responsibility and worker rights: Institutionalizing social dialogue through

international framework agreements. Journal of Business Ethics, 153(1), 215-

230.

272

Lévesque, C., Murray, G. & Le Queux, S. (2005). Union Disaffection and Social

Identity Democracy as a Source of Union Revitalization. Work and

Occupations, 32(4), 400-422.

Lévesque, C. & Murray, G. (2006). How do unions renew? Paths to union renewal.

Labor Studies Journal, 31(3), 1-13.

Lévesque, C., & Murray, G. (2010). Understanding union power: resources and

capabilities for renewing union capacity. Transfer: European Review of

Labour and Research, 16(3), 333-350.

Lewis, S. (2015). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five

approaches. Health promotion practice, 16(4), 473-475.

Lillie, N. & Martinez-Lucio, M. (2004). International Trade Union Revitalisation:

The Role of National Union Approaches. In Frege, C., Kelly, J., & Kelly, J. E.

(Eds.). (2004). Varieties of unionism: Strategies for union revitalization in a

globalizing economy. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Locke, R. & Thelen, K. (1995). Apples and oranges revisited: contextualized

comparisons and the study of comparative labor politics. Politics and Society,

23, 337-368.

Logan, J. (2006). The union avoidance industry in the United States. British Journal

of Industrial Relations, 44(4), 651-675.

López, D. (2002). Mitos, alcances y perspectivas de la flexibilización laboral: un

debate permanente. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/vifa-

latam/c02-02033.pdf.

López, D. (2007). Las relaciones laborales en Chile. Labour Again: Labour in Chile.

Lowndes, V. (2010). The Institutional Approach. In March, D. & Stoker, G. (2010).

Theory and methods in political science. Palgrave MacMillan

Luna, J. & Mardones, R. (2010). Chile: are the parties over?. Journal of Democracy,

21(3), 107-121.

Marchington, M. (2007). Employee voice systems. The Oxford handbook of human

resource management, 231-250.

Marchington, M. & Wilkinson, A. (2005). Direct participation and involvement.

Managing human resources: personnel management in transition, 398-423.

Marshall, A. & Perelman, L. (2008). Why “union revitalization” is not an issue in

Argentina? Labour institutions and the effectiveness of traditional trade union

recruitment strategies. Retrieved from

273

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Adriana_Marshall/publication/228546249

_Why_union_revitalization_is_not_an_issue_in_Argentina_Labour_institution

s_and_the_effectiveness_of_traditional_trade_union_recruitment_strategies/lin

ks/55d78e3008aec156b9aa16d8.pdf.

Martínez-Lucio, M. (2003). New communication systems and trade union politics: a

case study of Spanish trade unions and the role of the internet. Industrial

Relations Journal, 34(4), 334-347.

Martinez-Lucio, M. (2006). Trade Unionism and the Realities of Change: Reframing

the Language of Change. In Alonso, L. & Martinez-Lucio (2007).

Employment relations in a changing society: assessing the post-Fordist

paradigm. Palgrave MacMillan.

Martínez Lucio, M. (2007). Trade unions and employment relations in the context of

public sector change: the public sector, “old welfare states” and the politics of

managerialism. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 20(1), 5-

15.

Martínez-Lucio, M. (2010). Dimensions of internationalism and the politics of the

labour movement: understanding the political and organisational aspects of

labour networking and co-ordination. Employee Relations, 32(6), 538-556.

Martinez-Lucio, M. (2014) International human resource management: An

employment relations perspective. London: Sage Publications.

Martinez Lucio, M. & MacKenzie, R. (2004). Unstable boundaries? Evaluating the

‘new regulation’within employment relations. Economy & Society, 33(1), 77-

97.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Mustchin, S. (2013). 6 Training and workplace skills in the

context of globalization: new directions and discourses in skills. In Martinez-

Lucio, M. (2013). International human resource management: An employment

relations perspective. Sage Publications

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Perrett, R. (2009). The diversity and politics of trade unions'

responses to minority ethnic and migrant workers: The context of the UK.

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 30(3), 324-347.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Stuart, M. (2002). Assessing partnership: the prospects for,

and challenges of, modernisation. Employee Relations, 24(3), 252-261.

274

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Stuart, M. (2002b). Assessing the principles of partnership:

Workplace trade union representatives’ attitudes and experiences. Employee

Relations, 24(3), 305-320.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Stuart, M. (2004). Partnership and modernisation in

employment relations. Routledge.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Stuart, M. (2005). Partnership and new industrial relations in

a risk society: an age of shotgun weddings and marriages of convenience?

Work, Employment & Society, 19 (4), 797-817.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Stuart, M. (2009). Organising and union modernisation:

narratives of renewal in Britain. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Martínez Lucio, M., & Stuart, M. (2011). The state, public policy and the renewal of

HRM. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 22(18),

3661-3671.

Martínez Lucio, M., & Walker, S. (2005). The networked union? The internet as a

challenge to trade union identity and roles. Critical perspectives on

international business, 1(2/3), 137-154.

Martinez-Lucio, M., Walker, S., & Trevorrow, P. (2009). Making networks and (re)

making trade union bureaucracy: a European‐wide case study of trade union

engagement with the Internet and networking. New Technology, Work and

Employment, 24(2), 115-130.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Weston, S. (1992). The politics and complexity of trade union

responses to new management practices. Human Resource Management

Journal, 2(4), 77-91.

Martinez-Lucio, M. & Weston, S. (2000). European works councils and ‘flexible

regulation’: the politics of intervention. European Journal of Industrial

Relations, 6(2), 203-16.

Martínez, R., Garmendia, R., & Soto, E. (2012). El Consenso de Washington: la

instauración de las políticas neoliberales en América Latina. Política y cultura,

(37), 35-64.

Marusic, M. (2018). Banco Estado se impone en la Suprema por servicios mínimos.

In press. Retrieved from https://www.latercera.com/pulso/noticia/bancoestado-

se-impone-la-suprema-servicios-minimos/255560/.

Marzi, D. (2017). Reforma a las relaciones sindicales en Chile, o sobre el legislador

impasible. Anuario de Derecho Público, (1), 335-354.

275

McAlevey, J. (2016). No shortcuts: Organizing for power in the new gilded age.

Oxford University Press.

McAvoy, J. & Butler, T. (2018). A critical realist method for applied business

research. Journal of Critical Realism, 1-16.

McIlroy, J. (2008). Ten years of New Labour: workplace learning, social partnership

and union revitalization in Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations,

46(2), 283-313.

Michelson, G. (2000). Trade union mergers: a survey of the literature. Australian

Bulletin of Labour, 26(2), 107.

Mingers, J. (2015). Helping business schools engage with real problems: The

contribution of critical realism and systems thinking. European Journal of

Operational Research, 242(1), 316-331.

Mizala, A. & Romaguera, P. (2001). La legislación laboral y el mercado del trabajo:

1975-2000. LOM Ediciones. Chile

Montero, C., Morris, P., De la Barrera, R., Guerra, R. & López, D. (2000).

Tendencias Emergentes en la Negociación Colectiva: el Tránsito del Contrato

al Convenio. Cuaderno de Investigacion No. 11. Direccion del Trabajo.

Morison, M., & Moir, J. (1998). The role of computer software in the analysis of

qualitative data: efficient clerk, research assistant or Trojan horse?. Journal of

advanced nursing, 28(1), 106-116.

Munck, R. (2011). Beyond North and South: Migration, informalization, and trade

union revitalization. WorkingUSA, 14(1), 5-18.

Murray, G. (2017). Union renewal: what can we learn from three decades of

research?. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 23(1), 9-29.

Mustchin, S. (2012). Unions, learning, migrant workers and union revitalization in

Britain. Work, employment and society, 26(6), 951-967.

Mustchin, S. (2014). Union modernisation, coalitions and vulnerable work in the

construction sector in Britain. Industrial Relations Journal, 45(2), 121-136.

Mustchin, S., & Martinez-Lucio., M. (2017). Transnational collective agreements

and the development of new spaces for union action: The formal and informal

uses of International and European framework agreements in the UK. British


Narbona, K. (2014). Antecedentes del Modelo de Relaciones Laborales Chileno.

Retrieved from http://www.fundacionsol.cl/wp-

276

content/uploads/2014/11/Narbona-K.-Antecedentes-hist%C3%B3ricos-del-

modelo-de-relaciones-laborales_2015.pdf

Noe, R., Hollenbeck, J., Gerhart, B. & Wright, P. (2017). Human resource

management: Gaining a competitive advantage. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill

Education.

Otero, G., Echeverria, M., Lopez, M. & Cabezon, J. (2013). Labour and Employment

Compliance in Chile. Kluwer Law International: The Netherlands.

Oxenbridge, S., & Brown, W. (2002). The two faces of partnership? An assessment

of partnership and co-operative employer/trade union relationships. Employee

Relations, 24(3), 262-276.

Palacios‐Valladares, I. (2010). From militancy to clientelism: labor union strategies

and membership trajectories in contemporary Chile. Latin American Politics

and Society, 52(2), 73-102.

Palacios-Valladares, I. (2010b). Industrial Relations After Pinochet: Firm Level

Unionism and Collective Bargaining Outcomes in Chile. Bern: Peter Lang.

Panagiotopoulos, P. (2012). Towards unions 2.0: rethinking the audience of social

media engagement. New technology, work and employment, 27(3), 178-192.

Panagiotopoulos, P. & Barnett, J. (2015). Social Media in Union Communications:

An International Study with UNI Global Union Affiliates. British Journal of


Peetz, D. (2002). Decollectivist strategies in Oceania. Relations

Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 57(2), 252-281.

Perez-Arrau, G., Eades, E. & Wilson, J. (2012). Managing human resources in the

Latin American context: the case of Chile. The International Journal of

Human Resource Management, 23 (15), 3133-3150.

Peters, G. (2005). Institutional theory in political science: the 'new institutionalism'.

London: Continuum.

Peters, G. (2009). Institutional theory in political science. In Flinders, M., Gamble,

A., Hay, C. & Kenny, M. (2009). The Oxford Handbook of British Politics.

Oxford.

Phelan, C. (2009). Trade Union Revitalization: Trends and Prospects in 34

countries. Bern: Peter Lang.

Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics.

American political science review, 94(2), 251-267.

277

Plaza, P. & Carrasco, P.(2013). Centrales sindicales en Chile: una visión crítica.

Retrieved from http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/114369/de-

plaza_p.pdf?sequence=1

Price, L. & Martin, L. (2018). Introduction to the special issue: applied critical

realism in the social sciences. Journal of Critical Realism, 17(2), 89-96.

Provis, C. (1996). Unitarism, pluralism, interests and values. British Journal of


Pulignano, V. (2010). Trade unions and transnational regulation in Europe:

developments and limitations. Employee Relations, 32(6), 574-589.

Pulignano, V. (2011) The EU and industrial relations modernization: supranational

state support for trade union and social partner modernization and social

dialogue. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 22 (18),

3775-3793.

Purcell, J. (1987). Mapping management styles in employee relations. Journal of

Management Studies, 24(5), 533-548.

Purcell, J. & Ahlstrand, B. (1989). Corporate Strategy and the Management of

Employee Relations in the Multi‐divisional Company. British Journal of


Purcell, J. & Sisson, K. (1983). Strategies and practice in the management of

industrial relations. In Bain, G. (1983). Industrial relations in Britain. London:

Blackwell.

Rainbird, H., & Stuart, M. (2011). The state and the union learning agenda in

Britain. Work, employment and society, 25(2), 202-217.

Ramalho, J. (2009). Trade Unions and Politics in Brazil. In Phelan, C. (2009). Trade

Union Revitalization: Trends and Prospects in 34 Countries. Bern: Peter Lang.

Remmer, K. (1980). Political demobilization in Chile, 1973-1978. Comparative

Politics, 12(3), 275-301.

Riesco, M. (2009). El modelo social chileno comienza a cambiar. Revista

internacional del Trabajo, 128(3), 311-330.

Rodríguez, D., & Ríos, R. (2009). Paternalism at a crossroads: labour relations in

Chile in transition. Employee Relations, 31(3), 322-333.

Rodríguez, J. (2010). Employment relations in Chile: Evidence of HRM

practices. Relations industrielles/industrial relations, 65(3), 424-446.

278

Rodriguez, J. & Gomez, C. (2009). HRM in Chile: the impact of organisational

culture. Employee Relations, 31(3), 276-294,

Rodriguez, J. & Stewart, P. (2017). HRM and work practices in Chile: the regulatory

power of organisational culture. Employee Relations, 39(3), 378-390.

Rojas-Miño, I. (2007). Las reformas laborales al modelo normativo de negociación

colectiva del Plan Laboral. Ius et Praxis, 13(2), 195-221.

Roy, D. (1980). Repression and Incorporation: Fear stuff, sweet stuff and evil Stuff:

management’s defenses against unionization in the south’. Capital and

Labour: A Marxist Primer, Glasgow: Fontana, 395-415.

Royle, T. (2004). Employment practices of multinationals in the Spanish and

German quick-food sectors: Low-road convergence?. European Journal of


Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (2011). Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing

data. Sage.

Ruiz-Tagle, J. & Sehnbruch, K. (2015). ¿Más trabajo pero no mejor en Chile? La

importancia capital del contrato indefinido. Revista Internacional del

Trabajo, 134(2), 247-274.

Salamon, M. (2000). Industrial relations: theory and practice. Pearson Education.

Salinero, J. (2004). La destrucción del sindicato: Intolerancia a un derecho

fundamental. Cuaderno de Investigación, No. 20. Dirección del Trabajo.

Salinero, J. (2006). La afiliación sindical y negociación colectiva en Chile:

Problemas y Desafíos. Cuaderno de Investigación, No.29. Dirección del

Trabajo.

Salinero, J., Rozas, M. & Tapia, A. (2006). Veinte años de afiliación sindical y

negociación colectiva en Chile: problemas y desafíos. Cuaderno de

investigación, No.29. Direccion del Trabajo.

Sater, F. (2007). Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884.

Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.

Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2016). Research methods for business

students. Pearson education.

Schurman, R. (2001). Uncertain gains: Labor in Chile’s new export sectors. Latin

American Research Review 36 (2): 3–29.

279

Schwandt, T. & Gates, E. (2018). Case Study Methodology. In Denzin, N & Lincoln,

Y. (2018). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Sage Publications, New

York.

Senen, C., Trajtemberg, D. & Medwid, B. (2010). Tendencias actuales de la

afiliación sindical en Argentina: evidencias de una encuesta a

empresas. Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations, 65(1), 30-51.

Serdar, A. (2012). Strategies for revitalizing labour movements: Union organizing

and building alliances with community in Argentina. Economic and Industrial

Democracy, 33(3), 403-420.

Serrano, M. (2014). Between accommodation and transformation: The two logics of

union renewal. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 20(3), 219-235.

Silva, E. (2002). Capital and the Lagos presidency: business as usual?. Bulletin of

Latin American Research, 21(3), 339-357.

Silva, P. (1995). Empresarios, neoliberalismo y transición democrática en Chile.

Revista mexicana de sociología, 3-25.

Simonet, R. & González, Á. (2015). Limitaciones al derecho de huelga en Chile: los

servicios esenciales, el reemplazo de trabajadores y los servicios mínimos en el

contexto de la reforma laboral. Revista Chilena de Derecho del Trabajo y de la

Seguridad Social, 6(12), 140-161.

Soto, R., & Torche, A. (2004). Spatial inequality, migration and economic growth in

Chile. Cuadernos de economía, 41(124), 401-424.

Stewart, P., & Smith, C. (2010). Internationalising industrial disputes: The case of

the Maritime Union of Australia. Employee Relations 32 (6), 557-573.

Streeck, W. & Thelen, K. (2005). Beyond continuity: Institutional change in

advanced political economies. Oxford University Press.

Stroud, D. (2012). Organizing training for union renewal: A case study analysis of

the European Union steel industry. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 33(2),

225-244.

Stuart, M., & Martinez Lucio, M. (2000). Renewing the model employer: changing

employment relations and “partnership” in the health and private sectors.

Journal of Management in Medicine, 14(5/6), 310-326.

Stuart, M., Martínez Lucio, M., & Robinson, A. (2011). ‘Soft regulation’and the

modernisation of employment relations under the British Labour Government

280

(1997–2010): partnership, workplace facilitation and trade union change. The

International Journal of Human Resource Management, 22(18), 3794-3812.

Tapia, M., Ibsen, C. L., & Kochan, T. A. (2015). Mapping the frontier of theory in

industrial relations: the contested role of worker representation. Socio-

Economic Review, 13(1), 157-184.

Teague, P. (2009). Path dependency and comparative industrial relations: The case

of conflict resolution systems in Ireland and Sweden. British Journal of


Terry, M. (2003). Can “Partnership” Reverse the Decline of British Trade Unions?

Work, Employment and Society, 17(3): 459–472.

Thelen, K. (2009). Institutional change in advanced political economies. British


Thornthwaite, L., Balnave, N., & Barnes, A. (2018). Unions and social media:

Prospects for gender inclusion. Gender, Work & Organization, 25(4), 401-417.

Toro, S. & Luna, J. P. (2011). The Chilean Elections of December 2009 and January

2010. Electoral Studies (30) 223-244.

Trafilaf, J. & Montero, R. (2001). Chile, sindicalismo y transición política. Los

sindicatos frente a los procesos de transición política. Retrieved from

http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20101108014337/6trafilaf.pdf

Turner, L. (2004). Why Revitalize? Labour's urgent mission in a contested global

economy. In Frege, C. & Kelly, J. (2004). Varieties of unionism: Strategies for

union revitalization in a globalizing economy. Oxford University Press on

Demand.

Turner, L. (2005). From Transformation to Revitalization A New Research Agenda

for a Contested Global Economy. Work and occupations, 32(4), 383-399.

Ugarte, J. (2008). Inspección del trabajo en Chile: vicisitudes y desafíos. Revista

Latinoamericana de Derecho Social, (6), 187-204.

Ulloa, V. (2003). El movimiento sindical chileno, del siglo XX hasta nuestros días.

Oficina Internacional del Trabajo. Central Unitaria de Trabajadores. Santiago

de Chile.

Undurraga, T. (2012). Transformaciones sociales y fuentes de poder del

empresariado chileno (1975-2010). Ensayos de Economía, 22(41), 201-225.

Upchurch, M., Croucher, R. & Flynn, M. (2012). Political congruence and trade

union renewal. Work, employment and society, 26(5), 857-868.

281

Upchurch, M. & Mathers, A. (2012). Neo-liberal globalization and trade unionism:

towards radical political unionism. Critical Sociology 38(2): 265–80.

Upchurch, M., Taylor, G. & Mathers, A. (2009). The crisis of “social democratic”

unionism: the “opening up” of civil society and the prospects for union

renewal in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Labor Studies Journal,

34(4), 519-542.

Van den Broek, D. (1997). Human resource management, cultural control and union

avoidance: An Australian case study. Journal of Industrial Relations, 39(3),

332-348.

Van den Broek, D. & Dundon, T. (2010). (Still) Up to No Good: Reconfiguring

Worker Resistance and. Industrial Relations, 67, 97-121.

Van Klaveren, A. (2011). La política exterior de Chile durante los gobiernos de la

Concertación (1990-2009). Estudios Internacionales No. 169.

Vejar, J. (2012). Tendencias de un sindicalismo fracturado. Sindicalismo autoritario

v/s sindicalismo movimientista. Actuel Marx Intervenciones, 13, 95-113.

Vejar, J. (2014). La precariedad laboral, modernidad y modernización capitalista:

Una contribución al debate desde América Latina. Trabajo y sociedad, (23),

147-168.

Villalobos, S. (2004). Chile y Perú, la historia que nos une y nos separa, 1535–

1883. Chile: Editorial Universitaria.

Waddington, J. (1988). Trade union mergers: a study of trade union structural

dynamics. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 26(3), 409-430.

Waddington, J. (2005). Restructuring representation: The merger process and trade

union structural development in ten countries. Brussels: Peter Lang.

Waddington, J. (2006). The trade union merger process in Europe: defensive

adjustment or strategic reform?. Industrial Relations Journal, 37(6), 630-651.

Waddington, J. (2016). Employment Relation in the United Kingdom. In Bamber, G.,

Lansbury, R., Wailes, N. & Wright, C. (2004). International and comparative

employment relations: National regulation, global changes. London: Sage

Publications.

Waddington, J. & Hoffmann, R. (2000). Trade unions in Europe. Brussels: European

Trade Union Institute.

282

Wahyuni, D. (2012). The research design maze: Understanding paradigms, cases,

methods and methodologies. Journal of applied management accounting

research, 10(1), 69-80.

Wallis, E., Stuart, M., & Greenwood, I. (2005). ‘Learners of the workplace unite!’ an

empirical examination of the UK trade union learning representative initiative.

Work, Employment and Society, 19(2), 283-304.

Warhurst, C., Findlay, P., & Thompson, P. (2006). Organising to learn/learning to

organise: three case studies on the effects of union-led workplace learning.

Retrieved from https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:924774b5-ac6b-4110-adae-

71b57d8e7d53/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=Organising%2

Bto%2Blearn%252Flearning%2Bto%2Borganise%253A%2Bthree%2Bcase%

2Bstudies%2Bon%2Bthe%2Beffects%2Bof%2Bunion-

led%2Bworkplace%2Blearning&type_of_work=Research+paper

Weeks, G. & Borzutzky, S. (2012). Michelle Bachelet's Government: The Paradoxes

of a Chilean President. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 4(3), 97-121.

Wever, K. (1998). International labor revitalization: Enlarging the playing field.

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 37(3), 388-407.

Wilkinson, A., Gollan, P., Marchington, M., & Lewin, D. (2010). The Oxford

handbook of participation in organizations. Oxford University Press.

Williams, S. (1997). The nature of some recent trade union modernization policies in

the UK. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 35(4), 495-514.

Williamson, J. (2004). The strange history of the Washington consensus. Journal of

Post Keynesian Economics, 27(2), 195-206.

Wills, J. (2001). Community unionism and trade union renewal in the UK: moving

beyond the fragments at last?. Transactions of the Institute of British

Geographers, 26(4), 465-483.

Wills, J. (2009). Subcontracted employment and its challenge to labor. Labor Studies

Journal, 34(4), 441-460.

Wills, J., & Simms, M. (2004). Building reciprocal community unionism in the UK.

Capital & Class, 28(1), 59-84.

Winn, P. (2004). Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the

Pinochet Era, 1973–2002. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Wynn Jr, D., & Williams, C. K. (2012). Principles for conducting critical realist case

study research in information systems. MIS quarterly, 787-810.

283

Yin, R. (2003). Case study research design and methods third edition. Sage

Publications.

Zapata, F. (1992). Transición democrática y sindicalismo en Chile. Foro

Internacional, 32(5 (130), 703-721.

Zapata, F. (2000). El trabajo en la vieja y en la nueva economía (Una discusión

desde América Latina). El Colegio de México.

Zapata, F. (2004). ¿Crisis del sindicalismo en América Latina?. Retrieved from

http://www.iisg.nl/labouragain/documents/zapata.pdf.

Zapata, F. (2004b). De la democracia representativa a la democracia ‘protegida’.

Movimiento Obrero y sistema político en Chile. Revista Enfoques, 3, 148.

Zittrain, J. (2008). The future of the internet and how to stop it. Yale University

Press.

284

Appendices

Appendix 1: The process of Collective Bargaining leading to

Industrial Action


Ballot

(Trade union members vote to accept or reject the employer’s offer. The ballot

can only takes place in the last 5 days of the negotiation)

Agreement Reached?

(Members voted for the Employer’s last offer

or for the strike?)

Collective Contract is

signed

No

Strike

Yes

Good Offices

(Called by the employer and implemented by the labour inspection to further mediate

negotiations) Good offices are implemented 48 hours after the ballot took place.

Agreement Reached?

Implement strike

Additional Conditions to be met for the strike to happen:

- Strike must take place the next working day after the Good

Offices ends.

- There needs to be 50% of the trade union members striking for

it to be implemented.

Conditions for Strike

met?

Strike

Trade Unions present their draft for a

new collective agreement before the

previous CA expires. (45 days prior to the expiration date).

Employer responds to this draft with

an offer (usually contesting the trade

unions’ demands)

Negotiations occur over the course of

40 days.

Employers present their last offer

No

Yes

Yes

No

285

Appendix 2: Discussion of anti-union practices predominant in the

Chilean literature

Employers can frequently prefer to manage workplaces without the presence of a

trade union (Dundon, Harney, Cullinane, 2010; Dundon, Cullinane and Harney,

2006), so they can sometimes implement practices that attempt to consolidate their

interests, and in so doing, they can undermine trade union organisation and

mobilisation (Van den Broek and Dundon, 2012). Therefore, one of the major

obstacles trade unions face when trying to advance their power and influence in their

workplaces is the resistance from employers (Dundon, 2010; Van den Broek and

Dundon, 2012; Gall and Dundon, 2013). The literature has reviewed the practices

implemented by employers against the trade unions, classifying them as anti-union

(Gall and Dundon, 2013), union-weakening (Dundon, 2002) and, more recently, de-

collectivising practices (Peetz, 2002; Cooper, Ellem, Briggs, Van den Broeck, 2009;

Gall and Dundon, 2013). The commonality among such practices is their aim of

reducing the influence of unions in the workplace (Peetz, 2002; Gall and Dundon,

2013).

These strategies can take different forms that can range from simplistic, crude

methods to highly sophisticated practices (Peetz, 2002). The forms taken by the

strategies are a function of the employer’s ideology and attitudes towards unions and

the workplace and national contexts (Gall and Dundon, 2013; Peetz, 2002). These

practices can also be used simultaneously and be combined and re-combined by the

employer (Gall and McKay, 2001). The literature on these type of practices has been

motivated to develop an understanding of the types and uses of de-collectivising

strategies, yet these studies have been developed in reference to industrialised

countries such as the UK (Gall and Dundon, 2012; Dundon, 2002), Ireland (Dundon,

Cullinane and Harney, 2006; Wilkinson, Dundon, Marchington and Ackers, 2004)

the US (Logan, 2006) and Australia (Van den Broek, 2010, Peetz, 2002; Cooper et

al, 2009). This chapter is an attempt to fill that empirical gap, understand the

different forms taken by de-collectivising strategies in this context, informing the

literature on weakening practices, while at the same time, describing in detail the

practices that Chilean employers implement in their workplaces to limit trade union

286

power. Engaging in this description makes it possible to understand the

circumstances trade unions face and how these shape labour’s responses.

To understand the different forms taken by union-weakening practices in the

Chilean context it is important to provide a general background. As has been

indicated in previous chapters, Chilean labour legislation has a tendency towards

individualisation, flexibility and deregulation (Feres, 2008; Duran, 2012; Ugarte,

2018; Barrett, 2010). As a result, Chilean employers can be characterised as having a

unitarist ideology, assuming that their prerogative is legitimate and that employees

should identify themselves with the aims of the firm (Cullinane and Dundon, 2014).

Similarly, Chilean employers can perceive the workplace as unnecessary,

exceptional and often irrational, mainly as a result of miscommunications or

misunderstandings. Due to this ideology, Chilean employers can go to great lengths

to keep a workplace free from unions (Feres and Infante, 2007; Henriquez, 2017;

Baltera and Munoz, 2017). In the few workplaces where unions are developed and

recognised, they remain limited and tend to be instruments of the employer. Chilean

companies may openly show their refusal to trade unions while at the same time

trying to indirectly implement practices that limit their influence in the workplace. In

so doing, the employer can show ambivalent behaviours whereby they seem to

support trade unions but at the same time engage in activities to undermine their

power. Having said that, since implementing overt anti-union practices can

exacerbate workplace conflict, Chilean employers may have become craftier in

developing more sophisticated or indirect forms of union avoidance practices. This

chapter will show how Chilean employers have built an intricate web of mechanisms

to resist the influence of trade unions while accommodating their approach to the

limits of the national legislation. These de-collectivising mechanisms can have the

potential to strongly influence the responses the Chilean trade unions implement to

revitalise.

National statistics (ENCLA, 2014) seem to support this argument as 45% of

trade union leaders have suffered from at least one negative practice against their

organisation. Negative practices include, but are not limited to, blocking trade union

affiliation (25.8%), having a negative attitude to bargaining collectively (18.9%),

modifying or altering the trade union leaders’ job functions (15.2%), unfair dismissal

of a trade union’ worker (13.5%) and harassment to trade union leaders (12.4%). In

Chile, these practices have tended to be more frequent in larger companies, which, as

287

argued by academics, can be attributed to the diminished bargain capabilities of

smaller Chilean trade unions (Crocco, 2017; Henriquez, 2017; Baltera and Munoz,

2017).

288

Appendix 3: Summary of union democracy in Chile.

This appendix illustrates the process of union democracy in Chile as premised by the

Labour Code. Union democracy is said to be key in generating the collective identity

through which a trade union becomes concerned with revitalisation (Levesque et al.

2005), which is the main reason why it will be explained at length in this section.

The process to form a trade union in Chile are contained in the Labour Code, article

227 and indicates that the first step to form a trade union is to have the minimum

number of workers required. For companies with more than 25 but less than 50

workers, a union can be formed with at least 8 of those workers. If the company has

more than 50 workers and has other trade unions in the workplace, the new trade

union needs to have a minimum of 25 workers to form. Notwithstanding this, if the

workplace has more than 50 workers but there has never been a trade union

representing the workers, the new union can be formed with 8 workers, who then

have one year to recruit the minimum of 25 members required to form a trade union.

In the case that the trade union fails to recruit the remaining workers, the union is

dissolved. This process is summarised the next table.

Table 1, Appendix 3: Quorum of workers to form a union

Total employees in the company Quorum to form a trade union

More than 25 workers and less than 50 workers. 8 workers.

More than 50 workers with other unions existing in

the workplace. 25 workers.

More than 50 workers with no other unions existing

in the workplace.

Minimum 8 workers to form a trade union;

they have up to one year to recruit 25

workers. If they fail, the union is dissolved. Source: Own Illustration

Once those agitating to form a union successfully meet the quorum for

implementing one, the second step of the process is to hold an assembly. In this

assembly, the workers that are present need to perform two tasks: to approve the

statutes of the trade union (the Labour Inspectorate has templates of these statutes

available) and hold elections to vote for the leaders of the trade union. This election

process takes place through a secret ballot and with the mandatory presence of a

‘Minister of Faith’ (Ministro de fe), who can be a Labour Inspector, a public Notary

or anyone from the state’s administrative hierarchy (Direccion del Trabajo, 2016).

289

The role of the Minister is to witness the election and confirm it has been performed

democratically. In addition, the Minister must produce an Assembly Act (Acta de

Asamblea), recording in writing the most important portions of the meeting,

certifying the name of all workers that attended the meeting and the names of the

elected trade union leaders. This Assembly Act must then be sent to the Labour

Inspectorate within 15 days of the meeting. The Labour Inspectorate then records the

Assembly Act in their data base and proceeds with the inscription of the trade union.

The Labour Inspectorate then has 90 days to make observations upon the Assembly

Act, which can be amended by the trade union within 60 days after receiving these.

The union must send an official copy of the Assembly Act to its employer, together

with a list of all workers who are part of the trade union, 3 days after the assembly

took place. Workers who formed a trade union have dismissal immunity from 10

days prior to and 30 days after signing the Assembly Act. If the trade union misses

any of the aforementioned deadlines, the trade union is automatically considered

dissolved. This process is shown in the next figure.

Figure 1, Appendix 3: Process of Union formation in Chile.


The law also determines how many trade union leaders a trade union can

have; this is based on the number of members. If the trade union has less than 25

workers, then only one person can act as leader. If the trade union has more than 25

but less than 249 workers, the union can have three leaders. In the election, together

290

with voting for the trade union leaders, the constituents also vote to determine the

positions of each of the leaders within the union (e.g., Trade Union President, Trade

Union Treasurer and Trade Union Secretary). If the trade union has more than 250

workers but less than 999, the union can have five leaders. The five roles played by

the elected trade union leaders in this case are: Trade Union President, Treasurer,

Secretary and two Trade Union ‘Directors’ who support the role of the trade union.

If the union has more than 1.000 workers but less than 2.999, the union can have 7

leaders with the positions of Trade Union President, Treasurer, Secretary and four

Trade Union ‘Directors’. If the trade union has more than 3.000 members, it can

have 9 leaders with the positions of Trade Union President, Treasurer, Secretary and

six Trade Union ‘Directors’. This information is summarised in table 2.

Table 2, Appendix 3: Positions of trade union leaders in regards to members

Total of trade union members Trade Union Leaders and Positions

Less than 25 One trade union leader

25-250

Three trade union leaders

Positions: Trade Union President, Trade Union Treasurer

and Trade Union Secretary.

250-999

Five trade union leaders

Positions: Trade Union President, Trade Union Treasurer,

Trade Union Secretary and two ‘Directors’

1.000-2.999

Seven trade union leaders


Trade Union Secretary and four ‘Directors’

More than 3.000

Nine trade union leaders


Trade Union Secretary and six ‘Directors’.


The trade union leaders can remain in their positions for up to four years with

the possibility of being re-elected. All trade union leaders enjoy dismissal immunity

from the moment they are elected and up to 6 months after they cease their functions

as trade union leaders. Trade union leaders are also granted union facility time

(permiso sindical) which covers six hours per week for trade unions with less than

250 members and up to eight hours a week for leaders whose trade unions have more

than 250 workers.

The process of union democracy is much criticised in the Chilean academic

literature because of its strictness in regards to deadlines and compliance (Feres and

Infante, 2007; Feres, 2008, Ugarte, 2018; Baltera and Munoz, 2017). According to

these authors, such rigidity is put in place to weaken the process of union formation.

291

Another significant issue concerning the quorums for implementing trade unions is

that many small and medium size companies, despite being the sheer number of

workers employed by this sector as a whole, fall below the threshold required to

establish a trade union, thus leaving an important segment of workers without

organisation rights.

292

Appendix 4: Individual Labour Standards

This subsection aims to discuss the main individual labour standards contained in the

Labour Code and then to discuss the provision of collective rights. Chilean labour

regulation emphasises individualised employment arrangements, which can be traced

back to the military government where structural reforms were aimed to dismantle

labour and promote a free-market ideology (Rodriguez, 2010). Despite regulatory

changes introduced after the country’s return to democracy, collectivism remained

problematic while individualism was the norm (Vejar, 2012; Lopez, 2002). In

contractual terms, individual contracts are the basis of the employment relationship

and collective agreements, if any, act as a supplement to that initial contract

(Ensignia, 2016; Lopez, 2012). Consequently, several aspects of the employment

relationship, such as appraisal systems, payment schemes and communications, tend

to focus on the individual rather than the collective (Rodriguez, 2010).

According to national employment statistics, the Chilean labour market

participation rate is 59.1% (INE, 2018). Of this, 55% corresponds to workers in

employment with a 7.1% unemployment rate. Nearly half (45%) of workers who are

employed have a contract while a third (21%) work on their own account. Chile has

essentially three types of employment contracts: open ended (or indefinite), fixed-

term, and job-specific (Duran, 2013; Ensignia, 2016; Frias, 2008). The majority of

workers in the Chilean employed labour force have open-ended contracts (74%)

while 12.1% have fixed-term contracts and 11.6% have job-specific contracts. Even

though the majority of contracts are open ended, most of these contracts only have

three-year tenure. In fixed-term contracts, these are usually extended for one or two

years. If the parties agree, the contract automatically renews to become open-ended.

The third form of contracting, known as the job-specific contract, is when the

duration of the employment is limited to the completion of a specific task or work

(whether material or intellectual). In this type of contract, the duration is uncertain

and corresponds to the end of the task or activity in question. Workers with a fixed-

term or job-specific contract are not entitled to severance pay and, until recently,

could not organise to bargain collectively. This was modified in the 2015 labour

reform, where job-specific workers were given the right to collectively bargain with

the company and form trade unions for the duration of their contract.

293

The minimum individual employment standards under the Chilean legislation

can be summarised as follows. The national minimum monthly wage as of March

2019 was approximately US $440. As expressed in the 2001 labour reform of

Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), the weekly working time cannot exceed 45 hours. The

working day cannot exceed 10 hours with at least half an hour break for lunch. Daily

overtime cannot exceed two hours and must be mutually agreed (Otero et al, 2013;

Ensignia, 2016). Rest on Sundays and holidays is mandatory except for specific

activities industries such as retail, which was established in the 1991 labour reform.

It is also mandatory for an employer to provide 15 business days of annual leave and

pay social security contributions, provisions also finalised during Patricio Aylwin’s

administration (1990 to 1994). These rules do not apply to public workers, who are

subject to their own statutes (Otero et al, 2013) and who have also seen an

improvement in their provisions, specifically with the labour reform of Patricio

Aylwin (1990-1994), Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) and Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006).

Individual arrangements are also made as regards performance appraisal

systems (Rodriguez, 2010), whereby workers’ performance is primarily assessed on

individual basis. Similarly, payment scales are dealt with in secrecy and workers’

wages are always kept confidential. As mentioned by Rodriguez (2010) “secrecy is a

key factor surrounding the topic of wages, as pay scales are not available either to

prospective or current employees in organizations” (p.434). As the author explains

this “raises questions of fairness as it is unclear to workers what others in similar

posts or doing similar jobs are earning” (p.434).

Another set of HRM practices that lean more towards individualism are

participation mechanisms. Participation in work decisions is limited in Chile “due to

lack of freedom of expression for fear of repercussions (being punished, ostracized

or dismissed) with 78.6% of [the study’s] participants admitting to speaking with

suspicion and fear” (p.436). Thus, worker participation in any type of decision-

making process is seen to be rarely encouraged. Upward participation is mostly

achieved through job satisfaction surveys without any real opportunity for problem

solving.

Additional individual rights in the Chilean legislation refer to the dismissal

clauses. Under Chilean law, employers have to show valid reasons to dismiss

workers and these must be based on the grounds strictly presented in the labour code

(Pattison and Mogab, 2011; Otero et al, 2013). The specific causes for dismissal

294

include the company's needs when the firm is undergoing modernisation,

productivity downturn and changes in the national economy; 2) employer’s eviction;

3) unjust termination or without cause (only for managers); and 4) indirect dismissal

(for a worker who terminates the contract because it is the employer who incurs a

termination cause or breach of contract). When the employer dismisses the worker,

the employee is entitled to receive severance payment corresponding to one month

per year of service.

Even though there is significant labour regulation established, these minimum

standards are frequently challenged by employers. The majority of retail employers,

for example, as a way of evading minimum wage’ regulations, have established a

mixed wage system. In this sector, there is a basic component that tends to be very

low plus a variable component increased by sales commissions and production

bonuses where workers need to compete with one-another to secure a good salary

(Rodriguez, 2010). Moreover, daily working hours can often surpass the 10 hour a

day limit while mandatory rest between shifts can also be bypassed. Health and

safety issues can also be a problem in certain industries where workers can

experience hazardous working environments. Recent research indicates that, in

general, Chilean workers dislike the level of individualistic employment relations

that their country has (Rodriguez, 2010) but given that Chilean society has

experienced strong de-politicisation (Zincke, 2015; Duran, 2013; Vejar, 2012; Frias,

2008) it is difficult for workers to challenge the status quo. Now that the basic

individual labour rights have been highlighted, collective labour rights will be

explained below

295

Appendix 5: Interview schedules

Appendix 5.1: Interview schedule for Local Trade Union Leaders

Presentation

1. What do you do and what are your main functions in this job?

2. How long have you been in this job?

3. What was your previous experience on and how does it relates to this job?

Unionism

4. What do you think are the main challenges of this trade union today?

5. Do you think that there have been changes in the way unionism has been

done in this company?

6. How has this union responded to those challenges?

7. Do you consider that this union is prepared for the upcoming challenges?

- Labour Crisis.

- Labour Transformation

- Modernization.

Revitalization

8. In your experience, what kind of strategies is your trade union using to

improve its position in the bargaining table?

- Recruiting?

- Focusing on any particular type of workers (young, women, migrants).

- Training?

- Links with the community?

- Links with political parties?

- Links with international body?

- Cooperation with employer?

- Internal changes within the trade union?

- Communication strategies?

9. On several journals there is much research on trade union renewal and

revitalization; do you see these topics happening in this particular union?

10. What topics have not been developed in this trade union: Health and Safety

issues, training, equity, gender, discrimination, harassment, bullying?

Institutional Support

11. How is this union’s relationship with its employer?

12. Do you think that this trade union has the support of the State?

13. What do you believe is the real impact of the approved Labour Reform on

this particular union?

Labour Market Renewal

14. What is your opinion on the practice of multi-rut?

15. What is your opinion on the growth of collective convenios vs contratos?

296

Labour Inspection

16. Do you think the labour inspection is a competent and effective body in

Chile?

17. Does mediation and arbitration are important processes for trade unions?

18. Do you consider that the role of the labour inspection should be more about

controlling than about educating employers about compliance with labour

laws?

International Links

19. Have you heard or know about any practice/strategy happening in other

countries regarding renewal of the labour movement?

20. What do you think is similar or different between labour movements within

the region?

21. Do you exchange information with any international labour movements?

297

Appendix 5.2: Interview Schedule for National Trade Union Leaders.

Presentation




Unionism

4. What do you think are the main political and economic challenges for trade

unions today?

5. What do you think is the future of collective bargaining in Chile?

6. How do you perceive the job of trade unions?


done?

8. How has Chilean trade unions responded to those challenges?

9. Do you consider that trade unions in Chile are prepared for the upcoming

challenges?

- Labour Crisis.


- Modernization.

10. Do you think trade unions are doing something to improve their position in

negotiations?

Revitalization

11. In your experience, what kind of strategies are trade unions using to improve

their position in the bargaining table?

- Recruiting?


- Training?







12. On journals there is much research on trade union renewal and revitalization;

do you see these topics happening in Chile?




14. What do you think is the opinion of Chilean employers about trade unions?

15. Are there any good practices in terms of employers and trade unions?

16. Do you think trade unions have the support of the State?

17. What is the real impact of the approved Labour Reform on trade unionism?

Labour Market Renewal

18. Does the state gives recommendations to trade unions on general topics?

19. What is your opinion on multi-rut?

298

20. What is your opinion on the growth of collective convenios vs contratos?

Labour Inspection


Chile?


3. Do you consider that the job of the labour inspection should be more about

controlling or educating employers about compliance with labour laws?

International Links



5. How do you compare Chilean unionism to Argentinian and Brazilian

unionism?


the region?


299

Appendix 5.3: Interview schedule for HR Managers

Presentation




4. What is the structure of this HR department?

5. How has the way in which HR are managed changed?

6. Do you learn from other HR manager’s experience?

Unionism

7. What do you think are the main political and economic challenges of trade

unions today?

8. What do you think is the future of CB in Chile?

9. How do you perceive the job of trade unions in Chile?

10. Do you consider trade unions in Chile are on top of the existing debates?



12. How has this company’s union responded to those challenges?

13. Do you consider that this company’s union is prepared for the upcoming

challenges?

- Labour Crisis.


- Modernization.

14. In general, do you think trade unions in Chile are prepared for the country’s

labour challenges?

15. Are there any differences between the existing trade unions of this company?

Why do you think those differences exist?

Revitalization

16. In your experience, what kind of strategies is your trade union using to


- Recruiting?


- Training?








do you see these topics happening in this particular union?




19. What do you think is the opinion of Chilean employers about trade unions?


300

21. Do you consider that you have the support of the State?

22. What is the real impact of the approved Labour Reform on this union?

Labour Inspection


Chile?



controlling or educating employers about compliance with labour laws?

International Links




the region?


301

Appendix 5.4: Interview schedule for Employer’s Associations

Presentation




4. What has been the identity of this association?

5. What have been the landmarks of this institution?

Unionism


unions today?



9. Do you consider trade unions in Chile are on top of the existing debates?


done?

11. How are trade unions responding to those challenges?

12. Do you consider that trade unions in Chile are prepared for the upcoming

challenges?

- Labour Crisis.


- Modernization.


labour challenges?

Revitalization



- Recruiting?


- Training?







15. In your opinion, do you think these strategies are going to be successful?

16. How do negotiations work at national level?



18. What are the employee participation mechanisms in companies?


19. What do you think is the opinion of Chilean employers regarding trade

unions?


21. Do you consider that the State supports the activities of this institution?

302

22. What do you think is the real impact of the approved Labour Reform on trade

unions?

Labour Inspection


Chile?

24. Does mediation and arbitration are important processes for trade unions and

collective bargaining?


controlling than educating employers about compliance with labour laws?

International Links




the region?


303

Appendix 5.5: Interview schedule for Labour Minister

Presentation

1. What would you say are your main activities?

Unionism


unions today?



5. Do you consider trade unions in Chile are on top of the existing debates of

the field?


done?

7. How are trade unions responding to those challenges?


challenges?

- Labour Crisis.


- Modernization.


labour challenges?

Revitalization



- Recruiting?


- Training?







11. In your opinion, do you think these strategies are going to be successful?

12. How do negotiations work at national level?





15. What support does the State provides to trade unions and national

confederations?

16. Are there any specific programs or forums that support trade union activity?

17. What is the real impact of the approved Labour Reform on trade unions?

18. Do you think the market plays a role in the process of trade union renewal?

304

Labour Inspection


Chile?

20. Does mediation and arbitration are important processes for collective

bargaining?


controlling than educating employers about compliance with labour laws?

International Links




the region?


305

Appendix 5.6: Interview schedule for Line Managers.

Presentation




Unionism

4. What do you think are the main challenges of trade unions today?



6. How has this company’s union responded to those challenges?


challenges?

- Labour Crisis.


- Modernization.

Revitalization

8. In your experience, what kind of strategies is this trade union using to


- Recruiting?


- Training?









International Links




the region?


306

Appendix 6: Summary table of interviews conducted during the

three fieldwork visits.

This appendix also contains the code provided to the interviewees for citation

purposes.

N Level Coding Position Age Sex

1 Company A Union A Leader 1 Phase1 Trade Union Leader 30-35 M


3 Company A Union A Worker 1 Phase1 Worker 30-35 F

4 Company A Union A Worker 2 Phase1 Worker 25-30 F

5 Company A HR 1 Phase1 HR Manager 30-35 M


7 Company A HR2 Phase1 HR Manager 40-45 F

8 Company A HR3 Phase1 HR Manager 40-45 M

9 Company A LM1 Phase1 Line Manager 35-40 M

10 Company A H&S1 Phase1 Health & Safety 50-55 M

11 Company A H&S2 Phase1 Health & Safety 35-40 M


13 Company A Leader 1 Phase2 Trade Union Leader 30-35 M



16 Company B Union A Leader 1 Phase1 Trade Union Leader 40-45 M



19 Company B Union B Leader 1 Phase1 Trade Union Leader 40-45 F

20 Company B LM1 Phase1 Line Manager 35-40 M

21 Company B Union A Leader 1 Phase 2 Trade Union Leader 40-45 M

22 Company B Union A Leader 2 Phase 2 Trade Union Leader 50-55 M

23 Company B Union A Worker 1 Phase 2 Worker 50-55 F

24 Company B Union A Worker 2 Phase 2 Worker 50-55 M

25 Company C Union 2 Leader 1 Phase 1 Trade Union Leader 45-50 M



28 Company C LM1 Phase 1 Line Manager 40-45 M

29 Company C LM2 Phase 2 Line Manager 35-40 M


31 Company C Union 2 Worker 1 Phase 2 Worker 55-60 M

32 Company C Union 1 Worker 1 Phase 2 Worker 55-60 M




36 National

National

1 Phase 1 Trade Union Leader 45-50 F

37 National

National

2 Phase 1 Trade Union Leader 30-35 F

307

38 National

National

3 Phase 2

Director of Social

Dialogue Programme 40-45 F

39 National

National

4 Phase 2 Confederation President 55-60 M

40 National

National

5 Phase 2

Confederation Vice-

President and Trade

Union Leader of a

Superstore 45-50 M

41 National

National

6 Phase 2 Confederation CUT 60-65 F

42 National

National

7 Phase 2 Trade Union Leader 30-35 M

43 National

National

8 Phase 2

Women and Trade

Unions NA F

44 National

National

9 Phase 2

Labour Plan and

Reforms NA F

45 National

National

10 Phase 2

Industrial Networks

during Pinochet NA F

46 National

National

11 Phase 2

Past, present and future

of trade unionism:

Challenges NA M

47 National

National

12 Phase 2

Agrarian Reform and

impact on trade

unionism NA M

48 Experts Expert 1 Phase 1 NGO Director 35-40 M

49 Experts Expert 2 Phase 1

Labour Lawyers -

Practitioners 35-40 F


Trade Union School:

Organizational Health

Class NA


Trade Union School:

Social Dialogue Class NA


Trade Union School:

Social Security Class NA


Labour Lawyer -

Academic 40-45 M

54 Experts Expert 7 Phase 2 NGO Director 55-60 F


Labour Lawyer -

Academic 35-40 F

56

Supplementary

Case Study Sup 1 Leader 1 Phase 1 Trade Union Leader 30-35 F

57

Supplementary

Case Study Sup 2 Leader 2 Phase 1 Trade Union Leader 35-40 M

58

Supplementary


59

Supplementary


60

Supplementary


61

Supplementary


62

Supplementary


63

Supplementary


64

Supplementary

Case Study Sup 9 HR1 Phase 1 HR Manager 35-40 F

65

Supplementary

Case Study Sup 10 HR1 Phase 2 HR Manager 35-40 F

66

Supplementary

Case Study Sup 11 W1 Phase 2 Worker 40-45 F

67

Supplementary


68 Supplementary Sup 13 HR1 Phase 2 HR Manager 40-45 F

308

Case Study

69

Supplementary


309

Appendix 7: Rationale for the lack of qualitative software analysis

The use of software programs designed to assist the researcher with qualitative data

analysis has become prominent. The advantages of these pieces of software have

captured the attention of researchers (MacMillan and Koenig, 2004; John and

Johnson, 2000). Such advantages focus on the convenience and efficiency of the

software, enabling researchers to save time in conducting the manual and clerical

tasks of research and project management. Additionally, it is argued that such

software offers higher validity and rigour for analysing data than traditional

approaches offer (Creswell and Miller, 2000). Other advantages are said to be that it

enables researchers to deal with large volumes of data, examine complex

relationships in the data and engage in theory building (Morison and Moir, 1998).

However, the disadvantages of relying in software programs to analyse

qualitative data can outweigh these advantages. Authors argue that software can

sometimes predetermine the way researchers see data and conduct research, leading

them to observe the data within certain parameters (MacMillan and Koenig, 2004;

Morison and Moir, 1998). The software can also favour a code and retrieval

approach over an actual analysis of the data gathered. As explained by MacMillan

and Koenig (2004), there can be a misconception among some researchers that

analysis is achieved simply by organising the data into hierarchical categories within

the software program. One of the most important features of qualitative data analysis

software is that by reducing the data to codes, there can be a potential loss of

meaning and context from the information provided by the interviews, running the

risk of creating meaningless data that does not add much to the topic being

researched (John and Johnson, 2000).

Seeing as the present research had, in its primary stages, an exploratory aim,

it was of relevance to understand the extent of the trade union renewal phenomenon

in its context as well as the meanings that the labour actors attributed to their

experiences. Since it was also critical to explain the way in which trade unions

implemented their strategies for renewal, it was important to analyse all available

information in its entirety, maintaining its richness and complexity. As mentioned by

John and Johnson (2000) “computer technology can distance the researcher from

intimate interaction with their data” (p.396) for language is rich in words and

310

meanings, and often that meaning is derived not only from context, but from body

language and inflection.

Consequently, a more direct, open and interactive approach with the

interviews was taken. The goal was to capture meanings and purposes beyond a

software analysis that would bring light into the trade union renewal debate.

Therefore, a choice was made in this research to not use qualitative software

analysis, based on the above discussion.

311

Appendix 8: Reflexivity

After presenting the research’s design, data collection methods and data analysis

procedures, it was critical to comment on the research’s validity. One way in which

researchers can ensure validity of their qualitative research is through reflexivity

(Creswell and Miller, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2018). Reflexivity is considered

essential since it can facilitate understanding of the studied phenomenon and the

research process (Watt, 2007). Reflexivity is the process of critically reflecting on

oneself as a researcher (Denzin and Lincoln, 2018) evaluating and interpreting the

researcher’s attitudes and beliefs, reactions to the data and findings, considering the

interactions of those who participate in the research and acknowledging the way

these affect the process and outcomes of the research (Saunders at al, 2016; Berger,

2015). Reflexivity is important because of the underlying assumption that the

researcher’s ontological and epistemological positions can influence the research

process and its outcomes. Through this process of reflection the researcher

recognises and takes responsibility for the effect that their personal characteristics,

beliefs, biases, preferences and political and ideological stances may have on the

research setting, the people studied, the questions asked, the data collected and, most

importantly, the way the information is interpreted (Berger, 2015). Reflexivity is said

to be important to reduce researcher bias and value judgements by examining the

assumptions embedded in the research activity (Watt, 2007).

In this research, reflexivity was conducted along two different paths, the

first was exercised when collating a portfolio to become accredited as a Teaching

Assistant at the University and the second was while taking part of certain ongoing

PhD-related work group. The first path led to reflexivity since the portfolio’s main

objective was to have researchers reflect on their teaching practices while being PhD

students. It was important to determine the PhD students’ strengths and weaknesses

when teaching. The practice of reflecting on the experiences was developed when

collating the portfolio and would then be extrapolated to the research during the

fieldwork stages. After conducting the scheduled work while on fieldwork, the

researcher would take her notebook and summarise what she considered were the

most relevant topics. She would also write her thoughts regarding the overall

interview process and the interviewee. While doing this, the researcher noticed that

312

when she struggled to build rapport with the interviewee, the outcome of the

interview was not as positive. By reflecting on this, the researcher was able to work

on building rapport quickly for the next interview. The second way in which the

researcher practised reflexivity was as part of her PhD work group. In this group, the

researcher participated in sessions about research challenges, reflecting on the

closeness to the topic, how past experiences could potentially sway the way

researchers interpret some of their data, discussing political stances and any other

topic pertinent to the session’s objective. This process was particularly important

when analysing trade union-weakening practices by employers where, in that work

group, the researcher was able to reflect on her past experiences and how they were

possibly influencing the analysis.

During these sessions, two potential sources of bias became clear. One was

the fact that the researcher had previously worked for one of the case study

companies and the second was the researcher’s psychology background. To diminish

the first source of potential bias, the researcher ensured, to the best of her ability, that

her previous experience did not inform the analysis. This was considered during the

first interim reports conducted. The second potential source of bias warrants

explanation more in detail. Having a background in social and organisational

psychology may have also influenced the way the researcher was interpreting data.

During her undergraduate degree, she was exposed to positivism as the main

paradigm since her University was committed to the idea that Psychology was a

‘hard’ science and that all research conducted had to be done following the scientific

method. This exposure to positivism could have influenced the way the researcher

analysed the data collected as methodological rigour was one of the main values

taught during her years of training to become a psychologist.

Overall, interpersonal factors, as well as the research’s context and

epistemological assumptions, could have influenced the way this research was

conducted. Both the work group and collating the portfolio helped her to practise

reflexivity and be more aware of potential bias in the analysis and interpretation

portion of the research. The researcher became more open and appreciated greater

contingencies as the process of reflexivity developed further. Reflexivity helped the

researcher understand her ideological baggage as a researcher and to try and limit it

to the greatest extent possible. With the help of reflexivity, there is greater

313

understanding of the range of influences shaping this research. An example is the

broad nature of the challenges facing trade unions in Chile.

Documents

Trade Union Renewal in Chile - Research Explorer