!To what extent can the nature of public museums

or galleries be utilised to prevent art theft? !!Min Tse Chong

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

School of Art History !

AH4099: 30-Credit Dissertation !

Submitted 24 April 2015 !

6029 words !

Table of Contents

!1. Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………… 3

2. Synopsis …………………..………………………………………………………..… 4

3. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..… 5

4. On the nature of public museums and galleries ……………………………….….… 8

5. Incorporating criminological theory …………..……………………………………. 11

6. Recommendations for art theft prevention ………………………………………… 14

7. Conclusion ……………………………….………………………………………….. 19

8. Works Cited …………..………………… …………………………..……………… 20

!!

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Acknowledgements !I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Ulrike Weiss, for her advice and support during

the researching and writing of my dissertation. !!

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Synopsis !Much of the literature on art theft from public museums or galleries (PMG) insists that

the nature of PMG is incompatible with security measures against stealing art. For instance,

PMG are necessarily publicly accessible, which allows potential thieves to straightforwardly

carry out surveillance under the pretence of being an ordinary visitor. Moreover, thieves

planning to commit larceny have easy access to entrances into and exits from the PMG in

question. However, this dissertation will explore the ways in which the context of PMG can

be used to prevent against art theft, particularly deterrence due to more comprehensive

security systems that do not rely primarily on advanced technology, and deterrence due to

PMG’s (potential) role in increasing the chances of catching art thieves. These

recommendations will be informed by criminological theory on theft, particularly an

augmented version of the routine activities perspective (RAP). This dissertation aims to

provide a basis for more research into the subject of art theft prevention within the context of

PMG.

!!!

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Introduction !In 1961, Francisco Goya’s Duke of Wellington was sold at auction for the unprecedentedly

high price of US$392 000 to an American buyer. Soon after that, the British government

collected the funds necessary to buy back the national treasure, and it was soon added to the

collection of the National Gallery in London. Eighteen days later, it was stolen. Though art

theft had been committed before, this particular case arguably marked the beginning of an

understanding that art is highly monetarily valuable, and can be a viable and lucrative target

for theft (DeGraw 1). Art theft incurs massive losses every year, and the black market trade

in stolen art is famously estimated at between US$1.5 million to US$6 million annually

(Houpt 12). Whether this vague figure should be challenged or not, the notion that art has

great monetary value is cited heavily not only in the media and popular culture, but also in

academic literature. However, it is also important to note that when a piece of art is stolen, it

leads not only to the material loss of the artwork but also intellectual and cultural loss, as

represented by the unique piece (Durney & Blythe 116). Thus, one of the underlying

assumptions of this dissertation will be that art is valuable, and whether that value is intrinsic

or constructed is not of concern - art is worth protecting, either way. In particular, I will be

focusing on art theft prevention in public museums or galleries (PMG), which contain key

collections of cultural heritage and knowledge (Hill 444), and I will be answering the

question of to what extent the nature of PMG can be utilised to prevent art theft.

!Perhaps because stolen art can always potentially be recovered, unlike when art is

destroyed, the issue of art theft is generally treated in a prescriptive, reactionary way, rather

than as something that can be prevented proactively from the outset . There is a worrying, 1

albeit difficult-to-prove statistic that nine out of ten stolen artworks will never materialise

after their thefts (Dolnick 1). Despite this apparent difficulty in tracking down, let alone

recovering, stolen art, it seems remarkable that much of the literature on art theft does not

focus on prevention in order to avoid the problem of recovery. Instead, academics and those

with experience in the field tend to discuss the processes and methods that take place after

thefts have occurred. A common emphasis is on the lack of specialised police forces, as well

as the limited focus and responses of current policing bodies when it comes to art theft

(Oliveri 87; DeGraw 8). Additionally, the necessity of law and regulation to prevent the sale

and trade of stolen art is often highlighted, as can be seen in Carol Morris’ and in Sarah

Conley’s articles on international art theft (80; 494-498). However, there is far less emphasis

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It must be noted that though vandalism and forgery are also art crimes that PMG should be 1

protected from, I will not be focusing on these due to the constraints of this essay.

on the role of PMG in art theft prevention. The recurring assumption in much of the

literature is that art theft is best prevented in PMG by buying better alarm systems and

security devices, coupled with better security guards. This is best exemplified in the

UNESCO document The Protection of Museums Against Theft. Although it was written fifty

years ago, its heavy emphasis on up-to-date alarm systems is still pervasive today. Moreover,

even though the importance of security staff is also highlighted, they are written about in the

context of being human responses to alarm systems rather than as a separate and individually

important defence against art theft (Noblecourt 184, 187).

!On the other hand, I will draw inspiration from John E. Conklin, who wrote the first

academic book dedicated to art crime in 1994 in which he recognised the need to understand

art crime within the “social context” of the art world (Conklin 11). Though subsequent

scholarship has, on occasion, followed in a similar vein, such as in the case of Simon

Mackenzie’s work, there is still a dearth of literature that not only recognises that the nature

of PMG can undermine efforts to protect against art theft, but also suggests changes that

could be made within the system to circumvent these issues. This dissertation will not be

concerned with recovery per se, or the role of involved bodies like police departments;

instead, it aims to fill a gap in the literature about the role of PMG themselves in art theft

prevention. By looking at the issue more generally, I hope to provide a strong basis for more

research rather than a comprehensive study due to the limited nature of this dissertation.

Thus, instead of selecting a particular case study to focus on, this dissertation will draw from

a selection of art theft cases that best illustrate the points made, starting from the arguable

beginning of the rise of art thefts from PMG in 1961 (DeGraw 1). Moreover, international

as these examples will be, the linking factor will be their statuses as PMG in the Western

tradition, which has informed the way that PMG are currently understood (Duncan 13). In

terms of suggestions for art theft prevention, I will be collecting suggestions from each

source, analysing and compiling them with the overall aim of composing a more complete set

of suggestions that could help prevent art theft in ways that are feasible in terms of resources

and systems within PMG. However, PMG can include famous, well-funded institutions as

well as smaller-scale PMG; similarly, art theft is not limited to masterpieces, but also applies

to less well-known art pieces (Durney and Proulx 119). As such, although general

conclusions will be drawn, I do not advocate a blanket application of all recommendations to

all PMG.

!This dissertation will try to add to the current scholarship by providing a theoretical

basis for better preventing art theft within PMG systems, first by outlining the nature of

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PMG, then by reconciling that with criminology theory on theft. Firstly, the nature of PMG

as publicly accessible, educational institutions that have a responsibility to preserve cultural

heritage will be discussed, as will certain aspects of their operation such as funding and staff.

Secondly, criminology theory will be drawn upon to see where the options for improving

security lie, particularly Conklin’s routine activities perspective, as well as notions of flagging

and repeat victimisation. Finally, based on the previous two sections, I will explore how

PMG can prevent art thefts by taking precautionary measures as well as easing the processes

of theft discovery and recovery. There is a strong need to reconcile the nature and purpose

of PMG, as well as the protection of the art that they hold. Essentially, I will take an

inductive, exploratory approach to the issue of art theft prevention and I will argue that art

theft security in PMG should work in tandem with what these spaces are, and what they

have. In order to better protect against art theft, it is important to consider the context of

PMG and find a way to work within their systems and nature.

!A common concern about the study of art crime, and art theft, is that there is a

comparative lack of academic literature on the subject, particularly considering the

prevalence of art theft and its importance as a worldwide concern (Conklin 2, Nicita and

Rizzolli 293). Although some authors like Durney and Proulx rebut this point, insisting that

there is in fact a proliferation of art theft writing, many of their examples focus on looting

from cultural heritage sites, or in wartime, rather than art thefts from, for instance, PMG,

private homes or companies (117-118, Shillingford 28) . However, I have circumvented this 2

issue by relying not only on books and journal articles by scholars, but also newspaper

articles and books written by individuals who have had direct experience with art theft, such

as journalists and police detectives. Though these sources may not be traditional sources of

academic scholarship, it would be a mistake to discount them as they have valid facts and

insights to offer. Moreover, the field of art theft is an interdisciplinary one; it spans art

history, museum studies, criminology, law and even economics (Nicita and Rizzolli 293). To

reflect this diversity, this dissertation will take a similarly interdisciplinary approach and in so

doing, I hope to be able to lay the groundwork for more effective methods of theft prevention

in PMG.

!!

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There should not be a conflation between ‘art theft’ and ‘looting’, particularly in this dissertation, 2

where the two terms will be kept separate and the latter is not included in the former term (Raguideau 196). Here, ‘theft’ will be used generally as an umbrella term for larceny, burglary and robbery that has occurred in PMG (Conklin 126).

On the nature of public museums and galleries !It must be noted that PMG are not homogeneous institutions; they vary, for example in

size, resources available and standards in management (Ambrose and Paine 6). Also, the

value of the artworks they hold can differ greatly, which can in turn impact the way that each

PMG operates. However, this section is not intended to be an exhaustive exploration of

what PMG are. Instead, it aims to discuss the twofold purposes of PMG, namely to educate

and to preserve, whilst also highlighting the seeming disconnect between these aims and the

everyday security of the museum space when considering the daily operations of PMG.

!PMG, as distinct from commercial galleries who aim to sell artwork, are generally

understood as having two major functions: they must be open to and educate the public, and

they must preserve the cultural objects that they hold and display (De Sanctis 51; Harrison

17, 23). In order to educate the masses, which is the primary raison d’être of PMG, they must

be publicly accessible institutions that follow in the European tradition of displaying art in

settings that allow for and encourage contemplation, enjoyment and learning (Duncan 13,

Nicita and Rizzolli 302, Ambrose and Paine 11). This museum philosophy holds the visitor

as key, and central; thus, PMG need to be “audience-conscious”, as De Sanctis calls it, and

must take into account the ease and convenience of visiting when making curatorial choices

(73, Dolnick 8). The Code of Ethics for Museums, created in 1986 by the International Council

of Museums (ICOM) as a manifesto on the international minimum standards for museum

operation, underlines these responsibilities and insists that PMG must interpret and make

accessible the “primary evidence” that they hold, such as artwork, so as to educate the public

(ICOM IV, 6, 8). Moreover, in order to maintain connections with the public and attract

them to view collections, PMG must engage in advertising and public relations by

broadcasting details about the exhibitions that are being held, as well as the artworks that are

being displayed (Ambrose and Paine 45). The preservation of culture follows on from the

main educational role of PMG, and is linked to the understanding of PMG as promoters and

protectors of culture (Hill 444). Though this notion is necessarily linked to everyday security

features in PMG, ‘preservation’ revolves more around the keeping and maintenance of

cultural heritage and, more specifically, knowledge for the enjoyment of future generations

(ICOM 1, 6). Part of this preservation mission involves the recording of what is in the

PMG’s collections, as well as how they acquired each work (Ambrose and Paine 214). These

records should fully describe the artworks held, as well as document “its associations,

provenance, condition, treatment and present location” (ICOM 5). Nonetheless, it is well-

known that due to the extreme size of many PMG collections, this is condition is not always

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adhered to; the Victoria & Albert Museum in London, for instance, still has not completed a

full inventory of its holdings (Houpt 137-138).

!In order to pursue these objectives, PMG require proper funding. However, the reality

of the situation is that many PMG have limited budgets, particularly in light of the constant

slashing of culture budgets by governments around the world (Knelman 50; Houpt 142).

Granted, PMG do not rely solely on funding from governments; other external sources

include companies, organisations and individuals, and internally, PMG can raise money

through admission fees, events, merchandising and membership subscriptions (Ambrose and

Paine 344, 383-386). Additionally, PMG can draw upon a wider museum network, where

formal relationships between PMG allow for cooperation and the sharing of resources such

as artwork, equipment and even staff training (ICOM 7; Ambrose and Paine 342-343).

Despite these factors, the overall budgets of PMG are still low enough that they must

compromise and distribute the money they have between general administrative costs, visitor

education and enjoyment, and security. Essentially, assuming that general administrative

costs must be met, the funds left that are being spent on security are not being spent on

fulfilling the PMG’s educational undertaking. Moreover, security measures such as

bulletproof glass and rope barriers have the unfortunate side-effect of undermining the

viewing experience (Houpt 133). As a result, many PMG choose to focus their funds on

improving exhibitions and enhancing the visitor experience, usually to the detriment of the

PMG’s security (Dolnick 15). For instance, in order to save money, it is a common practice

for PMG not to insure their artwork. In the UK, the Tate and the National Gallery, amongst

others, have uninsured permanent collections, despite the fame and value of many of their

artworks (Nicita and Rizzolli 302). Rembrandt’s Portrait of Jacob de Gheyn III, displayed in

the Dulwich Picture Gallery in London, UK, has an insurance premium of a mere £5000 -

that the gallery cannot afford (Knelman 111). Overseas, the Isabella Stewart Gardner

Museum in Boston, USA also does not insure its collections; the cost of theft insurance, circa

1990, would have amounted to more than US$3 million or more a year, whereas its annual

operating budget was US$2.8 million. Instead, it spends its funds on the maintenance of its

space and collections, and on general operations (Butterfield).

!This tension between the main educational aim of PMG and the necessity of security can

also be seen in the nature of the staff system in many PMG, where there is often a disconnect

between front of house staff, such as security guards, and operational staff like curators. The

latter are seen as integral components of running a well-functioning PMG, whereas the

former are understood more as subsidiary roles (Noblecourt 188-189). As a result, less is

�9

spent on the development of and wages for security staff, which in turn reifies the notion that

being a guard is an unskilled, low-wage job with a high turnover rather than a viable career

choice. Instead of producing dedicated, professional guards who are an integral part of

PMG operation, many PMG are dubiously protected by security staff who are not invested

enough in their jobs, or adequately trained to follow protocol (Conklin 124-125).

!!!!

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Incorporating criminological theory !One of the most applicable criminological theories to art theft is the routine activities

perspective (RAP), which centres on the practicalities of stealing art and can thus ground the

theoretical framework of this dissertation (Mackenzie 353). It states, if obviously, that theft

is most likely to occur when there is a suitable target, when guardianship is weak, and when

there is a motivated offender to commit the crime (Conklin 119). Art theft is no different to

any other kind of theft; those who steal must be motivated to do so, make plans, and weigh

the risks involved. What is different, however, is the environment in which they are

operating; thus, the RAP must be related back to the context of PMG (Raguideau 203). In

addition, I will augment the RAP with other criminological ideas like the flag effect, in order

to develop a more comprehensive theoretical basis. In so doing, I will show where security

improvements can and should be made in PMG to prevent art theft.

!Firstly, target suitability in the RAP relies on the idea that the item to be stolen must be

easily portable, concealable and storable, as well as easy enough to sell. Much of the art on

display in museums fulfil these criteria, as items like small sculptures and paintings can be

stolen with ease. Consider, for instance, the Portrait of Jacob de Gheyn III in the Dulwich

Picture Gallery. It has been nicknamed the ‘Takeaway Rembrandt’ because it has been

stolen four times since the gallery’s opening in 1981 due to its small size. Additionally, the

high value of art means that even if a thief is only able to sell a stolen work at a small

percentage of its estimated price, the profit could easily still come to more than would be

made from a generic house burglary (Conklin 119-120; Conley 494; Knelman 109, 125).

Lesser-known works can be sold or traded legitimately or on the black market, and in the

case of famous masterpieces that cannot be sold because they are too ‘hot’ and easily

recognisable, thieves have the option of ransoming what they have stolen (Nicita and

Rizzolli, 292-293).

!Secondly, if the potential target is not adequately protected, then it becomes even more

attractive to thieves. This includes, for instance, if an artwork is not well-guarded by security

staff, or is protected by technology that can easily be circumventable by the thief (Conklin

123-124). This can be seen in heists like the 2003 theft of three paintings from the

Whitworth Art Gallery in Manchester, UK, worth more than £4 million altogether. They

were found the next day in a public toilet block, along with a note saying that the thief stole

the artworks to “highlight the woeful security” (Houpt 73; Ward). Similarly, in 2005, the

National Museum of Fine Arts in Santiago, Chile, had a Rodin stolen by a 20-year old

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student who turned himself in after the theft, citing the desire to prove that the museum,

again, had poor security (Houpt 84). This second criterion of the RAP can be associated

with the notions of the ‘flag effect’, and repeat victimisation. The flag effect occurs

particularly after a PMG has been stolen from. Because the theft necessarily highlights

weaknesses in the PMG’s security, flags that mark certain features like a lack of CCTV

cameras or concealed entry-and-exit points can be placed both on the affected PMG as well

as other similar PMG. This is, in turn, linked to the potential for repeat victimisation of

either the same collection, as in the case of the Takeaway Rembrandt, or one with similar

flags (Mackenzie 360-362; Pease 12). The 2010 theft of five paintings from the Musée d’Art

Moderne de la Ville de Paris, France, can be seen as a result of the flag effect as the alarm

system there had been broken for the two months prior to the heist. Similarly, and in the

same year, the Mohamed Khalil Museum in Cairo lost a van Gogh because its alarm system

was known to be non-functioning; moreover, only seven of its forty-three security cameras

were working (Durney and Proulx 120).

!Lastly, for a theft to occur, there must be at least one motivated offender to steal the art.

There are many reasons for art thieves to steal, such as a love of art or a desire for profit

(Mackenzie 355). However, no matter what the specific motivation, thieves tend to be risk-

averse; they are often driven by the promise of high profit, be it monetary or otherwise, for

low risk (Raguideau 197, 208). If the punishment is too severe, or the risk of detection too

high, then the offender in question will not be motivated enough to commit the actual theft

(Nicita and Rizzolli 293). Thus, the focus here is not on determining the separate reasonings

for stealing art that different thieves can have; rather, the way that the context of PMG

provides easy opportunities for thieves to steal should be emphasised. Consider, for example,

the fact that PMG must be publicly accessible. Instead of having to devise a means of

surveillance in order to determine the security risks and potential pathways that could be

taken, thieves can take advantage of the PMG’s regular opening hours. Moreover, the

necessity for PMG to advertise the artworks that they exhibit means that thieves can easily

find out what is being held by the PMG in question, and what can potentially be stolen,

rather than having to do extra reconnaissance as they would have to do for a house theft

(Dolnick 8). Thus, by removing the discussion of theft motivations, a better understanding

of what can push thieves in general towards actually stealing art can allow us to devise more

effective prevention schemes (Houpt 72).

!It would be a mistake to believe that all three main criteria must be fulfilled in order for

theft to occur; for instance, increasing security levels is not necessarily a deterrent for art

�12

thieves and could instead lead to functional displacement (Dolnick 15). This is the notion

that in the face of improved security systems, especially determined thieves will turn from

one crime, such as larceny, to a more brazen kind, like armed robbery, in order to secure

their targets (Conklin 126). According to the Museum Security Network, the global

average of armed robberies of PMG was a grand total of one per year. Though burglary is

still the most common method of art theft, since 2000 the number of PMG-related armed

robberies has increased exponentially, arguably as a side-effect of more effective security

measures in PMG worldwide (Mackenzie 364; Knelman 292). This can be seen most

notably in the 2000 theft of three paintings from the Swedish National Museum in

Stockholm, Sweden, where three men were armed with a submachine gun, and in the 2004

armed robbery of The Scream and Madonna from the Munch Museum in Oslo, Norway

(Nasstrom; Houpt 12). In a similar vein, improving security in some PMG can have the

effect of displacing potential thefts to other PMG that are more poorly guarded in

comparison (Conklin 124) . Perhaps, then, prevention through improved security should not 3

be pursued on its own; instead, prevention by increasing the chances of catching thieves

should also be pursued.

!!!

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Displacement can also trickle over into other places that do not have the resources to properly 3

secure the art they own, such as private homes or churches.

Recommendations for art theft prevention !In this section, the main aim is to outline some easily-implementable recommendations

for improving art theft prevention by using the nature of PMG rather than fighting against it;

in this way, I hope to target both well-funded as well as under-resourced PMG. Though I

am by no means advocating a ‘no-technology’ approach, I strongly suggest steering away

from an over-reliance on technology . Though improved and technologically impressive 4

security measures have their role to play in deterring art theft, they must not be treated as an

automatic panacea and assuming this has the effect of falsely engendering a sense of security

(DeGraw 8; Oliveri 85; Ambrose and Paine 282). Not only is it important to pursue art theft

prevention by bettering security measures within museums, but it is also imperative that

deterrence should also come from PMG’s role in increasing the chances of catching thieves in

the stolen art recovery process.

!In terms of directly protecting each artwork, and considering the low budgets of many

PMG, performing extensive, expensive upgrades of security systems that can ultimately

impede the visitor experience should not be the standard. Instead, low-tech materials can be

combined in creative ways to augment existing technological security measures; this way,

even if technology fails, there will always be a backup. Low-tech security also has the added

benefit of being tailorable to the artwork being protected; for instance, sculptures can be

physically anchored to plinths that are fixed to the floor. In the case of paintings, they can be

attached to and detached from the wall by a sliding chain mechanism according to a certain

shape, like a Z or an L - much like a cross between a hotel sliding lock and an Android lock

code (Charney). In addition, rather than allocating a budget for insurance or elaborate

security precautions, Nicita and Rizzolli suggest that PMG could instead use that money to

make the artworks in their collection as famous as possible. They argue that investing too

much in security only serves to increase thieves’ determination to steal, as they expect a

greater reward proportional to the amount of money being spent on protecting it. By

allocating these funds instead to heightening the visibility and fame of their artworks, PMG

can not only pursue their educational role in serving the public, but also deter thieves from

theft due to the extreme difficulty in selling well-known paintings in both reputable and

black market deals. Granted, not every artwork owned by every PMG can be made famous

in this way, and those that remain less prominent can potentially become even more coveted

�14

I will not be exploring the technologies that could be used by PMG to secure their buildings, 4

such as particular alarm systems or CCTV cameras, as their discussion lies outside the limits of this essay.

by thieves for their relative anonymity (291-292, 302). However, this is still an interesting

idea that can be applied to the more expensive artworks in any given PMG’s collection.

!Though the artworks themselves are the main thing being protected, there is little point

in focusing merely on the safekeeping of individual pieces. The protection of the entire

collection is also critical; thus, the physical security of the PMG’s building or buildings is

important in terms of architectural parts like windows, doors, and the roof (Ambrose and

Paine 278, 317-319; Conklin 255). Consistency is key, be it in time or space, as the security

of the museum space should not change drastically between areas or at different times of day.

If the windows of a PMG have special fastenings, then these should be in use during opening

hours as well as when the museum is closed to visitors. Moreover, other possible points of

entry like doors should also have similar fastenings (Noblecourt 189). Also, regular updating

and reviewing of physical security features should constantly be undertaken in order to avoid

flags being placed on the PMG due to poor security (Ambrose and Paine 317-319). These

reviews should not only be inspections of security equipment, but should also take into

account any changes in the general museum space. Consider, for example, that the three

men who robbed the Musée des Beaux-Arts in Montreal, Canada in 1972 gained access to

the museum’s interior through a skylight that was being repaired. If the security staff had

noted this, and taken precautions against possible intrusion, then that museum may not have

had fifteen paintings stolen that night (Knelman 165). This example also suggests that

cooperation and internal communication between security guards and operational staff needs

to occur. Rather than separating the running of the museum and its security, there should be

more interaction between both sides so that the latter can be treated as something that is also

integral to the former (Noblecourt 188-189). Essentially, security staff should be regularly

briefed on the information that they need to effectively carry out their jobs, and should work

in tandem with operational staff so that the display of artwork and their security can be

considered together rather than separately (Ambrose and Paine 398). The Getty in Los

Angeles, USA, uses a colour-coded system of areas where red spaces, which hold artwork,

should connect to blue transition spaces as much as possible rather than leading straight into

green spaces, which denote public areas (Knelman 211). If other PMG began using this

method, then exhibition spaces within PMG can be decided based on the architecture of the

place. In this way, the layouts of PMG can be taken advantage of and used to help minimise

theft risks.

!Theft deterrence, however, should not be limited to being about preventing a theft before

it can occur, or interrupting a theft as it is occurring. By maintaining full, comprehensive

�15

inventories that record the contents of its collections, a PMG can quickly discover when an

artwork has been stolen. Moreover, the PMG will possess enough information about the

stolen piece to kick-start the recovery process (Conley 512). Both of these factors lead to a

higher chance of art thieves getting caught, whether they silently burgled or robbed with

arms, and can be said to act as a deterrent in its own right (Nicita and Rizzolli 293). The

importance of up-to-date, complete inventories is outlined by the example of the Hermitage

in St Petersburg, Russia. In 2006, worries about security breaches were raised, leading to an

audit of museums across Russia. As a result, the Hermitage discovered that more than 200

items were gone from their Russian mediaeval art collection, having been gradually stolen by

a custodian since 2001 (Chappell and Polk 43). Thus, not only do collection audits (or at

least regular reviews) allow PMG to be more familiar with their holdings so they can better

exhibit and preserve what they own, but they also indicate exactly what the PMG holds in

case anything is stolen or goes missing (Ambrose and Pain 218). In order to help in

recovery, the records of artworks need to contain information like names, dimensions, colour

photographs, provenance and other signs of identification (Conklin 261, DeGraw 4). Much

like collection audits, collecting this information is not only useful for recovery, but should

already be established practice due to the nature and purpose of PMG.

!The PMG role in interagency cooperation, whether local, national or international, is also

important in art theft prevention. If PMG are capable of lending each other artwork and

equipment, then a museum network of sorts must be in place (Oliveri 85). However, because

this network is not an all-encompassing web but is rather made up of formal and informal

relationships, the network should be expanded to include all PMG (Ambrose and Paine

342-343). Through this international network, museums can constantly stay connected and

keep updated on art theft news; for instance, if somewhere similar to another institution is

stolen from, the other institution will have some warning in case a flag is placed on them

(Raguideau 207; Mackenzie 361). Additionally, PMG need to cooperate and efficiently

exchange information with other bodies involved in art theft recovery such as local police,

international organisations like Interpol or the Art Loss Register and agencies associated

with insurance companies. By doing so, PMG will have the opportunity to become familiar

with the bodies they need to contact in the event of theft, and the bodies are familiar with

museum security - all of which contributes to a quicker reaction when an art theft occurs

(Knelman 12; Noblecourt 190).

!A key line of defence for PMG are their security staff, who are involved at every step of

prevention. They are integral not only as a method of deterrence, but also as physical,

�16

human responses to thefts (Ambrose and Paine 283-284). However, their full potential in

preventing art theft is not taken advantage of in many PNG. For instance, the ease of

surveillance in PMG for potential art thieves is a problematic issue. However, security staff

can learn from intelligence agencies, where possible cases of hostile surveillance are recorded

(Mackenzie 365). If, for example, certain visitors act suspiciously by asking odd questions or

continually visiting the same artwork in a short time period, these instances would be

reported and logged, and the person in question would be photographed and kept an eye on

(Knelman 212). This should include individuals that have seemingly legitimate reasons for

wanting more information or access to certain artworks. If this were the norm, the man who

stole five Rembrandt etchings in total from two different American museums would not have

been able to on the pretence of being a scholar writing a book on Rembrandt. Security staff

also have a role to play in discovering thefts, particularly in larceny and burglary cases.

Because guards work in shifts through opening and closing times, they should be tasked with

logging the artworks they are meant to protect, thus ensuring that they end their shifts with

every piece of art they started with (Conklin 178, 257). Having this become a regular

practice would prevent cases of security guards not realising that a theft has occurred on

their watch, such as in the 2007 theft of A Cavalier by Frans van Mieris from the Art Gallery

of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia (Oliveri 81; Chappell and Polk 50). Thieves

would also be unable to adequately delay the discovery of their thefts by rearranging

collections of smaller objects to conceal a missing piece, or stealing the descriptive plaques of

paintings that were taken (Conklin 167-168). Overall, quicker discoveries of missing art

means that the recovery process can be begun faster, which can in turn mean deterrence for

thieves as there is a higher risk that they will be caught before they can sell on their stolen

goods.

!Obvious as it seems, guards need to be trained well, and regularly, in order to maintain

high standards of security. This is particularly important for PMG that cannot afford to hire

contracted guards from professional security companies, and so train their own security in-

house (Mackenzie 361). Importantly, too, the monotony of the job must be taken into

account, as must the fact that in any system, failures occur without constant monitoring -

routine is the enemy of diligence. When making rounds, security guards have been described

as having “their eyeballs open…[without] seeing anything” (Knelman 208). Moreover, thefts

have often occurred despite working alarm systems, because guards tended to assume they

were faulty when activated (Houpt 143). Regular training can be helpful for inculcating the

following of protocol and regulations into guards. This can take the form of ‘scenario

training’, where security staff can simulate art theft situations and respond accordingly. In

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this way, new ideas about how to adjust security are continually being tested, and

simultaneously, the guards being trained will better understand the psychology of potential

thieves (Knelman 212). By emphasising protocol, unprofessional mistakes like the ones

made by the Isabella Stewart Gardner’s guards during the infamous 1990 heist, who

accidentally let the thieves in in the first place, can be reduced in PMG (Conklin 126).

!!

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Conclusion !There is a need to find a compromise between the function of PMG as educational

preservers of culture with the prevention of art theft. Though much of the literature on this

field bemoans their incompatibility, the nature of PMG can actually be utilised to deter art

thieves. This can partly be done by ensuring that what should happen within the system

does happen, such as the inventorying of all artworks in the PMG’s collections, and partly by

making changes in preventative measures that work with the nature of PMG rather than

against them, like profiling suspicious visitors to the PMG in question. By contextualising

art theft in terms of the nature of PMG, and combining this with criminology theory on theft,

I outlined a theoretical basis from which recommendations on what measures could be taken

against art theft. Rather than focusing on technological security fixes, emphasis was placed

on preventative methods that could be adopted selectively by PMG of different sizes and

access to resources. However, these recommendations are not intended to be blindly applied

to all PMG; moreover, the conclusions arrived at in this dissertation are intended to provide a

foundation for future research into the effective prevention of art theft in PMG, despite the

perceived limitations attached to the nature and context of PMG.

!!

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