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The Stoic Theory of Moral Development

Richard F. Kitchener

Department of Philosophy

Colorado State University

Introduction

Not much has been written on the history of moral development oron the history of theories of moral development. Partly this isbecause the concept of moral development lacks an unambiguous singlereferential subject—does it refer to the individual person, theaverage person, the epistemic subject, societies? All of these havebeen taken to be the underlying subject of moral development, butthere has not been a single unified account of this multi-faceteddevelopment, in fact, such a history may be impossible to write.

The subject of moral development is often discussed under rubricssuch as ‘moral education’ or ‘philosophy of education’ or even‘political philosophy.’ It seems clear, for example, that (in somesense) G.W.F. Hegel (1821/1991) and Karl Marx (I963) were writingabout the development of morality just as Friederick Nietzsche(1887/1995) was or (on the current scene) Jurgen Habermas (1976).Philosophers of education (e.g., Carr, 1991; Peters, 1981) areconcerned with issues in moral development or moral education (as theysometimes put it) even if what they are writing may not easily fitinto other ways of conceptualizing moral development as characterizedby psychologists. Indeed, anyone concerned with what the Germans callBildung—roughly moral self-cultivation (Bruford, 1975) would be doingmoral development, a concept originally rooted in the Greek notionof paideia (Jaeger, 1939/1965).

But often the history of moral development is taken in adifferent, rather unclear sense: a history of theories (conceptions,ideas) about moral development. Here such a history concerns therepresentation of moral development, not the thing itself, and it isthis theoretical history that lacks a well-defined conceptualperspective. There have been different theories about thedevelopment of the particular individual (idiographic moral development) andof people in general (nomothetic moral development); there are differenttheories of how the moral agent develops (where the moral agent is theethical counterpart to Piaget’s [Beth & Piaget, 1966/1974] epistemic

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subject) just as there are different theories of how societies andculture have developed morally (assuming that they have).

One might expect psychologists to have written about at leastsome of this since they are in the business—at least some of them—ofstudying the changes that occur in a particular psychological domain.So we do find several histories being written of domains that overlapthe subject matter of moral development: child psychology, childdevelopment, and developmental psychology (although these are rarelydistinguished). But roughly speaking child psychology is thepsychology of “little kids”, e.g. how they learn a particular task ortheir emotional response to environmental stimuli as in Watson’sfamous study (Watson & Rayner, 1920). Nothing very developmental ispresent here since we are investigating events occurring in a verticaltime slice. If we study psychological changes occurring duringchildhood, we have child development studies, but to have a robustdevelopmental psychology one needs to study the entire complement ofpsychological properties over the life course.

Accounts of moral development focus on theories about thesedomains or about the accumulation of empirical data about theserealms: we can find described changing conceptions or theories about,say, the child and how the child moves through a temporal span of time(Aries, 1960/65; Boas, 1990); we also find accounts of the gradualincrease in empirical data about childhood practices, which havechanged over time (DeMause, 1974, 2002). But both types of accountssuffer from a rather short and narrow perspective, with the temporalspan of interest often covering only the last hundred years or so.But more than that, there does not seem to be anything out there thatone could call a history of theories about moral development (althoughthere is an interesting area of historical studies, inspired by Aries[1960/65], concerned with the moral practices of different historicalperiods such as the Pilgrims of North American or 17th century Frenchculture).

When individuals do discuss a history of theories of moraldevelopment, this is almost invariably limited to the theories of JeanPiaget (1932/1965) and Larry Kohlberg (1981) and perhaps with somegood reason. At least in psychology, the field of moral developmentseems to have been rather single-handedly created by these twoindividuals, in particular by Kohlberg. But what about other thinkerswho wrote about moral development before these two giants?—Freud(1930/62) should have something said about his account I would think.But are we to believe that nothing of any interest occurred in the

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history of, say, and western thought in the 2000 years before Freud?Some individuals may recognize the important views of Rousseau(1739/1979) and Locke (Axtell, 1968) but what about Immanuel Kant(1803)? For that matter, what about earlier thinkers such as Aristotle(1999)? And even if, per chance, some individuals write aboutAristotle’s theory of moral development (Silverstein & Trombetti,2013) , are there no other significant theories of moral developmentto be found in other Greeks, who (after all) were the formativethinkers of our conceptual outlook—not only Socrates and Plato, forexample, but also the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Skeptics? Infact, it has become clear in recent years, that in addition toAristotle’s widely recognized theory of moral development, there wereat least four other theories of moral development in ancient times:Theophrastus (Porphyry, 1965)—Aristotle’s successor among thePeripatetics—the Stoics, and two “hybrid” views of Antiochus ofAscalon (Cicero, 2001, book V) and Arius Didymus (Fortenbaugh, 2002).All of these thinkers had theories of moral development that containedimportant psychological components, virtually unknown among modernnon-specialist scholars.

I would like to make a small beginning towards creating such ahistory by discussing the theory of moral development advanced by theancient Stoics, a theory of moral development that rivaled Aristotle’s(in antiquity) and one that has had an important influence throughoutthe subsequent history of western thought— throughout the middle agesand the modern period, continuing on into the 20th century with theviews of psychologists such as Albert Ellis (1962; Robertson, 2010 )and Aaron Beck (Evans, 2011).

A prime example here is the psychological theory of the Stoics, agroup of thinkers spanning over 500 years (300 B.C.E. to 200 CE),beginning with Zeno of Citium (335-263 BCE), its originator,continuing through Cleanthes (331-232 B.C.E.) to the greatest of allthe Stoics, Chrysippus (279 – 206 B.C.E.), down to Panaetius (185-109B.C.E.) and Posidonius (135-50 B.C.E.) and finally to the more well-known Roman Stoics: Seneca (55 B.C.E.-40 C.E), Marcus Aurelius (121-180 C.E.), and Epictetus (55-135 C.E.)—to mention just the mostimportant members. We have no extant works of the Greek Stoics, ourknowledge of them basically limited to fragmentary quotations andreports from doxographers (the situation is somewhat better withrespect to the Roman Stoics). Furthermore we have nothing like thecomplete collected sayings of the Stoics. The standard anthology (inGreek and Latin) is the four volumes of von Arnim (1903-24), whichremains incomplete. Fortunately, we now have several English

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anthologies of selections from the writings of Hellenisticphilosophers, including of course the Stoics (Inwood & Gerson, 2008;Long & Sedley, 1987). Wherever possible I will give references to theEnglish translations of these works.

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Stoic Metaphysics

Stoic ethics and theory of moral development cannot be understoodwithout seeing, however briefly, how these notions are based upon theStoic theory of metaphysics—their theory of reality and theirphilosophy of nature. Briefly put, this view consisted of thefollowing concepts: naturalism, vitalism, materialism, holism,determinism, providentialism, and rationalism. All of this wascombined with an empiricism and a radical cognitivism.

Naturalism

First of all the Stoics held a view about the nature of realityshared by most Hellenic and Hellenistic thinkers: a belief innaturalism. According to this view, nothing exists outside or beyondnature, the natural world (the Stoics qualified this claim somewhat).Such a view was also held by Aristotle, the Epicureans, and theSkeptics along with many other lesser known representatives of ancientschools, the only exceptions being Plato, the Pythagoreans, andcertain lesser-known figures.

Given the diversity of views covered by the term ‘naturalism’, itis obviously of crucial importance to understand what these thinkersmeant by ‘nature’ and what kind of naturalism they adhered to. Ourterm ‘nature’ comes from the Latin ‘natura’, which is Cicero’stranslation of the Greek term ‘phusis’. Phusis is from phyein "to bringforth, produce, and make to grow”. The phusis of something was to beseen in observing the course of events associated with a particularsubstance over time, where the sequence was something indigenous tothe individual substance in question, i.e., internally determined andnot due to external factors. Hence the underlying nature of somethingwas an internal principle of change.

Phusis got translated as ‘natura’, which derives from nasci, ‘to beborn, grow, and be produced’. What was ‘natural’ was (once again)organic growth and development, with the entire process being governedby the nature of the thing in question. So originally the Greeks tookthe world around them—what we would now call the natural world—toconsist of substances that grew and developed according to theirinternal natures. Biology was thus the paradigm not only forunderstanding their surrounding world but also for understanding what,in particular, we would take their physical world to be. This can beseen in the case of Aristotle’s physics (1984), where objects move totheir natural places following a causal trajectory that was, at leastin part, a teleological one. Such a biological view of physical

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phenomena (including inorganic substances) was present up until theScientific Revolution, even including aspects Sir Isaac’s Newton’sthinking.

Thinking about the physical as the stuff something was made of,was a medieval notion (12th-13th centuries). The physical as material—what something is made of, e.g., wood, water, gold, earth—was a lateraddition and found its home in the Scientific Revolution. How mattercould thus explain a substance’s course of development--what we nowthink of as materialism—was a mystery and accounts for thepredilection of modern scientists to disavow the underlying teleologyof development and to replace it with laws of movement involvingcorpuscles and atoms interacting in space by collision, vibration,etc.

Phusis as the natural was a concept that had, as corollaries, thenotion that what was not part of the natural course of things, viz.,human intervention and creation, was un-natural. Hence artifacts andconventions were thought as opposed to the natural order of things.Since this occurred primarily in the human arena, it was easy toconclude that language, social norms, technological products were non-natural. Among the Greek Sophists, the issue became one of nomos(human law and convention) versus phusis (the natural), with theimportant question being: what objects fell on the nomos side andwhich ones on the phusis side? The natural seems fixed and determined,necessary in some sense, whereas the nomos side was variable andcontingent. So, one aspect of the meaning of naturalism is itsopposition to non-natural (the arbitrary outcome of human activity).

A second aspect of this theme concerned the existence of a realmdifferent from the natural one, a realm above and beyond the naturalworld, in short a transcendent realm—the super-natural. These heavenlyrealms were placed outside of nature and hence outside of normalnatural processes involving space, time, matter and motion—thecategorical features of our natural world. The non-natural (the super-natural) realm was thus outside of space and time, immaterial, andimmovable. Here one thinks of the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Plato(and later thinkers such as Plotinus and Augustine).

Thirdly, what was natural was what usually happens (given certainconstraints and conditions). If these initial conditions were absent,for example, if a plant did not have soil and water, then the outcomeof development would not be what was expected; if a certain sideconstraint was violated, if an external force interfered with theongoing process (for example, a pig ate the acorn), then the

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development process would be derailed and something unusual(unnatural) would occur. But such things, at least in the case ofbiology, rarely happened; these were a-typical results. Hence, therebecame associated with the notion of the natural, a normativeassociation: the end-result was what usually occurred (psychologicalnormativity) and what ought to occur (teleological normativity).

Finally, the natural realm has a necessity to it not to be foundin the non-natural realm, which manifests contingency. Naturalprocesses were governed by an internal principle of change, lodged inthe essence of the individual substance. This governing principle(developmental program) specified how an individual process had tooccur in order for it to be a part of its nature. This naturalnecessity was to be contrasted with the accidental, random, andcontingent series of events that could be observed to occur when somephenomena was “unnatural”. There was an indefinite number of wayssomething could fail to manifest this natural necessity depending onthe disturbing external factors present— the impediments.1 Here therewas variance whereas in the ideal natural realm there was uniformityof process. This distinction was part of the basis for the long-standing assumption in the history of thought that the realm of chancewas somehow unintelligible in contrast to the natural, which was theonly thing that made sense.

In short, the natural was conceptualized in contrast with theconventional, the super-natural, the atypical, and the accidental,where all of these were conceptually located in the external realm inrelation to the individual substance.

Materialism (Corporealism)

In addition to a generic kind of naturalism, the Stoics gave aparticular interpretation of what nature ultimately consists of:matter (corpuscles). According to the Stoics, everything that existsis physical (corporeal), and by this they meant “everything thatexists, exists in space and time with causal properties,” i.e., hasthreefold extension (length breath, depth) together with resistance(Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 272).

Several caveats are required here. First, Stoic materialism issomething of a misnomer. It is better to term it a version of

1 According to Galileo’s theory of impediments (Galileo, 1632/1967), natural motion and velocity of objects were sometimes derailed and set off course because of impediments such as air resistance and friction. But in the absenceof these impediments, objects would obey the ideal laws of physics.

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corporealism since there were versions of Greek materialism, namely,atomism, which differed fundamentally from Stoic materialism. Stoiccorporealism takes the ultimate constituents of reality to be bodies(corpuscles), not atoms, a view also championed among somematerialists in the Scientific Revolution. These ultimate constituentswere, in turn, reducible to the four elements of earth, air, fire, andwater.

Secondly, the Stoics were not radical corporealists since theyalso recognized that there was the incorporeal realm, things which didnot “exist” (in their technical sense) but did “subsist” (as theysaid): these were space (place and the void), time, and the lekta(roughly the meaning of propositions). The Cosmos is spherical andcorporeal, existing in space and time, but there is an infinite voidbeyond this cosmos. Place (space) and time are viewed as containers:place is that spatial extension which is occupied by a body, and timeis what events are contained in. Lekta are semantic-type propositionalstructures, which constitute the meaning of assertions. Henceeverything that exists are bodies but incorporeals subsist. How theseincorporeals (especially lekta) fit into the Stoic theory of physicalismremains problematic. Fortunately we can ignore these perplexingquestions.

In the Cosmos, there are two main states of matter, an activekind of matter we call reason or logos, and a passive kind of matter,which we usually associate with everyday matter. Matter consists ofone or more of the four basic elements: earth, air, fire, and water.Air and fire make up a light element—pneuma; earth and water make up apassive element. For the Stoics, the entire universe consists ofvarying states of degrees of tension in this pneuma, which theyreferred to as pneumatic tension and which (according to some)anticipated something like modern field theory in physics (Sambursky,1959). Hence, the Stoics also believed in a cosmic holism ororganismic view of nature.

Vitalism

Thirdly, the Stoics did not view the corporeal as inanimate,since the Cosmos is an animal, alive, rational, intellIgent, withsense perception (Inwood & Gerson ,2008, p. 134). In fact, theircorporealism is a kind of vitalism: everything that exists, namely theentire Universe, is alive, conscious (in some sense) and rational. Thecosmos is thus an organism and everything in the cosmos (or at leastmost things) appears to be alive and to grow. For the Stoics (as formost Greeks) the cosmos (nature) literally develops the way an

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organism does. There are generative principles in nature calledspermatikos logica and these logical “seeds” govern the world. DivineReason (Zeus) “seeds the world for its growth” (Long & Sedley, 1987,p. 46).

In short, the Universe (Nature) is a Divine, rational substance(God), which has an active aspect and a passive aspect (what weusually call matter). We are also rational beings (smallerspermatikos logica) and obviously a part of Nature, also possessing anactive aspect to our being and a passive aspect. As a part of thisRational Order, we are therefore “seeds of Universal reason”. Theleading (active) part of our being they called the hegemonikon andascribed a thoroughly rational nature to it. It, like Zeus, was a kindof controlling agency or ruler over other aspects of our psyche, e.g.,impression, impulse, emotion, etc., which were themselves rational (tovarying degrees). So, for the Stoics humans were rational all the waydown, with the result being they had a kind of monistic psychologywith no room for irrational emotions, unconscious forces, etc .

Stoic psychology consisted of a subtle kind of materialism, forthe soul itself is a body (pneuma), which pervades the entire body butwhich takes on a particular governing structure (the hegemonikon)—theadministrative unit of the mind. The mind (mental states) obviouslyacts on the body and on objects in the environment; hence the mindmust be something physical. Cleanthes claimed: no incorporealinteracts with a body, and no body with an incorporeal but one bodyinteracts with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body whenit is sick and being cut and the body with the soul; thus when thesoul feel shame and fear the body turns red and pale respectively.Therefore the soul is a body (Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 272 ).

Determinism and Providentialism

The Stoics were thorough-going rationalists: For them, everyevent had a (sufficient) reason why it occurred. Furthermore, thisreason was a cause, which necessitated the consequent event. A causeis “that because of which” something happened (Inwood & Gerson, 2008,p. 91). Hence there was a causal universalism, which they also calledFate. “Fate is a continuous string of causes of things, which exist ina rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed” (Inwood& Gerson, 2008, p. 55). To say that something was fated is thus to saythat it was determined by a causal chain. But since this causal chainwas a rational chain, there is a reason, in fact a good reason, foreverything that happens. This is equivalent to Providence, since what

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is rational is good or beneficial. Evil in the world is thus deniedor justified as part of the overall divine plan.

Determinism (fate) and Providence thus go together. At the sametime, however, the Stoics also maintained that “things are up to us”since our actions and decisions are in our power. “. . . those thingsare in our power of which we also are capable of the opposites and itis to such cases that praise and blame and encouragement anddiscouragements and punishments and rewards are given. . . “ (Long &Sedley, 1987, p. 381). This power is lodged in the internal realm ofour minds and such an internal causal nexus must also be taken intoaccount in understanding what it means to say that a person could havedone otherwise. Some Stoics (e.g., Chrysippus) wanted to retain astrict determinism (Fate) but also to deny that actions arecategorically necessary. Whatever we do is caused, including internalstates of desire and belief, but this does not mean necessitated byexternal causes, for our actions also depend upon internalpsychological factors: our constitution, personality, earlyexperience, current desires, etc. Hence Stoicism was committed to whatis sometimes called soft determinism or compatibilism.

Everything that happens is rational (the Stoics claimed). If so,then there is Providence in the world since the gods control theoperation of the Cosmos and do so for good reason. This natural orderis, therefore, good. It is good in that this cosmic state isbeneficial to members of the cosmos, including both animals andespecially humans. Ever thing (every object) has a purpose and itspurpose is, in most cases, to benefit human beings. That is why sheephave wool, horses can be ridden, etc. Nature is designed to benefithumans. Any appearance of evil in this world is thus denied orjustified as being part of the divine plan.

Greek Ethics

There are several assumptions about the nature of ethicsvirtually all Greek thinkers shared. Their differences concerned howone interpreted these notions and the relations between them. AllGreek ethics was committed to eudaimonia (happiness), arête (virtue), andphronesis (practical wisdom).

Eudaimonia (Happiness)

Stoic ethics, like all Hellenistic theories of ethics, was aversion of eudaimonism, the notion that the ultimate good in life andthe goal everyone seeks is the state of well-being and flourishing theGreeks termed eudaimonia and we translate as happiness. There are lots

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of reasons that happiness is not a good translation of eudaimonia, themost important of which is the fact that we moderns associatehappiness with an internal psychological sensation of “feeling good”,which, although it might be one component of eudaimonia, is notessential to its nature. Better translations have been given: thehighest good (value) to be sought in life. Because there are severalmisunderstandings that result when eudaimonia is translated as‘happiness’, I will continue to use the Greek term, understanding byit a blessed state of the good life, flourishing and well-being thatonly humans are capable of attaining. This state is the ultimate telos(goal) of our entire existence, the only question being: what is thenature of this state and how we are to attain it.

Aretaic (Virtue) Ethics

Almost all Greek theories of ethics were committed to thecentrality of arête in the quest for eudaimonia. Our term ‘virtue’ isderived from the Latin virtus, which is how Cicero translated arete. Butvirtue is a misleading way to translate the Greek notion, since‘virtue’ is embedded in antiquated Victorian ways of thinking aboutproper behavior and is a term most individuals no longer use in theirdaily lives although we still use phrases like “in virtue of . . .”and “by virtue of” as in “by virtue of the power invested in me, I nowpronounce you man and wife”. We also say things like: “enlightenmentis one of the virtues of a good education” and similar things. But itis rare to hear someone talk about the virtuous traits of a person’scharacter, e.g., courage, dependability, etc. In fact in psychology,even the term ‘character’ was thought to be too laden with moralisticconnotations to be scientific, with Gordon Allport suggesting that wesubstitute ‘personality traits’ for ‘character’ (Allport, 1921;Nicholson, 1998). This apparently caught on, resulting not only in thedemise of ‘character’ but also of ‘virtue ’talk in general—untilfairly recently. (See also Himmelfarb, 1975.)

But the underlying idea of virtue theories of ethics is quiteintelligible. Various kinds of objects, people, and professionalactivities excel at their natural or characteristic functions; inorder to do this, they must possess certain properties—certainexcellences—which result in their functioning in this excellent way.This is true of the eye, a clock, a human being. In the case of humanbeings, their excellence consists in how they perform certain kinds ofbehavior, with such behavior being the result of a complex set ofinternal character traits (dispositions), issuing in this behavior,

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not automatically but as the result of intelligent reflection,associated emotions, and social context.

Virtues are thus complex dispositions of individuals—dispositionsto act in a certain kinds of way under certain conditions. They areinternal psychological properties of people like character orpersonality traits. But virtues are always tied to appropriate socialcontexts, with these contexts producing certain kinds of demandcharacteristics. What one ought to do, therefore, is importantly fixedby the corresponding social context and one’s social roles. There is,therefore, no real conflict between internal dispositions and socialdemands. These two variables are important determiners of what oneought to do, of what it is rational to do. A virtuous life is a lifethat is consistent over time, in fact over an entire life-time. Thisis because a virtue is “a character which is itself consistent, firm,and unchangeable reason” (Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 378).

But although Greek theories of ethics agreed that eudaimonia isthat state we all strive to attain, they disagreed about what thestate consisted of and what things were necessary and/or sufficient toproduce it. Several disagreed with the Epicureans, for example, on therole to give pleasure in the pursuit of the good. In this, theyopposed the views not only of the Epicureans but also that ofAristotle (1999), who argued that other things were normally neededto be happy: a decent physical appearance, good social standing,adequate income, friends, etc. This was denied by the Stoics, althoughthe precise differences between the Peripatetics and the Stoics wereoften difficult to delineate. But understanding that claim—virtue issufficient for happiness—-is perhaps the most difficult part of theentire Stoic account. For, as we will see, the Stoics did give theseother factors a certain kind of value—they were of value (we might say)but not valuable (intrinsically good). This distinction lies at theheart of the Stoic theory of ethics.

Phronesis

According to virtue theory, individuals act in particular ways wedeem good because they possess stable traits of character. In order toact in a morally appropriate way, one must of course know-how to act;this kind of knowledge the Greeks termed phronesis, which we (badly)translate as prudence; a better translation would be practicalrationality or wisdom. Phronesis “ is knowledge of what to do and not todo and what is neither; or the knowledge in a naturally social <andrational> animal of good things, bad things and what is neither”(Inwood & Gerson, 2008, p. 125). It is ethical know-how and is the

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result of a complex process of acquisition from childhood toadulthood. Phronesis is the ethical knowledge that is the outcome of acomplex developmental process and lies at the heart of thosecontroversies between Greek theories of ethics. It is here that theStoics advance their most peculiar theory of moral development, onebased on their notions of oikeiosis, kathekonta, and katorthormata. These aretechnical theoretical constructs introduced by the Stoics to give anaccount of moral development.

Stoic Ethical Theory

Developmentalism

Like virtually all Greek theories of ethics, Stoic ethics iscommitted to the notion that ethics is concerned with the question ofwhat is the best possible life a human can live and this in turn is aquestion of how our moral virtues develop over the course of our life.But theories of moral development, in turn, are based upon a model ofwhat development is and how it proceeds. This conceptual model issometimes called developmentalism (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Nisbet,1969) and the Stoics were clearly committed to such a model.2 There areseveral contemporary areas in which developmentalism is a prevalentmodel: economic developmentalism, educational developmentalism, andpsychological developmentalism. Developmentalism has been historicallythe prevalent model in theories of moral development, especially inancient thought. In the case of the Stoics, their developmentalism waspaired with their distinctive theory of oikeiosis.

The Cradle Argument

As we have seen, the natural was conceptualized in a variety ofways: in contrast with the super-natural, the conventional or human(nomos), the atypical or unusual, and the contingent. The causes ofthese non-natural states or processes were externally located inrelation to the individual substance. The natural is thus what isbiologically given in the newborn and in animals—implanted by nature—where these inborn factors are not yet corrupted by external factorsand social influences. Greek metaphysics, therefore, is modelled noton our conception of physics but on an earlier biological model, whereall objects in nature are alive and move towards their respective teloi.

2 The concept of ‘developmentalism’ is used in different senses in these different areas. There is little consensus about what ‘develop’ means in thesevarious areas and little cross-fertilization of ideas. For example, major thinkers in developmental economics rarely discuss work in developmental psychology at all.

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The natural is thus the biologically innate, and this is best seen inthe primitive stages of life and in the natural unfolding ofsubsequent development. We should, therefore, look to the cradle tosee what behaviors are occurring, for these will be the ones given bynature.

Secondly, what is to be found in these primitive stages is to beascertained by empirical observation, by actually observing anddescribing newborn and animal behavior. The different schools werethus prepared to let the empirical evidence decide which of theirmoral theories was correct. This was because they agreed that moralclaims were to be based upon empirical observation. From theseempirical claims, normative conclusions about what is good andvaluable, what the meaning of life consists of, how one shouldorganize one’s life to attain well-being and happiness could bedetermined.

One might think that it is sufficient just to look to the initialstage of the cradle and not to consider subsequent development, butthis would be mistaken since most Hellenistic thinkers believed thatthe (human) telos was not actually and fully present at birth—a terminusad quo—but rather was at the terminus ad quem. These are the twoendpoints one must consider. One should begin, therefore, by firstconstructing an empirical account of the behavior present in newborninfants and animals, and secondly an account of mature adult morality.It was the latter, of course, the telos of this entire process that wasthe real object of interest. This was because this final moral stagewas the completion and perfection of the moral processes occurringearlier. This was the ideal culmination of the entire process thatbegan at birth. In the case of humans, this final state would be thatof full adulthood where individuals would have the entire complementof rationality, including free choice, consciousness, and criticalreflective ability.

The temptation of developmentalists has always been to begin withthe terminus ad quem, the final state, and then to read these full adultproperties back into the terminus ad quo with these properties taking onan attenuated form. They would be present in the infant but not fullyand completely present; they would be there in a reduced or latentform in which case they would await the presence of the rightoccasioning causes in the environment, which would result in theirappearance. We have at birth, according to a popular Greek conception,the seeds (sperm) of subsequent adult finality. Just as a farmerplants seeds, so the gods implanted these seeds of rationality or

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virtue in the very being of the inborn infant. Such has been theprogram of virtually all of the nativists in the developmental camp, atemptation all of the Greeks no doubt felt including Aristotle and theStoics. The underlying strategy was obvious: to explain a property Ppresent in adults, hypothesize that such a latent property P* existsin the newborn. If P* exists at birth, admittedly in a latent form,there is no problem of explaining how P can appear de novo. Itdoesn’t really emerge since it has been present all along. Such astrategy can be found, I would suggest, in contemporary thinkers whosuggest the newborn comes into the world with a theory of Newtonianphysics, an instinct of justice, or a conception of the divine. Thisis, in my opinion, a failure of nerve.

Assuming the terminus ad quem is adequately described, andassuming one postulates a terminus

ad quo that is qualitatively different from the former course thisteleological process had to be explained; it had to be shown how theterminus ad quo was transformed into a terminus ad quem. These thinkers thushad to propose developmental explanations of this process (Kitchener,1983). Hence, something theoretical had to be said about thisintervening process, the transition from the primitive moral stage ofchildhood to the vastly superior stage of adult morality, to explainhow this initial behavior changed over time into full morality. Suchan explanation would involve explanations of these developmentaltransitions and transformations. Assuming that infantile human andanimal behavior lack the rich characteristics of morality present inadulthood, e.g., justice and altruism, the task was thus to show howthe infant stage of morality developed into the adult stage ofmorality. Since the initial stage did not show many of the importantcharacteristics of full-bodied morality, this question is often putas: how it was possible for less than moral behavior to develop intofull morality? Developmental explanations have to answer how-possiblyquestions. It was precisely here that the Greeks fell down the mostand failed to say much that has proved fruitful to subsequentdevelopmentalists.

It was common among Greek thinkers, Cicero says, to “visit thecradle, in the belief that the easiest way of understanding nature’sintentions is to look at early childhood (2001, p. 136). Hence theyemployed what has been called the cradle argument: that is a procedurewhich consists first in describing (or in claiming to describe) thebehaviour and psychology in the child in the cradle (usually inconjunction with young animals) and then in drawing (or in claiming to

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draw) more or less directly, certain conclusions which, in one way oranother, lead to formulation and justification of a moral doctrine(Brunschwicg, 1986, p. 113).

Hellenistic thinkers were thus concerned to draw normativeconclusions from such cradle arguments. In fact, according to severalindividuals, such a developmental approach lay at the very basis ofStoic ethics, namely, in their concept of oikeiosis. The Stoic theory ofoikeiosis nicely illustrates Stoic moral naturalism, an account of moraldevelopment that is at once naturalistic and rationalistic. It is afoundational element of the theory of the Stoics so important that atleast one individual has claimed “if there had been no oikeiosis, therewould have been no Stoa” (Pembroke, 1971, p. 115).

Hedonism Refuted

We look to the cradle, according to the Greeks, in order to seewhat is natural. If we do, what do we find? The Epicureans claimedthat pleasure is the good (hedonism), citing the behavior of infantsand animals who (they argued) do seek pleasure. Pleasure is not onlynatural, they argued, it is the supreme good in life. The Stoics,however, disagreed with this view. First, they argued that the initialbehavior of both the infant and the animal was something quitedifferent than the pursuit of pleasure, for their behavior is notthat of pleasure-seeking but can be more correctly described as self-preservation.

Secondly, even though the new-born might be said to be an egoist,concerned only or primarily with itself, this initial behavior would,in time, change in a patterned way, giving rise to justice, altruism,virtue, and (full) rationality. In short, what some individuals havecalled the moral point of view would emerge from an egoistic point ofview. Epicurean hedonism denied such development and was thereforeincorrect. The Stoic account of oikeiosis was thus offered as a morecorrect view of the matter. According to Diogenes Laertius:

[The Stoics] say that an animal has self-preservation as theobject of its first impulse, since nature from the beginningappropriates [oikeiosis] it, as Chrysippus says in his On Ends bookI. The first thing appropriate to every animal, he says, is itsown constitution and the consciousness of this. For nature wasnot likely either to alienate the animal itself, or to make itand then neither alienate it nor appropriate it. So it remainsto say that in constituting the animal, nature appropriates it toitself. This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and

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accepts what is appropriate. They hold it false to say, as somepeople do, that pleasure is the object of animals first impulse.For pleasure, they say, if it does occur, is a by-product whicharises only when nature all by itself has searched out andadopted the proper requirements for a creature’s constitution,just as animals frolic and plants bloom. Nature, they say, is nodifferent in regard to plants and animals at the time when itdirects animals as well as plants without impulse and sensation,and in us certain processes of a vegetative kind take place. Butsince animals have the additional faculty of impulse, through theuse of which they go in search of what is appropriate to them,what is natural for them is to be administered in accordance withtheir impulse. And since reason, by way of a more perfectmanagement, has been bestowed on rational beings, to livecorrectly in accordance with reason comes to be natural for them.For reason supervenes as the craftsman of impulse. (Long &Sedley, 1987, p. 346)

Their argument structure seems to be the following: Certainbehavior is observed in animals and new-born human infants. Twoexplanations of this behavior are in competition: (1) hedonismexplains this behavior—why it occurs—as pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidance. (2) Oikeiosis theory explains it as self-preservation. Nextthe Stoics argue that (2) is better than (1). “So little,” Senecasays, “ does fear of pain compel [animals] to [move their partsappropriately] that they strive for their natural motion even againstthe pressure of pain” (Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 347). Seneca cites twoexamples. Here is one: “A baby who is set on standing up and isgetting used to supporting himself, as soon as he begins to try hisstrength, falls down and with tears keeps getting up again until hehas trained himself through pain to do what nature demands”(Long &Sedley, 1987, p. 347). Therefore, hedonism is inadequate.

Animals and infants at birth are not pleasure-seekers. They aredriven by instinctive behavior; this instinctive behavior is implantedin them by nature, which is providential since this behavior isbeneficial to them—to their existence, their health, and theirflourishing. Nature thus takes care of them; not to do so once havingcreated them, we are told, would be irrational on the part of nature,and nature is not irrational. Here we have a kind of precursor to themodern argument that evolution designed things for the good of theorganism. In short, there is greater selective advantage to organismspursuing self-preservation than the pursuit of pleasure.

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The Concept of Oikeiosis (Οίκείωσις)

But what the concept (or concepts) of oikeiosis included remainsunclear just as there is little agreement on how to translate thisterm (Blundell, 1990; Brunschwicg, 1986; Engberg-Pederson, 1986,1990; Gőrgemanns, 1983; Inwood, 1983). The stem of oikeiosis (οικία)relates to household (i.e., the root of economics) and retains thecore sense of belonging to one, togetherness, affinity towards,endearment, concern for, to be well-disposed towards something. Theverb oikeion could be translated as “to appropriate” with the nounoikeiosis connoting “having an affinity to”. Since its’ opposite isalienation, the sense of oikeiosis is whatever is contrary to alienation,viz., affinity, belongingness, togetherness. When one appropriatessomething as one’s own, as belonging to the self, one takes and makesit one’s own. Certain kinds of behavior would thus be appropriate—what is suitable, proper (one’s own), as following from one’s natureor one’s station in life. As a result of one’s professionaloccupation, e.g., being a physician, certain kinds of behavior arethus appropriate by virtue of the nature of this profession.Likewise, if one adopts a child, one appropriates that individual, andcertain kinds of behavior of obligation naturally follow. What isappropriate, therefore, is what is natural, what issues from thenature (essence) of that thing.

Animal Psychology

A corollary of Stoic oikeiosis is the claim that this behavior isbest explained by assuming that animals and humans are aware ofthemselves from birth. As they sometimes put it, “animals perceivetheir constitution and themselves”. The same applies to infants. Theythen cite evidence for this claim: e.g., “when bulls do battle withother bulls or animals of different species, they stick out theirhorns as if these were congenial weapons for the encounter (Long &Sedley, 1987, p. 347). “We should realize” , according to Hierocles,“that as soon as an animal is born it perceives itself. . . The firstthing that animals perceive is their own parts. . . both that theyhave them and for what purpose they have them” (Long & Sedley, 1987,p. 347). But if animals know how to use the parts of theirconstitution and for what purpose, an animal “perceives itselfcontinuously” (Long & Sedley, 1987, 314). When an animal knows how todo something that is beneficial to it, the only explanation, theStoics argued, was the animal’s cognitive awareness of the purpose ofthis behavior. The animal knows that its horns are for fighting,humans know that we have a soul (Inwood & Gerson, 2008, p. 190, my

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emphasis). But we may question the confusion here between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We may want to insist that these are quitedifferent and that the Stoics are confused about this entire matter.But we should also perhaps forgive them for their lack ofepistemological sophistication. At the very least, we would have toinsist that they are not using ‘soul’ or ‘self’ in anything like thesay we moderns use those terms.

Although several contemporary scholars endorse such a view—animaloikeiosis requires self-consciousness—this is not a view that seemsnecessary, for one can explain oikeiosis without invoking a self in anytheoretical robust sense of that term. Indeed, Seneca himself gives analternative account, dispensing with animal selves altogether. On hisaccount, animals are indeed aware of their constitution, and theevidence for that is “that they move their limbs in a fitting andefficient manner, as though they had been trained to do so. . .” But,he says, they didn’t learn such things; these have been given to theanimal by nature : “they come into the world with this knowledge; theyare born with a sound training” (Inwood & Gerson, 2008, p. 189). Inhis 121st Letter, Seneca claims that an animal is aware of itsconstitution, which is “the leading part of the soul in a certaindisposition relative to the body” (Inwood & Gerson, 2008, p. 190).This does not mean, he insists, that the animal understands thedefinition of constitution; this would require that the animal be akind of “dialectician” and this is obviously unnecessary to assume.

Animals are born knowing how to do certain kinds of things incertain situations, e.g., knowing how to move certain parts of theirbody to defend themselves. They are goal-directed systems because ofan instinctive program guiding their actions—an innate skill. One cancall such knowledge an awareness of their constitution if one wantsbut there is no need to involve a self or self-consciousness, just asone can talk of an animal being “aware” or “conscious” of itsenvironment without resorting to cognitive states appropriate fordiscussions of higher organisms. Hierocles seems to have helpedhimself to an account that he didn’t need and one that seemsquestionable.

Appropriate Action (Kathekonta)

Oikeiosis is a theoretical ethical construct introduced to explainand justify certain aspects of moral development. But there are twoother concepts that were central to their theory of morality, conceptsthat are (in some sense) more philosophical. Central to their ethics,for example, was the claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness (it

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is much better to phrase it as: arête was sufficient for eudaimonia).This claim rests upon two technical concepts in Stoic ethics: kathekontaand katorthormata.

As we have seen, human infants come into this world much likeanimas do and this means they lack rationality—at least one kind.Nature has provided for their initial well-being by determining thatthey behave in certain kinds of ways. (The same was true of animals.)These behaviors were said to be appropriate for them to do because oftheir nature. The Stoics technical term here is kathekon—appropriatebehavior.(Since certain kinds of behavior were tied to theirparticular biological nature, this term is sometimes translated asappropriate function.) Nature has programmed organisms to performcertain initial biological, psychological, and primitive socialactivities, which in the case of mature humans include things such ashonoring parents, spending time with friends, paying ones debts, etc.These behaviors are kathekonta: things it is appropriate to do.

But although kathekonta have a certain kind of instrumental value,they are not, in and of themselves, morally good or intrinsicallyvaluable. From the moral point of view, they are said to beindifferent and their objects—life, money, beauty, friends—areproperties not morally good. Wealth, for example, does not reallycontribute to your happiness and hence is morally neutral. As naturalcreatures, we would of course be inclined towards possessing theseindifferent things. We would prefer them, the Stoics said, althoughwe would not choose them. What is morally good then? Not kathekontabut kathekonta performed in a certain way, transforming them intokatorthormata, morally perfect appropriate actions.

When kathekonta are performed in a certain kind of way—in arational way, with a certain frame of mind—they are candidates for abeing a morally good action. A kathekon, for example, the act ofreturning money to someone can be performed in different ways—in avirtuous way or in a non-virtuous way. For Cicero, this meant “withthe right intention”: other Stoics said it must be done in accordancewith right reason, meaning we realize it is the rational thing to do,given the providential and rational nature of all things. It would befollowing nature—the ideal natural order—if we were to do them.However, katorthormata are virtuous actions that are performed only asthe result of our moral development and this moral development is theresult of our rational development. Animals and children can performkathekonta but only mature humans can perform katorthormata.

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Morality is thus tied up with the development of virtue and this,in turn, is tied up with the development of reason in the individual.Thus moral development can be said to progress in the sense thatkathekonta develop into katorthormata. Such development occurs and is madepossible, in turn, because reason, the basis of this process, itselfis developing, proceeding from one primitive form to an advanced type—reflective rationality. The Stoics here have something like a stagetheory: instinctive behavior—rationality—moral virtue, where eachpreceding stage partially explains the subsequent stage.

Living in Accordance with Nature

The Stoics were consistent believers in determinism. But theirdeterminism was also a key ingredient in their ethical theory. As wehave seen, they believed that everything we do and think is determinedin the sense that there is an antecedent cause for this action. Such acause is the reason something happened, why someone did something, itis that thing because of which the person acted. But the Stoics alsoclaimed that we are responsible for what we do, our decisions(judgments, assents) are up to us. An external stimulus (impression)does not always compel us to act in a certain way or to make aparticular judgment. We have the ability to reflect upon thisimpression and to rationally decide what to make of it: to accept itas true, to act on its basis, etc. This reflective rationality wassomething unique to humans, something we shared with the largerrational divine universe but not the animals. This kind of rationalitywas a second-order rationality, something that emerged or supervenedin the course of our development. Seneca called it our secondarynature.

As the Stoics consistently stressed (although interpretedsomewhat differently), our goal in life is to live in accordance tonature. This means that, in some sense, we are to follow nature. Butwhat they meant by this was expressed in different ways. The Stoicsparsed ‘living in agreement’ in various ways

Zeno: the goal was to liv according to virtue

Chrysippus: to live in accordance with the experience of whathappens by nature, doing nothing which is forbidden byuniversal law, which is right reason pervading everything

Diogenes: the goal is reasonable behavior in the selection ofthings according to nature.

Archedemus: to live completing all the appropriate acts

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Antipater: selecting natural things and rejecting unnaturalthings, doing everything in one’s power to attain the principalnatural things.

The view of the Stoics can thus be expressed in a ratherparadoxical way. Everything we do is determined (fated) by priorevents. But we do have choices, although determined, which are up tous. We have the choice (second level) to behave according to nature(first level). Unlike the lower animals, humans have a second-ordermode of functioning, one that is naturalistic and rational butnaturalistic at a reflective level. To use more contemporaryterminology: A human can have not only a desire to smoke (first leveldesire) but a desire not to desire to smoke (second level desire).First level desires are caused but so are our second-order desires notto have first order desires. Determinism operates at both levels butthe second order nexus causally interferes with (changes) the firstorder nexus.

Whereas our first-order rationality is biologically fixed as apart of human nature, our second-order rationality had a somewhatdifferent status. It was something that changes over time but changesin a developmentally structured way. When rational development iscompleted was answered in somewhat different ways by the Stoics. Some(Aetius) claimed we are rational by age 7; some said age 14, and somesaid reason begins at age 7 and is completed by age 14—the preferredinterpretation. At this age, we have the fully developed ability(faculty, disposition) which we can employ. If we use it correctly, wehave right reason. But we can also employ it incorrectly and fall intoerror; this is largely due to our upbringing and misleading socialinfluences.

Two Tiered Rationality

Because the Stoics were fundamentally rationalists in theirviews, they propounded a rationalistic theory of moral development: Itis the development of rationality that underlies and explains whymoral development occurs and why proper moral behavior and correctthought are manifested.

The Stoics had a two-tiered theory of rationality with bothlevels being naturalistic and causally determined. The lower level,primary naturalistic rationality, was rooted in their theory of oikeiosis, apattern of behavior shared with the rest of the animal kingdom.Animals and humans (and apparently even plants) were thus said to berational in consistently behaving in a way characterized as issuing

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from their primary nature—their instincts or inborn biological drivesThis is sometimes called primary or personal oikeiosis. Birds wererational in flying, beavers in building dams, fish in swimming,spiders in spinning a web, etc.; such rational behavior consisted of astream of what modern behavior ethologists might undertake todescribe.

At this lower level of rationality, we have basically an S-Raccount of behavior. It was determined by a chain of prior events,notably external stimuli, with the degree of determinism varying withthe level of life. Plants, we may assume, were rigidly determined;animals determined to an overwhelming extent (although some animalbehavior might be out of sync with their primary nature since therewas room for causal slippage—although there was a causal explanationeven for this, e.g., birds might sometimes fail to build their nestsor rear their young); humans were determined but in a way that wasunique to them, for they had two levels of causality operating, withthe higher level being able to monitor and direct the lower level.

Humans have been designed by nature to function in a certain way,following their development trajectory towards their natural telos.This was a normative plan. But, the Stoics insisted, much of the timethe average individual does not operate at this natural level. This isbecause there are impediments to following this ideal path. Theseimpediments are external to the individual and reside largely in thesocial arena—what the Sophists called ‘nomos’, arbitrary culturalhabits and traditions. This is the source of error and explainsdeviance from the primary developmental path. In Diogenes Laertius weread: “and the rational animal” (according to the Stoics), “iscorrupted, sometimes because of the persuasion of external activitiesand sometimes because of the influence of companions” (Inwood &Gerson, 2008, p. 114). Something similar might also be true ofanimal behavior.

This is all that can be said about the primary natural level ofplants and animal, but in the case of humans, nature has created amechanism for correcting this negative influence of the impedimentsand for facilitating the ideal development of the individual towardsits final goal of eudaimonia. This is secondary natural rationality, whichoperates at a higher, meta-level, able to causally act upon theprimary level and to guide our development to a state of virtue. But,we must remember, the functioning of this secondary rationality wasitself something that was subject to universal law and hence

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determined. Paradoxically put, what we do at the primary level is upto us (at the secondary level).

Now, whether animals possessed anything of the second tier ofrationality was apparently somewhat debatable since Stoics such asChrysippus produced examples of animal behavior that certainly seemedto be rational in this other way. Nevertheless the Stoics seemed todraw a firm line between animals and humans, claiming that animalscannot be said to be virtuous since they lacked the necessary kind ofrationality: The good is not found, Seneca said, “in dumb animals andinfants” (Inwood & Gerson, 2008, p. 193). Why is this? “Becausereason is not there either”.

This secondary rationality supervened on primary rationality andwas the basis of morality (moral excellence). Although it was fullynaturalistic, physical, and causally determined, it was also the realmwhere free judgment and beliefs about what is good and bad and whatwe ought to do were made. It was the realm of moral responsibility andthe Stoics insisted that humans are morally responsible for theiractions and beliefs! This kind of soft determinism or compatibilismengendered long and extensive debate since many Hellenistsicphilosophers would have none of this kind of compatibilism andadvanced all of the arguments against moral determinism that havebecome famous over the years. This, in turn, was answered byChrysippus in subtle arguments. Unfortunately, this debate cannot bediscussed here. Unlike primary rationality, this secondary rationalityfollowed a developmental trajectory. It was here that moraldevelopment occurred and it occurred because there was a developmentof rationality.

Moral Development

However we describe the initial stage of childhood, it does notappear that the infant manifests much in the way of moral behavior,moral judgment, and moral reasoning. At least if it does, it iscertainly not the pinnacle of morality. That comes much later—inadulthood. There is, in short, moral development, somethingHellenistic thinkers, especially the Stoics, affirmed. In fact, asscholars have pointed out, the Stoics were fundamentally concernedwith constructing a theory of moral development.

What they did say was, however, a beginning sketch of an accountthat would be very powerful in the history of developmentalpsychology. There is, as we have seen, the initial state of primayoikeiosis, where the infant is concerned primarily with his biological

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needs. This is largely an animal-like state that is based on itsbiological instincts and drives (its horme). It is, the Stoicsconsistently maintained, a thoroughly naturalistic processbiologically determined. In describing this initial state, the Stoicsprovided anecdotal accounts of the behavior of the newborn. But theirdescription of this childhood process did not extend much further, nodoubt because Greek childhood practices did not provide for suchobservation on the part of the fathers.3

We know there must be an initial stage and a final stage, but theStoics postulated the existence of several intervening stages. Forexample Seneca says: “There are different stages of life for a baby,boy, a teenager, and also towards his constitution is the same”(Inwood & Gerson, 2008, p. 191). There is, therefore, “a differentconstitution for every age” An individual’s constitution includes thephysical and biological aspects of its nature; hence the Stoicsapparently believed there were biological stages of life. But sinceeverything that exists is physical, they also seem to have believedthat our constitution includes the soul or psuche—the underlyingprinciple of life—and hence also the human soul, i.e., reason. Therewere, therefore, also psychological stages of development.

Cicero sets forth a stage-type account of the development ofkatorthormata:

. . .the initial “appropriate action” (this is what I call theGreek kathekon) is to preserve oneself in one’s naturalconstitution. The next is to take what is in accordance withnature and reject its opposite. Once this method of selection(and likewise rejection) has been discovered, selection then goeshand in hand with appropriate action. Then such selectionbecomes continuous, and, finally stable and in agreement withnature. At this point that which can truly be said to be goodfirst appears and is recognized for what it is. A human being’searliest concern is for what is in accordance with nature. But assoon as one has gained some understanding, or rather “conception”(what the Stoics call ennoia), and sees an order and as it wereconcordance in the things which one ought to do, one then valuesthat concordance much more highly than those first objects ofaffection. Hence through learning and reason one concludes that

3 The belief in the existence of developmental stages, rooted in our biological nature, was present in several of the Greek thinkers. For example, there was a widespread belief that there were seven stages of life. Hippocrates held such a view:

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this is the place to find the supreme human good, that good whichis to be praised and sought on its own account. This good lies inwhat the Stoics call homologia. Let us use the term“consistency”, if you approve. Herein lies that good, namelymoral action and morality itself, at which everything else oughtto be directed. (Cicero, 2001, p. 71).

Although the Stoics were among the first to set forth kinematicaldevelopmental laws, they fell short of specifying the necessarydynamic developmental factors. They specified the terminus ad quem andthe terminus ad quo but said very little about what happens in between.Their basic explanatory scheme involved the notion that there isrational development in the individual, a process linked to thedevelopment of the self. This development allowed the individual tomakes ethical progress. The development of reason involved twocomponents: an initial innate, biological rationality present in alllife forms, and a secondary rationality present only in humans. Theinitial biological rationality is explained by our innate biologicalnature—organisms were programmed to do this. But it is the secondlevel of rationality, reflective rationality, that the Stoics need toexplain and about this, as we will see, they said very little

Social Oikeiosis

According to many modern ethical theorists, Greek ethics wasessentially misguided in its view of the goal of ethical theory. Insetting the goal of ethics to be that of answering the question, whatis the nature of the good life and how should one attain it?, theywere narrowly individualistic and hence mistaken in their egoisticapproach. By contrast, so it is said, ethics is fundamentallycommitted to a non-egoistic point of view, to a view that takes theinterests of others also into account , which is definitive of thenature of ethics. This has seemed to some to mean that ethics isaltruistic in its approach or at the very least non-egoistic. If thisview is correct, then Stoicism would be guilty of this same mistake,since their concern was with setting forth a view of what happinesswas and how it was to be attained. Once again, it is said, themistaken view consisted of an account that did not stress or allow forthe sufficiently rich account of the interests of other persons.

As many writers on Greek ethics have point out, the aboveobjection to the program of Greek ethics is mistaken; it is especiallymistaken in the case of the Stoics, for their account of ethics wasbased upon their theory of oikeiosis and a central point in this viewwas that oikeosis was not restricted to an )account of individual

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appropriation—primary or personal oikeiosis—it also included the notionthat the process of appropriation was a process of appropriating theinterests of others; in short, they stressed the existence of socialoikeiosis.

In social oikeiosis, an individual took into consideration theinterests, desires, beliefs, and perspective of other persons. Infact, not only does an individual take such considerations intoaccount, the individual has a positive affinity towards theperspective of others. This is obviously a social perspective and itwas the basis of the claim that the Stoics were concerned withquestions of justice, of treating others fairly. In particular, it wasthe Stoic claim that oikeiosis is the basis of justice; justice can bederived from oikeiosis (Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 350

We must remember that justice is a virtue for the Greeks andhence that it is fundamentally a way of interacting with others;justice is concerned with how to treat people fairly, which means(essentially) that one should give them their due, what is appropriateby virtue of their own nature and their manifold social relations.Stoic ethical theory, therefore, incorporated two kinds of oikeiosis—primary oikeiosis and social oikeiosis.

The most famous passage demonstrating this is the overlappingcircle of obligations account of Hierocles:

Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by manycircles, some smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing theformer on the basis of their different and unequal dispositionsrelative to each other. The first and closest circle is the onewhich a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind.This circle encloses the body and anything taken for the sake ofthe body. For it is virtually the smallest circle, and almosttouches the centre itself. Next, the second one further removedfrom the centre but enclosing the first circle; this containsparents, siblings, wife, and children. The third one has in ituncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins. Thenext circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed bythe circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow-tribesmen, next that of fellow-citizens and then in the same waythe circle of people from the neigbouring towns, and the circleof fellow-countrymen. The outermost and largest circle, whichencompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. Oncethese have all been surveyed, it is the task of the well-temperedman, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles

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together somehow toward the centre, and to keep zealouslytransferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosedones… It is incumbent on us to respect people from the thirdcircle as if they were those from the second, and again torespect out other relatives as if they were those from the thirdcircle. For although the greater distance in blood will removesome affection, we must still try hard to assimilate them. (Long& Sedley, 1987, p. 349)

In primary oikeiosis, an organism is concerned about itself—its parts andits constitution, with self-preservation. But organisms are alsoconcerned about objects in the environment that affect their well-being. We might reasonably assume, therefore, that since people can beseen as objects in one’s environment, at least as something externalto the individual, these individuals would have appropriation towardsthem. But would this social oikeiosis be any different from primaryoikeiosis?

The Developmental Gap

The Stoics clearly believed in the existence of social oikeiosis, sothe major issue was whether there were two kinds of oikeiosos or onlyone, with the single one developing into the second form. Severalpossibilities were suggested: (1) primary oikeiosis, in the absence ofsocial oikeiosis, is sufficient to generate morality; (2) primary oikeiosisdevelops into social oikeisos (a monistic view), and (3) social oikeiosisexists alongside primary oikeiosis either (a) at the beginning—a hybridaccount; or (b) it exists in a latent form, which is activated later.Scholars have defended one or more of all of these accounts. Sincesocial oikeiosis seems to be what some call altruism, sympathy, or aconcern for others, the question really concerns the relation betweenwhat would seem to be self-interested behavior (egoism) and other-interested behavior (altruism). Can an initial egoism explain moralityin the sense of showing how altruism can be generated from egoism? Ordo we have to begin with some kind of altruism already existent inchildren (either in an actualized form or in a dispositional form)?Altruism might be a latent property present at birth (alongside actualegoism) such that upon an appropriate occasion or external stimulus,it then is manifested?

The key question here is how this could be, and did they havean account of how it could happen? I believe the answer to this secondquestion is that the Stoics, at least the early ones, did notexplicitly propose an explanatory account of this transition fromprimary oikeiosis to social oikeiosis. But such an account was available to

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them and was discussed by several others, who advocated a similartheory of moral development: Theophrastus, Antiochus of Ascalon, andArius Didymus among others. These individuals were not Stoics butappropriated aspects of Stoicism. In fact, in Cicero’s presentation ofStoicism, this theory is explicitly endorsed. So, these views wereavailable. Hence, the question is, why did they not avail themselvesof such an obvious solution?

Which Stoics (if any) believed social oikeiosis developed out ofprimary oikeiosis? Scholars have discussed this question in great detail.Some claim Chrysippus did not believe this since he says virtuallynothing about childhood social relations other than pointing out thatparents naturally love their children. The most that can be said isthat Chrysippus did not explicitly hold such a view.

According to Plutarch: “[Chrysippus] keeps on irritating us bywriting in all his books. . . that we are familiarized with ourselvesas soon as we are born, and to our parts, and to our own offspring.. ..he says that even the beasts have an appropriate disposition relativeto their offspring in harmony with their needs. . . (Long & Sedley,1987, p. 348). On this account, children manifest primary oikeiosistowards themselves and parents (mothers?) show social oikeiosis towardstheir offspring, presumably by nurturing them, catering to theirneeds, showing love and affection, etc. This is clearly a biologicallybased and is naturally interpreted as being, in some sense,instinctive, i.e., unlearned. There is thus a major gap betweeninfancy oikeiosis and parental oikeiosis, a gap of a decade or more betweeninfancy and child-bearing age. Are due to believe that nothing ishappening in this intervening period relevant to social oikeiosis? Arewe to believe that oikeiosis towards others, as indicated in the accountof Hierorcles, only begins with parenthood (probably motherhood) andthen, by some process, is extended to family, friends, etc.? Whatwould such a process be other than a shrug and a “it’s rational to dothat” reply? It is not likely that the Stoics were unaware of thisdevelopmental gap since it was a crucial assumption of the Stoics thattheir theory was perfectly rational, coherent, complete, andconsistent; this is something they prided themselves on. Severalscholars finds this dualist view—of two separate kinds of oikeiosis—incredulous and I agree. It defies our understanding of humandevelopment to believe that there is nothing occurring in childhoodthat is fostering the development of a monistic one. On this model,personal oikeiosis develops into social oikeiosis. It is this developmental

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process that fills the gap between infancy and paternal oikeiosis.4 Butwhat would such a developmental process be? I would like to suggestthat such an account was not only available in nascent form in ancienttimes, but that contemporary psychology has the resources to fill outthat account. Unfortunately I only have the space to sketch out whatthe beginnings of such an account would be.

The solution: Infant Social Relations

There are several factors that would enter into an adequate account of the emergence of social oikeiosis from personal oikeiosis. Although no one has yet put all of these factors into one overall theoretical account, the germinal seeds (as the Stoic would say) are there, awaiting development (see , for example, Damon, 1977, 1988; Dunn, 1988; Eisenberg, Fabes & Spinrad, 2008; Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). The key ingredient here is the social and emotional development of the child, something that begins at birth and continueson into later childhood. We can divide this development roughly into three periods and three corresponding theoretical foci: initial instinctive behavior (0-6 months), Mother-Infant Attachment Theory (6 months to two years) , and the development of friendship (two years on).

Period One: 0 – 6 Months

At birth, the neonate is basically ruled by its biological inheritance. Here the Stoics’ account of personal oikeiosis seems correct. The infant’s focus is on survival and its needs are centered on this. During this period its motor behavior and its perception is developing and along with this there are the important behaviors of smiling, vocalizing, and tactual information. These are the socio-emotional roots which, along with certain developmental mechanisms will lead to subsequent socio-emotional development and later its moral repertoire.

Period Two: 6 Months to Two Years

During the next period, several other moral ingredients are apparent including primitive social behavior such as empathy, sympathy, and helping behavior, but the key socio-emotional datum seems best characterized by Attachment Theory.

4No doubt one motive for a dualistic view springs from philosophers penchant for a radical is-ought distinction, but, of course, Greek ethical theory didnot accept this view.

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At birth, the infant is dependent on its care-giver(s), whoministers to its biological needs. During the first six months, thenewborn manifests instinctively based behavior, both biological andemotional. But during this period, it is the infant’s attachment toits caretakers that is of signature importance.

According to Attachment Theory (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999), there isa special relation here between the care-giver (e.g., the mother) andthe child: the mother bonds with the child and the child forms anattachment to the mother. This includes not only attachment behavior(contact, clinging, swift return to the mother, etc.) but alsoemotions of attachment (particular kinds of crying, fear, pleasure,etc.). According to attachment theory, children attach to caregiversinstinctively in order to survive—an assumption that Stoics seemprepared to endorse, given their theory of oikeisis

Attachment theorists have described several stages of attachmentoccurring during this period, with the earlier one leading to thesubsequent one in a classical stage-like manner. In addition, varioustypes of attachment styles (the most important of which is the securevariety) have been proposed. Most of this can be seen as non-controversial, based largely on the description of behavior over time.The more controversial aspects of the theory enter when one takes upthe claim that early attachment is explanatory of later behavior,constituting causal determining factors of what occurs later. At thevery least, however, several kinds of attachment relations appear tobe necessary conditions for a morally mature individual to develop. Asthe evidence appears to show, secure attachment appears to be thebasis of the child’s developing morality (van Ijzendoorn, 1997).

During this initial period (1-2 years), another crucial proto-moral phenomenon occurs: empathy. Empathic behavior and emotiontowards other infants occur automatically, being natural responses ofthe infant to certain kinds of stimulus occasions and social cuesinvolving the behavior of other infants, e.g., an infant will cry atthe sight of another infant crying or comfort a peer in distress.Feeling for another person’s plight seems to constitute an importantpart of the basis for subsequent altruism and a sense of justice. Inpart this is because empathy seems to be intimately connected toperspective-taking, which also appears at this early period. Takingthe perspective of the other infant, seeing things from its point ofview, and feeling the way it would feel in the current situation seemsto be tied up with a concern for the interests and well-being ofothers (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1999; Hoffman, 2000).

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At about this same time, infants and children, who engage invarious kinds of social activities and games, manifest the importantbehavior of sharing (a toy) and taking turns. They soon learn to playtogether and to cooperate at a rudimentary level. Such behavior is oneof the seeds of a subsequent sense of fairness, justice and moralobligation. By the second year, therefore, the child is on its way tobecoming a moral agent.

All of this is now coin of the realm, commonly accepted facts ofearly child socio-emotional development. Not much of this appearscontroversial although Attachment Theory needs to be theoreticallyrefined and empirically supported much more than it has been.Nevertheless, it would be a rare individual who would not take infantattachments to its mother (and father) as crucially important. Indeed“attachment” is not too bad a translation of “oikeiosis

Period Three: Two Years and Later

Most researchers on moral development have begun their study withthe second year of the moral life of the child. One of the mainreasons for this is that it is at this point that the child’s socio-emotional development increasingly takes into consideration its peers—its siblings and playmates. In sketching its moral development,friendship appears to be an important component. It is a leadingfactor bridging the gap between the immediate family and the child’swider social environment.

Being a friend to someone is the kind of behavior that is takento be not only appropriate but contains the important notion of caringabout the interests and well-being of the other person. Such acharacteristic appears central to mature morality and can hardly beignored.

Just as there are stages of the attachment relation, so there arestages of friendship postulated by psychologists (Damon, 1977, 1988;Selman, 1981; Sullivan, 1953). The nature of this friendship changesover time, with the change constituting something like a stage-sequence, with initial friendships being based on an instrumentalexchange of benefits but changing later into a pattern that is lessegocentric, one more focused on the value of friendship and trulycaring for a friend.

Given the many works on friendship written by the Greeks(inciuding Aristotle’s theory of friendship which certainly seems tobe known to the Stoics), one wonders why this aspect was under-appreciated. (See Fraisse, 1974.) Indeed, Aristotle distinguishes

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several kinds of friendship, which can easily be put into adevelopmental sequence; likewise even the rather bizarre theory ofStoic friendship can be construed as constituting two stages offriendship with the second one being an ideal few (if any) individualsever attain.

Initially, therefore, the infant’s socio-emotional behavior isrooted in personal oikeiosis but is slowly transformed into a primitiveform of social oikeiosis—of caring for the interests of others. Initiallythis is focused on its siblings, but later includes its friends andfamily members. Of course, the child is also being socialized in partby the tutoring of its parents. The child is learning that there aresocial norms and that obeying them is something it is require to do.A key aspect here is the role of parental authority and the kind ofrespect it commands on the part of the child. Piaget (1932/1965)called it unilateral respect (as contrasted to the mutual respect presentamong peers). As this socialization occurs and moral norms acquired(e.g., internalized), the individual’s store of moral rules increases.Because of this, according to Emile Durkheim, a feeling of obligation—due to social constraint—becomes thoroughly grounded in theindividual.

Initially, therefore, the infant’s socio-emotional behavior isrooted in personal oikeiosis but is slowly being transformed into aprimitive form of social oikeiosis—of caring for the interests of others.Initially this is focused on its caregivers and siblings, but laterthis includes its friends and extended family members.

If something like this account is even close to being on themark, it becomes clear that social oikeiosis can be seen to be theoutcome of personal oikeiosis. By the time one is at the age of fertilityand parenthood, of course, biological drives enter and the motherbehaves a certain way towards her infant (as Chrysippus asserted andfew would deny). But this is an auxiliary moral process and is notneeded to show how it is possible for social oikeiosis to develop. Such aprocess is natural and biologically driven (at least initially), butlater takes on a kind of independence of its own—a kind of functionalautonomy—since it operates at a somewhat higher” level—a personal andsocial level and is expanded to include more and more individuals (asin Hierocles concentric circles analogy). Such an analogy is alsopresent in the account of some contemporary psychologists working onan account of the moral development of the individual. “A child’ssocial relations constantly change as the child grows older,” Damon(1977) says. “An infant’s intense attachment relations with caregivers

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soon are supplemented by extended family relations, peer relations,and ultimately by more distant relations with society-at-large” (p. 9)As these more and more inclusive social relations appear, theindividual’s moral concern is expanded to include them.

From Is to Ought

If the above account is on the right track—and it does seem toconstitute something like a commonly accepted account among at leastmany psychologists—then it would appear that the child begins life asa quasi-egoist, ruled basically by instincts as in the Stoic’s notionof primary oikeiosis, but then gradually changes into a non-egoist,concerned with morality in the widest sense including fairness andjustice as in the Stoic notion of social oikeiosis. But if this is so,then it would appear that the process is one of proceeding from an‘is’ to an ‘ought’: the process begins with a non-moral framework—purebiological instincts to put it in its most extreme form—and from thisa completely different framework—an ethically normative one involvingaltruism, concern for others, and an interest in justice, in short, amoral point of view. Indeed, this seems to be exactly what the Stoicsaccount entails and it is one countenanced by the social psychologicalaccount I have sketched. One seems to be deriving norms from facts,values from descriptions, oughts from is’s and this is anathema tomost moral philosophers. How then can this be justified if this sacreddistinction is to be maintained?

The answer, of course, is that any naturalism worthy of its namewill insist that norms are grounded in facts and the Stoics certainlywere naturalists and so are the majority of psychologists. But how canthis be?

One answer would involve showing that arguments supporting arigid separation of facts and norms are without credibility and shouldbe rejected. But another path to take would involve showing how, inthis very developmental process, oughts emerge from is’s. This is whatI propose to do.

The Stoic theory of oikeiosis involves appropriation of one’sbody, but also attachment to objects that are relevant to onesfunctioning, e.g., objects in the environment such as food, a safenest, and ones care-givers. This would include the mother. The infantcares about the mother as an object that satisfies its needs, e.g.,the nipple is a source of pleasure, but the Stoics allowed for otherinstinctive type appropriations; today we would cite imprinting. But

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there is no reason to exclude attachment-type behaviors from thisperiod.

So initially we may assume purely egoistic-type behavior on thepart of the infant. But very soon the infant experiences conflictbetween the mother’s needs and behavior and his own. The mother is notalways there to nurse him, the mother may be attending to otherchildren, the mother may be in need of satisfying her own desires,etc. In short, the newborn does not always get what it wants, i.e.,behaving in non-egoistic ways such as being forced to delay itsgratification.

Furthermore, when the child is playing with other children, thechild is typically forced to share his or her toys with the otherchildren, to take turns in playing a game, etc., with such compliantbehavior being due to fear of punishment (e.g., withdrawal of parentalaffection) or more positive reinforcement of parental praise.

We may assume, therefore, that it is mandated that the childbehave in non-egoistic ways. This repeatedly occurs over time. Hence,the child gradually and involuntarily builds up habits of behaving innon-egoistic ways. But now the child becomes motivated to do this,desires to behave in this non-egoistic way. Why? One possibility hereis to invoke well-worn principles from motivation psychology, namely,dynamic psychology. It was one of the principles of Woodward’s dynamicpsychology, for example, that instrumental mechanisms leading torewards can become intrinsically desired for themselves. Morefamously, Gordon Allport’s functional autonomy of motives (Allport,1937) seems germane. Allport was not particularly clear about thisnotion but this is what he said:

The second type of dynamic psychology, the one here defended, regards adult motives as infinitely varied, and as self-sustaining, contemporary systems, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them. Just as a child gradually repudiates his dependence on his parents, develops a will of his own, becomes self-active and self-determining, and outlives his parents, so it is with motives. Each motive has a definite point of origin which may possibly lie in instincts, or,more likely, in the organic tensions of infancy. Chronologically speaking, all adult purposes can be traced back to these seed-forms in infancy, but as the individual matures the tie is broken. Whatever bond remains, is historical, not functional (p. 143).

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What he seems to be saying is this: Repeated habits of doingaction A as a result of an original instinctive drive D, can result ina motive to do A in the absence of D (the original reward). Theexecution of the behavior A becomes its own motive. Hence, the habitof behaving non-egoistically originally done because of rewards and/orpunishment, become desired for themselves in the absence of theseoriginal rewards and punishment. In short, the child comes to desireto behave in non-egoistic ways.

Starting life, as a completely selfish being, the child wouldindeed remain entirely wolfish and piggish throughout his daysunless genuine transformations of motives took place. Motivesbeing completely alterable, the dogma of Egoism turns out to be acallow and superficial philosophy of behavior, or else a uselessredundancy. (p. 152)

Clearly, Allport took the concept of the functional autonomy ofmotives to have important ethical implications. What it entails isthat a child can come to desire to behave non-egoistically by virtueof behaving non-egoistically.).

Given that the child comes to desire to behave non-egoisticallysimply by virtue of habitual strength of responding, the next stepmight reasonably be thought to involve the person not only desiring tobehave non-egoistically, but to do so for certain kinds of reasons.This would involve a second level kind of reflective rationality, onein which the person can give ethical reasons for desiring certainkinds of behavior. This would occur much later in the child’sdevelopment with the development of a second-order rationality. Nodoubt this would be based on the earlier kind of moral discussionbetween care-givers and the child some (Hoffman, 1980) have calledinduction, something occurring during the early years of the child’smoral development. But to be able to give good reasons for onesbehavior and desires, one would have to proceed to the Stoic’s second-order kind of rationality. As the Stoics insisted, all of this isperfectly naturalistic process.

Greek Childhood Practices

Stoics do not explicitly discuss the early years of childhood andthe child’s social relations with parents, siblings, friends (exceptfor very sketchy comments). Are we to assume, therefore, that typicalchildhood social interactions were absent or that the Stoics simplyfailed to comment on them? The first alternative seems implausible;hence it is the second one that needs examination. The explanation, I

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think, is to be found in the cultural practices of raising childhoodto be found in ancient Greece (Golden, 1990; Rawson, 1991; Strauss,1993).

In ancient Greece, child rearing was left to the women of thehouse, who basically lived alone, in a different part of the house(Pomeroy, 1997). According to one author (DeMause, 1974), the familystructure was that of a gynarchy, composed of the grandmother, mother,aunts, unmarried daughters, female servants, midwives, neigbors called"gossips" who acted as substitute mothers, plus the children. Butmothers may not have been the principal caregivers: cross-culturalstudies conclude that "in the majority of societies mothers are notthe principal caretakers or companions of young children...olderchildren and other female family members mainly looking after them.”Indeed, this same author has drawn a rather surprising conclusion ofthe mother’s indifference or even antipathy toward her children. Inany case, fathers were simply not a part of this initial childrearing. In fact, there was virtually no social interaction betweenfather and children. ”In antiquity, “ this same author goes on to say,“I have been unable to find a single classical scholar who has beenable to cite any instance of a father saying one word to his childprior to the age of seven” (p. ), nor apparently were children evenseen by their father before age 5 or so. Stoic philosophers, we maythus assume, were simply not very aware of these early childhoodsocial-emotional relations.

Stoic philosophers, who were male, actually knew very littleabout the actual behavior of children during the first 6 years oflife. Actual observations seem rare or non-existent. The situation isnot much better with respect to children older than 6. Rationalitybegins at age 7, Stoics claimed, and is completed by age 14. But evenif the Stoics did observe 7 year olds and 14 year olds, which seemsdoubtful, they say virtually nothing about the behavior occurringbetween 7 and 14. What was actually going on? We might hazard theguess that the child was developing certain kinds of attachmentstowards family members and even that the child had ties of love andfriendship towards some family members. If this is so, then thesekinds of inter-personal relationships may provide the necessarymaterial by means of which the child first experiences love (from themother?) and in turn develops similar feelings and behavior towardshis or her extended family. In this way, moral feelings and behaviormay be assumed to be present although unobserved or unreported by theStoics and hence that the child can be said to be developing oikeiosistowards others (family members). Once this is in place, then the

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developing child can be said to be able to extend oikeiosis to moreremote family members. In short, the Stoic account of childhood has amajor developmental gap because their empirical observations did notcontain this account and this was due to their socio-culturalpractices.5 The Stoics had an empiricist epistemology but they were notonly good empiricists.

Conclusion

The study of the development of morality has a long historybeginning with the important theories of the Greeks. Nowadaysindividuals increasingly recognize the importance of Aristotle’stheory of moral development not only for philosophers but also forpsychologists. The same is true, I have tried to show, for theancient Stoic theory of moral development, centering on their notionof oikeiosis. The issues raised by a discussion of their theory areimportantly similar to those issues raised today by contemporarydevelopmentalists. The study of moral development requires all of theresources we can muster and one of these is a study of the history oftheories of moral development. In particular, the Stoics theory ofmoral development is one that will repay careful study.

5 clansmen, etc., in the manner of the overlapping circle metaphor.At least one individual has made comments at odds with the view that the Stoics were insufficiently empirical. Becker (1988) claims that the Stoics were observers of the moral development of children. This seems questionable as I have indicated and Becker does not provide evidence for this. At most (atthe very most) they made scattered anecdotal observations of infants (and animals) but not in any sufficiently thorough and systematic way. They did not, for example, make cross-sectional observations nor longitudinal observations. In fact ancient Stoics such as Posidonius remarked on the inadequate observations that Chrysippus made on young children. (With Posidonius and Panaetius we seem to have individuals who much more concernedwith the empirical basis of Stoicism.). We have little, for example, in the way of observations about the growth of rationality in children from age 7 to 14, other than extremely vague statements. Finally, as several individuals have pointed out, fathers were simply not around their children for the first 7 years! Is it an accident that they report rationality beginning at age 7, when they are now more aware of their own kin? Thus socio-educational practices influence what we can observe in children and hence the available evidence that can be obtained.

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